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Italian renaissancediplomacyMichael Mallett aa Warwick UniversityPublished online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Michael Mallett (2001) Italian renaissance diplomacy,Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12:1, 61-70, DOI: 10.1080/09592290108406188

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Italian Renaissance Diplomacy

MICHAEL MALLETT

A renewed interest in Italian fifteenth-century diplomacy and the publication of extensivesections of the diplomatic archives of the Italian states justify a new assessment of thesignificance of Italian Renaissance diplomacy. The conclusions of this essay are threefold,that Italian developments were less unique and less isolated from the European scene thanused to be thought; that too much emphasis has been placed on a transition fromoccasional to continuous diplomacy; and that the emergence of the resident ambassadorhas to be seen in the context of changing decision-making mechanisms and bureaucraticstructures. The differences between the diplomatic institutions and personnel of theprincely and republican Italian states are particularly emphasized.

Debates about the nature of the transition from Middle Ages toRenaissance have raged amongst historians on both sides of the'divide' for over 100 years. The history of diplomacy has been asignificant part of these debates. Charles Carter's dictum is typical:'In the Middle Ages the goal of diplomacy was the peace ofChristendom; in the Renaissance it was the interests of the individualstates." The break-up of medieval universalism, the growth of thewestern European state: these are big issues, debated over a timespanof 500 years. In the middle of them stands the figure of Erasmus - aRenaissance prototype, and yet scornful of emergent nationalism andmilitarism; critic, and yet committed defender, of the RomanCatholic Church. The pitfalls of overgeneralization and easyacceptance of a necessary continuity in transition and change aboundin this period and have beset the historiography of diplomacy.

The classic accounts of Renaissance diplomacy focused attentionon Italy and on the fifteenth century, particularly the latter half of thefifteenth century. De Maulde la Claviere, Perret, Mattingly andothers had largely prepared the ground which then lay fallow for along period, as indeed did the study of diplomacy generally.2 In recentyears there has been a remarkable revival of interest, particularly inItaly. The ongoing publications of diplomatic material by Kendall andIlardi (Milanese dispatches from the courts of France andBurgundy),3 by Sestan (Milanese-Burgundian relations),4 and aboveall Rubinstein and his colleagues (the letters of Lorenzo the

Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.12, No.l (March 2001), pp.61-70PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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Magnificent) have reawakened interest.5 There is now a major projectunderway to publish substantial sections of the Ferrarese andMantuan diplomatic archives; Margaroli's book on Milanesediplomacy in the 1450s,6 Corazzol's publication of ZaccariaBarbaro's dispatches from Naples in the early 1470s,7 Queller'sinterest in Venetian ambassadors,8 Cerioni's work on Milaneseambassadors and ciphers,9 Fubini's wide-ranging essays on Italianpolitics and diplomacy,10 have all refocused attention on Italy's greatdiplomatic collections of the second half of the fifteenth century.

The thrust of much of this recent work has been to dispel threelong-standing misconceptions and prejudices: first, that the Italianstates developed and conducted their foreign affairs in the fifteenthcentury, in a sort of vacuum, free from ultramontane interference;secondly, that the main thrust of diplomatic development wastowards the rapid emergence of the resident ambassador; thirdly, thatdiplomacy in the hands of the resident degenerated into news-gathering and espionage. The effect of these misconceptions was tostultify interest in the subject; historians in other countries lostinterest in the supposedly unique Italian developments,preoccupation with the resident ambassador led into the monotonousminutiae of diplomatic practices, denigration of the resident led to aloss of interest both in the men and in their dispatches which becameregarded as worthless gossip. This article examines where we nowstand with regard to these three areas of misconception.

The Importance of Foreign Relations

The origins of the idea of an Italy free from foreign interference inthe fifteenth century lie in part in contrasts with the fourteenthcentury, filled with foreign rulers and foreign mercenary companiesrampaging through the peninsular, and with the post-1494 period offoreign invasion and takeover. The emerging western European stateswere seen as preoccupied with their own affairs, with the HundredYears' War, with the Iberian Reconquista, with the internal problemsof the Holy Roman Empire, with the Turkish advance in the Balkans,and so on. However, the contradictions in this picture of isolation aremanifest: the Aragonese conquest of the Kingdom of Naples,completed in 1442; the continued Angevin and French interest inthat area and attempts to recover it; the defence of imperial rights ofsovereignty in northern Italy; the conflicts between papal authority

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and ultramontane conciliarism; concern with Turkish expansion inthe Mediterranean area as a whole; and, of course, the growingimpact of Italian cultural and intellectual developments on theEuropean imagination. Italy was the goal for scholars, churchmen,merchants and pilgrims; for princes and armies; and for diplomats.Italy was also a fundamental part of a developing system ofinternational relations in the fifteenth century, and at the centre ofthat system was the emerging sovereign state.11 Spasmodic and longdrawn out as was the process of state creation in the late Middle Agesand early modern period, the increasing importance of externalaffairs was a fundamental part of it. However much historians maywish to argue about the erratic development of centralization and theinternal authority of states and governments, the concern of thosegovernments about their relations with other states was a precociousphenomenon. Recognition of the need for continuity and expertise inthe handling of foreign affairs was an early phase in state-building,and the growth of bureaucracy and professionalism associated withstate-building. Alongside the growth of permanent armies in thefifteenth century went the development of sustained diplomacy; bothwere costly, both created the need for more efficient tax-gatheringand fiscal management to meet the costs, both conferred reputation,power and security on rulers and governments.

It is, of course, possible to argue that Italian states progressedmore rapidly along this road in the fifteenth century. They weresmaller, distances were shorter, their elites were better educated,threats from neighbouring states were more immediate.Confrontation and competitiveness necessitated constant preparationand alertness in foreign affairs. Alliance systems, as much asindividual military strength, were seen as crucial for the maintenanceof the independence of the main Italian states; alliances created bydiplomacy and maintained by diplomacy. The famous Italian Leagueof 1455 is often seen as the starting point of a systematic attempt tomaintain peaceful international relations through balance of power,and hence of a 'diplomatic revolution'.12 But the leagues and allianceswhich dominated the second half of the fifteenth century in Italy,normally balanced alliances of two or three states against the othersrather than the general league, had their origins in the long years ofwar before 1455. The reestablishment of the papal court at Romefrom the 1420s, the long alliance of Venice and Florence to thwartMilanese expansion from 1425 until the late 1440s, the realignment

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of Florence with Milan at the time of Francesco Sforza's accession tothe dukedom in 1450, the search for support from the new power ofAragonese Naples after 1442; it was these events which formed thebackground to a new intensity and a new importance of diplomacy inItaly which continued into the post-1455 period.13

However, this emphasis on innovative diplomatic practices in Italyis somewhat misplaced. State-building, and its impact on theimportance of foreign relations, was a European phenomenon in thesecond half of the fifteenth century, after the end of the HundredYears' War, with the dramatic emergence of an independentBurgundy, with the union of the Spanish crowns and the new energyof the Emperor, Maximilian I. While the particular development ofresident ambassadors was first practised widely in Italy and by theItalian states, the new concern with diplomacy in a broader sense wasfelt throughout western Europe.

Resident and Non-Resident Diplomacy

The appearance of the resident ambassador, as opposed both to thespecial and temporary missions and to the presence of less formaltypes of resident agents in the Middle Ages, has often been seen asthe main characteristic of a new diplomacy in the later fifteenthcentury. By the 1450s it was recognized by the larger Italian statesthat the maintenance of relations with an allied state required theexchange of resident ambassadors. This, MO{ course, is somewhatdifferent to saying that there was already a comprehensive system ofresidency in Italy. By the 1470s Milan, and to a lesser extent Venice,were maintaining resident ambassadors at some of the majorEuropean courts. One could say that the idea of residents wasgradually catching on, despite their cost and other perceiveddrawbacks which will be discussed later. Nevertheless, the bulk ofdiplomatic activity in western Europe in the second half of thefifteenth century was not conducted by resident ambassadors.Ceremonial and honorific missions to congratulate a new ruler or apope on his accession, to attend a dynastic marriage or tocongratulate a prince on the birth of a child, remained an essential,and indeed expanding, part of European dynasticism. Theopportunities for display and for high level contacts were a part ofthe changing diplomatic world, and such missions were conducted bymixed groups of ambassadors, including high churchmen and

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prominent courtiers and nobles. Similarly the use of experiencednegotiators for specific working missions, the negotiation of a treatyor the preparations for a royal marriage, remained commonplace.The men chosen for such missions would usually come from a groupof foreign affairs advisers regularly consulted by the government. Agroup of Italians, mostly Neapolitan Angevin adherents like Boffillodel Giudice and Jacopo Galeota, held high positions at the court ofLouis XI of France, advised on Italian affairs and went on missions toItaly.14 Such men were as much a part of the heightened profile ofdiplomacy and the new prestige conferred by involvement in foreignaffairs as was the resident ambassador.

Inevitably the growing emphasis on the discussion and conduct offoreign affairs led to an obsession with secrecy. This did not justconcern the confidentiality of dispatches from and instructions toambassadors abroad, but pervaded the mechanisms for the discussionof foreign affairs at home. It was also a part of a general trendtowards increasingly professional and elitist government. The processcan be observed most easily among the Italian states. The creation ofthe Consiglio Segreto in Milan, the growing role of the Council ofTen in Venice, noted for its secret procedures and success in detectinginternal conspiracies, in the discussion of foreign affairs, the creationof a special foreign policy committee in Florence in 1480, the Ottodi Pratica, all pointed in the same direction.15

It was in the early 1480s that Venetian ambassadors abroad firststarted writing confidential letters to the Ten alongside their formaldispatches to the Doge and the Senate.16 Florence's Otto di Praticawrote its first letters to ambassadors abroad in 1480 announcing theestablishment of the new committee and inviting them to pass secretsdirect to it.17 The point about this apparent transition was thattraditionally the discussion of foreign policy issues had beenrelatively open, an occasional responsibility for large councils of statein which ambassadors of allied states were invited to participate.However, it was becoming increasingly apparent in the 1460s and1470s that these mechanisms did not give sufficient continuity orconfidentiality to the conduct of foreign affairs when even alliescould be suspected of having contrary interests. The passage ofinformation and the conduct of diplomacy was beginning to operateat two levels. Diplomatic dispatches were edited before being madepublic, ad hoc meetings of specialist advisers were taking placealongside the more formal discussions, ambassadors were finding

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ways of filtering reports into the system by writing confidentialletters to individuals in or close to the home government.

Much has been written about the 'double diplomacy' of Lorenzode' Medici in this context, but the pattern was being repeated inother states.18 Ludovico Sforza's position as one of a council ofregency for his nephew led to him receiving confidential letters fromambassadors alongside the formal dispatches addressed to the Duke.Prominent senators in Venice also filled the same role and would passon the 'secrets' to appropriate caucuses within the decision-makingmechanisms. By the 1480s new formal mechanisms were in place;secrecy was institutionalized; in Venice the Council of Ten wasdeciding which foreign policy issues could go to open debate andwhich had to be restricted within the circle of the Ten and a speciallychosen group of advisers.19

The Importance of Renaissance Ambassadors

Resident ambassadors were only a part of this world, but they were amore significant part than De Maulde la Claviere or Mattingly havegiven them credit for. Both these authorities stressed the importance ofinformation gathering in the more intensive diplomacy of the fifteenthcentury and drew attention to the role of resident ambassadors andtheir almost daily dispatches in this process. Information became aform of currency, to be given and exchanged as well as received andpassed on. Both Louis XI and King Ferrante of Naples commented onthe role of Florence and its ambassadors as good sources ofinformation, and the first question asked of an ambassador when hepresented himself to a host government was what news did he bring.20

Information of the most diverse kind was of interest; not just statesecrets, policy decisions or even levels of military preparedness, butpersonal information on key political figures, comments on levels ofinternal disaffection, fiscal and economic statistics, comings and goingsat court. As Niccolo Michelozzi, Lorenzo de' Medici's secretary,commented: 'Not even the Devil could imagine how useful a piece ofinformation might be.'21 All this was undoubtedly true and animportant way of looking at late fifteenth-century European politics,but it was only a part of diplomacy and by no means the sole functionof the resident ambassador.

This point becomes clearer if we consider the type of men whoserved as resident ambassadors in fifteenth-century Italy. From the

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1430s residency became increasingly common, but there was a sharpcontrast between the practices of the main republics and those of theprincely states. The ambassadors of Milan and Naples tended to bedrawn either from the ranks of the emerging state bureaucracy orfrom the provincial nobility. They were left in post for long periods,sometimes as much as 20 years, and were true professionals. Notinfrequently they were actually foreign-born, but in the permanentservice of the Sforza dukes or the Aragonese kings. Some of themserved as foreign policy advisers to the central government when notabroad, but on the whole they were detached from the centraldecision-making processes. Nevertheless, their advice and opinions,as men often with profound knowledge of, and contacts in, the statesto which they were sent, were highly influential.22

On the other hand the ambassadors of Venice and Florence camefrom the patrician elites of the two cities; they were experienced andrespected members of the political class, filling the role ofambassador as part of a cursus honorum of political office-holding.Such men could not be spared for long periods abroad, nor did theynormally wish to be away from their businesses, or, moreimportantly, political life at home, for more than two or three years.Hence the resident representatives of these republican states changedover fairly quickly, but they brought considerable prestige and variedexperience to their diplomatic postings. Tommaso Soderini, leader ofthe pro-Venetian faction in Florence in the 1470s, or BernardoBembo, distinguished and scholarly Venetian patrician, brought aspecial cachet to the role of ambassador as they went to serve inVenice and Florence respectively." Zaccaria Barbaro, son of thefamous humanist and military hero, Francesco, who had played amajor role in cementing the Florentine-Venetian alliance in the1430s, was able to perform the role of resident ambassador in Romeand Naples with considerable pomp and prestige.24 Such men, whilethey conformed to type in producing daily dispatches filled withminutiae, were much more than news-gatherers and spies.

While the fifteenth-century ambassador could not exceed hisformal mandate and had to seek new instructions in the event of anymajor policy issue requiring a decision, he nevertheless was left withscope for considerable personal initiative. He was responsible formaintaining an alliance; he participated in constant discussions withthe government to which he was attached; he went hunting withLudovico Sforza and attended mass with Lorenzo de' Medici; he had

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private audiences with the Pope in the Sala del Pappagallo and wasvisited by King Ferrante's private secretary in the middle of the night.He spent some of his time protecting and furthering the interests ofindividual fellow countrymen, and a lot of his time quietly cultivatingcontacts, not just among those with authority in the host state butalso those temporarily on the sidelines, the opposition factions. Hekept an eye on the activities of exiles from his own state and workedto frustrate their potentially dangerous initiatives.25

It is true that the ambassador of an Italian state at the French orimperial court was in a different world, a less intimate world, a worldin which diplomacy was regarded with some suspicion, as a pooralternative to war. But this was a sort of appendix to the world ofItalian diplomacy, a situation from which many of the complaintsvoiced by Italian envoys tended to come as they made endlessuncomfortable journeys in the wake of the court, as theircorrespondence with home was interrupted and their funds ran out.Too much has been made by the influential writers on Renaissancediplomacy of the complaints of ambassadors. De Maulde la Claviere,Mattingly, and particularly Queller, have described the post ofresident ambassador as immensely unpopular and difficult to fill."The evidence for this is largely Venetian and has to be handled withcare. There were indeed moments, particularly around 1500, whensenior Venetian politicians were reluctant to undertake embassiesabroad because of the tensions in the political and economic situationat home. There was always a tendency to idealize the commitment ofthe Venetian patriciate to public service and office-holding; fierceprologues to Senate legislation denouncing those individuals whoevaded office have coloured our views on this general issue and ledto exaggerations of the extent of avoidance of office. Much, ofcourse, depended on the office in question and in the case of theresident ambassador there were attractions as well as drawbacks toaccepting the post. It is very important to appreciate the prestige andthe degree of influence enjoyed by ambassadors in Italy, as well as thedifficulties and sometimes hardships of their task.

A final point: the increasing reliance on continuous diplomacy, onreports and information-gathering, on the opinions and actions ofspecialists in foreign affairs in the later fifteenth century, ledinevitably to delays in decision-making, to a tendency towardstemporization. This was to become one of the dominant themes ininternational relations in the sixteenth century. Machiavelli, who had

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some diplomatic experience but was not really a professionaldiplomat, observed and deplored this without really appreciating theinevitability of it. He was more accustomed to being at the heart ofthe decision-making process as secretary of the Dieci di Balia, ratherthan on the fringes of it. At the same time, the particular indecisionand caution that he chafed at were those of a peculiarly weak andvulnerable state which had a long diplomatic tradition. Nevertheless,while his message was born out of particular circumstances, it cameto have universal application.

Warwick University

NOTES

1. C.H. Carter, The Western European Powers, 1500-1700 (London, 1971), p.19.2. M.A.R. De Maulde la Claviere, La diplomatie au temps de Machiavel, 3 vols. (Paris,

1892-93); EM. Perret, Histoire des relations de la France avec la Venise, 2 vols. (Paris,1896); A. Desjardins and G. Canestrini (eds.), Negotiations diplomatiques de la Franceavec la Toscane, 6 vols. (Paris, 1859-86); G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy(London, 1955).

3. P. Kendall and V. Ilardi (eds.), Dispatches and related documents of MilaneseAmbassadors to France and Burgundy, 3 vols. (Athens, OH, 1970-71, and Dekalb IL,1981). See also V Ilardi, Studies in Italian Renaissance Diplomatic History (London,1986).

4. E. Sestan (ed.), Carteggi diplomatici fra Milano sforzesca e la Borgogna, 2 vols. (Rome,1985).

5. N. Rubinstein et al. (eds.), Lettere di Lorenzo de' Medici, 7 vols. (Florence, 1977 - ).6. P. Margaroli, Diplomazia e stati rinascimentali. Le ambascerie sforzesche alia

conclusione delta lega italiana, 1450-5 (Florence, 1992).7. G. Corazzol (ed.), Dispacci di Zaccaria Barbaro, 1471-3 (Rome, 1994).8. D.E. Queller, Early Venetian Legislation on Ambassadors (Geneva, 1966).9. L. Cerioni, La diplomazia sforzesca nella seconda metà del Quattrocento e i suoi cifrari

segreti, 2 vols. (Rome, 1970).10. R. Fubini, Italia Quattrocentesca: politica e diplomazia nell' eta di Lorenzo il Magnifico

(Milan, 1994); idem, 'La figura politica dell ambasciatore negli sviluppi dei regimioligarchici quattrocenteschi', in Forme e techniche del potere nella citta, ed. S. Bertelli(Perugia, 1979-80), particularly pp.33-6.

11. For a recent survey of fifteenth-century political developments in Italy and contactswith the ultramontane powers, see New Cambridge Medieval History, vol.7, ed. C.Allmand (Cambridge, 1998), ch.23, pp.547-87.

12. For the classic account of the Italian League, see G. Soranzo, La Lega italica (1454-55)(Milan, 1924); more recently G. Pillinini, Il sistema degli stati italiani, 1454-94(Venice, 1970), pp.7-15, and Margaroli, Diplomazia, have redefined the role of theLeague.

13. For the importance of the wars in Lombardy, 1425-54, in the development ofinterstate relations, see Fondazioni Treccani, Storia di Milano, vol.6 (Milan, 1955),pp.248-386; Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, vol.4, ed. A.Tenenti and U. Tucci (Rome, 1996), pp.181-244.

14. Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, 6, pp.771-3 (Boffillo del Guidice or Boffille deJuge), 15, pp.156-7 (Jacopo Galiota or Jacques Galiot). A broad view of French

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foreign policy in this period is to be found in D. Potter, History of France, 1460—1560(London, 1995), pp.251-83.

15. On the Milanese Consiglio Segreto, see D.M. Bueno de Mesquita, 'The Privy Councilin the Government of the Dukes of Milan', in Florence and Milan: Comparisons andRelations, ed. S. Bertelli et al. (Florence, 1989), pp.135-56; F.M. Vaglienti,'"Fidelissimi Servitori de Consilio suo Secreto". Struttura e organizzazione delConsiglio Segreto nei primi anni del ducato di Galeazzo Maria Sforza (1466-69)',Nuova rivista storica, 76 (1992), pp.645-708; R. Fubini, Italia Quattrocentesca,pp. 107-35. The increasing role of the Venetian Council of Ten in consideration offoreign affairs is discussed in M.E. Mallett. 'Diplomacy and War in Later Fifteenth-Century Italy', Proceedings of the British Academy, 67 (1981), p.288, and the creationand function of the Florentine Otto di Pratica in idem, 'The Florentine Otto di Praticaand the beginning of the War of Ferrara', in P. Denleyand C. Elam (eds.), Florence andItaly: Renaissance Studies in Honour of Nicolai Rubinstein (London, 1988), pp.3-12.

16. For the beginnings of this practice, see State Archives, Venice, Consiglio dei Dieci,Misti, 20, ff. 4v-5v.

17. Lettere di Lorenzo de'Medici, vol.5, p.314. For a calendar of the letters of the Otto diPratica, see now / Carteggi delle Magistrature dell' eta repubblicana; Otto di Pratica, I,Legazioni e commissarie, 2 vols., ed. P. Viti et al. (Firenze, 1987) and II, Missive, 2 vols,ed. R.M. Zaccaria et al. (Florence, 1996).

18. N. Rubinstein, 'Lorenzo de' Medici: The Formation of his Statecraft', Proceedings ofthe British Academy, 63 (1977), pp.71-94; Mallett, 'Diplomacy and War', pp.282-7;M. Bullard, Lorenzo il Magnifico: Image and Anxiety, Politics and Finance (Florence,1994), pp.81-109.

19. For the role of Nicolo di Ca' Pesaro, a prominent Venetian politician, in secretnegotiations between Florence and Venice during the War of Ferrara, see Lettere diLorenzo de' Medici, vol.7, pp.235-7 and 317-18.

20. The quality of the information provided both by Lorenzo de' Medici in his letters toFlorentine ambassadors in France, and by those ambassadors back to Italy, was oftencommented upon. For examples of this, see Lettere di Lorenzo de' Medici, vol.5,pp.40-61 and 206-16.

21. 'Come dice, ser Niccolo, non pensarebbe il diavolo quello che puo qualche voltagiovare uno aviso' (Bernardo Rucellai, Florentine ambassador in Milan to Lorenzo de'Medici, 7 April 1482, Archivio Mediceo avanti il Principato (Florence), L1, 107).

22. This issue is discussed by M.E. Mallett, 'Ambassadors and their Audiences inRenaissance Italy', Renaissance Studies, 8/3 (1994), pp.233-4. For career details ofMilanese ambassadors, see Cerioni, Diplomazia sforzesca, vol.1, and F. Leverotti,Diplomazia e governo dello stato: i 'famigli cavalcanti' di Francesco Sforza (1450-66)(Pisa, 1992), pp. 105-256.

23. On Bembo, see N. Giannetto, Bernardo Bembo: umanista e politico veneziano(Florence, 1985), and on Soderini, see P. Clarke, The Soderini and the Medici (Oxford,1991). Many Venetian ambassadors of the period are profiled in M.L. King, VenetianHumanism in an Age of Patrician Dominance (Princeton, 1986).

24. Zaccaria Barbaro, in a diplomatic career lasting from 1469 to 1485, went twice asambassador to Rome and Milan, and once each to Naples, Mantua and Ferrara(Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, 6, pp.118-19). See also Corazzol, Dispacci diZaccaria Barbaro, passim.

25. Mallett, 'Ambassadors and their Audiences', pp.236-8.26. See particularly Queller, Early Venetian Legislation, passim; idem, The Venetian

Patriciate: Reality versus Myth (Urbana and Chicago, 1986), pp.113-71.

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