IS-Jul-2011NOT RELEASABLE luFOREIGN NATIONALS

28 August 1957

CONTINUED CONTROLSC No, 04443/57Copy No.

CURRENTINTELLIGENCEBULLETIN

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APPROVED FORfJ RELEASE DATE: HR70-14

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCECENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCEwhich may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to begained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of CentralIntelligence.

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CONTENTS

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csq-2_ 2. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MISSILE ANNOUNCE-MENT (Secret) (page 4).

c,Lt_ 3. FURTHER ACTION AGAINST MALENKOV INDICATED (Secret)(page 5).

4. JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSES FEDERATIONWITH IRAQ (Secret) (page 6)n

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2_ 7. INDONESIAN ARMY IN JAVA REPORTEDLY VOTED FORCOMMUNISTS (Confidential) (page 9).

(9 47, 8. ARREST OF KEY OPPOSITION LEADER MAY PROVOKESERIOUS UNREST IN VENEZUELA (Confidential) (page 10).

64) 9. GOMUL1CA REPORTEDLY TO VISIT TITO (Confidential)(page 11).

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2. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIETMISSILE ANNOUNCEMENT

Comment on:

The Soviet announcement on 26 Augustof a successful test of an interconti-nental ballistic missile and a series ofnuclear and thermonuclear explosions

"in recent days" is probably intended to help set the stagefor a major Soviet offensive at the forthcoming session ofthe UN General Assembly for a suspension of nuclear weap-ons tests and a pledge not to use nuclear weapons or mis-siles carrying nuclear warheads. The USSR probably an-ticipates an early recess in the London disarmament talksand believes that the General Assembly will provide a moreeffective forum to seek support for its position from manysmall non-nuclear powers.

The TASS announcement of the test includedthe standard charge that the Western powers were creating ob-stacles to a disarmament agreement, particularly a cessationof tests, The Soviet proposals of 30 April and 7 June for apartial disarmament agreement called for renunciation of theuse for military purposes of both nuclear weapons and missilesof any range carrying nuclear warheads. Soviet spokesmen inthe past have played down the problem of inspection and controlof missile experiments, stressing that the danger comes from thenuclear warheads.

In addition, Moscow probably calculatesthat its announcement will add substance to the Soviet warn-ings last spring that NATO members and other countries whichpermitted American guided missile bases on their territorieswould be subjected to Soviet nuclear devastation in the eventof war. (SECRET)

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Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4

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3. FURTHER ACTION AGAINST MALENKOV INDICATED

Comment on:

A new attack on former Soviet PremierGeorgy Malenkov by Party SecretaryKhrushchev in heretofore unpublicizedspeeches appears intended to prepare theway for further punitive action against

Malenkov. Summaries of these speeches were reprinted inthe party journal Kommunist and partially broadcast by RadioMoscow on 27 August. Characterizing him as Beria's "shadow,"Khrushchev accused Malenkov of "taking advantage of Stalin'sweaknesses in the last years of his life. In many instances heincited him to take action which was deserving of stern condem-nation."

Ithrushchev seems to be preparing a case inwhich Malenkov will be accused of masterminding some of theworst excesses of the latter part of the Stalin era. Malenkov,the leading rival of Khrushchev among those indicted at the Juneplenum of the central committee, is the logical victim of the mainattack. He was also singled out as the most heinous member ofthe "anti-party group" in the propaganda barrage following theJune plenum, being the one member of the opposition, for instance,charged with complicity in the notorious "Leningrad affair."

The return to the offensive against Malenkovafter a period of relative quiet may stem from the need to silenceany continuing opposition to Khrushche y's policies and to try tocreate a new wave of popular indignation against Malenkov thatapparently was not achieved during the initial effort.

As further information on the speeches car-.ried in Kommunist becomes available, the status of the remainingmembers of the "anti-party group" may be clarified. Molotov andKaganovich have reportedly been further criticized in secret lettersfrom the central committee to party organizations throughout thecountry, but they have not been accused of misdeeds as severe asthose of Malenkov. The diverse treatment thus far accorded Mol-otov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov suggests that each case is beingconsidered separately and that the fate of these other leading oppo-nents is not necessarily wrapped up with that of Malenkov. (SECRET)

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7. INDONESIAN ARMY IN JAVA REPORTEDLY VOTEDFOR COMMUNISTS

Over 60 percent of the votes cast by thefndonesian army and police in Java dur-ing recent local elections were for the Communist party,

The armed forces and__

vote can beascertained because they voted separately from the generalpublic. Reportedly very few police voted. (NOFORN)

Comment Even if exaggerated, this report is indica-tive of gains made by the Communists in pene-

trating army units in Java. Enlisted men and noncommissionedofficers, like the general population, undoubtedly were influ-enced by the Communist party's campaign tactic of identifyingitself with President Sukarno and his concept of "guided democ-racy."

The officer corps in Java, however, is stillbelieved to be largely anti-Communist.

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8. ARREST OF KEY OPPOSITION LEADER MAY PROVOKESERIOUS UNREST IN VENEZUELA

Comment on-

The arrest of Rafael Caldera, chiefVenezuelan opposition leader and headof the Catholic-oriented COPEI party,has provoked widespread concern inVenezuela and may seriously compound

President Perez' problems in seeking another five-yearterm in the December elections. The church, which hasbeen at odds with the government since last May and inAugust openly protested against the regime's authoritarianpolitical policies, is apparently determined to insist onCaldera's release. The church and the principal oppositionfactions would probably support Caldera% presidential candi-dacy in the event he is allowed to run.

The American embassy in Caracas com-ments that Caldera% arrest is a serious official blunder sincehis "martyrdom" might lead to a surge of popular support oreven demonstrations in his behalf. The arrest further indi-cates the government's lack of confidence in Perez' popularsupport for re-election.

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9. GOMULKA REPORTEDLY TO VISIT TITO

Polish Party First Secretary Gomulkaplans to visit Marshal Tito in Yugo-slavia in September or early October,

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Comment The possibility of a Tito-Gomulka meet-ing was suggested by reports that Tito's

chief of protocol visited Warsaw last month. Shortly after Go-mulka's rise to power in October 1956, the Yugosla ys expressedtheir willingness to consult with the Poles at any time at the high-est level, but indicated their understanding that the Polish polit-ical situation might well make such a move impossible at that time.

Gomulka may feel that the Tito-Khrushchevtalks earlier this month, as well as Moscow's favorable commenton Ho Chi Minh's visit to Yugoslavia, preclude any Soviet objec-tion to a meeting with Tito. An atmosphere more favorable toPolish-Yugoslav talks has resulted from the rebuff administeredto Soviet "dogmatists" at the Soviet party plenum in June and thesubsequent lessening of domestic opposition from Stalinist ele-ments in the Polish party. The Poles are studying some eco-nomic aspects of the Yugoslav system to determine their applica-bility in Poland.

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