( G ~C F i c l d S c r v i c o Regulations)

Horcwith i s a t r a n s l a t i o n of Pa r t I of t h o rcoont Gorman t c x t -"TRUP~~TNF~~IIRI~NG'roo^ Lead.ing ) .

" T R T J I ' I ~ N F ~ ~ U ~ ~ G ' ' ,t h e most important manual of t h e Geman Army, i s t h e German F i e l d Service Regulations. The present e d i t i o n was published on October 17, 1933. This document was "secret" u n t i l iVovem.ber 1, 1935, when Par t I ras re leased , Par t 11, containing t h e de ta i led ' t a b l e s of o rgan iza t ion and road spaces, i s s t i l l a "secret" document.

. . . . . --. ~. . . . . , ~... , , . ~ .- .

Pa11-t.1 i s now o f fe red i n tKe b e l i e f t h a t it 1611be found in - /

s t r u c t i v e and of t i m e l y i n t e r e s t .

By Direc t ion of t h e A s s i s t m t Commandant:

F. 1fiL IvVIILBURlJ, Lieut. Colonel, I n f a r t r y ,

Assi:;'tant Secretary.

P a r t I

Sect ions I - X I 1 1 Pars. 1 - 724 (inclusive)

In t roduct ion ............................. Par. 1 - 1 5 i n c l .

11

I vrar Organization ......................... " 16 - 26

I1 Loadorship ............................ " 2 7 - 1 1 9 I'

111 Roconnaissancc ........................... " 1 2 0 - 1 9 4 "

I V Secur i ty ................................. I' 195 - 267 "

V

V I Attaclc ................................... " 314 - 409 V II Pursui t .................................. " 410 - 426 "

V I I I Defonso .................................. " 427 - 502 " 1 X

X Dolaying Action c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 531 - 538 "

X I Specia l Typos of warfare ................; " 539 - 649 "

::I I B i l l e t i n g - Quartering ................... " 650 - 698 I'

X I 1 1 Army Cavalry ............................. 699 - 724 "fit

Introduction

1. The c0nduc.t of T a r i s an a r t , depending upon free, creative ac t iv i ty , s c i w t i f i c a l l y grounded. It makes the highest demands on t h e personality.

2 . The conduct of war i s ba sod on cont inuous development . New means of warfare c a l l for th ever changing employment. Their use must be anticipated, t h e i r influence must be cor rec t ly estimated and quickly ut i l ized.

3. Situations i n mar a r e of unlimited variety. They change often and suddenly and only r a r e ly a r e from the f i r s t discernible. Incalculable elemcnts are often of great i&luence. The independent w i l l of t h e enemy i s p i t t ed against ours, Wict ion and mistakes a r e of every day occui-rence,

4. T ~ Bteaching of the cbhduct of war cannot be concentrated exhausti~re- l y i n regulationsb Tho pr inc ip les so enunciated must be employed dependent upon the s i tua t ion&

Simplicity of oonduct, l ag i ca l ly carried through, w i l l most surely a t t a i n the objective.

5. War i s the severest t e s t of sp i r i t ua l and bodily strength. I n war, character outweighs in t e l l ec t* Many stand fo r th on the f i e l d of ba t t l e who i n peace would ranain unnoticed.

6. Armies a s well as l esser un i t s dm-and leaders of good judgment, c lear thinking and f a r seeing, leaders with independence and decisive resolution, leaders with perseverance and energy, leaders n o t emotionally moved by the varying fortunes of war, leaders w i t h a high sense of redponsibi l i tyr

7. The off ioer i s a leader and a teaoherr Besides his knowledge of men end h i s sense of jus t ice he must be distinguished by his supericr .knowledge and experienoe, his earmstness, his self-control and high courage.

8. The example and personal con%uot of p f f ieers and non-cn~iss ionod of f icers a r e of decisive influence on the troops. The o f f i ce r who i n the face of the enany i s cold-blooded, decisive and courageous inspire8 h i s troops on-ward. The of f icer must likewise find the way t o the hearts of h i s subordi- nates end gain the i r t r u s t through an understanding of t h e i r feel ings and thoughts and through never ceasing care of t h e i r needs.

Mutual t r u s t i s the surest bas i s of discipl ine i n necessity and danger.

9. I n a l l s i tuat ions every leader must exer t , without evasion of re-sponsibil i ty, h is wholo p3rsonality. Willing and joyful acceptMce of re-sponsibi l i ty i s the distinguishing charao te r i s t ic o f leadership. This does not man t l a t the subordinate should seek an a rb i t ra ry decision without proper consideration of the whole or tha t he shod$ not obey orders precisely or t ha t he should l e t h i s feel ing of greater knowledge t a l e precedence over obedience. Inde~endence of ac t ion should never be based upon oontrariness. Independence of action, properly used, i s o f ten tho basis of great suoceas,

In sp i t e of technique, the worth of man i s t h e decisive factor. I t s s ignif icmce i s increased i n group combat.

The emptiness of the b a t t l e f i e ld demands independently thinking and aating fighters, vho, congidering sach s i t i n t i on , are dominated by the convfc- t ion, boldly and dcoisivcly t o aot, and dotomined t o a r r ive a t success.

Being accustcmd i;o physical ~ccomplishments, laok c f consideration of sel f , w i l l power, se l f confidence, a d courage qualify a man t o master the most d i f f h u l t situdtions.

Report No. 14,507. -1.-

1

11. The vrorth of leaders and men determined the b a t t l e worth of the

troops, which i s supplemented by the possession, care and maintenance of arms

and equipment .

Superior b a t t l e worth can equalize numerical in fe r ior i ty . The higher the b a t t l e worth, the more vigorous and versa t i l e can war be executed.

Superior leadership and superior troop ba t t l e readiness are r e l i ab l e

portents of victory.

12. The leaders must l i v e with the i r troops, par t ic ipate i n t h e i r dangers, the i r wants, the i r joys, t h e i r sorrows. Only i n t h i s way can they estimate the b a t t l e worth and the requirements of the troops,

hlan i s not responsible for himself alone, but also for h i s comrades.

Xe &o can do more, who has greater capacity of accomplishment must i n s t ruc t

the inexperienced and weaker.

Frem suah conduct the feeling of r ea l comradeship develops, which i s just as important between the leaders and the men as between the men tliemselves.

13. Tmops only superficially, and not through long t r a in ing and exper- ience, welded together, more ea s i ly f a i l under severe conditions and under unexpected crises. Therefore before the outbreak of war the development and maintenance of steadiness and discipl ine i n the troops, a s well as t h e i r t ra in?

.ing, i s of decisive importance.

%cry commander is enjoined immediately t o intervene vritn a l l powers

a t his disposal agninst any relaxation of discipl ine, against excegses, plund-

ering, panic and other damaging influence.

Discipline i s fundarnontal i n an army, i t s s t r i c t mintenance a bene-

f i t t o a l l ,

14. The strength of the t roops must be able to meet the highest demands

i n decisive moments. He who unnecessarily fa t igues the troops jeopardizes

SUCCCSB.

The strength ellp?lo$d i n b a t t l e must stand i n preportion to t he ob-

jective desired. Unrealizable demands prejudice the t r u s t i n the leaders and

shako the s p i r i t nf the troops.

15. From the youngest soldier on q?the omploymont o f every s p i r i t u a l and bodily power i s demanded t o t h e utmost. Only in sueh conduct i s the f u l l power of accompliahmcnt of the troops achieved. So do men develop and maintain t h e i r courage and pwrers of decision i n hours of s t r e s s and carry fofmurd with them t o greater deeds the i r weaker comrades.

Tfio f i r s t demand i n w a r i s decisive action. Everyone, the highest

comaader end the nost junior soldior, must be avraro that omis s i9~s and neg-

l e c t s i n c r i a m t e himmore severely than the mistake of choice of mans.

Report No. 14,507.

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I. War Organization -- Troop D i s t r i b ~ t t i o n r 16. The o rgan iza t ion of war e s t a b l i s h e s tho r cgu la r command and ndmin-

i s t r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s of t h e army i n tho i l c l d . It i s ordered by the IIigh Command (War ~ c p a r t m o n t ) and by it only can be cbaged.

17. T h e F ie ld h y c o n s i s t s of armies, u n i t s of army cavalry, a i r u n i t s and army troops.

18, An Amp c o n s i s t s o f In fan t ry d i v i s i o n s ( a l l regula t ions enunciated for In fan t ry d iv is ions apply fo r the other arms, i n so f a r a s t h e y a r e con- ducted a s Idant&, &d o t h e r r e g u l a t i o n s the re fo r a r e not express ly p b l i s h - ed), which a s a r u l e a r e grouped .under corps commanders a s Army Corps. Corps have corps troops, armies, army troops.

Several armies m q be formed in to an Amy Group.

19. The u n i t s of Field Army Cavalry a r e genera l ly Cavalry d iv is ions .

Several Cavalry d iv i s ions may be grouped under a Corps commander a s a Cuvalry Corps, t o which a r e added corps troops.

The a t t a c h m n t of Field Army Cavalry u n i t s i n general i s l i m i t e d t o Army Groups m d armies.

20. Units of the a i r arm a r e the a i r u n i t s (reconnaissance echelons, a t t a c k ( p r s u i t ) squadrons nnd bomb% squadrons) and t h o a i r defonse troops.

Units of t h e a i r arm can b e a t t ached t o army groups, armies, army or Cavnlry corps, arvl oxceptionnlly t o In fan t ry and Cavalry clivisicns.

21. The fol lowing belong t o the F ie ld Army t roops : s t a f f f o r spec ia l q l o y m e n t , bicycle-, motorcycle-, machine gun-, minenlvcrfer-, nnd t ank defense un i t s , motorized recopnaissance b a t t a l i o n s , a r t i l l e r y , including observat ion ba t t a l iono and ba l loon platoons, t a n k un i t s , chemical t roops, onginecr m d s ignal units, spec ia l t roops end u n i t s of t h e s e r v i c e s of supply.

22. The Infant ry and Cavalry d iv is ions a r e the sma l l e s t u n i t s which organ- i c a l l y a r e capable of independent operations. They have a t t h e i r d i sposa l t h e m a n s f a r independent cambat missions and sustenanoe.

23. Amy and Corps t roops a ra organized s i m i l a r l y t o Fie ld Army troops. The supply serv ices of Corps t roops a r e only so l a r g e a s a c t u a l l y necessary t o supply the Corps troops.

24. The troops a r e distributed i n nccord,mce with t h c needs for s t r a t e g i -c a l and t o c t i c a l emploporit (advance gucrd, r e a r guard, f l ank guard, march col- umns, b a t t l e groups). The u n i t s a s organized a r c maint l ined i n t h e i r i n t e g r i t y a s f a r a s poss ib le .

25. Laadors a r e senior end subordinate. T h e higher 1es.dership ombraces commaIulers of a11u n i t s dolnn to inc lude Infant ry 'and Cavnlr j d iv is ions , t h o l a v e r al l s?nr,ller c o m d s .

1126. ( ~ r u ~ ~ o r i l " u h r e r )The t roop comr~wder is one pcrmmently o r tcmporcri ly

indopendently i n oomand of e. u n i t of a l l ttrms (combined arms).

Xcport No. 14,507.

---- 11.-----Leadership.

27. Great. successes presume boldness d a r i n ~ preceded by ;ocd juQmnent.

28. !'le never have a t our d isposa l a l l t h e des i r ed f o r c e s f o r tlie d e c i s i v e ac t i03 . Be :'rho w i l l be s c c w e everyi~here or vho f i x e s fo rces i n secondary t a sks a c t s cont rary t o ti le i"uidm.cntal+

Thm wczitcr f o r c e , t h r o u ~ h speed, !nobility, &rea t march accomplishmnents, utilization of d a r h s s and t h e t e r r a i n t o t h e A r l l e s t , s u r p r i s e and deception, can be the s t roncnr a t t he dec i s ive area ,

29. Time ar:3 space must be c o r r e c t i y es t imated , favorable s i tua -t i o n s quiclr l :~ recor,nized acd d e c i s i v e l y exs lo i tcd . .-.hvery advantagi- over the eneiny ine leases OLW oi-m ficcdom oYaot ion .

30. RZpidi t:r of ac l ion in t h e diSplacs!x?i?nt of troops ca be a s s i s t e d g r e a t l y o r retardi:d t y t h e roeds a d s t r e e t n e t s alld by t h e t e r r a i n conditions. The season, t h e nea ther , t h e condit ion of the t roops , a r e a l s o of irlfluence.

3 . The dura t ion of s4~ra te f ; i ca land t a c t i c a l operat ions cannot always be foreseen. Successful engagements of t e n proceed slovlly. Often the success of today ' s b a s t l e is f i rs t r e c o ~ l j zad -tomorror;.

2 . Surpr ise of the a ~ e ~ i z i is a deci :live i 'actcr iii a success. Actions based on su:?rise a r e only of isreat succes~? .:ihe:i we do not permit t h e enemy t o t a k e adequate countcr izea:ura-s.

The ene.:iy ~ ~ i j . 1 11,ilrev'is e endeavor to make use of s u r p r i s e . Our conduct must ta& t h j s i n t o consideration.

5 . The kno:?led;;e of the h o s t i l e l eade r sh ip and Tire;- p r i n c i p h s can inf luence t h e dec is ion arid a i d our h a t t l e condv-ct, bu-? i t m o t never load t o preconceptions.

34. Those condi:i.ons :;hich f a c i l i t a t e the conduct of -;Jar i n our land, make i t more difi ' ic:ll t i n f o m i ~ n land.?, req l l i re considerat ion.

35. I n s trenuous col?lbat,troopa are soonx!orn out and au ick ly used up. The forces m u s t r ece ive t imely re infcr cu51e1:t s in l e i d e r s , men, nnimale , b a t t l e ;leecis and vrnr m a t c r h l f i of a l l lcinds.

36. Tho mission and t h e s i t u a t i o n form xhe basis of the fiction.

The mission desi(y-att.s t k c objt c t i v e t o be at1;ained. The l eade r m u s t never ;"or;et h i s micsion. A :nission 7:bi.ch iridicatos s e v e ~ a l -tcnk,s e a s i l y divi:riz from ttic . x i n objcctivo.

Obscurity of t h a s i t u a t i o n i s t h a ru le . Seldon c i l l one have exact i n f o r m t i o n of the a a ~ y . Clarif ' ication of the h o a t i l e s i t u a t i o n Is a self-evirtent; demand. :icv;ever, t o wait. i n t e n s e s i t c a t i o n s for in-f a r m t i o n , is seldom a token of s t rons lcadersb.%p, cfbm of weakness.

37. The clecisior, a r i s e s froin t h e mission and .tile s i t c a t i o n . Should t h e mi@s io n no longer o?.rffi ce a s the 2.1ndamental of' conduct or I s it changed by event.9, t h e dec is ion -t t ake these ccnisiderations i n t o account. Ire 7.7bo chm,es h j s m i s s ion or iice s not execute t'ie one given !iiust r epor t h i s a c t i o n s a t or~ce and assulEs a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences. Re mst al.rq.rs ke q~ i n mind -the whole s i t u e t i o n .

The decis ion n q s t depic t a c l e a r ob jec t ive aimed a t mith t h e ,::hole force . The s t rong 7 1 i l l of the cmaander rflust support it. Often the s t ronger r-rill g a i n s t h e success.

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' : r i M o r ~ t -$er;; ~ o o d r:;asons a dec is ion occe ziade should not be abandoned. I f x s v c r , i n t h2 vicissi.';udcs of liar an irif!.exi b l e mainte- .;ar:ce o? tilo ori:,inal. d c c i s i o ~ : map l ead to p e s t raint5Kes. Timely reco:;nition o-r Lhi cor:di tici::; and the t i m 3;h ich c a l l for ' a :le*;/ dec is ion i s a11 aa.$tr ihutr . of .iflie a r t or leafi*.r-.hip.

%a c ,~~ma::.?cr t pern i t freedoxx of a c tio:l t o his!!?us s1.k o r d i ~ . a t e s i n s o t a r %hat t h i s 6% s not e!n$ail;;er -tl::e ~d:01s .sche;~~e. Iie mw t not suz?.cnder to tl-im t'losc docis ions fo r irhich ic alone in ~,nsponsi.bl.c.

Z? . Tho combs-t ( d m ~ e f e c h t ) - by lm$;e arr0.y vn ' i ts t h e b a t t l e ( d i e Rchlac:-~t) - is the armed c o n f l i c t vhich ensues -idlcn t:.ro opponoxts come taf;otknr.

39. Thh- attack; is launchod i n ordor to dofca t t h o oneniy. Tho a t t a c k e r has t h e i n i t i a t i v e . Supe r io r i ty of l cadc r sh ip and of t roops sl!o:-I t o t h e bes t a 3 v a n t a ~ e i n t h o a t t ack . Success does not il?.;ays c01!1e t o s u g e r i o r i ty oi' nm;te?s.

I n s y c i a l i n s t ances t k e objec t ive of an a t t a c k may he l i m i b ed.

?'he possibi1f . t y t hzt m a t t a c k clay miscarry siiould never gemlit the f e t t e r i n & : of enerf ;et ic l eade r sh ip from t h e f i r s % .

40. p ~ r s u i t -ec:-s t:?e f r u i t s oi' v i c to r , . It . s t r ives t o des t roy the enemy, xhic h 66::; tr::.ction was not possi.ble i n t h e l)i.eceding engage-' . Only a tho r0~~ . !1 -~ .0 i~ .r e l e n t l e s s pursui t , vriiich ;ci-'eiients t!le j: enemy f r o n gaiv.ini. t i to r e s t and rec i lpera te , ea.ies w r s e l v e s s a c r i - f i c e s necessi tate: i: -:-le pps?r.~it +he enemy t o fo rce another d e c i ~ i ~ , e art;q;ement.

41. The defeasa -;!&its f o r the opponent. Tho dcl'cnder seeks t o p r e s c r i b e t h e b a t t l e t e r r a i n .

The defense is chostzl when our o m i ; l fe r ior i ty p e r n i t s r,o o t h e r choice, or i f :'or o-the r reasons it ap2ears adv&tajeous.

The d n f s i SF: has the laission of s imt te~i i? i ; the enemy at-tack. FoY t h i s purpose, t h e a t t a c k is rece ived i n n ci-re11 t e r r a i n , 1-rliicll is held t o the l a s t .

The comrm-der ( l e a d e r s h i p ) m y lini-i; the t i n e of the de fewe .

A dec i siv e v ic i;oly ca be aclliuved only by an o i i a l s iYe re turn .

The delayi~l t : a c t i o n h a s t h e mission of i n f l i c t i q ; h i c h l o s s e s on t h e enemy wi thout p e c l i t t i n : ~ a decisi-ie a c t i o n t o r e su - l t . Fm t h i s pur?,ooe .;re m u s t .;iitildri?-:! in ti!= f ~ o r nt h o hoati2.c a t t a c k a&d @ v e t e r - r a i n for timc.

42. RreaLin, W f .in en(;ageiI:.ent has t h e pur20so of t e m i n a t i n z . the b a t t l e or ,jvi?;i UP tP.e .former p o s i t i o n i n order t o conti i l ls t h e en~;+;;.ai:unt a t a moro fa-;o:-able pos i t i on . 1x1 the l a t t e r i n s t ance delay- ing ac t ion i s oTton e??gloyc?d.

43. Tho r e t r e a t in tends t o avoid t ~ r The engage-wnt t h e r combat. lliust for t h i s purpo;.e b:, tcn:xinated and tho oithd~.arral of' the t roops be .protected.

44. The chacgir?: for t u w s of b a t t l e du.;.:mh of ten t h e pass ing ihrn one type of a~&a&clzion.tto another.

!:?port No. 14,556.

bmb

The pacsage fmr:? a t t a c k t o defense i s mcconiplished by holdin:;

t!?e t e r r a i n -.iliich hai; b curl $&en, or ,' if SEccssury, unitur hos l i l c c u . i . x -s~lxo. T!!e t l o op; oi1r!cd, dio pcnsablc Tor cos :-ri thdra,;ma r c r ~ f from t!1c

l i n e .

I n the gar:;a.-;c fro.;? t h e dcfonzc to t:ic a t t a c k t h c tiincly

concontrat ion of stro?:> fwco:; a t dccici-yo area:: i c of dcciciv;, i in-

p c r t m c c .

45. Dc:aying ac t ion aqmids a docision. It \-rill ga in t imc , keep

tlic mcmy hurjy ars! dcccivcd.

Fui1:t a t tackt j ,pmvido dcccption.

,v',o. Thc ;;i&th of battle: zoncs and s c c t o r s is dcpcndcnt u ~ o ntho

i n t m t i e n s , the istin tin{ aCJaccnt suppor t and t h c t e r r a i n . It is in-f lucnccd by t h c conduct an? breadth. of t h u c n c ~ ras 1-10ll a s hy o m o r bqtB opcri f1an::s. %?c brcadth of zonos and. s c c t o r s is d i f f c r m t . Groatcr brr~adthc, n r s pcrrfie s i b l c i n fa701,ablc t o r r a i n , i;spc c i a l l l ; if it is a r t i f i c i a l l y r c i n f m c i d . Grcatrir brcadths can uc u c d i f no a m ~ l o y b a t t l e Lroups. Great bre*O.ths can b r i n ~ t o ea r ly frui.tio!i t h e c n t i r e e f f e c t of t h e am.?, bu'i. thoy can prematurely b r i . n ~ ow t r o o p to a s tand-s t i l l . Too ;;reat breadth c rec t e s the dmger of a pene t r a t ion , t o o riarrov, ecpcc ia l ly inthou",eep or;anim,Lion, the clon;er of envelopme~~tor im e ~ a s i o n of tho pos i t i on by the enemy. I n an at-Lrc!; an i n i t i ~ lbre?.dth g r e a t e r t h n -th?.t of the ene;;l:; ri1r.y be the forerutmer of g r e c t e r success.

I n unc:.rxified s i tuc. t ionc, or;;nniz?.tion i n de;?th preserves freedoin of c c t i o n fo r t h e com:i,".mler. & p i n s t -.more r.-.pidlg moving eneiny or one ;:rith p o n t e r mobi l i ty is such o r ~ m i z n t i o n r.l:i?.y^.y:; proper in i t iCn . l lp . At t h e dec i s i - e ?re? t h e r e ir, norm".lly the dcr?;..~id fo r or;;:niz.?tion i n depth.

The cmt".nder must d i o t r i b u t e h i s f o r c e s i n depth ?nd breq.dth before con tzc t ?.nd during, the b ? t t l c , -.ccordin{, t o t h e n i t u l t i o n .

47. Durin:.: t?e course of the b , - t t le the com?nder inf luences t h e -.ction t ~ o ~ t increcse f i r e ?ad tkrou,h s t r o n ~ l yby t h e concentr.?.tion ?ad of the a n p l o p ~ ~ e n t or h i s reserves.

Ammunition oupplics hcld ::lobile, m - b l c him t o increcso t h e i 'ire e f f ec t ivcneas r.t tho dcc is ivo r.rc,:. z t the dec ic ivc t ime ,".11d t o in-f luence t h e en~?gcmcnt , cvcn ? . f te r h i s roscrvLs hcvc becrl coimiit ted.

D i s t r ibu t ion , loc?.tion .-ad eiap1oyf1or.t oof thc reservos r cqu i rc c.?rcftil considcr?.tion. Mobi l i ty incrozscs tilo p o n s i b i l i t i o s for t h e i r urployinent.

2'0 m?2:c tho foir coy c i ~ ~ p l o y ~ d t h e f r o n t l i n e t o o wc:lk i n511 ordor t o f l v o r r. l z r g c r ~ o s c r v c , oi'+on i1c.-11s tho l o s s of t h s succsss n.:y lo-.& to 4ofw.t ii; d c t n i l . TI1cr1; ?.re ir~st.-.nccs i n \-&ich it 4s b o t t o r to bold no rcscrvza .

Un i t s uf conbincd ?.r.r,.x".re p?rt iculo.r ly ' su i tzb lo .-.s rosorvcs s+i?$?nt l l c s~t-20c.-.p?blc of indcpondcnt cc t ion . The d i e n l p t l o n of such .mits "a ;.rill ns t ho f r i t t w i r i a :::::??a: of rosurvcs is t o bc ?Void~d.

Tho loant ior . of tho rcscrvo dcponds upon its p r o b ~ , h b ploy-InmC ;md tho tor,Yr.i]l. I t o tb io ly c?mployacnt must bc caaurod. Wnoml ly it $8 t o bc o c h o l o 1 ~ 3 hohind t+tc f lnrk . ~ i s t - = c ox d iatcrvp.1 from t h c fl?n!; iricrczsos i r i th t h o s i z o af t ho ?csc?vc.

Rcport No. 14,556.

-6-

A i-eserva h:??d xiell seek is pmt e,cteil z~d i t s a.l_olop,io;?t i n

d i f f e r e n t dhoct ioix; i.3 i~ reserTJo f ~ u ~ t l ~ o r ;:;icilitated. Tor-:lard accolcr -

a t e 6 its intcrscnt ici- i j.11 tlte b a t t l e . The s u r e r tho coim~liuzd~r is of t ho

oi:~pls:{mc~?tof thu r,.:scr-vc G:?. - t k i n r s ir.riiinont this ci.:plo3lllcnt i s , tho

n0ari.r tlir: f r a n t ,::ill, i.-5 !Inuall:r derived froii t h o :;ener&l im~x~ls&::e el" h i s r~ethccia 01- a r e pi.@cuved from s p e c i a l sources cf i n ;or:!ation. A i r and. c r o ~ ' a d roconr.ai ssar.ce , he searching f o r mid ccn t inua l o b s o ~ - ~ o t i o n thc: a:cr;y, and s e c w e d t!lrou;;h of' i i i i .~l .~; : t ior~ s ~ ~ c i a lr?eans prot'i;ii? a uo;-c d o f i n i t e p i c t u r u 0:' tho hosti2.e r w c c . , i l o n ~ ;?ith accura t e i n f c r l i ~ t i o n w.d r e p o r t s .;IO i .m.st roclton on inco1:i~lote %id inaccurate i n f m i a t i c n . >YC,:,I t h e ~ i i l o l ~ tho cm.i~mcicr j.s able to d r m c c r r c c t co!?cli?si.,ns. . i ppor~n t l7 mir.ipm tmt d e t a i l s nay, i n connection ,;.ith othc r r c p o r t s , hni-c c a-mid crcblr: ;lor th.

Zvcry r c ]~or - t ad Yio hc:;"si:li'~r~:iatioil oro of lit t l c or 110 volur! ;ihf;n they rnach t cn l c t c : t:ic corilia.n!: fir -:hich thcy nrn j.ntzn$od.

49. 7 i t h i n h i s a rea oT opera t ions , every co.manfier is respoiisible f o r t h e contir;u.al recoi:naiissan.ce of t h e h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n and % r t e r r a i n Imot:iledi,e both da:? and ni;,ht. Contact once zained u i t h t h e enemy nl~ls . i ;be rflaint ained.

A l l conlulmders arc: en joincci, a s e a r l y arid t o the ,&reatesT ex ten t p o s s i b l e , to in.:orc~ tt)lt: hj-h+- 7 comncns? e r of on and t o-the s i i , ~ ~ a t i t r a m m i t a l l importar t inforlna t i o n .

50. I n hi:;iier co:~mmds, if' necessary a l s o by lor - IC~ commands, an o r f i c e r i s char::ed ?d.th the e'valua'bion of reconnzissarice r e s u l t s s p e c i a l reports.

I n f m i a t i o n a d raporbs i~iust be d i s c ~ i n ~ i n a t e l yevaluated, Any a t t m p t t o deeuce ~~1ia.tis des i red by us or is-810s t favorable to us , ;nus t be avoided,

51. The one ;.!al:ix a r e p o ~ trnust e q r e s s hirilse7.f clear-ly end p ~ ~ i t i ~ e l y . bewe,-n ,,>:!at he lias seen , v ~ h a t ar.o'iher He ms-i; dLf fe ren t i a t e !:as noted o r s t a t e d , arid :-t>at is preswied. he source of the inf orrmtion lmst b e s t a t e d . 5;u?picions must have bases.

52. Exact stotei, lonts as t o numbers, t ime and place have ~ e o t-mom in:: .

I t is of ten of g.rect vs lue t o loam. I-here t h e enemy hos n o t been rne t ~ r i t h , ,?he ~ o n f j ~ r m a t i oof' previous inf'onnnt ion a d t h e proof n of unchanged condi.tion; i n a spec i f i ed t,imo W e also of g e o t value,

n c p o r t No. 14,556.

Important i n fo i~ua t ion a s t o t e r r a i n is to be addod ? o t h e r epc r ts c oncemiin[, thii oner,?y.

53. The contents and r e l i a b i l i t y of &por ts , not t h e i r numbers, ai-e the 5:mportan-i ~ a t t c ? . R ~ p o r t s must cal;nly dep ic t thc events. Ex-ag&;orated rscpor ts ace dctrairliontrd., soino t h e s d i s a s t r o u s . Colored r e p o r t s lEIdcr1~ne t r u s t and ma!rc t h ~ conniland o r uncertain.

F i r s t contact nit:? t h e cllc:~ny is aL\'~a:is t o he rcpor tcd , w l c s s o thc rc~ i so ordered. I n o ther ciFcu.mortin; agoncy, load thc cnrml icaLio 11s sys texi wid r,al:t: more d i l f i c u l t tile corm,iailder's conaim t.

I~lportan'; : i n f o m a t i o n of tile ene;ny inay demand v e r i f i c a t i o n .

54. B a t t l e i t s e l f m a - i d e s the o!ost rol ic .ble meam of e s t i l ; a t in& the memy.

Reports dui-lnc, b a t t l e a r e indispensable for ihe co~cluc t of

t h ~en~agcr~icnt.

During t h e combat, r o p o r t s nlust be con t inua l ly made about the enemy and our cml s i t u a t i o n , t h e t e r r a i n and t h e armunition supply. Cam-rnuicatin;; imyressions, su[;[>estions fo r exp1oi.ti.n; favorable oppor tun i t i e s and t h e t e r r a i n f a c i l i t a t e the f o r x u l a t i i q of dec is ions . Pauses i n the b a t t l e a r e to be, u t i l i z e d -to -~dd t o t,he informatio!: reported. At the approach of darlniess, h a s t y b a t t l e r c p o r t s a re of p r t i c u l a r value t o t h e 11j~gllercomand.

At .Lt~cclout: of a bat t le . Lhe f o l l o r , i l i ~ clessages s i i o ~ l d be s e n t 7-!ithout delay: '7liici1. h o s t i l e t roops a r e oppos i te , h m tho en.em:r coiidl>Cts l~irnself , i n -!hat coridj.tion he i s , our owl situatio!?, o w muniticn3, e tc .

55. I n pressin;. s i t m t i o n r ; , r e p o r t s r m t he made ilct only t o t h e n e s t senior c o m a 2 o r but io the s e n i o r coml-amder ( ~ r u p p e 1 1 f ~ r e . i ) . Troops threateneri by t h o e n e m y , r e p r t t h i s i rmediately viithont ro;;ard t o o t h e r ncccssary pressa(;es. -A. messu~o sent siniultctneoi~sl;r t o s e v e r a l co.w:ia!ldnrs conta ins t h i s i n f o r m t i o n of thi? enbilly.

56. Mcid;l?ori dctnchmcrts muo t comunicatc imnpmtmt okserua-t i o n s concornitv; thc ci-my ail&cb,anfps i n the i r o-m s i t l ~ n t i o n .

57. Tho l!lo:rc dcb?j. li? rcpori; f rcqucnt ly r ounds out tlm p ic ture p-.intec? by t h e :nesszLcs. Tt~c s h o r t iness,?.;,os sorli imi'1cdi?.telq' a f t c r tho b a t t l e do not el i~i i in?. tc t3.c n c c c s s i t y fur b?.tt le re;:% ls. Tl~csc a r c t o b i m?.;?o ,-.s soon 2 s ;.cssiblo M t ~ rtho bnt t lc . Tkcreforc d u r i n ~ ; thc b,?.ttl.o i t i s nccr;ss?ry t o i-71 t c dw;!n tcmpor?.?:ilg- ?.i~d to orr:>nza c:?il?.t is l a t o r t o kc r ~ p c r t c d .

Orders and nessa;;es 1-hich have been issuet? dirrily; aud have i n f u e n c ed %lie er?;a;;er,~en.c , .,ri 11be inclu-ied i n t h e report or added as inc losu res .

58. I?Ievery hi.:;he r :leadquarters, silxla t ion ]raps o r e t o be keg t and the s i t u a t i o n thereon posted. Ace ~rf i in- ; to t h e needs thoy must d e p i c t the h o s t i l e e i ' ;~~at ion , our 01-m si'uatio n and inforrna t i on Of n e i g h b o r i r ~ uni t s . T ia se f a c i l i t a ' t e

Es iimate of s i t u a i j o I;. Decision.-- --.----59. iin est i i .Bte of t h e s i t c a t i o n precedes each dec is ion . It

demands r a ~ i d thou.,i.t, s iniple , ly;i c a l coiisidnration of the e s s e n t i a l d e t a i l~ , 0111 y.

60. Our mission is tlie b a s i s . 7e proceed from i t and d e t e r n i n e :rhat it p resc r ibes and h m ~ -;re car, b e s t accomplish i t .

Itn@:?len;-;e ana co r rec t a s t i l m t i o n of tile t e r r a i n inf luence t o a [;reat ex ten t the t a c t i c a l cons ide ra t ions an6 tile meaouren ; h i c h a r e t o be employed.

6 l i cons idera t ion of our ovm s i t u a t i o n detertninec :-rhere tho m i - t s ef t h e a t tached f o r c e s a re , :;.ich imnediately, Or l a t e r a re ava i lab le $'or thi. ercccution of t h e ,nission, if aldi. t i0 n a l f o r c e s a r e t o be expected, and T r h u t h c ~ we sl-1aU. be supported by adjacent un i t8 o r :jhether thcsc unj.';o a r e i n need of our support.

The previous a c t i v i t i e s and t h e condi t ion of the t r o o p a s veil a s tho anx~unit ion o i t u a t i o n ~ u s t be considered.

6 The h o s t i l e s i k a t i o n riiust be estinrited s imi l a r ly . Based on t h e information a t ! ~ ~ Z l d , ' ~ 6must consit: o r to v ~ h a t extent t h e eneniy can h inder our and a c t , ,vere ve t h e hos t i l e , i n t en t ions ho;~:le i ~ t ~ l d fc rcc . Such conziderafions m u s t not lead to biased preconceptions. 'ye must corisid e r tine e;:em.;.'s conduct to be t h a t rfior t disadvar, t a ~ e o u s t o '-1s unless .ire have a'i hand s.u'f"i ent in;'ormc-tio:! to the cont rary , which is-formation ind ich ie s a moat probkhle enemy a c t i v i t y .

Ordinar i ly ~ t e !imi~1t cons ider i n d e t a i l l-rhicil a r ea or ~hic1-1 l i n e t h e enemy can have ;-eathe&, \:hat evidences of h is s t r m g ti: and 0 r ; m i z a - t i o n ne have, an6 rihetl-icr 1.e can contifiuc h is movement.

I n l a r c e r . conx~~artds :-x? mu? t tonsid e r the h o s t i l e st r e e t and r a i l ne ts , t h e a c t i : i t y of h l s air f o r c e , h i s A.L. z r t i l l e r y a,ld h i s comr!iimic a t ions t roops .

The charac ter of t h e h o s t i l e l e a d e r and the hos ti l e t r o o p may be 11sei1i n estirra ti:-:< the t of t h e enemy, especial.1. y if 1-~eco~:.d.t~c have bad previous b a t t l e e;:perience lrith the se.

63. A r?i:tcrrcincd docision must be tho lo[ ; ical r e s u l t of cars fu l consid e r a t i o n of a l l fac tors .

Tile docisioi is i~iade : k l l riot a k ~ a y s corrcsportd to t h e a c t u a l condit ions prcsonted. -;l:en t h e s i t u a t i o n devolops ot l ier than t h e de- c i s i o n coritea~plated, ho bas tl:c Grea te s t prospect o-E succc.ss y:;ho quic$ly and :;!:illfully e r ,q lo i t s f w t h e r reconnaissance but does not diange the c'ocisi on except -iri-bli ~ o r a r e l l i n ; ~reasons.

Orders.-.---64. Tho O r d ~ r pu t s tbe dec is ion i 2 t o e f f ec t .

65. Clear orders a r e ari essent? .a l for the f r i c - t i o i i l e s s cooperation o f a l l conlmard ers .

66. For t?ie h..i;,ller c m a d . e r , the n r i t t e n order prcvides %he founda- t i o n f o r the leadership. I t is co;mui~icated to the l & e r u l i t s , p r i n t e d , a s a carbon copy, typi:~.:rl.t t e n or *:=itten by hairi or by technical i!onmmica-' t ions m a a s . Frequeiltly i t is d ic t a t ed a - e r t h e telephone. I n every in- staxice the most FUIC & su i t ab le m e t h a of t r ansn i s s ion is to be chosen.

bmb

http:cmad.er

Sl~ovJd the order be; sim~7le or dl or t , it may be o r a l l y corn-

nmnicated. I t must l a t e r , hm;evar, bc camg~iitod t o paper.

67. Ord ina r i ly , l w e r cca!maiidel.s use t h e o r a l order . Their

o rders a r e vr i t . l en i f .the wal. or the te lephonic order is not pos:?ible

o r i f tke o r a l order is i n s u f f i c i e n t or thera e x i s t s t h e d a n c ~ r 0;" i t s

i l ~ t e r c ep t i on.

68. The mcre prossin. t h e s i tua t io l ' , t h e s h o r t e r the ordsr. ..h e r e cir.cuinstances p e r n i t , o r a l orders a1.e :i ven i n accordance r;ii ti1 the

terrai!], not tlie map. I n t h e f r o n t l i n e s ad ~i i t in t h e 1m1er command::rs

i e t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so.

6s. Orders t rai lsmii te? ttro!ljh tec 'hnical comunica t ion means re-

o~ij .re&a vnr i ? i cu t ion a:ri ai i thei i t icat ion. It i,? recmme1:1,8ed t h a t Llir!

srdi?r s o ;iveii be ?:of@ated t o t h e scndor.

.. ., . i l th important orders it i 3 ofte>l ac?~iisaljlc t o use i7m or more means of trnnsmis s ion.

70. It is easy to m d e r e s t i ~ ~ B t ethe time r e ~ u i r e d t o go t a n 01-der

t h rouc l~.

I n indil:idual :~istaiices i t may be ;locossary for Ll-e coimaxider

t o 'convince himsolf of the d i s t r i b u t i o n &?d .(:>::scution of h i s or-rtor.

71. 3'00 o r d e r s , cs?cciall:i i n S d t t l c , c'urini; vih,icil t h e con-municatio n moans cay miscar ry , -prod.uccs the ?.anger of causin;; i n Jury to ind~pendc:icc of a c t i o n of la.!c;r co.~iian?,c-:s.

72. ;Lccordi!i:, to s;;ccial rc( ;ulat ions (;:::TI) ( s c c r o t ) orders corn-mflcnicatcd by r a d i o , v i t h the oxccpLi on of tlloso ca1~lir.f; for the i.m;~e?iato cooacratio n oi' t l ~ c mar, a r c t o be cncodc2; a l so thos c sent by t clep!lmc di' t h r o is Gian:;cr of h.ostilc i n t c r c c p t i on.

I n ::Xc c,ptional Cii"cw-lst.lr~c;?s -r,'rit-i;criOrders a r c g o r t l y or cr.t i r c l g oricodcd.

73. An crdcr s i ~ a t i lo t f o r thi! lot-lor 11 contz in r : l l is ; ~ c c ~ s s a r y corrnlmd older t o !ma-! in o rds r for h i m to c x c c u t ~ indcpcndontly his task. I t should contain no more. Corrospon~.iny;ly tl-c; bo brio f andordcr ~ n ~ s t c l e a r , dec i s ive i n tone and corn~lebe, adopted to the understanding of t h e r ece ive r and, accordin, to Conditions, t o h i s p e e - d i a r i t y . The conmender must never f a i l t o p k c o h i i s e l f i n t!le p c s i t i o n of the r ece ive r .

74. T:le 1an:;~ra;e of orders must be sir;iple and unders-tandable . C l a r i % , rill icli elininat0n,,?P3. ..doubts, is more il;?portar.t than c o r r e c t technique. C l a r i t y :vi~;st nct be s a c r i :iced for hrevi t y .

iie~::aa;tive expressloris and cl1tn:;es l e a d t o iml? messmes anC a r e object ionable . Z

77. E'or t h e :mint enailce of secrecy , t o r-!hat e x t e n t and to rrborn the i n t e n t i o n s ma:? be ~ a d eh a m cleii~zllds caref l? l considerat ion.

I11 s i ~ ec ia1 oi:era Lio :iii er:j a r e occasi or all:: i a s t r u c t e dcoX~~nu~.rl by means of s~ ciall:? ?n-i'i te-!! i n s t r u c t i o n s or bj- o f f i c e r s e q e c i a l l y s e n t t o t)r, var ious comr,!ali;iers.

For b a t t l e on a 1m;e s c a l e , h m e r e r , the r e map be no vitil-5.alili11; of t?~.oro?&:hiri icir1:a t i o n aud adequate a s s i;:p.mer;c or m i s s i o m , i n order t o secu re the coopergtion of a l l for the attain!ileni of tile coinnon zea l . *is the t t r o i p e n t e r b a t t l e t h e r e must be no doubt i n any cu~~zriarirler's !!iind a s t o t h e i i ~ tmti 011 of tlle hi;;li cornmmtl.

I n so f a r as t h e condi t ions permi t , i t ja of Len b e s t f o r the comimd. e r t o c l a r i f y hi:: i n t e n t i o n s to h is sirbardilia t e s by ::ori:roti5nr: orcic;rc jovcrn t!~c n c t i - i @ of the - I roop and include Tor con1ba.t 213~ si:r;i.cc :? ';!hicli t r 0 0 ~ ~tr??iil:: t ! ! ~ instrnctioi::; t h e n u s t Imor-J; TLC orders nro fits ii;n;:.tcd occor ; i i x t o t h c lssuln; connlond (mzr":y, corps, d i v i s i o n , ro:;jrent, o rder c t c . ) o r , if ~uii;~-.l;l;:, according t o tho t roop d i s t r i b u t i o n c?.?v,cnco gucrd, outp0s.t o rdor) or ?.ccOrdiW; t o t h e s c p ~ r c t c,?.rm ( n r t i l l a r y m 3 o r ) .

SO. T:lc !?ollorrin(. r,eqv

81. I t is of ts%? s?zita'~oleto isi;:ie :'ar?!ini arders . Tl!e mrnin;: order i r ! f a rm; at' t!ie l a t - s t develo~?men+s of the si'ua tf.011; i t is llsed to e f f e c t the moct L P ; ; ~ ~ ;> rep ra t io i i s ; l i l ~ b r i s e i-l i:;used t o peJr?it +die t r o o p to conk to rsfbt e a r l i e r ard also t o *,ern t o r e r t Lonf;or.p-e-r:~t

"ramin; orrli;rs (Vorhofeille ) a r c e c ~ j e c i a l l y ?lor tl~-;hil.e .;11-ien they can 'de t r a r ~ s k i t t e d o r a l l y , by te lephone or ratlio.

82. O Z t m tilo u ~ g e n c y of Mle s i t u s t i o n den?n?ands, f requent ly in i t simp:.er to isste, ind ib idua l orders. These a re e x t r a c t s of t t e ??hole order &d nlvs -:con ta in everg-Uiing t h a t t l ~receivir i ; comr:aiidnr 1i;;ls t ltnosi i n w e e r to execute pro:;:erly h i s mission.

n.1.n..._ a-ir:!! t k i n c i v i d u a l orders a l l the t r o o p a r e not given tne genera l p i c tu re . In l a r & : r opc,-at$J ns , the r::-.ols o rde r ( o p r a - t i o n s o r d e r ) must ;;e?Lerall:.~ r o l l e ~ , ; i n ntlicr i n c t m c c s it is ~ o c o i ~ ~ e l l i ~ dt h a t the in-divi6.xc 1 eomm.? cr:; be i i ls t ructe d concc rn iw tho most impor-lant f a c t o r s of tile I-tiole s i t ua t ion . "

83. In t i c " t ro oi, d i s tribl1,tion" ~;;!iich {.;me r a l l y i:: ;iv on s c ; ~ r a t o fl-om ttiu .;ordin,:, of i i l ~ o rde r , t h o t r o o w nro s!yccificd nccordi rs to arm i n tl lc follo*riiw ocqiri.,ncc:

?;ifantry, cavallr;~, ho~nso and motor. i-;connaissance batta!.io-.s, l o , tan::?, chs::uca~..troop, cn- ;;iilee;.n, 8a ;?iot01., o r - n i c s , r i d i -c a l and scturi.;iar,i troops, o t l ~ o r t roops ( a i ~f o r co and a n t i - a i r c r a f t ) .

I f thc iiarc'.~. scqu-cnce i? a l r eady n r i t t o n i n t i ~ c order , tho t roops a r c so dcsi;;r~atcd i n tho "t2oo;i d i s i r ro -d t ionW; the corrospolld-g t roop 0r;anization (main bod:;, advanco ;;uard, r o a r ~ u a r d )conta ins the adai t i o n ttaccordin;: to ma~c!l soq!ionccv. Liii~x-ris o i n a r c t i r anent t 5 c i;rUo]??:ar:> sir: cii'io d is1 i;mrc!l n oqui~nco.

84. A t tile mid sf t h e order t h e r e is noted ho:; and by '

87. B a t t l e orders i!~i.si:not be s t e r e o t ~ e d . Under cer tai i : condi-t i on6 a t'tro op d i r t r j . briti on r' r ey be 1;i.ore r; h a-love-, t.1.e com,la?der upon e n t r y i n t o b a t t l e , should ~~in t i lmd i f possible t h e s e u n i t s nornlal.ly wider h i s conm~&!d accmdizy t o the " t a b l e s oi' o r ~ ; a ! . z a t i o n ~ ~ .

3 - k_ethi?r. I.he h a t t l o mdnr be w - j t ten o r o r a l , 1rl:et1e r it be i n the f o r m o i i n . i i - v i h l orders or a s a f i e l d crdi?r, the co r~d i t ions&m.t d e t e i r n i i ~ ~ . Tile order nrdst ::uarartcc tkc i?.eeir3~d. ofc o o ~ ~ u r a t i o n a11 c l e - xen t s.

8 . S m c i n l ordcrs (a~u!.exes) complete the onera-tions o r d s r ;:itli 1-i:c;ard to those cletclih ~:ri?ici; a r e iiot of i r ~ p o r t m c c to t h c vllolc cc~.nand. They d e a l , a s f a r as i lccessaq?, with tile conduc t aacbivity of' individ- u a l FrinIC:, t h e ronlacc-:~or,t of xmnit ions, fiotcr vc;hiclr: care mil s~~llpl : i , ; ~ o d i c a l and veterir1ar.y sc rv icc , tho food supply, th: sugply oC arins , !iraterial urld cqui~~cic?nt, a n d som. timcs \-nththo concluc t oT tine fi.216. a:;d baggcge trsitls. Ca i s idc ra t i cns of spccd and b r c v i t y ir: t h c ordor u is - t r i b u t i o n niay makrc it advisable to inc lu i l : stlcli niat tcrs i n t h e o p c ~ a t i o a s ord i r .

Ot>Lci.:nsu, r i l l necessary orders iswsed by t1:e aomnlander on tb.e supply se rv ices a r c issued as . s , ~Z i a l oi-dem.

311 sp c i a 1 orders {;o onlly t o t h e co::lmad. concerned. If these comni!:: :lo not rece ive the ocerat ions o rdz r , t h e spec ia l order :mrst contain t h e necessary inf m i a t i o n ~ . I I ~ ~ - R S ~ O : , ~ .

. 8'3. D a i l y o rders ( c o r i : ~ . ,d i .jisiori, e tc . , d a i l y mii. i :~*s):.elate t o t h e in ter i . or ecoilo!-:~y oi.' t l ~ e com1laix3 , maior ia l s , personal 1ra t i iers , roccC;nitioils, e tc .

S t a f f ori?err, reilfi-atn t h e i n t e r i o r economy of '

- - - T~:aiismission of ordcrs and reyol-ts.

Connectioil be t w e n t h e Commder aid -$he Tm ops .

90. Orders ant1 :repor. ts, accoi-dii;: to 2is-Lance and condi t ioiis,

a r e t r ansmi t t ed by nnans of' technical means, in t l iv iduals , dispa tch

r i d e r s , pi~;eons or inesselqor 60;:;~.

Techi:ical si{;rjn?.imcuis st!ould !le orciploged .:ilx?n more r a p i d

transr?issio n is a ~ s u r e d ,an3 if secrecy is not jeo;:ardized. Yet, -Glie

t ransmiss ion ma;. r equ i re tlie m.plo:~xent 02' other means. Long orders

and r e p o r t s t r a n s n i t t e d by te lephone a r e mme r a p i d l y and secu re ly ac -

complished srllon t h e t r a n s n l s s i o n is from one o f f i c e r t o another.

91. I i i fher , occas ional ly 10~1ez comrfianders, sendcor~i~andors can

:OrT:r3rd, i n the d i r e c t i o n of t h e g r c a t i ? s t coii~.~uil advancedca t ion t r a f f i c , :nessai;e centers . Tilese save t roops and f a c i 1 i t a t . e $he transr;lissicn of ordors and re;,orts. The advanced nBss,xe ccntcr mst be e a s i l y found, secured , if poss ib le a;-.ins t hos t i l c ac t ion , an? connected positivc1.y wi th t h e commander. I ts posi-tjon rnl int bc 1:no:m t o t h e troops.

I n l a r g e r con~~ficu~ds " repor t nssanbly plnccs" ma:. be cstr .bl ished,

rrhicli, 7.1hen -properly plccod, s c v e both ccn ?nd tiino. %csc ii~ustbe

cquippcd v i t h t h ~ncccss,?r:! com;nunic,ztions ncims ?.rlmust bc s t r o n g cnou;;h

t o r o p c l a;iGm. Ecch i s 1u16ci: t!lc cammr.ndll orrcxjr r,.rou:.x. '1-.sncmbly l;lr.ce"

of ".n cap::ri?Lly soli.ctc!d. c f f i c c r , 7.-ho s i f t s tho incornin;, mc,ss?.,::os, end,

?.ccordin, to t h c i r ?.r.:port.r,cr;, ?o to t i r r ~ -?ld k ind , docidcs 2s t o t h c i r

r . r i . It .;;?y bc suit- .blc t o incorpor-.tc t!-L c o n t s n t s of scvcrs-.l

i;:coniiil;, rc2po~ts i n i o *tic 0:)-L;;oi,n:,.

9 Con~t?~ui?ic::tion'orit:;i?cn ?vi,-.tors and ; ; rou~d troops i s accomplished by Li&;l!t and si:;nnl r i e a ~ s , dropped ;iiessaL:es, pick-up s t a i i ons , and by radio.

93. On t hi: slafi ' 0:: 1;ii:her commneers a r e personnel reqni red f o r the tTa;isWissio?l 9f ordcrs. I n add i t ion i t ;lay be su i t ab le to a t t a c h , !>ermanmtlg or tmq?orar i ly , t o t h e hi;!ier co~:m.ar:ds or t o s t a f f s of mixed units ( d i v i s i o n , e t c . ) intiivifivals fro111 lo\-:er commands as "order rece ivers" .

The co1~11an3, or staff to vrhic h these "receivers* a r e a t tached p ro~r ides for t l ~ e i r r a t io i l i i~g and q ~ a ~ t c r i n : ; .

94. Considera1;ion as to t h e froilt l i n e stren{;t:i demazds modcra- -tion i n tile number of these "receivers" . U2on t k e co l~~p le t ion of t h e i r d u t i e s these ettacl?c:l jndlvi~dim1.s D.1 s e n t back to t , i o i r coruniulds.

95. -:Tier;: ;;cod and aaecluatoly secilro i7catsand s t r c c t s a r e a v a i l - :.b 10, automobile s , n~otorc:rc l e s ard bicycl.t;s ars c!n~loycd.

On o i , n roacls, on t e r r a l . n sfi.t!;cuA6 ~ o a i ~ , and abovc all. on t h e l > n t t l o f i o l d , horscr.lcn and m.nncrs a r c to be I-sod.

-l i t h 1.nr::cr comiands and over g r c a t c r distances, c i q l c n c s ccn

L C u f f o c t i v o i y usod . 96. It i s on1.y durin.; t h e advance i n t o b a t t l g t h a t lrmer conmallders

nay be assembler? by t h e k i che r cw11,imd e r or to r ece ive o r d e r s , t he reby f a c i l i t atin& t h ~ ~ D u r i q - : isoriia- transr,!ission. batt?& such procedur e forbidden.

9'7. 'men m. order or r e p o r t is t racs i : i i t t ed o r a l l y , tk.e one bear ing the m d e r or re;>or-: rfii.~t r e 2 e a t it t o tk ismlln; person. ,ipnrsoll t r a n s - rzittin;:: a r i r i t t e~ .r e l p r t should be i n s t r u c t e d as t o i t s con ten t s , i n s o f a r a s condi t ions pelmit. Off icer* t r a n s r r i t ' b i i ~ ordero should, a o a m k , be i n s t r u c t e d as to the t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .

98. If p m s i l ~ l e , j :~por t a? t orders and, r e p o r t s shouIW be salt by o f f i c e r s .

T:3~en t5.e o r d e r or r e p o r t is e ~ ; ~ ? c i a l l yimportant or ii?i!re is a questioil of a s s m e d a r r i v a l , t r a n s n i s s i o n by .various rou te s i s ac-v isahle . IJndel- suck cond i t ions , o r if tl-e r o u t e is very lone;, i t way be aclvisaole to send o f f i c e r s ~ r o t e c t e d by e s c o r t , nlounted t roozs o r armored vehicles .

99. T:?C cocr2m.d e r mt c 0 P ~ i dc r \-?here h i s comunicatjon can r each the receiver, and. he ialst i n s t r u c t t h e bea re r a s t o ~:llom the m s s a ( e is t o be de l ivered m d t h e rou te he should follovi. If necessary, a s l z t c h or i h t , r o u t e should be g i c en. At ten t ion should be c a l l e d t o e s r e c i a l l y d a n ~ e r o u s areas. So:::etinez it is necessary t o s::ecify u11en the x1essa:;e 'lust reach the r ece ive r , a t t!le l a t e s t . The bearor ixust bo ii ist;?uc&?d as t o Tihat he s h a l l do upon dc l ive r i l ?~ . of the comxunicatlon.

100. Ul'on s a i o r s , r.la:nted. ~ i e s s e n ~ , x s meotir!g keep the i r g a i t ; to h i ~ > . c r o f f i c o r s :;boy r c l o r t tb.e des t i i l a t ion of t h e i r mssa;s. As thny ~ i d r ; by a r~iarch colunil tl?ey l ika- r ia o report to t h e c m m a ~ d e r a 3 riel1 as to the advanco (-roar) C:uiai.d conl.mmdor; a,? thr::! pass sccu r j ty f a rccs -t?.cy r e p o r t to tile i learest col-~!r:wd er . I:i s e r i o u s or tllreatenin:; sitzl.at ions they c a l l out t h o contelits of '&LC inessai;e to t h e coimardcrs and t h e tloo:!s. They rnmt be inst_*ucted to a;;!? for the loca t ion of the corilr~alder t o 7:ihon t3.e ordeer or messqe is direc-bed. B i c y c l i s t s conduc t thenselves s i n i l a r l y t o nooiu?ted r;essw.;;ers. >'roc. ~ i o t a r c y c l e riessengers the con ten t s of i.lessai;es cannot of ten. 3e denailded.

Hj.&her corma;ders and cormmders of reconnaissance b a t t a l i o i l s a r e au thor ized t o reod riessa.;es yassi11;; imst n o t unduly-then, b i ~ t +,i~:i de lay i t s t r ansn i s s ion . They r l w t n o t e on the i z s sage t h a t they have learned of i t s contellts.

A l l colxm~~d Lo ~ o i i l t o?it -the ?lily t o c r s a r e er: joined r.lesscilgers , a l l tr o olx t o nalco i-lay f ol> r2Bssengors. Every element i-.ust a s s i s t i n getti!lL the mssaze i,hroq;h, if necessary b:r ~ r o v i d i : q trans-;;ortation facilities.

101. ;is a r u l e one or more c r c s s e s pJLaceci 011 t h e nessage o r i ts conta iner i n d i c a t e s tile speed bo be xaiii taii led by counted ,mssen;ers:

x = one k i l o n e t e r i n 7 t o 8 r l inutes .

xx = one k i l o n e t e r i n 5 t o n inutes .

0 If necessary , t h e q e e d of b i cyc le and 110torcycle i;lessen:;ers is indj.cated i n !:ilo!lecers per bour.

103. -:llxer. tile t ransniss io i ; of messages and orders nust be i:iade over long d i s t ance aild t rar isr i iss ion b'r si&aal-,leans cannot be assured , i t m y b e c o r ~ necessary t o e s t a b l i s h d i spa tch r i d e r pos ts .

"Dispatch r iders ' ! :?ay be ruumers, r.iounted nesselli;ers, b i c s -c l i s t s or m t a r c y c l i s t s . i s o r i s t i . RUILI?~TSand mwntod riesser.{;eTs a r e t o be used oriiy if b i c y c l i s t s and n o t o r c y c l i s t s a r e not ava i l ab le or if t h e t e r r a i n does n o t p e n l i t t h e i r usc.

1 The d i s t ance bet\-men "dj. spa t& r i d e r " pos t s depeads upon the lenfitl l of t!r? ilistance to be t r ave r sec , t h e purpose of the ' f d l s p t c h l i n e w , and t!?e condi t ion of t h e roads aad t h e termain. The s t r e q t h of the post,s is deton.linod bg t h e i r du ra t ion , tho m o u n t of c o ~ ~ w . i c a t i o r . t r a f f i c , and t h e necessary l o c a l s e c u r i t y .

105. C a r r i e r pifieons and riessenger do

106. Tlie l?i:.>he:: cor.Tand is res::onsible for c o r r m - ~ j c a t i o n -to *lie lower, f o r the cons t ruc i ion and r.i:~ntenance +hereor.

Co!lr 7.ullic aTia n be b:/een r?ei ;;:ibori i?; o ie ien t s is t o be i n -au:.;urated ax1d rmi i~ ta in~cd jYor; t h e l e f t , ~ u ~ l e s s ordered.other'.!jse liOr?-

ever , t h i s does not rele:ise t h - e l e r e n t of the ri,Jlt f r o n t!.e duty of

establishin:; co:.:nlujlication t o the l e f t , i f t~is cor.?;lwicatioi? is lackin;;.

107. I n 1.ar~:er c o r n ~ a ~ d s t h e hi;;heY c a x ~ a n d s r :lay n i sxa tcl- l j a i s o n o f f i c e r s t o a t tached ~or.lnad.s a:ld to iiei;hbori:?: 'zits. These office?.^ inforr i the wnits to !-;;.:Tic!? sent of the i r t m t i o r i s o f t h e i r com.18nd-r and acquai?!t t hen riitl: the s i t u a t i o n . Iil addi t io l l t o c l e a r perceptiol: a?ld independent jud,.:.;!ei!t tlicae o f f i c e r s (;reat jnilital3, t a c t . r e q ~ ~ l r e :~15?.boi~ f r i e t j o n , they sczi: t o a s c e r t a i n t h e ?::t:?~?tions a?id sr'ders uf tlle csalanders to {-$.or: they a r c s e n t , anti, before sendin; their r q ? o r t s , t o tori.' incc t l i a ~ o e l v c o vrha ihjr i??

Tie d i v i s i oil comrmd c r adv-m ceo by bounds . Tilero is almqrs a :;orse or noto]? vd~ih;cle at h is dis;!os al!. Tile rer.?air:di?r of the s taf f fo1lff;is i n t h e march. colimm untl.1 it is ordered f'srvlard. Reports m i i t be able to roach t h e d i v i s i o ~ l commander quickl:r and a-t 62 .1 t i m s .

113. Sho11l.d co:.ltact :ritil ti:^: enen:r be i-mminent, t i le d iv is jo n \rielcornnand e r r m a i n s t h e arlva ced (;ua?d. I t i s t h e r e the s i t ~ l a t i o n

first brealrs and tiiere c a r lie e x e r t more u c r i in?!.uczce.

ils contac-t i s J-.~;c: nust i .c in- diccm.tod to t17.o ~i~;i:~?..l i n ?.n;>!c: Pro?~j.sion la i s t bc iii?.uu f o r o f f i c e r timc.

tho for;:;rdin;: t o t l : ~ r s r , of ordcrs 2nd r c p o r t s rcccivcd a t tki: uld

c or~mi?.rrd ]?os i.

115. I n the p i r s u i t t ho cornn?m~< ;:r inm t be f?u'tk:er i'or1:ard. Isis alipearailce ar-.on; the nioc t advanced air- .?ents srurs the troops t o the p e a - t e st exer t ions .

116. Slio1iZ.d na-! oon~'cmt impend a f t e r t1i.c e a r l i e r cor;ibat has been broken o f f , tlie divis- ion com;lander be takes himself Lo -the a reas of the ner: l i n e of resir , tance, a f t e r he has c w i n c e d hinisoU t h a t h i s orders f o r -the f i r t l i e r conr,uct of the t r o o p a r e beink c a r r i e d t1rou;;h. I n d i f f i c u l - t s i t u a t i o n s he remains x i i th the t r o o p . , Unless ordered otker7:risc, lo~?:m c:>r~x~i&e r s always raisin v i t h the troops.

. .

117. The command p o s t of the hi;;& r corrimm~der and -tkc m y t i le re to m u s t a lvays be r eco tp izab le by day and by ni:$~t. The C.P. fla: f a c i l i t a -t ~ sloca t ing i t , b-dr it n1.st be concealed from t b e cnec~y.

P lv t oct ion ar:ain:;t ,w ;> r i se a i r or ;,rmnC a t t a c k s fro?^ a i l d i r e c t i o n s must be ;:reparc&. Considerat ions of s e c m i t g Gay f o r c e t h e l o c a t i q ; of tilo C.P. vit l l in t h o p ro tec t ion oi' ib.c fi*g:tin& troops.

I . Tkr? c o r r e c t coni i inat ioc of tho staff and tho suitable d i s t r i b u -t i o n of t a s k s a r c @ c%,:ccial impo;.taricc. Tb.e hii!icl. f u n c t i c ng t a f f s i n~~ . s t . t h e prc:scrib cd stl-2n:;th.

A t t h e c@i~maadp o s t ,-recaut5.ons n.ust bo takmi and s t r i c t rci ;ulat ion or' the ::i>rl:: r!iust he cxercificd i n oriir:r to ~ ~ 1 a r a n t c . o arida ~ u i c t s u r c l c a d c r n t i p and t.) avo id piacing the bur dell^ oi' d e t a i l s on t h e camlander.

119. If t h e c;ml;a.ndcr loaoos the comtland p o s t , the Chief of staff bt cc>mus h i s r c p r o s m t a t i v c thorc.

Rcaort No, 14,576.

-17-

120. ?c!conn&. ssarice ~?-.a 11a:: quLo!tly, c onpie t e l y and r e l i a b l y a s j?ossihle , provi:?e a pic i:.xe of the h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n . The resul';s 0:f r econnas :;ante fo r% tk jnos t important bac is fo r the ?.ecision and the u t i l i z a t i o n of t1-e force.

121. The Secmiialssance i s de:;ifpaiea a s t a c t i c a l and s-trate:;ical reCCllnais:;a~ce, ground and a i r . It is aii~pli?iied by s ~ e c i a l riea:?s a s i r i ~ i c a - t e d i n oars. LC4 LO 189.

2 S : ra teg ica l rcconnaissa:ice provides the has is f o r tl?e ctra-tngi r a i d e c i s i on.

The t a c t i c a l recor.naj.ssm.ce pr w i 5 e s the bas is f u r -the t a c t i c a l lniiders??ip an.?.coildiic t of t h e t roow. .- 'ace; i :ilurt t a c t i -i t Lhe c a l recunnaisaar.ce 1)o~:n -::iLh contact . I t forms the basin fo r t l ;c conduct of thc cni;ac;cmc;nt. I t i.s pnrt j .c iptc!d by a l l orl:?s.

1.2. So %me -troors should b ~ :mployed f m rrcoiinnissancr; r , -~ rposes than a r e r;ecer,sar:r.

The rcconnais sxce f m c e c ore ear ly c onccn i i a l ed i r l t h e nics t impor tmt d i r e c t i o n , e spec i2 l l - j if IN: !mst rocicon v i th s u p r i o r l l ~ ~ ~ i l t : rccon:lcissn:lcl:. I n oill,:.~ d i r e c t i o n s only ihc most oflflcntial a r c c::lploy~d.

,"m 2ndcr.vrr c,l-ould he 1;:iidc to h.:.vc r c s c r r c . rcconn?.issnnce ~1.cmcrits ;:.hich c -11 hc c~;ployed to r c j n i c r CC? oc i;id cn t l ; c: ri;c!c!nr!-.?c s?ncu i n o f f o c t , o?, i c s s r t o h c smt i n 2 ?;cra i r ~ c t i u n .

1.24. 313c?riorit:; iil: a reconnaissance a rea lig!! Lens ozr t a s k , makes more &rficr,li t h a t of t h e er:w,j.

TIE .:linninf; of reconnair; oance supe r io r i ty 011 t h e yround is m a t e r i a l l y ai6ed by a ~ f : r e s s i v e cond.us:t a;;ainst the hcsti.!.e reconnais-: ; a c e mi;:;. 2kcoi.dil;~ t o tk,is, a l l recon;ialnsaxce units dffm to t h e p a t r o l s so con61.lc t t?.eh!selveo, i n so far as the r:~:ll.ssion and s i i u a t i o f i permit.

If reconnais aance batta!.icn.s a r e forced , i n order t o e f f e c t tha i r missions, t o broak throuy;l~, t h c 1imtil.c reco::naissance or s e m r i t y fo rces , they quickly concent ra te the i r for cos and d r i v e through. Should the enemy be suoeri r )r , our mission can ofte;! he:;t be f uli 'i l l e d by de lay ing ac t ion b e f o r e tlie m.eny and e n c i r c l i n g him.

:,my cauairy mj- bo eirployed ef f cc t lve ly for ti1 i.s e~.cir.cle- Inen 1. Should ai iiiido~ser:der:i moLorizeil r.eci)ni:?ii.s nal.ce b a t t a l i o n he eid- . ,ployed for t h i s I ir; m o t ha t i ~ n e l y xi~!?'cr cod by o thor rwtorizcd elel-,ent s .

Sor~~dti?Ds,Y;G can gain. suc?riori:y by e a r l y surpr i s c oc-C I i r F I t i 0 r. of inpcr tar.t t e r r a i n poini;s . Accalls o r,f l;h G j P r spesd, motorized fo rces a r c mi% t ,mi2(, ah].

Should it be r\ecessar:y 'Yo assim to a zecsr~naiscance b a t t a l i o n sin:ulta?~olisl:~r t h e !-aissicn of a i:econnais s a m e and csunter rrc.il;na>~ssancn ( s e c u r i t y ) , tile:^ t h arder should c!rpli .cit ly s t a t e .i?lich. ] ; a s prece:lence. In for ccs of sufi'icien4t s i z e , a ;~?r+,i~on~2ayhe a ~ s i m e d each task .

1 2 . The reco?!n.aisnance of $.he t e r r a i n , i ts n e i o t i a b i l i t y , t h e CCn& t i o n d tl~!e roads, r a i lyoads ;ir:d o r i d yen, o:,? ~ a c l o p r s s i b i l i tie o , :)'i:sei.vai;io :I p a i n t s a d c w e r , ao 1- ell a s ex i r t i n & comaunic a t i n n i ' a c i l i -t i e n o.se f r cquen l l y ass i ,Te d a s tasks f o r t:le roci.nriai ssari ce elc;mo;its.

-.!ith;>ut :;,recia1 o r d e r s , and iil so f a r nc: t h e ::ituatj.on c:ld AL L . ~,. a r c ,:fit11 t:~;.rai.i?r?issb:! porn%.;;, a l l rocc>maissanco aser.cios c i ~ n : c ~ ~ d rcCo:llalssC.'~11C~

A i r !j?:r,trjgrapki:: ai6. ail< cl;-.b erci;,; ;'cr,c,nncis:-jr::co.

2 Tho !:'.:rii;s of rir rcccl;~::.-.iss,?.? cc P.r.2 tho s r c cd si' t:!r 1~1-~ ics , ?>: c!ir p,'l, ili .!-T, t,. a .y i-vi~tf l i t s a frcqui:'lt, Ti'csc a r c r i . L l i r i ihed t o ar,y p a r t i c u l a r !:zur+s.

Thc iW.;c arc? n a i c a t niglkt and the g r e a t e r ?:?a.tilc m~~i . ie :? . l , s . .d.ofcnsc r:ma;:ur st: tr:c ~:~or,cytakcs corlz~-,t!:~ da:: , tPjc n;.Tc r,ose nsary

bi:ciirs1is 1:it:li; air :cccc~r.nais i$i~?,.t s a c is viu21i*l ro-sanc c , r~c , ? i~ : l a i s coniiaissaccc o t 1::) cl.ovati?ns, as:;istcd by var ious i-:loas dr' i l l u n ~ i n a t i o n . It ccmnat c:m!pr:!sa?'o f?r dayli~:!>t rcconnaiscancc. I t is l i m i t e d tc , !-!ell dcf iilod a116 i>cloily roco.3-:i.zod lanSnn:;-l:s , ol:c h nc oti:oo-to, r a i l x ~ o a d s C~ld n a t c r ci!zirsct; ,%:d i-!rrofc:ri: i s r c s t r i c t c d to l i ini tcd tml ts .

Recon;ai:;oance S l i c h t c made i!i t h e ea::l.r morninr; o r l a t e evening l ~ z y i3entij':., t h e co!a.ple t i o n or '3 eginnii-.c of a iliglit mov =tent.

IZO. ..ir phot o j raphs c u,iplm.e.ont and coilfirm the v i s u a l roconnais- sacce. The hi:;her the p lane must f l y , the more necessary i s the photo- :;ragh. The a i r p h o t o ~ ~ a p h i;f 'E:e ere?,ly, or our ai:,nprovif ies i n f a r n a t i c n 0 '~ z r ee f f e c t a?d ?~fcm.od:?i.ace. T'ie photograph is of l i t t l e i1:lportauce ','her, 'the nee2 i s im:;ediais and t h e b a t t l e ob jec t ive photogral,h is of tenl-pora1.y inpor t m c e .

P!>~io~ r a ~ l l s the t e r r a i n and a s s i s t prc-c i d e i n f .-:rrna t i o r af

i n neaswer~lent s ( a r t i l 1 . e ~ : ~ .f i r e ).

,iir phc'cocraphs a r e talren i n s e r i e s or as ind iv idua l p ic tures . Gocd p i c t u r e s r equ i re 'ori~l.?; d a y l i @ t , t h c i r develcpmnt dexlards time. "or h a t t l d recc;i!?rAs sm cc pm:>ao e s resqult s from a s m a l l numhor cf pic cures can i.c rcg- : r tcd iri one t o t\;o baurc. The p rcya ra t i cn of cxtc?:sive pic-t u r e ~.:T tho t a c t i c a l rcconn-3s 3ancc r cqu i rc s k~ti. f iv e haurt;. Fcr stratc;;icnl. purp:'scs, requi r ing i: g r e a t n b c r af pictures, r c m l t s can he c::~cctcd iir abcu t ton c r iwro hou.rs. The dmcl:!l;l:~cnt is r.ncic a t tile a i r p o r t or a "development" c a r aay be advanced to t h e lariding f i e l d o r i n proximity t o t h e col:.r!land :post of t h e com~ander .

1314 ;LS a m l e , g r a n d reconilaissanco cannot sccurc a pic t i r e deep i n the hcs t i l e a r e a , Tlie air recoim.aissaRce often d i r e c t s ttL'e ground Teconnaissalz e t o tile nos t dec is ive a r e a for i t s a c t i v i ty . Only jiro-md reconnais s ame can d e t e n l i n s if a g iven t e r r a i n a r e a is a l?so lu te ly zmoc- cupind by t h e ent?r.ly. Groulld reconnaissance f o r c e s can, by ,pisonern taken, throw:h v?o~;~id.eda13 dsad, by other id6nti.f i c a t i o n s , deterinine the h o s t i l e t r o o p co~lpos i t ion . Only grcund for ccs can ;'laintoin continu.ous coa tac t , detelrxine the d e t a i l e of tim hostile activit: , , learn t h e s t r e n g t h and corlpositioo ard perl;a,ps t h e b a t t l e vror t h of t!lc er:cng, and e a r l y l c a r n of gassed arcc.s. Likevnse ground f o r c s s caa opc:ratc mdcr rrcaiher condi t ions v!hich ;a&c i rq~oss ib l i . or very i l i f f j c l i l t Wc o y ~ r a t i o n s of c i r rcconnaissancc.

3.32. ?dfo.torizod rcconnoissiu-.cc brittz.?.:i.ions pmcuro quickly c::d a t &rcr.t i l i s t?nccs , rccon:1,".ir,s?.ncc results. % l ~ e y s ? i l lnot be ab le alv~ays 'GO i den t i f q d e t a i l s . Tlieir a c t i v i t y is norr.~all:; l i r l i t e d t o day l igh t hours; advanccs can be r%laado at n ight . Th.e use of s t r e e t s t a k e s advantage of' t h e i r si2ee8. Tlley shoulCL be ;lade independent of m r e s lm?ly r.larc!ling reconna-i ssan ce furceii.

The accor.plisl.r;ent s of noi:erized reconilaissance b a t t a i i o n s a r e depencent upon t h e ca;!abilitie s of t h e vei-. ides, upon the rep lenish- ment o!' IUc1, ugon z t r ce t and road conCitions, t e r r a i n , .leather, day l igh t and esne c i a l l y uyon the y o s s i b i l i t y of u.tili:iia:,i: the i r o.m and exis tiw; ?:]ear,s of co!:r.~uni ca-ti oils.

133. 1 ieun t e a reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n s Lave tho advan tq;e of @ e a t e r n o b i l i t y a c r o s s t c r r a i n and t h e a b i l i t y of t ravel l in( : i n a l l d- ircct ie ns and t o considerable di., t w c c s . They a r c l o s s de;-endcnt on '-!cathcr, t errai i i and sup11ly tkar. not or ized uni to. Their speed am? i~larc:? capaci ty a r c l i n i t cd . They a r c Oblc; to oLservo t!lc eller.ly f roc1 covered pos i t i ons , to L'orci a clos o r.?esiicd reconnaissct7.cc n e t acd , wl,a i: is of g r e a t e r va lue , t o d c t c n ~ i n c d e t a i l s to n g r c a t c r ex tent .

134. The :;reatest der inds a r e placed sn the leaS.ers of all e f iq lqed reconnaissance a:jeEcies, dmrn to inc lude ],at??o:i. l eaders . The p e r s o n a l i t y 0" t h e l eade r is u!? dec is ive i r q o r taxce. Cra f t ines s , Bexter i ty , under-s tanding of the s i t u a t i o n , deteril ined m a - m n t i n eve ry t e r r a i n , t e r r a i n resourcefulrioss by day and n izh t , cold blooded;leso, q ~ i c l s and independent conduct mlst be doi:~anded.

A l l co;.ria?ders a r e respons ib le t h a t coxtac t once gained i s not l o s t , i n s o f a r as the n i s s i o n does not otherl-rise p e s c r i b e . Contact i-lhich is l c s t should be rega ined i r ~ l e d i a t e l y .

135. The di::positio~? of tho recollnaissance iyoacie s is de$:tdmt upon t h e s i h m t i u n , t h e coI.uPiander's i n t en t io l l , t h e killd and nur.&er of agcncics , and t h e l ~ c s t i l c counter reconnaissance ':nth v h i c h n c r u t ruclron, u.pon the t e r r a i n , upon t h e road and s t r u e t n e t , upon t h e td.10 of t h e yuar and of thc day as : /e l l a s upon tho I-ioathur. So r.m:y p o s i i b i l i -t i c s cxis t f o r c x c c ~ ~ t i o n reconnaissance r?As oions of t:a t no p resc r ibed conduct c m bo l a i d d0v.m.

Hcport No. 14,570. -20-

http:ent?r.ly

81.1 reconnaissance aGenc i e s !lus t be uni T o r a y ( f r o ~ l one head)

er~plojrod.; 0nL:r in t h i s i-;arlne r can t hey e f f i c i e ~ i t l y rrorlc together and

d e l i v e r a co~:r;ilete 13icLure of t h e ene;:::!.

A l l reconnaissance r e s u l t s a t hand r?us t b e u t i l i z e d f o r t h e

firthe r e!ly,lo:rr~.eut of the agencies. Only i n t h i s r-lanwr is the? unnecess-

a r y el-lploynent of reco~maissance ileans aTrciided.

The qu.%ti t:' of reconnaiosnnce ina;>s e.lployed i s not the

r1ecisi~-c f a c t a r i n t h e pmcurenent of v a l u a b l ~ . i n fa : i a t ion . It is of

ut i lost ir:ii>ortance, oir t h e o ther hand t h a t e . v e p a j ency kncu ud.iere t o

sen6 i ts rel;or'ts and tha-la.t it be instructecl t l~a*oil@ilg a s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n ,

the c o~:u:i.and o r ? s i n t e n t i c n and ab mi; &endies p ~ e v i o u s1:; sent out and those

adjacent +

137, i.:!issions ;iven rccbnnaissanco agencr.corii:iandors riust be s:iar:>ly def in td arld ti!!?:r r~i ict s t a t e thosc po in t s ~ l h o s e estab1ishi:ients or ic icz t i f ica-t ion is t o bc: indo m d t i ic soqucncc of t h e i r i;lportancoi

138. Thc h i ~ i ~ o r who orders an2 s p e c i f i c s t h e en-.lploy:~ont c o ~ x ~ a n d c r , of a i r and cround rccorin:iissancc a l so rogu la tos co:x:unication bctvocn t h c txm. Hc ::ia:i a l so or.

Reports or f l i e r s n0rmal . l~ a r e sltbmittod a f t e r t h e r c t u r n t o tlic a i ~ d r o m c or iandinf; pla co. Ths:? a r c trar!sri&t26cd by phonc , ~ , i o t o r i i c d rcssm::crs, or c x c q t i o n a l l y by radio . Undcr s p c i a 1 cirnlrn- s t a i con tilo ohacrvo? milk3e a pcruonnl v ipo r t . Im?oratcnt olm.c:i-ts of tho rccon~oiss?a lcc s:io?lld be rcpor tod qu ick ly ox3 bofor c: the o n t i r o rol:or C is rcbAmittcd4 .is for thc r o p o r t , it should h c writ t m , i n c l e a r , concisc, but compli:-to .i'omii Eo$)or.ts from thr: 131:lnc z?c> ncdo by r a d i o or droppcd r,lesiicgos.

R e c o ~ n a i ssance b a t t a l i o n s , lack in^: an e x i s t i n ~ ; comunica t ion l i n e , employ the r a t i o o r m t o r i z e d ressengers . 1Iounted b a t t a l i o n s , i n case 4i' necess i ty , use mowted messengers. llo~lnted patro1.s re?or t , a s a .".?ule, Sy sea.= of mounted rc~essengers. i iotor - or L i c y c l i s t s may 50 a t tached o a . r ~ i s t i n g . cornmunication f a c i 1 i t i . e ~ shou1.d be u t i l i z e d . Zspe cia1.ly Lmpor'tant mounted p a t r o l s may have r ad io o r "Blinl;erl' equip-men t a s s icgned.

Ba t t l e reconnaissance r e p o r t s of ten a r e 0.f vallre only if they can be employed i i~i i~eir ia~tely ofLo t h e g e a t e r e f fec t iveness t h e vmapons employer!.

1'5. Rccause? of i r ~ t e r c a p i ~ i o nthe danger of tho unlimitei", o r very extensive enp1o:mont d' tile r ad io i n t k e reconnaissancu a rea m.lst be ;:ovcrncd S y the hi:;,ier command. Should "radio s i l enco" be orrlured, o Lhcr ;:leans of corm;ll.mication m a t 5e maintained to g u a r a i t c c tile t r a ~ s m i s s i o n of i ~ forinati m..

3 Tho s t -a tc f ; ica l rcconnaissanco crhibraccs t?13 olisorvation of t k e h o s t i l c concontrat ion, p r t i c u l a r l p h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o i ~ by r a i l , h i s ad~ranco o r roan-lard march, t ho l a d i n g or mlccdin@ of army c1cii:ont s , t h o cons t ruc t ion of f i c l d or pormmlcnt f o r t i f i c e t i o r i s and thc h o s t i l c a i r u n i t conccntrat io n. 'Tho carl:! idont i f ' i c a t ion of l c rgo hoa t i l e mot o r i zcd c l c ~ ~ i i t i s impor-Lnnt.s , cs:~o c i c l l y thos c on an open :'lank,

Generally, the s t r a t e g i c a i a i r recornaissance i s one of photographs talcen a t a l t i t uc l e s betveen 5,000 and 8,000 mators. The depth of t h i s rec onnaissanco may exter.d t o t h e l i m i t of the fli2:k.t range.

Slloilld !re not ex$ect an earl;. meeting rriTi-ih the eneiry on t h e ErOlmd, it n$y be s u i t a b l e t o draw upon t h e 3 z l y reconnaissance echelons ( a i r ) f o r s t r a t e g i c a l reconnaissance, t h e s e i n a d d i t i o n t o the s p e c i a l a i r force echeloas. 'Tile am>- ecke1c)ns have p lanes of l e s t range, l e s s speed, l e s s rapid asccn t c a p a b i l i t y .

145. Independent mcto*.izeri r eco r~ la i s sance ba t , t a l ions and arrny cavalry a x employod for s t - a t e g i c a l ground j?ecm~nsissance. h q v cava l ry is w e d p re fe rab ly f o i open f lank3 and i n d i r e c t i o n s 1-1hel.e i ts l a t e r b a t t l e employment is probable.

146. The ~ r i i ~ c i p l e s t r a t e g i c a l reconnaissance a re iil g e n e r a ls of tllcs c of t a c t i c a l ~econna i s sance .

Since? t h e missio rs ass ifpiid s t r a t e ~ i c a l a i r recomtlissallce a r e g e n e r a l l y l ic l i tod to tbe obaervation of important roads and r a i l r o a d s , the. assi,pment of rocoraaissanco a rea6sc ldom. comes i n t o qucstj.011.

Rcp0i-t NO. 14,578.

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As a r u l e , independent motorizei: t . l~ctal ioi lo and armyc a ~ i a l r u ~ a r e assigged only a diyec-tion and an object ive. If neceosar;, the!. :nag-he assic.ned b m n d a - i e s on one o r bo th flanlcs.

147. he t a c t i c a l reconnaissance er,l.braces t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n or f ix ing of the accezbly of t h e ~eneuyor h i s ad-;axe as i t approaches near- e r u s , h i s or;;anizatio~i, e i s t r i b u t i o n , ex tens ion i n b-tadth and de:.th, liio supply , h i s p o s o j b i l i t y of rcinforccmcnt , hi.n a i r s i tx ia t ion , os-.pcciaLiy as t o n(il:: aoi.rdrorncs, an6 hj.s nix dcfi:nse.

Timely r e p o r t s of h o s t i l e mo.tor.izod olcnLnis a r c very

irnpor t a n t .

Thc d(.,gth of tho t a c t i c a l r e c o n n ~ i s s a n c e d ~ p c n d s upon tho

s i t u a t i o n and t h o c a p b i l i - t i c s of t h c agc ic i3s .

For t h e w2loymcnt of t i c t a c t i c a l rcconnaissancc acencies ,

o s p c c i a l l y a s t o t h c i r d i r e c t i o n , the r e s u l t s or the s t r a t o g i c a l rocon-

. naissance should l.c u t i l i z e d , providcd delays a r c not occasioriccd tt1.c roby. Should t h i r i be no s t r o t c g i c a l rcconnaissancc, 'the t a c t i c a l rcconnais- sancc agcncics rust kc sun t fulrthcr t o ~ r a r d s and around t h e cncqf.

'The n c a r i r nr, apgroach t h e cnnily, tbi: .?lore is do ta i l ed

rcconnaissan cc nu cc;srary.

14C. A i r t a c t i c a l reconnaiosance is executed by t h e reconnaie-

sance echelons of h e arm:..

T a c t i c a l round recom~aissa:r:ce is c';;ccuied by m.otorized

seconnaissar,ce bat tali or:.^ and by ~~ooimtedreconnaissar?ce b a t t a l i o n s ( o f

Arniy, Cavalry and. hi'an+;ry Uivi s io n;; ) .

Note: Tile I r f a x t r y Division reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n as s e t

up a t p re sen t c o n s i s t s of: onc Cavalry Squadron. (4ner ican t r o o p ) , one

b i cyc le cori~pail:r, one heavy rachine [,un p la toon, oitl:.er pack or f o u r horse

drat;nl., and periiaps a tau!: dei'ense platoon (3 tan!: defense guns) . The

mounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n is organize3 t o provide the utinos t

t a c t i c a l mobil i ty .

14.9. The &my commander and the Corps or Cwalr ;. Gorp commander

einploy ilre reconiiaiuuance b a t t a l i o n s Lmnediatcl;~ under t h e i r coi~mand

a a = , t h e cooperation of these -;rit11 reconl-,aissance f o r c e s of sub-

o rd ina te un i t s .

The cava1r:r d i v i s i o n c m l a n d e r may exploy h i s motorized and

h i s lllounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n one behind t h e o t h e r , o r finploy h i s

mounted b a t t a l i o n to t h e f ron t and t h e motorize3 from one ring a g a i n s t

t h e 'flanl: of the enex-g. Arsy caval ry 1iwtori::ed b a t t a l i o n s should be

uoed to the utmost so t h a t t,he mounted Fati-ali.ons ;nay be held toge the r

f o r b a t t l e .

150. The t a c t i c a l a i r reconnaissance is usua l ly Fade a t he ights

froin 2,000 to 5,000 r ~ e t e r s .

.'is a r u l e , reconnaissance a r e a s a r e assi&ned t o t h e recon-

n&issance echelons. For t h i s purpose ind i catca p laces and l i n e s a r e

i nc l r~dedi n the bouildaries of both n u t u a l l y ad jacent elenients, o r over-

lappire a reaa a r e asci6;ned. Air boundaries a r e not dependent upcn t h e

boundaries ass igned ground troops. Echelons on t h e flard: a t the sme

time execute recorulais sance a g a i n s t tile hos ti i e flank.

Roport KO. 14,578

11. The o r d , . : ~ of a rcco:maissancez ivcn tlio c o m , ~ ~ ~ i i o ~ - a i r , cchelon 1;.1:? c o n t ~ i ni~ ildditio n to thc r!i.c;sic\rl: I n s t r u ~ c t i o n s a s to : (1)cornm~~ica- t ioan& iri'or:mtio n t r ansn~ i s s ion to tho P:i@ii r casiia::dern r;na t o rccor!ilnissailcc b c t t o l i o n s , ( 2 ) s p a c i a l i-,:.;ssn~e d e l i v e r i e s , ( 3 ) t!u rout ? ( s ) of t h e naii-I. force and rocon~ioissa i~ce ba t t - l i ons t i t i c s of a r r i ~ a lor d 6 ; ~ m t u r c of t l lese e l e ~ c n t s , cind ( 4 ) 1.ondi.l~ pl.2cssi 'l'hc ooijoion coammiai- o s s i ~ 3 s t2si:s t6 Lhe v::rioiii: ,I':.ici-s : x d exlrl:$ns tkn s i t u a t i o n , c t c . s p c i f io s tllc fl i i r s ) c : - l i a l z r &tii:s, dcciclcB ux!or- t i lo p1c;nc.s to b~ cr:p:Loyci'~ 2nd t h o tlinos of i'li[,i!t. icorr!l.lly, the riio-!- c'looscs t h e routcr

1 5 . The rnconnaiasarca i':Liers aa a r u l e are ai;>l~:~nfl j5ili',iii~li,l:r and a t those t i n e s d~~r i r ic ; tho n3n: favo;.able i . esu?~ts t o ;:o .:hie!: a r e expected. T:?e-,i a.;oid a i r co in~~at . ;:e!co!inals :;ante arid a l laclr (pursu i t ) planes r;ay b e des !%tclicd s i r~u l t ancous lq .

153. C e ~ e r a l i y , reco:;i~.aissance f l i e r s :::!oul.d be a s s i c l e d on17 one long, s t renuous ;'li:i;t ?o r r?ag-. A pl anc nag he a!:lyloyed on a h w t ti-ips a nuriber of ti;:les .~staftei? 11-e ,:;aps betrrcen adjaceilt reconnaissance -uni

157. When contac t with t h e enemy i s t o be expected, motorized recon- naissance ba t t a l io r i s advance nWmally by bounds. The length of bounds i s influenced by t h e form and cover of t h e t e r r a i n a s well a s by t h e road net . A s t h e d i s t ance t o the enemy decreases, t h e bounds a r e shortened. If and how the advance by bounds i s t o be pro tec ted , depends on the s i t u a t i o n .

A l l elements of a motorized reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n u t i l i ~ e roads and s t r e e t s a s long a s possible. I n a h o s t i l e l a n d the r e t u r n must of ten be made over d i f f e r e n t s t r e e t s . Po in t s a l o r g t h e roads and towns which a r e im-por tant f o r t h e movement must, i n case of necess i ty , be secured.

I n order to secure r e s t d u r i ~ i e the ni;:hts, patrol:; may be sent out a s s e c u r i t y forces . V i l l ages o r to-ms on main highways a r e no t recom-merlded a s riormally s u i t a b l e f o r b i l l e t s o r bivouac.

158. I n general the breadth of zone f o r a lnotorized reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n shoilld not exceed 50 ki lometers (about 30 m i l e s ) .

The depth t o which the b a t t a l i o n is employed must take i n t o con-s ide ra t ion t h e adequute supply of gaso l ine and o i l . I n order t o provide f o r unforeseen c i r cumtances , a su rp lus of gas and o i l should be reckoned.

The t o t a l c r u i s i n g range of armored motor veh ic l e s i s between 200 and 260 ki lometers (125 t o 150 m i l e s ) , without resupply..

159. P a t r o l s f o r the execution o f reconnaissance a r e , according t o the mission, t h e conduct of the enemy and the. a i v i l i a n populat ion, the roads and the grobable message r e t u r n , c o n s t i t u t e d of armored c a r s , machine &wn motor vehic les , and according t o negd, uotorcycles . S t rouger p a t r o l s a r e employed along t h e more important roads and agains t more important a reas . The com-mander of t h e b a t t a l i o n normally sends out t h e p a t r o l s .

160. Routes and ob jec t ives a r e given t h e p a t r o l s i n orders . Norinally they cannot be u t i l i z e d fo r t h e c lose- in s e c u r i t y o f the b a t t a l i o n o r the u n i t from which s e n t . They advance by bounds from O.P. t o O.P.. Their d i s t ance i n Pront of t h e b a t t a l i o n i s determined by th6 s i t u a t i o n , the t e r r a i n , and the range of t h e s i g n a l means. A s a ruln, t hey precede by not more than an hour ' s t r ave l ing d is tance .

161. The motorized reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n serves as a reconnaissance r e se rve f o r t!ie > a t r o l s , a message assen15ly group and a s the genera l reserve o f the reconnaissance element. When the g a t r o l s a r e a t a g r e a t d i s t ance i n f ron t of t h e b a t t a l i o n , t h e i r commnication t o the r e a r must be assured, under condi t ions through t h e advancing o f elements between the p a t r o l s and the b a t t a l i o n .

Contact once gained r&th t h e enemy i s maintained, i f necessary, by t h e f u r t h e r emplojment of reconnaissance veh ic l e s . hfotorcycles lnay ‘mil b e employed t o thicken the reconnaissanee ne t .

162. When t h e near approach of t h e enemy does not pennit t h e f u r t h e r p r o f i t a b l e employment of t h e motorized b a t t a l i o n it is oiithdrann,and t h e c l o s e r reconnaissance i s taken over by the mounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n . The commander so governs t h i s t h a t the reconnaissaLce is not i n t e r r u p t e d and t h e h o s t i l e contact is not l o s t . Elements of the m t o r i z e d bat tal ' ion may be temporari ly a t tached t o t h e mounted b a t t a l i o n t o a s s i s t i t s a c t i v i t y .

Motorized reconnaiss~ince b c t t a l i o n s wi thdraw froni the f r o n t s h o u l t be emJloyed t o reconnoi ter t h e f l a n k s and r e a r of the enemy o r t o screen a ga) betwee>n elements of *he army o r hold behind t h e Pront a s a r e se rve .

163. Mounted reconneissaiice b a t t a l i o n s must be sent out s u f f i c i e n t l y

e a r l y t o ga in t h e i r d i s t ance i n f r o n t of t h e main fo rce without has t e and

t o have a t t h e i r d isposa l the time necessary f o r reconnaissance.

For t h e i r pa t ro l8 they form a reconnaissance ( p a t r o l ) r e se rve . They advance by bounds, i n genera l avoiding t h e main roads ; e s p e c i a l l y if they l ack Vank o r armored c a r defense weapons they only observe those main roads. The less can the t e r r a i n be observed a t a d i s t ance , and t h e nearer t h e enemy is presumed, the s h o r t e r mst the bounds be made.

164. m u n t e d reconnaissance detachments a r e formed by the hr;ay Cavalry

t o conform t o the mission, t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e t e r r a i n . The s t r eng th v a r i e s

between a p la toon and tvm squadrons (U.S. t r o o p a??roximateiy); i n s p e c i a l

cases a caval ry regiment ( 5 o r 6 squadrons) can be employed f o r r eco~mais sance , As ti r u l e b i c y c l i s t s provide the r a d i o means. Heavy machine Dins, moiior- c y c l i s t s and t ank defense weapons a r e a t t a c h e d according t o need. l r t i l l o r y mag sometimes be at tached. But a s a r u l e it i s not s u i t a b l e t o d e c r e a ~ e the mobi.lity of mountsd reconnaissance detachments by adding l e s s mobile

alements. For t h i s reason it may be recommended t o leave t h e baggage

vehic les behind temporari ly and, if necessary, t o compensate f o r t h i s by

r equ i s i t ioned vuhic les &ich may be abandoned i f necessary.

165. The zone assi,gned a oavalry d i v i s i o n f o r reconnaissanc* Should not

exceed 50 ki lometers i n breadtll if it i s t o be observed %horoughly and with-

out gaps. The numBer of mounted reconnaissance detachlnents employed i s

de temined by the breadth of tho d iv i s ion zone. Should t h e eone excecd 50

ki lomdters , an e f f o r t should be made t o gocure reconnaiasance i n the most im-

portant d i r e c t i o n without gaps.

166. Zones a r e assigned t o mounted rsconnaissanoe detachments corres-

ponding t o the m a d net . Tho zone assigi:ad a squadron (U.S. t roop) should

i n general not exceed 10 k i lometers . Squadrons s e n t out on independent

missions, l ikewise p la toons and o f f i c e r p a t m l a sent out i n our. ovm l a n d , a r e

o r d i n a r i l y given only a d i r e c t i o n and reconnaiasa'nce ob jec t ive . On such

missions can we seldom hope f o r r econna i~eance without gaps.

167. The caval ry d iv i s ion commander must have t h e mounted d i v i s i o n

reconnairmdnne b a t t a l i o n f i rmly i n h i s hand. I t s d i s t ance i n f ron t of the

main bo4y of t h e d i v i s i o n i s dependent upon the conrmander's i n t e n t i o n s and

the a i t u a t i o n ; seldom w i l l it be more than 30 o r 40 k i lometers i n f r o n t .

I n the employment of p la toons and independent o f f i c e r ' s p a t r o l s , consider-

a t i o n must be given to t h e sending capaoi ty of t h e a t t ached rad ios .

Generally mounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n s rece ivo d a i l y missions.

Should it be poss ib le t o a s s ign a t one time t a s k s f o r seve ra l days, i t may be

advisable t o d i r e n t t h a t the b a t t a l i o n proceed on tho f o l l o v ~ i n g day's t a s k

only if no o t h e r o rde r has been rece ived by a c e r t a i n t im .

Mounted reconnaiasance b a t t a l i o n s r e s t during t h e night away from the main roads, which, howevar, they observe and block, so f a r a s necessary.

1 8 A message assembly cen te r may b e advanced mhen seve ra l mounted re- connaiasance b a t t a l i o n s a r e employed. If the caval ry d i v i s i o n changes i t s march d i r e c t i o n , a message assembly cen te r is indispensable.

169. The d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n of the i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n depends upon t h e mission, t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e commander's i n t en t ion , a a m l L au upon the breadth and depth of t h e reconnaissance area.

The d i v i s i o n noinmander a s s i g n s , i n general based on t h e Corps o rde r , t h e miss ions and d i r e c t i o n s Tor t h e reconnaissance. He determines i ts d i s t ance i n f r o n t O f t he d iv i s ion , which i n genera l can he l e s s than t h a t Of t he mounted reeonna.issance b a t t a l i o n of t h e caval ry d iv i s ion . (An in-f a n t r y d i v i s i o n reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n i s composed o f : a squadron of caval ry , a b i cyc le Company, a heavy machine gun platoon, and perhkps A

platoon of tank defense guns) and p resc r ibes any s p e c i a l t a sk . Should the reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n of a d iv i s ion marching i n one column be -at tached t o t h e advanced guard (which is except ional ) t h e advance guard commander a s s igns t a s k s and p resc r ibes the d is tance i n f r o n t of the advance-guard. These t a s k s a r e based upon the i n t e n t i o n s of the d iv i s ion commander. The subdividion o f t h e d i v i s i o n reconnaissance bat"ta1ion and al lotment thereof t o var ious march columns is t o be avoided. The fant t h a t ' o t h e r reconnaissance agencies may be operat ing in f r o n t of the d i v i s i o n does not r e l e a s e the d iv i - s ion connuandor f r o m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s own reconnaissance. Should the re be no reconnaissance agency ( f o r example, motorized .reconnaissanFe b a t t a l i o n ) i n front . of t h e d iv is ion b a t t a l i o n , the ob jec t ive of the l a t t e r may b i p l a c e d f a r t h e r forward. Yet, t h e connection with t h e d iv i s ion and t h e message and o r d e r t rahsmission must be fissured.

Should t h e march be execute4 on a broad f r o n t , precautions must

be taken t o a s s u r e the t imely r e c e i p t of information by a l l column com-

manders.

Should t h e d i v i s i o n be i n c lose proximity t o the enemy it may be r e c o w n d e d t o hold the reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n back and t o send out p a t r o l s only.

170. The commander of t h e d iv i s ion reconnaissanee b a t t a l i o n d i r e c t s

t he execution of t