zhu han, dusit niyato, walid saad, tamer basar, and are hjorungnes

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Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications Lecture 2 Bayesian Game Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

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Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications Lecture 2 Bayesian Game. Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes. Overview of Lecture Notes. Introduction to Game Theory: Lecture 1 Noncooperative Game: Lecture 1, Chapter 3 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications

Lecture 2Bayesian Game

Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

Page 2: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Overview of Lecture NotesOverview of Lecture Notes Introduction to Game Theory: Lecture 1 Noncooperative Game: Lecture 1, Chapter 3 Bayesian Game: Lecture 2, Chapter 4 Differential Game: Lecture 3, Chapter 5 Evolutional Game : Lecture 4, Chapter 6 Cooperative Game: Lecture 5, Chapter 7 Auction Theory: Lecture 6, Chapter 8 Game Theory Applications: Lecture 7, Part III Total Lectures are about 8 Hours

Page 3: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Overview of Bayesian GameOverview of Bayesian Game Static Bayesian Game Extensive Form Detailed Example: Cournot Duopoly with incomplete

information Application in wireless networks

– Packet Forwarding– K-Player Bayesian Water-filling– Channel Access– Bandwidth Auction

Summary

Page 4: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

What is Bayesian Game?

Game in strategic form- Complete information(each player has perfect information regarding the element of the game)- Iterated deletion of dominated strategy, Nash equilibrium: solutions of the game in strategic form

Bayesian Game- A game with incomplete information- Each player has initial private information, type.- Bayesian equilibrium: solution of the Bayesian game

Page 5: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Bayesian GameBayesian Game

Definition (Bayesian Game) A Bayesian game is a strategic form game with incomplete information. It consists of:

- A set of players N={1, …, n} for each i N∈ - An action set

- A type set

- A probability function,

- A payoff function,

- The function pi is what player i believes about the types of the other players- Payoff is determined by outcome A and type

RA :ui

)( :p iii

)Θ(Θ ,Θ i Nii

)A(A ,A i Nii

Page 6: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Bayesian Game

Definition Bayesian game is finite if , , and are all finite

Definition(pure strategy, mixed strategy) Given a Bayesian Game , A pure strategy for player i is a function which maps player i’s type into its action set

A mixed strategy for player i is

)}{,}{,}{,}{,( NiiNiiNiiNii upAN

iii Aa :

)|(.:)(: iiiiii A

)}{,}{,}{,}{,( NiiNiiNiiNii upAN

N iiA

Page 7: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Bayesian EquilibriumDefinition(Bayesian Equilibrium) A Bayesian equilibrium of a Bayesian game is a mixed strategy profile , such that for every player i N and ∈every type , we have

ii Nii )(

),()(})|({)|(maxarg)|(.}\{)(

auaap iiAa iNj

jjjiiiAiiii

i

- Bayesian equilibrium is one of the mixed strategy profileswhich maximize the each players’ expected payoffs for each type.- This equilibrium is the solution of the Bayesian game. This equilibrium means the best response to each player’s belief about the other player’s mixed strategy.

Page 8: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Bayesian Dynamic GameBayesian Dynamic Game Perfect Bayesian equilibrium demands optimal subsequent play

Belief system

Page 9: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Simple ExampleSimple Example Information is imperfect since player 2 does not know what player 1 does

when he comes to play. If both players are rational and both know that both players are rational, play in the game will be as follows according to perfect Bayesian equilibrium:

Player 2 cannot observe player 1's move. Player 1 would like to fool player 2 into thinking he has played U when he has actually played D so that player 2 will play D' and player 1 will receive 3. In fact, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where player 1 plays D and player 2 plays U' and player 2 holds the belief that player 1 will definitely play D (i.e player 2 places a probability of 1 on the node reached if player 1 plays D). In this equilibrium, every strategy is rational given the beliefs held and every belief is consistent with the strategies played. In this case, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the only Nash equilibrium.

Page 10: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Examples ー Cournot Duopoly

)(),,,()(),,,(

212221212

211121211

qqqqquqqqqqu

Cournot Duopoly model

}2,1{N(1) Players (2 firms):(2) Action set (outcome of firms):(3) Type set:(4) Probability function:

(5) Profit function:

}4/5,4/3{},1{ 21 )2,1(, iqi R

2/1)|4/5(,2/1)|4/3( 1212 pp

Market

Supplier 1

Supplier 2C2L

C1H

Low cost

High cost

q1

q2

Price p

C1

Page 11: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Examples ー Cournot Duopoly

Bayesian equilibrium for pure strategy- The Bayesian equilibrium is a maximal point of expected payoff of firm 2, EP2:

02),( *2

*12

*2

*1

2

2 qqqqqEP

)4/5,4/3(,2/)()( 2*122

*2 qq

- The expected payoff of player 1, EP1, is given as follows:

))4/5((21))4/3((

21

211121111 qqqqqqEP

22 uEP

Page 12: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Examples ー Cournot Duopoly

0)}4/5()4/3({2121),( *

2*2

*1

*2

*1

1

1 qqqqqqEP

4)4/5()4/3(2 *

2*2*

1qqq

Bayesian equilibrium is also the maximal point of expected payoff EP1:

.245)4/5(,

2411)4/3(,

31 *

2*2

*1 qqq

Solving above equations, we can get Bayesian equilibrium as follows:

Page 13: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Example: Packet ForwardingExample: Packet Forwarding System Model

– Sender type regular or malicious– Pay off: malicious vs. regular

– GA: attack success; CA: cost of attack; CF: cost of forwarding; CM: cost of monitoring

Mixed strategy– Sender malicious: attack with a certain probability – Sender regular: forward packet– Receiver: monitor with a certain probability

SenderReceiver

Regular Malicious

Forward/attack

Monitor/idle

Packet to be forwarded

Page 14: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Example: K-Player Bayesian Water-fillingExample: K-Player Bayesian Water-filling Waterfilling game

– R: rate; P: power; h: channel gain

But, the user type, i.e. the channel gain, is a random variable– Shadowing fading, for example

Path loss probability function as the belief of the other users

The best response is

Page 15: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Example: Channel AccessExample: Channel Access System Model

– Interference channel– Rate – Utility– Game– Bayesian since do not know the other’s channel (or type)

Threshold strategy– Interpretation of opportunistic spectrum access from the game

theory point of view

Access point 1

Access point 2

h2 h3

βh3

βh2

User 1 User 2 User 3 User 4

Page 16: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

Example: Bandwidth AuctionExample: Bandwidth Auction System Model

– Allocated bandwidth– S bid, B overall bandwidth, U: utility– t time duration of connection, local information, assuming

Bayesian game, iterative algorithm

Access point

Bandwidthauction

Competing users

Biddings

Bandwidth allocation

Page 17: Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad,  Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

                                                           

SummarySummary Games with incomplete information (i.e., Bayesian game) can

be used to analyze situations where a player does not know the preference (i.e., payoff) of his opponents.

This is a common situation in wireless communications and networking where there is no centralized controller to maintain the information of all users. Also, the users may not reveal the private information to others.

The detail of Bayesian game framework was studied in detail. Examples of this game are given