Youth Violence Prevention and Intervention: An overview

Chris Melde, Ph.D.School of Criminal JusticeMichigan State University

Violence in Perspective

The Long View of Crime National versus State and Local Trends Distribution of Risk

Not random Perceptual Indicators and Resulting Behaviors

Fear and Avoidance What makes youth violence unique?

Overall Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000): 1960 to 2010 UCR

19601962

19641966

19681970

19721974

19761978

19801982

19841986

19881990

19921994

19961998

20002002

20042006

20082010

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Violent Crime Rate 1960 to 2010

Rate

per

100

,000

Murder Rate (per 100,000): 1960 to 2010 UCR

19601962

19641966

19681970

19721974

19761978

19801982

19841986

19881990

19921994

19961998

20002002

20042006

20082010

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Murder Rate: 1960 to 2010

Rate

per

100

,000

Overall Violent Crime in Illinois:

2001 to 2010 UCR Data20

01

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Overall Violent Crime in Illinois

State of Illinois City ACity BCity CCity D

Rate

per

100

,000

Overall Violent Crime in Select Illinois Cities (not named Chicago)

2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Overall Violent Crime in Illinois by City: 2006 to 2010 UCR

Rate

per

100

,000

Crime in the MediaMilwaukee posts 4th largest drop in crime

12% decline in violence near top for big cities

From the June 8, 2005 editions of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

By CHASE DAVIS cdavis@journalsentinel.com

Violent crime in Milwaukee plunged 12.3% last year, the fourth largest drop among the country's 33 largest cities, according to a new FBI report.

More than 4,600 violent crimes - homicides, aggravated assaults, rapes and robberies - were reported in Milwaukee in 2004, down from nearly 5,300 in 2003, the FBI said.

Crime in the Media: One year later

Sunday, Dec. 03, 2006

Middle America�s Crime Wave By Kathleen Kingsbury

It's as if Milwaukee, Wis., had reverted to a state of lethal chaos. A Special Olympian is

killed for his wallet as he waits for a bus. An 11-year-old girl is gang-raped by as many as 19

men. A woman is strangled, her body found burning in a city-owned garbage cart. Twenty-

eight people are shot, four fatally, over a holiday weekend.

These are the kinds of crimes American cities expected never to see in high numbers again.

In the 1990s police departments nationwide began applying the so-called broken-windows

theory: arrest the bad guys for minor offenses, and they wouldn't be around to commit more

serious ones. This zero-tolerance approach--combined with more cops on the street to

enforce it, a strong economy and a fortuitous demographic change that reduced the

population of young men who typically cause the most trouble--lowered the rates of murder,

robbery and rape for 10 consecutive years. Until last year. Not only did crime suddenly

begin to rise in 2005, but the most violent crimes led the trend. Homicides shot up 3.4%.

Robberies, 3.9%. Aggravated assaults, 1.8%. Hardest hit were not metropolises like New

York City and Los Angeles but cities with populations between 400,000 and 1 million--such

as Baltimore, Md.; Charlotte, N.C.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Oakland, Calif.--and this year looks

to see similar rates of increase, if not worse.

Few places have suffered more than Milwaukee. The homicide count for the city of 590,000 fell from 130 in 1996 to just 88 in 2004. But last year, according to FBI figures, Milwaukee saw the country's largest jump in homicides--up 40%, to 121.

The Reality: Back to the 10-year average (20.1)

Distribution of Risk

The non-random nature of the distribution of violence risk.

Pin map of all homicides in Newark, New Jersey, 1982-2008

The spread of homicide risk in Newark, New Jersey, 1982-2008

Percent Black by Census Tract in Newark, New Jersey

Violent Victimization by Sex

Male Female10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Sex: NCVS 2009

MaleFemale

Violent Victimization by Race

White Black Other Multi-Racial0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Race: NCVS 2009

Total Violent Victimization

Violent Victimization by Ethnicity

Hispanic Non-Hispanic10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Ethnicity: NCVS 2009

HispanicNon-Hispanic

Violent Victimization by Age-Group

12-15 16-19 20-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 65 and over

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Total Violent Victimization rate (per 1,000) by Age: NCVS 2009

Total Violent Victimization

Focusing on Youth Violence Why?

Risk - Power Few Because the public is especially concerned

• Cycle of Juvenile Justice Malleability/Potential for Change

Focus on ages 12 to 24 While we often think of “youth” from a

legalistic standpoint (i.e., under age 18), that is not a realistic representation.

Adolescence

The Cycle of Juvenile Justice

The primary philosophy guiding the creation of the juvenile justice system was rehabilitation and reintegration. Juveniles are not wholly responsible for their

actions due to their maturity level. There is time to reform their behavior, and

create productive citizens.

This philosophy is easy to convey when juvenile crime is not in the spotlight.

The Cycle of Juvenile Justice

What happens when juvenile crime is perceived to be extraordinarily high?◦ A large contingent of people lobby for harsher

treatment of juvenile delinquents.

◦ The common sentiment: leniency “encourages juveniles to laugh at the system, to believe they will not be punished no matter what they do, and to feel free to commit more frequent and serious crimes” (Bernard, 1992, p. 37).

The Cycle of Juvenile Justice

The Result Lawmakers impose harsher penalties, including

mandatory transfer to adult court for serious crimes, and extended sentences; a ‘get tough’ on crime agenda.

What typically happens to the perceived juvenile crime rate in the face of ‘get tough’ policies?

The Cycle of Juvenile Justice Chasing our tails

Because our juvenile crime rate is, and always has been, relatively high compared with adults (with the exception of young adults 18-24), we change the system once again.

The juvenile justice philosophy returns to its’ roots, by focusing on rehabilitation and reintegration.

The question isn’t whether we’ll have another moral panic, according to Bernard (1992), but rather when.

Significant Supreme Court Rulings

Roper v. Simmons (2005) No Juvenile Death Penalty Juveniles fundamentally different than adults

Graham v. Florida (2010) Holding: Sentencing a juvenile to life in prison

without parole for crimes other than murder violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.�

Supreme Court: No more life sentences for juvenile killers

Monday, June 25, 2012 The Supreme Court says it's unconstitutional to

sentence juveniles to life in prison without parole for murder, siding with the petitioner in case of Miller v. Alabama.

The high court on Monday threw out Americans' ability to send children to prison for the rest of their lives with no chance of ever getting out. The 5-4 decision is in line with others the court has made, including ruling out the death penalty for juveniles and life without parole for young people whose crimes did not involve killing.

The Cycle of Juvenile Justice Back to Prevention and Intervention Prevention programs have a long, but not

so glorious, history. Most prevention programs do not “work.”

• “But if it helps just one child”• Difficult for any single program to produce change.

On average, schools provide roughly 14 different delinquency prevention programs in any given year. Schools provide ready access to youth Progression: Didactic models to skill

development

Why Get Involved in School-Based Prevention?

The Risks and Rewards of School-Based Programs

NCVS Youth Violence Data (ages 12-18): 1992 to 2010

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Youth Violence at School vs. Away from School (per 1,000)

Non-School Serious Non-school totalSchool SeriousSchool total

Rate

per

1,0

00

Adolescent Fear of Crime by Location: 1995-2009

1995 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 20090

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Percentage of students age 12-18 who reported being afraid of attack or harm, by location, 1995-2009

Total At SchoolTotal Away from School

Perc

ent o

f stu

dent

s

Student Avoidance Behaviors

1995 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 20090

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Avoidance Behaviors by Students at School (percent of students): NCVS

TotalAvoided School activitiesAny activitiesAny classStayed home from schoolAvoided one or more places in school

Perc

ent o

f stu

dent

s

Popular School-Based Programs Olweus Bully Prevention

Blueprints Program http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/index.html

• Page with information on Illinois State Laws on Bullying

Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) National Evaluation (2006-2012) Slight reduction in gang membership Improved attitudes about the police More negative views about gangs

Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Has not worked

• possible negative effects for low risk, positive effects for high risk youth.

New iteration of the program

Risks of School-Based Programs

Iatrogenic Effects Mixing high and low risk youth in programs has

been associated with more anti-social behavior on the part of youth considered to be at low-risk.

• Evidence of this in community and correctional setting as well (Hennigan and Maxson, 2012; Dodge et al., 2006).

Priorities of the School Education versus Prevention

• Especially in high risk schools Long-term commitments are difficult

Module 2: Community InterventionsBackground on Research Partnerships

Evidence of Impact

32

Continuum of Promising Practices for Comprehensive Gang Intervention

SUPPRESSIONDETERRENCE

Boston Ceasefire“Pulling Levers”

CAGI “Spergel Model”

SOCIAL SERVICEINFORMAL

Chicago Ceasefire “Violence Interrupters”

34

Traditional Research Model

Researchers were outsiders in problem-solving process Not involved in problem identification Observers, not participants, in program

development and implementation Involved only as independent evaluators of

impact• What went wrong? (i.e., the complainers)

– You should have done x, y, and z.

35

Action Research Model

Active, ongoing partnership between researchers and practitioner agencies

Use research process to help solve local problems Data collection to identify and understand

problems Strategic analysis to develop targeted

interventions Program monitoring and feedback for

refinement Assessment of impact

36

Data-Driven Problem Analysis

Gather data on the selected crime problem, including its sources, victims, offenders, and settings

Analyze the data to identify specific aspects and components of the problem

37

Focused Interventions andLinking to Evidence-Based Practice

Research facilitates: Developing focused interventions aimed

at reducing the specific sources and components of the crime problem

Implementing these focused intervention strategies utilizing the resources and expertise of the working group partners

Basing interventions on “best” practices and “promising” strategies

38

Monitor the implementation of the interventions

Provide constant assessment and feedback on the conduct and effects of the interventions

Modify and refine the interventions based on feedback assessments

Evaluate the impacts of the interventions on the service delivery system and on the targeted crime problem

Monitoring, Feedback, and Evaluation

39

Background on Research Partnerships

Evolution from Boston Ceasefire (The Boston Miracle) Strategic Approaches to Community Safety

Initiative (SACSI) Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Smart Policing and Intelligence Led Policing

40

Boston Ceasefire Foundation

Two Aspects to Boston Ceasefire Focused deterrence, “pulling levers”

strategy Systematic problem solving process

Multi-agency working group Problem solving model Police-researcher partnership

41

Boston Ceasefire: Focus on Youth Violence

Problem AnalysisSmall Proportion

YouthsInvolved street gangs

and crews

Strategies focused on those at

highest risk for violence

42

Intelligence Led Problem Solving

Violence Problem

Problem Analysis

Strategy

Implemen-tation

Assessment and Feedback

43

Evidence of Impact: Boston Ceasefire

Two one-half years without youth homicide Homicides decreased 63% Calls for Service decreased 32% Gun assaults decreased 25%

44

Evidence of Impact: SACSI

Ten city initiative SACSI cities experience a significant

decline in violent crime when compared to non-SACSI cities

Indianapolis showed a decrease in homicide and gun assaults of 35-40%

45

Reducing Homicide Risk: Indianapolis

All 15-24 year old victims

Young white female victims

Young white male victims

Young black female victims

Young black male victims

Young black male victims in five

hotspots

All other victims0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

26.1

5.114.9 18.2

112.9

152.1

3.514.8

2.2 4.511.5

66.4

45.6

2.6

Homicide victimization risk by Groupper 10,000 residents

Pre-IVRP Post-IVRP

46

Boston and Indianapolis as Examples Research identified the highest risk individuals,

groups, and contexts

Hard work by task force partners (criminal justice officials, social services, community groups) then focused strategies on highest risk

47

Findings from Boston and SACSISuccesses resulted in development and incorporation of

strategic problem solving model in a series of major DOJ initiatives since 2001

Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Smart Policing Initiative (SPI)

48

Project Safe Neighborhoods

Nation-wide DOJ program intended to reduce gun crime in America

94 separate programs, one for each US Attorney Office in the 50 states and territories

Based on the Action Research/Strategic Problem-Solving Model

Funding provided for a local research partner to work with each PSN task force

49

PSN Impact – Stage One

Series of site specific case studies Ten tests of impact on gun crime

Case studies Reductions in gun crime in all ten sites

Impact in two of these studies was equivocal

50

Summary of Case StudiesProject Exile• Montgomery• Mobile

Strategic Problem Solving• Lowell• Omaha• Greensboro• Winston-Salem• Chicago (Papachristos et al.)• Stockton (Braga)• St. Louis

– (significant but also drop in comparison sites)

• Raleigh – (reduction but not significant)

51

Summary of Case Studies

Sites chosen because of evidence that PSN was implemented in rigorous fashion

Thus, results not generalizable but suggest that PSN may have an impact where effectively implemented

52

PSN Impact – Stage Two

Assess impact of PSN in all U.S. cities with populations of 100,000+

Trend in violent crime 2000-01 compared to 2002-06 Compare PSN target cities with non-target cities Compare cities by level of PSN implementation

dosage

53

Measuring Implementation

Step One – composite measure Research integration Partnerships Federal prosecution

Step Two – focus on level of federal prosecution per capita and level increase

54

Step One

PSN target cities in high implementation districts experienced significant declines in violent crime in comparison to cities in low implementation districts and non-target cities

55

Step Two -Violent Crime Trends in PSN Target Cities by Federal Prosecution Level

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006850

900

950

1000

1050

1100

1150

High prosecution sites (n = 26) Medium prosecution sites (n = 29) Low prosecution sites (n = 27)

Viol

ent C

rime

Rate

per

100

,000

Pop

ulati

on

Low Prosecution

Medium Prosecution

High Prosecution

56

Violent Crime Trends in Non-PSN Sites by Federal Prosecution Level

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006400

450

500

550

600

650

700

750

800

High prosecution sites (n = 90) Medium prosecution sites (n = 42) Low prosecution sites (n = 38)

Viol

ent C

rime

Rate

per

100

,000

Pop

ulati

on

High Prosecution

Medium Prosecution

Low Prosecution

57

PSN ImpactLevel of PSN Dosage

PSN Target Cities Non-target Cities

Low -5.3% +7.8%

Medium -3.1% <-1.0%

High -13.1% -4.9%

-8.89% -0.25%

58

What’s in a Name?

Being a target city and having a higher level of dosage was significantly related to a reduction in violent crime controlling for:

Concentrated disadvantage Population density Police resources Correctional population

Source: Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2010) 26:165-190.

Drug Market Intervention (DMI)

The problem of open air drug markets

60

Drug Market Intervention (DMI)

Same principles and strategies applied to open, overt drug markets

Four Goals Eliminate the open-air drug market Return the neighborhood to the residents Reduce crime and disorder Improve the public’s safety as well as their quality of life

61

Drug Market Intervention Sites

Early “Adopter” Cities BJA DMI Training Cities

High Point, NC Baltimore, MD Memphis, TN

Winston-Salem, NC Chicago, IL Middletown, OH

Raleigh, NC Cook County, IL Milwaukee, WI

Providence, RI Durham, NC Montgomery County, MD

Rockford, IL Flint, MI New Haven, CTHempstead, NY Gary, IN New Orleans, LA

Nashville, TN Guntersville, AL Peoria, IL

Berlin, MD Indianapolis, IN Roanoke, VA

Jacksonville, FL Ocala, FL

Jefferson Parish, LA Seattle, WA

Lansing, MI

62

Offense Type Offenses Per Month - Pre

Offenses Per Month – Post

Percent Change

ARIMA Models (significance)

Violent 1.83 1.27 -30.6% <.10

Property 9.24 8.54 -7.5% NS

Nuisance/Drug 2.67 1.81 -32.2% <.10

High PointImpact on crime in the target area

63

Rockford, IL

Source: Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell. Forthcoming. Crime and Delinquency.

Target Area 12 month comparison pre- and post-DMI

HGLM Comparison to Trend in Remainder of City

Non-violent crime -24% <.10

Violent crime -14% NS

Jun-06Jul-0

6

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07Jul-0

7

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-0802468

101214161820

Non-Violent Crime RatePer 1,000 Residents

Target Area Remainder of City

64

Nashville, TNTargetArea

Surrounding Area

City Wide ARIMA Models

Drug Equipment -39.5% -52.1% -9.3% <.05

Narcotics Violations -49.7% -51.0% 5.5% <.05

Violent Crimes -23.6% -24.0% -7.4% <.15

Property Crimes -28.4% -25.6% -7.0% <.05

Call for Police Service -26.1% -6.2% -5.9% <.15

The remainder of city either experienced no decline or an increase in these offenses.

Source: Corsaro, Brunson, McGarrell, (2010) Evaluation Review, 34, 6:513-548.

65

Summary

Strongest evidence in terms of reducing drug related crime

Interviews with residents in three sites indicate: Neighborhood perceived as much safer and better place to

live Appreciation for police

66

Implications

Appears to be promising approach to addressing open-air drug markets

Change in trajectory of neighborhood Neighborhood begins to look like “normal neighborhood”

67

Promising Practices

Some combination of… focused deterrence communication data-driven problem solving and linkage to opportunities,

…appears promising in reducing gun crime

68

“There is strong research evidence that the more focused and specific the strategies of the police, the more they are tailored to the problems they seek to address, the more effective the police will be in controlling crime and disorder.”

Source: National Academy of Sciences, Fairness & Effectiveness in Policing (2004: 5)

69

15 Years of Suggestive Evidence on Reducing Gun Crime

Directed Police Patrol

Project Exile Strategic Problem Solving

Equivocal Evidence

Kansas City Richmond Boston St. Louis

Indianapolis Montgomery Indianapolis Durham

Pittsburgh Mobile Los Angeles

Stockton

Lowell

Omaha

Greensboro

Winston-Salem

Chicago

Mixed Model (Combination of Above Strategies)

PSN National Assessment (all cities over 100,000 population)

Pre-PSN

70

Common Ingredients

Focused enforcement, focused deterrence Systematic problem solving process

Multi-agency working group Problem solving model Police-researcher partnership

An Evaluation of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang

Initiative (CAGI)

Edmund McGarrell, Ph.D.Michigan State University

Chris Melde, Ph.D. Timothy Bynum, Ph.D.Michigan State University Michigan State University

Nicholas Corsaro, Ph.D.University of Cincinnati

Disclaimer

This project was supported by Award #2007-IJ-CX-0035 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings and conclusions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.

Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative

What is the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative? Project Safe Neighborhoods(94 US Attorney’s Offices) Spergel/OJJDP Comprehensive Model

A lesson in paradigm shifts and paradigm clashes. Successes and failures of CAGI

WWTJDILTP41? (Klein or Maxson, ? through Davidson (MSU), ?)

Painful lessons learned from Ignaz Semmelweis and Dan Ariely

Stopping the Cycle of Gang Violence

Youth Exposed to Incarceration/ Violence Re-

entry

Involvement with Getting into Guns, Violence,

Gangs Drugs

Continuum of Promising Practices for Comprehensive Gang Intervention

SUPPRESSIONDETERRENCE

Boston Ceasefire“Pulling Levers”

CAGI “Spergel Model”

SOCIAL SERVICEINFORMAL

Chicago Ceasefire “Violence Interrupters”

Components of the Spergel Model The Comprehensive Community-Wide

Gang Program Model 1) Community Mobilization

• Development of a community-wide working group 2) Social Intervention

• Street workers that mentor youth. Bridge to institutions.

3) Opportunity Provision• Employment, education, service

4) Organizational Change• Policies and practices routinely fail “at-risk” youth

5) Suppression• Specialized gang units, intensive probation,

prosecution

CAGI Details: Funding Areas

1) Enforcement and Prosecution ($1 million) Collaboration of local and federal law

enforcement• Intelligence sharing and case coordination

Collaboration of local and federal prosecution 2) Prevention and Intervention ($1

million) The prevention and intervention strategy

provides gang focused programming to youth at high risk for gang involvement

3) Prisoner Reentry ($500,000) The prisoner reentry strategy provides

mentoring, social services, and treatment to gang-involved offenders returning to “the” community from prison.

Participating CAGI Sites

Original Six (2006) Cleveland (OH-ND) Dallas/Fort Worth (TX-ND) Los Angeles (CA-CD) Milwaukee (WI-ED) Pennsylvania Corridor (PA-ED) Tampa (FL-MD)

Subsequent Four (2007) Indianapolis (IN-SD) Oklahoma City (OK-ED) Rochester (NY-WD) Raleigh/Durham (NC-ED and NC-MD)

Final Two (2008) Chicago (IL-ND) Detroit (MI-ED)

Average Violent Crime Trends between 2002-2009 (Violent Crime Rate per 100,000)

Law Enforcement Results

Process Evaluation Results suggest that law enforcement was quick to implement, and included 5 sites that engaged in policing strategies highly consistent with the model. Data Driven Targeted Solid Cases

No usable gang data in 10 of 12 sites. No overall program effect on violent crime.

Coefficient in the right direction, not significant

Law Enforcement Implementation Ranking and Changes in Violent Crime (High Imp. = 15% reduction in violent crime)

Reentry? The reentry component of the intervention

was not suitable for an outcome analysis. Poor planning led to the inability to identify

and serve the intended population.• Six sites did not become “operational” until 2009 or

after.• Only 5 sites met targeted number of clients.

Program assumed inmates would return to original neighborhood, which was not realized. No data driven planning; based on perception

A common complaint was that the program did not always deliver on promises. Economic collapse and job market in 2008.

Prevention and Intervention Weed and Seed Philosophy Identifying those most at-risk for gang

membership and violence. Gang members, while a small fraction of the

population, account for roughly 50 to 75 percent of violent crime in some U.S. locations.

Just target the bad apples (simple right?) How do we identify them? Who do we ask? Where do we get our information?

Extant research suggested problems in targeting the correct population.

• African American Male School Dropout Rate = 75%• Overall graduation rate = 43%• School District wanted to know the needs of students.

• Cleveland awarded grant to implement CAGI• Wanted a standardized instrument to help identify youth

most at-risk for gang membership.

• The Global Risk Assessment Device (GRAD) (Gavazzi et al., 2003)– 1) Those targeted as part of the CAGI (n = 146)– 2) A general sample of African American males

attending public high school (n = 1,438)

A Unique Opportunity: Cleveland, OH

Risk Domains• Four Risk Domains were evaluated across the two

samples:– Disrupted Family Processes (17 items)

– Sub-Domains: Conflict; Parental Tiptoeing; Hardship– Mental Health (26 items)

– Sub-Domains: Internalizing; Externalizing; ADHD– Educational Risks (12 items)

– Sub-Domains: Disruptive Classroom Behavior; Threats to Educational Progress; Learning Difficulties

– Delinquent Peers (sub-scale) (3 items)• Associate with Gangs, Involved with Gangs, Delinquent Friends

Hypothesis• Those targeted as part of the CAGI will report

more risk than the non-targeted general school-based sample in each domain.– The targeted sample was suppose to represent the

youth most at-risk of gang membership from high gang areas.

– The non-targeted sample represents African American males attending public high schools across the city.

Sample Description CAGI Sample

146 African American males Ages 14 to 17 (mean = 15.9, s.d. = .9)

General School-Based Sample 1,438 African American males Ages 14 to 17 (mean = 15.5, s.d. = .8)

Results Red = CAGI Blue = School

Education Family Mental Health Peer Group

5.615.12

10.83

2.03

5.25

6.66*

13.56*

2.33*

Level of Risk by Domain and Target Group

WWTJDILTP41? (Klein or Maxson, ?)Common Hurdles to Program Fidelity

1) The idea that “something is better than nothing.” Reality: Half-hearted implementation of

programs designed for high-risk youth fair no better than no implementation at all (Kovaleski et. al., 1999).

2) Insufficient “buy in” on the part of program providers. Effect: Program providers deviate from the

plan; implementation slippage leads to little dosage (Ruiz-Primo, 2005).

Painful Lesson from Ignaz and Ariely 3) “Buy in” is

simply not enough. Many people bought in

to CAGI Ignaz Semmelweis,

M.D. (1818 – 1865) A simple solution

4) Must be easily integrated into routine! “What about us?” Working with high risk

youth is difficult. Dan Ariely, Ph.D.

(Duke University)

Paradigm Shifts and Paradigm Clashes

RISK Law enforcement

have an easier time implementing risk focused interventions. It is how they view

the world; it is what they do.

Implementation of data driven programs is now commonplace.

NEED Social service

providers view the world differently. Identify subjects in

need, and do their best to remedy those needs.

Many youth are in need, but few youth are at risk.

Not Implemented As Intended

Law Enforcement

Prevention/Intervention

Re-entry

The State of the Spergel Model

When done with sufficient fidelity, the program appears to reduce violence.

The ability of jurisdictions to implement, let alone sustain, such a model is severely limited.

Chicago Ceasefire: Too Big to Fail?

Understanding the spread of a “popular” violence intervention

The Origins of Chicago Ceasefire

How it works Understanding Violence as a “Behavior”

How do we learn behavior? Unconscious imitation/modeling Social Pressure

Symbolic Interactionism (“Looking Glass Self”) “Fear of being called chicken is almost certainly the

leading cause of death and injury from youth violence in the United States” (Zimring, 1998: 80).

Shame vs. Guilt (Code of the Street, Made in America) Understanding Violence as an “Epidemic”

If violence acts like an epidemic, why not treat it as an epidemic?

Stopping Epidemics

Public Health Model of Intervention 1. Interrupt Transmission

• Limit Transmissibility 2. Who is most “at-risk” for infection?

• Target the risks and needs associated with high risk people.

– Clean needle program in emergency rooms.– Free condoms at health clinics.

3. Change group norms?• Much the same as smoking, condom use, seat belts etc.

– Every needle pack comes with literature on the effects of drugs on the body.

Violence Interrupters

“Carefully” chosen interventionists Why do they have to be “carefully” chosen? Potential Political Fallout

How did they find their clients? Past programs that have tried to target “at-risk”

youth have failed to garner the correct clientele. Why?

How did Chicago Ceasefire try to overcome this deficiency?

Outreach Workers

Behavior change in the long-term Violence interrupters and the outreach staff

were not one in the same. Modeling

Service referral

Ongoing guidance

Change Group Norms

Multiple Messengers; Same Message

How did Ceasefire Chicago deliver a unified message? What were their tactics?

Science Necessitates Replication

Wilson and Chermak (2011) Both professors at Michigan State University

Evaluation: One Vision One Life Program Pittsburgh, PA Community-based intervention in the mold of

Ceasefire Chicago• Utilized Violence Interrupters• Utilized Outreach Workers• DID NOT utilize police to the same extent as Chicago

– No legal deterrent message from police or prosecutors.

Results of the Evaluation

No impact on homicide in target neighborhoods, relative to comparison communities.

Aggravated assault and gun assault rates increased in the target neighborhoods relative to comparison neighborhoods.

There was evidence of a “spillover” effect of the program on adjacent neighborhoods. Neighborhoods around Southside experienced

increases in aggravated and gun assaults.

What does this mean?

Regression Effect in Chicago? How do we promote informal social

control? How can we coerce residents to take control of

their neighborhood? How can we document the “work” of the

violence interrupters? Needed for replication

Gang Cohesion and Violence External (real or perceived) pressure creates

cohesion.

Violence Interrupters are NOT NEW

Tita and Papachristos (2010) reviewed these efforts in Chicago, Boston, and LA in the 1960s, wherein they were found to have no, or even iatrogenic, effects. Sounds familiar

Other replications of Chicago Ceasefire have had mixed findings as well. Baltimore, MD- Mixed Newark, NJ- No effects

Is Chicago Ceasefire “Too Big to Fail?”

Science and Policy move at different speeds. Chicago Ceasefire started over a decade ago. Policymakers wanted results quickly

Without scientific outcome analyses, they based decisions on word of mouth “success” stories.

Breaking down the evaluation of Skogan. Network data suggested two (3?) of seven target

neighborhoods had evidence of success. Papachristos (2011)

Hot Spot analyses found three successful neighborhoods. Block and Block mapping analysis (Papachristos, 2011)

Is Chicago Ceasefire “Too Big to Fail?”

If we are treating homicide like an epidemic (i.e., a public health model), why not treat the results the same way? If HIV treatment was found to increase HIV

cases in some places, would we continue to fund such programs?

If cancer treatment was found to increase cancer cases in some places, would we continue to fund such programs?

Ceasefire is being replicated in numerous places, with more trainings being requested.

Resources for Identifying What Works, and What Does Not

Office of Justice Programs: Crime Solutions http://www.crimesolutions.gov/default.aspx

Blueprint Series: University of Colorado http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Default.aspx