Methodology for On-Site inspections and lessons learned

from different verification regimes

Yousry Abushady

CTBTO

OPCWIAEA

On-site inspections, though intrusive in nature, is one of the most important and effective mechanism as a verification tool in order for a treaty to achieve its objectives.

Different methodologies and technologies are implemented for the on-site inspections at different regimes to achieve the targets of their legal commitments.

Main Organizations using On-Site Inspections

IAEA safeguards inspection regime verifies the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has accumulated broad experience in the methodology and technology of conducting inspections on international, regional or national levels.

OPCW inspection regime verifies the prohibition of Chemical Weapons, though relatively new, has developed quite an effective methodology for their objectives.

CTBTO On-Site inspections –though implemented on test basis only-are planned for the detection of possible Nuclear Test Explosions

Other inspection regimes used for verifying other purposes, e.g. biological weapons, Safety, Security, trafficking, illegal transport activities or networks, Future verification of Fissile Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and others provide different methodologies to achieve their goals.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)On-Site Inspection Regimes

Legal basis:

1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

To prevent the proliferation and to limit –then- to eliminate the presence of NWs. It was Opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970. Today there are:

184 States(with Taiwan China) signatury of NPT as non-NW States5 States (US, UK, Russia, China and France) signatury of NPT as NW States3 States (India, Pakistan and Israel) are not signatury of NPT, though have limited number of nuclear installations subject to safeguards inspections1 State (DPRK)withdrew from the NPT and stopped all inspections

The IAEA is the organization responsible to implement the NPT.

Currently the IAEA has about 2300 staff members, with the SG department of over 600 (the largest department) including about 250 inspectors.

Safeguards (SG) agreements based on NPT provide more tools to confirm the declared NM at declared nuclear facilities (in most nuclear fuel cycle facilities) rather than to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities of a State.

2. The Additional Protocol (AP):

Provides wider scope and more effective inspections to cover the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities of a State.

It started from 2000 and currently (March 2011) the AP is in force at 108 States (while 135 States have signed the AP). Over 50 States not yet sign or ratify the AP including over 20 States having significant nuclear activities.

There are over 1100 declared facilities or locations subject to SG inspections. Close to 2000 inspections have been performed in 2010

Types of IAEA On-Site SG inspections:

(a) States having SG agreements with the IAEA in accordance to the NPT

Permitted for only designated inspectors to the concerned State

1. Routine (including Initial / Adhoc) inspections:

To be informed to the State within a period from one day to seven days. Initial inspections are meant to verify the initial declared inventory of a declared facility. The Ad-hoc inspections are routine inspections before the signature of a specific facility attachment agreement (though similar to known routine inspections for similar facilities) and may also be performed to verify the transfers of Nuclear Materia (NM).

Routine inspections –are based on an agreed specific facility attachment- are composed of different types, mainly:

PIV (Physical Inventory Verifications) inspections, normally once a year to verify all declared nuclear material at a nuclear facility. This type of inspections for significant facilities is conducted by a group of inspectors coordinated by a senior experience inspector.

Inerim inspections, to fulfil the requirement of timeliness verification of nuclear material (e.g. for fresh MOX fuel at an NPT State with no AP yet, the timeliness is one month), other goals for equipment service (e.g. Camera surveillance recording media)

Transfer verification inspections (e.g. To verify receipts of significant NM or shipment of NM to inaccessible areas)

Design information verification (DIV) inspections, to confirm the declared design and lack of changes that may affect the SG measures. This ype of inspections is normally done by experience inspectors (Engineers) knowledgable of the design of these facilities.

2. Special inspections:

In case of strong information or detection of indications of violation of a State of its obligation to the NPT, the IAEA has the right –while informing its BoG- to request to perform a special inspection at a particular location (whether declared or not). This type is very rare as it causes a strong political conflict. It was behind the major problem between the IAEA and DPRK in 1993. The importance of the special inspections is highly reduced following the entry of the AP into force for many States

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IAEA inspectors during a transfer verification inspection using a new sealing method (unattended Cobra/Vacoss) to seal a spent fuel cask before movement from reactor site to a storage

(b) Inspections at States having the AP in force:

All inspectors of the IAEA are normally designated to all States with AP in force.The inspections performed under the AP are somehow in line with the challenge inspection type of the OPCW and CTBTO though does planned entirely by IAEA without a request from other States Party. The inspections under APs could be:

1. 24 hours Complementary access (inspections):To confirm the absence of nuclear material and activities at different declared (and sometimes not declared) sites. It provides more access to locations not covered by the traditional SG agreements (e.g. Uranium mines, yellow cake production facilities, pre-safeguarded NM, irradiated declared non-NM, factories of significant components –e.g. Centrifuges- ..etc.) Normally these type of inspections are performed with knowledgable inspectors and relatively simple tools .e.g. Photos, observations, environmental samples, simple detectors, etc..)The State is informed of this CA normally 24 hours (sometimes more e.g. For far distance mines) before the start of activities.

2. Two-hours Complementary Access:Additional access to a location at a declared nuclear site during a routine inspection. This could covers buildings on the site with or without NM for the purpose to cover undeclared NM&A.

Integrated SG approaches:

For States with NPT and AP in force and having IAEA Broader conclusion that confirms its declared nuclear material and facilities as well as confirms the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, a simplified routine inspection regime is implemented (e.g. based on less frequent routine inspections and activities for timeliness purposes).

The integrated SG approach have been applied at over 50 States obtained Broader SG Conclusions.

Major Equipment used during On-Site Inspections:

Suirveillance equipment (mainly Digital as DSOS/DMOS/SDIS). Digital Cameras are used to support visual observation particularly during CA missionsSeals (metral, Vacoss, Cobra, Paper with possible surveillance and remote transmission links)

Hand-held Radiation detectors (e.g. HM-5, Cd-Te)

Equipment for spent fuel or fresh MOX underwater (FDET / UWCC / SFAT / IRAT)

ICVD (Improved Cerenkov Verification Device), is a Hand-held device for the verification of irradiated items –spent fuel, core fuel, non-fuel irradiated items). The result is subjective and based on inspector‘ assessment and experience. New digital units with computer program assessment attached are under development.

Sampling and Swipe Environmental Sampling (ES)

Heavy equipment are normally resident at facilities and require knowledgable trained inspectors to handel, operate and service them in the field.

GPS (Navigators) / Digital cameras / Hand-held NDA detectors and ES are the most frequent equipment used during CAs.

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ICVD with and Without Telephoto-lens

For spent fuel verification in ponds

The Organization of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

On-Site Inspection RegimesLegal basis:

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans chemical weapons and requires their destruction within a specified period of time (10 years). The treaty is of unlimited duration.

The convention opened for signature on January 13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997.

188 states signed and ratify the convection. Two signatories—Israel and Myanmar—have yet to ratify it. Key non-signatories include North Korea, Syria and Egypt.

The CWC is implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is headquartered in La Hague with about 500 employees in its technical Secretariat in addition to an Executive Council of 41 selected States-Parties’.

The OPCW inspects and monitors states-parties’ declared facilities and activities that are relevant to the convention, to ensure compliance.

OCPW has over 170 chemical inspectors performed 23000 inspection days mainly at chemical weapons destruction declared facilities and industrial sites.

On-Site OPCW Inspection Activities

Purposes: to generate confidence in states-parties’ CWC compliance.On 21 April 2011, OPCW performed its 2000th inspection. The OPCW covers over 1500 facilities in more than 80 States. Inspection Types:

Initial inspections: To verify initial declaration and to draft site-specific facility agreements for the conduct of routine inspections. Notification at least 72 hours

Routine inspections: Performed at declared chemical weapons-related facilities and chemical industry facilities to verify the content of declarations and to confirm that activities are consistent with CWC obligations. Inspectors need to verify chemicals, check its composition, visual observations and accountancy of declared inventories.Notification between 24 hours to 120 hours depend on the facility type and in accordance to the facility agreement. Normally less than 10 inspectors per inspection.

Challenge Inspections:

An inspection requested by a State Party triggered by a suspected violation of a treaty or agreement; with respect to the CWC to any facility or location declared or not declared on the territory of another State Party. The request for a challenge inspections could be halted by the support of 75% of the 41 OPCW Executive Council member States and that should be done within 12 hours from the request.

The inspection is conducted on a short-notice (the State concerned is normally notified 12 hours prior of inspector team arrival and the challenge inspection at the concerned facility is normally started next day with max.delay of 36 hours. The inspection may last up to 84 hours).

Managed Access could be implemented if necessary.

Inspection team may compose of a large number of inspectors (up to 50) with heavy equipment.

Observers from the requesting State (or other MS) has the right to attend and observe challenge inspections

Equipment Use for OPCW inspections:

Equipment use includes non-destructive testing equipment, detection equipment and a mobile laboratory to conduct analysis of swipe and soil samples.

Use of vehicle including helicopters to cover a wider area during a challenge inspection is possible.

Specific equipment:

Digital cameras, Hand held detector (CAM), Seal kit, Sample collection kit, sample transport kit, GC–MS (Gas Chromatograph) spectrometer, X-ray equipment, GPS, Weigh scale, compass, Binoculars, hand-held radios NDA as ARS (Accoustic Resonance Spectrography), NIPPS (Neutron-induced prompt-photon spectroscopy), Hydrogen concentration measurement (HCM)/chlorine-detection (CDS), Mask-fit test kit

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) On-Site Inspection Regimes

Legal basis:

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions on Earth whether for military or for peaceful purposes.

The treaty opened for signature on September 24, 1996 and would require 44 States to sign and ratify before its entry into force, which did not happen till today.

182 States signed the treaty including 153 States ratified.9 of the key 44 States have yet to sign or ratify the treaty (India, Pakistan, DPRK, USA, China, Iran, Egypt, Israel and Indonesia).

CTBTO was established in November 1996 in Vienna to implement the Treaty. It composes of two organs. The Preparatory commission (with Executive Council of selected 51 State Party) and a Provisional Technical Secretariat.

On-Site inspections (OSI):

If a detected event raises concerns about compliance with the basic obligations of the CTBT, an OSI may be conducted to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has taken place. Such an inspection could take place only after entry into force of the Treaty. The inspection Has to be approved by at least 30 of the 51 States member of the CTBTO‘s Executive Council. An inspection area of up to 1000 square kilometers would be searched by a team of inspectors (up to 40). The inspection constitutes the final verification measure under the CTBT.

The inspection is of a challenge type with short-time notification. . They can only be carried out upon request by a State Party based on detailed information about suspected events. The State requesting the on-site inspection can send a representative to observe it. The State Party subjected to such an inspection cannot refuse to allow it to take place.

The Director-General has only two hours to acknowledge receipt of the request and six hours to communicate the request to the concerned State Party. The Executive Council has to approve the inspection within 96 hours.The approved on-site inspection is conducted after 6 days of notification of the inspected State. Period of inspection may be extended up to 130 days

Managed Access could be implemented during the inspection if necessary.

Activities and Equipment use of an On-Site Inspection:

1.Setting Seismic After Shock Monitoring device (SAMS) to confirm the recorded pattern of the events (portable seismometers) with possible UG drilling2.Radionuclide Measuring and Sampling (e.g for Xenon and Argon)3.Gamma detection (hand–held detectors) and environmental sampling4. Visual observation including Over-flights, GPS and digital cameras 5.Use of pre-recorded satellite images for comparisons with the on-site images to check changes if any6. Multi-spectral imaging (including infrared measurements)7. Air-borne gamma spectroscopy8.Ground penetrating radar9.Electrical conductivity measurements (help to identify buried infrastructure of an explosion and disturbances in the underground geological features).

taking soil sample

Radionuclide sampling and analysis

Aerial observation and inspectors setting equipment

Comparison of On-site Inspections at the major organizationIAEA OPCW CTBTO

Legal base NPT-in force CWC-in force CTBTStates Ratified 184+1+5 187+1 152+1Major States Not 4 5 9Start 1970 / 2000 1997 Not yet # inspectors 250 170 30 P.I+1000 N.I in a reserve list# inspections/y 2000 200 0 Challenge/CA CA Challenge Challenge# Challenge/CA/y 200 0 (only exercises) 0 (Exercises) # inspectors/

inspection 1-10 4-40 =< 40Notifications 2h -7d 24h - 5d 6 dNormal period 1-14 days 2-3.5d(84h) 30-130 d Managed Access DIVs/CAs Yes YesObserver rights No Yes YesTraining/y 1-2 (ICAS) 1 1(for PI+NI)

Lessons Learned and Conclusion:On-Site inspections continue to play an important role in different regimes to support the achievement of different treaties or objectives.

Qualified, well-trained inspectors and the use of advanced equipment in addition to collected information and logestic support for preparation of the inspections are the basis of success of these inspections.

Experience collected from the conduct of different organizations may need to be shared for future improvements, particularly as there are significant similarities among those inspections and the equipment use.

Cooperation between the responsible of on-site inspections for the conduct of inspections, advanced equipment use, future methodology developments and training of inspectors, is recommended for best experience transfer.