As this issue of YANKEE SCOUT opens, in the months after the military

debacle triggered by the Union Army’s disciplinary disintegration at the

Battle of Bull Run – just two issues back, in YANKEE SCOUT!! -- the

Army is still being reformed according to a regime ordered by Gen Geo. B.

McClellan, in cooperation with E. Stanton, Secretary of War, and President

A. Lincoln. As 1861 rolls over to a brand new year – it’s now 1862, --

McClellan, as Commanding General, is also in charge of planning the Union

Army strategy for the coming Spring Campaign, which will realize his

Thus, over the winter of 1861-62, Gen. McClellan “labored …. for many months..” to devise an ingenious,

potentially effective plan of attack, for marine deployment of his Army down the Potomac on “troop transports” –

mostly commercial steam-boats pressed into Army service. See below. These transports were to move out from

Alexandria to the Chesapeake, and then paddle unnoticed up the Rappahannock River to the small neglected

tobacco dock at Urbanna, on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and behind the Confederate’s Manassas line: a

movement which would quickly bring the Union Army within 50 miles of Richmond, and which, if carried off with

surprise, would cut off the C.S.A. supply lines, also cutting of any retreat. Such was the plan, anyway.

“For many long months I have labored to prepare the army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme;

from the day when I was placed in command of all our armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other

armies in such a condition, that they too would perform their allotted duties.”

“Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake,

the point of landing which promises the most brilliant results, is

Urbanna, on the lower Rappahannock. The point is easily

reached by vessels of heavy draught, it is neither occupied nor

observed by the enemy, it is but one march from West Point [ Not

that one, but a headland on the York River, served by rail – Ed.]

the key of that region, and thence, but two marches to Richmond.

A rapid movement from Urbanna would probably cut off

Magruder [ from his supply lines ] in the Peninsula, and enable us

to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced.

Should we fail that, we could, with the co-operation of the navy,

cross the James and show ourselves to Richmond, thus forcing the

enemy to attack us, for his position would be untenable, with us

on the southern bank of the river.”

“Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbanna,

we can use Mob Jack Bay – or the worst coming to the worst, we

can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete

security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the

Peninsula.”

McClellan to Edwin Stanton, February 3, 1862

Plan A: Urbanna Plan B: Mob Jack Bay Plan C: Fortress Monroe

But could it work? McClellan’s Urbanna plan was a professionally-conceived military strategy for moving the

Union Army well behind General Johnston’s advance positions with the objective of cutting off Johnston’s supply

lines back to Richmond.

J. H. Latrobe, a West Point graduate, who shares with McClellan professional’s aptitude for communication on

matters of advanced strategic planning, was an early outspoken defender of McClellan’s soon-to-be-abandoned

Urbanna plan. Latrobe, who may have been writing in anticipation of McClellan’s 1864 Presidential campaign,

wrote, in Three Great Battles, (Baltimore, 1863):

“If interested take a map of the seat of war – Lloyds is good. [ EDITOR’S NOTE: Latrobe appears to be

referring to Lloyd’s American Railroad Map for 1861 , which was evidently retitled before its final printing,

so that it could do double-duty as a current map of the Whole Seat of War.] [Latrobe again:] Put your

finger on Yorktown. Next find Urbanna on the Rappahannock; Now find Fredericksburg. You see the

three places.” [ With only a momentary glance at Lloyd’s, the three key locations mentioned by Latrobe

can be quickly identified along the relevant rail routes. To actually see the three places go here:

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701p.cw0014100/ [COPY/PASTE if the link is dead. – Ed.]

“McCLELLAN’s plan was to have an army advance from Old Point, [Old Point Comfort, where Fortress

Monroe was situated: see p. 17 of This Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Ed.] an army from Fredericksburg,

an army from Urbanna, all upon Richmond. Look again at the map [ Here is a better copy of Lloyd’s:

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701p.cw0014000/- Ed.], and you will find that the Confederate Army, if it

remained to fight at Yorktown, would be taken in the area by the army advancing from Urbanna. This the

Confederates would not have allowed; and yet there was but one way to prevent it, which was to retreat

without fighting, from Yorktown, far enough to place the Yorktown and Urbanna [Union] armies both in

front. Look at the map and then be sure of this. [ https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701p.cw0014000/

Latrobe wants you to check again -- Ed.] But no army was to be sent from Urbanna; and so McCLELLAN

had to get to Richmond as best he could; and as he wanted men and had none to spare, instead of storming

the entrenchment of the Confederates, he planted batteries and made it essential for them to retreat. Had

they fought behind entrenchments at Yorktown, [See, YANKEE SCOUT – Yorktown!! – Upcoming –

Ed.] as they had fought in the open field at Williamsburg, [See, YANKEE SCOUT – Williamsburg!! –

Upcoming – Ed.] the Potomac Army would have been crippled from the beginning. McClellan forced

them away without a fight, and Congress wisely thanked him for the saving of human life.”1

J.H.B. Latrobe, Three Great Battles, pp. 20-21 (1863)

https://archive.org/details/threegreatbattle00latr

So much for the details of the Urbanna Plan.2

As we shall see in This Issue of YANKEE SCOUT, after considerable

effort and process, McClellan’s plan was eventually approved by the Lincoln Administration – as of March 8, 1862.

On that date, something else happened, that would completely alter the course of the Civil War! GUESS WHAT?

Meanwhile, still dealing with the situation as of January, 1862, and still strategizing, McClellan is operating on an

assumption that he has full rein and the confidence of President Lincoln. So McClellan is developing the Urbanna

Plan alone, without consulting Lincoln. Lincoln, for his part, thinks that McClellan is thinking what he is thinking…

1 A discussion of Latrobe’s research and methods in the writing his military history, appears in Semmes, John H. B. Latrobe and his Times 1803-1891, p. 129 (Baltimore, 1917) https://archive.org/details/johnhblatrobehis00semm 2 For an up-to-date, comprehensive account McClellan’s use of military intelligence in developing the Urbanna Plan,

see, Edwin Fishel, The Secret War for the Union: the Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War, pp

134-138, (1999). Fishel, at p. 137, says: “[Urbanna] was an idea, that …. could have sprung from a two minute study

of a map that lacked enough detail to show swamps but did show Urbanna’s accessibility by water and … railroad.”

Fishel’s description of Mac’s hypothetical map, could easily be a description of Lloyd’s “Seat of War” map.

Or is he? Or is he merely letting McClellan think that he is thinking?

Maybe not: Lincoln, for whom the prosecution of the war is tied to a

political schedule3

as well as a military one, has grown impatient

waiting on McClellan, and has been devising his own military strategy.

Thus, on January 27 Lincoln issues his General War Order No. 1,

and then, on January 31, his Special War Order No 1, commanding

McClellan to execute a Feb. 22 marine landing up an insignificant

river, called the Occuquan – where he intends that McClellan’s army

will confront the Confederates head-on once more, at Manassas.

This is the famous Occuquan Plan – which doubles as a flanking

maneuver to cut off the Confederate supply lines. It is the very

operation which Confederate General Joe Johnston most fears.4

But advance on Lincoln’s Occuquan Plan did not take place. Here’s why:

Lincoln’s orders for the Occuquan landing were delivered to McClellan on January 31, at which point “Little Mac”

– totally astonished -- made his own assault upon Washington D.C., taking his outrage and arguments directly to

Lincoln.5

He asks for permission to make written objections to Occuquan, and submit his own plan – the details of

the Urbanna plan which he has been working up… but still has not committed to paper! Lincoln assents, and finally,

over the weekend, McClellan dashes out a 22-page document, which he delivers to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton

on Monday, February 3. After review of the text of the Urbanna Plan, Lincoln objects, as the proposal would move

too many troops behind Johnston’s army and leave Washington undefended against a possible Rebel attack.

Forceful discussions take place between McClellan and Lincoln, over the merits of the two plans. February passes

– rainy throughout -- with much internal governmental debate over the efficacy of McClellan’s operations.6

Finally, to break the log-jam, on Friday, March 7, McClellan proposes to have the Urbanna plan vetted by a panel

of twelve division commanders,7

and Lincoln assents again. Again, finally, on March 8 the military panel approves

McClellan’s plan in an 8-4 vote, and Lincoln relents: Urbanna is now the official Union Army assault plan, and will

be implemented with a few exceptions: Lincoln issues new orders, that reserves be left in the District of Columbia

to defend Washington City. At last, the moment of McClellan’s brilliance has arrived!! Except for one thing …..

WHAT? WHY or HOWCOME? WHICH? Beginning Saturday, March 8, the War Department begins to

receive news that Johnson’s Army has begun to retreat from Manasasas — a thing which would render McClellan’s

Urbanna Plan moot! At the same time, Fortress Monroe sends telegrams that the Confederates’ ironclad ram

Merrimac(k) has appeared at Hampton Roads, and is attacking Union vessels! It was a big weekend at the office.

McClellan’s chance, as he sees it, for battlefield “brilliance” is gone, within the very moment it had appeared.

What will he do now? For McClellan, his “worse has come to worse,” and its looking like PLAN C.!!

3

Lincoln is being pressured by a faction of his Republican party supporters who are more “radical” – and are, e.g.,

calling for more vigorous prosecution of the war than McClellan is delivering. 4 Fishel, Ibid, pp. 132, 136. 5 A good account of these early 1862 war councils in Lincoln’s Army, is found in Mark A. Snell, From First to Last: The Life of Major General William B. Franklin, Chapt. 6, “From Bull Run to Yorktown” (Fordham U., 2002). 6 For an excellent treatment of the role of the “radical Republicans” at this time, who have formed the Congressional

Committee on the Conduct of the War, to oversee military affairs, and are pressuring both Lincoln and McClellan,

see, Bruce Tap, Over Lincoln’s Shoulder: the Committee on the Conduct of the War, esp. pp. 108-115 (1994). 6 Fishel, Ibid, p. 136. 7

Some vetting: Fishel, Ibid, p. 137, states, “… no discussion preceded the generals’ vote on the plan….”

Recall now, that in the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Death on the Picket Line!!, that last September, 1861,

Gen. “Baldy” Smith’s Division of the Army of the Potomac has moved out from Chain Bridge, and went into

Winter Quarters at Lewinsville, in Fairfax County, Virginia – about 12 miles away. Pvt. Drew and his squad were

assigned with scouting out Rebel positions south of Lewinsville, and according to Drew, the party unwisely ventured

behind Rebel picket lines as they traversed an open field and approached a high hill. Drew reported laconically:

“We found the rebel picket lines -- they were at home at Falls Church.” At this time, following the Battle of Bull

Run, the Confederates had moved their front positions out from Manassas Juncion, and were also occupying key

vantage points, such as Minor’s Hill (shown below, right) and Munson’s Hill to the south … (not quite shown):

Detail from Sneden, Topographical Map of Washington D. C. and Vicinity showing Union forts and defenses.. 1861-1863 . (Library of Congress) https://www.loc.gov/resource/gvhs01.vhs00240/

Army Formation

“Colon Burnham allowed me many privileges and gave me many useful instructions….

“The 1st

duty of a soldier is obedience – it matters not if it be a Gen’l or a corporal that gives the order, you may

ask for fuller instructions, but never but never argue the matter, even if you know it to be wrong. Military

discipline is the glory of a soldier – to be a good Soldier a man must be able to grasp commands quickly and to

carry them out accurately.

3 or 4 Regiments make 1 Brigade

3 or 4 Brigades a Division

3 Divisions a Corps.

“A corps may contain from 30 to 60,000 men with artillery &c. Such a command is a big burden and few men

[are] capable to manage the corps in action on a battlefield successfully.

“In all the Brigade drills Conol Burnham he rode beside Gen’l Hancock and repeated his orders – he could be

heard by all the men – he has often drilled the Brigade, when Hancock was away and is able to command a

Brigade but he is a volunteer, has not been to West Point. And now we will move on into 1862.

[P. 35] Discipline

“We were done with the Easyer drill and the Harder was taken up – we like it, the skirmish drill is good.8

“On or near the middle of the month a corporal of Co. A was reduced to the ranks at a dress parade for not

taking off his cap to a West Pointer. And orders came from the President of the U.S. that the Army of the

Potomac would make an advance against the [foe] at Manassa on the 22nd

of February [the Occuquan Plan !! – See

p. 4 above] in commendation [sic] of Washington's birthday9

, if those so anxious to fight would join the Army, the

U.S. would be busted in short-order.”

“We were willing to do most anything to escape the drills, inspections and reviews. More of the other troops

around us had half the drilling we had, and we began to think that Gen’l Hancock who as a West Pointer, was

somewhat biased against the Volunteers. There was extra blankets and [ fleece ?] to the tent during the winter –

they were ordered turned in to the Quartermaster. We was getting redy for the move: orders [came] to make our

loads light as possible; then, that order was countermanded. “We concluded the politisians was trying to get

Unkle Abe muddled – but it did rain & snowed the last of Janry and nearly all Febry.”10

8

The MS text reads “Harder,” capitalized, and the word is juxtaposed to “Easyer,” which is also capitalized; yet one

might wonder if Pvt. Drew was playing on the name ”Hardee” here, referring to the manual of arms of tactician Brig

Gen. William J. Hardee – who was by this time serving in the Confederate Army. Hardee had published Instructions for Skirmishers, in 1861. http://draytons.tripod.com/drill/2ColHardeeSkirmishOdds.pdf See the discussion on

tactical drilling of the volunteers, in the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Death on the Picket Line!! @ p 8.

Hooker’s it was March 12, after Hooker’s forces were encamped at Newport News, before Yorktown (see below,

pp. 15 ff. ) that the Second Division troops were first introduced to drilling according to Hardee’s Tactics. See, e.g.,

B. K. Benson, Who Goes There?, p. 102. https://archive.org/details/whogoestherestor00bens 10

The lack of communication or consensus between President Lincoln and Gen. McClellan over the strategy of the

Spring Campaign is reverberating, with consequences that are even cognizable to the troops.

Col. Hiram Burnham

Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock

Rebs Move

“The first of March Conol Burnham sent for me on going to Head Quarters I found Gen’l Hancock and him

talking. Burnham told me he wanted me to go out and see what the Rebels was doing. Taking Dan [Bagley] we

left camp after sundown we got back the next morning at bugle call with the news and the proof that the Rebs were

gone bag and baggage – their camps + forts were deserted.11

“The Col. [ Burnham ] called his orderly + started him for [Gen. Hancock’s] Brigade H.Q. we had picked up some

late Richmond papers that had more news about the Army of the Potomac and what was going on in Washington,

than any of our [own, Northern] papers. We gave the papers to Burnham.”

[P. 36] “Then, some horsemen was sent out [to] see if the report was true …”

Pvts. Drew and Bagley have returned on Sunday morning, March 2, 1862, reporting the first military intelligence,

that the Rebs under have abandoned their Fairfax county front position south of Lewinsville. Pvts. Bagley and Drew

may have again reconnoitered south towards Falls Church, and found that enemy positions at Minor’s Hill and

Munson’s Hill have been evacuated … For the Editor’s conjecture as to which Rebel positions the two young

YANKEE SCOUTS may have found abandoned see map and note, following page.

11

Pvt. Drew’s development as an Army Scout can be discerned again here.

In this sequence, Maine Regimental Col. Hiram Burnham, has again

summoned Drew to Burnham’s Headquarters – only this time, Drew is

asked to come during the tail-end of a consultation between Burnham and

Brigadier-General Winfield S. Hancock. With Gen. Hancock still

present, Pvt. Drew is now asked – aka, ordered -- out on his third

“voluntary” scouting assignment. You may recall he had reported on two

scouts in the preceding year: when first, in October, 1861, Drew with his

scouting party narrowly escaped capture by a band of Rebel cavalry near

Falls Church, Virginia: then, later in December, 1861, he was assigned

with dispatching a night-time terror that had been stalking and killing

Union Army soldiers on McCall’s Division picket line. YOW !!! See, the

Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Death on the Picket Line!!

Reconnoitering out of the Union Army camp near Lewinsville, Pvts. Drew and Bagley have been monitoring once

again, rebel-held Falls Church, Virginia, and probably keeping an eye on the Rebel fort on Minor’s Hill which

commanded a view of the Leesburg turnpike down to Falls Church. After finding these positions vacated, he

perhaps also checked on Munson’s Hill south of Falls Church. The two men report back on the morning of March

2, 1862 that these -- or other, nearby – positions, have been are abandoned. This report is among the first Union

intelligence of any Rebel withdrawal. The report is confirmed, but in itself is not a significant piece of intelligence.

The REBEL RETREAT from STRATEGIC ADVANCE POSITIONS

Rebel fortifications at Minor’s Hill and Munson’s Hill – as well as Mason’s Hill further south -- were Confederate

advance positions, as was Falls Church and Centerville: following the Battle of Bull Run, these positions had been

occupied in late August, 1861, by an infantry force led by General James Longstreet, assisted by cavalry under the

command of J.E.B. Stuart -- as we saw in that issue of YANKEE SCOUT. But because these were not strong nor

readily defensible, Confederate General Joe Johnston was obliged to maintain his stronghold back at Manassas

Junction, which was effectively impregnable: and yet from these new positions the Rebs could appear to threaten

the safety of Washington. In fact, once on Munson’s Hill the Confederates had hoisted a large Rebel flag that could

be seen from Washington 12

– that is, with a powerful spyglass or good pair of field glasses – raising thereby a reminder

and a taunt of the Union debacle at Bull Run, promising a reprise at least and even

threatening an outright attack on Washington City!! Hence, of course,

Gen. McClellan’s aggressive program of defensive fortifications

around D.C. – such as Fort Ethan Allen, discussed in the Last Issue !!

R.K. Sneden, Looking at the Confederate earthworks on Munson's Hill down the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike from Bailey's Crossroads, September 1861, (Virginia Historical Society)

Why, after such a decisive victory at Manassas Junction, did Gen. Longstreet not advance his forces even closer to

Washington, and occupy positions that could command Arlington Heights, or threaten Potomac River traffic, or

Alexandria? What was Longstreet’s strategy for taking up ONLY these limited new positions in Fairfax County –

and Minor’s Hill on the border with Arlington County – …?

Would he not have been further overextended? OR…..

12

The film “Saving Lincoln” (2013) by Salvador Litvak does an excellent job in treating these opening months of

the Civil War, giving a sense of the “homeliness” of the national conflict brewing across the countryside, and

illustrating events and locales with actual period photographs collaged on “green-screen” backdrops.

In this image, the original perimeter of the District of Columbia is highlighted in red – as it was laid out by President

George Washington, and surveyed by Alexander Ellicott. NOTE that without exception, all of Gen. Longstreet’s

advance positions lie just before this border – which, after the 1846 retrocession of D. C. territory west of the

Potomac river, back to Virginia, became Alexandria, then Arlington County, Va. Does occupation of these positions

— especially Minor’s Hill and Falls Church, which noticeably “flank” the western corner of the old D.C. diamond -

- show Longstreet was unwilling to encroach even upon the retroceded territory of the District of Columbia? Was

Longstreet indeed fighting a “defensive war,” at least in terms of its battlefield strategy? Very doubtful. Consider,

for instance, the August 7, 1861 burning of Hampton. So, what, indeed, is this cause of this retreat? JUST THIS:

.

On Feb.19-20, 1862, General Johnston had been in Richmond to discuss with Jeff Davis and the Confederate

Cabinet, his concerns over the vulnerability of the Confederate Army holding on to these same overextended

positions around Manassas and along the Potomac. Johnston’s chief concern was against the possibility of a flanking

move by the Union Army, on his right … that is, coming off the Occuquan river. Indeed, the Confederate General

feared the very assault that Abraham Lincoln had been planning. The Occuquan plan.

While the content of these Richmond meetings were supposed to be top secret, nevertheless rumor volat… and

when Johnston returned to his hotel after the meeting, he heard from other Confederate officers all about the talk

of withdrawal. Upon attending Jeff Davis’ second inauguration ceremonies on February 22, he found the matter of

withdrawal was on everyone’s lips: unsourced, but confidently asserted.13

So, when Gen. Johnston returned to

Centerville-Manassas the following day, he heard yet more iterations of the same rumor… and so forth, and was

buffaloed: Johnston presumed an order had issued – and in this way, the Confederate Army whispered its way into

an all-out retreat. Find that in the official West Point History of the Civil War !! Fishel, at p. 132, writes:

On February 22, immediately upon returning from Richmond, he [Gen. Johnston] began movement

preparations on a scale that should have come to the attention of Union intelligence, but did not. On

March 1 he [ Johnston—acting without authorization from Davis – Ed.] issued orders for evacuation by

railroad – sick and wounded to go first, then ordnance and hospital equipment, then food and storage.

The troops would move on foot. The process of collecting cars and engines assembled from five different

rail lines produced a state of confusion so visible that, although the terrain screened it from the Federal

balloonists, it would have been observable by any would-be deserter or refugee who had been at Manassas.

Like an American “Appointment in Samarra” yoked to herd instinct, the Confederate Army made an immediate

and total withdrawal from the Manassas line, only because there was a rumor it was going to happen! And this must

also be the cause of the withdrawal observed & reported by Drew, following his March 1-2 recon of advance

Confederate positions near Falls Church. Could Johnston’s order of retreat, issued at Manassas on March 1, be

received by Confederate troops 37 miles away at Falls Church on the same day, so that Pvt. Drew’s recognizance

on the evening of March 1 would find them gone “bag and baggage” – as Pvt. Drew states? Of course.

The REBEL RETREAT and GEN. GEO. McCLELLAN’S PSYCHOMACHE

As noted above, Gen. McClellan is having a difficult weekend: news of Rebel retreat from Manassas reaches

Washington very nearly on the same day as the ink is drying on approval of Urbanna. Urbanna is now irrelevant,

whereas, rapid movement on Lincoln’s Occuquan would have caught Johnston before this retreat was complete,

and perhaps ended the war. Meanwhile, on March 9, the Monitor appears and sends the Merrimack packing,

which opens Fortress Monroe and Newport News for marine landing, and execution of the Peninsular Campaign.

“The weather had got fine, the mud had dried up. We had [???? ] the old canvass leggings and on the 10th

of

March we moved [from] Alexandria – the Army of the Potomac was moving on the Peninsula Campaign —

McClelland commanded only the Army of the Potomac.14

”

13

For details on this self-inflicted withdrawal, see Fishel, pp. 130-141, from which this account has been taken. 14 McCLELLAN DEMOTED: On March 11, 1862 -- the day after Drew notes that Army troop deployments have

begun out of Alexandria, Lincoln removed McClellan as General-in-Chief of the Union armies, demoting him to

field command of the Army of the Potomac. This assertion by Lincoln of absolute Executive Office control of

Union Army strategy, and demotion of McClellan, was accompanied by other moves to re-organize the Army, but

was a rebuke to McClellan. If ever there was one, it is an inauspicious beginning, to Gen. McClellan’s debacle ….

Detail from Sneden, Topographical map of Washington D.C. and Vicinity showing Union forts and defenses. 1861-1863

Observant readers will be unable to overlook amonalies on Pvt. R. K. Sneden’s Topographical Map of Washington D.C. …https://www.loc.gov/resource/gvhs01.vhs00240/ Just two of these carto anomerlies are highlighted here:

FIRST, as we saw above, Sneden represents the original D.C. border as if it were still in existence in 1861. I have

again highlighted Sneden’s D.C. border in red. This puts Virginia’s Arlington County and Alexandria back in the

District of Columbia. Why did Sneden “restore” this retroceded territory to the Federal capitol? Historic reference?

Notice that while this map is extraordinary for its topographical rendering, Sneden left all topographical data OFF

the Maryland portion of the map, outside of D.C., so the landscape appears blank, thereby highlighting another

SECOND anomaly: the “North arrow” is drawn by Sneden to place North at 45 degree eastern deviation leaning

away from True North, to “True North-East” This is especially interesting, since true, or Polar North defines the

District of Columbia as a diamond standing on its southern tip near the mouth of Hunting Creek at Jones Point,

balanced on a True North axis or meridian running through Meridian Hill, to the upper diamond tip. Therefore,

this can’t be a casual error. So what else is this arrow indicating? What has Pvt. Sneden left “off the chart”?

Image: R. K. Sneden,

Map of the Potomac River: from Alexandria to below Occoquan ..

Down the

Potomac

“The 5th

Wisconsin +

6th

[ Maine ] was put

on sidewheel

steamboat slow but

shure.15

“When we passed

Mount Vernon

[Circled in red – Ed.]

I thought of

Washington and

wondered which side

he would take if living

at the present time.

“As a large steamer

was passing us towing

two schooners all

loaded with soldiers,

we all went to the side

of the boat, causing it

to keel over so far that

the wheel on the other

side missed the water

and we started on a

circle.”

15

Pvt. Drew here remarks on the close camaraderie that is already developing ( and is recognized by the Command),

between his own regiment – the 6th

Maine Infantry -- and the 5th

Wisconsin Infantry regiments, who will be assigned

reconnaissance of the Confederate’s Yorktown defenses together as early as Next Issue, YANKEE SCOUT –

Yorktown!! These same two regiments will then contribute key fighting power to Hancock’s 1std

Brigade of the

Gen. Smith’s 2nd Division, of the Army’s IV Corps– achieving some dramatic Union victories, beginning very

shortly … at Williamsburg!! Pvt. Drew remarks at one point in his Memoir, that “the best thing going into the

make-up a good soldier, is a good soldier beside him,” and the bond between the 5th

Wisc. and the 6th

Me will shortly

prove this maxim!! For more, see YANKEE SCOUT –- Williamsburg!!

“The Captain of the boat rushed

out of his cabin bareheaded and

coatless, damming us in good

sailor fashion for a set of fools.”

“Get on the other side of the ship!” he ordered. So we did all

togeather and soon was on a

reverse circle – More swearing.

“He ordered us back, with the

same result. Then the Capt. got

awful mad. I thought the Conol.

could swear some, but he was an

infant longside of that Sta.+

[steamboat] Capt. He ordered the

engine stoped.

“Then we did try to turn that old

boat over, but it couldn’t be

done.”

“Another steamer towing three

large schooners loaded with

Artillery, one of the schooners

seeing an old friend [of the

captain’s], we were taken in tow

and our fun was over. We landed

at Fortress Monroe in the night ….

Troops unloading off a sidewheel steamer:

but this is actually the 9th

Army Corps

embarking from Acquia Landing !!!

“…..We landed at Fortress Monroe, in the night – went ashore and camped on the beach.”

“The Battle between the Monitor and the Merrimac was fought on the 8th

of Mar.16

The flag of the Cumberland

had been nailed to the mast and was waving [P. 37] some 4 or 5 feet above the waves in the morning sunshine

when I woke up. They told me that her crew went down with the ship.”

Detail of Kurz & Allison, Battle between the Monitor and the Merrimac, fought March 9TH

, 1862 …

Smith’s Division, and Pvt. Drew’s brigade just missed the action at Hampton Roads. On the morning of March 8,

1862, the C.S.S. Virginia –originally the U.S.S. Merrimac(k), under the command of Confederate Navy Capt. F.

Buchanan, launched an attack on the on the U.S.S frigate Cumberland, -- Drew writes, sending her to the bottom,

with all souls. Or maybe not quite. Union soldiers onshore were serving up a baloney sandwich to the “newbies”

arriving at Fort Monroe: actual casualties from this attack were considerable, with 120 killed and many wounded,

with the remaining souls abandoning the defeated and destroyed U.S.S. Cumberland and getting safely to the beach,

at Newport News, as illustrated in this Kurz & Allison print.

The same afternoon the Merrimac(k) initiated another attack on the nearby frigate, U.S.S. Congress soon disabling

her. The Congress offered surrender under a white flag, and was being boarded, when further shelling from onshore

wounded Capt. Buchanan, and he ordered the Congress set afire with hot shot !!! The ship lit up the night sky,

until her powder magazines caught, and she exploded!! At the time, a third frigate, the U.S.S. Minnesota was to

be the Merrimack’s next target, but her captain had deliberately run her aground on a sandbar nearby, where the

deep-draft Merrrimac(k) could not follow, and nightfall spared her from the attack. Contrary to the Kurz & Allison

print, the U.S.S. Monitor was not present that day, but arrived that night at Fort Monroe, under cover of darkness.

16

It was actually March 9, 1862 – Ed.

aka the C.S.S. Virginia

The Confederate Navy had wanted an ironclad, and it would get one. Few achievements in the Civil War better

underscore the character of Rebel “grit and determination” than the development of the C.S.A. Virginia !!

The C.S.A. Navy had commissioned Lt. Col. John M. Brooke to design the South an ironclad – which he did: but

when the Navy moved to build it, Joseph R. Anderson & Co. at Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, observed that

there were no ship’s engines to be found in the South … so the Rebs looked to be in a fix! But at this fairly early

stage of the war, the United States Norfolk Navy yard was targeted for Confederate takeover, in retaliation for Gen.

Winfield Scott’s “Anaconda Plan” for the blockade of Southern ports! The Confederates wanted U.S. ships, to

break the U.S. blockade – On April 17, 1861 Virginia politicals voted to secede, and soon thereafter Virginia army

forces were moving into Portsmouth and Norfolk to effect a takeover ! So, on April 20, 1861, the commander at

the naval yard, Comm. C. S. McCauley in an effort to prevent the powerful vessels of the U.S. fleet from falling into

rebel hands, had ordered all the ships at Norfolk burned at anchor!

Such self-immolation, or “friendly-fire”– that

is, the torching of a U.S. naval vessel to

prevent its coming under enemy control -- is

reminiscent of the burning of the U.S.S.

Philadelphia which had stranded on the

rocks off Tripoli, during the Barbary wars …

and was blown to smithereens by the crew

of the ketch, U.S.S. Intrepid, led by

Comm. Richard Somers, in order to

prevent the more powerful vessel from

falling into the hands of the piratical Pasha

of Tripoli, and being converted into a

pirate ship. (The bodies of Somers and his

comrades still lie buried on foreign soil,

and justice and, the integrity of the Navy and

Marines code, require that they be

repatriated– NOW. See, the Intrepid Project:

http://www.intrepidproject.org/home.php )

BUT -- at the time of the Civil War, the

heroic conduct of Lt. Richard Somers and the

crews of the Intrepid and Philadelphia, was

still within living memory of U.S. Naval

officers like Comm. McCauley – who was a

whopping 10 years old during the Tripolitan

War, which served him as an example: and so,

there not begin sufficient men to guard the

naval yard --- he immediately ordered the

burning of the U.S. vessels. Yet, for some

reason, this foresighted act didn’t sit well with

Gideon Welles, or Gen. Scott, or Pres.

Lincoln, and so McCauley took a mysterious

forced retirement, as of Dec. 21, 1861.

FOR OUR PURPOSES, however, the prime U.S. naval vessel at anchor at Norfolk on the night of April 20, 861,

was the aforementioned U.S.S. frigate Merrimack – a top-of-the-line screw-steamer which Navy Sec. Gideon Welles

and Comm. McCauley had sought valiantly to protect in the weeks before the Norfolk attack. Ultimately, the

Merrimack, like others, was burned on McCauley’s orders, to prevent its falling into Confederate hands, even if

they seized the Norfolk yard – as they did. Now, Merrimac(k) lay burned-out and sunken in the harbor at Norfolk…

but her advanced steam engines, drive-shaft and propeller were good. And so the sunken hulk of the Merrimack

was raised intact, and them Rebs decided to use the whole ship! Use the United States’ best ships against her!!

Brooke’s original plan was now reconfigured to the Merrimack: to shield her guns, a 4”-thick pitched-roof iron

superstructure was fabricated out of rails pried from Virginia railroads. The result was a mighty steam-powered

iron ram -- but with stationary guns, a deep draft, and limited navigability. It was, indeed, a monstrosity…

But war is never pretty. While a true submarine was in development at Tredegar Iron Works, 17 under the eye of

Wm. Cheeney,18

and while the Union also had its own submarines in test phases, neither of the two vessels Monitor or Merrimac(k) qualify as such. The Rebel Merrimac(k) was not the only proof of Southern resourcefulness and

“extreme makeover” know-how: the Reb navy also had C.S.S. Manassas, C.S.S. Tennessee, & C.S.S Palmetto State.

The engineer and designer of the Merrimack/Virginia, Lt. Col. John M. Brooke, C.S.N., described the process

involved in realizing his invention this way:

17

For more on Tredegar Iron Works, See YANKEE SCOUT – Stranger in Richmond: Fugitive Slave !! 18

Charles B. Dew, Ironmaker to the Confederacy, p. 123 (1967)

“Early in June, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy of the Confederate States [ Stephen R. Mallory ] asked me

to design an iron-clad. The first idea presenting itself was a shield of timber, two feet thick, plated with

three or more inches of iron, inclined to the horizontal plane at the least angle that would permit working

the guns; this shield, its eaves submerged to the depth of two feet, to be supported by a hull of equal length.

There was nothing novel in the use of inclined iron-plating. It was apparent that to support such a shield

the ends of the vessel would be so full as to prevent the attainment of speed; and that in move end on even

a small sea would prevent working the bow or stern gun. It then occurred to me that fineness of line,

protection of hull, and buoyancy with light draught, could be obtained by extending the ends of the vessel

under water beyond the shield, provided the shield were of sufficient length to give the requisite stability.

Considering, then, the liability to the banking up of water over those submerged ends, I erected upon each

a decked superstructure of ship-iron, carried up from the sides of the submerged parts to a height above

water not greater than would permit free use of the guns, and of the usual form of hull above water. Water

could be admitted or taken from them.

“I submitted to the secretary outline drawings, --sheer, body and deck plans, with explanations,--and he

approved and adopted this novel form. In reply to my suggestion that Naval-Constructor John L. Porter

and Chief-Engineer William P. Williamson should be called to Richmond, that we might put the plan in

execution, he replied that a practical mechanic would be sent from the Norfolk yard. This mechanic--a

master ship-carpenter--came; but he was * * * permitted to return to the yard. * * * The secretary then

called the attention of Messrs. Williamson and Porter to the plan proposed by me, which had been

adopted by the department. The drawings were laid before them, the reasons for extending the hull under

water beyond the shield were given, and both approved it. As the drawings were in pencil, the secretary

directed me to make a clean drawing in ink of the plan, to be filed in the department. Messrs. Porter and

Williamson were directed to ascertain if suitable engines and boilers could be obtained. Mr. Porter offered

to make the clean drawing, as "being more familiar with that sort of work." Accepting the offer I went with

Williamson to the Tredegar works, where we learned that there were no suitable engines in the South.

Williamson then said he thought the engines of the Merrimac could be used, but that the vessel would

necessarily draw as much water as the Merrimac, and it would not be worth while to build a new hull, as

enough of the old hull remained to carry out the plan. Mr. Porter and I thought the draught too great, but

that we could not do better. We so reported to the secretary, who concurred. That there might be official

record of results of consultation, as there was of the original plan, he directed us to consider and report

upon the best mode of making the Merrimac useful, which we did in accordance with the views above

stated. Mr. Williamson and Mr. Porter returned to Norfolk, the former to adapt and repair the engines,

the latter to cut the ship down, submerge her ends, etc. To me was assigned the preparation of armor,

construction of guns, etc. On the 11th of July [1861] Mr. Porter submitted to the secretary drawings, based

upon actual measurements of the ship and on the plan of submerged extended ends, which I had

presented, and which had been unanimously approved.19

After approval by the Confederate Naval Secretary Mallory, construction began – at Tredegar Iron Works. Lest

we should forget what was involved in Southern “resourcefulness,” considerable slave labor was also employed.

Once finished, the Merrimac(k) was re-christened the C.S.S. Virginia and was launched from Norfolk this same

March. It saw action for only a single day – March 8 – before it was challenged by the Monitor, in its appearance

of March 9, and checked. The sagacity and foresight of President Lincoln must be uniquely credited, for forcing

the production schedule of the Monitor, which put the United States Navy ram on the water within 100 days.

19 John M. Brooke, Commander, The Plan and Construction of the Merrimac, from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. I, Johnson & Buel, eds. pp. 715-716 (1887). http://cssvirginia.org/vacsn4/original/bj87bl.htm

“The Monitor lay at anchor out in the bay -- it shure was a cheese box on a raft. We were told that an Army of

7,500 [75,000 – Ed.] was left to take care of Washington and we had an army of the same strength.”

Engineering breakthroughs like those embodied in Ericson’s ram, the U.S.S. Monitor, will often run counter-

"intuitive" – defying “sense-certainty” or at least all habituated sensual expectations of the layman or landlubber –

and often of the experienced seaman. So, when the Monitor appeared at Hampton Roads, it was a baffling thing,

and could only be derided or described with this colloquial reference to things familiar: it was like “a cheesebox on

a raft." The phrase was frequently used, and Pvt. Drew, a 16 year-old Army Infantry, just followed suit.

But from New Jersey to Maine, American nautical design and shipbuilding has always led the world... and helped

propel the United States forward, from naval victory to naval victory, to achieve now the global maritime supremacy

which she enjoys, in defense of free trade on the open seas: meaning, primarily, the frustration of piracy. This sea-

faring sagacity and ingenuity can be traced back to our colonial period, and indeed, was exemplified during the

American Revolution, by no less a figure than Benjamin Franklin -- who is said to have proposed key modifications

to hull contours, etc., of the budding U.S. naval fleet: modifications which were accepted and incorporated by Capt.

John Paul Jones. See, Melville's Israel Potter, chapter X, p. 64. https://archive.org/details/israelpotterhisf00melvrich

American shipwrights and machinists, collaborating with the U.S. Navy, have maintained this tradition of innovation

and excellence to the present. But, as in the Monitor, the results of advanced nautical engineering can frustrate the

ignorant or habituated eye! Just check out the design the new Navy destroyer, U.S.S. Zumwalt, built in Bath, Maine:

https://www.facebook.com/7NEWS/videos/10154373204153332/ It’s indetectable to radar! Weird – but cool !

Just as the Editor did not paint the picture on the cover of the current issue of YANKEE SCOUT, because there’s

a better one already done, so it is unnecessary to re-invent the wheel – or in this case, the water-wheel – by re-writing

a story that has been told well many times before. The following excellent account of the Monitor vs. Merrimac(k)

duel, goes strictly blow-by-blow. It appears in Winch – Chronicles of the Great Rebellion, p. 21 (1867):

March 8 -- The iron-plated war-steamer Merrimac (called by the rebels the “Virginia”) , commanded by Captain

Franklin Buchanan, came out from Norfolk [Naval Yard] Virginia, and steamed for the United States frigates

Cumberland and Congress, which were anchored near the mouth of the James River. The Merrimac was

accompanied by the rebel steamers [Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson (which were partially iron-plated),

and by three small steamers. The Cumberland opened fire on the Merrimac; but the balls glanced off without

effect. The Merrimac passed the Congress and fired a broadside into her, and then ran into the Cumberland,

near the bow, firing into the ship at the same time. Backing off, this action was repeated, and the sinking ship

was then left to her fate. In the mean while an attack was made upon the frigate Congress, by the Jefferson and

the Patrick Henry, which did much damage to the Congress. After the fate of the Cumberland was seen, an

effort was made to run the Congress on shore, -- which was accompanied with the aid of the gunboat Zouave.

This movement prevented the Merrimac from acting as a ram in sinking its antagonist. The rebel monster,

aided by the Henry and the Jefferson, then attacked the Congress with their guns. After sustaining this fire for

more than an hour -- there being no hop e of help from the other vessels in the United States fleet, and

Lieutenant Smith who was in command, having been killed, and the ship being on fire from hot shot – the flag

of the Congress was struck, and the crew finally removed in boast to the shore. The ship continued to burn

and was consumed. Meanwhile the United States fleet which was lying below [further down Chesapeake bay –

Ed.] had endeavored to come unsuccessfully to the ships which were attacked.

The steam frigate Minnesota unfortunately ran aground. The St. Lawrence (a sailing vessel) fired at long range,

but could not get near enough to be of any service. The frigate Roanoke ran aground; the gunboat Oregon was

disabled by a shot through her boiler; and the gunboat Zouave was damaged. After having engaged the

Minnesota, at a distance, with little effect, the Merrimac and her consorts went back to Norfolk in triumph.

The loss on the Cumberland was about 120 men, On the Congress, Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith, commanding,

Acting-master Thomas Moore, and about 100 men were killed, and 40 taken prisoners. On the Merrimac,

Capt. Buchanan was seriously wounded, 2 men were killed, and 6 wounded. The Patrick Henry had 4 killed,

and 3 wounded. Midshipman Hutter was killed on one of the small rebel vessels, and 2 officers wounded.

March 9 -- In the evening of the 8th

, the Ericson iron-plated battery Monitor, under the command of J. L.

Worden, arrived at Fort Monroe. This little novelty was prepared to go into immediate service. She moved

up to the Minnesota, which was still aground, and lay under her lee [out of sight from the Norfolk yard – Ed.].

It was supposed that in the morning the Merrimac would make an attack upon the Minnesota, the advent of

this new foe not being known. At one o’clock on the 9th

the Merrimac came down, followed by the henry and

the Jefferson, both full of troops, which it was supposed were intended to board the Minnesota. As the

Merrimac stood out from Sewall’s Point, the Monitor put out for her. The Henry kept approaching, but was

soon astonished by an eleven-inch shell from the Monitor which caused her to turn about and steam away

rapidly. The fight between the two iron-clads then commenced, and was kept up for several hours, at distances

varying from fifty to two hundred yards. The Merrimac attempted to run the Monitor down, but failed in the

attempt. The evolutions of the vessels were quick and exciting, the Monitor having the advantage in lightness,

speed, and facility in steering. The Merrimac, in the encounter, lost her iron beak, and began to leak badly; in

consequence of which she steamed away to Norfolk, followed by her consorts. The Monitor received no

serious damage. The only person on board who was hurt was Lieutenant Worden, whose eyes were injured

by the scales and dust struck off from the interior of the iron plated pilot-house [the cheese-box – Ed.] which

was struck with a round ball whilst he was looking through a narrow slit left open as a peep-hole.”

Finally, review this historic action up close and in 21st

Century fashion, in this very fine Youtube video clip:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vmnnqJm_4Pc

While the Confederate army has occupied almost the entirety of the Lower Peninsula, the Union has retained

control of this extreme tip of Hampton Roads shoreline of the same … so the Union Army troops are landed at the

Army’s Fortress Monroe on “Old Point Comfort” – at the confluence of the Potomac and James Rivers.

“The First Day’s Firing at Yorktown, 1862” sketched by an officer – Harper’s Weekly, April 26, 1862

In terms of immediate strategy, the arrival of the Monitor at Hampton Roads, and its defeat of the Merrimac(k),

broke the Confederate control of navigation up the York River -- and Union vessels finally moved up the York in

April to assist McClellan in the Siege of Yorktown -- above. See, YANKEE SCOUT – Yorktown!! – Next! Although

the Merrimac(k) was dry-docked for repairs at Norfolk until May 4, the U.S. Navy was unaware of the extent of her

damage, so -- further south at the mouth of the James -- the threat of the Merrimac(k) emerging from Norfolk

discouraged a Union gunboat advance upriver to Richmond, until the Rebs finally abandoned Norfolk on May 1.

Shortly thereafter – in another “friendly-fire” incident – the Confederates torched the Merrimac(k) on May 11.20

Union ironclads with a U.S. gunboat flotilla, under Comm. Rogers, at last moved up the James River to attack on

Richmond on May 15!! What happened? See, YANKEE SCOUT-- Stranger in Richmond: Fugitive Slave!!

Of all the naval battles of the Civil War – and even considered among all the most pivotal land battles with potential

to alter the outcome of the conflict -- the contest between the ironclads, the C.S.S.Virginia and the U.S.S. Monitor is certainly the most remarkable, given the very limited manpower involved. The duel would have been unique

itself, anywhere in the world, at any time – but is incomparably more fascinating because of the contest between the

Rebel scavenger savvy and resourcefulness of C.S.N. Commander Brookes, and Tredegar’s Anderson on the one

hand, and the incomparable engineering genius of Ericson, on the other, backed as he was by President Lincoln in

fast-tracking production of the Monitor during this winter of in 1861-62. The Monitor’s victory also led to the

production and launching of an fleet of “Monitor”-class vessels, and the inauguration of a new era of submarine

naval warfare. A later, comparable conflict occurred at Mobile bay, Ala., in August, 1864, where Buchanan again

commanded another Rebel ironclad, the C.S.S. Tennessee, against a half dozen such Monitors – and lost.

20

See, e.g., Anderson, By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War, Chap. V, (1962).

That, at any rate, offers a glimpse into the history of the momentous head-to-

head between the Ironclads at Hampton Roads, on March 8-9, 1862. The

confrontation was coincident with the launch of the Peninsular Campaign of

the Army of the Potomac, but barely affected the decision to go “Peninsular.”

Gen. Johnston’s “boot-strapping” retreat order of March 1, 1862, did that.

Certainly no single naval conflict in the Civil War has merited more attention

from scholars and historians; and their consensus today, is that the outcome

of the duel was a draw. However – none of them were eyewitnesses, and as

of March, 1862, the Northern papers declared it a victory for the U.S. Navy

and the cause of the War: and when Pvt Drew and the 6th

Maine Infantry

reached Newport News, the U.S.S. Monitor was anchored triumphant and

on show in front of Fortress Monroe. There was no sign of the Merrimac(k).

For another, technical inspection of these two ironclads, “from the waterline,”

as it were, check out YANKEE SCOUT – 100 vs. 100!!

“Details from each Co. was put to work unloading transports, Dan & I always get in on all the good things.

“Our baggage got along in the afternoon had three days rations issued and was told to do our own cooking so we

did – There was the largest cannon on the seawall I had ever seen, they called it the Lincoln Gun. I got a look

inside of the big fort: Gen’l Wool is in command we did not pitch tents as were expecting to move any minute.

One of the “Abraham Lincoln” Rodman guns on the Potomac, at Battery Rodgers (Library of Congress)

“We moved out to Newport News [ Virginia ] – a point of land, the James River on one side and the bay on the

other, here we pitched tents and began to drill – 100,000 men, 44,000 animals, ambulances, batterys, wagons,

pontoons, telegraph equipage, pioneers, engineers, ammunition and supplies all transferred from Alexander

[Alexandria] in less than a week.

Above: Detail from Sneden, Position of U.S. Troops. The troops, weapons and supplies were rapidly transported

by steamer, from Fort Monroe to the new Army camp at Newport News, from which the Peninsular Campaign will

soon be launched. However, the Confederates, noting the buildup of troop strength at the tip of the peninsula, are

uncertain as to its significance. Is it a feint? A mere show of force? Or the staging area for a marine assault up the

James River? See Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, the Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War, Chap. 6 “Outnumbered on the Peninsula.” (1996).

So, in the Next Issue of YANKEE SCOUT, Pvt. Drew and the men of

the 6th

Maine, with the entire Army of the Potomac under the command

of Gen. McClellan – freshly demoted by Lincoln, to field command, and

executing his “worst coming to worst” Plan C. scenario – will finally

inaugurate ground campaign with an all-out advance of forces from

Fortress Monroe toward Richmond … the Peninsular Campaign!!

This territory near the eastern tip of the Middle Peninsula, is shot through

with sinuous tidal sloughs and saltwater marshes …. As of 1862, this

region had never been scientifically mapped. The assistance of a

knowledgeable local guide could prove invaluable to the Union Army as

it gropes its way forward toward Yorktown, across

this very strange and treacherous landscape…. But

WHO ? Might serve such a function?

The area is solidly Secessionist Virginia: enemy territory. Not only do strong native

sentiments hold sway among the population, against Lincoln’s invasion, but in addition,

Confederate troops are entrenched in every direction – at Big Bethel, Little Bethel, and

– as the Army will soon find out – behind and in front of the Warwick River: thus posing

a mortal threat to any civilian who might take it upon himself to betray the Southern

Cause, and assist any YANKEE …. And false friends abound! The Army is in dire need

of reliable intelligence…. but even if anyone offered help, who could be trusted ?

In this Issue of YANKEE SCOUT the Editor wants to introduce a novel of Blackwood Ketcham Benson, Who Goes There? The Story of a Spy in the Civil War (1900). It’s a military-psychological thriller of astonishing

verisimilitude, as if told by an eyewitness, and it includes an account of the March 9 engagement of the Monitor and

the Merrimack. Periodically in the YANKEE SCOUT series, the Editor will be making reference to this book by

Benson, as well as its companion volume A Friend with the Countersign –almost as companion texts.

With that in mind, to get ready for the Next Issue of YANKEE SCOUT, it’s imperative that the reader should

make his own advance reconnaissance of the ground in front of the rebels’ Warwick line of defenses at Yorktown.

But to do so, you too will also need a reliable guide !! So the editor recommends reading carefully through Benson’s

Chapters IX “Killing Time” and X, “The Line of the Warwick,” in Who Goes There? The Story of a Spy in the Civil War, available here: https://archive.org/details/whogoestherestor00bens -- and as you read, refer, to this map

also by Pvt. Robert Knox Sneden, The Union Position before Yorktown, Va., 18th April 1862, available here -

https://www.loc.gov/resource/gvhs01.vhs00247/ in order to get yourself oriented on the landscape and better

prepared for the upcoming first engagement of the Army’s Peninsular Campaign…the Siege of Yorktown !! You

must find Mulberry Island, Warwick Courthouse, Lee’s Mill, Wynn’s Mill, Cheeseman’s Creek, Heinzelman’s

H.Q. -- and then report back here. Just get the lay of the land, soldier… ALL OF IT!