wwii 9th troop carrier command

8/9/2019 WWII 9th Troop Carrier Command

1/82

/( i

Capt., a

AIRBORNE (

RESUPPLY CEVACUATION O

)PERATION

)F FINAL CF PATIENTS

VARSITY)FFENSIVE

AND POW'S

26 JUN 1945

LAN

I;A4i

K;

-4

i4,4

"A r -s

.- O


2/82

HEADQUARTERSIX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

ro, ,.: r .:'.

ICAL AND NON-TACG

ERATI

DURING THE FINAL PHASE

INC1

I',I

EUR

LUDING

;1\AR

OF

/

ONS

OF THE

'E

/

OPERATION

SITY"~~ ~ 1

BY ADATE:E: a

RANK:

L

a WAR IN

", "1 i r n~ ~'I.~. E - uLu~i L~~ U~~ E U E

AUTHORIZATION FORREPRODUCTION

NO. DATE SIAE &RANK

I 2 ./%VZ 4

_- C/

R:FE

^at s & as sL1


3/82

G W GENBROUS 0 G BIRTWISTLI G W ERITSTCol. D C/S Col. A-1 Col. A-2

G M JONmS

Col. A-3

Major General PAUL L WILLIAMS

J E DUKECol. C/S

F A McBRIDE

Col. A-4E L BF.RGQUISTCol. M ed

J C PRUITTCol. Comm

.11


4/82

P R E F A CE

It is with great pride that I salute the courage an d magnificent

devotion to duty of the officers and men of IX Troop Carrier Command

whose deeds contributed their ful l share to the victory over Germany,

These chapters recount the extent of their participation in the

airborne operation VARSITY which assisted the Allied armies in crossing

the Rhine, the aerial resupply which helped maintain the lightning

sweep across Germany an d subsequent activity before redeployment.

Toward the end of perpetuating the record of IX Troop Carrier

achievement in the European Theater and offering a guide fo r the future,

this chronology will supplement existing documents dealing with the

performance of this Command in operations in Normandy, southern France,

Holland and Bastogne.

It is hoped that these pages will stand as a valuable chronicle

of experience as well as a tribute to the officers and me n who lived

an d died by their devotion to duty in the accomplishment of the Troop

Carrier Command Mission.

PAUL L, WILLIAMS,Major General, USA,

Commanding,

.^~~I ,

a tEStICTD


5/82

PREPARED AT HEADQUARTERS, IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND (FWD)

APO 133 - USAAF STATION 186

JUNE 1945

. ''I Wf" "',11 "I-I r i I I, i w i ;I ` I'---'1- ' n

RESEARCH AN D NARRATIVE BY BT H HISTORICAL UNIT

SPECIAL LAYOUTS, STATISTICS AND COORDINATION BYIX TROOP CARRIER STATISTICAL CONTROL

PHOTOGRAPHS BY IX TROOP CARRIER C01BAT CAMERA UNIT (PROV)

r] g, ! i;-; :.y -^ i a? p ' '

REPRODUCTION LATOON, 01st ENGINEER F HQ. O.

\- 0.

1' 'f ~


6/82

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pege

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

APPENDIX

- OUTLINE OF AN OBJECTIVE

- MOVEMENT - CONSTRUCTION - DEFENSE

- DISCUSSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

- DRESS REHEARSAL AND FINAL PLANNING

- MISSION ACCOIMPLISHED

- A3RIAL RESUPPLY - EVACUATION OF PATIENTS AN D POW'S

- ADDITIONAL PLANS AND MISSIONS

- POSTWAR TROOP CARRIER AVIATION

1

17

27

39

75

93

105

127

133

,-I- I

-,I

ai Li I.,t`1i


7/82

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Development of th e highly special ized technique of airborne war-

fare in World War II ma y a t some future date be regarded as dynamic to

military science as the introduction of horse cavalry or the invention

of gunpowder. Without question, the tactic of "vertical envelopment"

was one of the most decisive in shattering Hitler 's European Fortress.

Both in Normandy and on the Riviera the guns and men of th e

Wehrmacht pointed toward the sea. But the aer ia l cavalry of IX Troop

Carrier Command assaulted from the sky, and the Airborne Divisions

helped unlock the Fortress barricades from within,

In March 1945, the swift-flowing Rhine was the moat guarding the

Inner Citadel of the enemy. And again "vertical envelopment" proved

instrumental in breaching the gates.

As the ai r echelon participating in all airborne operations in

the European Theater, IX Troop Carrier Command embarked on the campaigns

as pioneer and ended as veteran in the ar t of the paradrop, the glider

tow, the paranack drop in resupply, air-landing of supplies and medical

evacuation.

Ho w Troop Carrier performed its manifold mission in the final phase

of the European war is the subject of the narrative that follows.

Any material in this report classified as Top Secret has since

been downgraded to Secret and will be treated as such.

X m m; 0 ,;Le


8/82

//

//

/

- N\1-

\\

/

- N~ I

- -

-7 -Iffvff0;df::V:I

/(

kF.

I


9/82

CHAPTER I

OUTLINE OF AN OBJECTIVE

Section 1

Target Across th e Rhine! EMMERICH 9761 - WESEL 22)40!

From th e first days of November 1944 u n t i l H-hour f in ia l ly struck at

1000 hours 24 March 1945, these two Teutonic towns on th e nor theas t bank

of th e Rhine held a magnetic a t t r ac t ion fo r th e IX Troop Carr ier Command

planning s ta ff under Major General PAUL L. WILLIAMS.

Seizure of th e ammerich-Wesel sector would fling open th e gate to th e

indust r ia l ly-prec ious Ruhr and th e heart of the Reich. So it wa s that th e

greatest of German rivers was being spanned on Troop Carrier planning

tables hardly before the echo of September 's skyborne thrust into Holland

had faded into th e silence of past events.

In November, at his headquarters in Ascot, England, General WILLIAMS,

commander of the air component of th e First Allied Airborne Army, surveyed

th e pro jec t designated as Operation VARSITY with a s ta ff of seasoned

veterans-Colonel JAMES 3. DUKE, JR., Chief of Staff ; Colonel GLYSNE M.

JONES, Ass i s t an t Chief of Staff , A-3; Colonel OWEN G. BIRTWISTLE, Assis-

tant Chief of Staff, A-l; Colonel GRANT W. ERNST, Assis tant Chief of

Staff , A-2; Colonel FRANCIS A. McBRIDE, Ass i s t an t Chief of Staff , A-4;

Colonel JAMES C. PRUITT, Signal Officer; and Colonel EHRLING L. BERGQUIST,

Medical Officer.

Always recognized as a monumental mil i tary obs tac le , th e eas tern

bank defenses of th e Rhine were to f a l l victim to vertical envelopment

by paratroops and g l ide r infant ry in conjunction with waterborne assaul t

by ground forces from th e west bank. It wa s to be th e same fundamental

f , , , , : ~~7


10/82

pattern that spun out victory on Cherbourg peninsula and la ter on the

Riviera coast of France.

When the plan fo r Operation VARSITY was f i r s t outlined by Head-

quarters, First Allied Airborne Army on 7 November, 'it called upon IX

Troop Carrier Command to be prepared to lift two airborne divisions by

25 November.

To Seize a Bridgehead

Mission of the airborne force in the Emmerich-Wesel area was to

ass i s t the advance of the 9th U.S. Army of the Central Group of Armies by

seizing a bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine between Rees 0852 an d

Bislich 1443. Then the skyborne troops would assist in enlarging the

bridgehead to the required size of five to 10 miles in width an d five

miles in depth in order to enable bridging operations to be undertaken

relatively unhindered by artillery fire.

Following the lift phase of VARSITY, Troop Carrier was committed to

its no w traditional role of resupplying bridgehead troops by ai r until

adequate ground arteries were able to function.

Immediately available for the lift were the 6th Brit ish Airborne

Division an d the 17th U.S. Airborne Division. The battle-famed 82nd and

101st U.S. Airborne Divisions were still engaged against the enemy in

Holland. It was expected that rebuilding an d further training of these

outfits could not be completed before 15 January.

3valuation of Possibilities

The projected rple of Troop Carrier plane and glider formations

called for a preliminary evaluation of existing possibi l i t ies . This was

supplied in a report by Colonel ERNST (A-2) on 12 November on (1) Possible

drop and landing zones, (2) Disposition of ground forces affecting the

airborne operation, (3) Enemy flak strength an d (4) Ability of the German

Air Force to launch effective opposition.

Studies of photographic evidence revealed three broad areas on the

northeast bank of the Rhine as most suitable fo r airborne assault. Almost

unmarked by trees an d obstacles of comparable height, this sweep of low

imeadowland invited lo w glider approaches. Fields ranged 190 to 250 yards

in length on the average ani-side stretched to 350 yards. Drainage

-- 2-


11/82

ditches, about nine feet wide, sliced the cultivated fields and appeared

quite dry.

In the firmest levels of terrain, few farmhouses interrupted the land-

scape, while none existed on the swampier soil. Yet the softer ground was

due for a frost the following month, and the newly-hardened outer surface

would supplement the already existing numerous roads and paths that were

counted upon to simplify rapid cross-country troop movements. About th e

only type of glider obstacles to be found in the territory were wire

fences and ditches.

Location of Assault Areas

These characteristics fitted each of the three proposed assault areas.

the first extending five miles southeastward from Emmerich an d three miles

in depth from the Rhine; The second, a chunk of land covering approximately

three square miles, pointing three miles north of Rees and bordered by the

Rhine loop on the west and south; the third stretching eight miles from

Rees to a point east of Bislich and pushing ou t tw o to three miles from the

Rhine.

In the first zone around Emmerich, the intelligence photos revealed

the largest and firmest fields to lie north of a railroad about two miles

from th e r iver and no t grouped too compactly. Reconnaissance of the area

south of the railroad had been obscured by cloud and offered no adequate

information.The second zone, nestling in the Rhine loop north and west of Rees,

disclosed the best concentration of spacious an d dry fields, easily

accessible to a thousand gliders, but a cluster of villages-Speldrop,

Androp and Esserden--posed tactical disadvantages.

Big 2nough fo r 1.500 Gliders

Inviting the widest choice of landing zones, the third area, from

Rees to Bislich, could accomodate 1,500 gliders but presented disad-

vantages in a dispersal of f ie lds and the potential threat of scattered

villages as well as tree-bordered roads and boundaries.

With the picture of the possible assault objectives laid out, Colonel

ERNSTIS (A-2) report proceeded to fill in the disposition of ground troops.

It was assumed that the bleeding away of German armor by Allied pressure

_ W -T7

;-i of FT

11


12/82

l X along the entire lengt th e Western front would leave the enemy with-

ou t suff ic ient strength fo r effective counterattacks. That being th e

case, he would be forced to re ly on f ixed defensive ins ta l la t ions to meet

th e t h r ea t of Allied armor. In pursui t of such a. strategy, it appeared

tha t Emmerich and Wesel would be heavily defended as key points , and th e

Reichewald Forest could well become another stronghold.

Mailn Flak Concentrations

Bolstering th e threat of German ground defenses were th e three main

concentrations of f lak around Emmerich, Rees and Wesel. Al l these would

grow more menacing as a large portion of the mobile guns then deployed on

th e west bank of th e Rhine would be withdrawn in the face of the Allied

advance to the river.

In the immediate rear of the battle line from th e German-Dutch

frontier at Emmerich to Geldern, southwest of Wesel, there were known to

exist 42 heavy and 28 5 light flak posit ions with th e majori ty of these

west of th e Emmerich-Cleve area.

Further, it could be assumed that withdrawal and repositioning would

provide a heavier buildup between Emmerich and Rees than between Rees and

Wesel. This factor obviously made the latter a more l ikely assault point

fo r th e projected Operation VARSITY.

Need fo r Advaace Boabardment

It was believed that much of th e enemy's withdrawn flak equipment

would be converted fo r ground defense owing to h is increasing shortage of

f i e ld an d an t i - t ank a r t i l l e r y, but security fo r airborne success dic ta ted

th e necessity fo r thorough advance bombardment of th e area.

Although th e rai lway flak in th e sector added up to only four heavy

and three l i g h t guns pinpointed a t Wesel, the possibility of moving

addit ional guns ou t of th e heavily defended Ruhr to counteract a Troop

Carrier operation had to be considered as a threat, since Wesel fringed

th e northern outskirts of the Ruhr. With the railway connecting Emxnerich

and Wesel running just east of potential drop and landing zones, it wa s

deemed vital that this line be severed at both extremities to forestall

th e commitment of t h i s type 'f : f lak to th e area.

Other flak threats -cai fo r consideration were barges an d Seibel

- 4 -


13/82

ferr ies plying the Rhine waters with light gun instal la t ions.

No smoke cloud generators were reported in the assault zone, but th e

balloon barrage a t Wesel offered another hazard.

It was believed that threats from isolated pockets of enemy resist-

ance on the west bank of the Rhine could be avoided by close liaison with

ground forces. Routes then could be planned to give these pockets a wide

berth.

Short Range Weapon a Menace

As a substitute for 20 MM . flak and supplementing normal ack-ack

fire, the Germans ha d begun to use greater numbers of 13 MM. anti-aircraft

machine-guns. With a higher rate of traverse an d a more rapid rate of

fire than the 20 MM., it was a much more effective weapon at short range.

Since it was a standard gun, it was believed available in large quantity.

Troop Carrier formations probably would find the enemy concentrating

hi s 13 MM . guns in numbers at vital points in the communications net, es-

pecially along roads. It also could be expected that ground troops

would be employing them on improvised ant i -a i rc ra f t mounts.

Although the Luftwaffe ha d long been written off as a force that

could ultimately affect the outcome of the war, it could no t be underrated

as an instrument which, under favorable conditions, could wreak inestimable

destruction against unarmored, unarmed an d comparatively slow-moving C-47

and C-46 aircraft an d the even more vulnerable gliders they towed.

Threat of 300 Fighters

Colonel ERNST'tS (A-2) estimate of German Air Force daylight

capabilities as of 7 November disclosed the availability within 24 hours

notice of an Allied airborne effort of 250 to 300 single-engine fighters,

20 to 25 twin-engine fighters, 15 to 20 fighter-bombers and five to 10

reconnaissance planes.

To meet a night operation, the Germans in 24 hours could assemble a

maximum of 200 to 210 twin-engine fighters, 20 to 25 twin-engine ground

attackers, 10 to 15 single-engine fighters an d the same number of fighter-

bombers.

Over a three or four day period, the enemy was believed capable of

mustering fo r daylight: 150 to 200 single-engine fighters, 10 to 20

'*; jjj-LI_ Sr


14/82

| ~/'~:~engine fighters, fivweo. fighter-bombers and a similar number of

reconnaissance aircraf t ; at night: 150 to 200 twin-engine fighters, 15

to 20 twin-engine ground attackers and 10 to 15 single-engine fighters.

These figures were based on an estimate of 60 per cent service-ability of total aircraft inside 150 miles striking range of the target.

One sortie a day was counted upon as maximum capacity for single-engine

fighters. It was assumed that twin-engine fighters would. be employed

principally against Allied resupply or reinforcement flights under cover

of darkness. However, they could be switched over to ground attack or

bombing against suitable targets.Threat ef the Je t lighters

Looming as possibly the most dangerous threat was the German Me 262

Jet-propelled fighter, since Troop Carrier formations and height were

ideally suited to the tactical capabilities of this enemy ship. The 500 to

6 00-mile-an-hour speed together with the small number of Me 262s available

might enable them to slip inside Troop Carrier formations unnoticed.A total of 30 to 35 Jet-propelled machines were known to be based in

the area of Achmer, but only 15 to 20 were believed serviceable. Attempts

to step up Jet-propelled. aircraft production indicated that they might be

augmented in strength.

Favorite tactic of the M e 262 was described as the head on or out of

the sun attack in a single sweep. Pilots were being trained to attackeither from 12 o'clock high coming in, or from shallow dive, or in one

pass and run Just above the formation. An attacking formation would

include 10 or 15 planes strung out in a single line.

Warned. AMalst Overconfideace

Colonel DRJST (A-2) believed that cover against hostile aircraft

should not be too difficult to effect in view of the Troop Carrier route

following friendly territory for a ll except three to five miles. But he

warned that an enemy already stung three times on the continent by

airborne blows might be tempted to come up this time in force.

On 13 November, Lt. Colonel Leonard T. Geyer, A-3 Plans Officer, in

a memorandum to Colonel JONS (A-3), submitted the view that the Operation

VARSITY would present no undue difficulties from the standpoint of ai r

__


15/82

delivery of troops and gliders.

Although the original plan called for Troop Carrier a i rc ra f t to

remain over host i le terr i tory fo r a comparatively short period, Colonel

Geyer declared the time could be shortened still more by dispatching four

columns--two paratroop and tw o glider--to h it simultaneously. This system

would accomplish total delivery in an hour and a half.

Natural Check Points on Route

The memorandum pointed out that routes from the continent were not

difficult. A northern course from Blankenberghe to Goch was well marked

with natural check points that could be easily supplemented by normal

radio aids. It was suggested that twin columns to British an d American

target areas swing out in opposite directions for the homeward run.

With the fairly certain knowledge that all terrain up to the west

bank of the Rhine would be in friendly hands, no diff icul ty was con-

templated in providing navigation aids fo r Troop Carrier a i rc ra f t .

In view of unstable weather conditions prevailing at the time,

Colonel Geyer recommended that the operation be confined to a single day

to be followed up by emergency resupply, if neccessary.

He indicated that it might be necessary to move IX Troop Carrier

Command entirely to France in order to accomplish existing commitments.

However, military developments during the month precluded th e accomplish.

ment of VARSITY on 25 November, as originally scheduled.

Still Held First Priority

On 7 December, Major General FLOYD L.PARKS, Chief of Staff, FAAA,

informed IX Troop Carrier Command that VARSITY still held first priority

over Operations CHOKER TWO an d NAPLES TWO in that order.

General PARKS also indicated that an y one of the three airborne

operations might be called on 20 days notice by General OMAR BRADLEY,

commander of the Twelfth Army Group. On the other hand, if none were

called during December and January, it could be expected that two

operations would be mounted in February with the 82nd and 101st U.S.

Airborne Divisions participating in the second.

On 12 December, Colonel JONES (A-3) IX Troop Carrier Command,

4 formed G-3, FAAA that the mac1 (hics were fairly complete fo r the three

-7 -


16/82

proposed operations but called attention to difficulties to be encountered

in resupply. He warned that the enemys awareness of the imminence of an

airborne blow together with his tremendously heavy flak concentration

could conceivably inf l ic t losses on Troop Carrier to outstrip a ll previous

missions.

Planning Limited by Weather

Further, it was pointed out by Colonel JONZS (A-3) that extensive

resupply planning was limited by weather so unsettled that flying for

two or more consecutive days over a route of three to five hundred miles

was not considered possible. He advanced the possible solution that a

resupply mission be accomplished by the 50th Troop Carrier Wing which had

350 aircraf t available in Prance. By setting up a field in Belgium

from which to originate resupply fo r VARSITY, the route would be con-

siderably shortened and thereby less subject to changing weather con-

ditions as well.

However, Colonel JONES (A-3) stated that the problem could be solved

most adequately through an arrangement for channeling supplies to air-

borne troops through normal ground routes as soon as the water-borne

crossings brought the main army to a Junction with the airborne divisions.

But again the operation was delayed. December and January passed

with the Allies s t i l l held in check along the main Siegfried defenses.

Airborne tactics were no t ye t feas ib le .

Revisioa of ABRSITY Plan

Then, on 10 February, FAAA submitted a revised plan for Operation

VARSITY. The merich-Wesel objective remained the same, but now the air-

borne task force would be dropped to ass is t both the 2nd British Army and

the 9th U.S. Army of the Northern Group of Armies. 25 March was

established as the new deadline.

It was considered that flood conditions of the Rhine might limit

drop and landing zones which otherwise were ideal. But flak could not

now be viewed as a seriously limiting factor despite the anticipated

movement of guns in the Nazi retreat across the river from the west bank.

With the 17th and 13th U.S. Airborne Divisions based on the continent,

I ^!d-he double towof CG^-A Waco gliders became practicable and opened the way. - _, _

wy;. 1;wI***^*.I m ',^


17/82

fo r hauling increased numbers of fighting men. The element of distance

was solved. Each C-47 aircraf t flying from a base inside France couldZMMM. . . . . . . . . . . . . t

Waeo C G - 1 4As ix Dual Tew

safely tug a pair of gliders to landing zones on the east bank of the

shine. However, limitations in planes and airdromes prevented the

simultaneous lift of the 13th and 17th Divisions.

From i ts starting point in East Anglia, the 6th British Airborne

Division coul4 easily negotiate the distance in Hora& l iders towed

singly by Halifax, Stirling or Dakota aircraf t . Parachute lift likewise

offered no problem.

Bombardment of Targets

The revised plan fo r VARSITT provided fo r pre-D-Day bombardment of

any targets that might affect the operation. It was established that

should it be necessary to employ heavy or medium bombers over DZ's or LZ'I

or vicinity on D-Day that the operational schedule would permit ample

time to elapse fo r smoke and dust to subside prior to arrival of Troop

Carrier columns.

The plan also called fo r proper timing to allow fo r visual precision

bombing by heavies and mediums. Necessary diversions and dummy drops

would be carried out as requested by the Airborne Corps commander.

Fighter cover and escort were committed to accomplish maximum neu-

tralization of flak along the route and over DZ's and LZ'. Fighters

and fighter-bombers would be assigned the task of accompanying and pre-

ceding Troop Carrier formations to attack a ll hostile batteries, guns or

troops using small arms fire.

_ 9 _


18/82

Accurate anticipation of Troop Carrier supply and maintenance needs

fo r Operation -VARSITY demanded considerably more than crystal ball

technique from the various A- 4 branch sections under Colonel McBRIDE (A-4).

Against ne w problems constantly arising, only the foresight and patience

forged in the experience of past operations insured sound planning by

Air Corps Supply and Engineers, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Chemical

Warfare.

97 Per Cent Operational

On the eve of VARSITY, 97.3 per cent or 1,251 out of a total of

1,285 C-47 and C-53 aircraf t were reported in operational condition by

Lt. Colonel Charles H. Jourdan, Air Corps Engineering Officer. Almost

a ll supply problems connected with this type of aircraf t had been en-

countered and solved in previous combat action, and these planes were

ready to Jump either American or British paratroops.

The chief task this time was to properly equip the ne w group of

C-46D aircraft never before employed operationally by IX Troop Carrier

Command. Improvisation on a high order became necessary to gird these

planes of the 313th Group for combat, and the necessary steps were taken.

A very limited quantity of supplies accompanied the first C-46's to

arrive in early January and necessitated the initiation of procurement

action for spare parts and ground handling equipment.

Modification of B-24 jacks and B-17 tow-bars was the method adopted

to assure an adequate supply of these critical items.

No Tested Means of Dropping Parapacks

The C-46D aircraft arrived in the European Theater without a prac-

ticable and tested means of dropping parapacks with latest information on

the subject disclosing that experiments were still being conducted at

Wright Field, Ohio. However, the following equipment was available:

six electric releases and means of attaching bomb shackles; six 2,000-

pound bomb shackles; an d 24 buckles, straps and strap tighteners.

One of the most acute problems crying for a solution involved a

system for protecting the parachute of the A-5 parapack container from

A th Eplipstrenam.xperimental attempts in the States to use plastic*'~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1gy?'fy.;,'* .;'*' " yss


19/82

- ' fair ings proved a failure when these crushed in f l ight . A later develop-

ment was the aluminum hood, but these would be impossible to obtain in

the European Theater before May.

That le f t the question squarely in the lap of Troop Carrier Air Corps

Engineers. Colonel Jourdan's section instituted a series of tes ts with

paper P-51 jettisonable 108-gallon fuel tanks, and these provided the

answer,

Not only did the P-51 paper tank prove adaptable as a parachute hood,

bu t it also was procurable in sufficient quantities through Ai r Technical

Service Command in Europe to furnish each C-46D with a total of 12 as

part of normal aircraft equipment.

1.700 Paper Tanks Converted

Contributing to the success of the experiments were the A- 4 an d S-4

sections of the 52nd Wing, the 313th and 316th Groups, the 3S3rd Air

Service Squadron and the ls t Air Service Squadron (Prov). In the final

process, upwards of 1,700 salvaged P-51 paper tanks were converted into

1,350 hoods--a total considered adequate for the contemplated operation.

Another bug to be ironed out was the inability to release a ll para-

pack bundles from the bomb shackle after normal pressure on the release

switch. To overcome this diff icul ty, the 313th Group, advised by Major

Jacob J. Myers.,Jr., Engineering Officer, together with the 383rd Ai r

Service Squadron supplied the necessary "know-how" to modify the bomb

shackle by welding a fillet into the release jaw. Then a directive was

issued with detailed instructions on the attachment of hoods and loading

A-5 containers on the pararack equipment of the C-46D.

Requisitioned from U.S.A.

The 24 straps an d buckles available per plane were believed in-

sufficient to meet commitments, so urgent action was instituted to

procure an additional 12,000 by ai r shipment from the States. A size-

able proportion of this requisition arrived in time to guarantee com-

pliance with immediate requirements.

With the eight-foot span between the door of a C-46 and the ground

necessitating the employment of fork-l i f ts , two of these were provided

for each Squadron.

f '1

7 ' * *- !w ~~~~~~~~~~~~i . t . . ., .. - ''_ M


20/82

BU

C"46 Comsand.o Marshalled for Takeoff....

.... Approaching the Wind Sock....

.. . ,Almos t Overhead

~ J ^ .~ lull. :.:. .

\'

.. .

, , 1,%p J:........r,* } ' ..........

I ; ,' II

S " (

. a-a,.,,~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -. l> ,, ,

B I t~n ! `


21/82

11~~~~ ~~~ !N r.? ^ : ; " I""^B - ^. r i~ ."- 11, i : = X, . . . , w ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Silhouetted Over the iand Sock....

.... tere They Gor

'' '* 1 1 . . 1 -- .I DnI ,k "',

u ri 11

11 -U, V-1,


22/82

^ i" A reserve of maintenance parts for C-46 aircraft to cover a minimum

period of 30 days was in the possession of the 313th Group in the form of

four consignments of Combat Table II and six prod-packs. Combat Table

II consisted of standard C-46 parts, while the prod-packs carried items

applicable to the latest model C-46D.

Refueling Facilities Supplemented

In every combat operation, refueling facilities are of paramount

importance and fo r Troop Carrier units preparing for VARSITY on the con-

tinent, it was necessary to supplement existing capacities. To fill the

maximum possible requirements, 19 complete refueling units were provided

in the following quantities: two F-1, two P-2, 10 F-3, five A-3.

Deterioration of paper Bolero gas tanks introduced the necessity for

replacement and resulted in the decision to install metal fuselage types.

In this connection, it was believed the P-38 discardable metal tank would

be of particularly high value in planes towing two gliders, and steps were

taken immediatelyto procure and i n s t a l l the P-38 tanks. This type of

tank, with a capacity of 155 U.S. gallons, was slated to be installed in

pairs in the fuselage of each aircraft, since little more hardware was

required than for a Bolero tank.

With glider assembly at Crookham Common speeded uD in January an d

service teams with the 53rd Wing inaugurating further assembly on their

ow n stations, the program wasstill further intensified when the

Commanding General, Ai r Technical Service Command in Europe, instructed

Base Air Depot Area at Burtonwood to assemble gliders at Wharton.

Assembly Lines for Gliders

The l a t t e r step, recommended by the Commanding Officer of the IX

Troop Carrier Service Wing resulted in assembly line development to a

point where five CG-4A gliders were producedper day while the assembly

at Crookham Common reached 15 to 18 daily.

As a result of this assembly program, IX Troop Carrier CommanC on

D-1 was able to point to 2,162 operational Waco gliders out of a total

of 2,290.

During the glider buildnup period, a leading source was the area

around Eindhoven where the landing zones for the Holland operation were

- 14 -.v?

7 7 P 111I 4. I lw-4,' -i ; I ' 'i i i: A ;n. 7


23/82

located. Here the reclamation-program of the Service Wing produced a

sizeable yield of silent craf t which had flown on the previous mission.

After these had been distributed among units of the 50th and 53rd

Wings, a thorough inspection procedure was established to detect any

structural flaws that might have been discovered during reclamation.

The obvious purpose of this move was to eliminate the possibi l i ty of any

glider mishap other than that inflicted by direct enemy action.

Inspection to Eliminate Flaws

Before VARSITY was attempted, an inspection wan carried out on every

f ield of the two Troop Carrier Wings by a committee of four officers,

comprising the Command glider inspector, the Service Wing Ai r Corps

Engineer Officer, a glider officer of the particular Group Involved an d

th e Air bervice Squadron Engineer Officer serving the Group. These

officers checked every glider of doubtful condition to determine its

combat worthiness.

To equip gliders for VARSITY, rapid steps were taken to obtain De -

Acceleration Parachute Kits. Three thousand were requisitioned on high

priori ty from the States on 20 January, and before D-Day 326 were re.

ceived fo r instal la t ion. Another request was made' o have parachute

arrestors installed on or included with a ll unassembled gliders leaving

the Zone of Interior. These measures accounted for 1,246 gliders being

equipped with De-Acceleration Parachute Kits on D-Day.

Nose Crash Protection Kits

Another vital glider accessory was the nose crash protection, and

1,585 of these, either Corey or Griswold models, were available fo r th e

operation after arrangements had been made to procure every k it held in

the depot. From January unti l D-Day, 412 Corey and 28 Griswold kits were

obtained to swell the overall total to almost 1,600.

When Colonel McBRIDX (A-4) received a request on 19 February for

Landmark Beacon Trailers (Pundits) to be employed on occupied fields and

forward airdromes fo r assembly and turning points, he obtained a high

priority fo r delivery of seven of these cri t ical items from SAEF Main

Air. Troop Carrier was thus enabled to embark on VARSITY with a total of

10 beacon t rai lers .

: ' ^ ^:. - : e J15


24/82


25/82

CHAPTER II

MOTVIMT * CONSTRUCTION DUISE

Section 1

Strategic nobility of Troop Carrier units, demonstrated many times

in the ]Nropean Theater, was reemphaseized in Operation VABSITY which re-

quired the moTement from Britain to France of a ll five tactical Oroups

under the 53rd. Wing, two Groups of the 52nd, the Pathfinder Group and

large elements of the IX Troop Carrier Service Wing.

The emergency nature of land and water movement, dating from 11

February, unfolded new problems for Major Udward J. Sandetrom, Chief

Quartermaster Officer, and his assistant, Major John VW,Daughtry.

Decision to move came too swiftly to permit normal preparation for

overseas movement, Ixtreme urgency forced cancellation of the routine

procedure of issuing warning and alert orders, holding showdown

inspections, preparing administrative orders and marahalling.

Special purpose vehicles shuttled 53rd Wing organizations from home

stations to their assigned port of embarkation within. 48 hours of notice

and accomplished the project according to plan.

More serious difficulty attended the aovement of the 52nd Wing.when

the Chief of Transportation at Headquarters, United Kingdom Base refused

to move forward the original embarkation date, since no formal priori ty

had been designated for IX Troop Carrier Command.

Finally, through coordination with PAAA and U.S. Strategic Air Forces

in Europe, a priority was obtained from SEAfD to advance the 52nd*t

||giir^~~~~ 17-^ JjP ^ ' ! * '.- .- * - - ** ;


26/82

movement date by u4 houre.

The same obstacle was confronted in connection with moving the rear

echelon of the 53rd Wing and the Pathfinder Group. Again the schedule w as

advanced. this time by four days, after contact with the liaison of USSTAF.

Actual movement was expedite by splitting each tactical and service

Group into two echelons, with the f i rs t echelon taking charge of the main

body of vehicles required for completing preparation for VARSITT.

Those Groups engaged in the glider assembly program were faced with

the most critical need for vehicles. Their situation wa alleviated by

a policy which diverted vehicles to then from organizations with a later

readiness date.

Major Project For Wlneerg

By D-Day, a total of 4,000 personnel and 3, 300 vehicles had completed

the transition from ktgland to France without serious interruption of

operational commitmentE,

As uwual, the word #"movement added up to a major project for the IX

Troop Carrier ngineer section. On 9 February, Lt. Colonel Charles C.

Burbridge, Command Engineer, and his Chief assistant, Major Frederick M.

Kaiser, were handed the assignment of rigging 15 airfields into oper-

ational condition in a time span of 34 days.

It was a new version of an old headache to Engineers who belong to

an army on the offensive. Typically, they had been given a back-breaking

job with instructions to wind it up in a hurry.

Deadline Established

Construction target date had been deadlined at 15 March when the

Engineers plunged into an effort that called for everything from general

maintenance up to wholesale rehabilitation of airdromes which had fallen

into various states of disuse in the wake of a retreating enemy's

demolitions and bombardment.

As the construction men bent to their work, Troop Carrier units began

to move across. On 11 February, ground detachments of the 53rd Wing

boarded ship for passage across the Channel as flight echelons took wing

overhead., the 434th Group enroute to Mourmelon Le Grand (A-80); the 435th

to Bretigny (A-48); the 436th to Melun (A-55); the 437th to Coulommiers

jj ( 3 i WQ ^si^ '*'* . 2. - 8


27/82

- .-.. );'and th e 438th to Prosnes (A-79). - F

Accompanying th e 53rd were Service Wing elements of th e 10th, 82nd

and 318th Service Groups as well as th e 33rd A ir Depot Group.

The pilgrimmage was resumed on th e 23rd by two Groups o f th e 52nd

Wing, th e 313th to Achiet (B-54) and th e 314th to Poix (B-44), along with

elements of th e 82nd and 317th Service Groups.

Slated to Land in France

In th e case of th e 52nd Wing, th e Engineer pro jec t didn ' t stop with

prepara t ion of a i r f i e lds fo r th e 313th and 314th. Although VARSITY cal led

fo r th e remaining three Groups to carry 6th Bri t ish Division paratroops

from bases in England, it also s la ted them to land on French airdromes on

th e return t r ip , th e 61st a t Abbevil le-Drucat (B-92), th e 315th at

Amiens/Glisy (B-48), th e 316th a t Vitry-en-Artois (3-50). The latter three

f i e lds , therefore , ranked j u s t as high on th e Engineer list as an y of th e

others.

Four days a f t e r th e 52nd arr ived on th e continent , th e Pathfinder

Group moved into Chartres (A-I40). This famous ca thedra l ci ty also wa s

th e si te of th e 50th Wing headquarters which had arr ived in France in

September, along with four Groups, th e 439th a t Chateaudun (A-39), th e

440th a t Bricy (A-50), th e 44ls t a t Dreux (A-41), th e 442nd a t St. Andre

De L'Eure (B-24).

Only 34 Days to Go

In th e slim 34 days a l lo t t ed to him, Colonel Burbridge threw 3,200

American and Bri t ish Engineer troops, rotated on a 24-hour schedule, and

750 French c iv i l i ans into th e mammoth task of building runways, marshal l-

in g areas, hardstands, taxiways and access roads. Existing facilities

which had been damaged by enemy action were e i the r converted fo r us e or

cleared away. Hazardous bomb cra ters were f i l l e d . Hardstands were

cleared. Access roads, drainage di tches and culver ts sprang to useful

service in answer to engineering ingenuity.

A var ie ty of problems cropped up for IX Troop Carrier Engineers as

they examined th e ind iv idual requests of each Group commander. In some

cases, two commanders with ident ica l commitments each demanded a different

plan of construction. Such a development invariably produced new

problems and consequent delays for th e Engineers who nevertheless,, EX C -- ;F . C: [|.

if W; ;' i,


28/82

UNCLASSiFIED' -accepted them because they recognized that commanders were Justified on

the basis that no two fields were laid ou t alike nor did the runways have

the same magnetic bearing. Bugs were ironed out in the most expeditious

manner, and work proceeded.

With a greater number of gliders allocated to each airf ield than ever

before, glider parking loomed as the most intr icate of Xagineering problems

fo r VARSITY. The apron method, employed in previous operations, proved

inadequate owing to the 7,000 square feet of surfacing material required

fo r each motorless craft. This system was based on an area approximately

100 feet wide and 70 feet long with an allowance of 20 feet between noseand ta i l serving as trucking and loading space.

Limited time, materials and transportation faci l i t ies demanded a

Glider Marshalling From Individual Hardstands

simpler method. The answer was supplied in a br i l l ian t solution by IX

Troop Carrier Command Xngineers who designed individual hardetands, only

77 feet long and 21 feet wide, fabricated from three rolls of square mesh

track.

The hardstand area of 1,617 feet, contrasted to the old apron,

accomplished a saving of 5,383 feet of material pe r glider-..a phenomenal

j f ;aj ViIEDx n - 20jtbL~diuab~l '


29/82

SKETCHES SHOWING SAVING OF SQ.UAB:

MATiRIAL BETWEEN THE APRON TYPE OF GLIDERPARKING AN D TEE IYDIVIDUAL HARDSTAND METHOD

:," -' (:i .~ : ; .W~t '/

Layout of apro0 type of glider parking requiriag 7,000 squarefeet of SM T fo r each glider including aisles fo r trucks, etc.

4o O | 1oo0

H.

100

_HI

H

_

1 0 0

HH

ioO

H-

Ht

oo 0

H4

H

,c0

rHtThis sketch is

a consolidatedarea equivalentto 48 individualhardstands shcthe saving matbetween that tand the apronfo r an equal nof gliders.

Layout of individual hardstandmethod requiring 1,617 square

feet of SMT pe r glider.

Enlarged scale showing the individualhardstands placed along the taxitrack! ^:ing clearance fo r planes and gliders.

21 -

NW*~~"ft

1 I

H

H

* iw w F W 4 w b , _ * il . t F b. wr -

_ I A

_ _

l ! . A =

I I._w I . --

.

.

I

. 0; 4' ;It I t _ t l

B . t

i-


30/82

developmen on i d mightily to acceleration of the construction

tempo.

Other advantages also were derived. In a ll cases, hardstands were

situated adjacent to taxiloops and gliders parked behind the taxiloops,

allowing full wing clearance for aircraft. This arrangement permitted

any glider to be pulled off th e stand without interfering with any other

glider.

Buabooe in Transportation

Procurement and transportation of materiel provided bugaboos, as

always. But plane and Jeep made possible rapid coordination between

Engineers of Troop Carrier, USSTAF, IX Engineer Command and British

supply sources in Brussels, To expedite deliveries, a system was estab-

lished under which enlisted men were detailed to ride supply trains from

points of origin to destination. Aircraft often were dispatched over

railroad lines to locate and speed th e movement of materiel. Ivery

possible medium was utilized for speed and more speed,

Engineer aviation units and materiel were provided principally by IX

Bngineer Command under Brigadier General JO B. NEWMAB and the First

Canadian C.S. Works at Brussels under Brigadier D. H. Storms,

Manpower and materiel totals sreak for themselves, During th e 34

days of airfield preparation, a total of 469,750 man hours was contributed

by U.S. Army personnel; 150,000 by British Army personnel; and 99,880 by

French civilians,

Vast Tonnae Consumed

In terms of materiel, the Job swallowed up 13,719 tons of pierced

steel plank; 7,050 tons of Tarmac surfacing material; 2,500 tons of rock

for maintenance; 100 tons of stone chip screenings; 18,000 gallons of

bitumen seal coat; 5,310 rolls of square mesh track; 1,070 rolls of Hessian

mat; 53,300 cubic yards of hardcore; 55,686 bales of straw; and 300

barrels of tar,

With th e entire 50th and 53rd Wings together with tw o Groups of th e

52nd already on the continent, the forward headquarters of IX Troop Carrier

Command was opened at Chateau de Prunay in Louveciennes, a suburb of Paris,

on 22 February. A rear headquarters was st i l l maintained in Ascot.

- 22 -


31/82

I ;t ' t I

Only

de Prunay

echelon.

sections

officers

I*,

i:

r si x miles from TAAA headquarters in Malsons Laffitte, Chateau

r was ideally located fo r close l iaison with the next higher

General WILLIAMS brought with him to Trance his A- 2 and A-3

together with other key personnel, comprising a total of 43

and 116 enlisted men.

Operatioxal Headcquarters at Louveclennes

,, I. :. A :

: : . . iZwI ,. _*/

%*- I ^ ".'i

I'-'.** ;t. i- -

143,

' i

,~~~2

s ~ ~-wr


32/82

U~NC~LAL~'IF~~ElSection2

Recognising that a determined German effor t against newly-established

Troop Carrier airf ields on the continent could seriously impair prospects

fo r the successful execution of VARSITY, Colonel John S. Spencer, Command

Defense Officer, began a survey of a ll fields in France on 24 Febru&ry.

Colonel Spencer, a British officer (Duke of Wellington's Regiment)

serving with Troop Carrier, found that conditions of destruction and

deterioration on the new airdromes precluded a policy of dispersal of

planes and gliders, as practiced in England. Under the circumstances,

massed parking could not be avoided.

Called fo r Increased Vigilance

The situation called fo r increased vigilance and training on the part

of the 4roups concerned and additional defense measures to be supplied by

appropriate branches of the Army.

Already operating in France since September, units of the 50th Wing

were best prepared fo r discharging the responsibilit ies of airdrome defense.

Each squadron had been equipped with four .50 caliber machine guns and

had trained the requisite number of gunners.

More remote from the front on British bases, the 52nd and 53rd Wings

found it necessary to intensify airdrome defense programs prior to em-

barkation fo r France and after arrival, Training was stepped up and re -

fresher courses inst i tuted to bring these organizations up to date fo r the

commitments imposed by VARSITY,

Allocation of AA Arti l lery

On 6 March, a le t te r was ini t ia ted to the Commanding General, 7AAA,

requesting allocation of anti-aircraf t ar t i l le ry fo r Troop Carrier fields,

And on the 14th, Colonel DUKE, Troop Carrier Chief of Staff, Colonel JONES

(A-3) and Colonel Spencer visited IX Air Defense Command to draw up a plan

fo r maximum protection of Troop Carrier bases.

As a result, anti-aircraf t battalions were allocated fo r distribution

around the Command, and on 2000 hours of the same day these outf i ts were

alerted fo r duty.

The 391st AA A automatic weapons battalion was stationed a t Proesses

,^?4 i,3: -f-v"r i fe -\ 1, v^s>i,.. -k? . -


33/82

(A-79) and the 133rd AA A gun battalion, leas one'battery, a t Mourmelon Le

Grand (A-S0). These organizations were sp l i t to provide two automatic

weapons batteries fo r each field and three gun batteries fo r area defense

of the two combined.

Airstrips Poix (B-44), Achiet (B-54) and Abbeville-Drucat (3-92) each

were alloted an automatic weapons battery by the 791st AA A battalion. A

similar arrangement was provided fo r Bretigny (A-48), Melun (A-55),

Coulommiere (A-58) and Bricy (A-50) by the 564th AAA battalion, and for

St. Andre De L']ure (B-24), Villacoublay (A-42), Chartres (A-40) and

Chateaudun (A-39) by the 789th AAA battalion.

Night Fighters on Call

Ninth Air Force also agreed to act upon IX Troop Carrier 's request

to hold night fighter units available fo r limited periods beginning

20 March fo r interception of enemy aircraf t and to divert day fighters

whenever necessary fo r the same purpose.

By 19 March, a ll airdromes in France were fully alerted for defense,

and Colonel Spencer flew to England to complete security preparations for

the three Troop Carrier staging fields in East Anglia. In cooperation

with 38 Group (RAP), it was decided that anti-aircraf t batteries for

individual fields wa s not essential in view of existing area defense, but

local blackout discipline was rigidly enforced.

--

t.


34/82


35/82

CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION AN D DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

Section 1

Planning went forward at a rapid pace a t Chateau de Prunay. Agenda

was drawn up fo r a conference on 26 February to include key Troop Carrier

commanders and representatives of Airborne Divisions.

Meanwhile, in preparation fo r the impending operation, a training

schedule had been dispatched by TW X on 17 February to a ll Troop Carrier

units. The program outlined by Major William V. Morgan, A- 3 Training

Officer, directed the 439th and 44oth Groups of the 50th Wing to stress

double and single tow. Double tow missions would be performed by two

planes and four gliders echeloned to the right. The remaining two Groups

of the 50th, the 441st and 4 4 2nd, were directed to concentrate on single

glider tow and American parachute technique.

In the 53rd Wing, emphasis was placed on single glider tow by the

435th and 436th Groups; double and single glider tow by the 437th; an d

American paradrop work by the 434th and 438th.

The 52nd Wing breakdown called for the 313th Group to continue

transition training in C-46 aircraft and to include paradrop technique.

A second priority for the C-46's consisted in double tow of the CG-4A

and single tow of the CG-13. American parachute work was designated for

the 316th Group and British paradrop technique for the 61st, 314th and

315th.

The Pathfinder Group continued to rehearse its own special techniques

but also trained for standard American paradrop activity.-O 7

L Ai_71Ac i r u n~ i ~ J j 6

rv

,


36/82

ICNLAMSI*ns o:fft0 0 X S 0 :000X00;if00Q0000ft~tAti0=tffit0000 f000;; E~iS~~f00000 i;;:00000\ : idi;;l l t :;00:X0X00t~iVff:0000:i~::~ff00i~f::f00:D:0:: :::Q::: :

Formation of C-46't in Flight

Intensive glider pilot training wa s ordered in a ll Groups, and each

Wing was directed to schedule an exercise before 2 March.

On the 26th a t Chateau de Prunay, General WILLIAMS opened the pre-

VARSITY conference with a general discussion of the proposed operation

and the part it would play in assisting the crossing of the Rhine by th e

Northern Group of Armies under Field Marshal BERNARD HONTGOMERY.

The General stated that although specific information was s t i l l

lacking in regard to certain phases of the operation, it was now possible

to complete a major part of the air planning.

The requirements of the 6th British Airborne Division were outlined

by Lt. Colonel N.J.L. Field of the lot Brit ish Airborne Corps. For th e

parachute lift, 275 aircraf t were needed, while a total of 425 gliders,

including 398 Horeas and 27 Hamilcars, would be the maximum towed.

Six-Pound Guns to Be Dropped

Colonel Field represented the minimum acceptable glider figure as

383 Horsas and 23 Eamilcars. In addition, the 6th Division desired to

drop 12 to 16 six-pound guns -- a commitment which could be accomplished

only by 38 Group (RAF).

With three Groups of the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing already allotted to

the British 6th by Major General MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, commander of XVIII

Corps (Airborne), General WILLIAMS stated it was unlikely that additional

IX Troop Carrier Command aircraft would be allocated for British glider

tows.

To lift the 6th, 38 Group (RAY), operating from United Kingdom

airf ields a t Great Dunmow, Earls Colne, Shepherd's Grove, Rivenhall and

.


37/82


38/82

training of tug crews, it was recommended that the 0-461s should no t be

required to tow the CG-13 glider unless terrain was considered suitable.

In that case, it might be attempted on a l imited scale.

General WILLIAMS stated that he would further discuss the matter

with the commanding generals of PAAA and X7VIII Corps.

The tentative plan of operation fo r the 17th Division was- then out-

lined. Fo r paradrops, 72 C-46 aircraft would be committed by the 313th

Group from Achiet (B-54); 162 C-47's by the 434th and 438th from Prosnes

(A-79) and Mourmelon Le Grand (A.80); 90 C-47's by the 44lst and 442nd

from St. Andre De L'Eure (B-24) and Dreux (A-41).

Siule Tow of SO by 314th

The glider schedule called for single tow of 80 by the 314th from

Poix (B-44); single tow of 80 by the 435th from Bretigny (A-); single

tow of S0 by the 436th from Melun (A-55); double tow of 144 by the 437th

from Coulommiers (A-58); single tow of 48 by the 442nd from St. Andre De

L'Zure (B-24); single tow of 48 by the 441st from Dreux (A-41); single

tow of 90 by the 439th from Chateaudun (A-39); single tow of 90 by the

44oth from Bricy (A-50).

General CLARK stated that to accomplish an 80-glider lift from

Poix (B-44) or to sp l i t it between Poix (3-44) and Amiens/Glisy (B-4$),

considerable work would yet have to be accomplished by the Engineers.

General WILLIAMS concurred and said the project had been referred to

Colonel Burbridge, Command Engineer.

Surplus Aircraft for 50th

Brigadier General JULIAN M. CHAPPELL, commander of the 50th Wing,

pointed out that the 17th Division's requirement of 370 planes instead

of 400 would leave his 441st and 4 4 2nd Groups with surplus aircraft.

Under those circumstances, he was in a position to recommend that the

aforementioned tw o Groups accomplish an additional lift of 20 to 30

gliders. He was requested by General WILLIAMS to give further study to

the possibilities an d submit a recommendation.

On his status of 420 aircraft, Brigadier General MAURICE M, BEACH,

commander of the 53rd Wing, asserted that he would be left with only a

five per cent overage bu t could still meet hi s commitments.


39/82

General WILLIAMS wasii-nftrmed that enough A-5 containers modified

fo r C-46 use had been obtained fo r the in i t ia l lift. A total of 425

already had been delivered to the 313th Group and another 500 were on th e

way.

Following the conference, Colonel JONES (A-3) requested a ll part ies

concerned to remain fo r a discussion on training. It was decided that

f i r s t priori ty would go to combined training of Troop Carrier and airborne

troops,

Glider Infantry Trained as Unit

A l imitation of 16 gliders was placed on each lift owing to the con-

dition of airf ields and the necessity fo r transferring large numbers of

motorless craf t from England to Prance. A lift total of 16 was agreed

upon since it enabled an entire glider infantry company to train as a unit.

In addition, an extensive a ir program was set up fo r Troop Carrier

units with a view to solving the individual problems of each airf ield in

the l imited time remaining before the operational deadline. Units were

urged to utilize all flyable weather to the greatest extent possible when

not committed to combined training.

For training in loading and lashing, 80 glider fuselages from the

Eindhoven area were made available to the 17th and 13th Divisions.

Pull Dress Rehearsal Inadvisable

A 100 per cent dress rehearsal of VARSITY was considered inadvisable

in the few remaining weeks of training, since airborne units would be

unable to replace possible losses incurred. It was decided to set up a

mock operation on a reduced scale approximately 10 days before D-Day to

test communications, operational suitability of airf ields, timing, navi-

gational aids and related problems.

Upon completion of therehearsal, a ll training would cease to permit

proper staging of troops and necessary maintenance of a i rc ra f t , 20 March

was established as a tentative date fo r termination of training.

It was further decided that a pair of Troop Carrier Glider Combat

Control Teams would accompany each Airborne Division. And glider pilot

control would follow procedure to be laid down in the new Memorandum

50-21A, Headquarters. IX Troop Carrier Command, subject: "SOPfor the

_ - -: \~* ~ '- 0' -


40/82

4 .1 , 11 . I1 .4 JI M IWI '-, I -1

., , 1. _ _j ."I - - 11U", - -3

Equipment of a Combat Control Team --Jeep and SCR-499 Radio Set on Special Tr a i l e r. . . .

.... Closeup of the SCL-499 Badio Set

f I i 3 2 -, . . , ,- . 3 .

.. , 5:...g

; L A ,, , .e 4ij - : .;

i1

g ''\ m . i-, i s;;? i , , ' ya,

*c


41/82

A Complete Teaf Ready

... Belaying Information from the Yield

- 33-

f o r A c t i o n . . . .


42/82

U AWgaI~e . ider Pilots", dated 11 March 1945.General WILLIAMS strongly emphasized the need for continued training

of airborne personnel in C-46 aircraft. He stressed that two Regiments.,

one from each American Division, be selected for C-46 lifts an d be moved

immediately to the area adjacent to Achiet (B-54) to faci l i tate training

and to have these troops in position fo r actual staging.

Conferees were informed that VARSITY control would center a t the

Brussels headquarters of Lieutenant General LZWIS H. BREEETON and Air

Chief Marshal OONINGHAM to FAAA (Main) to IX Troop Carrier Command (FWD)

and 38 Group. Overall plans would be drawn up at FAAA (Main) by repre-

sentatives of IX Troop Carrier Command and the Airborne Divisions.

Section 2

On 8 March General WILLIAMS reported to General B3RZITON that eight

Glider Combat Control Teams had been specially equipped and trained to

perform the duties carried out by a ir coordination part ies during the

Normandy and Holland operations. Operationally, each team could function

as a completely self-sustaining unit.

General WILLIAMS stated that tw o such teams would be assigned to

each Airborne Division to insure reliable communications. He pointed out

that in Normandy two out of four a ir coordination parties were los t due

to enemy action, while the Holland battle saw six out of eight parties

suffer casualties an d damage with three units completely knocked out,

A further reason fo r employing a spare team was the fact that all

control personnel could not be carried in a single glider, this factor caus-

ing a dispersal of team members. Under such conditions, an extra control

team would permit reshuffling of personnel on the spot and accomplish

necessary communication in a minimum of time.

In addition to combat dril l , the control teams had been thoroughly

trained in the use of codes and ciphers and the maintenance of their

radio equipment.

Under the plan outlined by General WILLIAMS, two Combat Control

0.;---'. ] - 34-


43/82

Teais Were scheduled for assignment to XVIII Corps (Airborne) during

Operation VARSITYT

Normally two gliders would be adequate to lift the necessary

personnel and equipment of each team, but in this case an additional two

gliders would be required to haul special pickup apparatus of both teams,

bringing the total number of gliders to six. Every effort was being

made to insure the operational success of the control teams, General

WILLIAMS stressed.

Responsibility Delegated to Teams

Abroad range of responsibility was delegated to the teams which

were to establish themselves with XVIII Corps headquarters fo r the purpose

of coordinating a ll outgoing messages through the Corps or Division

commander, Further coordination was to be established with Corps G-3 to

arrange glider pickups from combat landing zones if emergencies dictated

such measures. In preparation for such a contingency, necessary pickup

ropes and stations would be sent in with thecontrol t eams . Both IX

Troop Carrier Command and XVIII Corps had agreed upon the desirability of

such action if permitted by the tactical situation.

In line with this procedure, 16 gliders committed for the movement

of a medical Battalion also were equipped with l i t ter straps in the event

it was considered practicable to evacuate patients by glider, Decision

to make such a pickup was reserved by GeneralWILLIAMS, In case the

method were to be employed, the glider pickup location would be designated

by the grid coordinate system.

Three Hour Weather Reports

The control teams were further directed to effect radio contact

with the headquarters of both IX Troop Carrier Command and FAAA in order

to facilitate th e transmittal of three hour weather reportsto

D-Day

serials and later to resupply formations. UCO code was stipulated as the

medium of communication,

Information was to be relayed by the teams to IX Troop Carrier

Command concerning known strength of resistance points that could be

circumvented enroute to and surrounding DZIs and LZ's. Hazards in glider

rLZ's and methods of eliminating them were to be pointed out,if

possible.


44/82

DZ's.

Teams were to maintain contact with Troop Carrier serial leaders

and to supply necessary pert inent information over V H F. They were re .

sponsible fo r setting up pickup stations, if called upon to do so, an d

transmitting coordinates together with timing and any other information

applicable to such a task.

In addition, control teams would transmit a ll messages directed by

the Commanding General, XVIII Corps relative to concentration of enemy

troops, enemy a ir activity and any other necessary information.

Tamiliarisation with Units

Preliminary to VARSITY, Troop Carrier Combat Control Teams No. 1 and

2 would be placed on five days detached service beginning 12 March with

XVIII Corps for the purpose of familarising themselves with the units with

which they would serve. Then they would proceed to marshalling areas.

The Glider Combat Control Teams of IX Troop Carrier Command were

molded in the crucible of combat on the fields of Normandy and Bolland.

Their development was in answer to the acute need fo r on-the-spot recon-

naissance from DZ's and LZ's during an operation and speedy communication

to oncoming serials and operations leaders a t headquarters.

Faulty relay of information under extreme pressure of fluid batt le

l ines during previous operations resulted in continuous improvements that

culminated in the formation of eight combat control teams to part ic ipate

in VARSITY.

Two Teams pe r Division

Colonel JONDS (A-3) pointed out that eight teams were formed in order

to provide two fo r each of the American Airborne Divisions in the European

Theater- the 82nd, 101st. 17th and 13th.

A wide range of versatility was demanded of the four glider pilots

and single enlisted ma n who comprised each team. One GP, with a minimum

of 500 hours as a power pilot in addition to at least two combat missions,

served as flying control operator, while each of the remaining three

glider pilots doubled as radio operators. The enlisted ma n functioned

as radio operator and mechanic. All personnel were qualified to drive a

a2 t At'.C~rn 6 -.-~.:, ~J ~ , ,,~ i~ : '

&; Ds"-&?s ' *:, *F,_- ? * '

in locatlons of LZt's and resupply


45/82

Jeep and t rai ler.

In addition to possessing special ski l ls in the use of radio and

cryptographic equipment, each ma n was given infantry training with th e

airborne uni tin

which he was intended to serve.Since the control teams were to operate from airborne landing areas,

often inside enemy lines under the most fluid battle conditions, their

ability to survive was the only guarantee of a workable communications

system. The paramount importance of combat training was obvious.

Jeep and Trailer

A single team's equipment included a Jeep and a one-quarter ton two-

wheeled t ra i le r with special rebui l t body to provide adequate space for

radio apparatus and an operator. A standard Jeep t ra i le r could not

accommodate an SCR-399 radio set and still permit an operator to work

efficiently.

Either an SCR-399 or SCL-499 radio could be employed along with a

P3-75 power uni t substituted fo r the PE-95.

Also included in the t rai ler was the SCR-522 VHP radio to provide an

auxiliary channel of communication to aircraf t in f l ight . This se t could

be mounted in th e Jeep, but such an installation would require additional

power equipment which was listed as a critical item and difficult to

procure.

NoSpace Inconvenience

Although the team could function without the SCR-VHF, the set added

less than 100 pounds to the total load without imposing any space incon-

venience an d therefore was considered a highly valuable aid.

Each team carried a set of documents to include three M-209 convert-

ers with special settings to provide approximately 32-hour security for

an y message; special code similar to air support request code but with

vocabulary to fit the type of messages to be handled and assuring a

longer period of security than the M-209; and air-ground authentication.


46/82


47/82

CHAPTER IV

DRESS REMAARSAL AN D FIIAL PLANNING

Section 1

To stage a limited dress rehearsal for VARSITY, Colonel JONES (A-3)

directed plans to be drawn up fo r Exercise TOKEN and published a f ield

order on 12 March, designating the 16th as D-Day.

With a ll units of IX Troop Carrier Command together with 38 and 46

Groups (RAF) scheduled to participate, TOEX2 was primarily an a ir exercise

fo r the purpose of testing timing, communications, operational sui tabi l i ty

of airf ields and navigational aids.

In the overall picture, TOKEN provided the extent of Troop Carrier

participation in the larger Exercise BULL-FIGHT ordered on 6 March by

FAAA. As stated in the original directive, BULL-FIGHT's three objectives

were (1) To thoroughly test communications, (2) To test the detailed

functioning of the Combined Command Post at Headquarters, FAAA; Tactical

Headquarters, FAAL (a t 2nd TAF); forward Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier

Command; and Headquarters, 38 Group (RAP), Marks Hall, (3) To train flight

leaders of the Troop Carrier echelons and key personnel of the participat-

ing ai r forces.

The BULL-FIGHT directive named the Commanding General, IX Troop

Carrier Command, to exercise control of all Troop Carrier aircraft from

the Combined Command Post at Headquarters, FAAA. Communications to each

transient camp headquarters would be checked as aircraft and gliders

operated from fields assigned for pending operations, but no troops would

be Jumped and no gliders released.


48/82

3 rescribed in BULL-FIGHT, the Exercise TOKEN

established fo r Troop Carrier th e task of flying an air route to a drop

zone-landing zone area, simulating drops and releases and returning to

home bases.

Under the plan, formations would simulate actual Troop Carrier and

RAF serials with (1) Parachute elements in the three ship V; (2) Single

glider tow with four aircraft and four gliders echeloned to the right;

(3) Double glider tow with two aircraft and four gliders echeloned to the

right; (4) RA F single tow with two aircraft and two gliders at a 10-second

interval and in loosepairs.

Rope Drop Area Selected

In view of the comparatively short time to be spent over enemy

territory during the Operation VARSITY, a rope drop area had been desig-

nated for the return trip. Similarly, a rope drop area was selected for

TOKEN and all glider tug pl.anes, except the 439th Group and 38 and 46

Groups (RAP),directed to proceed to it after swinging 180 degrees from

the LZ's, then to keep on going for home stations.

The 439th Group and 38 and 46 Groups (BAF)--all with double glider

tow--would proceed only as far as the Command Assembly Point at MARFAK,

then would return to starting points on a reciprocal route.

Head to head time intervals were specified at four minutes for 48-

aircraft parachute serials; three minutes for 36-aircraft C-46 serials;

seven minutes for single glider tow; and ten minutes for double glider tow.

Payload Maximaums stablished

Payload maximums were established at 5,000 pounds fo r the C-47, 9,000

pounds for the C-46 and 3,750 pounds for the CG-4A Waco glider,

Unit assignments on Exercise TOKEN called for the following simulated

parachute serials: two by the 434th Group; two by the 438th; one by Path-

finder; tw o by the 313th; and two each by the 316th, 61st and 315th.

Simulated glider serials would approach in the following order: four

single tow by 46 Group (RAP); 11 single tow by 38 Group (EAF); tw o double

tow by the 437th, 436th and 435th; two single tow by the 440th, with two

gliders of the f i r s t serial containing personnel and equipment of the IX

Troop Carrier Command Control Teams and to be released on Villeneuve/Vertus

UJ &> f A U - -, _-am~~~~J


49/82

(A-63) airf ield after passing simulated LZ'1; two s*ingle tow by the 441st;

one single tow by the 442nd; and two single tow by the 314th.

During the staging and buildup period fo r TOKEN, the IX Troop Carrier

Communications section furniahed adequate signal and radar facil i t ies for

the exercise.

Direct speech and teleprinter circuits were made available from Head-

quarters, IX Troop Carrier Command (FWD) (Tomahawk) to Headquarters, JAAA

(Midnight); Headquarters, 50th Troop Carrier Wing (Transport); Headquarters,

52nd Troop Carrier Wing (Tradewind); Headquarters,. 53rd Troop Carrier Wing

(Transfer).These were supplemented by similar direct circuits from

each Wing to each of It s Ro. ,

CT?' -- VWoahorse Planes of World Wa r II

Teleprinter traffic was confined exclusively to operational messages

from six hours before D-Day to 2000 hours on D-Day.

Special point to point speech circuits were installed between A-3,

IX Troop Carrier Command, located in the operations room of PAAA, and the

A-3 sections of each Wing. In addition, a special cross-channel speech

circuit was made available between Headquarters, FAAA and Headquarters,

38 Group (RAF) on a common user basis.

Normal operation of the Command-Wing radio net was assured on a

frequency of 3940 kilocycles, with an alternate of 2956 kilocycles.

The heart of air to ground communication was a W/T radio station

established at Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command (FWD) on 5915

kilocycles and using the call sign K69. This station was to be employed

primarily for recall of planes whenever necessary.

.~ ~ ^;-**s r t',-^. ,.,'' . :?

^1 1

' i ', :,,? 7e "9 '1

* '* I.. I


50/82

the strict maintenance of radio silence except for

the exercise of command function by Wing and higher commanders, or by any-

one in cases of extreme emergency. Permission was granted to break silence

on the return Journey for navigational purposes when aircraft were at least

40 miles from the DZ-LZ area.

Time signals would be broadcast on the hour and half hour, and all

Troop Carrier aircraft were directed to listen to K69 at a ll times when

they were no t working on HF or MF/DF stations.

Air to Ai r Intercom

Fo r ai r to ai r intercommunication, VHF channel "D" was allocated to

Troop Carrier aircraft.

Navigational aid faci l i t ies included the usual full complement of

radio, radar an d visual instruments. 14 beacons were in operation at

seven points along the route and on DZ's "A", "B", "X m and "W".

Provision also was made for air-sea rescue.

Procedure called fo r Rebecca to be operated only by the Squadron

leader of each nine-plane element. However, one additional aircraf t in

each nine would maintain Rebecca in standby position, with se t switched

on bu t the transmitter off. Rebecca equipment was to be turned off

immediately following drops and would not be turned on again unti l planes

had traveled 40 miles beyond the drop-release area. Again no deviation

from this arrangement was permissible except in emergencies.

Weather Causes Postponement

It was decided that whenever serials were broken np, each small

element lead ship would operate Rebecca. SCR-717-C was to be turned on

in a ll planes carrying this type of equipment in order to confuse enemy

radar l istening posts as much as possible.

Inclement weather caused postponement of TOK3N D-Day from 16 March

to 17 March.

Upon completion of the exercise, Colonel JONES (A-3), in a memorandum

to General WILLIAMS, reported the results of navigational aids, timing

an d communications.

The 50th and 53rd Wings had found Rebecca functioning sat isfactori ly.

at all points, an d visual aids on the DZ were excellent. Bu t the MF

0 hnh of |ak r e f l ec t ion .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7


51/82

Eurieka also proved adequate fo r the 52nd Wing which stated that DZ

markings stood out very well over a 20-mile radius. In addition, the MF

beacon a t Marfak and the Gee a t Rheims met their tests successfully, but

th e Ruhr Gee Chain faded at the DZ, probably as the result of high terrain.

One squadron could not identify Eureka on the las t lap, and anotner was

unable to pick up the MP beacon in the same area.

The Pathfinder Group reported the MF beacon fair to good, the Eureka

adequate an d visual aids excellent.

Speedy Arrival over DZ'a

Colonel JONES (A-3) added that most serials arrived over the DZ much

sooner than scheduled with variations ranging from one to 12 minutes.

With three exceptions, the communications system functioned normally.

The direct line to the 53rd Wing became inoperative at 1730 an d remained

unserviceable until 1910 hours, while the direct line to the 50th kept

cutting in an d out. And the 50th Wing's A- 3 line to the 442nd Group went

dead late in the exercise.

As additional training for VARSITY, a simulated resupply mission to

the 17th U.S, Airborne Division was se t up by Colonel JONES (A-3) for

18 March at 1130 hours. It was to be accomplished by the 44Oth Group,

departing from Bricy (A-50) an d flying the TOKET route to DZ "V" and LZ

"A", With the mission designed to test communications only, the 27

aircraft and 12 CG-4A gliders assig ned to the task actually never left the

ground. It was further warmup fo r VARSITY.

Successful on the Whole

At the critique for TOKEN held at 1100 hours on the 15th at IX Troop

Carrier Command (FWD), General WILLIAMS declared the practice mission as

successful on the whole. There were no aborts an d no accidents. The

Troop Carrier commander pointed out that the Command Post established at

FAAA only two days before TOKEN had satisfied General BEERETON.

Citing a failure in cross-channel lines during the exercise, Air

Vice Marshal SCABLETT STREATFIELD, commander of 38 Group (RAF), indicated

that a ll else was on the positive side of the ledger. Airfields were

suitable, while navigational aids and inter-unit communications had proved

adequate.

X;'$0>i-s"" ; , : ' * 14 ^ 5- .


52/82

0 C Ln$ IIIfifTroop Carrier Communications Officer, reportedthat steps were being taken to correct those failures which had occured

during the exercise.

ColonelBurbridge

andthe Command Engineer

sectionwere commended by

General CLARK, 52nd. Wing commander, fo r speedy preparation of airdromes.

Timing System Modified

After General CHAPPELL, 50th Wing commander, and Colonel Joel L.

Crouch, Pathfinder Group commander, discussed timing diff icul t ies on

TOKEN, General WILLIAMS stressed the need for modifying the existing plan.

Wind had caused some formations to coast ahead of the Pathfinder echelonleading the mission. A discussion of methods resulted in the decision

to maintain a constant airspeed af te r leaving the Command departure point

in order to alleviate the timing diff icul t ies which had arisen during

TOKEN,

Confidence in the double tow fo r VARSITY was expressed by General

BEACH, 53rd Wing commander.No w that TOWK had been successfully executed, General WILLIAMS

could feel assured that h is Command was ready fo r its greatest achieve-

ment in the performance of VARSITY.

Section 2

As it must fo r a ll operations, the Communications section worked out

a system of speech and teleprinter circuits, radio fac i l i t ies and nav-

igational, radar an d visual aids for VARSITY.

Telephone and teleprinter l ines linked Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier

Command (PWD) to Firs t Allied Airborne Army (Midnight) and to each of th e

Wings--50th (Transport), 52nd (Tradewind) and 53rd (Transfer). In addition,

there were direct circuits between each Wing headquarters and its respective

Groups.

From si x hours prior to D-Day unti l 2000 hours on D-Day, these channels

were kept clear fo r operational t raff ic only.

Special point A in t speech circuits were made available between

2JNCL7 SFi


53/82

i 'i 5, Ix Troop Carrier i , located in the Operations Boom, lirst

Allied Airborne Army and the A-3 section of each Wing. A special cross-

channel speech circui t was rigged up between First Allied Airborne Army

and Headquarters, 38 Group (SAY) on a common user basis.

Pattern of TOE1 Followed.

Employment of radio fac i l i t ies followed the pattern of Xxercise

TOKIE. Policy dictated radio silence except fo r the exercise of command

function by Wing and higher commanders n"' fo r cases of extreme emergency.

On the return Journey, the breaking of radio silence was permitted for

navigational purposes when aircraft had travelled at least 40 miles from

the DZ-LZ sector, but transmission* were still to be held to a nininum.

The Command-Ving radio net was se t up to function at a frequency of

3940 kilocycles, with 2956 ae alternate. For the primary purpose of re-

call, air-ground W/T radio station was to be established at Troop Carrier

forward headquarter on 5915 kilocycle., using call sign 169.

G 6 * e - Oa the Ground a d in the Air

Call sign fo r any serial would be UGG, followed by the number of th e

serial, and KTRC was the collective W/T call sign fo r a ll Troop Carrier

aircraft . All messages would be broadcast by the "F # method.

In each V of V's of nine aircraft , two planes would be designated to

guard EF command air-ground frequency 5915 kilocycles during the ent ire

rlight, and no frequency checks or routine exchange of signals would be

made.

With Station X69 broadcasting time signals on the hour and half hour,

the sixth blip on each broadcast would denote the exact time.

In a ir to a ir communication, VHF channel #D" was reserved fo r IX

Troop Carrier aircraft inter-communication.

r1g -fflj \ t . .,M ;3 C Tr .


54/82

.< .. 1J2 -. I _5 1S % r t l *I- - - -_-f - I -auUo aB agagiona al s IncDloea. 'Ar Deacone a t JL locations along the

route leading into the DZ-LZ sector. For air-sea rescue, the use of sect-

ion "H" was directed together with M/F D/F, cal l sign B12, frequency 273

kilocycles. Aircraft properly equipped could also use section "A" VEF

channel 755) for air-eea rescue,

Radar and visual aids called for standard display and codings of

panels and Eureka beacons except for the panel letters at LAST LAP,

Smoke identification would be stil l another form of visual aid.

Rebecca Used by Leaders

It was directed that Rebecca would be operated only by the Squadron

leader of each nine-aircraft element, but on e additional plane in the

element would hold Rebecca in standby position with se t switched on but

transmitter off. Deviations were expressly banned except in emergency.

Rebecca equipment would be turned off immediately after drops were com-

pleted and would no t be turned on again unti l a t least 40 miles from the

DZ-LZ sector.

In cases where serials broke apart, the leading plane of each small

element would operate Rebecca. ReFe stages of all Rebeccas would be peaked

to LAST LAP frequency,

Choice of two Eureka channels would depend on the specific DZ des-

tination of aircraf t , and pilots would be briefed by unit radar officers

on which of the two was to be employed.

Removal of Radomes

IFF would be used in accordance with existing procedures, bu t no SC0R.

717-C would be employed on VARSITY. Units were instructed to remove

radomes and associated antenna equipment for storage unt i l a la ter dates

The two radio-equipped combat control teams would maintain contact

with IX Troop Carrier headquarters from LZ "tN" by using W/T call sign B-38

on the frequency 4375 by day and 2436 by night. For transmitting information

to headquarters, the teaes would use special settings fo r X-209 and One-

Time Pad Cipher. An authentication table also would be employed.

If necessity arose fo r the teams to contact approaching Troop Carrier

aircraf t , it would be done on VHF channel 757, Team R/T cal l sign would

be ACHILLES. The team station would take over net control after estab-

U~gLAS@-g'Etb t


55/82

lishing contact with IX Troop Carrier headquarters,

To guard against unforeseen communication interruptions, a Command

relay would be in operation a t MARFAK. It would monitor the frequencies

used by the Combat Control Teams and the Troop Carrier headquarters net

and copy a ll messages. In the event a message from the DZ were not

acknowledged by Troop Carrier headquarters, or vice versa, the relay

station would immediately pass along the message to the station concerned.

W /T call sign of the Command relay would be J68. At H plus 5 hours, th e

relay point would contact headquarters fo r instructions regarding further

operation of the M/F beacon fo r resupply missions.

Operational Message Centers

Operational message centers capable of handling a ll

wwii 9th troop carrier command

Documents