wwi 33rd infantry division

8/3/2019 WWI 33rd Infantry Division

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U. S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS HISTORICAL STUDIESGAS WARFARE IN WORLD W AR I -V 3

THE 33rd DIVISION ALONG THE MEUSEOctober 1918

940.436C663taC 1

U. S. Army Chemical Corps Historical OfficeOffice of the Chief Chemical-Officer

Washington, D .C July 1958Study No. 8


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The 33rd Division Along the MouseOctober 1918

Redmond Co Cochrane

GAS WARFARE IN WORLD WAR IStudy Number 8

U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPSHISTORICAL STUDIES

USc Army Chemical Corps Historioal OfficeOffice of the Chief Chemical OfficerArmy Chemioal Center, Maryland

1958


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The 33rd Division Along the MeuseOctober 1918

Prepared byRexmond Co Cochrane, PhD.

Under Contract DA-18-108-CML-6214with

USo Army Chemical Corps

This is an accepted draft study on gas warfare in World War I

Wo R.\CURRIEBrigadier General, USAAsst CCmlO for Planning & Doctrine


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ForewordThis Is a tentative study of the gas experience of

the 33rd Division Along the Meuse during World War IoThis study is not presented as a definitive and officialhistory, but is reproduced for current reference usewithin the Military Establishment pending the publication of an approved historyo

The author was assisted in his research by Mr 0 GuyF. Goodfellow and Mrs* Charlotte Mo Bolln.

Note to Readers Comments and suggestions relativeto accuracy and adequacy of treatment are invited, andmay be transmitted to the Chief, USo Army Chemical CorpsHistorical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland.


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Map 8Map No 1 Forges Seetor* 26 Sep - 1 Oct* 5Map Noo 2 Area of Operations, 33rd Division,

Map No 4 Approximate Disposition of 33rd Division,

10 Sep - 20 Oot 10Map No* 3 Situation des Foroes Ennemies, 25 Sep 11

30 Sep . . . . . . . . 19Map No* 5 P a t r o l M a p , 1 3 0 t h I n f a n t r y , 2 - 3 O c t . 2 9

Map Noo 11 S i t u a t i o n M a p , 1 2 9 t h I n f a n t r y , 9 - 2 0 Oot Map Noo 12 Map t o A cc om pa ny F i e l d N o t e s * E a s t o f t h e

S k e t c h o f B r l e u l l e s 3 0Map Noo 6 S i t u a t i o n M a p , 1 2 9 t h I n f a n t r y , 2 - 8 O o t 3 3Map No 7 S i t u a t i o n d e s F o r c e s E n n e m i e s , 8 O o t . . . 4 0Map Noo 8 F i f t h G er ma n A rm y L e g e n k a r t e , 8 O ot 4 1Map Noo 9 L e s C o t e s d e Meuse . . . . . . 4 2Map Noo 10 C o n t r e - A t t a q u e A l l e m a n d e , 9 O o t . 47

& O v e r l a y A p p r ox i m a te D i s p o s i t i o n o f 33rd D l v , 1 0 O o t 5 5

Meuse . . . * 56Map No* 13 Fifth German Army Lagenkarte, 11 Oct 63Map No* 14 Situation des Foroes Ennemies, 15 Oot 72


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THE 33RD DIVISION .ALONG THE MEUSEOotober 1918

NarrativeG a s D i s c i p l l n e o o * 2P l a n o f A t t a c k . . . . . . e 7T h e H a l t o n t h e C o r p s O b j e c t i v e o o * o o 1 2H a r a s s i n g F i r e w i t h H E a n d G a s * < > < > - 1 7R e s u m p t i o n o f t h e A d v a n c e > o o o o o o o o o 2 6G a s A t t a c k o n t h e B o i s d e s M o r i a u z < > 3 2A c r o s s t h e M e u s e o > o o e o o o o o o 3 8H e e n f o r c e m e n t s t o t h e E a s t B a n k o o o o o o o 4 9" S i t u a t i o n o o o u n t e n a b l e o . o c o n d i t i o n o f m e n d e s p e r a t e " . 5 8M o d e s t G a i n s * o o o o o o o e o 6 6

End o f t h e Cam paign . o < > < , < , < , 68

A n a l y s i sT h e B a t t l e C a s u a l t l e a o f t h e 33rd Division* . o 7 6T h e G a s C a s u a l t i e s o o e , o o e . 7 8Ga s M a s k E x h a u s t i o n o o O . o * 8 1Ga s a n d H E S h e l l * * 0 o 8 6Us e o f G a s b y t h e 52nd Field Artillery 9 3The Yello w Cros s Div isi on o o o o o . 9 4


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THE 33rd DIVISION ALONG THE MEUSEOCTOBER 1918

On the first day of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, Bullard's III Corps,along the Mousep was to advance to a position above Brieulles^sur-Meuse*On the second day the oorps was to cross the river and outflank the enemyartillery and observation positions on the heights east of the Mouse*

When the left and center of III Corps delayed halfway to the ArmyObjective on the first day, the enemy recovered from his flight and fromsuperior positions on both sides of the Meuse stopped the advanoe of IIICorps before Brieulles with deadly accurate artillery and machine gunfire and with gase

For almost two weeks, under ceaseless harassing fire with HE and gad,the 33rd Division, on the right flank of III Corps, held its positionsalong the Mouseo On 8 October it split its forces and crossed the riverin an effort to take the heights by frontal assault* Weakened by the gascasualties suffered west of the Meuse, the division was in no condition toundertake such an assaulto Both east and west of the Meuse there were tobe almost twice as many gas casualties and HE casualties* In the opinionof one of the division medical officers, "every officer and man in theDivision, working with combat battalions and in other organisations operatingooonear the front, was gassed to some degree during the operationsalong the Meuse river*"

Rpt, Medical Officer, lfc3rd MG Bn, in Med Hist of the 33rd Div, p.26 (Med Dept Box 3704, fol ! )

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Despite, or, possibly because of, the level of gas discipline that seemsto have been maintained in the division, and the deep concern for gas discipline by the higher command, it was gas mask exhaustion as much as battleexhaustion that wore out the division* This is the study of a division thatwas gassed incessantly until it broke down*

Gas DisciplineThe 33rd Division, known from its insignia as the Yellow Cross Division,

was organized at Camp Logan, Texas, in August 1917 from Illinois NationalGuard units brought up from duty along the Rio Grande The division com*prised the 129th and 130th Regiments, 65th Brigade, under Brig. Gen* EdwardLo King; the 131st and 132nd Regiments, 66th Brigade, under Brig* Gen* PaulAo Wolf; the 58th FA Brigade (which did not join the division in Franco untilafter the war); and machine gun, engineer, signal, and sanitary train component so In command of the division was MaJ* Gen* George Bell, Jr, knownto the whole Regular Army as perhaps the most exacting inspector generalthat was ever in it*n

By February 1918 the customary administrative and personnel difficultiesof organisation had been sufficiently resolved to begin intensive trainingand schooling of the division, during which "the infantry was given tours ofduty in a system of trenches and was subjected to gas attacks arranged bythe British and French instructors to simulate as closely as possible actual

Majo Gen Robert L Bullard, Personalities and Remlniscenses of the War(New York, 1925), p


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battle conditions of the Allied western front."3In April the division received over 7,000 recruits, to bring it up to

strength, and a month later sailed for France Moving to its training areanear Abbeville, the 33rd Division began the program of retraining prescribedby GHQ AEF, under the eye of the Fourth British Army, and on 4 July, muchagainst the wishes of Pershing, four companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry participated with Australian troops in a minor operation against thetown of Hamel, east of Amiens* On 9 August, the entire 131st Infantry tookpart in a British operation in the Somme valley In a two-day battle forBressaire Wood, the 131st lost 385 officers and men, and another 370 casualties were suffered in the week that followed as the 131st held the woodagainst almost continuous HE and gas fire,4

On 23 August, the division left the British front for the Toul sectorfor final brigade and division maneuvers, and was joined there by the artillery that was to serve it in the coming campaign, the 52nd FA Brigade (27thDivision), under Brigo Gen George A Wingateo Two weeks later the divisionwas placed under the XVII French Corps, Seoond French Army, and entered

3 Frederic L Huidekoper, The History of the 33rd Division, AQBQFQ(Springfield, 1921), I, 21* The History by the Division Adjutant, comprisesfour volumes in the series, Illinois in the World War, the first volume ofwhich is the narrative history* The documentation is complete, but the history is singularly devoid of any opinion or judgmento Nowhere in the historyis the Division Gas Officer, 1st Lt. W E Vawter, mentioned, nor does anyrecord of his appear among the documents*4 H i s to r y , I , 30 , 35 - 49j Col Jo Bo Sanb orn, CO 13 1st In f, Rpt on Opnsof 8 - 10 Aug, 18 Aug (33 rd Div Box 17, 2 0o l)o SO Is, 1 31 st In f, 10 - 19Aug (same f i l e ) in di ca te t h a t phosgene and /or mustard gas was f i re d on 131s tIn f po s i t i o n s on eve ry one o f tho se d ays .

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the line along Hill 304-Mort HommeCumieres9 northwest of Verdun, completingthe relief of the French units on the morning of 10 September (Map No0 l)o

Whether or not it was thej^ressaire Wood experience that alerted thedivision , the 3 3rd a on coming into the line^ had a highly gas-oonscious commandoWe are now in the gas zone areaooooEvery possible precaution will be takenregarding gaso The Division Commander directs and insists upon strict compliance with his directive that gas officers and NCOs be used for no otherpurpose except for gas instruction and enforcement of gas regulationsoThe 132nd Infantry acted promptly in the case of a breaoh of gas disciplinesIt has been observed that men attached to transport and supply companies ardvery careless about their helmets and respiratorsooooBattalionj, company andplatoon commanders will begin at once a thorough inspection of their sectorsto see that steel helmets and gas respirators are worn at all times by alltroopsoThis concern was also evident in an incident that occurred on the afternoonof 13 Septembero During a gas mask inspection of Battery Dp 106th FAP anumber of men from the 3rd Battalion^ 131st Infantry,, the veterans ofGressaire Wood, stood around and made remarks "to the effect that gas was ajoke andf, having been under fire several times, they were wise enough nownot to bother carrying maskso On numerous other occasions they [had) laughedand attempted to make fun of the artillerymen wearing maskso w

The incident was reported by the battery commander as detrimental to gasdiscipline^ and ten indorsements on his letter indicated that the matter wasnot taken lightly0 For one week* all companies of the 3rd Battalion were

FOs 32 and 33* 132nd Inf, 7 and 9 Sep (33rd Div Box 20fl 32ol)o Suchcarelessness in discipline had been general throughout the division earlierSee ltr Col Eo Do Ardery, CGO II Corps to Asst CofS G - 3, 24 Jul, subs GasTng in 33rd Div (33rd Div Box 11, 55)o

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n 18 M i a 2 2 3 J O 2 s r a j 7 I J 8

MO. 1FORGES SSCTO*


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giv en an ex tr a hour of ga s mask d r i l l d a il y and had read to them at each a s sembly a l e t t e r from the 131 st I nfa nt ry commander de sc ri b in g th e o ffe ns e andolosmg with the warning thatA contin uation of th is sp ir it w i l l re su lt sooner or la te r in a large numberof cas u al t ie s in your org aniz ation , when in ao tion or sub ject to gas atta ck s,and the f a ct cannot be impressed too str on gly upon ever y man th at h is l i f edepends upon striot conformity to orders governing gas defense* 6

On the th ird day of the Sto M ihiel o per atio n, th e 33rd D iv isi on and the79th to i t s l e f t pass ed to th e command of Bui la r d 's I I I C orps, and prep arati o n s began for the coming Meuse-Argonne off en siv e* During t h i s pe rio d,"utmost stress was laid upon the absolute necessity for every preoautionagain st h o s t i le aer ial observa tion and gas attacks* St re ss was als o la idupon th e n e c e s s it y for q u iet and a minimum of movement, to con oeal t he i n te n si ve p repa ration s being made ju st behind the fr on t li n e s for th e oomingas sa ul to A memo from th e 65th Brigade commander to d iv i s io n head quar tersreported an outbreak nearby*We have receive d very s t r i c t orders from you* o ff ic e to keep q u ie t, out ofsi g h t, and do ever ythin g po ss ib le t o preve nt th e enemy from thin kin g anybody i s here* The 79th on my le ft i s r ai s in g h e l l - - machine guns, r i f l ef ire 5 gr en ad es , and heaven knows what* My on ly hope is th a t th ey are do ingso much the boohe w i l l rea lize , th ey are a roo kie o u tf it and not pay any a tte n ti o n to i t , but ca n' t you do something tp get i t stopped?6 Ltr, CO Bty D 106th FA to CO 106th FA, 13 Sep, subt Gas Disc of Inf,and 10 Inds (33rd Div Box 46, 400*73).7 History, I, 58 - 598 Memo, Brig Gen King to CofS 33rd Div, 18 Sep (33rd Div Box 13, 32*15)

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Fortunately, as the division history said, most of the week "was marked bybad weatherooo [and] the comparative supineness of the enemy artillery."

On 19 September, a four-page training circular on gas defense, withparticular emphasis on mustard gas, was distributed throughout the division.This circular^ which was the first issued by the division to order temporaryevacuation of positions contaminated with mustard gas to alternate positions, "superseded all gas training circulars up to that date1*9 The division was to have need for all the gas discipline it oould muster, for itwas to be under gas attack every day it spent along the meuse0

On the night of 21 - 22 September, the 4th and 80th Divisions were inserted between the 79*h and 33rd, and on 24 September the division receivedthe order for the attack*

Plan of AttackThe First Army plan was to attack in the direction of Buzancy and

Stonne, with III Corps (including the 33rd Division) on the right maintaining liaison with Claudel's XVII French Corps, holding fast east of theMeuse^, and with I Corps on the far left keeping in touch with the advance ofMangin's Fourth French Army.

The mission of III Corps was to advance across the Ruisseau de Forges(Forges Brook) north to the Bois de Foret, above Brieulles-sur-Meuse, th

Tng Circ 177 (33rd Div Box 10 , 50*3) There i s no record that the off i c e r and 30 NCOs pe r week a uth oriz ed t o atte nd AEF and I Corps Gas Sc ho olsbeginnin g 6 Oot, did so By then , circumstances ce rt ai n ly m il i ta te d again sti t o (L tr , TAG AEF t o CG 33rd Div, 21 Se p, subs In st ru in Gas Def, 33rd DivBox 47,, 565o 2)

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33rd division wheeling and organizing the west bank of the Meuse as quioklyas possible to protect the Army advance (see Map Noo 1).

The initial ob ective of III Corps was the enemy's Hagen Stellung, aseries of trenches extending, west of the Meuse, from north and west ofMalancourt throi gh the Bois de Forges to the river. Beyond lay the Corps0bjeotive9 the Volker Stellung complex, which ran from Montblainrille, onthe edge of the Argonne Forest, across the front to Dannevoux. In the IIICorps sectorp it skirted south of Montfaucon, thence between the Bois deSachet and the Bois dfen Dela, and up the east edge of the Bois Jure tothe Meuseo Both enemy positions were to be overrun on the morning of thefirst day

Above the first two enemy positions was the Kriemhilde Stellung, adefensive belt on this front from the Bois des Ogons to Brieulles-sur-Meusea with a second series of positions above that from Andevanne to Dunsur-Meuseo The Army Objective, through the first line of the KriemhildeStellung and including the heights of Romagne, Cunel, and Brleulles, wasto be reached during the afternoon of the first day. Penetration of theKriemhilde Stellung was to be completed by exploitation that night*

The 33rd Division was to attack between the Passarelle du Don (afootbridge across Forges Brook midway between Bethincourt and the Moulin

10History, 61 - 62, 65 - 67o

11 FO 20 , F i r s t Army, 15 h r s , 20 Se p, p ar 3(X )5 (U. So Army in th eWorld Wara 191 7-191 9 ( 19 48 ) , DC, 87 j F i r s t Army Box 3 2 )

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12

de Raffecourt) and the Meuse, and in one bound take Drillancourt and the Boisde Forges , advance to Dannevoux and organize the river front from Dannevouxdown to Cote de l'Oie (Map No . 2) The attack was to be made by the 66th Brig

ade, with two battalions each of the 131st and 132nd Infantry in line, rocaforced by Company A, 1st Gas and Flame Regiment, and accompanied by ninetanks. "Proper precautions [were to be] exercised against gas in passing

12through woods and low ground."Opposite III Corps from Malancourt to the Meuse were the 117th and

7th Reserve Divisions. All reserves were east of the Meuse, since FifthA m y fully expected the next attack, extending the St. Mihiel operation, tobe made in that sector (Map No. 3 ) . The rolling ground before III Corpsgave little observational advantage to the enemy forces on the immediatefront, but the enemy on the east bank of the Meuse had a clear field ofobservation well to the south of Forges Brook, and his artillery on theCotes de Meuse commanded both sides of the river.

First Army appears to have been somewhat sanguine about the defensivevalue of the Meuse in its note that the river provided "easy protectionfor the right or east flank of the proposed operation," yet it expressedsome concern about possible enemy observation and fire from Hill 382, below Bois Plat-Chene, and from the summits in the Bois de la Grande

FO 23 , 33rd Div, 9$00 a.m., 24 Sep, esp par 3(h)8 (33rd Div Box 5,32.1). "In case of an advance Bois de Forges would undoubtedly be gassed.It should be cleaned up quickly and vacated." Addenda to Intel Bui 2,33rd Div, 20 Sep (33rd Div Box 3, 20.6). But the enemy did not gas thewood during the attack.

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S T E U U( U . .

9 tJJ

MA P No .OPERATION

DIVISION. \O 5fp - 20 ocr

10


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ffl&L

SITUATION des FORCES ENNFMIESDEVA NT LE FRONTDvl7eC. fi-le 25 Sephr*7976

Source> 33 -* Dv Sox zs

MAP NO. 3


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Montagne* As a result, XVII French Corps was directed to join in the preparatory bombardment, to make deep raids at H hour, and to assist Army, IIICorps, and divisional artillery in an intense 15-minute neutralization withyperite of known hostile artillery and observation points on the Meuseheightso

The Halt on the Corps ObjeotiveA half hour before midnight on 25 September, corps artillery began its

preparation for the attack* At 0230 on the 26th the Army artillery joinedin, and the 108th Engineers began construction of nine passages over themarsh through which Forges Brook ran, using 12,000 fascines it had previously prepared


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the enemy wire and trenches, met little oppositidn, and between 1,000 and1,330 had flanked the Bois de Forges and reached th Corps and Army Objective s, from Laiterie de Beihaine, east of Dannevoux, down to the easternedge of the Bois de Forges, opposite Brabant, between five and seven kilrmeters from the line of departure,. During the last few hundred yards advance, reported one battalion, "The entire skyline in front was dotted withfleeing Bocheo"16

In the advance that morning, the 131st Infantry lost 1 officer and 19men killed, 2 officers and 131 men wounded, while the 132nd Infantry lost1 officer and 15 men killed and 72 men wounded, for a total of 241 battlecasualtieso Almost 1,400 prisoners had been taken, as well as 42 guns and

17mortars and 161 machine guns*Similarly overruning the enemy forces on their fronts, the 80th and

4th Divisions to the left of the 33rd advanced to the Corps Objective onthe morning of the 26th and halted there to wait for V Corps, stopped atMontfaucon, to come abreast. When ordered to continue the advance withoutV Corps, almost six hours later, it was too late The halt at the CorpsObjective, well below Brieulles, had been decisive* The retreating enemyhad stopped and manned his defensive positions in the rear, as nearby reserve forces came down to fill gaps in the line and distant reserve forces

16 History, I, 69 ff; Opns Bpt, CO 1st Bn 131st Inf, nod*. (33rd Div Box19, 33o6)o17

History, I, 76, 80; Brig Gen Wolf, Opns in the Mort Homme Sector,nodo (33rd Div Box 15, 336); rpt, 131st Inf Engagement in Forges Wood,26 Sop (33rd Div Box 19, 33*6)e

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18were set in motion*Elements of the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division, coming in to support the

117th and 7th Reserve Divisions in the event of at ta ck, had arrived atVilosnes at 0515, 26 September* At 1025 the German command learned t hat theAmericans had broken through the defense line east of Montfaueon, and a t1155 elements of the division were across the Meuse and on the west edge ofthe Bois du Fayso At 1800, i t s 12th Regiment had attacked the 4th and 80th

19Divisions ooming through the Bois de Septsarges.On the 27th, against mounting re si st an ce , the le ft of the I I I Corps

line inched forward, ooming to a stop along the line Hill 295-"weetrn edgeof Bois de Septsarges-through the Bois de Brieulles-HiXl 280north edge of

20Bois de la Cote Lemonte After the great s tr id e made the fi r s t day, Fir s tArmy had come to a s tandst i l l along Apremont-Nantillois-Bois de la CoteLemonto The Army Objective was not to be reached for another f ifteen days.

The War Diary of Art i l ler ie Kommando (Arko) 95, 7th Reserve Division,reported the new dispos it ion of troops and weapons made on the afternoonof the 26tho As the Americans stopped the i r pu rsuit about noontime^ the

18 Too la te , FO 27, F irs t Army, 23*50 hrs , 28 Sep, was to say that corpswere to advance within their zones of ac tion without regard to objectives*See or ig inal p at te rn of objectives, USA in the WW, IX, 81* Gf LiddeliH a r t * The Real War, 1914-1918 (Boston 1931), ppa 465 - 666e19 5th Bav Res Diy WD, 26 Sep (5th Bav Res Div WD&A, 23 Sep ~ 10 Nov,German Files Box 149, fol II, pp 2 - 5)20 II I Corps Rpt of Opns, 9 Sep - 11 Nov ( i l l Corps Bosr. 4, l l 4 ) o

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scattered forces of the division halted, the 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisionarrived to fill in their gaps, and the 147th Infantry, 37th Division, wasbrought up as support at Brieulleso Two battalions of field guns savedfrom capture were put across the river near Vilosnes as a flanking group,and a heavy battalion, two long mortar batteries, and a 15-om cannon battery were reorganized back of the field guns as the heavy flanking group oAt least five other field batteries from reserve were hastily brought

21down t o augment th e l ig h t f lan kin g gro up.

While these dispositions were being made, the 1st Austro-HungarlanDivision (KuK) was directed by Maas Ost H to support with all means theHaas West sector, n r e s e t t i n g i t s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p s w for operations againstthe west bank of the Meusen To t h i s end, a number of f i e l d and heavyba tt er ie s from the 15th Div is ion were transferred to sw el l the a r t i l l e r y

Aft

groups of the 1st Austro-Hungarian. On the 27th, s t i l l more a r ti l l e r ywas brought down "to support th e [German fo rc es on t h e ] we st bank of t heMeuse w ith flan kin g fire" The a r t i l l e r y of the 1s t Austro-Hungarlan wasordered "to put fla nk in g f i r e in th e area between Dannevoux-Gercourt and21 Arko 95 WD, 26 Sep (7 th R es D iv-Sub Uhits-WD&A, 23 Sep - 11 Oot,German F i l e s Box 155, f o l I I , po 51)o Arko 17 WD, 2 6 - 3 0 Sep (5th BavRes Div-Sub Units-WD&A, German F i l e s Box 149, f o l I l i a , pp 210 - 11 ),rp ts th at a fla nk in g group remained on the ea st bank under the 7th Res Dlv,th e r es t of i t s b a tt e r ie s moving to th e Bois de Cunel and Clery le Grande,th ei r p r in cip al t ar ge ts the Bo is du Fays , Bois de Br ieu l le s , and Bois CoteLemonto)22 Msg, Maas O st , t o 1 KuK, 26 Se p, and Maas Ost Opns 0 38 03 , 26 Sep(Maas Ost C5th Res Corp s i Annexes, 18 Sep - 20 Bov, German F i l e s Box 116 ,f o l I I , ppo 8, IX ).

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in the Bois de Forges," to prevent enemy orossing of the Meuse in that sector, and to Tire unconditionally with everything they have Conservation

23of ammunition is of no importance."

"While the 7th Reserve Division sought to collect its scattered forcesand move them into the Vilosnes-Slvry seotor, the 5th Bavarian ReserveDivision, spanning the river at Brieulles, temporarily consolidated the7th Reserve artillery with its own. When the 7th Reserve was in place, itwas to resume command of its flanking group on the west bank, receivingmissions from Maas 24Over the next several days, as Maas Ost assured its divisions oneither side of the river that there was "adequate time to get out ordersfor the regulation of methods of annihilation fire*oreciprocal groupingof artillery*oocommunioations and liaison with neighboring divisions," theartillery defense was completed* "Large yellow cross shoots*o[were] tobe prepared" and submitted for approval by 2 October*2**

23 Maas Ost WD, 26 Sep (German Files Box 115, fol I, p* 22); Maas OstRpt 1451, 27 Sep (German Files Box 116, fol II, ppo 14 - 15)o24 _ _Orders 60 1# 515 27 29Maas West |_glst Cor?fJ " S eP (Maas West WDfcA,24 Sep - 8 Nov. German Files Box 50, fol II, pp 34, 36, 4EJ1

Notes 7th Res Dlv arty (Arko 95) operated intact but the troops ofthe division seem to have been intermingled with those of the 1st A-H Div*The German mapsc below, make this clear, but no confirming rpt has beenfoundo25 Maas Ost Order 3917, 30 Sep (German Files Box 48, fol 810/32.13)* Aprisoner on the 28th was to report the arrival of 3 or 4 divisions on IIICorps front, along with much arty on the east bank, including long navalguns (SOI 19, 33rd Div, 28 - 29 Sep)o

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26

Harassing Fire with HE and GasOn 27 September, as enemy artillery began systematic shelling of the

Bo is de Forges, Cumieres, and the back areas, the 65th Brigade of 33rd Division, inactive in the assault, advanced to positions west of Dannevouxpreparatory to relieving the 80th Division in the Bois de la Cote Lemont andBois de Dannevoux. Driven back repeatedly by enemy machine guns in the Boisdu Fays, the 4th Division needed assistance, as did V Corps to the left, andfirst a regiment, then the entire 80th Division, was to be swung around tothe left flank of the 4th Division* Owing to delay of orders, a Germancounterattack from Brieulles on the morning of the 28th, and extremelyheavy enemy fire with "many gas shells," it was the morning of the 30th before the 33rd Division relief of the 80th was completed.

During the enemy shelling on the 27th, twelve 77-mm dlphosgene andchloropicrin shells were reported to have fallen just beyond the villageof Forgeso No troops were in the immediate area at the time and the gaswas said to have been quickly dispersed by the wind. Nevertheless, thenext day 43 men of Company A, 1st Gas Regiment, and 3 men of the 131st

FO 24, 33rd Div, 10i30 p.m., 28 Sep; History, I, 85 - 89. Tele order,G - 3, First Army to III Corps, 1*59 p.m., 26 Sep (USA In the 1W, DC, 135)directed "lengthening out the defensive front of 33rd Divo""Hostile shelling on front with intense fire*.Gas concentrations

used during night Q r o m ] right bank of Meuse River" (Msgs G - 2 65th Brigto G - 3, 33rd Div, 7|15 a.m., 10sl5 a.m., 30 Sep, in 33rd Div Boxes 6 and13, 32ol6)oIt was probably the 80th Div that received the "ordered contamination ofthe village of Dannevoux and Bois des Moriaux with yellow cross...carriedout by Group Hpt. Edleman [on hill E of Villeneuve Fme] early this morningQ o Q o , the 28th1" U r k o lst,A-H dally rpt, Italian Files Box 2, fol I, p.139).

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In fa nt ry , in the Forges area , were evacu ated w ith se ve re symptoms of chlor op ic r in po iso nin g. In ve st ig at ion by 1st Lt W. E Vawter, Acting D iv isi onGas O ffi ce r, ind icat ed th at a l l 46 men had drunk co ffe e th at had probablybeen made from contaminated s h e ll -h o le w ate r, sin ce the KP who had beensent for fre sh water, almost a ki lometer di st an t, had returned in a su sp iciously short time

A ll four regimen ts of the 33rd D ivi sio n th e 130th and 129th Infa nt r y , in l i n e at the bend of th e Meuse, and th e 131 st and 132nd, betweenDannevoux and Forges were within range of enemy gun groups in the Bois

28de C h at ilio n as w el l as th e Bo is de Consevoye (Map No0 4 ) o While the 65thBrigade was being subjected to pe rio dic b urs ts of gas s h el l on the 29th the30th, the 66th Brigade reported "heavy gas shelling [jrith yellow cross andchloropicrixT] during the night fof 2 9 - 3 0 September! in th e Bois de Forgesareao" The D iv isi on Gas O ffioer was to rep ort only a si n g le episod e in thewidespread gas s h e ll in g tha t ni gh t* Approximately f i f t y 105-mm mustardgas sh el l s f e l l in the v ic in i t y of the 2nd Ba tta l ion , i32nd Infantry , at1730 on the 29tho A si n gl e gas s h e ll , making a d ir ec t h it on the entrance

27 L t r , [ i c t g , DGO t o CGO I I I C or ps , 7 O ct , Rp t B-2 (WD H i s t Box 30 0 , 3 3 o 6 ; G AF 33rd l i )Notes There i s no DGO f i l e and no DGO co rr esp in 33rd Div recordsHis reports and corresp have been found in GAF, WD Hist, III Corps, andFirst Army recordso

28 The arty of the 1st A-H Div, in position between the Bois de la GrandeMontagne and the Bois de Consenvoye, kept the areas around Dannevoux andopposite Consenvoye and Brabant under gas and HE fireo See 1st A-H Divorder 4?o/8, 28 Sep and rpts 29 Sep (Italian Files Box 2, fol I, pp. 64,149 - 50)o

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29

to H Company headquarters dugout in the Bois de Forges, reportedly producedall the casualties resulting from the attack 2 officers and 25 men*.

When the shell burst, all in the dugout masked at once, but no effortwas made to leave the area* About an hour later the company commander, whohad been to the gas sohool at St. Valery and should have known better, removed his mask end so did the rest of the men* The company gas NCO remarked on the strong odor of gas in the dugout and suggested evacuation ofthe area, but the company commander thought it only the smell of drugs,since the dugout had recently been a German dressing station.

At 2000, the Battalion Gas Officer and Assistant Division Gas Offioerheard of the gas attack from another company that passed near H Companydugout and at once went over and ordered immediate evacuation of the area.Shortly after, all 27 headquarters men, who had been exposed for over anhour to the mustard gas fumes, developed serious eye complicationso Twoof the men, who had apparently inhaled high concentrations of the gaswhen it struck the dugout, died two days later. 9

Both the 80th and 4th Divisions had been subjected to far more intense gas and HE fire than the 33rd in the first three days of the campaign, and with the failure of their repeated assaults on the line

Ltr, Actg DGO to CGO III Corps, 7 Oct, Rpt B-2 (GAF-33rd Div) CfFM CO 132nd Inf to G - 3 33rd Div, 12*20 porno, 30 Sepj "Last night myle f t ba tta lio n was hea vily she lled with ga s. One sh el l broke in front ofhq at Coo Ho Company Comdr, Capt Dauberfie ld , Lt Heath, the 1st Sgt, and16 men gassed and evacuated during the night" (33rd Div Box 6, 32ol6 )oNotes Despite the date on l t r above, the III CGO received no rp ts of gasatk from his DGOs unt i l after 9 Octo See memos to DGOs 4th, 80th , 33rd5 and 9 Oct, re no gas attack rp ts 26 Sep to date ( i l l Corps Box

63o33)o

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Cierges-Brieulles on 28 and 29 September, the attacking power of III Corpswas spento It was clear that the German batteries in the Bois de Chatillonand on the heights beyond had to be silenced, and that the German defenseat Brieulles, forming a tactically favorable point d*appui or strongpointat the bend of the Meuse, must be dislodged. Unless III Corps oould getabove Brieulles, an extension of the fighting front across the Meuse wouldbe imperative, and much sooner than planned*

As the 65th Brigade took over the 80th Division sector, III Corpsdirected the 33rd Division to organize a stout outpost line from the nameless hill south of Brieullee-Cote 294-the bend of the Meuse-Cote de l'Oie;to construct a main line of resistance along the Septsarges-Dannevouxroad; and to begin patrolling the Meuse east of the Bois de Forges andreconnoiter for fords along the river flatso 30

The 130th Infantry, on the hill below Brieulles, found that "itshouses were full of machine guns," with at least fifteen seen in actionon one occasion* Immobilized by artillery fire from the Bois de Chatillonand the ridge above Vilosnes, the 130th and 129th Infantry were also sweptby frequent bursts of machine gun fire from the edge of the wood and from

31the village of Vilosnes. Enfilade fire from the vicinity of Sivry begaicoming into the 65th Brigade sector on the night of 30 September and

30Rpt of Opnsp III Corps, 28 Sep (ill Corps Box 4, Ilo4); G - 3 Memo,First Army, 29 Sep (TJSA in the W, IX, 149); 33rd Div Plan of Defense,Vilosnes-Consenvoye Sector, 29 Sep (33rd Div Box 8, 328); Opns Orders 6,7, 130th Inf, 2 and 5 Oot (33rd Div Box 17, 32ol2, 33ol)o

31SOI* 130th Inf, 29 Sep - 6 Oot (33rd Div Box 17, 20*1)

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continued through the next day, as the 66th Brigade to the south reportedgas and shrapnel on Forges wood at the rate of four rounds per minute

32through the midnight hours of 30 SeptemberoObserving artillery moving up to support the 65th Brigade on 1

October, 7th Reserve Division ordered its artillery "to destroy with allmeans the enemy artillery moving into position Whenever possible gas isto be used" A second order, to gas the Bois de Brieulles and Bois desMoriaux on the night of 1 - 2 October, was carried out in the morning

33hours of the 2nd.Confirming these enemy gas missions, the 65th Brigade reported gas

concentrations on Butel ravine and the Dannevoux Septsarges valley at 1845and 0230 on the night of 1 - 2 October* The gas attack on the 130th Infantry sector at 1845 was said to have been ineffective when the wind blew

32 DOR, 66th Brig, 30 Sep - 1 Oct (33rd Div Box 15, 33.1)j SOI 22,33rd Div, 1 - 2 Oct.33 Div Orders , 1 Oct (7th Res Dlv WD&A, 18 Sep - 19 Oct, German F i lesBox 155, fo l 1, pp 127, 133).

Maas Ost Order 3964, 1 Oot, call ed for ngas shoot into Bois desMoriauxoooand: Bois de Forges*to prevent p repa ra tio n of mater ia l forhasty br idg es ," the gassing to be car ried out at i rr eg ul ar times between2200 and 0500 (German Files Box 48, 810/3213).Maas Ost WD, 2 Oot, said th at blue cross had been used in th e usual

harassing fi re th a t morning on ravine s, roads, v il la ges, and woods up tothe line Nantillois-Montfaucon-Malancourt (German F iles Box 115, fol la ,p 19) There was no word of the gas shoots in any of the spec if iedwood s oNote* Orders and reports on HE and gas missions in the Germanrecords are f a i r ly complete from 1 Oot on, but almost nowhere are th enumber of rounds given for th es e missionso Thus i t i s po ss ib le to confirm most German gas missions but not t he i r degreeo

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the gas into the zone of the 4th Division.,34 In the 129th Infantry sec tor,in the Bois des Moriaux, a repor t of "some gas shell s" was made ju st af termidnight on 2 October,, At 0654, i t was reported th at the "gas attacklaunched agains t the 129th is s t i l l going on. Attack is coming fromVilosneso Our a r t i l l e r y i s firin g on th at towno" A message at 0712 saidthe artillery had "stopped the gas attacko" 35

The Division Gas Officer was to re port only 60 rounds of 77-mm yellowcross shell f ired on the slope below the Bois des Moriaux at 0530 thatmorningo The 129th Infantry, in the wood, reported no ca sua lt ie s* 36 Onthe evening of 2 October, the 65th Brigade reported 150 gas shel ls in a"ra th er heavy bombardment of large cal ib er shrapnel and gas on the frontof the 130th Infant ry , causing 3 k il le d and 7 wounded* Our artillery*osilenced the enemy." No DGO repo rt has been found for th is shelling*

34SOI 22, 33rd Div, 1 - 2 Oct; Hi story, I, 90. Ill Corps Opns Rpt,1 - 2 Oct (USA in the , IX, 208) said about 300 sneezing and phosgenegas shells were fired into the ravine and valley,.

35Msg, G - 2 65th Brig to G - 3 33rd Div, 5*26 a.m., 2 Ootj Msg, LtProsser to G - 3 33rd Div, 6*54 a.m; Msg, 65th Brig to 33rd Div, 7*12aomo (33rd Div Box 6, 32ol6).

36Ltr, Actg DGO to CGO III Corps, 7 Oot, Rpt B-2; FM Osborae RGO 129thInf to DGO 33rd Div, 9*30 am, 2 Oct (33rd Div Box 15, 32ol6), rptd "twoor three casualties*)"

Unreported by the DGO was the shelling of "the approaches and crossingplaces over the Meuse with yellow cross" by the 1st A-H arty on the morning of 2 Oot (Daily rpt, 2 Oct, Italian Files Box 2, fol I, p o 171)37

Msg, G - 2 65th Brig to G - 3 33rd Div, 4j50 porno, 2 Oot} Msg, CO65th Brig to CG 33rd Div, 9*00 pom*, 2 Oct (33rd Div Box 6, 32ol6)o

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As will be shown later, both the German orders and the 33rd Divisionreports in the first week of the campaign apparently exaggerate the quantityof gas shell being used. Yet some proportion of gas shell was fired in thenightly harassing missions and no part of the 33rd Division sector was exempt from this fire. As a result, the troops were kept alert and in theirmasks through most of each nighto The effectiveness of the fire, by wearing down the troops through keeping them awake and masked, is only partlyrevealed in the number of gas cases recorded eaoh day The gas casualtiesreported by the DGO and those actually admitted to the gas hospital on 1and 2 October, for example, totaled 16 and 33, respectively.,

Although the 33rd Division artillery had large stocks of gas munitionson hand, they were not used, and such retaliation as there was for thenightly gassing by the enemy was inadequate. At 2300 on 2 October, after aday's delay owing to unfavorable winds, a gas projector shoot was carriedout by Company F, 1st Gas Regiment, to inflict casualties on the enemyforces around Vilosnes* Although 50 phosgene drums were launched from projectors installed near the center of the Bois des Moriaux, the attack wassaid to have resulted in only two casualties, according to a later prisonerinterrogation report, beoause of the high wind at the time and the factthat few men were in the vioinity of the target area when the shoot occurred o

38

L tr , CGO I I I C orps t o C CWS, 12 Nov, su bi Rpt on Gas A c t i v i t i e s fo rOct (GAF-III C or ps ) . A re pe at of t h i s a t t a c k on th e morning of 5 Oct wasnot car r ie d out owing to unfav orable w inds , nor on 6 Oct , "owing t o d i f f i c u l t ie s making i t im poss ib le to comple te op era t io ns in on e .n igh t" (Opns 0Za 1st GRf 4 Oct and pencil note, 33rd Div Box 12, 63o3, and Memo, Co F,1st GR t o CO 65th Br ig , 6 Oc t, subs C an ce ll at io n of prop osed Gas Opn, 33rdDiv Box 138 12o8)o

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Bxoept for a brief HE bombardment, there was no immediate reprisal bythe enemy for the gas projector attack* The 7th Reserve Division artilleryorder for the night of 2 - 3 October was to be substantially repeatedthrough the week that followed as the enemy sought to wear down the Amerioantroops on his front and prevent them from crossing the river?Harassing fire with HE and gas on Bo is de Laimont (cote Lemont], Bole deDannevoux, Bois des Moriaux; long-range fire on Dannevoux and Geroourfc, andon the Dannevoux-Vilosnes, Dannevoux-Septsarges, Dannevoux-Geroourt, andGercourt-Cuisy-Montfaueon roads as well as other targets to the left ofthe 33rd Division] At 9*30 pmo, inorease of gas shells in the harassingfire, especially"on Bois des Moriaux and Bois de Septsarges, and 150 10-cmHE and blue cross on Bois de Brieulles*^

Of this gas shelling, the Division Gas Officer reported only 12 yellowcross shells that fell among 90 men of the 129th Infantry in the Bois Jureat 0430o Six men who were sprinkled with the liquid from the bursting

40shells were said to have been evacuated* Hospital records,, however, showthat 21 gas cases were admitted on 3 October and 22 on 4 October9 principally from the 129th Infantry and the 123rd MG Battalion, in the 66th Brigade sect or o

39 Arko 95 order fo r 7 pom* 2 Oot t o 7 aomo 3 Oct (7 th Res Div-Sub U n it sWD&A, 23 S e p - U O ct, Arko 95 ann exes, German F i l e s Box 155 , f o l I I , p . 6 1 )Fol I in th i s f i l e con tain s d iv is io n a l morning and noon repo rts confirmingthese fire missions**40 Ltr Actg DGO to CGO III Corps, 7 Oct, Rpt B-2o III Corps Opns Bpt,2 - 3 Oct (USA in the W , IX, 210), reported 200 gas shells in Bois Jureand on Hill "294

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Resumption of the AdvanceOn the evening of 3 October, the 33rd Division received the First Army

order resuming the attack, in an effort to pierce the Kriemhilde Stellung.In the assault, III Corps was to penetrate the enemy position between Cuneland Brieulles, advancing to the heights northeast of Cunel, and then sweepeast to the Meuse, cutting off Brieulles. The 80th Division, on the leftof the 4th Division, was to attack along the Bois des Ogons to the Northedge of the Bois des Rappes; the 4th Division through the Bois du Fays tothe north edge of the Bois de Foret and then east to the river The 33rd

41Division was to hold its positions and protect the flank of the attack*For the attack, three field batteries and four machine gun companies

of the 33rd Division were moved into the northwest edge of the Bois de laCote Lemont, to assist the 130th Infantry in breaking up possible enemycounterattacks between the Bois de Brieulles, Bois de Foret, and Brieulles*As the hour of attack approaohed, the remaining divisional artillery prepared to bombard Brieulles and its defenses to the northwest, and to neutralise with HE the enemy guns in the Bois de Chatillon, Bois de Sartelle,

42and the two ravines east of Liny-devant-Dun#The enemy artillery order for the night of 3 - 4 October indicated

no particular awareness of the impending attack as it called for

41 F0 33 , F i r s t Army noon, 1 O ct; F0 22 , I I I Corps, 9*00 a


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harassing fire with surprise bursts of gas and HE at irregular intervalsonooowoods of Dannevous, Moriaux and Jure, on Dannevoux and Gefcourt,and on roads running from Dannevoux to Septsarges, Vilosnes and Gercourt. 43The 66th Brigade, along the west bank of the Meuse, reported heavy shellfire and gas along its entire front from 0215 to 0330, the 131st Infantryspecifying it as tear [chloropiorin?) gas*44 Of the gas shelling in thisbrigade sector, Lieutenant Vawter was to report only an undetermined number of yellow cross shells that fell in the Bois de Forges some time thatnight resulting in a highly contaminated area that was discovered by a gas

officer the next morningo Guards were at once postedo In the 65th Brigade sector, however, Vawter said 300 gas and HE shells were reported tohave fallen into the southeast corner of the Bois de Septsarges betweenmidnight and 0600 on the 4th There were two casualties

It is apparent from Lieutenant Yawter's long, belated report on gasattacks up to 7 October that it was not possible to report the numerousareas subjected to bursts of gas, and he oould only say that in generalthe sector of the 65th Brigade north and west of Dannevoux had beenheavily shelled with HE, yellow cross, and blue cross every nighto He43

Arko 95 order for 7 porno 3 Oct to 7 a.m. 4 Oct (7th Res Div, above,po 627)44 Msg CG 66th Brig to G - 3 33rd Div, 6*10 amo 4 Oet; Msg, G - 2131st Inf to CG 33rd Div, n.h., 4 Oct. (33rd Div Box 6, 32d6)o See alsoSOI 23, 24, 33rd Div, 2 - 4 Oct; SOI, 131st Inf, 3 - 5 Oct (33rd Div Box18, 20ol)o45

Ltr, Actg DGO to CGO III C, 7 Oct, Rpt B-2o

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might have said the same for the sector of the 66th Brigade,, south ofDannevouxo

In the attack launched by First Army at 0525 on 4 October, the 80thand 4th Divisions almost reached the Cunel-Brieulles road, when savageartillery and machine gun fire and counterattacking forces from Brieulleshurled them back to their former positionsc For the next two days, asall available guns of Army and corps concentrated on the enemy batteriesin the Bois de Chatilion, 33rd Division guns pounded Brieulles, and itstroops attempted, without success, to take Teton Trench (Map No 5 andsketch of Brieulles), in an effort to protect the 4th Division forces,which had got into the Bois du Fays, iSrom intense flanking machine gunfireo47

At 1800 on the night of 6 October, 20 Allied planes carried out abombing raid on Brieulles, setting fire to a part of the towno Sevenhours later the III Corps Gas Officer signalede "Hamiltonf~8Oth Division^ is going to throw gas into.Brieulles at 4 AoMo" Beginning at04009 80th Division 75*s fired 1,000 phosgene shells into Brieulles,following up with an equal mixture of HE and yperite shells for thirtyminutes, and then yperite shells alone until 1,500 No 20 shells had been

46See Analysis, p 92o

47See 65th Brigade memo orders, 4 - 6 Oct (33rd Div Box 13, 3213)

48 Msg, CGO Emerson t o G - 3 33rd D iv, U 0 0 aon u, 7 Octo

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Sooxton p.

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put into the town., All divisions in the vicinity wore notified "to takethe neoessary precautions when the town is taken*3'49

Although the entire front became "very quiet" after the rain of destruction on Brieulles,50 its defenses in front of the town and on thridge to the northwest were quickly restoredo Teton Trench, said the65th Brigade commander, had in the past wa@k been "fairly well ehot topieces,* but on the afternoon of the 7th h had to admit that wa considerable amount of machine gun fire was still coming from that locationo" Meanwhile, determined to hold the Bois du Fays, a salientwith enemy troops pressing on both flanks and with strongly entrenchedforces above in the Bois de Malaumont, III Corps called the 53rd Division for assistance. On the morning of 7 Octoberff the 3rd Battalion,132nd Infantry, and its machine gun company were sent in to relieve thregiment of the 4th Division in the Bois du Fays*

49Memo* Robbe CGO III Corps to C CWS Att Def Divp 8 Oot (OAF-IIICorps); ltr* CGO III Corps to C CWS Att Def Div, 27 Get* subt Recordof Gas Atks (First Army Box 340, IIICGO) % ltr, CGO III Corps to C ~12 Nov, subt Rpt on Gas Activities for Oct This corresp indicatesthat the 4th and80th Divs fired considerable gas shells during theperiod, the 33rd Div noneo

50 ,_Msg, Prosser [ l e t Lt, I I I Corps LO at 65th Br lgJ t G - 3 33rd Div*9*15 am.s 7 Oct (33rd Div Box 6, 32ol6), reported completion of the.g asmissiono "Ent ire front now very quiet*"51 ,Msg, CG 65th Brig to G - 3 33rd Div, 12*25 p*m5 7 Oct (33rd DivBox 6, 32ol6o)On 9 Octp 4th Div put 400 yperite shells into Brieullos and the next daycaptured*Teton Trenoho Brieulles however was not to be taken until theend of the month52

History I, 96 - 97, 100*


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Gas Attack on the Bois das MoriauxThe only major gas attack on the 33rd Division during the operation

occurred on 5 October0 The initial gas bombardment occurred between 0200and 0330 when approximately 1,500 green, blue, and yellow cross 77 and105-mm shells were fired into the Bois des Moriaux, opposite Vilosnes, anarea of approximately one square kilometer (Map No* 6)o

Nothing has been found to suggest that this attack was in reprisalfor the gas projector shoot of 2 Octobero More likely it was the threatof a possible crossing at that point, indicated by the continued heavyfire of the trench mortars in the wood, that the enemy sought to neutralize o But the gas shoot got none of the mortarmen, for they regularlywithdrew to the Bois Jure when not firinge

The wood was occupied at the time by the 1st Battalion and part ofthe 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, a total of approximately 1,100 men*Evacuation of the area was impossible, as the enemy held the men therewith intense HE fire and air-burst shrapnel following the gassingo During the attack^ a message from the 131st Infantry on the right said; "HEshells and gas from 12*30 to 2;30 rsicL two wounded, three gassedo129th very heavily shelled during same period.11

Between 0815 and 0645f another 700 gas shells were reportedly putinto the wood and again evacuation was blocked by follow-up HE fire At1515 that afternoon, 400 more gas shells fell on the slope just south ofthe wood, as troops attempted to move down to esoape the gas-filled wood

Msgp 3rd Bn 131st Inf to CO 131st Inf, 2t55 am., 5 Oct (33rd DivBox 18, 32ol6o )

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3 S D Bov. 5 ,l t.5Qt**d area oprk>>oqd

33


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Alt og eth er, i t was est imated tha t between 5,000 and 7,000 s h e l l s had been54fir ed int o that square ki lometer that day, 2,600 of them gas s h e l l s .

As soon as nigh t had f a l l e n , th e wood was com plet ely evaouatedo Casu a lt ie s re su lt i ng from the prolonged gas attaok were reported by Lie ute nant Vawter as 350, inclu din g two men k il le d by fragments of explo ding gasshells For ty men were evacuated w ith lung co m pli ca tio ns , the remainderw ith eye or body burns The most ser io u s o a s es , th os e w ith lung com plicat ion s , were sa id to have been the re su l t of e i th er c lo se- bu rst ings h e ll s or long exposure* Some of the men had kept t h e i r masks on as long

55as s ix hours be for e succumbing to th e disco m fort of th e maskA brigade report sa id tha t the 1st B att a l io n, 129th Infantry , lo s t

5 of fi c e r s and approximately 375 men in th e prolonged gas a ttao k, and the

54 No arty order has been found for this atk in the records of the 7thRes Div, 5th Bay Div, 1st A-H Div, Maas Ost, or Maas Westo Arko 95 orderfor 7 poma 4 Oct to 7 am, 5 Oct called only for the usual harassingfire with sudden gas concentrations on the woods of Moriaux, Septsarges,and dBen Dela, on Dannevoux, Geroourt, and the roads out of Dannevoux,with other targets out of the 33rd Div sector (German Files Box 155, folII, po 65, confirmed in Morning Rpt, p 66)oDaily Rpts, 7th Res Div, 5, 6 Oot, confirms the gas attack* "At 2*00aomo, 8*00-9*00 am, and 3*00-4*00 p.m., Bois des Moriaux contaminatedwith yellow cross" (7th Res Div YTDfcA, 13 Sep - 19 Oot, German Files Box155, fol I, ppo 160 - 161, 166; also in Maas Ost WD, 5, 6 Oot, GermanFiles Box 115, fol I, po 39>o55 Rpt on Gas Atk, 7 Oot (WD Hist Box 300, 33o6; GAF-33rd Div); Spencer, H o 365 - 66oDiv G - 2 seems not to have been aware of this gas attaok, but in a raredetailed accounting it did report on 4 - 5 Oot "Heavy intermittent shelling with HE and gas of areas Bois Jure, Bois Septsarges, Gercourt*; 159gas shells between 1140-1155, 4 Oct, on the Forges-Cummieres road; 96 gasshells on the same road at 2315; 24 gas shells on Forges at 0300, 5 Oot;and heavy shelling with 200 HE and gas rounds on the front line area fromDannevoux to Bois de Forges between midnight and 0230, 5 Oot (SOI 25, 33rdDiv, 4 = 5 Oct) There is no mention of the atk in SOI 26, 5 - 6 Oct, either.

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next day the battalion waswithdrawnoooto Regimental Reserve [south of Hill 28T] Qn~| account Olong continuous service in the line and having suffered heavy casualtiesQromJ enemy artilleryoooand the enemy gas attack of October 5thoooOrders [were] issued to all units of the Brigade to insure men protectingthemselves by proper wearing of the gas mask in oase of gas attaoks.As a result of the gas attack, together with earlier HE and gas casualties,the effective strength of the 1st Battalion was now reduced to 16 officersand 305 meno Apparently refusing to believe so many casualties could becaused by gas, the brigade began an investigation at once wto determinethe actual number of serious cases, with a view to having returned to duty

egthose not se ri ou sl y gassed*" No record of th e in ve st ig at io n has beenfounds but a reg im en tal memo iss ue d on 6 Octob er, co nta ini ng d et a ile d in s tr uc t io ns on pr ote ct io n again st gas befor e , during, and af te r an at tack,ind ica ted the l in e o f inv es t iga t ion *It has been reportedoo othat in the rec ent a ttack on our F ir st Ba ttal ion,t h a t a ft er th e m ain atta ck in which men wore th e ir masks from 3 to 5hoursfl men removed masks when th ey could s t i l sm ell gas s tro ng ly andooon ly mo uth-p ieces and no se -o li p s were used [therea ftei^]o eBrigade hasdir ec ted th at any man who does th is w i l l be carr ied on the s ic k report as'Gassedp not in line of duty'* SBRB can be worn a day and night withoutinju ry, and eye ca su a lt ie s due to t h is improper use w i l l be consideredse l f= in f l i c t e d woundso57

In th e week th a t follow ed the ga ssin g of th e Bois des Moriaux, theD iv is io n Gas Q ffice r was t o say tha t no re al gas atta cks occurred, although

56Chron Reo of Events of 65th Brig, 5 - 7 Oct (33rd Div Box 13, Ilo5);

History, I, 97, I, 597.57 _.Memo, PC P in e tr ee [12 9th In fJ , 6 Oot (33rd Div Box 15, 32 ol3 )

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58considerable amounts of gas were used each day in harassing fir e. On 6October, he reported that 75 77-nm mustard gas shells caused 27 eye casualties among 165 me n of I Company, 3rd Battalion* 129th Infantry, in the Bois

Rondo The next day, an estimated 175 rounds of mustard gas, with somephosgene^ landed among 425 me n in the Bois Jure Most of the 150 casualties evacuated were in K Company, 129th Infantry, and since the woods wereunder direct observation of the German lines aoross the river, evacuationwas not possible until nightfall* The gassed area was posted and putunder guard, but during the next three days, "25 meno.omanaged to pass

59through the area" and all were subsequently evacuated to the gas hospital*The Division Gas Officer did not report the 2 officers and 176 men

"wounded and gassed" in this same 3rd Battalion on 8 October when it wasshelled near Dannevoux as it began moving down to the Bois de Forg es, pr e

60paratory to crossing the Meuse at Consenvoyeo In addition to direct

58 Arko 95 ord ers for n ig h ts of 5 - 6 Oct , 6 - 7 Oc t , and 7 th Res Divorde r to a r t y on 7 Oct a l l ca l l e d fo r "ha rass ing f i r e and sudden con cen t ra t io n s o f gas" on the woods, r av in es , v i l l a g e s , and roads in the 33rd Divse ct or (7 th Res Div-Sub Unlts-Arlco 95 Annexes, German F i l e Box 155, f o l I I ,pp o 67, 69 ; 7t h Re 7 Div WP&A, 7 O ct, f o l I , p . 173 )*59

Ltrp DGO to CGO III Corps, 13 Oot, subs Gas Rpts (GAF-33rd D i v ) .Chron Rec of Events of 129th Inf, 7 Oot (33rd Div Box 15, 11*5 and History,II, 645) says that on the 7th, 3 officers and 106 me n of the 3rd Bn and ""*atchd machine gun company were wounded and gassed in the Bois Rond (notBois Jure)o60

Chron Rec of Events of 129th, 8 Oct j History, II, 645; Morning Rpt ,7th Res Div, 9 Octs "At 10 p*m (8 OoF) two installments of oontamination fire on Dannevous" (7th Res Div WDfeA, German Files B ox 155, fol I, p182) o

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shelling, the 129th Infantry also suffered from indireot gassing in the Boisdes Moriaux, as the 130th Infantry, to its left, in the Bois de Dannevoux,pointed outsGas shells, frequently mixed with HE and shrapnel (air bursts), are almostconstantly thrown in great numbers in the wooded areas adjacent to the outpost zone*, If a south wind is blowing the enemy may shell the valley, extending from Dannevoux east to the Meuse river, a very concentrated mustardgas being used, the wind carrying it into the Bois des Mortaux where itclings persistently for days.With the 129th in the Bois des Moriaux was the 102nd Trench Mortar Battery,most of whose mortars were concentrated in that wood* The history of thebattery was to say that only its weapons were maintained in the wood, withall else back in the Bois Jure, "on account of the large amount of gas whichthe enemy continued to fire into the valley of Dannevoux and the Bois desMoriauxc" 62

Between the enemy harassing fire with gas night after night and thegas attack of 5 October, the severe drain on the strength of the 129th Infantry resulted on the 8th in a memo to all battalion commandersiThe rapid depletion of the fighting strength of the regiment, due to theevacuation of large numbers of *gassed* cases is a matter of vital conoernto all officers*) While undoubtedly the greater number of oases are bonafides it is quite probable that some men are availing themselves of thisexcuse in order to leave the firing line*.Company and platoon commanderscan assist by seeing all gassed oases (except wounded) before they reportto aid stations*. oBattalion surgeons should use the greatest care in evacuationooo0nly earnest and painstaking care..will enable this regiment*not to neglect its actual gassed cases on the one hand, or deplete itsstrength through unnecessary evacuations on the other*

61 Situ Rpt, 130th Inf, 9 Oot, sub* s/s Dannevoux (33rd Div Box 17,33ol)o62 Brief History, 102nd TM Bty, nd. (33rd Div Box 13, 33*2).

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And the next daysThe regimental commander desires to impress on all officers and men theseriousness of the situation, and to remind all unit commanders that theyare responsible for the enforcement of gas disciplineoThe second memo went on to say that all gas cases were to be investigated,and if any officer or NCO had failed in his duty, he was to be disciplinedoMeanwhile^ company commanders were to see that all companies were givenfurther gas defense instruction by the gas personnel.,w

Across the MeuseWith the failure to pierce the Kriemhilde Stellung in the attack on4 Octoberp Claudel9s XVII French Corps, which had remained in place since

the stajrt of the offensive, was alerted to prepare a frontal attack on theMeuse heightso On 7 October, the 33rd Division was put under XVII Corps fortactical purposes, with orders to hold its defensive position on the leftbank of the river and at the same time ready a part of its forces to crossthe river and cooperate in the attack*

The mission of XVII Corps was to seize and hold the heights of theMeuse northwest of Beaumont between the Meuse and Theinte riverSo Itsforces included the 18th and 26th French Divisions, reenforoed by sixSenegalese battalions To their left would be the 58th Brigade of the 29thAmerican Division, and astride the Meuse, the 33rd Divislono Opposite was

63 MemOp 129 th In f t o bn and spe c u n i t c om drs , 8 O ct , sub t Evao of GasCasesi memo, i b i d . , 9 O ct , ns (33 rd Div Box 16, 644)64 FO 39, First Army, 14 hrs, 5 Oct; SO 546-S/3, XVII Corps, 3rd Bur, 6Oct; FO 249 III Corps, 17s30 o'clock, 7 Oct.

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t h e 1st Austro-Hungarian Di vi si on , soon to be reenforoed by the 32nd D iv isi on and elem ent s of th e 228th D iv is io n (Maps No. 7 and 8 ) .

The fi r s t o b je ct iv es of the 58th Brigade and 18th French D ivi sio n werethe enemy OP fs at Malbrouck ridge and the Bois d'Haumont; the second objecti v e s , M o ll e v il l e Ferine and the B ois d'Ormont. On the r ig h t, the 26th FrenchDivision was to capture the Bois des Caures and Flabas.

When XVII Corps had advanced t o th e l in e Consenvo ye-top of B ois deConsenvoye-Flabas, elements of the 33rd Division would cross at Consenvoyeand Brabant and j o i n th e f lan k o f th e 58th Brigade* The whole corp s wouldthen advance in an arc to the f i r s t l in e of exp lo ita t io n , north edges ofB ois de Chaume and Pla t-C he ne -B ois d'E tra ves -C rep ion -Fla ba s, and then thesecond l i n e , S iv ry -t op of Bois de la Grande M ontagne-Flabas. I l l Corpswas to a s s i s t t h i s ope ratio n by a simultaneous at tac k west of the Meuse(Map Noo 9 ) o 6 5

For i t s part in the oper ation, the 33rd D ivi sio n was dir ecte d to puttwo battal ions along the southern edge of the Bois de Forges, ready tocr os s at Brabant, and a b a tt a li o n on th e north ern edge of the wood, tocr os s at Conseiwoye. Six b a tt er ie s of 75*8 In the Bois de Forges, th reemore near Cote de l' O ie , and th re e b a tt e r ie s of 15 5's below Cumieres were

66to protect the crossing at Consenvoye.

65History, I, 100 02, and FOs, above. Also, Plan dfEngagement du

17th CoAo, 4 Oct (33rd Div Box 5, 32) See Map 37 in History, IV, for33rd Div objectives*66 F0 27, 33rd Div, 6*00 p.m., 7 Oot.

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SITUATION deDEVANTLE FRONT ouf7

le 6 Octobre 1918Source 3 3^ P'v ^x ^ 4


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Sect-ion *f r t t

5. Atmeet^4 xefn 8.10.(8.

Source. 5 *


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NO. 9Sc a U , t /O"


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On 7 October, two of the machine gun companies and the three batteriesof 75* s in the Bois de la Cote Lemont moved down to the Forges area, arriving there well after darko At the same time, the 1st and 2nd Battalionsof the 132nd Infantry, in reserve at Malanoourt, and the 2nd Battalion ofthe 131st Infantry with its machine gun company, near Dannevoux, as well astwo companies of the 108th Engineers, came into the Bois de ForgeB oppositeBrabant and Consenvoyeo Observing the movements, enemy artillery shelled"the neighborhood of Forges with gas from 2200 until shortly before midnight o"67

At 0500 on 8 October, without artillery preparation, the Amerioan andFrench forces between Samogneux and Beaumont began their attacko Before0800 they had advanced above Brabant, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the132nd Infantry, under a dense barrage, were ordered aoross to that townoConstruction of passages over the river and canal had begun at dawn "underheavy fenemyl artillery fire averaging ninety shells an hour many of

n68them gas shells, so that masks had to be worn during part of the time oWith their machine gun companies on their flanks, the 1st and 2nd

Battalions of the 132nd Infantry, under Colo Abel Davis, formed abreastjust north of Brabant At 1100, learning that the 58th Brigade had reachedMalbrouck and the southern edge of the Bois de Brabant, they advanced toward their objective, the road running northeast out of Consenvoye*

History, I, 98 - 99o DOR, 33rd Div, 7 - 8 Oct (33rd Div Box 8, 33ol)reported 18D gas shells in the Forges area between 2200-2345, with 150 HEshells in the Bois de Forges* Two casualties were reported.68

History, I, 104 - 05.

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Despite flanking fire from the Bois de Consenvoye, the objective wasreached shortly after noon. At that time the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, was ordered across at Consenvoye, to support the 132nd Infantry inits next advance to the top of the Bois de Chaume. Under a two-hour standing and rolling barrage, the line advanced towards the wood, only to behalted by intense enemy shell fire. At nightfall the troops dug in along

fiQthe south edge of the Bois de Chaume, overtaken by "darkness and storm".0The line of XVII Corps, advanced that day with the fire support of 600guns, extended from the southern edge of Bois de Chaume-through the Boisde Con8envoye-0rmont Ferme-north edge of Bois d'Haumont-northwest corner70of Bois des Caures.

Because of the danger of counterattack against its troops east ofthe Meuse, as well as the toll-taking machine gun and artillery fire fromthe heights north and east of Sivry-sur-Meuse, the 33rd Division on theafternoon of the 8th ordered the two remaining battalions of the 131st71Infantry to the Bois de Forges as an emergency reserve.69 DOR 33rd Div, 8 - 9 Oot. Cf Msg, CO 132nd Inf, 8$20 p.mo, 8 Oct;nAt 6$40p left battalion advance element about 700 yards north of ConsenvoyeooooStopped by standing barrage till dark and dug in for night* Noword from right battalion. Capt Kendall, surgeon, just came in, reportsabout 75 casualties; some gas, some bullets, and some artillery, apparently pretty well mixed" (33rd Div Box 20, 3211)70 FO 28, 33rd Div, 11*45 p.m., 8 Oct; H i s t o r y , I , 107 - 08 . The 12b a t t e r i e s of the 52nd Br ig f i r e d 13,000 rounds in s u p p o r t t h a t day anddur ing the next two days were to f i r e as many more (DOR 33rd Div, 8 - 1 0Oct)o71 H i s t o r y , I , 109 - 10.

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In stubborn retreat before the advance of the Franco-American forcesalong its front that day, Maas Ost ordered its artillery to make "the widestpossible use of gas ammunition* o o[by the 77' s and field howitzers], withslight use of HE" through the night of 8 - 9 October. The harassing fire ofthe 7th Reserve Division artillery was to cover Consenvoye and the terrainto its north, that of the 1st Austro-Hungarian Division from Consenvoye- toSamogneux, the 32nd Division from Samogneux to Anglemont Forme, and the15th Division from Anglemont Forme to Beaumont, The 1st Austro-Hungarianartillery was also to keep Forges and Brabant under heavy fire during thenight, to prevent further reenforcementa coming over from the west bank,while from 0500 on its artillery and that of the 32nd Division were tomaintain annihilation fire on the portion of the Hagen and Brabant Stel

72lugen on their frontso The forces under Colonel Davis were later to report that they were "flooded with gas" on 8 - 9 October.

Resuming the attack at 0640 on the 9 October under a 6,000-roundbarrage, the two battalions of the 132nd Infantry, with the 2nd Battalion,131st Infantry, in support of the right flank, advanced from below theBois de Chaume and reached their objective about noontime, a line abovethe Tranchee la Vanne and along the north edges of the Bois de Chaume andBois Plat-Cheneo That same morning, as the enemy launched a concertedcounterattack against XVII Corps forces, the 177th and 102nd Infantry of

Maas Ost Order 4163, 8 Oct (Maas Ost Opns Orders to Oct 18, GermanFiles Box 48 fol 8lo/32.13)o Maas Ost WD, 9 Oct, said in confirmationthat "our arty held the Meuse crossings as well as assembly points and approach roads under heavy fire mixed with gas" (German Files Box 115, folla, po 344)

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the 32nd Division, which had come in beside the 1st Austro-Hungarian Division during the night, assaulted the 58th Brigade forces at the top of theBois de Consenvoye, driving them back through the woods and exposing theflank of the 33rd Division troops (Map No. 10). Nevertheless, the threebattalions continued to advance above the Bois de Chaume and at 1400 were

74in the vicinity of the road from Sivry to Villeneuve Ferine.At that point, the 102nd Infantry wheeled and hit the 131st Infantry

on the right flank, as the 232nd Reserve Infantry and 105th Storm Battalion of the 1st Austro-Hungarian Division struck the battalions of the132nd Infantry below Sivry.^^ All three battalions were driven back approximately two kilometers as the German forces recaptured the Bois deChaume and Bois Plat-Chene. The troops that had fallen back to thetrenches below the Bois de Chaume were described that night as "in very

73 Msg, Maj Chipenfield [JAG, 33rd Div] with 18th Fr Div, 8*50 a.m.,9 Octj Msg, Huidekoper, 9jl5 a.m., 9 Oot; Msg, Adj 58th Brig, 10*10a.mo( 9 Oct (33rd Div Box 6, 32.16).74 Particular Order 868/3, XVII Corps, 1350 hrs, 9 Oct, reporting Msg,Huidekoper at 2*20 p.m. (with Msgs in Box 6, 32.16)o75

These erroneous identifications of the 1st A-H units involved appear in a number of 33rd Div records. The 1st A-H Div had a 106th St.Bn_o but not a 105th, and the 232nd Res Inf was in the 107th Div and noton this front. See Map Noo 10 for the more probable units. There arealso discrepancies between this map and the records concerning the 32ndDiv unit involvedc

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CONTREATTAQUEA L L E M A N D E 9Octobre 1918

5ec

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It 7 6poor shapeo"The three battalions under Col, Abel Davis were in no oondition to con

tinue the attack. In two days they had advanced five kilometers through theHagen and Volker Stellungen and were at the Giselher Stellung when they werestopped* "They.o.had been heavily pounded with shells and machine-gun fire,and flooded with gas," and had lost 1 officer and 37 men killed, 11 officers77and 315 men wounded.

The Division Gas Officer was to say there were no special gas attackson 8 and 9 October, but that large numbers of gas shells mixed with HE fellover the entire division area, on both sides of the Meuse. "The largelosses reported this date [j.e 257 gas oases in the 129th Infantry, 181gas cases among the forces east of the Meuse] were misleading.n The

76 Msg (Conversation), Capt Bader [XO Fr Mission!} at 66th Brig Hq toG - 3 33rd Div, n.h., 9 Oct (33rd Div Box 6, 32.16"); DOR, 33rd Div, 9 - 1 0Oct; History, I, 112 - 15; Itr, CO 132nd Inf to CG 33rd Div, 15 Nov, subiConf Memo 36 (33rd Div Box 20, 33.6).Maas Ost WD, 9 Oct, implied that the principal objeot of the counterattack that day was Kronprinzhohe Htiill 316 in the oois de Chaume] , butthe arty comdr of the 32nd Div said its 102nd and 177th Inf were orderedto retake the HWL [le# MU\ or Volker Stellung (32nd DiyTSub Units WD&A,8 - 20 Oct, German Files Box 184, fol III, p. 112).

A prisoner that day described the fortified mg nests, 10 metervdeepdugouts, and trench network in the Bois de Chaume and Bois de Consenvoyeand said these woods would be held and that 3 to 4 divisions were in reserve back of the woods for that purpose (Msg, Capt Lauer Asst G ^ 2 33rdDiv, tc G - 2 33rd Div, 12*05 pm, 9 Oct).77 Historyp I, 115. Ltr, CO 132nd Inf, 15 Nov, above, said the casualties as of the 9th were 2 officers and 34 men killed, 7 officers, and 191men wounded.

Note* The History (I, 115, 362) reports the same casualty totals forthe bn of the 132nd Inf on the west bank as for the two bns on the eastbank. See p0 57 below. Ltr, 15 Nov, is probably correct.

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operation under Colonel Davis had slowed down, said Lieutenant Vawter, andon the 9th all those men who were thought to have been gassed were sent tothe aid station for examination. The Medical Department kept no record ofthe number of those who were evacuated but estimated that it was at least50 percent of those examined.78

Reenforcements to the East BankBrigadier General Wplf, commander of the 66th Brigade, was now

placed in charge of troops across the river, and on the night of 9 Octoberreenf or cements began pouring over the bridges. All three battalions ofthe much-gassed 129th Infantry, the 3rd Battalion of the. 130th, and thetwo remaining battalions of the 131st, with four machine gun companies,

79were moved across during the nighto Except for the battalion of th132nd Infantry with the 4th Division in the Bois du Fays, two battalionsof the 130th Infantry in front of Brieulles, and a single machine guncompany in the Bois de Forges, all combat units of the 33rd Division were

80now on the east bank of the Meuse.

78 L t r , DGO t o C CWS, 22 Fe b, sub* Gas Atk s (GAF-33rd D lv ). H o sp it a ladm ission l i s t s show 251 gas ca s u a l t i e s and 115 wounded evaouated on 9Oct ( see Analys is )79 Six gas casualties were reported in one of the MG companies when ittraversed a contaminated area in the Bois Jure that night (Ltr, DGO toCGO III C, 13 Oct, sub* Gas Rpts)o80

History, I, 116 - 17. Actually, the 3rd Bn, 129th Inf, crossed onthe night of the 9th, the other two the next day (Chron Reo of Eventsof 65th Brig, 10 Oct, 33rd Div Box 13, 11.5).

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The movement across the river had been carried out under continualharassing fire from the enemy guns to the north. The War Diary of the7th Reserve Division artillery commander reported that "abundant gas"was fired on the night of 9 - 10 October, both on the reenforcementsmoving down the west bank and the forces clinging to their positions onthe east banksDuring the night the batteries fired heavy harassing fire on troop areas,woods, roads, approaches, probable assembly places, and bridgeheads southof Vilosnes, west of Sivry to south of Belhaine-Muhle on the west bank ofthe Meuse, with_long range fire in front of our lines south of Sivry-Kronprinz draw-) below Hill 316J-Schaumberg Ravine |3 the west of Hills375 and 38]~south of Pantaleon Kapelle. The nightly harassing shoot wascarried out with abundant gas content

The order for attack issued by XVTI Corps on the evening of the 9thdirected the 33rd Division to retake the Bois de Chaume and Bois Plat-Chene with the two "fresh" battalions of the 131st Infantry in the lead,exploiting to the line south of Sivry-Villeneuve Ferme-Grid line 24 (see

Map Noo 2)o The 58th Brigade of the 29th Division and the 18th FrenchDivision would continue their advance to the Bois de la Grande Montagne,

82Bois de la Reine, and Bois d'Ormont.When General Wolf arrived on the east bank, he reported to General

Bells

81 Arko 95 WD, 10 Oct (7th Res Diy-Sub Units-WD&A, 23 Sep - 11 Oct,German Files Box 155, fol II, p. 52); Morning Rpt, 7th Res Div, 10 Oot(fol l8 p o 188) o The Morning Rpt for 11 Oot (p. 196) said that duringthe night gas and HE had again been put on troop assembly areas, roads,draws, and the bridgeheads on the Mouse*82 Msg, CofS XVII Corps, 9*45 p . m . , 9 O o t ; P a r t i c u l a r O r d er 8 6 4 / 3 , 9Oct (33rd Div Box 6, 32ol6)o

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83

Unless Q t h e 58th Brigade^] helps us on the right, wo will be only throwingaway me n to attack the German forces in the woodsTj . Bader |_Capt, LO ,French M ission] thinFs unless they will help us we should withdraw to thenormal objective "i oe oj Consenvoye~top of Bois de Consenvoye~LGeneral Bell replied*That attack has got to be made tomorrow morning at 6 o'clocko Has Ridgwaybeen relieved in accordance with my orderst Relieve him at onceo.ooHe ispanickyo The regiment at the right is going to make the attacks,ooWere thetroops of the 131st engaged in this fight? What is tp prevent the fivebattalions that did not take part, making the attack tomorrow? o c oYou havefive fresh battalionso I will see that they get thereo 8

The attack was made without the help of the 58th Brigade on the rightThe barrage came down at 0605 on the morning of the 10th and the troopsmoved out through Colonel Davis 1 exhausted and disorganized forces in theTranchee du Cableo Against heavy artillery and machine gun fire, the 3rdBattalion* 131st Infantry0 fought its way through the Bois de Chaume totne road from Sivry to Villeneuve Feraeo At 1050 its commander reported!Our troops gained objective but could not hold it on account of intenseshelling and machine gun fireo Shelling is of HE and gaso Am trying togather troops who are in the underbrush and will establish a new line inLa Vanne trench west of Bois de Chaume o Can you send re-inforcements tojoin on my right?

Msg (Conv), no ho, 9 Oct (33rd Div Box 6, 32ol6) records a series ofconversations between Bader, Wolf, and Bell that nighto One conv indicates it was 2040 when Gen Bell ordered the two bns of the 129th and oneof the 130th to rpt to Gen Wolf on the east bank, and that they were tolead the attack at daylight. But the 131st Inf units, preoeding themacross the river^ made the attackoThe reference to Maj Hamlet Co Ridgway (2nd Bn, 131st Inf) seems explainedin Rptfl 131st Inf Engagement at Bois de Chaume (33rd Div Box 19, 33o6)$"One recently assigned Major who had never ben in -action before was inclined to be panicky, and more or less disorganization existed in some ofthe three Regimental Detachments and Machine Gun Companies scattered asthey were through the woodso" Major Ridgway, however, was with the division when it arrived in France o The "recently assigned Major" has nototherwise been identifiedo

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An hour later he signalled*We are in a hole So is 1st Battalion* Company A of 1st Battalion is withdrawing o Enemy artillery fire is ruining us*And ten minutes later;1st Battalion is now 1000 yards to my right with no troops in between* Ihave no field of fire and in case of attack will have to fall back in thewoodso The woods are being shelled very heavily and it would be almostimpossible to keep troops in there with gas as strong as it is*-It is impossible to stay in the front edge of the woods without having a gas maskon all the time We sure need more men.At 1240, the 3rd Battalion fell back through the woods. 84

On the right, the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, initially disorganized by intense machine gun fire, had almost oome up to the 3rd Battalionwhen its position along the north edge of the woods was made untenable byhostile fire and "vegetation...reeking with gas." Tenable or not, the1st Battalion hung on, for at 1400 the commander of the 131st Infantry reported his line spread thinly along the north edges of Chaume and Plat-Chene woods, without any sign of the 58th Brigade on his flank. Ten minutes later, the 1st Battalion signalled!Enemy is forming for counterattack. Without further strength for frontline will have to withdraw. Heavy casualties have been suffered and notouch on right.86

84 Msg, CO 3rd Bn 131st Inf pJaj Francis M. Alien] to CO 131st Inf,1050, 10 Oct; Msg, ibid., 1205j Msg, Capt Magner with 3rd Bn, ibid., 1215;;, 3rd Bn, ibid.,1240 (33rd Div Box 18, 32.16.)85

History, I, 118 - 21.86 r- _Msg, CO 131st Inf ]_Col Jos B SanbornJ to CO 115th Inf [58th BrigT.1400, 10 Oct; Msg, CO 1st Bn, 131st Inf fHaj Coady] to CO 131st Inf,1410, (33rd Div Box 6, 32.16. )Although Msg, CO 131st Inf to CO 1st Bn, 131st Inf, 1355, 10 Oct (33rd DivBox 18, 32ol6) ordered Capt Walter Ho Magner of 2nd Bn, 131st Inf to replaceCoady as 1st Bn comdr, this does not seem to have taken place until 13 Oct.See below, p 61O

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Advance elements of both the 3rd and 1st Battalions, 131st Infantry,seem to have got on the road west of Sivry and above the Bois Plat-Chenalmost to Villeneuve Ferme, for the first wr seen from the air and,though questionable, the others were so reported at 1600 by the 1st BattalionsHave suffered heavy casualties* Troops dug in on 84 Meridian* 1st Bat~talion, 129th Infantry in rear my right flanka87

With troop elements dug in to the east of Sivry and the remainder ofthe 3rd and 1st Battalions, 131st Infantry, disorganized and scatteredabove and in the Bois de Chaume and Bois Plat-Chene, the 3rd Battalionsof the 130th and 139th Infantry were sent up as support on the afternoonof the 10th, and were themselves thrown into disorder by the wterrifioartillery fire consisting of high explosive, shrapnel and gas, as wellas flanking machine gun fire resulting in many casualtieson wThe terrain which they occupied was flooded with gas," and "enemy planes sprayed

88the line with machine gun f ireo.without oppositionsThat night the left side of the line remained near Sivry, while the

battered right of the line, held only by disorganized detachments, dug inalong Dans les Vaux valley and through the woods east to Meridian 24 Under heavy machine gun, shell, and gas fire, it was not possible to connect

87Msg and map dropped by Lt Borden, 90th Air Squad, 1520a 10 Oct; FM,CO 1st Bn 131st Inf to CO 131st Inf, 1600 (33rd Div Box 6, 32ol6)

88 History, I, 122 - 24o

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89up the line, "but individual units dug in the best they couldo"

At 2015 that night, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry,sent the first of a series of messages describing his plight*Counterattack imminent as enemy has been massing troops all day* Frontthinly heldo Support is absolutely necessary if we hold*Need supporto Valley is shelled and gassed0 Casualties estimated at 50^My right flank entirely open Have lost touch with my C and D companiesand the other two badly shot up Need supporto ^At midnight, the regimental surgeon reported*The extreme point of endurance has almost been reached and I have gravefears for the result if the regiment is not withdrawn from the line.

Indicating the probable disposition of 33rd Division troops on thenight of 10 October is a map prepared by the 129th Infantry, tracing themovements of its battalions between 9 - 2 0 October (Map No 11) Anothermap showing the disposition of 131st Infantry troops on th 10th is represented by the Overlay to Map No 11 Neither map indicates any advanceforces or patrols on a line with Sivry, although messages and records ofevents put them that far forwardo

Still another map, made by an officer of the Historical Section, ArmyWar College, and based on unidentified division records and an actual surveyof the terrain east of the Meuse, appears as Map No 12 It is unlikelythat any of the battalions represented, except perhaps those in the Tranohee

History, I, 12490 Msgs, Coady CO 1st Bn to CO 131st Inf, 2015, 2245, 2400, 10 Oct (33rdDiv Box 6, 32ol6)o91 Msg, MD to CO 131st Inf, 2400, 10 Oct (33rd Dlv Box 18, 3216)o

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MAP tHO.il


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M A? T O AC CO M PAN Y PIELD NOTESON 33 DIVISION EAST OF MEUSE

B o i $ d e C h a u m e '']

Consenvove NO.


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or\ t>\^Wt of 10 Oft"Source -. f ***V

OVERLAVAP HO.

ToU


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92

du Cable and above Consenvoye, possessed anything like the cohesion indicated on these maps

On the west bank of the Meuse on the 10th, under relatively lightenemy fire, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 130th Infantry were spreadin a thin line from the western edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont, throughthe Bois de Dannevoux, around the bend of the Meuse, down to Laiterie deBelhaine, with two platoons sent that day to occupy the sector between

92Dannevoux and Consenvoye The only other element of the 33rd Division on that side of the river

was the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, and its machine gun company, withthe 4th Division in the Bois du Fays* On the 10th it participated in theattack against the Bois de Foret, advanoing to the northern edge of thewood, and holding its position until relieved by the 3rd Division on the13th. In its week with the 4th Division, the battalion lost 1 officer and37 men killed, 11 officers and 315 men wounded and gassedo The machinegun company commander was to say that "due to the enemy alternating highvelocity shells with gas," 105 of his 130 combat men had become casualties

93during that weeko

History, I, 125*H i s to r y , I , 125 , 130, 3 62 . L t r , CO MG Co 132nd Inf t o CO 132nd In f,30 Jan 19 , sub i R p t on A c t i o n . . . i n B oi s du Fays , 6 - 1 2 Oot (33rd DivBox 20, 33o6)oCf Msg, Maj B u l l i n g to n CO 3rd Ba 132nd I n f t o S - 3 33rd Div , 5*10 pm,10 Oct (33rd Div Box 6, 32 .1 6) * " I have had 9 o f f ic e r s and abou t 160 menc a s u a l t ie s* Located in Bois de Fa ys . My doc tor and f i r s t a id people werea l l gassed and have gone to the h o s p i t a l . "

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"Situationc. e ountenable*ooondition of menooodesperate"The order of XVII French Corps on th e evening of 10 October announced

th at the l ine reached that day ran across the top of th e Bois de Chaumeand Bois Plat-Chene-H ill 371 (west of Richene, i.e ., , H il l 382)-the no rth ern edge of the Bois de Mollevilie-southern edge of the Bois d'OrmontoThere waa no change in the mission of the 33rd Div ision , as the 58th Brig ade was di rected to continue i t s advance to th e Grande Montagne the nextmorning, supported by the French divi sion s on it s right 94

But the Bois de Chaume was as yet tenuously he ld , and most of theBois Plat-Chene remained firmly in the enemy's hands* Fearing anothercounte rattack against it s ti re d forces, the 33rd Division dir ec ted t ha tan emergency defense line be prepared along the top of the Bois doChaume running sou theast to Hil l 371, with a li a ison detachment betweenH ills 371 and 382 (Richene), connecting with the 58th Brigade* *The Lineof Resistance w il l be held to the last .Prompt means w il l be taken tobring up a l l st ra gg le rs , and to complete any neoessary reo rga niza tion ofuni t so"9 5

94 History, I, 126*95 FO 29, 33rd Div, 9*00 p.m., 10 Oot; IMf CG 66th Brig to Opns 0 131stInf, 2025, 10 0ct(33rd Div Box 18, 32.16),Troops "drifting to the rear in large numbers upon small excuse" a problem in the Sto Mihiel operation became a real threat on the whole Armyfront in October* See III Corps orders on straggling, cited in Conf Memo7, 33rd Div, 7 Sep, and Conf Memo 24, 33rd Div, 21 Oct (33rd Div Box 5,32ol5)oThe events east of the Meuse that week were anticipated by III Corps before the operation began. Opns instructions, 131st Inf, 25 Sep (33rd Div

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Throughout the night of 10 - 11 October and the following day incessant high explosive, machine gun, and gas fire hampered the division as itsought to round up its stragglers, reorganize its units, and set up the defensive line on the edge of the Bois de Chaume* The commander of the 1stBattalion, 131st Infantry, in the valley above

wwi 33rd infantry division

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