WS 2014-15

Kunibert Raffer

Folien zur Vorlesung:

Grundlagen der Entwicklungsökonomie

© K. Raffer 2014

The obstinate conservatism with which the classical comparative cost thinking has been retai ned in theory as something more than a pedagogical introduction - or a model for the treatment of a few special problems - is evidence that, even today, there is in many quarters an insuffi cient understanding of this fundamental fact.

It follows that not only the comparative cost model but also the factor proportions model can only be applied in special cases and used as a general introduction to illuminate the character of trade in some essential aspects ... It is characteristic of the developing countries that a good many factors do not exist at all and that the quality of others differs from factors in the industrialized countries. This means that a simple method of analysis - such as the factor proportions model - which does not take this into account is to some extent unrealistic.

Bertil Ohlin (1967) Interregional and International Trade, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard UP 308f. (stress in or.)

Table 1.a: Graham's Case (Viner's presentation) Basic Assumptions: Countries A and B both have 400 Units of (nationally standardised, or homogeneous) Labour (LU); the international price ( net barter terms of trade) remains at 4C = 3.5W (Pintl = 0.875) 1) Constant Returns (Ricardian-Torrens) Case: A Bproduction per LU ( productivity) C 4 4

W 4 3

 Pb = 0.75 (4C = 3W) Pintl = 0.875 Pa = 1 

Production Changes (LUs used to produce C and W respectively)

Specialisation I Specialisation II Total SpecialisationCountry A B (A+B) A B Differ*) A B Diff.*)

C 800 800 1600 400 1200 0 0 1600 0(LU) (200) (200) (100) (300) (400) W 800 600 1400 1200 300 +100 1600 0 +200(LU) (200) (200) (300) (100) (400)

Table 1.b: Graham's Case (Viner's presentation)

2) Graham's Case:Specialisation (II) Specialisation (III)A B A B

C 4.5 3,5 5 0.5W 4.5 2 5 0.25

 0.571 < Pintl = 0.875 < 1 0.5 < Pintl = 0.875 < 1

Production changes: Specialisation II Specialisation III Total Specialisation.

A B Diff.*) A B Diff.*) A B Diff.*)C 450 1050 -100 5 199,5 -1395,5 0 200 -1400(LU) (100) (300) (1) (399) (400)W 1350 200 +150 1995 0,25 +595,25 2000 0 +600(LU) (300) (100) (399) (1) (400) *) compared with Specialisation I

Austauschverhältnisse (Terms of Trade)

1) Commodity or Net-Barter ToT: Px/Pm

 Px price (index) of exports Pm price (index) of imports  2) Double Factoral (US: Factorial) ToT 

PxNx/PmNm

NBToT weighted by productivity indices (N); compare rewards of homogeneous factor units

Unequal Exchange : DFToT ≠ 1 Income ToT: PxQx/Pm Qx exported quantity; real export income  Gross Barter ToT: Qx/Qm Single Factoral ToT (only exports weighted with Nx ) Employment Corrected DFToT:PxNx multiplied by index of employment in developing country (cf. Spraos 1983; Singer 1989)

Factors contributing to falling NBToTs (sometimes wrongly called different "versions" of the PST)

- low income elasticity of commodity exports; initially hotly attacked, meanwhile generally accepted (e.g, IMF, 1987; IBRD 1987) Expanding of raw material exports ▬► excess supply- low elasticities of demand of periphery exports - necessary imports to promote development only produced by Centre – PCs’ income elasticity of imports high. Developmental needs ▬► excess demand

-cultural dependence or wasting resources for luxury consumption

-oversupply of labour in PCs keeping wages down-(absence of) market power of factors of production: workers (trade unions) and entrepreneurs in the North have sufficient market power to keep Northern prices from falling along with technical progress; lack of such power in PCs forces their prices down

- protection by the Centre restricts export outlets ▬► additional force to the deteriorating trend; Centre’s protectionism increases market disequilibria created by the disparity of export possibilities and import needs of SCs

- Singer (1991) added debt pressure

Ungleicher Tausch: Produktspezifizität und Preisdurchsetzungsmacht

- |i| = - |wi| - erij srj si-1

i Spezifische Elastizität eines Exportgutes des Landes i

wi Kreuzpreiselastizität der Welt nachfrage erij Kreuzpreiselastizitäten des Angebots aller

anderen Quellensrj Anteil am Gesamtangebotsi Anteil des Exportlandes i am Weltexport

Unterschiede zu den üblichen Elastizitätsschätzungen

Bogenelastizitäten

Substitution hängt von Verfügbarkeit (auch im Sinne wirtschaftlicher Vertretbarkeit) ab

Zeitabhängig (Reaktionszeit)

Definition Official Development Assistance (ODA): "those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their exe cutive agencies, each tran saction of which meets the following tests:a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of de veloping countries as its main objective, andb) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent."

 DAC (Development Assistance Committee) der OECD

Zuschußelement (grant element): Unterschied OEH-Kredit und Kredit mit 10% Zinsen (gemessen in Kapitalwerten)Beispiele, gerade >25% (OECD 1985, p.172): - 4 %, 7 Jahre Laufzeit, 3 Jahre tilgungsfrei - 5 %, 11 Jahre Laufzeit, 4 Jahre tilgungsfrei - 5 %, 15 Jahre Laufzeit, keine tilgungsfreie Zeit

DAC -ODA 1950-2013 (%)

Source: DAC

1950-55 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013

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ODA by DAC MembersBroadened and Deflated Totals

(% of GSP)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994DAC-value 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33*) 0.31 0.30minusadmin. costs 0.307 0.318 0.317 0.317 0.296 0.286refugees 0.306 0.315 0.311 0.307 0.284 0.274emerg.& dis.relief 0.302 0.311 0.303 0.303 0.278 0.269emergency food aid 0.302 0.310 0.301 0.298 0.274 0.265debt forgiveness 0.297 0.284 0.266 0.282 0.259 0.247capital subscr. 0.271 0.255 0.251 0.245 0.233 0.222contrib. to NGOs 0.264 0.249 0.245 0.240 0.228 0.217students (imputed) 0.260 0.245 0.242 0.236 0.224 0.213former Commun. C. 0.260 0.245 0.239 0.235 0.221 0.211

ODA-Inflator 1.231 1.347 1.381 1.404 1.403 1.424Sources: Raffer (1998), based on OECD-data

(various publications)

ODA by DAC MembersBroadened and Deflated Totals

(% of GSP)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994Official DAC-value 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.30Deflated ODA 0.260 0.245 0.239 0.235 0.221 0.211ODA-Inflator 1.231 1.347 1.381 1.404 1.403 1.424 

Source: Raffer 1998a

Table 6.2: Corrected ODA and OA by DAC Members(% of GSP)

 

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994Deflated ODA 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21OA 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04Total 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.25 

Quelle: Raffer & Singer 2001/2004, p.89

Country Programmable Aid (CPA)

“is the portion of aid donors programme for individual countries, and over which partner countries could have a significant say. Developed in 2007 in close collaboration with OECD DAC members, CPA is much closer to capturing the flows of aid that go to the partner countries than the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA).” Source: OECD

CPA:

“(1) inherently unpredictable (such as humanitarian aid and debt relief); or (2) entails no flows to the recipient country (administration, student costs, development awareness and research and refugee spending in donor countries); or (3) is usually not discussed between the main donor agency and recipient governments (food aid, aid from local governments, core funding to international NGOs, aid through secondary agencies, ODA equity investments and aid which is not allocable by country). Finally, (4), CPA does not net out loan repayments, as these are not usually factored into aid allocation decisions.”

ODA  Composition 2011

Source: OECD 2013

The Millennium Development Goals Eight Goals for 2015

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger2. Achieve universal primary education 3. Promote gender equality and empower women 4. Reduce child mortality 5. Improve maternal health 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 7. Ensure environmental sustainability 8. Develop a global partnership for development

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 1: Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day

Indicators:1. Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day 2. Poverty gap ratio, $1 per day3. Share of poorest quintile in national income or consumption

Target 2: Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Indicators:4. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age5. Proportion of the population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)

1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.

2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.

3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.

4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.

5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development

results.Accra Agenda for Action (2008)Ownership 

Inclusive partnerships: All partners - including donors in the OECD DAC and developing countries, as well as other donors, foundations and civil society - participate fully.

 

Delivering results: Aid is focused on real and measurable impact on development. 

Capacity development: ability of SCs to manage own future - also lies at the heart of AAA

Busan Partnership (2011) “result of an inclusive year-long process of consultation” – “sets out principles, commitments and actions that offer a foundation for effective co-operation in support of international development.”

Is the Busan Partnership document legally binding? How will implementation be ensured?

“The Busan Partnership document does not take the form of a binding agreement or international treaty. It is not signed, and does not give rise to legal obligations. Rather, it is a statement of consensus that a wide range of governments and organisations have expressed their support for, offering a framework for continued dialogue and efforts to enhance the effectiveness of development co-operation.

The Busan Partnership document foresees the establishment of a Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, which will support and help ensure accountability for implementation at the political level. A light framework will be agreed through which progress will be monitored and mutual accountability supported.”

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Graph1: GPG1 and GPG2 as Shares of CRS Totals

GPG1

GPG2

IFI SIND NICHT BEVORZUGTE GLÄUBIGER

IWF

nachzulesen auf IWF-homepage (auf Seite 820 des Files):

www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/ch16.pdf

Rutsel-Sylvestre (1990):

Gründer(innen) des IMF stipulierten NACHRANGIGKEIT der Fondsforderungen; explizite Nachrangigkeit (Schedule B, paragraph 3) mit 2. Statutenänderung verschwunden

SDRM war der Versuch, sich die wider besseres Wissen behauptete rechtliche Bevorzugung endlich und insbesondere zu Lasten des privaten Sektors zu erschleichen

Folgen des Verhinderns von Haftung, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und marktwirtschaftlicher Prinzipien:

“IFI flops securing IFI jobs” (Raffer 1993) steigende Verschuldung der EL, erschwertes “Schuldenmanagement”, aber mehr Einkommen und Einfluß für IWF ökonomisch perverses Anreizsystem

Beispiele:a) J. Stiglitz: IWF soll umfangreiche Textpassagen aus Dokument für Land A in Dokument über Land B eingefügt haben (manchmal vergessen Namen zu ändern) b) Blumenthal Bericht (Zaire 1982)c) Asienkrise: IBRD (1999) GAB offiziell ZU Jahre vorher gewußt zu haben, daß von IFI stark propagierte, rasche Liberalisierung wieder Krise auslösen würde; warnte Mitglieder aber nicht! IWF MUSZTE es WISSEN (Chile Crash!)

IMF-IEO (2004) The IMF and Argentina, 1991–2001 http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/arg/eng/index.htm

“program was also based on policies that were either known to be counterproductive ... or that had proved to be ‘ineffective and unsustainable everywhere they had been tried’ ... [A]s expressed by FAD [Fiscal Affairs Department] at the time.” (p.91)

Board unterstützte “a program that Directors viewed as deeply flawed” (pp.81f) - “September 2001 augmentation suffered from a number of weaknesses in pro-gram design, which were evident at the time. If the debt were indeed unsustain-able, as by then well recognized by IMF staff, the program offered no solution to that problem.” (p.89, Herv. KR) – IWF "staff estimates“, Schuldenreduktion zwischen 15 und 40% wäre nötig ▬►crédito abusivo (J.P. Bohoslavsky)

Haftung, Schadenersatz

IWF laut Art. IX, Abs 3: vollständige Immunität “except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract”

Schiedsgerichtliches Verfahren (wie zB IBRD) zur Feststellung ob Haftungsgründe vorliegen, ob bzw. wie viel Schadenersatz an rechtswidrig geschädigte Mitglieder zu zahlen ist.

Risikovorsorge („precautionary reserves“)Alle IFI außer IWF statutarisch verpflichtet, auch IWF hat

vorgesorgt - ALLE haben Kunden Kosten der Risikoabsicherung verrechnet, weigern sich aber die schon bezahlte Versicherungsleistung zu gewähren

Neue Ausrichtung & Paradigmata der EH

Hilfe für private Investitionen

Politische Konditionalität

Globale Öffentliche Güter

Kampf gegen Terrorismus

Robert Cornall (Australia's Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department):

necessity to "balance" security and human rights (once “established when the world was a safer place”)

“Global Security in the New Millenium”, 10 October 2003

Kolonialer Ursprung:Römer Verträge, dann Notwendigkeit völkerrecht-licher Abkommen (Jaunde)

Lome-Verträge

"concern to defend ... economic and geopolitical interests in the age of the Cold War ... the international situation ... European anxiety at the first oil crisis, i.e. a fear of raw material shortages and a desire to hold on to valued overseas markets, united with geostrategic interests.“

Europäische Kommission (1996) Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the

eve of the 21st century, (Draft) Brussels (14 November), p.9

LOME- COTONOU (EU – AKP)

Lome I: STABEX, Rohstoffprotokolle

Lome II Sysmin

Lome III: Überaus komplizierte Administration, Strikte Kontrolle durch EG

Lome IV/1: weiterer Abbau der Partnerschaft

Mid-Term Review

Lome IV/2: “Flexibilität“, 2 Tranchen, “essential elements clause“, RSA: formelle MitgliedschaftPekuniär: “ two pints of beer & a packet of chips in an average London Pub“ pro Kopf

COTONOU: Wünsche von 1973-4 durchgesetzt

STABEX – wie es funktionierte

Jahr 1- Jahr 2 – Jahr 3 – Jahr 4 – Jahr 5 – Jahr 6ExErl. 100 100 100 100 80 80

Durchschnitt (letzte 4 Jahre) 100 95

Kompensations-Zahlungen 20 15

Abhängigkeitschwelle, Auslöseschwelle (ursprünglich: 7.5% bzw f. “begünstigte Länder” 2,5%)

Ziele der 1970er mit Cotonou endlich erreicht:

Aufsplitterung in Gruppen

Reverse Preferences wiedereingeführt

Stabex abgeschafft (EPA-Entwurf pazifischer Staaten verlangt ähnlichen Mechanismus)

WTO-Kompatibilität: Abschaffung von Rohstoffprotokollen zu erwarten

Keine fixen Finanzzusagen (= Ansprüche derAKP) mehr („bis zu“ € 13.5 Mrd)

Übrig gebliebene Gelder (vorige EEF) an EEF 9 transferiert und nach neuen Bestimmungen zu verwenden

Kommission:

“lack of supply capacity and competitiveness of most ACP countries which renders them unable to cope with external demand and competition“

"Analyse du projet des directives de négotiations, Accord du partenariat CE-ACP", Document du travail des

services de la Commission (January 1998), p.53

“Our experience tells us that FTAs between a large market like the EU and small economies are not easily sustainable and often lead to a deficit for the weaker partner.”

EU-Kommission, „Central America“http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/central_america/index_en.htm

“Trade will not promote development without parallel investment in the supply side.”

Peter Mandelson, EU Commissioner for Trade

at LSE, February 2005

Kosten der EPA (Anpassungskosten)

Milner (2005) alle AKP € 9 Mrd(Commonwealth Secretariat) Pazifik € 642 Mil

Smith (2006) Pazifik € 184 Mil(UN-ESCAP) (über 5 Jahre, “niedrig”)

unter 10. EEF: max. € 88 Mil

Narsey (2003) bei max.Imp-Abgab. ≤ 10%(Pacific Regional Economic Einnahmenverluste von zBIntegration Programme) 51% (Kiribati), 42% (Samoa),

41% (Vanuatu)

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Graph 8.1: Real Oil Prices 1945-1994 (1994 US $)

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$(1

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Table 8.1 The Composite Barrel and Its Components

(US$ and percentages in 1998) USA EU Japan OECD* UK $ % $ % $ % $ % $ %

Composite b. 39.9 100 94.5 100 80.8 100 72.7 100 131.7 100 Crude cif 12.0 30.08 12.4 13.12 13.7 16.96 12.5 17.19 12.6 9.57 Tax 13.5 33.83 64.2 67.94 32.6 40.35 35.4 48.69 89.6 68.03 Industry margin 14.4 36.09 18.0 19.05 34.5 42.70 24.8 34.11 29.4 22.32

ú OECD countries excluding Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, and Iceland Source: OPEC 1999, p.125

Asiens Tiger: Erklärende Faktoren des„asiatischen Wunders“

1) Großzügige EH (Kommunismus!)

2) Bodenreform

3) Produktionsstrukturen aus Kolonialzeit

4) Wirtschaftspolitik

5) Kontrolle Transnationaler Konzerne

6) Rolle des Staates

“BWI-TRAP” NOT “MODERNISATION TRAP”

IFIs KNEW that advised liberalisation policies would lead to catastrophe because of earlier crises (especially Chile 1982!!)

neglect of proper sequencing and institution building "featured prominently in the Chile and Mexico crises."

Source: IBRD, Operations Evaluation Department (OED) (1999) 1998 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness, Task Manager: Robert Buckley, IBRD: Washington DC, p.2

1990(!) Audit Report on SAL in Chile “highlighted the lack of prudential supervision of financial institutions in increasing the economy's vulnerability to the point of collapse.‘”ROBICHEK Doctrine!!!

“premature financial liberalization”

OECD: regulatory changes; pressure to liberalise (Korea)

Basle I: triggering short term & hindering other capital flows

No contagion: China, Taiwan, and India – Hong Kong (intervened, explicitly non-neoliberal measures) – Malaysia

An IMF Self-Interest in Crises?

IMF's First Deputy Managing Director during Crisis (with Thailand & Mexico as supporting evidence): prospect of larger crises due to capital account liberalisation calls for more IMF-resources to cope with the very crises the IMF's proposal would create in the future

Stanley Fischer (1997) “Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF”, IMF Seminar Asia and the IMF, Hong Kong, (19 September) http://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/asia/FISCHER.HTM

COMPARING BEFORE & AFTER

Washington Consensus + -

Corruption (cronies) - +

Correct bureaucracy + -

Competent public service + -

Strict criteria of intervention + -

Market friendly + -

Great success – “miracle” + -

Due to following BWI-advice + -

V-shaped vs. U-shaped Recovery

Keynesian policy (Jomo)

low interest rates

government intervention

“degree of government intervention …was actually increased … contrary to the IMF prescription and the Korean government’srhetoric”. (Shin 2000, p.22)

Ownership?

resistance to reform “underestimated” by IMF; “visible presence” of Western country officials “sometimes created a misperception” of the IMF’s motives weakened country ownership. (IMF, IEO 2003)

Stockpiling Reserves – One Fundamental Change

December 2006: 10 countries (East Asia and India) > 44% ofthe world’s official forex reserves;

of which: China nearly half Korea ($238.4 B), Taiwan ($266.1 B) > > whole Euro areaKorea’s reserves 2005 about 28% of GDP (early 1990s: appr. 9%)

US, Germany and Britain: all ratios < 2.5% of GDP

HIGH COSTS

Ra (2007): Reserves earning 2-3% financed by government paying 9% interest

IMF: reserves/short term external debt (R/STD) “Single most impor-tant indicator of reserve adequacy in countries with significant but un-certain access to capital markets.” But: “conditions to ensure private sector access to international capital markets” reduces reserve needs

Reserves unnecessarily high and costly

BETTER ALTERNATIVE: Using Membership rights as inten-ded by IMF’s founders & reflected in its Articles of Agreement

Art.VI.3: RIGHT to Capital Controls

Art. XXX: RIGHT to restrict amortisation of loans,and FDI re-flows

Art. VI.1.a: IMF's general resources may not beused to meet a large and sustained outflow of

capital (as done in Asia 1997-98)

Especially so as high reserves produce “global imbalances”, and IMF demands more imports (especially from one big deficit country) to re-balance disequilibria (finally, a Keynesian IMF?)

Not Recommended by North: ODA - “rogue aid”