Danielle V. Heard

Directed Research

Flint, Michigan

Source: FiveThirtyEight.com

Introduction and Research Question

Long before Flint’s water system was poisoned, it faced varying crises that shaped its

current socio-economic standing and political agency/agents. The following factors combined

to make Flint citizens vulnerable to emergency management, thus opening the floodgates to

the horrors that began in 2014. Given the lead contamination of the citizens of Flint, Michigan

and the meandering response of policy makers as demonstrated by bungled policy and

dismissal of citizen complaint, how do our socio-political systems allow environmental injustices

to develop and continue? By examining the contrast of our social and political systems, the case

of Flint water lead contamination reveals a crumbling democracy and the citizens mobilized by

its collapse. My research question aims to highlight the potential for more Flint cases which

may not be water or lead related, but have the ripple effect of toxic(s) exposure through

political inaction or sluggish policy implementation. For example, the infamous case of Love

Canal, New York which highlighted the presence of corporate profit/abandonment and

local/state/federal incompetence.

Political Science Literature, Methods, and Data Collection

I examined two political science pieces that provided additional methods to examine the

social and political significance of what transpired in Flint, Michigan. The first being, the

quintessential 2003 text: Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies by John W. Kingdon. The

literature provided the answers to the following questions: why are some issues placed on the

political agenda and others not, and in the case of Flint, what was happening politically that

prevented aging infrastructure from reaching the top of the agenda? What are policy windows

and why did none of the initial red flags about lead poisoning invigorate an individual at any

level of government to seek the appropriate policy solution? Lastly, who are policy

entrepreneurs and how did they emerge in Flint and were there actions benevolent or

calculated when implementing solutions to citizen’s concerns in Flint? Kingdon’s literature was

invaluable in investigating how Flint occurred. Kingdon’s literature emphasizes the power, and

likewise ramifications, of agendas and public policy implementation. The city of Flint, Michigan

was in a compromised position economically and politically, where it was under the jurisdiction

of emergency managers which usurped local elected officials. Thus, the agenda and public

policy setting that was implemented in Flint was against financial bankruptcy and geared

towards economic growth and capital generation. Switching to the Flint River was supposed to

be a cost saving measure or alternative as Kingdon would assert, that would save money and in

turn generate more capital for the city. The aftermath of which only lead to bad public policy.

The second piece of political science literature I briefly examined is Social Construction

of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy1 by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram.

Through Schneider and Ingram’s literature, I examined why Flint occurred. Schneider and

Ingram argue that social constructions of certain target populations translate into where they

are placed on the political agenda and furthermore gives rationale to the policy choices enacted

upon them. These constructions become subliminal or blatant in policy and affect the political

affiliation and orientation of voters and non-voters. Schneider and Ingram examine why some

groups have more advantage than others politically and how that power disseminates amongst

various levels of privilege and agency.

As previously stated the research question focuses on the social and political systems at

work in the city of Flint, Michigan. I explored the failures of governance perpetrated at various

levels of government by examining the e-mails that were released by Governor Rick Snyder.

Within these e-mails, he corresponded or received correspondence with various government

officials, aids, staff members, health experts, environmental agencies, etc. about the years long

crisis in Flint, Michigan. By utilizing NVIVO text analysis software, I discovered that the

frequency of words, names, or issues escalated or deescalated with time. The frequency of said

1 This political science literature was not investigated at length, but was included to narrow the definition of social constructions and its applicable theory.

categories reveals an additional narrative about what was happening socially and politically in

Flint. In conjunction with this case, I discovered that the research must be conducted using a

mixed methods approach of qualitative and quantitative analysis. By scouring through

demographic data of population and economic distribution in Flint I revealed that there was a

relationship between the socio-political structures of race and class. The e-mails I gathered

information from were coded and analyzed using wordclouds and were coded in such a way to

discern the key words or phrases that appear unilaterally across articles in regards to key

players (politicians, administrators, etc.) and their associations to aging infrastructure, lead

particulate(s) in water, hospital correspondence, school alerts, contact with the EPA, MDEQ,

and other departments of environmental or health safety/quality. The unilateral examination of

the words within the wordclouds assisted in weaving a narrative of who and what was being

mentioned most prior to, during, and after the Flint water crisis; conversely, what was not.

Furthermore, I delved deeply into various news outlets that have been reporting on the

crisis in Flint and created a timeline of events that further encapsulates the initial complaints

about the odor, smell, taste, and/or appearance of the water. Thereafter, I traced the media

coverage about the rotating politicians and emergency managers appointed pre and post Flint

lead contamination. This timeline also included brief examinations of the following: public

health records, epidemiological implications, historical Flint documents, and graphics which

which will be elaborated further as approached within the timelinesb. Referring to my initial

research question, I anticipated that a pattern or relationship would emerge between the

strength of socio-political systems and the environmental injustices that occurred therein. Thus,

I performed a brief examination of literature pertaining to environmental discrimination—as it

pertains to race and class—and hazardous waste siting.

Exploring the Dynamics of Race and Class in Hazardous Waste Siting

The dynamics of race and class must also be examined in the Flint case. Critical theory has been

done in the field of environmental discrimination. In particular, environmental racism falls

under certain criterion and has the ability to change or fluctuate depending on

internal/external biases, economics, and location. “According to Bunyan Bryant, environmental

racism ‘refers to those institutional rules, regulations and policies of government or corporate

decisions that deliberately target certain communities for least desirable land uses, resulting in

the disproportionate exposure of toxic and hazardous waste on communities based upon

certain prescribed biological characteristics. Environmental racism is the unequal protection

against toxic and hazardous waste exposure and the systematic exclusion of people of color

from environmental decisions affecting communities’ (Girdner & Smith, pg. 61).” Its important

to be mindful that the institutions of power at the local, state, or federal level can influence

one’s location/residence and employment opportunities/financial status. Upward mobility is

very dependent on generational wealth accumulation, this includes where one lives and has the

choice to live. Within the definition of environmental racism, the conditions of targeting and

racism are introduced and left irrefutable. However, the economic components of rationality

act as a countermeasure to claims of racism and siting patterns of hazardous facilities varies

based on controlling costs and where it is cheapest to do so. Economic theorists also assert that

residential sorting2 also affects the behavior of communities, and oftentimes is independent of 2 Residential Sorting: “Economic theorists argue that the presence of facilities in minority communities is not the result of intentional discrimination. Instead, people move into and out of communities in

race. The behavior of corporate or government entities should not be excused for any reason

however. The presence of “…. disproportionate siting in minority and low-income areas can be

an unintended consequence of profit maximization and cost containment. Disproportionate

siting can occur because neighborhoods with low commercial property values often abut

neighborhoods with low residential property values….companies are attracted to areas with

low housing prices and a high proportion of minorities because such locations lower any

potential compensation that polluters might be required to pay (Taylor, Dorcetta E., pg. 70).”

White flight—or persons with the economic wherewithal to flee from racial and class

compositions—can also flee due to noxious or hazardous sites approximate to their

communities. White flight can oftentimes leave a community disproportionately racially

marginalized. This includes, those that lived there prior to and those that move in once white

flight has occurred. Variance of the phenomenon of white flight varies from county to county,

city to city, and state to state. The chicken and the egg theory is also applicable to hazardous

waste siting. Industrial sites or toxic waste may have already been or gone, or conversely

appeared whilst a community was living there. The willingness to pay and environmental

tradeoffs that are associated with it also lend itself to cost-benefit-analysis economics. To

elaborate, when an area is assumed or has documented hazardous risks, persons who are able

to move or relocate away from the risk are able to do so, thus leaving those unable to move

away behind. Those who have less economic prospects are trading off living with higher risks

for more affordable housing, education, etc. Yet, the same persons with less economic

response to neighborhood characteristics. That is, the spatial arrangement of environmental amenities and disamenities includes residential sorting or neighborhood racial change that might appear on the surface to be discriminatory…Downey refers to this process of neighborhood racial change as racial succession (Taylor, pg.72).”

prospects can and will pay more for appropriate housing to mitigate risks, which includes

additional costs to keep the areas clean and installation of desired amenties.

Within Dorcetta Taylor’s 2014 text: Toxic Communities: Environmental Racism, Industrial

Pollution, and Residential Mobility two theoretical perspectives are also examined to explain

the power elites plus the inherent power imbalances levied on others, and how a community or

location is classified as vulnerable. Its imperative to examine how systems of power would

operate in a marginalized city like Flint and therefore the steps necessary to empower/aid

those at most risk. Firstly, Taylor examines C. Wright Mills’s concept of the power elites and

treadmills of destruction (pg. 94) that converge to create political, economic, and

environmental inequalities. These treadmills emerge as large institutions of power that have

the legal authority, legislation, monetary funds, etc. to achieve their aims but leave behind

immense debt, death, and destruction. For example, the United States military has the powers

of legislation, the scientific community with research, the storage and deployment of

munitions, the testing facilities necessary to conduct experiments, and so on. The end result is a

over equipped, over funded, and sometimes overzealous institution that has the authority and

capability to cause lethal and oftentimes unchecked harm. The treadmill of destruction also

operates at the racial/social/economic level as well. For example, marginalized and other-ized

communities of color and/or sexual orientation can receive the full brunt of political legislation

and segregation, under or overwhelming industrialization, and direct or indirect militarism—

such as surveillance or frequent policing. Secondly, Taylor examines Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley’s

main tenets on the research on vulnerability (pg. 95). “The researchers use the hazards-of-place

model of vulnerability to determine the components of social vulnerability….risk, (the likelihood

of a hazard event) interacts with mitigation (steps taken to reduce risks or their impacts) to

create the hazard potential. The hazard potential is influenced by geographic factors (such as

location and proximity) and the social characteristics of the place. Hence, the biophysical and

social factors interact to produce the overall vulnerability of place (pg. 95).”

As mentioned previously with the treadmills of destruction, those already or made vulnerable

face innumerable risks and hazards to their health and economic welfare.

The ‘Blame Game’ and Word-Cloud Quantitative Analysis

The dynamics of the key actors in Flint highlight Schneider and Ingram’s theory of social

constructs and political power. For example, the government officials are associated with

strong power but negative social constructions and the citizens in Flint are associated with

weak power but positive social construction. Their theory of social constructs and power ties

the intricate threads of the Flint story together in a timeless and tragic way. The Rick Snyder e-

mails analysis I performed, alongside the qualitative research I collected continuously cemented

among other things—the effects of power and powerlessness.

The Flint e-mails released from 2013 to early 2016 follow the day-to-day activities of

various actors at various levels of government. These actors include the Mayor Dayne Walling,

Governor Rick Snyder, Emergency Managers: Darnell Earley, Edward Kurtz, and Jerry Ambrose,

Head of Environmental Protection Agency Susan Hedman and EPA water analyst Miguel Del

Toral, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality persons: Brad Wurfel, Dan Wyant, and

Stephen Busch, Michigan Department of Health and Human Services persons Michael Prysby,

Mike Glasgow, and Howard Croft and the Senate Democratic Leader Jim Ananich. As the dire

situation in Flint became more pronounced civilians Marc Edwards from Virginia Tech and Dr.

Mona Hanna-Attisha from Hurley Children’s Hospital were mentioned and contacted more

frequently.

The drinking water crises in Flint did not reach critical mass until 2015 and when that

moment occurred various government actors were assigned blame. Brad Wurfel of the MDEQ

stated on October 18, 2015, “lt appears DEQ staffers have essentially downplayed or ignored

warning signs from EPA's water expert, Miguel DeltoraI. We have been aware of Mr. Deltoral's

unofficial memo that went public in April. But his email dated two months earlier on Feb. 27, to

Jennifer Crooks and Mike Prysby, he seems to lay out exactly what' s come to pass…(Flint

Michigan E-mails, pg. 170).” A similar e-mail follows on December 22, 2015 following Virginia

Tech’s Marc Edwards Flint Water Study Report, “DHHS reached out to DEQ after some red flags

about lead levels; Stephen Busch responded with inaccurate information. Even so, DHHS

proceeded with studies on lead levels and found spiked levels for Q3 2014 and 2015 (third

quarters-the summer months - often have season spikes). July 2015 memos indicate they could

see something was awry, but the story implies that DHHS sat on the results (Flint Michigan E-

mails, pg. 227).” There are various accusatory e-mails in the latter portion of 2015 that continue

in the same manner, which are accusatory and describe the incompetence, ignorance, or failure

of various government officials. Interestingly, Gina McCarthy, head of the EPA, was never

mentioned in the e-mails at all and Susan Hedman, previous head of the Michigan EPA was only

mentioned once. In a little under three years of e-mail correspondences, the heads of the

highest Environmental branches weren’t electronically corresponded to during the height of

this crisis—a brief cc’d from the Senate Democratic Leader notwithstanding. As of April 21,

2016 Michigan Attorney Bill Schuette3 began issuing charges against Mike Glasgow, the city's

laboratory and water quality supervisor; Mike Prysby, a Michigan Department of Environmental

Quality official; and Stephen Busch, the Lansing district coordinator for the DEQ’s Office of

Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance. Each person has a myriad of felony and misdemeanor

charges. However, none of the Emergency Managers, officials within the EPA, or anyone within

the Governor’s Office have received any criminal charges.

By utilizing quantitative analysis, I was able to document the trajectory of the word

narrative in the city of Flint. The words did indeed weave together a fascinating and escalating

series of crisis events that came to a dynamic conclusion in 2015. To grasp a clearer

understanding of what was happening chronologically, I read through the entirety of the e-

mails and placed them, if they weren’t already, in order beginning with the earliest date in 2013

and the latest date in 2016. Thereafter, I created separate pdf files by year to be analyzed using

the word analysis software NVIVO. Any words or extraneous numbers were placed in a stop

words list; thereafter, I created a series of Word Clouds which elaborated more tangible results

for word frequency. The word frequencies express what actor’s events, actions, or (what can be

inferred) inactions were occurring per year. In the year 2013, the words city, flint,

councilperson, motion, water, KWA (karegondi water authority), resolution, governor,

emergency, and public elicited over 30 word counts/frequencies.

3 Dolan, Matthew, Elisha Anderson, and Paul Egan. Detroit Free Press. http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/04/20/2-mdeq-employees-city-employee-charged-flint-water-crisis/83272760/. Online. 21 April 2016.

In the year 2014, the words are similar in frequency, but as the switch was finally made

to the Flint River as a drinking source notable words appear: transition, plan, public, safety,

budget, community, and residents. There seemed to be concern for the citizens in Flint, in as

much related to the new water source.

However, in the year 2015 the word counts begin to take a drastic turn with lead having

more than 168 frequencies, health with more than 115 frequencies, corrosion with more than

92, child/children with more than 80, DEQ with more than 72, drinking with more than 71,

schools with more than 67, and testing with more than 62. The words described above for the

years 2013 to 2015 are merely snapshots of the entirety of the e-mails but illustrate how

quickly the crisis snowballed and how dire the situation became for the children and adults of

Flint, Michigan.

I decided to break up the 2015 Flint e-mails into two separate word-clouds due to the large

number of e-mails and correspondence with various local, state, and federal government

officials at this time. The year of 2015 highlights how quickly the conversation was changing to

public health, citizen awareness, and the effect of lead on children.

The e-mails are far fewer in the year 2016, but the word frequencies illustrate the who-

what-where focal point in Flint now almost perfectly with the following word frequencies:

governor, millions (money), grants (money), funding, help, and infrastructure.

Timeline: A Brief Socio-Economic History of Flint, Michigan

Flint, Michigan once had a thriving economy that was due in part to the automotive

industry. Various North American automotive producers, e.g., General Motors, called Flint (and

its sister city Detroit) home. From the late 1880s to the present day, Flint has relied on the

automotive industry for a substantial portion of its economic profit. Presently, Genesee

County’s automotive sector is having great difficulty remaining buoyant due to automotive

factory closures, downsizing, or relocating operations to other cities or countries. It’s important

to note that various social, economic, and banking agreements and deregulations greatly

damaged Flint much further and faster than a plethora of other cities across the United States.

For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1993 greatly

contributed to Flint’s current automotive/economic decline. NAFTA was touted as reducing

deficits and increasing U.S. job growth, but millions of jobs such as various automotive

industries gradually became outsourced to countries outside of the United States. Due to a

significant number of automotive/manufacturing jobs being siphoned from Flint, a large swath

of its population was left jobless and with insufficient skillsets to pursue alternate forms of

employment. A few years after the national legislation of NAFTA was passed, the Aid to Families

with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families

(TANF) in 1996.

This social program had demanding employment guidelines and timeframe limits on

assistance distributed amongst the fifty states. In the state of Michigan, the welfare/subsidy

benefits currently cover only twenty to thirty percent of those impoverished, whereas during

AFDC there was a more substantial cushion of more than sixty to seventy percent of the

citizenry covered. In financial terms, the state of Michigan now only provides $5 dollars per day

for each person receiving benefits. Those hardest hit by all of these social, economic, and

banking reforms were single parents, persons with low income, and black families. “Today, the

poverty rate in Flint is over 40 percent, with 66 percent of its children living in poverty. African

Americans make up 56 percent of the Flint population, with whites making up 37 percent…the

only other city of similar size with more poverty than Flint is Youngstown, Ohio (Census.gov).”

During the automotive economic boon prior to the 1960s, Flint had a population roughly

of 200,000. Currently, the population of Flint, Michigan hovers around 99,000 thousand people.

The median household income as of 2013 at $24,834, which is half the statewide median, with

more than 42% percent of its residents living below the federal poverty level (Flint City,

Census.gov). With this rate of poverty and low level of income, its important to show local level

agencies/institutions that directly effect the citizens. For example, the graphic below from the

Food and Water Watch shows that Flint, Michigan residents pay the highest water bill in the

state—regardless of their inability to utilize the contaminated water or potentially afford the

bill.

Source: Food and Water Watch – Detroit Free Press

Timeline: A Brief History of Financial Emergency in Flint, Michigan

Various cities across the state of Michigan have had on again-off again emergency

management situations since 1986, beginning with the city of Hamtramck and then Ecorse,

which had a $6 million deficit. At the time, the title of emergency management and manager

did not exist—instead there was 4receivership and the receiver. The receivership for the

4 Receivership—A court order whereby all the property subject to dispute in a legal action is placed under the

aforementioned city of Ecorse lasted until 1990. However, the city of Ecorse returned to the

authority of an Emergency Manager from 2009 to 2013. In 2011, Public Act 4 renamed the

Emergency Financial Manager position from Public Act 72 to the current title of Emergency

Manager (EM) and in turn gave the EM greater authority in making governmental policy

decisions. In 2012, the Michigan Supreme Court suspended Public Act 4 and reinstated Public

Act 72; all of these Acts were finally replaced by Public Act 436 in the same year by the

Michigan Legislature and haven’t currently been repealed or replaced yet…

Source: Wikipedia.org—Financial Emergency in Michigan

Public Act 4365 (also known as The Local Financial Stability and Choice Act) includes the

following criteria for ‘potential’ Emergency Managerial-ship:

Board requesting a review via resolution

Local petition of 5% of gubernatorial election voters requesting one

Creditor’s written request

Missed payroll

dominion and control of an independent person known as a receiver. Receivership is an extraordinary remedy, the purpose of which is to preserve property during the time needed to prosecute a lawsuit, if a danger is present that such property will be dissipated or removed from the jurisdiction of the court if a receiver is not appointed. Receivership takes place through a court order and is utilized only in exceptional circumstances and with or without the consent of the owner of the property. (West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2.) 5Michigan Legislature: Public Acts of 2012—Act No. 436 https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/publicact/pdf/2012-PA-0436.pdf

Missed pension payments

Deficit-elimination plan breach or lack of plan within 30 days after its due day

A legislative request

The following cities and institutions have fallen under the authority of Emergency

Manager(s) 6 at least once: Benton Harbor, Detroit, Ecorse, Flint, Hamtramck, Highland Park,

Pontiac, Three Oaks Village, Detroit Public Schools, Muskegon Heights School District, and

Highland Park Schools. Focusing specifically on Flint, there have been a total of four emergency

managers, with some having reinstated tenures, all of whom are listed as follows: Ed Kurtz,

Michael Brown, Ed Kurtz, Darnell Early, and Jerry Ambrose. Additionally, Rick Snyder was also

the governor of Flint beginning with Michael Brown’s emergency managership in 2011 to the

present. “One of his first actions was to sign legislation greatly enhancing the powers of

emergency managers…Snyder, the Republican-controlled legislature, and the former

Democratic legislator whom Snyder appointed as treasurer, all decided that the managers

needed more authority… (Alec MacGillis, The Daily Beast).” The citizens of Michigan protested

the law, performed community activism, and actively sought to get the law repealed or

stopped.

“‘The people spoke loud and clear,’ said Tonya Schuitmaker, a Republican who had voted

for the 2011 law. ‘I gave deference to them and why they did not want it.’ Mike Kowall, a

Republican who had also voted for the 2011 law, wouldn’t back the new measure. ‘I was not

going to go against the vote of the people,’…So instead of fighting the referendum when it was

before the voters, its opponents simply overruled it. Snyder, whose office did not respond to a

request for comment, signed the replacement law on Dec. 27, 2012. Less than four months

later, Flint’s emergency manager signed an agreement moving the city into the new water

system (The Daily Beast).” The danger of implementing policies such as these without a

majority consent from constituents potentially leads to crises such as Flint. Citizens should be

involved in the process of resource allocation, especially if it translates to human health

6 An emergency manager, formerly an emergency financial manager, is an official appointed by the governor to take control of a local government under a financial emergency. A manager temporarily supplants the governing body, chief executive officer, or chief administrative officer of the local government and has the authority to remove any of the unit's elected officials should they refuse to provide any information or assistance. (https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/EMF_Fact_Sheet2_347889_7.pdf)

ramifications. If there are red-flags that emerge from a resource transition, such as natural gas,

water, food, agricultural product, etcetera the community has a right to know. Due to mistrust,

the citizens may demand a vote on every single decision, and I reiterate the process of voting

should be made public especially if life and health are potentially at risk. If local and state

officials are not willing to listen to concerns poised by its citizens, certain actions can go

unchecked; furthermore, if one institution of government can so blatantly dismiss citizen

outcry, then the actions of the MDEQ and the EPA come as no surprise. The immediacy of

various local, state, and federal agencies to silence and/or cover up the dire health situation in

Flint is appalling, but sadly not astonishing.

Timeline: A Brief Lead History and Key Researchers in Flint, Michigan

The city of Flint, Michigan switched its water source from Lake Huron to the Flint River

on April 25, 2014 (MichiganRadio). Jarringly, the local and state government of Flint did not

follow federal procedures by having a corrosion control plan for the pipes; this plan, which

involves adding orthophosphates to the pipes, stops the water from corroding/disintegrating

the infrastructure. It would have cost the city $100 dollars per day to add the

orthophosphates7. Dr. Marc Edwards, an environmental engineer at Virginia Polytechnic

Institute and State University found that lead levels in one home were at 13,200 parts per

billion (ppb). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states that dangerous or toxic lead

levels begin at 15ppb. Thus, Dr. Edwards and his team found lead levels so high in certain

homes that children and adult poisoning was irreversible. They continued to test almost 300

homes for lead poisoning and continuously found dangerous lead levels in the drinking and

bathing water. “In recent years we’ve learned that simply testing the water one time doesn’t

tell you much. The problem is coming from pieces of rust that fall off into the water at [random]

intervals. Sometimes a chunk of that corrosion will fall off a lead pipe. If you’re unlucky and you

put your glass under the tap at that time, you can drink a glass of water that creates the same

lead exposure as eating eleven paint chips (Dr. Marc Edwards, Scientific American).”

7 Edwards, Lambrinidou, Scott, Schwartz: Gaps in the EPA Lead and Copper Rule

Source: FiveThirtyEight.com—Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, FlintWaterStudy.org

The pipes in Flint were further compromised by high chloride amounts in the Flint River.

Chloride is incredibly corrosive because its primary chemical composition is road salt. Salt

accumulation expedited the process of pipe corrosion in Flint. The graphic below describes how

road salt from large industrial trucks travels from our roads to our pipe infrastructure and

eventually waterways. There is a natural amount of salt in most rivers throughout the United

States, but human distribution of salt brines, road salts, etc. during our harsh winters across the

country has lead to said salt deposits running off or leaching into our waterways. Annually, the

United States places 135 pounds of salt per person on roadways.

Source: Autostraddle.com—How Road Salt and Environmental Racism Caused a Crisis in Flint

The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), which is charged with

ensuring safe drinking water in the state, was found by Dr. Marc Edwards to have made a series

of decisions which ultimately endangered the lives of the citizens of Flint. As mentioned

previously, they did not follow the corrosion control plan as designated by the EPA, despite

telling the Agency that they had done so on February 27, 2015 (FlintWaterStudy.org). Samples

were taken from the wrong locations using protocols which were know to miss important

sources of lead. Lastly, the MDEQ disposed of two important samples, which would have fallen

under the 10% ‘actionable level’ of lead of 15ppb. By doing so, the MDEQ would have ample

time to warn residents of the city that there was a lead problem in the water in late 2015 or

perhaps earlier. “When the county declared a public health emergency on Oct. 1, 2015, it was

not a revelation for many residents. They had been fighting for months to convince officials that

something was wrong. Instead of heeding those reports, priority was given to the official data

— data that was flawed and shortsighted. As a result, the percentage of children with elevated

blood lead levels in Flint doubled (Anna Maria Barry-Jester, FiveThirtyEight.com).”The graphic

below illustrates the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality’s missteps in regards to

appropriate protocol sample size and the ramifications of not following procedure. Due to them

not following procedure, the federal government was not immediately alerted to the high levels

of lead contamination in Flint.

Source: FiveThirtyEight.com—Michigan Department of Environmental Quality

Prior to Dr. Edwards and his Virginia Tech team’s findings, a local resident and mother

named LeeAnne Walters performed many of the scientific tests necessary to legitimize her

claims and the dangers of consuming the lead contaminated water. She and other residents

had been experiencing loss of head, eyelash, and other areas of body hair and her son among

many other children was persistently ill8. The city’s testing protocols greatly underestimated the

risk of the contamination by: lowering the number of samples of 100 homes to 60 due to Flint’s

population being below 100,000 thousand people, flushing the systems the night before testing

which lowers lead detection in samples, collecting samples in small neck bottles with small

streams of water rather than the full flow which would reveal the lead corrosion from the pipes

into the samples, and not having a record of its lead services pipes or which homes were at

most risk.

One of the persons, besides regional EPA officials that Walters wrote to, was EPA’s

Regulation Manager Miguel Del Toral who has national expertise on the Lead and Copper Rule

(LCR). His familiarity with the issue included that sampling protocols using the LCR often missed

the highest levels of lead. (Detection and Evaluation of Elevated Lead Release from Service

Lines: PubMed.gov) After discussing his concerns with Walters about the lack of corrosion

control and gathering more data, he acted as a ‘whistleblower’ who revealed the dire situation

occurring in the city and the peril posed to Flint’s children. Furthermore, Miguel Del Toral

published a Memorandum on the high lead levels in Flint, Michigan’s pipe systems on June 24,

2015. LeeAnne Walters made the initial information gathered by Toral public, and thereafter

Toral drew the ire of both Susan Hedman of the EPA and the MDEQ at the time, with Brad

Wurfel of the MDEQ calling him a “rogue employee”. (Dr. Marc Edwards, FlintWaterStudy.org)

No level of lead exposure is considered safe. (CDC.gov) Most elevated blood lead levels

are not high enough to cause immediate health problems, but there are a plethora of long term

health effects from lead exposure, even amongst small dosages. "...research is fairly clear on

what it does to a population. It causes miscarriages and low birth weight for babies, and it shifts

the entire IQ of a population down a few points. It’s also believed to cause decreases in impulse

control and increases the incidence of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, learning

8 Lee Anne Walters—Flint Water Crisis Timeline: Google Spreadsheets https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1zbUZOS7pXF6phYFo3_NHoCfxW-1_3OSbLUeHIgtNfbA/edit?usp=sharing

disabilities (U.S. National Library of Medicine: Environmental Health Perspectives) and

potentially violent behavior (MotherJones.com). Newer research suggests that exposure can

also affect DNA, carrying damage on to the children and grandchildren of those exposed. The

effects of exposure on adults include, but are not limited to: cognitive impairments, digestive

system issues, nervous system damage, and reproductive/fertility issues (Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention).”

A culmination of Dr. Marc Edwards, LeeAnne Walters, and Miguel Del Toral’s work on

the the looming threat to Flint’s children lead to the final red flag of the crisis. A pediatrician,

named Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, who worked for the city’s Hurley Medical Center had heard

about the work that the EPA was conducting and utilized lead tests from her clinic and the city’s

public health lead labs. Prior to releasing her final analyses/datasets to the American Journal of

Public Health, she held a press conference in which she alerted the public to the danger their

children faced. "After the Sept. 24 news conference, where Hanna-Attisha announced that the

percentage of children with elevated blood lead levels had gone from 2.4 percent to 4.9

percent citywide, the governor’s spokeswoman said Hanna-Attisha had “spliced and diced” the

data to get those numbers. Hanna-Attisha says a DEQ spokesperson called her comments

“unfortunate.” A week later, the county declared a public health emergency.” (FiveThirtyEight)

The results of Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha’s results are illustrated in the graphic below.

Source: FiveThirtyEight.com—American Journal of Public Health

On January 5, 2016 Governor Rick Snyder declared a state of emergency for Genesee

County, which includes the city of Flint. A few days later on January 13, a Legionnaires Disease

outbreak was reported in Flint due to exposure of legionella bacteria which infects the lungs

and causes pneumonia; More than 87 cases were reported, with a total of 10 fatalities.

(mLIVE.com) Less serious bouts of the disease cause a mild flu and are thus designated as

Pontiac Fever. At the present, it is unknown whether the rise of cases was attributable the

toxicity of Flint’s water system. The day after Susan Hedman—Michigan’s EPA chief regional

administrator—resigned on January 21, the EPA declared 1431, i.e., “imminent and substantial

endangerment” (TheWashingtonPost) and began handling the responsibilities for the water

system from the MDEQ.

On November 15, 2015 a class action lawsuit was filed by the citizens of Flint against the

state of Michigan and the city itself, which addressed claims of personal injury and property

damage. (MichiganRadio) As of February 22, 2016 a petition has been signed to recall Governor

Rick Snyder from office. The Emergency Managers, Mayor, and other appointed officials during

the crises have been shuffled around the state of Michigan in various capacities or left office

voluntarily. After almost more than three years, on March 4 the city of Flint has replaced its first

residential lead pipe with a copper pipe, with about 8,000 more to go. (Alissa Walker,

Gizmodo.com) “...the work can be performed quickly and relatively cheaply (about $2000 a

line), but there is not enough funding at the moment to fix all Flint’s pipes...so far the state has

only allocated $2 million. The “Fast Start” pipe replacement announced by Mayor Karen

Weaver about a month ago prioritizes neighborhoods with the highest rate of children under

six, retirees, and pregnant women—all of whom are most susceptible to the effect of lead."

Conclusion & Connections

Flint, Michigan—like many cities across the United States—represents a forgotten

promise. When various economic industries sought their fortunes outside of Flint and the local

government sought cost-saving measures during emergency managership, the lack of foresight

in regards to human health seemed to be of least concern. The cost to transition to new water

systems was expensive, but preventing your citizens from being permanently poisoned is

priceless. A similar social, political, and environmental story to Flint, is that of Love Canal, New

York. Multiple levels of government and the industry that abandoned the chemicals knew of

the toxics that lingered below the homes of the populace and school grounds. The citizens

responded immediately with their concerns as soon as contaminants were found, but were

initially dismissed, similar to the citizens of Flint. Both communities kept unrelenting pressure

on the media and government and received varying degrees of aid. I face a dilemma in the

word aid, due to its loaded connotations, and in turn reluctant to utilize the word justice,

because such terrible injustices were perpetrated against the citizens in both cities. No

monetary, verbal, or written apology will ever be sufficient to the citizenry effected—especially

the children who must now navigate the world leery of big business and their elected officials.

In lieu of these injustices, what would justice ideally look or operate like in an ideal world? In

Eddie J. Girdner and Adam Smith’s 2002 text entitled: Killing Me Softly: Toxic Waste, Corporate

Profit, and the Struggle for Environmental Justice, they elaborate upon this quandary.

“Ultimately, ‘achieving environmental justice demands major restructuring of the entire social

order.’ Such restructuring would include a challenge to absolute property rights; a challenge to

the logic of growth without limit; the right of everyone to a clean environment; the concept of

security as a sustainable ecological system, rather than a military superiority; and social

planning and grassroots democracy as the basis for environmentally sound growth (Girdner &

Smith, pg. 66).” Thus, our entire thought processes about what we truly require and desire

need to change; we need to engage with each other in equal measure as we do our natural

world, to enact permanent environmental sustainability and compassionate human welfare.

Everyone would most certainly have to live with less or be required to share. Humanity should

reflect humaneness and this belief should extend to business practices and public policy. On a

slightly positive note, the pipes in Flint are finally being replaced, but sadly the cost is far

outweighing the speed in which they can be installed.

Source#1: Twitter.com—Shaun King https://twitter.com/shaunking/status/694908558740185089

Source#2: Twitter.com--Kyle Feldscher https://twitter.com/Kyle_Feldscher/status/705852404185567232

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Blum, Elizabeth D. (2008). Love Canal Revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in Environmental Activism. University Press of Kansas.

Bullard, R. D. (2000). Dumping in Dixie : race, class, and environmental quality. Boulder, Colo : Westview Press, c2000.

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