writing sample ahmed mostafa
TRANSCRIPT
THIS BRIEF IS IN RED!
Oral Argument Request
No. 13-112173
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
CHARLOTTE ELIZA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ILLINOIS STATE POLICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois in Case No. 12-CV-15919, Judge Diane Larsen
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE
Ahmed Mostafa Illinois Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street Chicago, Illinois 60601 (555) 555-5555 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Illinois State Police November 12, 2015
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. iii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ....................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .......................................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................................. 3
I. Proceedings Below ................................................................................................ 3 II. Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...................................................................................... 12
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 14
I. The Standard of Review for this Appeal is De Novo .......................................... 14 II. McDonnell Douglass Burden Shifting Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
III. Eliza Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII,
When Her Job Performance Was Continuously Criticized in Numerous Evaluations, When the Employment Actions Taken Against Her Were Not Adverse, and When She Could Not Show That Similarly Situated Males and Non-Pregnant Females Were Treated More Favorably. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Eliza’s Performance as a Trooper Did Not Meet the ISP’s Legitimate Job
Expectations. .................................................................................................. 16 B. Eliza Did Not Suffer an Adverse Employment Action ................................. 19 C. Similarly Situated Employees Outside Eliza’s Protected Class were
Not Treated Differently By the ISP .............................................................. 22
IV. Eliza Failed to Show That the ISP's Reasons for Its Employment Actions Were Pretextual When the ISP Acted out of Legitimate and Reasonable Employment Concern and Took Eliza's Medical Restrictions and Employment Qualifications into Account ......................................................................................................... 27
V. Eliza Failed to Establish a Claim of Retaliation Under Title VII When She Could Not Show That Her Transfer to the Police Academy Was an Adverse Action and When the Transfer Was Not Causally Connected to a Charge Filed with the ISP's EEO Office ................................................................................... 29
A. The ISP did not subject Eliza to an adverse employment action ................ 30 B. There is no causal connection between Eliza’s charge to the EEO office and
the employment action undertaken by the ISP ............................................ 33
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 36
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................................... 37
PROOF OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................... 38
ii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE(S)
Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................... 23
Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
682 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................... 22 Atanus v. Perry,
520 F.3d 662 (7th Cir.2008) ...................................................................................... 20 Brill v. Lante Corp.,
119 F.3d 1266(7th Cir.1997). .................................................................................... 18 Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp.,
464 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................... 23 CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
553 U.S. 442 (2008) .................................................................................................... 24 Coleman v. Donahoe,
667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012). .................................................................................... 24, 34 Culver v. Gorman & Co.,
416 F.3d 540 (7th Cir.2005) ..................................................................................... 31
Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 14
Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522,
657 F.3d 595 (7th Cir.2011) ...................................................................................... 18 Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp.,
453 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................... 27, 28 Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc.,
161 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir.1998) .................................................................................... 18 Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne,
241 F.3d 597 (7th Cir.2001). ..................................................................................... 20, 32 Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
513 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................... 30
Goodwin v. Bd. of Trs. of Ill., 442 F.3d 611 (7th Cir.2006) ...................................................................................... 14, 16
Harper v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 687 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................... 16, 34
Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc.,
218 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2000) ..................................................................................... 20, 31
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Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., et al.,
260 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2001). .................................................................................... 35 Lapka v. Chertoff,
517 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................... 30 McDonald v. Union Camp Corp.,
898 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.1990) .................................................................................... 19 McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) .................................................................................................... 14
Moser v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 406 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... 33, 34
Naik v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc.,
627 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2010) ..................................................................................... 17, 19, 27 Nichols v. S. Illinois U.-Edwardsville,
510 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................... 19, 21,24, 31, 32 Oest v. Illinois Dep't of Corr.,
240 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................... 24 Patterson v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc.,
589 F.3d 357 (7th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................... 23 Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir.2006).
589 F.3d 357 (7th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................... 29
Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 957 (7th Cir. 2012). 700 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2012). .................................................................................... 30, 31
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997) .................................................................................................... 30 Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll.,
420 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... 14, 20, 21
Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park Dis., 634 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 29
Serednyj v, Beverly Healthcare,
656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir.2011). ..................................................................................... 29
Slaney v. Intl. Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................... 14, 30
Smart v. Ball State U.,
89 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1996) ....................................................................................... 19, 20, 31
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Spring v. Sheboygan Area Dist.,
865 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1989) ..................................................................................... 31 Stutler v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 263 F.3d 698 (2001).
263 F.3d 698 (2001). .................................................................................................. 22, 32, 34 Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
463 F.3d 731 (7th Cir.2006) ...................................................................................... 26 Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis,
457 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................... 33 Visser v. Packer Engr. Associates, Inc.,
924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991) ..................................................................................... 27 Watson v. Potter,
23 Fed. Appx. 560 (7th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................. 27 Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
85 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1996). ...................................................................................... 20 Wyniger v. New Venture Gear, Inc.,
361 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2004) ..................................................................................... 34 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
191 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2015) ............................................................................................ 23
v
1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdictional statement of the Plaintiff –Appellant is complete and
correct. Plaintiff, Charlotte Eliza (“Eliza”), filed a two-count complaint against the
Illinois State Police (“ISP”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
alleged that the ISP discriminated against her based on her sex and pregnancy and
retaliated against her for complaining to the ISP’s Equal Employment Opportunity
office. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(k); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3. (R. 2.)
Because Plaintiff’s complaint raises a question of federal law, the district court
properly had jurisdiction over the matter under 28. U.S.C. § 1331.
On August 3, 2015, the district court granted Defendant-Appellee’s Motion
for Summary Judgment for both counts of the complaint. (R. 43.) The court entered
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 on the same day. (R. 39.)
On August 12, 2015 Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal and no motion to alter or
amend the judgment was filed. (R. 44.) Because Plaintiff appeals the district court’s
final order, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the Plaintiff-Appellant failed to establish a prima facie claim of
discrimination, when her job performance was continuously criticized in
numerous evaluations, when the employment actions taken against her were not
adverse, and when she could not show that similarly situated males and non-
pregnant females were treated more favorably?
2. Whether the Plaintiff-Appellant failed to show that the ISP’s reasons for its
employment actions were pretextual, when the ISP acted out of legitimate and
reasonable employment concern and took Eliza’s medical restrictions and
employment qualifications into account?
3. Whether the Plaintiff-Appellant failed to establish a claim of retaliation, when
she could not show that her transfer to the Police Academy was an adverse
action, and when the transfer was not causally connected to a charge filed with
the ISP’s EEO office?
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Proceedings Below
Plaintiff- Appellant, Charlotte (“Eliza”), alleges that she experienced
discrimination and retaliation during her pregnancy under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. (R. 2.) 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(k); 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-3. The Defendant-Appellee is the Illinois State Police (ISP). (R. 2.)
On December 30, 2014 Plaintiff-Appellant filed a two count complaint against
the ISP. (R. 3, 4.) In the first count Plaintiff had alleged that ISP discriminated
against her based on her gender and pregnancy when ISP refused to give her light
duty work, denied requests for training, and had her attend counseling for her
below average writing. (R. 3.) In the second count, Plaintiff alleged that her transfer
to the police academy was a retaliation to her complaining to the ISP’s Equal
Employment Opportunity Office (“EEO”). (R. 4.)
On March 9 2015, ISP filed a summary judgment motion stating that the
Plaintiff could not establish a pre-text for discrimination, a prima facie case for
discrimination, or a retaliation claim. (R. 6.) Specially, that 1) Eliza claimed that
the ISP treated her less favorably than similarly-situated employees on the basis of
her pregnancy and transferred her to a position with the Illinois Police Academy
because she filed a complaint with ISP’s Equal Employment Opportunity office; and
2) ISP was entitled to summary judgment as to one or more of the following reasons:
(a) Eliza failed to prove that she was meeting the ISP’s legitimate expectations; (b)
Eliza failed to prove that similarly-situated employees, outside of her class, were
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treated more favorably in the terms and conditions of employment; (c) Eliza failed
to prove that she suffered an adverse employment action; (d) The ISP had
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for each of the employment actions taken; (e)
Eliza failed to establish pretext; (f) Eliza was not transferred because of her EEO
complaint; and (g) the transfer was not an adverse employment action. (R. 6.)
On August 3, 2015, the district court granted the ISP’s motion for summary
judgment on both of the counts filed against them. (R. 42.) Because the basis of the
court’s decision rested on a finding that there was no adverse action, the court did
not attend to the issue of whether the plaintiff adequately addressed causal
relationship. On August 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. (R. 44.)
II. Facts
A. Background
Eliza began her employment as a state trooper with ISP District 18 on
December 2, 2009. (R. 9.) The ISP is a paramilitary organization that maintains a
chain of command to ensure policy and procedure. (R. 9.) District 18’s Chain of
Command from top to bottom contains District Commander Finnick Snow, Captain
Lieutenant Ashley Morgan, Master Sergeant Harvey Hunt, and lastly troopers like
Eliza. (R. 8, 9.)
Eliza’s duties as a trooper included investigating crimes and motor vehicle
accidents, promoting and enforcing traffic safety, escorting prisoners, checking
parking meters for overtime parking, and numerous other duties while working
patrol. (R. 9.) Also among her duties is to write reports. (R. 9.) Report writing is
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critical to the successful prosecution of cases; as such Eliza prepared 93 reports per
month. (R. 23.) However, in specific reference to Eliza, her documents were
continually returned after being reviewed by Sergeant Master Hunt for spelling
errors, omissions, and inaccuracies (R. 9, 23.)
B. Eliza’s History Regarding Performance & Performance Evaluations
In particular, Hunt’s remarks on Eliza’s writing range from December, 2010
through July, 2014. (R. 10.) On December 17, 2010, Hunt noted that Eliza “needs
improvement” in the area of record and report management (R. 10.) Nearly six
months later in July, Hunt clarified his remarks in a promotional evaluation stating
that he could not recommend a promotion and that Eliza needed to “slow down,
proofread her material, and consult with a dictionary.” (R. 10.) In December,2011
Hunt reiterated that Eliza keeps making the same mistakes “primarily, mistakes in
grammar, spelling, punctuation, and leaving blanks.”(R. 10.) The performance
reviews are graded on an evaluation system that entails the following possible
outcomes: unsatisfactory, below average, satisfactory, above average, or
outstanding. (R. 21.) In March 2012, Plaintiff received a disciplinary write-up for
insubordination. (R. 12.) In July 2012, Hunt signifies that Eliza’s writing had
improved to satisfactory. (R. 10, 11.) A few months later, in October 2012, the ISP
instituted a hiring freeze for all of its districts - a freeze that precluded any
promotions. (R.12.) That hiring and promotion freeze lasted until February 2014;
and as a direct result, no Promotional Evaluations were conducted in 2013. (R. 12.)
However, on June 12, 2014, Hunt sent Eliza a written counseling “for having a high
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number of reports returned for correction, including a ticket referencing the wrong
township; failing to check appropriate boxes on citations; numerous errors in
grammar, sentence structure, punctuation, and spelling; and omitting necessary
information while including irrelevant information.” (R. 12.) In a performance
evaluation on July 7, 2014 Hunt later stated Eliza needed to master the basics of
patrol work instead of being preoccupied with skills that would get her “off the
road” and that she was not capable of being assigned to investigations, her stated
goal. (R. 12.)
C. State Police Directives Pertaining to Medical Duty
On May 21, 2014, Commander Snow congratulated Eliza after he was
contacted and informed by her that she was pregnant. (R. 12.) Commander Snow
wished her good health and hope that the odds would be in Eliza’s favor. (R. 12.)
Doctor Ada Kriv, an obstetrician-gynecologist, wrote a letter intended for Eliza’s
Superiors stating that Eliza should work “light duty. She is not to carry a gun belt
or do patrol work. She is to have a sedentary job until 6-8 weeks postpartum.” (R.
13.) Dr. Kriv felt that, as Eliza’s pregnancy advanced, the gun belt would pose a
problem around her expanding mid-section. (R. 13, 22.) Later on in July, Master
Sergeant Hunt told Eliza during her evaluation that her “current situation,”
gesturing toward her mid-section, was a problem. (R. 22.)
After Dr. Kriv sent the letter, District Commander Snow met with
Lieutenant Morgan to discuss Eliza’s duty restrictions. (R. 14.) Snow then informed
Morgan that pregnancy was covered under the state police directive relating to
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medical duty. (R. 14.) The Police Directive is as follows:
“A. The Illinois State Police shall assign employees to medical duty when there is sufficient evidence of their inability to perform at full duty and provide a mechanism for determining when the employee should return to full duty status.
B. Employees may be placed on medical duty status for less than 90 calendar days by the district commander/bureau chief or laboratory director.
C. No positions, including vocational assignment, will be created and/or designed for those persons on medical duty status.
D. Duties will be assigned to match the affected employees’ capabilities and experience with the needs of the Department.
E. In assigning an employee on medical duty status to a specialist position, no preference will be accorded to such employee over employees on full duty status or in violation of the labor contracts currently in effect.
F. Any employee who disagrees with the decision may submit, through the chain of command, a written appeal to the director within ten calendar days of the employee’s receipt of the decision.” (R. 14.)
D. Unavailability of Light Duty Assignments
After discussing available options with Snow, Morgan determined that there
was no available job duty for the Eliza because many of the light duty options
required above average written skills, and that according to Department policy, no
position needed to be created (R. 14, 15.) On May 24, 2014 at Snow’s discretion,
Morgan telephoned Eliza and told her that there was no light duty available that
met her doctor’s restrictions. (R. 15.) This would result in Eliza accumulating sick
time; additionally Eliza was considered to be on inactive duty at that point. (R. 15.)
The way accumulated sick time with ISP is as such: “accumulated sick time:
officers will receive eight hours each month of accumulated sick time. Accumulated
time is available for use as needed.” (R. 16.) Additionally, on January 1 of each year,
sworn personnel are credited with an additional 40 days of sick time (R. 16.) The 40
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days of annual sick time can be used over and above accumulated sick time for non-
service connected injuries or illnesses. (R. 16.) After using all available sick and
leave time, the officer is placed on unpaid leave of absence, unless that officer
applies for and receives disability. (R. 16.) Moreover, it is unwritten protocol in
District 18 that an inactive officer will not participate in Control and Arrest Tactics
(“CAT”) or other weapons training (R. 16.)
Morgan advised Eliza that after all accumulated sick time of 12 days was
used, Appellant-Plaintiff should use her 40 annual sick days, and after that she
could then apply for temporary disability or use her remaining vacation time. (R.
16.) Morgan and Snow agreed to meet periodically and review job availability and
Eliza’s medical condition to reevaluate their decision. (R. 16.)
After these conversations Dr. Kriv authored a second letter stating Eliza is
“not to carry her gun belt or do patrol work… to have light duties…may carry her
gun…may work where there is a restroom available… may do truck inspections, can
walk and write tickets… and do background checks.” (R. 14.) Upon receiving this
second letter, Eliza and her union representative met with Commander Snow,
Assistant Director of Human Resources Pam Johnston, and Master Sergeant
Morgan to discuss the following: the requirements of the Department’s policy,
whether light duty was available, whether Eliza was qualified for certain light-duty
assignments, and whether the District was willing to locate suitable medical/light-
duty assignments for Eliza. (R. 18.) In this meeting Snow told Eliza that there were
no full time jobs available with Dr. Kriv’s restrictions, but that she could fill in part
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time for other part time light duty employees (R. 17,18).
At that time Trooper Melanie Maloney was on light duty. (R. 17.) Maloney
was working a desk and doing a clerk’s job on light duty because of her medical
restrictions. (R. 17.) Maloney was issued light duty for approximately seven months,
including assignment to the vehicle identification bureau, fleet duty, and other
administrative tasks, while recovering from spinal surgery and a broken arm. (R.
17.) After a second on her vocal cords, Maloney requested light duty, but ended
being denied because no duty met her physician’s limitations. (R. 17.)
Other employees like, Alex Moor, Shawna Boondeer, Harry Porter, and
Donald Temple had all been given has been light duty. (R. 22.) Moor was given light
duty as a call-taker at district headquarters since March 2013 after being shot in
the foot. (R. 22, 23) After Moor recovered the positioned was eliminated. (R. 23.) For
Boondeer, Pam Johnston, director of human resources suggested that a position of
call taker be created for her; the position of call taker position was created, while
she was also approved for optional training. (R. 22, 23, 25.) Temple received
training even though he had consistent writing problems. (R. 23.) Harry Porter also
given light duty after he suffered form a genetic order (R. 23.) Quinn Perkson, on
the other hand, was denied a request for light duty when she became pregnant in
2013, even though her physician wrote District 18 a letter advising it. (R. 23.)
E. Eliza’s Transfer to the Police Academy
In 2013, Eliza attended a going away party for Erin Pauls, who was moving
away to get a job with the Police Academy two years after giving birth to a child. (R.
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20.) At this event Eliza notably stated to Hunt that what Pauls was doing made
sense and that it was something that Eliza might want to do in the future when she
started a family. (R. 20.)
On June 9, 2014, Snow informed Eliza that no full-time light-duty jobs were
available within Dr. Kriv’s restrictions, yet Snow mentioned transfer as a possibility
for Plaintiff. (R. 18.) On June 11, 2014, Hunt, Morgan, and Snow met to debrief
after the June 9 meeting, resulting in Hunt and Morgan deciding to ask Johnston to
contact the Police Academy to see if there were any positions available (R. 18.)
Johnston and Plaintiff knew each other from high school, where animosity had
developed between the two. (R. 24.) On June 16, 2014, Johnston contacted the
Police Academy about what would need to be done to transfer Appellant-Plaintiff
there to become an instructor, and she was told that the Academy would have to
post the instructor position for 30 days before it would consider accepting Appellant-
Plaintiff; Johnston asked the Academy to post the position. (R. 19.)
After this had occurred on July 11 Eliza called the ISP Equal Employment
Opportunity office and complained of discrimination. (R. 19.) On July 22, 2014,
Eliza was told that she was to be transferred to the Police Academy in Springfield,
Illinois. (R. 20.) The Police Academy would be a 45-minute commute for Eliza. (R.
27.) The cost of living near the Police Academy in Springfield is 10% higher than
where Eliza currently resides in Litchfield, Illinois, where District 18 headquarters
currently are. (R. 27.) Additionally, Eliza would have to pay for an extra hour of
day care. (R. 28.) Although there are private schools and magnet schools in
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Springfield, the location where Eliza would currently reside is within the limits of a
public school currently on probation. (R. 27, 28.) Additionally, Eliza would live two
blocks from a public school that has consistently met state academic standards. (R.
28.)
Up to July 22, 2014, Eliza was provided 16 days of light-duty work in several
locations working many different activities (R. 18.) Between 2010 and 2014, 21
officers in District 18 were denied light duty either because they did not qualify or
no light-duty assignment was available, while 17 officers, including Eliza, were
granted medical/light-duty assignments (R. 18.)
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SUMMARY ARGUMENT
The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the ISP should be
affirmed. Eliza claims that the ISP discriminated against her based on her sex and
pregnancy. She further alleged that the ISP retaliated against her after she filed a
charge of discrimination with the equal opportunity office. For both claims, Eliza
has the burden to ascertain the requisite evidence to establish her claims. If she
fails to establish all four elements of a prima facie case of discrimination and if she
fails to establish both of the two elements in retaliation, then the district court may
grant summary judgment in favor of the ISP.
In this case, Eliza did not establish a prima facie claim of discrimination
because of her report writing which was consistently criticized in multiple
evaluations over a span ranging from 2012-2014—an indication that Eliza
continuously failed to meet job expectations. Eliza did not suffer any adverse
employment actions when she was denied light-duty employment, prohibited from
participating in training exercises, and issued a written counseling; these actions
were the result of reasonable and legitimate concerns. Eliza had only once obtained
a satisfactory evaluation in her writing. This rating was two year ago. She further
exhibited regression in her writing, as noted by the written counseling she received
from Sergeant Hunt when she had a high number of reports returned for correction;
referenced the wrong township; failed to check appropriate boxes on citations; had
numerous errors in grammar, sentence structure, punctuation, and spelling; and
omitted necessary information while including irrelevant information.
13
Eliza also failed to establish the necessary evidence to determine whether or
not similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. She failed to display
the material respects of the of the other employees’ situations. For example,
Boondeer received the CAT training that Eliza was denied; however, we know that
Dr. Kriv had prescribed Eliza to a sedentary job. This sort of job essentially
prevented her from attending the CAT training.
Moreover, Eliza failed to show any pretext. Although the ISP provided
legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for its actions and met its burden before
the court, Eliza could not come up with enough evidence to show that the ISP’s
explanations were a lie. Eliza also does not do enough evidence to show that an
employee’s animus was influential in the ISP’s actions.
Furthermore, Eliza’s transfer to the police academy was not an adverse action
because it did not negatively alter her work environment. Finally, she could not
show that the transfer was a result of her charge at the EEO office because the ISP
had initiated and settled the transfer a month prior to her charge. Thus, Eliza
cannot establish any causation.
For these reasons, the district court’s judgment should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I. The Standard of Review is de Novo
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s judgment granting the
defendant’s motion of summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 56. Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2011).
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact
and “the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In addition, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 F.3d at 582. This Court may affirm the
dismissal of any ground supported by the record even if the district court did not
rely on that particular ground. Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244
F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
II. McDonnell Douglass Burden Shifting Test
In a case of discrimination, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of
persuasion. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir. 2005). If
a situation arises where the Plaintiff has no direct evidence to support her
discrimination claim, the Plaintiff must establish an indirect or prima facie case.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Thus, Eliza must show that
“(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she performed her job satisfactorily;
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action,” and (4) her employer treated
similarly situated non-pregnant females and males more favorably. Goodwin v Bd.
of Trs. of Ill., 442 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2006). The burden would then shift on the
15
employer to provide a legitimate and non-discriminatory explanation for the
employment actions taken. Id. As soon as the employer articulates a legitimate
reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s
explanation was merely a pretext for discrimination. Rudin, 420 F.3d at 724.
III. Eliza Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII, When Her Job Performance Was Continuously Criticized in Numerous Evaluations, When the Employment Actions Taken Against Her Were Not Adverse, and When She Could Not Show That Similarly Situated Males and Non-Pregnant Females Were Treated More Favorably.
Eliza alleged in her complaint that the ISP discriminated against her due to
her gender and pregnancy, that the ISP’s reasoning for its behavior was pretextual,
and that the ISP retaliated against her when she was officially transferred after she
complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office. In this case,
however, Eliza did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination when she failed
to offer evidence of the following: that she performed her job in a satisfactory
manner, that the ISP treated similarly situated males and non-pregnant females
differently, or that she was subjected to adverse employment activity.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of such
employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Moreover, Congress amended Title VII to extend the protection to pregnant women
through the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”); this ensured equal treatment
for pregnant women in all employment-related purposes. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).
However, the PDA only requires employers to treat pregnant women as “other
16
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work”; it does not
require employers to provide special treatment or accommodations for pregnant. Id.
As a pregnant woman, Eliza had satisfied the first component of a prima
facie case of discrimination. The issue before this court is whether Eliza can
establish the other three components.
A. Eliza’s Performance as a Trooper Did Not Meet the ISP’s Legitimate Job Expectations
Eliza’s performance as a trooper did not meet the ISP’s legitimate
expectations because her report writing was continuously criticized in numerous
evaluations conducted between 2010 and 2014. (R. 18.) Evaluating an employee’s
job performance through the eyes of her supervisor is the measure to determining
whether an employee was meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations.
Harper v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 310 (7th Cir. 2012). For example, in the
case where an employee delivers a satisfactory work record, that record can be used
in the employee’s favor to show that the employer was meeting expectations.
Goodwin, 442 F.3d at 619. Alternatively, if an employee’s behavior negatively
interferes with her performance, then that is sufficient in showing that the
employee was not meeting her job expectations. Harper, 687 F.3d at 297.
As a trooper with the ISP, Eliza’s duties included but were not limited to
writing various departmental reports. (R. 9.) She averaged 93 reports per month;
signifying that report writing was not a minor or unimportant job duty. (R. 23.)
However, despite receiving training in the ISP Academy, Eliza’s report writing
skills were inadequate. (R. 37.) On numerous occasions, she had her work returned
17
for omissions or inaccuracies and was responsible for re-doing her work. (R. 9.)
Consequently, her poor report writing negatively interfered with her job
performance.
Moreover, Eliza’s immediate supervisor, Master Sergeant Hunt, continuously
criticized Eliza’s writing on numerous evaluations conducted between 2010 and
2014. (R. 9.) In four out of the five evaluations mentioned in the record, Hunt stated
the following: that Eliza’s report and record writing needed improvement, that Eliza
continued to make the same mistakes she made in years prior, and that Eliza
needed to “consult with a dictionary prior to turning in her reports.” (R. 10.)
Although Hunt found Eliza’s writing to be “satisfactory” in a July, 2012
evaluation, merely showing that an employee has met the employer’s legitimate
expectations in the past is not enough to prove the employee was meeting legitimate
expectations. Naik v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 627 F.3d 596, 600 (7th
Cir. 2010). The employee must demonstrate that she met her expectations at the
time of the alleged discriminatory event. Id. In this case, Eliza would have to show
that she was meeting expectations up until the time she was seeking light-duty
employment. However, as the record states, Eliza could not show that she met
expectations because her report writing was criticized twice more after her
“satisfactory” evaluation, and after she began seeking light duty. (R. 11.) In June,
2014 she was issued a written counseling that resulted from inaccurate report
writing. (R. 12.) Additionally, Hunt concluded in a July, 2014 evaluation that after
five years in the ISP, Eliza still “needed to master the basics of patrol work.” (R. 12.)
18
Furthermore, Eliza’s own assessment that her performance was satisfactory
and improving is insufficient to proving that her performance met legitimate job
expectations. An employee's “own evaluation of her work cannot be imputed to her
employer, and is insufficient to permit her case to survive past summary judgment.”
Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 603 (7th Cir.
2011). Thus, Eliza’s valuation of her overall improving performance, cannot
substitute her employers’ expectations that, in contrast, point to a high number of
reports returned for correction. Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1273 (7th Cir.
1997).
Moreover, her employer’s examples of her specific failures validate that her
work performance was unsatisfactory. Dickerson F.3d 595 at 603. Despite
acknowledging improvements in Eliza’s writing, Hunt’s negative evaluations
continued, noting Eliza’s inability to “master the basics of patrol work.” (R. 12).
Such statements establish Eliza’s failure to meet the ISP’s legitimate expectations
for a trooper.
In addition, “earlier evaluations cannot, by themselves, demonstrate the
adequacy of performance at the crucial time when the employment action is taken.”
Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir.
1998). Eliza contended that the ISP’s “2010 and 2011 yearly performance
evaluations only criticized her writing skills, while her overall rating was
satisfactory to above average in every other category.” (R. 21.) In spite of this, an
employer may counter these kinds contentions with evidence defining its
19
expectations as well as evidence that the employee was not meeting those
expectations. McDonald, 898 F.2d 1155 at 1160.
Finally, the ISP has provided undisputed evidence in the record that
proficient “report writing is critical to the successful prosecution of criminal cases.”
As a matter of public policy, it is incredibly important that we have strong report
writing. As noted in the infamous Brewer v. Williams, even a child murderer can be
retried with significant pieces of evidence left out due to negligent or inappropriate
police behavior.
Therefore, in the eyes of her supervisor and as evidenced through her poor
work record, Eliza was not meeting the ISP’s legitimate job expectations.
B. Eliza Did Not Suffer an Adverse Employment Action
Eliza did not suffer an adverse employment action when she received a
written counseling, when she was denied light-duty work, and when her requests to
participate in training were denied. (R. 17.)
An adverse action negatively alters an employee’s work condition or
environment. McDonald, 898 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1990). Additionally, if an
employee is subjected to humiliating, degrading, or unsafe conditions, then an
adverse action can be found. Id. Conversely, a minor employment action is not
adverse. Nichols v. S. Illinois U.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007).
Evaluations alone, also, do not constitute an adverse employment action. Smart v.
Ball State U., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). They are merely tools that help to
identify strengths and weaknesses. Id. at 442-443. When Eliza was issued a written
20
counseling in June, 2014, it was due to her inaccurate report writing. (R. 15.)
Because the written counseling was an evaluation that identified Eliza’s weakness,
it was not itself an adverse action. Although the Hunt’s written counseling
admonished Eliza for her poor reporting, it did not itself cause her to lose a
promotion, termination, nor demote her from the duties she already had, and thus
,did not rise to an adverse employment action. Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 675
(7th Cir. 2008). Eliza, additionally, never made any claim for failure to promote.
Additionally in spite of the negative evaluations lessening Eliza’s chances for
promotion, they were not the sole cause of her ineligibility for promotion. For
example, even when the evaluations worked in favor of Eliza, she still did not
receive the promotion over her other peers.
Moreover, Eliza’s increased travel to work was not adverse. “Not everything
that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Lateral transfers,
increased travel distance to work, and a change in job title to other departments, do
not constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of retaliation claim under
Tile VII.” Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2000). A strictly
lateral transfer of an employee from one division of a company to another was not
an adverse employment action. Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,85 F.3d 270,
274 (7th Cir. 1996). Even if the ISP had denied a request for reimbursement for
travel expenses, it would not constitute an adverse employment action. Fyfe v. City
of Fort Wayne, 241 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2001). Additionally, at-least five other
staffers have already been enduring relatively longer commutes. Therefore,
21
although Eliza will experience increased travel expenses due to her a longer
commute, the increased expenses should not be considered an adverse employment
action.
Furthermore, Eliza’s inability to obtain light-duty employment was not an
adverse action; it was just an inconvenience caused by an alteration of job duties. In
order for an action to be adverse, it must be “more disruptive than a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Nichols, 510 F.3d at 772.
After Eliza found that there were no light-duty positions available, she was advised
to use her accumulated sick time and was placed on inactive duty. (R. 11.) ISP
policy suggests that “an officer’s salary continues during sick time, and vacation
and holiday accrue.” (R. 16.) In cases where an officer has used all the sick time
possible, an officer may use “holiday, vacation, personal, and compensatory time to
continue salary.” (Id.) Eliza, then, could maintain the benefits of a full-time active
duty trooper, despite her inability to get a light-duty position.
Additionally, the denial of participation in training exercises for Eliza did not
result in her suffering an adverse employment action. An adverse action creates a
“dramatic downward shift in skill level”. Smart v. Ball State U., 89 F.3d at 441. It is
not a minor employment action about which the employee is not happy. Nichols, 510
F.3d at 780. Eliza was denied participation in training exercises only after she
could not obtain light-duty employment and was given an inactive duty status. (R.
15.) Before that, she was qualified to participate. (R. 17.) There is no evidence in the
record to show that Eliza suffered a dramatic shift in skill level due to ISP’s denial
22
of training. This lack of information can be held against Eliza since she had the
burden to come forward with evidence. Additionally, if Eliza was merely unhappy
that she should could not participate in such exercises, then her inability to
participate was also not an adverse action. Moreover, Eliza’s rejection of CAT
training can be seen as legitimate due to Dr. Kriv prescribing sedentary job duties.
Finally, Eliza’s change in job title was not an adverse employment action.
Despite a dissimilarity where a new position decreases an employees
responsibilities, the Supreme Court has held that because of a lack of evidence that
the transfer decreased the employees responsibilities, and because of unchanged
pay due to the employee's transfer, that the transfer did not constitute an adverse
action. Stutler v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 263 F.3d 698 (2001). Accordingly,
because Eliza had no change in pay as a result of her transfer, the ISP’s actions
were not adverse.
Thus, Eliza cannot establish that she suffered an adverse employment action
from the ISP.
C. Similarly Situated Employees Outside Eliza’s Protected Class were Not Treated Differently By the ISP
The ISP did not treat Eliza differently from those outside her protected class.
When distinguishing an employer’s treatment of a pregnant woman seeking light-
duty employment, the comparison cannot be made between pregnant employees.
Arizanovska v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2012). A pregnant
employee must be compared to similarly situated males and non-pregnant females.
Id. The Supreme Court doubts that Congress intended to grant pregnant workers
23
an unconditional “most-favored-nation” status, such that employers who provide
one or two workers with an accommodation must provide similar accommodations
to all pregnant workers, irrespective of any other criteria. Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1342, 191 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2015). Similarly situated
employees to the plaintiff are directly comparable in all material aspects. Patterson
v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 365-66 (7th Cir. 2009). In determining a
similarly situated employee, the court considers whether the employee “reported to
the same supervisor, whether both employees were subject to the same standards,
and whether they had comparable education, experience, and qualifications.” Burks
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, none of
Eliza’s witnesses can be used.
Eliza failed to prove that the ISP created new light-duty assignments that
did not exist previously for other similarly situated employees. (R. 22.) There must
be “enough common factors to allow for a meaningful comparison in order to divine
whether intentional discrimination was at play.” Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co., 481
F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2007). In contrast, a meaningful comparison is one which
usually serves “to eliminate confounding variables, such as differing roles,
performance histories, or decision-making personnel, which helps isolate the critical
independent variable: complaints about discrimination.” Argyropoulos v. City of
Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 735 (7th Cir. 2008) In this case Eliza had the burden of
identifying employees with a similar history of poor writing skills, who received
light duty positions. Nichols, 510 F.3d at 786. Eliza has failed to show that any of
24
the troopers assigned to the created position had similar deficient writing skills or
performance histories.
Additionally, Eliza failed in her assertion that other troopers were given light
duty assignments, while also having had consistent with their report writing skills.
(R. 24.) “A meaningful comparison” to employees in discrimination cases should
have similar enough educations, experiences, and qualifications. CBOCS West, Inc.
v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). Eliza and her employee Temple had similar
writing deficiencies, however Eliza’s statements do not show any evidence that
Temple was not given a light duty assignment that may not have required
exceptional writing skills. Further, in a Seventh Circuit case, a female corrections
officer did not establish that she was treated differently than similarly situated
male officers based on her own uncorroborated statements that similarly situated
male officers were treated differently. Oest v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605
(7th Cir. 2001). In fact, the record indicates that Eliza, unlike Temple, had a
prescription denying her from carrying a gun.
Moreover, Eliza failed to provide the existence of a common supervisor.
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 847 (7th Cir. 2012). Even though Johnston
promoted the creation of the call-taker position for Temple, she not was not one of
Eliza’s listed supervisors in the chain of command provided in the record. (R. 23.)
Thus, because Eliza could not show the existence of a common supervisor, she
cannot make an assertion of being similarly situated.
Eliza also failed in her contention that the created call-taker position was
25
transferred to two other troopers, Boondeer and Moor, because she cannot show
that either of them have a history of similar substandard writing. (R. 23.) The ISP
policy stated that “Duties will be assigned to match the affected employees’
capabilities and experience with the needs of the Department.” (R. 14.) Eliza also
did not consider that the position of “call-taker” likely requires writing skills the
other troopers had, dissimilar to her since “many light-duty jobs, such as
interviewing witnesses, and maintaining records, [and] require above average
writing skills.” (R. 15.)
Eliza failed again in her comparison to Perkson, a pregnant female trooper
who was denied a light-duty request in 2013, because the timing in which Eliza and
Perkson were denied light-duty was not comparable. (R. 22.) Eliza’s request for light
duty in May 2014, was dissimilar to Perkin’s 2013 request because there was a
hiring freeze in 2012 through February 2014, which prevented the creation of light-
duty jobs. (R. 12.) Therefore, because Eliza made her request when the freeze was
over and because Perkins made her request when it was not over, the court should
determine that they are not similarly situated. Eliza further disregards undisputed
facts that between 2010 and 2014, 21 officers were denied light duty because they
did not qualify or no light-duty assignments were available. (R. 18)
Once more Eliza failed to show that the ISP’s Accommodation Policy gave
preferential treatment to employees injured outside of work over a pregnant
woman; pregnancy is a condition sustained outside of work. (R. 22.) Eliza
disregarded facts in the record that the ISP denied Melanie Maloney, a female
26
trooper injured outside of the job, light-duty because no duty met her physician’s
limitations. (R. 19.)
Further, Eliza was unable properly establish a proper comparison to the
situation of Harry Porter. (R. 26.) Porter was assigned to truck and scale duty. (R.
23.) Eliza contended that she qualified for both truck and scale duty while pregnant.
(R. 23.) However, the record is silent on whether Eliza ever applied or specifically
requested truck duty. An employee who does not apply for a vacancy cannot
establish prima facie case of discrimination without evidence that employer
deterred her from applying. Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 738–
39 (7th Cir. 2006). Eliza’s lack of a “requested particular job assignment” cannot be
used to establish a finding that she was treated less favorably than others. Id.
Finally, the record is entirely silent on the standard to which these troopers
were subjected, their education, experiences, and qualifications. For example, while
Hunt cited that he feared Eliza could get hurt on truck duty given her pregnant
condition, the only fact regarding Porter’s diagnosis was that he was terminally ill
with a brain tumor; not only are there not enough facts regarding the illness, but
also the level of caution between a terminally ill individual and pregnancy
individual is materially different. Similarly, while Boondeer was accepted for the
CAT training, there is a little detail as to what her material circumstances were. In
contrast to Boondeer, the record indicates that Dr. Kriv prescribed Eliza sedentary
duties. Because of the lack of information, the court cannot determine if the
witnesses are similarly situated to Eliza. Eliza has the burden to produce this
27
evidence.
Thus, Eliza cannot establish that similarly situated employees outside of her
protected class were treated more favorably.
IV. Eliza Failed to Show That the ISP's Reasons for Its Employment Actions Were Pretextual When the ISP Acted out of Legitimate and Reasonable Employment Concern and Took Eliza's Medical Restrictions and Employment Qualifications into Account
ISP’s actions regarding Eliza were “the result of reasonable and legitimate
employment concerns.” Watson v. Potter, 23 Fed. Appx. 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2001). As
a result, Eliza could not show that they were a pretext for discrimination. “A
pretext is a lie that the employer offers for its actions,” in order to conceal its
discriminatory reasons. Visser v. Packer Engr. Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657
(7th Cir. 1991). When assessing pretext courts should only look to see if the
employer had a legitimate and non-discriminatory explanation. Naik, 627 F.3d at
600.
Due to “having a high number of reports returned for correction, including a
ticket referencing the wrong township; failing to check appropriate boxes on
citations; numerous errors in grammar, sentence structure, punctuation, and
spelling; and omitting necessary information while including irrelevant
information,” Eliza received written counseling. (R. 12.) It does not matter if the
employer was “too hard on the employee.” Naik, 627 F.3d at 601. If the explanations
for the behavior are found to be plausible and the explanation can be evidenced,
then pretext did not occur. Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 417 (7th
Cir. 2006). Although report writing is a critical element for the success of a criminal
28
proceeding, Eliza’s employment file did not reflect that her habitual poor writing
resulted in her impeachment. Id. Thus, Hunt issuing written counseling to Eliza
regarding her high number of reports returned, numerous errors, and omitting
necessary information was reasonable. (R. 12.)
Regarding light-duty procedures, the ISP took medical restrictions and job
qualifications into account. (R. 16.) In fact, between 2010 and 2014, twenty-one
officers in District 18 were denied light duty because they did not qualify or no light
duty was available (only seventeen officers were granted assignments). (R. 18.)
When Eliza sought out light-duty work, her superiors met more than once to discuss
possibilities. (R. 14.) Eliza was denied a full-time light-duty position only after the
ISP found that no position, which fit her capabilities and experiences, existed. (R.
12.) Even if Hunt was mistaken in his assessments, it does not matter “if the
employer may have been wrong about its employee’s performance.” Naik, 627 F.3d
at 601. The court only looks to see if the reason for the employer’s action is
legitimate. Id. Thus, Eliza’s inability to obtain light-duty was a result of legitimate
reasons.
Furthermore, it is unwritten protocol in District 18 that inactive officers are
not allowed to participate in Control and Arrest Tactics (“CAT”) or other weapons
training. (R. 16.) Before Eliza informed her superiors that she was pregnant, she
was approved to attend Methamphetamine Training. (R. 25.) However, when she
was unable to obtain a full-time, light-duty post, she was given an inactive status.
(R. 13.) As such, ISP’s protocol applied to her. (R. 25.) The ISP was not required to
29
accommodate Eliza with a light-duty position because she was pregnant. Phelan v.
Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2006). A duty to accommodate arises under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, not Title VII, and because temporary
complications related to a normal pregnancy do not trigger that duty, the ISP’s
actions were thus not adverse. Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 553–
54 (7th Cir. 2011). Further, in the initial note from Dr. Kriv, Eliza was to have a
sedentary job. (R. 13.) Sedentary is defined in Merriam Webster as “desk-bound”.
(R. 13.) Dr. Kriv’s message was sent on May 22. (R. 13.) Her training was then
subsequently denied the training in June; this was reasonably an attempt to
address the orders given by Dr. Kriv. Control. (R. 25.) Arrest Tactics training in the
eyes of a reasonable individual cannot be seen as sedentary. It would therefore
make more sense for the ISP to respect Dr. Kriv’s orders and follow ISP protocol.
For these reasons, Eliza’s inability to participate in training exercises was a
reasonable employment concern.
For these reasons, Eliza failed to establish that the ISP’s reasons for its
actions were a pretext for discrimination.
V. Eliza Failed to Establish a Claim of Retaliation Under Title VII When She Could Not Show That Her Transfer to the Police Academy Was an Adverse Action and When the Transfer Was Not Causally Connected to a Charge Filed with the ISP's EEO Office
Employers are prohibited from retaliating against employees who complain
about discriminatory practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42
U.S.C. §2000e-3. For a case of retaliation, a Plaintiff must offer evidence that (1) she
engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) that the defendant subjected her to
30
an adverse employment action, and(3) that there exists a causal connection between
the two events. Gates v Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2008). Eliza
alleged that after she filed a complaint with the ISP’s Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) office, the ISP retaliated by transferring her to the police
academy. (R. 36.) The ISP concedes that Eliza’s complaint to the EEO office was a
protected activity. (R. 36.) Therefore, the issues before this court are whether the
ISP conducted an adverse action when it transferred her to the police academy and
whether Eliza established a causal relationship between the two events.
A. The ISP Did Not Subject Eliza to an Adverse Employment Action
Eliza’s transfer to the police academy was not an adverse action because
materially adverse actions for retaliation claims are broader than that of
discrimination claims; however, the adverse action must still be material. Porter v.
City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 957 (7th Cir. 2012). A material adverse employment
action separates significant harms from trivial harms. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). Further, materially adverse actions dissuade reasonable
workers from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Lapka v. Chertoff,
517 F.3d 974, 986 (7th Cir. 2008). Materially adverse action can also encompass the
termination of employment or a demotion as evidence by a decrease in wage or
salary. Id. If the employer can show that it would have taken the alleged adverse
action against the employee even if it had no retaliatory motive, then summary
judgment can stand. Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, an increase in an employee’s commute can be a negative
31
consequence; however, it alone would not constitute an adverse action. Spring v.
Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 1989). Also, a minor
employment action is not adverse action. Nichols, 510 F.3d at 772. Additionally,
actions that solely make an employee unsatisfied are not adverse. Smart, 89 F.3d at
441.
The ISP’s refusal to provide Eliza’s preferred accommodation is not an
adverse employment action, even for purposes of retaliation claims. Even if a
transfer, which occurs as a result of medical leave, fails to account for an employees
religious beliefs, the transfer itself is not adverse since it would not dissuade a
reasonable worker from seeking further accommodation. Porter v. City of
Chicago,700 F.3d 944, 957 (7th Cir. 2012). Eliza’s transfer to the Police Academy
arose out a result of her request for light duty accommodation. There is nothing in
the record to suggest that she sought further accommodations after she was
displeased with the ISP’s good faith response to accommodate her needs.
Significantly, Eliza was not terminated; rather, she was transferred to another
employment position and her salary remained the same. (R. 4.) Although the
transfer increased Eliza’s commute from ten minutes to forty-five minutes, the
transfer cannot be found to be adverse; this is a location in which she earlier stated
she wanted to work. (R. 20, 28, 32.) In addition to this, at-least five other staff
members from the police academy stated that their commute was longer than one
hour each way. (R. 20.)
Additionally, academic deficiency among one of the public schools near the
32
academy is a mere inconvenience for Eliza. “Not everything that makes an
employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Lateral transfers, increased
travel distance to work, and a change in job title to other departments, do not
constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of retaliation claim under Title
VII. Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2000). The record
indicates another public school within her jurisdiction that has consistently met
academic standards. Even so, there are several magnet and private elementary
schools in which Eliza could enroll her child.
Furthermore, although Eliza’s commute would be slightly more expensive
and around thirty minutes longer, it would not be an adverse action. Even a denial
request for reimbursement of travel expenses would not constitute an adverse
employment action. Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 241 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2001).
While Eliza’s commute would increase to 45 minutes in total, at least 5 other
staffers endure a commute of longer than 1 hour. (R. 20.) Such an action being
considered adverse could have disastrous public policy implications. For example,
considering that a study published by CNN determined that the average work
commute in the United States is 45 minutes, a 45 minute commute being considered
adverse could then prompt reasonable employees taking long commutes currently
not seeking legal action to file a complaint. 1
Moreover, Eliza’s change in job title as a result of her transfer was not a
result of adverse employment actions for retaliation purposes. Stutler v. Illinois 1 http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/17/pf/work-commute-time-and-money/
33
Dept. of Corrections, 263 F.3d 698 (2001). The change in job title was as a result of
her of her request for light duty. Further, Eliza did not suffer a change in salary a
result of the transfer.
Therefore, although the transfers may have been an inconvenience for Eliza
and even though she may not have liked it, it was not an adverse action. Nichols,
510 F.3d at 772.
B. There is No Casual Connection Between Eliza’s Complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Office and the Employment Actions Undertaken by the ISP.
The court must affirm the lower court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment
for the ISP Eliza because Eliza cannot prove that she suffered an adverse
employment action in retaliation to her complaint; additionally, Eliza must
establish that there was a causal connection between her filing the charge at the
EEO office and the ISP’s alleged retaliatory transfer.
The timing of the retaliation and the adverse action is essential to
determining the causation element of retaliation claim. Tomanovich v. City of
Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir. 2006). Retaliation is when an adverse
action immediately occurs after the complaint is filed. Id. Although, it is clear that
the alleged adverse action occurs after the complaint is filed, “suspicious timing
alone rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue.” Moser v. Indiana Dept. of
Corrections, 406 F.3d 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2005). Additionally, temporal proximity is
insufficient. Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 981 (7th Cir. 2004).
Eliza cannot establish retaliation because there is no causal connection
34
between the filing of the charge and the transfer. On June 9, 2014 White convened
and later contacted the police academy to inquire on needed to be done for Eliza’s
transfer. (R. 19.) Eliza filed her complaint to the Equal Opportunity Office on July
11, 2014. (R. 4.)
Furthermore, Eliza cannot prove that her denial of training was caused by
her complaint through circumstantial evidence. “Circumstantial evidence of
retaliation can include suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written,
and other bits and pieces from which an inference of [retaliatory] intent might be
drawn.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012). Even if the ISP
initially granted Eliza’s training before her complaint, Eliza cannot cite “other facts”
sufficient to create an inference of a causal connection, thus her own reliance on
temporal proximity alone is thus insufficient to prove causation. Harper v. C.R.
England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 308 (7th Cir. 2012).
Furthermore, Eliza's encounter with Morgan stating that she could withdraw
her complaint if she decided to work through “the usual channels” does not prove a
causal connection to her transfer. (R. 27.) Although Morgan acted inappropriately,
her behavior was too petty and tepid to constitute the material harm necessary for a
Title VII retaliation claim. Stutler v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 263 F.3d 698, 710
(7th Cir. 2001). The conduct of ISP's comments did not heighten after Eliza reported
the ISP to the EEO, raising doubt of a causal connection to her transfer. Johnson v.
Nordstrom, Inc., et al., 260 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 2001).
Finally, Hunt’s gesture to Eliza’s belly and comment that “her situation
35
would be a problem” does not establish a causal connection to her transfer. A
supervisor’s threat that does not materialize or result in any material harm to the
employee disproves a causal connection. Stutler, 263 F.3d 698, 711 (7th Cir. 2001).
More importantly, Hunt’s comments and gesture on their own cannot be
conclusively taken to be a threat. Dr. Kriv virtually stated the same thing when she
suggested that Eliza’s gun belt would eventually become a problem. There was
neither any evidence that Eliza was transferred in response to her supervisor’s
gesture, nor any evidence that Eliza’s transfer constituted the material harm
necessary for a Title VII retaliation claim.
Thus, it is clear that the ISP had the intent on transferring Eliza before any
complaint ever occurred.
36
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Defendant-Appellee, Illinois State Police, respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the district court’s judgment.
Sincerely,
Dated: November 12, 2015 /s Ahmed Mostafa Ahmed Mostafa Illinois Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street Chicago, Illinois 60601 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Illinois State Police
37
CERTIFICATE OF RULE 32 COMPLIANCE
The undersigned counsel of record for Defendant-Appellee Illinois State
Police hereby certifies that the foregoing Brief complies with the type-volume
limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B), because this Brief contains 7,342 words.
Counsel further certifies that this Brief complies with the typeface requirements of
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6)
because this Brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
Microsoft word in Century Gothic type-style, 12-point type in the body of the Brief.
Dated: November 12, 2015 /s Ahmed Mostafa Ahmed Mostafa Illinois Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street Chicago, Illinois 60601 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Illinois State Police
38
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned counsel for Defendant-Appellee Illinois State Police hereby
certifies that on November 12, 2015, two copies of the Brief as well as a digital
version containing this Brief, were served by mail and email upon the following
attorney:
Young Barack Obama 3042 North Illinois Route 71 Ottawa, Illinois 61350 (555)555-5555 [email protected]
/s Ahmed Mostafa Ahmed Mostafa Illinois Attorney General 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, Illinois 60601 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Illinois State Police