wpt essay final draft

War, Peace and Terror: M140844216620

‘What is the role of intelligence in peacetime?’

In answering the question of the role of intelligence in peacetime it is necessary to define what is meant by both ‘intelligence’ and ‘peacetime’. The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a drastic rise in so-called ‘new wars’, often resulting from the vacuums left where authoritarian states became greatly weakened by opening themselves up to the rest of the world (Kaldor 2013). These conflicts can see numerous entities – domestic and foreign, state and non-state, driven by many different ideologies and motives – fighting asymmetrical conflicts often with no clear end or simple resolution (Ibid.). In this context the ideas of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ become less useful as their boundaries are blurred, making framing any question in terms of either of these supposedly binary states a difficult proposition. For the purposes of addressing the question this paper will consider ‘peacetime’ to be any situation where a state is not actively engaged in a struggle for its survival, and will not address intelligence activities directly related to ongoing military conflict. The Cold War will therefore, due to its historical richness and importance for examining issues of intelligence, be treated as ‘peacetime’ for the purposes of this analysis. The perspective, based on available sources, will be predominantly Western but incorporate other examples where this is beneficial.

‘Intelligence’, too, poses difficulties as a term, not because it is too hard to define but because historically intelligence established itself as a field which was inextricably linked to warfare; the first such organizations recognizable as precursors to modern intelligence agencies were established as elements of the military staffs of various European countries in the late Nineteenth Century (Herman 1996: 17 – 19). It was only after the First World War, the rise of Soviet Communism as an ongoing existential threat to other European powers and the recognition that ‘total war needed total intelligence’ that intelligence began to be organized along the lines we see today, with separate agencies for domestic, foreign, signals and military intelligence (Ibid.: 20 – 25). ‘Intelligence’ as a catch-all term refers, broadly, to the information gathered, the activities carried out to acquire it, and the agencies that collect, analyse and disseminate it (Shulsky 1993: 1). However it has never received a universally accepted definition (Warner 2007). This paper will therefore take ‘intelligence’ to mean the broadest possible sense of the gathering of information by dedicated agencies, whether military or civilian, and the processing and use of that information to inform government actions and policies.

In order to retain a sense of relevance this paper will examine intelligence from the period of the Cold War to the present. It will argue that two significant events have fundamentally jarred the foundations of Western intelligence activity in recent decades,

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those being the collapse of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Temporally the paper covers a span of several decades, and will examine the roles of different types of intelligence in the periods of the Cold War, the 1990s and finally the post-9/11 world, combining examples from different periods where appropriate to show how the priorities and role of intelligence has changed across the years. It will finish by concluding with an assessment of the likely role of intelligence in peacetime in the near future.

‘The Cold War was fought, above all, by the intelligence services’ (Aldrich 2001: 5). The idea of intelligence in ‘peacetime’ therefore existed only notionally for organizations such as the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in this period. In the environment of ‘peace’ after the ravages of the Second World War and the occupation of Eastern and Central Europe by the Soviets, Western intelligence agencies had to quickly reassess their priorities and revitalize their efforts against Soviet Russia. To an extent this was already occurring, as both the British and Americans had been engaged in a ‘low-level Cold War’ against the Soviets since 1917 (Ibid.: 22). This fear of Soviet Communism was to define Western intelligence activity until the precipitous collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91, which led to quickly-formulated warnings that this, the first of the two ‘watersheds’ for Western intelligence examined here, would cause massive disruption in the shape of reorienting strategic intelligence priorities, and subsequent entrenched institutional resistance to the necessary adjustments (Turner 1991: 150).

The early Cold War years were fraught with tension over fears that the Soviets would attempt to roll the Iron Curtain westwards across the remainder of non-Communist Europe. The ambiguous but chilling declaration in April 1946 from Stalin to Walter Bedell Smith, the US Ambassador to Moscow and future Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), that ‘We’re not going to go much further’ provided no reassurance whatsoever to a paranoid Western intelligence establishment (Weiner 2007: 17). Western intelligence, though sorely lacking direction and, in the case of the newly-formed CIA, experience, was geared towards preparing for a Soviet invasion of ‘free’ Europe, and if possible even pushing them back to their pre-war borders. To take one example, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), formed under the CIA’s aegis and headed by OSS (Office of Strategic Services, forerunner to the CIA) veteran Frank Wisner, was tasked with covert action against the new Soviet menace in Europe for which the USA could maintain plausible deniability, and ultimately told to roll back the Soviets to Russian territory (Aldrich 2001: 13; Weiner: 36). Among other things his organization was pressured by the US Army to cultivate underground resistance movements in countries such as Poland, which could be valuable in the outbreak of active military hostilities (Aldrich 2001: 166).

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The lines between civilian and military intelligence were therefore already blurring, as they frequently do in war but less often in peacetime. The Cold War was a strange phenomenon intelligence-wise for this very reason: not only were two massive intelligence-security complexes – those of the democratic West and the Soviet East – arrayed against each other, but the constant omnipresent threat of military conflict, especially nuclear war, kept the boundaries between civilian and military activity unclear and the stakes incredibly high. There is perhaps no better illustration of the struggle to define the role of intelligence in this peculiar ‘peace’ than the rivalry between two men who would play key roles in American intelligence through this era.

Frank Wisner transitioned to the CIA from his wartime role in the OSS, which itself was formed to conduct covert activity in support of the American war effort, and was soon enthusiastically plotting myriad schemes to reverse Soviet domination of the European continent (Smith 1972: 1 – 2; Weiner: 37). Richard Helms was in many ways Wisner’s antithesis in his approach to intelligence activity; another young member of the OSS who transitioned to the fledgling CIA, he differed in his strong belief that intelligence served its political masters best through espionage, not derring-do of the wartime OSS mould. He maintained this belief, and a strong antipathy for large-scale covert actions, throughout his distinguished career which saw him rise to become DCI in 1966 (Johnson 2003: 24 – 25). The two men’s uneasy alliance and wildly divergent views on the role of the CIA encapsulate the dilemma of the role of intelligence in the strained peace of the Cold War.

In a contemporary context the role of covert action still often falls to intelligence agencies, although the adversary has shifted from the Soviet behemoth to transnational terrorist organizations, necessitating much cross-border and inter-agency collaboration. A prime example of this is the joint ‘Alliance Base’ formed by US and French intelligence in 2002 for the purposes of conducting renditions – covert abductions – of terrorist suspects across Europe (Aldrich 2009: 123 – 4). Although based in France and largely funded by the CIA it has included participation from the UK, Germany, Canada and Australia (Ibid.: 130 – 1). Covert actions then have remained a part of intelligence work in peacetime, and this ethos is clearly not restricted to a single country. Only the nature of the threat, and therefore the type of covert action appropriate, has changed across time.

As the Cold War progressed the need for collaboration between military and civilian intelligence remained intertwined. The wide-ranging intelligence collection efforts of the civilian agencies moved quickly into the fields of imagery intelligence (IMINT) on Soviet military assets, utilising early satellites and the specially developed U2 spy plane (Herman: 66). In these examples the intelligence agencies ran the programmes, but it was the military that had most use for the information that was gathered (Crickmore 2002: 5). ‘Peacetime’ intelligence, under the auspices of a civilian agency, was therefore feeding into strategic military planning and high-level political decisions, emphasized in

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President Johnson’s statement that ‘Before we had the photography our guesses were way off’ (Herman: 74).

The Cold War also witnessed massive counterintelligence (CI) efforts by agencies in both East and West, as all remained gravely worried that they were being penetrated by agents of their adversaries. Sometimes this was true, but paranoia flourished of its own accord. At the CIA this was embodied by James Angleton, the chief of CI, who became increasingly obsessed with the ‘hidden hand’ of Moscow to the point that it undermined the whole Soviet Division of the agency (Weiner: 317-9). However CI efforts, despite their inherently defensive nature, were decidedly necessary. Kim Philby, a high-ranking officer of the SIS, betrayed numerous agents and operations to the Soviets while working for them in the early Cold War (Shulsky: 123). The direct targeting of the enemy’s intelligence agencies offered the potential to access huge amounts of information, as well as discovering exactly what the enemy knew about one’s own operations. However it was easy to take this too far, and grant the enemy excessive credit for potential ruses. In Angleton’s case it was his downfall when he was fired in 1974, an outcome stemming from the huge morale damage done to the CIA by his all-consuming fear of Soviet penetration (Ibid.: 142).

Military intelligence organizations also ran their own operations throughout the Cold War, trying to be ready for any outbreak of hostilities while also needing to prepare for asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, a rising spectre during this period. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 several US citizens were held hostage in Tehran, and a special forces operation was planned to attempt a rescue. However the CIA refused to divulge much of its useful intelligence to the military planners because they feared compromising their agent (Smith 2006: 18-21; George Washington University 2001). As a result of this failure to cooperate between civilian and military intelligence, the US military established a new covert intelligence unit, the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), to focus on gathering intelligence that could be needed for future special forces operations outside regular warfare (Smith 2006: 30). Therefore although a military organization the ISA’s activities focused on peacetime planning and operations outside of warfare, such as mapping out vulnerable US embassies in detail for use in any future rescue operations in the event of a hostage situation (Ibid.: 35-6).

The Cold War, therefore, saw much frenzied activity by intelligence organizations, both civilian and military, which spanned defensive counterintelligence operations, running agents and covert action abroad, providing critical intelligence to government on ongoing events and foreign threats and much more, such as supporting military counter terrorism operations. Newer types of intelligence such as signals intelligence (SIGINT) and IMINT became crucial, particularly as the difficulties of gleaning information on national security and military matters in closed countries, such as those of the Eastern Bloc, with human agents became apparent (Shulsky: 36-7; Crickmore: 5).

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Indeed ‘technical intelligence’ methods, including SIGINT and IMINT, saw a huge rise in perceived criticality by the US intelligence community in the latter stages of the Cold War – DCI Stansfield Turner argued that these technical methods were America’s great advantage in intelligence gathering activities (Shulsky: 36). This idea however flew in the face of much of the CIA’s ethos, with other agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) supposedly primarily responsible for SIGINT and IMINT respectively – the debate about the type of intelligence necessary, and how best to acquire it, is also an ongoing duty of intelligence agencies in peacetime to ensure the best information is gathered for whatever purposes it may be required (Smith 2006: 17). The end of the Cold War and the rise of new threats soon spurred reassessments of intelligence and its role in the new era of ‘peace’ the end of Soviet Communism supposedly heralded.

The end of the Cold War pulled out from beneath Western intelligence agencies the most obvious reason for their existence. For half a century the Soviet menace had defined their existence and activities to an enormous degree, and the 1990s saw a reduction in sizes and budgets to ‘peacetime levels’ for Western intelligence services (Aid 2006: 73). Indeed the failure to foresee the end of the Cold War with the total and seemingly spontaneous collapse of the Soviet system is often cited as a prime example of an intelligence failure, along with events like the first Soviet nuclear test of 1949 or more recently the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Jensen 2012: 263). Apart from the irony of Western intelligence agencies failing to predict the event which would effectively eviscerate much of their workforce and funding, these latter two examples provide a useful bracket for the change in the peacetime role of intelligence under discussion.

The beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s saw massive efforts beginning to penetrate and understand the closed society of Soviet Communism, with which Western intelligence agencies remained obsessed for almost half a century. The spectre of international terrorism, which slowly worked its way into the consciousness of the intelligence communities of many countries during the Cold War, has since grown to become viewed as the greatest threat to national security. Sir John Sawers, the serving head of SIS, during an open Intelligence and Security Committee hearing on the role of the UK intelligence agencies, stated the following – ‘It’s not like it was in the Cold War, there aren’t states out there trying to destroy our government and our way of life, but there are a very wide range of diverse threats that we face – the biggest is terrorism’ (Intelligence and Security Committee 2013).

The 1990s therefore saw a huge shift in the priorities and operations of intelligence agencies outside of armed conflict, needing to understand a diverse range of non-state actors, the threats they posed and the backgrounds, motivations and ideologies driving them. Robert Baer, a veteran CIA officer posted to Tajikistan in the

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early 1990s, explained how the CIA ‘had apparently written off the Russian military despite the fact that it still possessed missiles that could send a nuclear warhead to anywhere it wanted in the U.S.’ (Baer 2002: 248). This was based on his difficulty getting a Russian-speaking CIA officer to replace him when he was due to leave – the only Russian military officer he had as a source did not speak English (Ibid.). The CIA itself was in crisis as the Eastern Bloc collapsed, with DCI Robert Gates drafting a National Security Review over the winter of 1991 asking other arms of the government to define what they wanted from Central Intelligence for the next fifteen years – an entreaty to redefine the CIA’s existence for it (Weiner: 500-1). Meanwhile the SIGINT agencies of the US and UK – the NSA and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) respectively – also suffered multiple slashes in personnel and budgets, severely weakening their capability (Aid: 73).

Yet despite the loss of the old enemy of Western intelligence there was still much to be done in this new ‘peacetime’, and the priorities of intelligence in those early post-Cold War days lead very directly to the threats currently posing the greatest danger to Western countries. Indeed it was never the case that the Soviet threat was the only thing occupying Western intelligence during the Cold War, and the agencies had been simultaneously collecting information on ‘transnational issues such as terrorism, instability and revolution’, in keeping with one of their main roles being to identify and understand any and all threats to national security (Hulnick 1999: 105). Almost concurrent to the decline of the Soviet Union as a threat many terrorist movements, which had existed essentially separately from the Cold War conflict, also became neutralized as a threat one way or another. For instance the Oslo Accord of 1993 led to a massive decrease in Palestinian terrorist activity and the loss of state sponsorship for many of the more radical Palestinian terrorist factions (Aid: 73-4).

A good example of the mixed bag of new threats left in the wake of the Soviet collapse was given by the Clandestine Service of the CIA when in May 1995 it presented DCI John Deutch with a list of its ‘top ten targets: loose nukes, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, support for military operations, macroeconomics, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Russia, China’ (Weiner: 526). That this list was split neatly in two between states viewed as hostile and a combination of other more asymmetrical problems is an indictment of the difficulties faced by intelligence in not only combating but also defining the amorphous collection of threats confronting the West at the dawn of the Twenty First Century. Former DCI James Woolsey has defined the situation as ‘the slain dragon having given way to the jungle of snakes’ and this is as good a metaphor as any for the confusion engulfing Western intelligence in the 1990s (Scott and Hughes 2006: 655). However it was not long before the new millennium was to give the agencies a renewed focus and energy, but in a far more chimaeric form than the Soviet Union had helpfully provided.

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The attacks of 11 September 2001 ushered in a new era of Western foreign policy, launched two American-led military campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia and, in the context of this paper, heralded a new dawn for the focus of Western intelligence. Ignoring the wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, outside the realm of ‘peacetime’ as they undoubtedly are, it is necessary to look at the threats faced in the new century and the methods and information needed to counter them in order to establish what role intelligence agencies must now forge for themselves.

Terrorism, as has been outlined above, is now defined as the primary threat to the West in peacetime, and it is therefore here that much of the resources of intelligence agencies, particularly in North America and Europe, have been focused. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the UK places ‘International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests’ as the first on its list of ‘Tier One’ priority risks, those posing the gravest threat to the UK’s national security (HM Government 2010). Intelligence must therefore continue to monitor and collect information on dangerous states in peacetime but also monitor as closely as possible the myriad groups and individuals regarded as being potential terrorist threats.

Al Qaeda, arguably the greatest single terrorist threat (although only one of many), presents an unusual problem for intelligence agencies. Prior to 9/11 the group was already responsible for attacks on two US embassies in Africa and an attack on the USS Cole, an American warship, in Aden (Posner 2005: 20; Weiner: 549). However the difficulty posed by Al Qaeda lies in its decentralized nature (Vinci 2008: 69). This amorphous form of organizing and operating makes it incredibly hard for intelligence agencies to track, certainly by SIGINT means which saw such an ascendance during the Cold War. To avoid this as far as possible Al Qaeda employ the simple expedient of rarely using the same means of communication more than once (Aid: 84). This is a paradigmatic example of the different types of challenges facing intelligence during peacetime in the early twenty first century – it is not simply a matter of tracking and monitoring your enemy, you have first to find them.

The 9/11 attacks are held up often as a catastrophic intelligence failure, and the inability to prevent this atrocity flies in the face of the perceived wisdom that American intelligence in particular has an obsession, stemming from Pearl Harbour, with preventing surprise attack (Herman: 342-3). The precise details of the possible failures of intelligence in the approach to 9/11 are outside the scope of this paper, but it does usefully highlight another key role of intelligence, and one which has become even more important since 2001 – the role of sharing and cooperation with ‘friendly’ intelligence services, whether within or between countries. This is of particular note in Europe, and especially between European states and the US – the example given above of ‘Alliance Base’ established by the CIA and DGSE, France’s foreign intelligence agency, is an excellent case in point (Aldrich 2009: 123-4).

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The rise of a truly transnational terrorist threat and the difficulty in finding and combating it therefore necessitates this kind of cross-agency multinational cooperation, and is an area that has grown in importance to the intelligence operations of many countries in recent years. Given the delicate nature of many intelligence-sharing relationships, existing as they do not only between states but also their different agencies and even individual intelligence officers, this is not an easy mechanism to establish quickly. Mistrust continues to mar intelligence sharing, even among such supposedly close allies as EU member states (Walsh 2006: 631). However this is not a new phenomenon, as intelligence is an inherently paranoid and security-obsessed field. During the Cold War the US became concerned at the security threat posed by Kim Philby when he was seconded to Washington, and threatened to end sharing intelligence with the UK unless he was removed (Lefebvre 2011: 535 – 6). As demonstrated above they were right to be concerned as he was eventually revealed to be a double agent.

The role of intelligence in ‘peacetime’ has thus continued and in many ways accelerated and expanded upon the changes begun after the end of the Cold War. Indeed the declaration of the ‘Global War on Terror’ by the USA means that the very idea of ‘peacetime’ seems to be almost obsolete, although a clear distinction can still generally be drawn based on whether the armed forces of a state are currently engaged in active operations, as is still the case in Afghanistan for the US and many of its allies. To conclude this assessment of the role intelligence has played in peacetime environments, and the likely future direction of intelligence activities outside of war, it is necessary to briefly reflect on the events since the end of the Second World War and the most likely threats to be faced in the near future.

As has been argued here, the casting of the Soviet shadow over large parts of Europe in the late 1940s was to define Western intelligence activity for much of the next half century. Military intelligence too needed to remain active in peacetime to prepare for any future conflict. The Defence Intelligence Agency of the US and the Defence Intelligence Staff of the UK were born out of this requirement (Herman: 19). The impact of the Cold War legacy did not cease immediately with the fall of the Soviet Union – events such as the revelations of the spying of Aldrich Ames, a CIA analyst, for the Soviets over a nine-year period, which came to light only in 1994, go some way to showing how long that shadow proved to be for the intelligence agencies (Weiner: 517). The 1990s then saw an almost panicked frenzy to redefine intelligence for the new post-Cold War world.

The 9/11 attacks, the most recent paradigm shift-inducing event to shake the Western intelligence community, occurred from a combination of a determined but misunderstood threat and missed opportunities to act in the preceding years. The US was not blind to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and his network; indeed as far back as

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1995 the NSA had focused some very determined SIGINT efforts against him when he was located in Sudan (Aid: 82-3). However the warnings were missed or overshadowed by other concerns, and it took the monstrosity of the Twin Towers collapsing to truly refocus American intelligence, and by extension that of their allies.

Looking to the future then, intelligence will be called upon to do more and more as the non-state threats to national security continue to proliferate and expand their reach and agendas. The website of the SIS succinctly sums up their role: ‘SIS provides Her Majesty’s Government with a global covert capability to promote and defend the national security and economic well-being of the United Kingdom’ (Secret Intelligence Service 2013). However some threats from the past have decreased markedly – counterintelligence against foreign espionage is conspicuous in its absence from the UK NSS (HM Government 2010). Predicting, as far as possible, this ebb and flow in future threats, and gathering as much information on them early enough, is a key role of intelligence in peacetime and will always continue to be.

The role and scale of intelligence in peacetime will likely see expansion in the near future as the increasingly globalized and unpredictable nature of the security threats to states, such as transnational terrorism and international crime, are coupled with the rise of complex human security issues arising from population growth and resource depletion (Homer-Dixon 1994: 5). As traditional wars decline in frequency and scale and a much more complicated nexus of threats emerge to take their place, states will find themselves increasingly reliant on high-quality and timely intelligence to inform their policies and actions. As has been argued here the role of intelligence in peacetime is extremely multifaceted and diverse, and only likely to increase in importance and scale as we move further into the 21st century.

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