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2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Jl. Diponegoro No. 72Jakarta 10310
Indonesiaph: 62–21 314 8175
fax: 62–21 3190 3190
Table of ConTenTs
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS IV
Message froM the Chair of the Joint ManageMent CoMMittee, Ceppie Kurniadi suMadilaga, deputy Minister for poverty, eMployMent and sMes, national developMent planning agenCy/Bappenas 1
Message froM the Co Chair of the Joint ManageMent CoMMittee, stefan KoeBerle, Country direCtor, the World BanK, indonesia 3
exeCutive suMMary 5
pnpM Mandiri: the ongoing proCess of developing the World’s largest CoMMunity eMpoWerMent and poverty alleviation prograM 7
INSTITuTIONAl INNOVATION 9ThE ROlE OF ThE INTERNATIONAl DONOR COMMuNITY 10Reflection: Ayip Muflich, DiRectoR GeneRAl foR coMMunity AnD VillAGe eMpoweRMent, the MinistRy of hoMe AffAiRs 13
pnpM Mandiri: Core prograMs 18PNPM–RuRAl 18PNPM–uRBAN 23SuPPORT FOR POOR AND DISADVANTAGED AREAS IN ACEh AND NIAS (SPADA) 27RuRAl INFRASTRuCTuRE SuPPORT TO PNPM MANDIRI (RIS–PNPM) 29REGIONAl INFRASTRuCTuRE FOR SOCIAl AND ECONOMIC DEVElOPMENT (RISE) 32Reflecction: Bito wikAntosA, heAD of section, MethoD DeVelopMent, DiRectoRAte GeneRAl foR coMMunity AnD VillAGe eMpoweRMent, the MinistRy of hoMe AffAiRs 33
WindoW one: direCt Budget support and Co–finanCing for CoMMunity eMpoWerMent 36
GREEN PNPM 36PNPM GENERASI 43DISASTER MANAGEMENT SuPPORT 55PNPM–RuRAl III ADDITIONAl FINANCING (CRISIS) 57Reflection: ViVi yulAswAti, DiRectoR foR sociAl pRotection AnD welfARe, the nAtionAl DeVelopMent plAnninG AGency/BAppenAs 59
WindoW tWo: providing iMpleMentation and Coordination support 62PSF SECRETARIAT 62PNPM COMMuNICATIONS 65PNPM SuPERVISION AND MONITORING 70TRAINING OF lOCAl AuDITORS IN PNPM–uRBAN 72INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (MIS) FOR PNPM MANDIRI: (SIMPADu PhASE 2) 73TEChNICAl ASSISTANCE TO BAPPENAS AND ThE STEERING COMMITTEE OF PNPM (POkJA PENGENDAlI) 74Reflection: JAn weetJens, heAD of pnpM suppoRt fAcility 77
WindoW three: strengthening Civil soCiety organizations WorKing With Marginal, disenfranChised and vulneraBle groups 82
PNPM PEDulI: SuPPORTING ThE wORk OF CIVIl SOCIETY ORGANIzATIONS 82Reflection: suJAnA RoyAt, Deputy MinisteR foR poVeRty AlleViAtion AnD coMMunity eMpoweRMent, cooRDinAtinG MinistRy foR people’s welfARe 85
ii 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
WindoW four: strengthening pnpM Mandiri through teChniCal assistanCe 90MONITORING AND EVAluATION 90DElIVERING SERVICES TO ThE POOR 95POVERTY ENGAGEMENT, kNOwlEDGE AND ACTION 97PNPM REVOlVING lOAN FuND (RlF) CAPACITY BuIlDING AND SuSTAINABIlITY PROJECT 100lOCAl GOVERNMENT CAPACITY DEVElOPMENT PROJECT 105INDONESIA uRBAN POVERTY ANAlYSIS, PROGRAM REVIEw AND PNPM–uRBAN EVAluATION 107Reflection: RuDy pRAwiRADinAtA, DiRectoR of poVeRty ReDuction, the nAtionAl DeVelopMent plAnninG AGency/BAppenAs 109
strategiC direCtions for 2012 and Beyond 112Reflection: scot t GuGGenheiM, foRMeR heAD of pnpM suppoRt fAcility 115
annex one: hoW pnpM–rural WorKs 121
annex tWo: finanCial overvieW 124
annex three: suMMaries of MaJor analytiCal WorK ConduCted in 2011 128
story BoxesGREEN PNPM: lET ThERE BE lIGhT 41PNPM GENERASI: hARVESTING AND EATING lOCAllY IN lARANTukA, EAST FlORES 53REVOlVING lOAN FuNDS: wEAVING A lIVING 103
iii
abbReVIaTIons anD aCRonYMs
ADB Asian Development Bank
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BAPPENAS Badan Perecanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency)
Bawasda District Government Audit Boards
BkAD Badan kerjasama Antar Desa (Inter–village Cooperative Board)
BkM Badan keswadayaan Masyarakat (Community Organizations)
BkPG Bantuan keuangan Pembangunan Gampong (Fund for Village welfare Assistance)
BlT Bantuan langsung Tunai (unconditional Cash Transfer)
BP–uPk Badan Pengawas unit Pengelola kegiatan (Community–Appointed Financial Management Oversight Body)
BPkP Badan Pengawas keuangan dan Pembangunan (Development and Finance Surveillance Agency)
BPS Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics)
BRR Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency)
CDD Community–Driven Development
ChS Complaints handling System
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CSO Civil Society Organization
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DfID united kingdom’s Department for International Development
DGhS Direktorat Jenderal Cipta karya–DJCk (Directorate General for human Settlements)
DIAlOG Delivery Improvements and local Governance Program
DIPA Daftar Isian Pelkasanaan Anggaran (Budget–Funded Project Proposal lists)
EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return
EO Executing Organization
Eu European union
Fhh Female household head
GoI Government of Indonesia
IDT Inpres Desa Tertinggal, Instruksi Presiden Desa Tertinggal (Presidential Instruction on Neglected Villages)
Inpres Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction)
Jamkesmas Jaminan kesehatan Masyarakat (health Fee waiver Program)
JMC Joint Management Committee
kDP kecamatan Development Project
kPDT kementerian Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal (Ministry of Disadvantaged Areas)
kPI key Performance Indicator
kPk komisi Pemberantasan korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission)
lGCD local Government Capacity Development
lGSP local Government Support Project
llI3 local level Institutions 3
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MDTFANS Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra
Mhh Male household head
MIS Management Information Systems
MoF kementerian keuangan (Ministry of Finance)
MohA kementerian Dalam Negeri–Depdagri (Ministry of home Affairs)
MoPw kementerian Pekerjaan umum (Ministry of Public works)
Mou Memorandum of understanding
iv 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
MhP Micro–hydro Power
Musrenbang Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Multi Stakeholder Consultation Forum for Development Planning)
NGO Non–Governmental Organization
NRM Natural Resource Management
NTB Nusa Tenggara Barat (west Nusa Tenggara)
NTS National Targeting System
NTT Nusa Tenggara Timur (East Nusa Tenggara)
P2SPP Program Pengembangan Sistem Pembangunan Partisipatif (local Government Participatory Development Planning Program)
P3BM Perencanaan, Penganggaran Dan Pemantauan Yang Berpihak Pada Masyarakat Miskin (Pro–Poor Planning, Budgeting and Monitoring)
P3DT (VIP) Pembangunan Prasarana Pendukung Desa Tertinggal (Village Infrastructure Project)
PAPG Poverty Alleviation Partnership Progam
PD Pendamping Distrik (District Facilitator)
PEkkA Pemberdayaan Perempuan kepala keluarga (women headed household Empowerment)
Pk Pendamping kampung (Village Facilitator)
Pkh Program keluarga harapan (hopeful Family Program)
PMD Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa (Directorate General of Village Community Empowerment)
PNPM Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Program for Community Empowerment)
PNPM Generasi PNPM Generasi Sehat dan Cerdas (PNPM–healthy and Smart Generation)
PODES Potensi Desa (National Census carried out by BPS every three years)
Pokja kelompok kerja (working Group)
Posyandu Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Village health Post)
PSF PNPM Support Facility
RASkIN Rumah Tangga Miskin (Poor household)
RE Renewable Energy
Rekompak Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Masyarakat dan Permukiman Berbasis komunitas (Community–Based Settlements Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project)
RESPEk Rencana Strategis Pembangunan kampung (Strategic Plan for Village Development kDP scale–up, with locally funded Block grant in Papua & west Papua Provinces)
RIS Rural Infrastructure Support to PNPM Mandiri
RISE Regional Infrastructure for Social and Economic Development
RlF Revolving loan Fund
RPJM–Desa Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Desa (Mid–Term Village Development Plan)
SIMPADu Sistem Informasi Manajemen Terpadu (PNPM Integrated MIS)
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SPADA Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas
Susenas Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (National Social Economic Survey)
TA Technical Assistance
TNP2k Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan kemiskinan (National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction)
TPk Tim Pengelola kegiatan (Village Implementation Team)
TPkk Tim Pengelola kegiatan kampung (Village Activity Operational Team)
uPk unit Pengelola kegiatan (Financial Management unit)
uPP Program Penanggulangan kemiskinan Perkotaan (urban Poverty Program)
uSAID united States Agency for International Development
abbReVIaTIons anD aCRonYMs
v
IN 2010, the Indonesian Government launched the National
Medium Term Development Plan 2010–2014, which places
increased emphasis on poverty alleviation through targeted
social protection schemes and through other means. The
Plan establishes clear targets for poverty alleviation.
In particular, in this five–year period, amongst other goals,
the Indonesian Government
will attempt to improve on
previous poverty reduction
practices by striving to:
(a) increase the coverage
and quality of the social
protection scheme; (b)
reduce welfare disparities
between provinces; (c)
improve poor Indonesians’
access to basic services; (d)
protect the poor from the
negative impact of external
forces such as globalization;
and (e) protect the poor
from the negative impact of
climate change.
In order to organize its
poverty reduction programs
more efficiently and
effectively, the Indonesian
Government has defined
three clusters, based on the
objectives and targets of
each of these programs. The
first of these clusters is the
Social Assistance Cluster,
the objective of which is to
provide direct assistance to
poor households to ease
their burdens in meeting
basic necessities. The
second of these clusters
is the Community Empowerment Cluster, the objective
of which is to provide social funds to poor communities
that they can use to improve basic social and economic
services according to their own priorities. The third of these
clusters is the Microenterprise Empowerment Cluster,
the objective of which is to provide access to credit for
microenterprises without constraints related to requirements
to provide collateral.
The PNPM Mandiri program is the key component of
the Indonesian Government’s Cluster Two poverty
alleviation program. PNPM Mandiri, Indonesia’s largest
community–driven poverty
reduction program, works
nationwide to provide
funds to poor rural and
urban communities so they
can invest in their own
development priorities.
These priorities typically
include small–scale social
and economic infrastructure,
education and health
activities, and micro–loans to
women savings groups. Plans
to ensure the achievement
of these priorities are
implemented through
mechanisms to ensure
broad–based participation
and transparency. Through
the PNPM Mandiri program,
the Indonesian Government
provides block grants and
facilitation support to every
rural sub–district and urban
ward in Indonesia.
One of the most significant
physical outcomes of the
PNPM Mandiri program has
been a major increase in
small–scale infrastructure
in both rural and urban
areas. Through PNPM
Mandiri’s largest core
program, PNPM–Rural and its predecessor, the kecamatan
Development Program, first initiated in 1998, the program
has facilitated the building or rehabilitation of more than
109,000 kilometers of roads, 40,700 clean water systems,
17,500 irrigation systems, and 28,500 schools in rural
areas. Through its urban counterpart, PNPM–urban and its
MESSAGE FROM ThE ChAIR OF ThE JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
Ceppie Kurniadi suMadilagaDEPuTY MINISTER FOR POVERTY, EMPlOYMENT AND SMES, NATIONAl DEVElOPMENT PlANNING AGENCY/BAPPENAS
1 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
resources (71%), with seven projects and activities totaling
uS$ 133 million.
The JMC also consists of representatives of the world Bank,
which is the other co–chair of the JMC and which acts as
PSF’s Trustee, and development partners from Australia,
Denmark, the Netherlands, the united kingdom, the united
States, and the European Commission. The Indonesian
Government welcomes the significant contributions made
by these development partners, both in terms of their
provision of access to financial resources, but also, and
just as importantly, in terms of the facilitation of access to
international best practice, which provides valuable input
for the Indonesian Government’s ongoing and continuing
improvement of both PNPM and its poverty reduction
programs more generally.
It is worth emphasizing that the exchange of ideas and the
sharing of experiences is a mutual process through which
Indonesia’s experiences benefit other developing countries
around the world. while PSF provides welcome access to
international experience and best practices that enables
it to improve and build upon the PNPM Mandiri program,
it also provides an avenue for the Indonesian Government
to share the valuable experiences it has gathered through
the implementation of the world’s largest community
empowerment program with international development
actors elsewhere. In this way, the PNPM Mandiri program
achieves not only poverty alleviation and community
empowerment within Indonesia, it provides valuable input to
the achievement of those same goals around the world.
Ceppie Kurniadi SumadilagaChair, Joint Management CommitteeDeputy Minister for National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency for Poverty, labor and Small & Medium Enterprises
predecessor, the urban Poverty Program, PNPM Mandiri
has facilitated the building or rehabilitation of more than
31,000 of small roads, 8,700 km of drainage, 164,700 units of
solid waste and sanitation facilities, 9,400 community health
facilities, and 126,500 houses for the poor.
while the physical infrastructure has been important, of
equal significance is the change the program has brought
in decision–making and management at the local level. The
program advocates for inclusion of women and marginalized
groups in development processes and actively promotes
transparency and accountability. This has led communities to
demand better service delivery in all spheres of development.
In 2011, the Indonesian Government sought to maintain
and strengthen the ability of the PNPM Mandiri program to
facilitate poverty alleviation and community empowerment
by improving management and governance frameworks. In
particular, the Indonesian Government focused on:
zz Strengthening the Directorate General for Community
and Village Empowerment’s (PMD) ability to appropriately
manage the program
zz Redesigning the Management Information System (MIS)
zz Strengthening of the Complaints handling System
zz Reinforcing formal and informal fiduciary controls
zz Improving facilitation
Amongst other means, the Indonesian Government works
to achieve these and other improvements in the design
and implementation of the PNPM Mandiri program through
its participation in the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), a
multi–lateral trust fund established to ensure the effective
management and implementation of the program and to
enable the Indonesian Government to access a range of
donor programs and resources.
The activities of PSF are overseen by the Joint Management
Committee (JMC), which includes representatives of the
major Indonesian Government agencies and ministries
responsible for the design, management and implementation
of PNPM Mandiri. The JMC is co–chaired by BAPPENAS and
includes the Coordinating Ministry for People’s welfare
and the Ministry of Finance. As of 2011, the Indonesian
Government executes the largest share of approved PSF
2
IN a country that often warrants superlatives, the
achievements of Indonesia‘s PNPM Mandiri program deserve
particular accolade. In the 14 years since its inception, the
Indonesian Government‘s centerpiece poverty alleviation
initiative has grown exponentially, with a presence today in
more than 70,000 rural and urban villages and wards. PNPM
Mandiri is simply the largest community empowerment
program in the world.
we should not
underestimate the scope
of this work, nor its
importance. PNPM Mandiri
places significant power in
the hands of communities
to decide on their own
development priorities and
needs. In doing so, the social,
economic and governance
conditions are better for
millions of poor people.
In 2009, the Indonesian
Government announced
that PNPM Mandiri was and
will continue to be key to
helping reduce poverty rates
from 14.1% to a projected
8 to 10% by 2014. This will be
an astounding achievement.
The scope of PNPM Mandiri‘s
platform is increasingly
broad, targeting multiple
sectors, from infrastructure
to health to education and
disaster management. As
the scope of the program
continues to expand, so
does its potential impact
on communities. The PSF
plays an important role
in expanding this capacity. It supports the Indonesian
Government and its partners in the program’s management
and technical implementation. It helps ensure strong
coordination amongst development partners in maximizing
the available funds for the various initiatives, and in
maximizing the impact of these initiatives. This is no easy
feat. The breadth and number of agencies involved in the
implementation of PNPM programs and all its sub–programs
is substantial.
The work of the PSF goes beyond coordination. The PSF
provides technical assistance
in the continuous effort
to build capacities of
communities, governments
at the local, provincial
and national level, and
civil society. It assists the
development of a very
robust monitoring and
evaluation framework
which supports continuous
improvements to the
program. It makes sure
that donor funds are
used appropriately.
The PSF also facilitates
the implementation of
analytical work that forms
the foundation for the
planning, management, and
improvement of government
poverty–reduction
programs. A key element
of the PSF approach is
innovation: it provides
space for explorations and
experimentation. PSF’s
pilot initiatives are highly
innovative and carry the
potential for high rewards.
The PSF has various
comparative advantages.
By tapping into the world
Bank’s global knowledge base, it can facilitate access to
international best practices across a range of development
areas. It also has the credentials and capacity to play a
strong convening role, so that all development partners can
MESSAGE FROM ThE CO ChAIR OF ThE JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
stefan KoeBerleCOuNTRY DIRECTOR, ThE wORlD BANk, INDONESIA
3 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
leverage their own competitive advantages and particular
expertise. The key is determining what each partner can
bring to the table. The objective is the best possible way to
make the most of the PNPM program.
As a result, the interaction among donors involved in a
PNPM program is very high — much higher than is usual
for multi–donor trust funds. Donors do not just make a
contribution and then leave the implementation to a single
implementing agency. Donors remain engaged, and their
input is constantly sought. The level of excitement amongst
donors towards the PNPM program is unique. This makes the
PSF quite special.
The success of the PSF has not gone unnoticed. In recent
years, PNPM has served as a model for the development of
similar community–driven development programs, such as
in Afghanistan. The PSF plays a direct role in this. knowledge
sharing continues to expand between the PSF and parties
interested in emulating the success of PNPM. None of this
success could have been achieved without the support of
all our development partners, and the strong leadership and
commitment of the Indonesian Government. we cannot
overstate the vital role of the Ministry of home Affairs, the
Coordinating Ministry for People’s welfare, and BAPPENAS
in leading the PNPM program. we must continue our
support for their vision of inclusive, community–based social
development throughout Indonesia.
Stefan KoeberleCo–Chair, Joint Management CommiteeCountry Director, world Bank, Jakarta
4
FOR the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), 2011 has been a busy
year. As the Indonesian Government’s flagship poverty
reduction and community empowerment program,
PNPM Mandiri has continued to support more than
70,000 communities across the country, enabling them to
identify and implement their development priorities. In 2011,
the PSF continued to support PNPM Mandiri through the
provision of technical assistance to strengthen management
and implementation systems; through analytical work and
evaluations to inform data–based policy making; through
pilots to learn how to address new challenges; and through
innovative approaches to expand the impact of the program,
especially on the poorest and most vulnerable.
The results achieved in 2011, summarized in this report,
confirm that PSF’s business model continues to be relevant to
Indonesia’s efforts in the area of community–driven poverty
alleviation. The cycle of research and analysis to inform
policy reform and operational design, pilot testing, rigorous
evaluation, and scaling up has resulted so far in continued
innovation to Indonesia’s PNPM program. It is illustrative that
delegations from countries around the world continue to
visit Indonesia to learn about PNPM. At the same time, there
have been considerable trade–offs: while fostering a social
movement for community empowerment is PSF’s central
mandate, the reality on the ground illustrates the magnitude
of the challenge the Indonesian Government is facing in
its endeavors to establish core systems and to ensure the
efficient management and good governance of the program.
Supporting the development of these core systems to handle
the repercussions of the massive scale up of the program has
been amongst PSF’s top priorities .
PSF also delivered on its commitments under each of its four
windows:
zz PSF Window One—Direct Budget Support and Co–financing: In 2011, development partners increased
their support for PNPM’s pilot operations (PNPM Generasi
and Green PNPM ). They also provided incremental
support to PNPM Rural and urban to help communities
deal with the aftermath of crisis and disaster. PSF’s Joint
Management Committee brought the total allocation
to these activities to uS$ 132. million, of which uS$
73 million was disbursed by the end of 2011. Given the
success of these programs (especially PNPM Generasi, in
which communities are rewarded with additional block
grants if they achieve certain results related to health
and education related MDGs), the question emerges
whether these should continue to operate as pilots or
whether should graduate to become core programs as
they gradually expand their coverage. At the same time,
efforts to support communities in their post–disaster
recovery efforts encountered implementation challenges
as various constraints in the national disbursement
and other systems affected the timely channeling of
resources to these communities.
zz PSF Window Two—Coordination and Supervisory Support: A full restructuring of PSF was completed in
2011. PSF moved from a “project” approach towards a
“portfolio” approach, facilitating the identification and
resolution of systemic issues that cut across the various
programs. In 2011, there was also a marked increase in
the quality of reporting systems, with the introduction
of quarterly reports for all projects under all windows,
ExECuTIVE SuMMARY
5 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
six–monthly governance updates, and a new PSF website
facilitating access to all of these reports. Moving forward,
further improvements will be made to support in the
formulation of strategy between stakeholders in the
JMC; to strengthen the exchange of knowledge and
experience across stakeholders and partners in PNPM;
to ensure that data from PSF’s research and analytical
activities are accessible to students, researchers and think
tanks across the country; and to support the Government
in the implementation of its policy of zero–level
tolerance for corruption in PNPM.
zz PSF Window Three—On–granting to Indonesian Civil Society: One of the most encouraging developments
in 2011 was the launch of PNPM Peduli, a program that
supports CSOs that work directly with Indonesia’s most
marginalized groups, including street children, landless
farmers, hIV and AIDS survivors, sex workers, and many
others. Beyond its potential to increase the program’s
positive impact on the most vulnerable members of
the community, PNPM Peduli is also an opportunity for
development partners in general and the world Bank
in particular to learn how to bridge the gap between
donors (with robust fiduciary and supervision systems,
but little access to marginalized groups) and CSOs
(with strong grassroots presence, but less familiarity
with administrative processes). while considerable
progress was made in 2011, the challenge in 2012 will
be to significantly increase the number of marginalized
people who benefit from the program. In addition, the
program will continue to focus on the development of
this new business model to ensure that the program can
benefit from the comparative advantages of both the
development partners and the CSO communities.
zz PSF Window Four—Technical Assistance: Most activities
under this window focus on research and analytical work
to inform data–based policy making. The reader is invited
to explore Annex 3 to this report, which summarizes the
major studies conducted, the key findings, and policy
recommendations of the analytical work conducted in
2011. Moving forward, PSF will work in close collaboration
and consultation with key stakeholders to articulate a
framework to identify which additional areas and subjects
have the highest strategic value to inform policy making
and operational design in Cluster Two.
looking forward to 2012, the PSF will strive to place increased
focus on the fostering of a social movement to promote
community empowerment and the strengthening of local
institutions, good governance and accountability, and better
services for the poor. As the Indonesian Government finalizes
its Road Map for Indonesia’s Community Development
Program up to 2014 and beyond, the PSF will focus on
supporting the analytical and operational work to implement
the Road Map. At the same time, it is clear that continued
attention to the support of the core systems in PNPM,
including the prevention and elimination of corruption, will
remain high on the agenda.
As the reader will discover, this year’s Progress Report
includes personal and professional reflections of a number of
the key actors in the PNPM Mandiri program. while the views
expressed in these reflections do not necessarily represent
those of the PSF or of any other institution, they are included
to convey some of the experiences, hopes and aspirations of
the many stakeholders working to eliminate poverty and to
achieve the empowerment of Indonesia’s communities. ∞
6ExECuTIVE SuMMARY
ThE program nasional pemberdayan Masyarakat Mandiri
(PNPM Mandiri), or National Community Empowerment
Program, is an Indonesian Government program aimed
at empowering communities and alleviating poverty. The
program operates in every sub–district in all of Indonesia’s
provinces. The PNPM Mandiri program grew out of the
successful kecamatan Development Project (kDP) and
urban Poverty Project (uPP), pilot projects which began
implementation in 1998 and 1999 respectively, and which
incorporated the design features of a number of preceding
Indonesian Government programs, including the Village
Infrastructure Project (VIP) and the economic empowerment
program, the Presidential Instruction on Neglected Villages
program (IDT ).
The PNPM Mandiri program has built upon an understanding
that Indonesian communities have a long tradition of
organizing themselves to achieve shared goals, with a
number of studies showing that throughout Indonesia,
community–owned projects perform better than projects
directed and managed by government or NGOs.1 These
studies show that community–owned and driven projects
also have a higher rate of participation of the poor, a
greater degree of participation of women and significantly
greater contributions from the villagers themselves. kDP
was established on the premise that this tradition could be
harnessed to achieve development objectives by devolving
power from government agencies, particularly centrally
controlled government agencies far removed, spatially and
socially, from the communities they claimed to be serving, to
the communities themselves (see Annex 1 for a full description
of how pnpM–Rural works).
while self–directed community organization had shown itself
to be a powerful means of achieving community objectives,
including pro–poor objectives, during the New Order period,
self–directed community projects occurred more despite
Government and its agencies, rather than through the
Government. For many years, the New Order government
supported what was known as the “floating mass policy”,
which explicitly banned or restricted political and other
community activities or groups in rural areas, except
during specified electoral periods, on the grounds that it
fostered needless disputation on issues that could be better
determined by qualified, professional planners in centrally
located planning agencies.
Prior to the East Asian economic crisis, there was certainly
an argument that this policy resulted in the rapid, efficient
development of major infrastructure vital to the nation’s
growth. Through this economic growth, the New Order’s
economic policies were credited with creating economic
expansion that “trickled down” to create dramatic
improvements in the standard of living of most Indonesians,
with official poverty rates dropping from more than 50%
in 1970 to less than 20% in 1997 (although, as the crisis
eventually proved, many had stayed at the “near poor”
level and remained highly vulnerable to price and income
shocks — as they do today). From the 1980’s, as part of its
endeavors to improve the nation’s human capital, the New
Order administration implemented a massive program to
achieve universal enrolment in primary education, improve
the coverage and, perhaps, the quality of community health
facilities, particularly in rural and remote areas.
PNPM MANDIRIThE ONGOING PROCESS OF DEVElOPING ThE wORlD’S lARGEST COMMuNITY EMPOwERMENT AND POVERTY AllEVIATION PROGRAM
1 See, for example, the Local–Level Institution Studies conducted by P. Evers (2001); K. Chandrakirana (2000); L. Dharmawan (2002); and A. Wetterberg (2002), cited in Crises and Contradictions: Understanding the Origins of a Community Development Project in Indonesia by Scott Guggenheim.
7 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
however, as subsequent events showed, a number of latent,
unresolved structural problems somewhat detracted from
the overall Indonesian development success story. These
included a weak financial sector, unequal distribution of
benefits from growth, and perceived problems of social
justice. Strong central control and perceived improvements
in living standards kept these problems in check for
most of the New Order period, but when the financial
sector came tumbling down during the crisis, popular
resentment suddenly boiled over into open upheaval. Public
demonstrations and riots shook the country and eventually
led to the sudden downfall of President Suharto after
32 years in power. Indonesia entered into a period of political
transition that in June 1998 lead to the country’s first free
general elections in 44 years.
The change in leadership, however, did not solve the
country’s deeper problems. Despite high rates of poverty
reduction, vulnerability remained high and many poor
did not benefit adequately from economic growth. Three
decades of authoritarian rule had also undermined local
capacity and placed heavy restrictions upon local community
organization. while new decentralization laws were passed in
2000 to give districts greater authority and decision–making
power that did not mean that power would then
automatically shift to communities or indeed be democratic.
Recurrent problems of elite capture, corruption, and political
manipulation in government–sponsored community
development programs were and remain commonplace
to the point of significantly reducing their effectiveness
and credibility.
kDP therefore began in 1998 at a time of tremendous political
upheaval and financial crisis. The economic crisis reversed
years of progress in poverty reduction and plunged millions
of rural poor below the poverty line. Although kDP was not
designed to be a crisis response project, the project proved
to be a strikingly robust way to deliver resources to the rural
poor, despite the institutional turbulence of the post–Suharto
period. As a result, over time the project has evolved into
a key element of the central government’s strategy for
supporting decentralization and local governance reform
across a very broad range of development environments.
There is no doubt that the single most important factor
behind PNPM Mandiri’s success has been the Indonesian
Government’s commitment to the principles of both
decentralization and community–driven development. This
was particularly true in the period during and immediately
following the crisis, when these principles were less a matter
of choice as of vital political, social and economic necessity
if the nation was to remain a viable, integrated unit. But
virtually none of the core concepts in PNPM Mandiri are
new. Rather, PNPM Mandiri built on a number of Indonesian
processes that come from a much larger collection of
programs intended to cut poverty. In Indonesia’s case, the
question at hand was not whether the Government could
find the political will and commitment to a comprehensive
program of poverty reduction. That question was already
central to the policies of the previous thirty years, when
Indonesia saw one of the world’s fastest rates of poverty
reduction in modern times. Instead, the issue at hand
was primarily one of identifying which additional design
mechanisms could make the poverty alleviation program
more efficient and better able to reach groups who had not
benefited from Indonesia’s overall growth.
Three particular elements are essential to understand
PNPM Mandiri’s ancestry. kDP and its urban equivalent,
the uPP, predecessors to PNPM–urban and PNPM–Rural
respectively, built on Indonesia’s tradition of bottom–up
planning. long before kDP was implemented, Indonesia had
developed a national bottom–up planning process whose
purpose was to encourage local communities to propose
investments that could be screened for their engineering and
economic viability and then incorporated into the national
development budget. Thus, the notion of bottom–up
planning was not new at all; what differed when kDP came
along was the level of aggregation against which funds
were provided.
The second source for kDP was a series of projects known
as IDT. IDT built on ideas from economists and planners in
BAPPENAS (Badan perecanaan pembangunan nasional, the
National Development Planning Agency) and the national
universities. This Government program was launched in
1994 to assist villages identified as “neglected” or “left behind”
(tertinggal), especially those on islands outside Java, Bali,
and Sumatra. It was specifically intended to reduce regional
income inequalities. This program made grants to self–help
groups, which were intended to manage funds to on–lend
to other members. while this program was clearly intended
to create opportunities for the poor through economic
8PNPM MANDIRI
empowerment, it failed largely because of elite capture and
inappropriate targeting.
The third root of kDP lay in the Village Infrastructure Project
(pembangunan prasarana pendukung Desa tertinggal, P3DT
or VIP) project, which was closely tied to the IDT program.
whereas IDT provided seed capital for productive investment,
VIP let villages choose from a limited menu of low–input
infrastructure. It introduced a number of technological
innovations to improve the quality and sustainability of
village works. It also recruited and trained civil engineers
from the private sector who were then assigned to clusters
of villages. kDP drew heavily on the VIP’s operational
mechanisms, particularly the engineering designs and its
disbursement and bookkeeping formats.
All three of these foundations had in common a strong
national commitment to local–level planning. Over time
it became clear that the three strands needed to be
brought together into a single program that could support
broad–based participation. kDP was in fact at first housed
within the IDT Secretariat. Although initially conceived to be
a relatively small–scale pilot program that would cover no
more than 1,000–2,000 villages, when the East Asia crisis hit
the project was quickly modified to allow for an accelerated
scale–up.
Strong BAPPENAS and later Ministry of home Affairs (MohA)
ownership of PNPM–Rural and Ministry of Public works
(MoPw) ownership of PNPM–urban have been essential
to the program’s relative success and rapid scale–up.
Community block grant programs frequently suffer from
problems of corruption. Destructive for all projects,
corruption in small projects quickly leads to catastrophic loss
of quality. worse, corruption in highly decentralized projects
such as PNPM Mandiri will quickly spread out of control if
prompt action is not taken to check its spread. Collaboration
with advocacy NGOs who assist villagers to file complaints
against corrupt officials has been helpful.
InsTITuTIonal InnoVaTIon
PNPM Mandiri’s core institutional innovations revolve around
the distribution of functions between higher levels of
government, lower levels of government, and the villages
and the financial tools used to support this. As noted
earlier, PNPM Mandiri built on Indonesia’s long tradition
of bottom–up planning. Its innovations lie in making the
funding approval decision point much further down the
administrative system and in a much more intense facilitation
of the local planning process. Rather than aggregating
and reconciling proposals in districts and then in the
national budget, funds move all the way down the system
to the sub–district, to the inter–village forum, which has
final sign–off on which activities get funded for the year.
Advantages to this approach are its speed and its simplicity.
A significant disadvantage is its divorce from higher order
network planning. By and large, though, village level
infrastructure needs rarely require network planning. Freeing
up sectoral agencies from village level work allows them to
concentrate their own scarce resource on more technically
complex activities.
PNPM Mandiri’s second institutional innovation is its high
level of collaboration with the private sector. Civil servants
play key roles in PNPM Mandiri. They set policies, regulate
the project, supervise implementation, and account for
results. But field activities are carried out primarily through
large numbers of facilitators who support the Government,
participate in monthly coordination meetings, but do not
have the same administrative status as public servants.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows for greater
use of specialized skills in low–tech engineering and social
facilitation. It also avoids burdening the civil service budget
with additional fixed positions and minimizes the managerial
challenges that are inherent to the public sector.
Third, PNPM Mandiri develops village skills and capacities.
PNPM Mandiri’s engineering improvement to village roads,
though simple, double or triple the average life expectancy
of market roads. PNPM Mandiri facilitators train villagers, who
over time take over most functions. Villages are trained in
using the private sector rather than relying on government
for all services. Village record keeping and PNPM Mandiri
procurement rules build up villager’s awareness of how
to shop competitively. Villagers can also directly contract
and manage private sector engineers from a pre–qualified
shortlist certified by the project. There are a large number of
cases where villages reported their surprise at discovering
the savings that result from competitive purchasing.
9 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Fourth, PNPM Mandiri’s decentralized design is very flexible.
This has been especially important in a time of transition.
The program has little difficulty responding to local requests
for adjustments because of cultural, geographical, or
administrative variances. Provincial teams adjust the project
operating manual to reflect such changes. Similarly, because
there are no big contracts involved, stopping, delaying
or modifying works in conflict or natural disaster areas to
meet changed circumstances is relatively simple. This same
flexibility allows PNPM Mandiri to respond quickly once the
problem has passed.
Conversely, PNPM Mandiri is often used by the Government
to provide a rapid response to crises — as, for example, in
the case of several natural disasters, including earthquakes
in Mentawai and the eruption of Mount Merapi, when PNPM
programs have been used to facilitate emergency relief.
The final institutional innovation has been PNPM Mandiri’s
promotion of transparency and civil society involvement in
project monitoring. BAPPENAS managers quickly recognized
that one recurrent problem in their village level poverty work
has been the difficulty of receiving reliable information about
project performance when information sources are restricted
to local officials. A certain level of transparency has been
achieved through the involvement of newspaper journalists
and activist NGOs as independent monitors, which has been
actively encouraged as an integral part of the program. PNPM
Mandiri’s transparency policies extend to the public release
of annual audit summaries. The net result of this openness
has been much more accurate information about project
results, even at the price of occasional embarrassment when
things go wrong. Most observers report that PNPM Mandiri’s
openness and the independence of its oversight also lead to
substantially less loss from mismanagement.
The Role of The InTeRnaTIonal DonoR CoMMunITY
PNPM Mandiri has gone through major transformations
since the first implementation of kDP in 1998. As the
program has evolved from a world Bank–funded pilot
study into a nationwide, Indonesian Government program,
the role of the world Bank and donor agencies has also
changed dramatically.
In the earliest stages of the program, the world Bank played
an important role by providing the Indonesian Government
with the funding to conduct a pilot study that demonstrated
that the PNPM Mandiri community empowerment approach
could work. with the world Bank providing financing, a
number of innovative approaches could be tested that might
otherwise have been considered too high risk.
The world Bank was also able to contribute to the scaling–up
of kDP through the provision of technical assistance. The
world Bank helped by keeping processing delays to a
minimum and by helping the Government improve specific
parts of the project design. The world Bank also worked
closely with the Indonesian Government to make sure
that project formats and disbursement procedures were
kept simple and easy to use. Because of the close working
relationship between the Indonesian Government team and
the world Bank project team, kDP projects essentially had no
policy conditions despite the institutional and policy changes
that the projects bring about. They were all incorporated
into the design of the project and reviewed well before
negotiations. however, both the Bank and the Indonesian
Government devoted fairly significant resources to field
supervision, substantially more than well–performing projects
normally receive. This investment in problem prevention was
particularly necessary because of the ongoing overall change
in central–local government responsibilities across Indonesia
meant that project rules had to be explained to a large range
of new actors.
Additionally, the process of decentralization and the
implementation of electoral and other reforms resulted
in massive process of institutional reform that required an
extended period of learning by doing and capacity building.
without an intensive field presence, the donor community
would not have the knowledge of the real challenges
stakeholders face on the ground, and hence would lack the
ability to provide the support necessary to establish, reform,
and strengthen systems as needed.
Now that PNPM Mandiri and the programs that preceded it
have been established for approximately 14 years, the PNPM
Mandiri approach has been demonstrated to be largely
successful. It is no longer considered a radical, high risk
program. In addition, through experience, the Indonesian
10PNPM MANDIRI
Government and its agencies have developed and improved
on many of the capacities required to implement the
program. So, is there still a need for the involvement of the
donor community? If so, what should this role be?
Indonesia has the resources to achieve community
development and development objectives sitting in its
communities. however, for many decades, these resources
were marginalized from a discourse promoted by both
the New Order and by traditional development agency
paradigms. Ensuring that PNPM Mandiri achieves its goals
involves not just entrenching the language of community
empowerment into formal systems that are implemented by
bureaucrats conducting “business as usual,” it also requires a
thorough, ongoing examination of state building practices
and the related mindset, particularly when these have all
too often led to the abrogation of authority to state systems
through mystification and control over resources.
In some cases, policy makers may be resistant to examining
the processes that have entrenched vested interests.
In other cases, even when policy makers are genuinely
committed to the goals and processes of the PNPM Mandiri
program, they may not have the exposure to the lessons
of international best practices. In addition, their ability to
experiment is limited by the constraints these policy makers
may face as office bearers within the very systems that
they hope to reform. Therefore, one of the major roles for
the international donor community, apart from providing
technical assistance to strengthen PNPM’s core management
systems, is to foster innovation and experimentation within
the PNPM Mandiri program and in implementing the PNPM
approach in other areas of government. The main role for
the international donor community rests in the ability to: (a)
test new approaches through pilot studies that might be too
innovative or risky to implement through standard budget
allocations; (b) provide implementation support to foster a
sense of ownership and to help the Indonesian Government
to assess how to address remaining weaknesses in the
systems; and (c) conduct a robust program of analytical work
to inform next generation policy and operational issues.
In 2007, the Indonesian Government and development
partners established the PSF to provide high–quality,
coordinated technical assistance, policy and planning advice
and targeted financial assistance to PNPM Mandiri. Since the
scaling up of kDP and uPP as the PNPM Mandiri program,
PSF has provided financial and technical assistance for the
design and implementation of a number of pilot studies and
experiments. Amongst other purposes, these have aimed to
test adjustments to PNPM’s core model, such as earmarked
block grants, in order to ensure that that the core model
continues to achieve its aim of poverty alleviation, rather
than degenerating into a standard village infrastructure
development program. One such project is PNPM Peduli,
which aims to leverage the impact of core programs to
reach the most vulnerable and excluded people of Indonesia
through the provision of recourses to Indonesian civil society
organizations with proven experience in poverty alleviation,
particularly amongst marginal groups.
when such pilot studies prove successful, the international
donor community may still play an important role in the
scaling up and expansion of such programs. Examples of
pilot programs whose coverage has been expanded with
the assistance of PSF include PNPM Generasi, which provides
an incentivized block grant mechanism to develop health,
educational and other associated facilities specifically
aimed to meet the needs of the poor and the very poor.
Another such program is Green PNPM, which disburses
block grants that are earmarked to finance community
investments in natural resource management, environmental
conservation, and renewable energy, all activities which
were unlikely to have ever been selected through the core
PNPM–Rural program.
It is a fact that it is easier to implement a successful pilot
study than to scale that study up to become a national
program. with the establishment of PNPM Mandiri as a
nation–wide program, there is a need for increased oversight
and action by multiple stakeholders. The deployment of PSF
field analysts has helped intensify supervision missions, which
are now routinely conducted in more than 20 provinces
and 160 sub–districts each quarter. Special attention has
been put into involving multiple stakeholders in field
supervision, fostering cross–learning and supporting systems
reviews and audits. In this area, PSF can play a role through
its convening power to support a consensus–building on
reform priorities and corrective actions. PSF also provides
technical assistance to follow–up on supervision findings in
11 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
the field and to support the design and implementation of
new policies, standard operating procedures and operational
instruments for the strengthening of core management
systems at all levels. Over the last year, the implementing
agencies completed a number of critical benchmarks, leading
to upgrades in PNPM’s overall performance ratings at both
national and province levels.
As stated earlier, a significant number of key policy makers
have not only supported the implementation of the
nation–wide PNPM Mandiri program, they have also been
fully supportive of efforts to maintain and improve the
program’s pro–poor orientation by implementing measures
informed from international best practices. however,
such policy makers often have limited institutional or
other access to gain access to the lessons learned from
international experience. PSF plays a role by providing an
objective platform for the review, sharing and application
of lessons across poverty programs and for fostering debate
on solutions to poverty programs. PSF’s strategy links
operations with applied research to optimize the design of
community–based programs for increased poverty impacts as
well as to better understand social dynamics in Indonesia and
their influence on development and poverty reduction. For
example, several rounds of impact surveys for PNPM–Rural
and PNPM Generasi have conclusively demonstrated positive
impacts on household’s income, including the poor, access to
services and employment as well as strong economic returns
to infrastructure investments and social accountability within
the program. Special studies (such as the Marginalized Groups
study, stock–taking study on local Governance, Revolving
loan funds study or urban poverty Analysis) complement the
monitoring and evaluation work to foster program innovation
and inform policy formulation. In addition to conducting
and preparing such inputs, PSF also provides a forum for the
Indonesian Government and donors to discuss how such
inputs can inform implementation, together with other
managerial and operational challenges associated with
PNPM’s massive scale–up to national coverage.
Finally, PSF provides the Indonesian Government with a
forum through which it can attract and mobilize financial and
other resources from the international donor community. At
the end of 2011, the Indonesian Government had attracted,
through the PSF, more than uS$ 207 million in donor
contributions, from Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands,
the united kingdom, the united States, and the European
union (Eu). Canada and Millennium Challenge Corporation
are planning to join the PSF in 2012. Currently, PNPM Mandiri
is scheduled to run until June 2015, with PSF continuing in
its current role until that point. At present, the Indonesian
Government is in the process of determining how the
lessons learned from its experience with the world’s largest
community–driven development program will inform its
future policy and programs. At the same time, the approach
adopted under the PNPM Mandiri program has had a
significant influence on the formulation of similar programs
elsewhere in the world, including war–torn Afghanistan
and the new nation of South Sudan. PNPM Mandiri is not
just a program, with a set budget and completion date:
it is an approach to community development. hopefully,
the lessons learned from Indonesia’s experience with
this program will not just result in the empowerment of
Indonesia’s communities and the alleviation of poverty
there, but in a global shift in the development sector’s
prevailing paradigms. ∞
12PNPM MANDIRI
ayip MufliChDIRECTOR GENERAl FOR COMMuNITY AND VIllAGE EMPOwERMENT, ThE MINISTRY OF hOME AFFAIRS
beneficiaries, their capacities were limited. There is an
enormous variation in the capacities of communities in
different regions and in different circumstances, and some
communities didn’t have the capacities to formulate and
implement plans to improve infrastructure, health and
education. So, we realized that communities needed
facilitators to help them help themselves.
Those were the two key
components of the kDP
program: the provision of
funds directly to community
groups and the deployment
of facilitators to assist them
to use them appropriately.
Actually, Indonesian
development has always
involved dynamic
tension between two
different approaches: the
top–down approach and
the bottom–up approach.
In the New Order period,
the top–down approach
dominated. The bottom–up
approach has always existed,
village development
plans have always been
formulated through a
consultative approach.
But when the top–down
approach predominated, the
community had no power
and no resources to actually
implement these plans.
They made proposals at the
village level, which were
passed to the district level
and then on to the center.
Very few of the proposals
were ever implemented, so that in the end people got tired
of making proposals.
So, the final step in bringing about the realignment of
the two approaches was to move the locus of power over
decision making and the deployment of resources away from
IN 1998, the Government designed and implemented a
program the goal of which was to change a paradigm. The
goal was to facilitate a shift from centralism to decentralism.
By decentralism, I mean a system in which the community
was empowered to make decisions over their own fate. In this
paradigm, it was the community that had to take the central
role in development initiatives, not the Government.
The barrier to achieving
this paradigm change was
the question in the back of
the minds of all agents of
the bureaucracy and the
Government: can we trust
the community to make
the decisions needed to
improve their own welfare?
For so many decades,
the bureaucracy and the
Government thought of the
community as recipients,
passive beneficiaries. can we
trust them?
At the time, with the impact
of the financial crisis and
the Government’s limited
resources, we realized that
we had no choice but to
trust them. we knew that the
old paradigm was broken.
And we knew that we
couldn’t answer the question
in our own minds without
putting the proposition to
the test. we had to believe
that the community was
capable of identifying
the constraints that held
them back from achieving
their own potential, of
creating solutions and putting them into practice. The only
way for them to do that was by our putting resources at
their disposal.
At the same time, duty bearers realized that after decades
of the community being accustomed to acting as passive
13 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
the district and central levels and back to the kecamatan, or
sub–district. The kecamatan was the natural point to achieve
a harmonious alignment of the top–down and bottom–up
approaches. under the old paradigm, the kecamatan was the
point at which proposals were discussed and formulated, but
it had no power over the allocation of resources. The goal
was to devolve power to the point where proposals could be
contested and debated.
Since 1998, I believe that the fundamental question that I
posed before has been answered for the Government and
the bureaucracy. That is demonstrated by the fact that in
2006, PNPM was scaled up to
nationwide level to become
the major component of the
Indonesian Government’s
Cluster Two Poverty Reduction
program, which emphasized
community empowerment.
In fact, the major reason
for that is simply that it has
been proven to be more
effective in achieving the
Government’s goals: it is a
better, more effective way of
building roads, health centers,
educational facilities than
the top–down approach.
District heads, provincial and
central bureaucrats who were
initially cynical now realize
that through PNPM, more is
achieved in terms of what
is spent.
Perhaps the main reason that
community–driven development is more effective comes
from the approach’s commitment to transparency and
openness. under the old approach, the community never
knew what was being done with the money allocated for
development initiatives. under PNPM, the community is
actively encouraged to take note of how money is allocated
and how it is actually utilized. Every expenditure is noted
and publicized on public notice boards, through the media
and through the internet. Community groups can question
and challenge the figures. They feel that they own the
project, so they react strongly to misuse of funds. In and
of itself, that makes funds disbursed through PNPM less
subject to corruption, which leads to greater efficiency and
effectiveness. The community monitors and controls the
funds far more effectively than a central–level agency could,
and at a much lower cost.
Regarding impact evaluations that show that PNPM is better
at improving village infrastructure than at reaching the
very poorest members of the community, in part that is a
natural consequence of the open menu principle espoused
by PNPM. Decisions are made by consensus, with the
community as a whole deciding what initiatives need to
be prioritized. I think that to
some extent, it’s natural that
the community will focus
on initiatives that benefit all
members of the community,
rather than a particular group,
even the poorest members
of the community. So maybe
more specific approaches are
required to meet the special
needs of this group.
At the same time, you have to
realize that a large proportion
of PNPM funds go to support
economic empowerment,
particularly for poor women
in villages, and those funds
are allocated according to
the open menu principle.
The program mandates
that a certain proportion of
proposals must come from
women’s groups, particularly
to support their economic empowerment. Through PNPM,
we now have revolving funds with more than Rp 6 trillion in
assets, specifically intended to assist poor women in villages
to establish small businesses, as tailors, in food production,
weaving, in all sorts of activities. At present, there is also
a maximum limit on the proportion of funds that can be
utilized for these activities, with the cap set at 25% of the
total available funds. The impetus for that limitation came
from the world Bank, because of concerns that the funds
might be misused or might not reach their intended target.
“The barrier to achieving this paradigm change was the question in the back of the minds of all agents
of the bureaucracy and the Government: Can we trust the community to make the decisions needed to improve their own welfare? For so
many decades, the bureaucracy and the Government thought
of the community as recipients, passive beneficiaries. Can we
trust them?”
14
Speaking personally, I don’t agree with that limitation. when
I go out to the villages, women’s groups are always coming
up to me and pleading that we eliminate that cap. They
always say that the funds for economic empowerment have
the greatest positive impact on their lives. I feel that the
cap is not consistent with the principle that the community
itself should decide how PNPM funds are allocated. But the
fact that there is still the strong demand for these activities
shows that it’s not true that communities are only concerned
with infrastructure development and not with community
empowerment. when funds are made available in a way that
encourages the community to use them for empowerment,
then they do. I have no objections to the world Bank’s
drive to improve the efficiency and sustainability of the
revolving loans funds, by establishing linkages with formal
microfinance institutions and so on. The community’s
capacities have grown, so maybe it is time for that kind of
system to be implemented. But we have to be sure that that
system continues to serve the people it was intended to
serve. It comes back to what I said before: we have to trust
that the community can make the right decision.
looking to the future, I see that PNPM could make more
use of mechanisms to reward villages for making the right
decisions. Instead of giving the same budget allocations to
all sub–districts, we have to find means of rewarding villages
that demonstrate a higher level of capacity for community
empowerment. Of course, we also need to concentrate on
the villages with lower capacities, so that they can catch up.
we have to allocate funds to encourage the kind of successes
that we want to achieve. To some extent, we are already
doing that: but it is true that people and communities do
better when they are rewarded for doing better. PNPM should
continue to serve as a platform for providing incentives
to all elements of society to work to achieve an inclusive,
transparent, accountable and democratic society. ∞
15 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT15 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
INDONESIA’S National Program for Community
Empowerment (PNPM Mandiri) is the world’s largest
community development program. Through PNPM, the
Indonesian Government endeavors to make development
planning more inclusive, accountable, and reflective of local
needs. PNPM works by giving communities block grants that
they can spend to carry out plans that they have developed
through a participatory, bottom–up planning process that
is facilitated by social and technical specialists who provide
advice to communities but do not control the funds.
The community–driven development approach of PNPM
Mandiri encourages all members of the community to
become involved in the development process. with funds
received through PNPM Mandiri, members of communities
work together to plan, implement and maintain the roads,
schools and other small infrastructure that they need the
most, working with local governments to ensure that the
projects are in line with government’s planning.
Formally established in 2007, PNPM Mandiri grew out of
an innovative pilot program known as the kecamatan
Development Program that in 1997 involved only 25 villages.
Since then, it has grown to a nationwide program
involving approximately 60,000 rural villages. More than
11,000 facilitators hired by the Indonesian Government help
villagers prioritize their development needs, negotiate which
ones take precedence, and train villagers in proper financial
and technical management. The program disburses nearly
uS$ 2 billion per year over some 50,000 sub–projects.
PNPM Mandiri is popular with the members of communities
it is designed to assist. Qualitative impact evaluations
show that through PNPM Mandiri programs, members of
the community eat more, go to school longer, find jobs
and establish businesses, have access to health care and
participate in community and local political forums. PNPM
Mandiri supports development plans made and approved
by communities. By focusing primarily on the process by
which local development projects are planned and managed
rather than on what gets built, PNPM Mandiri marks a
sharp departure from the traditional ways in which large
development projects are conceived and carried out.
PNPM Mandiri’s core programs are programs with a
nationwide reach, operating on the basis of systems
and procedures that have been tested since the first
implementation of the kDP program.
PNPM Mandiri consists of five core programs:
zz PNPM–Rural
zz PNPM–urban
zz Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA)
zz Rural Infrastructure Support to PNPM Mandiri (RIS–PNPM)
zz Regional Infrastructure for Social and Economic
Development Project (RISE)
PnPM–RuRal
scope: national
2007: 33,300 villages/1971 sub–districts/343 districts
2008: 34,405 villages/2,447 sub–districts/336 districts
2009: 57,266 villages/4,371 sub–districts/379 districts
2010: 61,000 villages/4,791 sub–districts/385 districts
2011: 63,000 villages/5,020 sub–districts/393 districts
PNPM–Rural is a flagship Indonesian Government program
that invests in organized, empowered communities which
are enabled to demand a higher level of services; to hold
local governments and service providers to account; and to
seek more inclusive opportunities for local development.
Through the program, the Indonesian Government has had
a positive impact on the lives of more than 34 million people
in rural areas; has built more than 100,000 kms of roads and
more than 18,000 water supply systems; and reduced poverty
PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
18PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
in 60,000 villages. The program is a key element of the
Indonesian Government’s strategy to reduce poverty from its
2009 level of 14.1% to 8–10% in 2014.
PNPM–Rural achieves its development objectives by
providing block grants directly and transparently to
communities to finance an open menu of poverty alleviation
activities identified through a gender–inclusive community
participatory planning process; and by enhancing
the capacity of the Indonesian Government and local
governments to partner with community organizations
to improve the delivery of basic services. The annually
disbursed sub–district block grants range in size from Rp
750 million to Rp 3 billion (approximately uS$ 84,000 to uS$
330,000) per sub–district. Block grant allocations depend on a
sub–district’s population, poverty incidence, and remoteness.
Total funding for the PNPM–Rural program, which began
in 2008 is approximately uS$ 4.4 billion, inclusive of uS$
1.8 billion in world Bank loans and uS$ 2.5 billion of
Indonesian Government funds. In July 2011, world Bank
approved a uS$ 531 million loan to continue its support
to PNPM–Rural (through PNPM–Rural IV ). The Indonesian
Government has secured a block grant budget 2012,
and has requested Bank support again for another three
years implementation.
The program continues to produce good results in
sub–districts, where the model of providing direct control of
decision–making and resources to communities is leading
to improved socio–economic conditions. Research clearly
demonstrates that PNPM Rural has had sustained poverty
impacts: PNPM raises income;2 reaches the poor;3 improves
special meeting for women, an important stage in the pnpM process, which ensures they have a voice in the decision-making and process can express what they want and need.
2 Households in PNPM–Rural areas saw their consumption increase by approximately 5% more than the increase for control areas between 2007 and 2010.3 The same impact is at 6–7% impact among poorest 20% of households. Poor households in PNPM–Rural areas were 2.3 percentage points more likely to move out of poverty;
this is significant given the large number of rural households clustered near the national poverty line. Households in the poorest 20% of kecamatan saw consumption gains which were 19 percentage points higher than the increase in control areas.
19 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
access to employment4 and services;5 and provides strong
economic returns on infrastructure investments.6 PNPM
Revolving loan Funds (RlF) have also become a significant
national operation reaching poor rural women who typically
have no or limited access to other sources of credit.7 The
RlF component is currently being reviewed to ensure that
it reaches its objective of improved rural livelihoods and, if
possible, sustainable financial operation.
The program expansion is on track, with more than
75,000 sub–projects implemented in 4,168 of Indonesia’s
kecamatan in 2011 out of a targeted 5,020 (compared to
2,600 kecamatan in 2008). The kDP/PNPM–Rural series
have financed:
Type of sub–projectKDP (1998–
2007)PNPM Rural
(2008–2011)
km of farm/rural roads built
40,371 68,821
# bridges built 9,049 8,142
# irrigation systems built 11,062 6,527
# clean water systems built
11,081 29,701
# public toilets and washing facilities built
4,822 16,101
# school buildings built or rehabilitated
6,732 21,855
# health facilities built or rehabilitated
3,865 10,839
# village electricity units built
842 1,401
# education activities supported
123,837 120,590
# health activities supported
1,037 1,301
# women revolving loan fund activities supported
42,425 258,578
The program’s participatory and transparent framework is
also helping improve local governance by directly involving
communities in decision–making and has been successful in
increasing the poor’s (including women’s) access to tertiary
socio–economic infrastructure and other basic services.
About 60% of funded village proposals arise from women’s
special meetings and a majority of the beneficiaries are
below or at the poverty line.
In addition to being a key platform and direct channel for
resources across multiple development sectors (e.g., disaster
management, finance, health, and infrastructure), the
program also serves as an important mechanism to articulate
and support key policy issues for the future, including
those of integration of community–based programs within
Cluster 2 and also to strengthen the formal and informal
arrangements between PNPM and sector service delivery at
the local level. Dialogue on these policy issues continues to
be enriched through PNPM special programs and pilots. For
example, these special programs and pilots include PNPM
Generasi, which focuses on health and education, and Green
PNPM, which focuses on natural resource management and
village–level renewable energy.
PNPM–Rural’s track record in improving the welfare of
millions of people has gained the attention of other countries
which are sending teams to Indonesia to learn from, create
and adapt their own community empowerment programs.
These countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India,
kenya, Mongolia, the Philippines, Sri lanka and Vietnam.
while the expansion of the program has been successful, it
has strained the management and governance frameworks
upon which the program relies to implement well. with PSF
support — and drawing on findings from PSF–supported
field supervision and systems audits — the Indonesian
4 Individuals living in PNPM–Rural areas who were unemployed in 2007 had a 1.25 percentage point greater chance of being employed in 2010 than in control areas. A greater problem is underemployment, which PNPM addresses to some extent through short term temporary jobs providing a safety net.
5 Individuals in PNPM–Rural areas were 5 percentage points more likely to access outpatient health care.6 39%–68% economic returns to infrastructure investments in water supply, roads and bridges.7 The volume of RLFs under PNPM is much larger than originally estimated, with capital in both PNPM Rural and Urban reached over US$ 600 million and about 700,000 groups
— many of them women groups — with an estimated outreach of nearly 5 million individual borrowers. Client surveys suggest that RLFs have had positive impacts on household income, business development, job creation and children’s education.
20PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
could not or were not resolved at the local levels. New
standard operating procedures (SOPs) on complaints
handling, with a three–month deadline for resolution
of fraud and corruption allegations at each level,
improved protocols for escalation of cases and a new
policy for stagnant and deadlocked cases have been
issued. Annual audits are being carried out jointly
by the National Government Audit Agency (BPkP)
and District Government Audit Boards (Bawasda) in
approximately 20% of the sub–districts and increasingly
the results are read in public to help reduce corruption
and increase transparency. Going forward, there will be
closer collaboration with the world Bank’s Justice for
the Poor Program and paralegals and lawyers will assist
communities in legal cases. Such increased cooperation
is expected to include an expansion of partnerships with
legal aid offices for the protection of whistle blowers and
provision of legal assistance to community members.
zz Improving the quality and deployment of human
resources, particularly facilitators: The role that
facilitators play in empowering communities, ensuring
application of program procedures, transparency, and
limiting corruption in PNPM is crucial. As key players
in the oversight system, facilitators train and monitor
community sub–district financial management units
and village implementation teams (uPks and TPks,
respectively). PMD has taken critical steps to reverse years
of underinvestment in facilitators, including: (a) budget
provisions to create 20% reserves staff; (b) restoration of
the competitiveness of salary scales; (c) new guidelines
on recruitment and instruction on performance
evaluation; (d) budget provision for twenty–one days
of pre–service training and semi–annual week long
refresher trainings; and (e) 95% of facilitator positions
have been filled in accessible areas. while these steps are
encouraging, considerable challenges remain to ensure
all facilitator positions are filled with well trained staff.
Going forward, pre–service and refresher training for
facilitators will be improved, and facilitators in remote
areas, such as Papua, will be provided additional benefits
to make such postings more attractive.
zz Utilizing existing fiduciary controls: The program’s
fiduciary systems aim to ensure that: (a) funds flow
as they should to communities and are managed
properly and efficiently for their intended purposes; (b)
accountability is stimulated through a strong flow of
Government and development partners agreed to focus
making progress in the following key areas:
zz Enhancing institutional and management capacity
of PMD, the executing agency for PNPM–Rural: PNPM
now accounts for about 80% of MohA’s budget but
the organizational capacity of PMD has not grown
commensurate with the program’s expansion. A
functional review of PMD to recommend potential
capacity enhancements and organizational realignment
to better manage the nationwide scale and complexity
of the program is ongoing. The overarching objective is
to ensure that PMD has the institutional and managerial
capacity to manage PNPM successfully, in line with the
following principles: (a) staff fully dedicated to PNPM;
(b) staffed with qualified civil servants and technical
assistance TA; (c) staff selected through competitive
processes; and (d) staff movement in line with
government hR regulations.
zz Strengthening the Management Information System
(MIS): Timely and reliable data is essential for program
managers to monitor implementation and make
informed decisions. The MIS had become fragmented
and suffers from inefficiencies and inaccuracies in
data gathering, transmission and reporting. An initial
assessment of gaps in MIS systems has been conducted
and through AusAID support a firm will be hired to carry
out a systems audit and a comprehensive redesign.
Additional technical assistance from AusAID has also
been provided. key principles driving the redesign of the
MIS are: (a) prioritization of data to focus on those that
are critical to inform decision making at various levels; (b)
built–in checks and balances to ensure accuracy of data;
(c) integration of different databases that currently exist;
and (d) generation of simple and automated reports to
inform management decisions.
zz Supporting governance enhancements: The program’s
ability to promote downward accountability and
enhance citizens’ ability to engage as well as to report
on grievances and fraud is critical to its success. In
a program like PNPM which is operating in a highly
decentralized environment across tens of thousands
villages this is an ongoing challenge. PNPM–Rural’s
Complaints handling System (ChS) is being strengthened
to ensure better capture and follow through on
complaints, including the escalation of cases which
21 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
information among all concerned levels of government
and in the communities; and (c) the capacity of
communities and local institutions to own and manage
their activities is strengthened. while these systems are
in place there are not always utilized to a satisfactory
level. A number of steps have been taken to increase
the utilization of fiduciary controls: (a) additional staff
has been added to the national and provincial financial
management oversight units; (b) internal audits are
mandatory in all sub–districts; (c) new instructions
were disseminated on increased supervision of village
procurement; and (d) a new risk–based audit manual was
developed. Continuous efforts are nonetheless required
to ensure successful implementation of new SOPs and
system improvements, and reverse recent years of
underinvestment in human resources. while engagement
with civil society, which plays a vital role — as watchdog
— in exposing corruption cases has been stepped up,
progress has been more uneven in regards village–level
social controls. Going forward, strengthening social
controls for improved local governance will be
fundamental. In particular, capacity improvements
and increased oversight are needed for community
self–monitoring groups.
zz Increasing implementation assistance from the PSF:
Just as the Government’s team was being overstretched
by the increased scale and complexity of the program, so
was the Bank’s. The team was increasingly taxed to ensure
timely follow up of issues that required management
decision and to provide adequate field–level support. The
Bank’s implementation support has been strengthened
to meet the requirements of a scaled–up PNPM. A
“portfolio approach” has been adopted for supervision
and monitoring, and the various programs and pilots are
being supervised in an integrated fashion.
Progress in most of these areas is ongoing. The underlying
systemic problems affecting PNPM–Rural’s implementation
are known; action plans have been developed and critical
steps are being taken to address them. Capacity constraints
of implementation units at all levels, however, remain
a key constraint and will affect the speed with which
improvements are realized. Strong implementation support
pnpM facilitators play a crucial role in the empowerment process.
22PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
will be needed through the completion of PNPM–Rural IV and
for preparation of PNPM–Rural V to continue to address the
key systemic issues and ensure the program’s success.
The focus for 2012 will remain on strengthening PMD’s
management capacity and making governance and
fiduciary systems more robust. There will be a renewal
of PNPM’s core elements of transparency, accountability,
inclusion, and participation. Government, PSF and other
development partners will continue to engage on: (a)
adjustment of the core PNPM model to different kinds of
poverty across Indonesia’s diverse regions (e.g., targeting
the poorest sub–districts or trying to reach the poorest in
richer areas); (b) bringing the social capital created through
PNPM to bear to strengthen the downward accountability
of local government; and (c) utility/scope of PNPM as an
instrument to address the needs of the most marginalized
and vulnerable peoples (through instruments like PNPM
Peduli, discussed later under window Three of this report,
and through other means).
PnPM–uRban
scope : national
2008 : 8,813 urban wards in 245 cities/districts
2009 : 11,014 urban wards in 267 cities/districts
2010 : 10,948 urban wards in 268 cities/districts
2011 : 10,948 urban wards in 268 cities/districts
like PNPM–Rural, PNPM–urban is a core component of the
Indonesian Government’s flagship poverty alleviation and
community empowerment program. while PNPM–Rural
has been specifically designed and implemented to benefit
the rural poor, PNPM–urban works to ensure that the urban
poor benefit from improved socio–economic and local
governance conditions. Based on the priorities expressed
by the participating communities the program provides:
(a) tertiary infrastructure (such as roads, drainage, housing
rehabilitation, water supply and sanitation); (b) social
programs; and (c) economic support activities to benefit
the poor. Since the first implementation of PNPM–urban
and its predecessor program, uPP, the program has had a
positive impact on the lives of more than 32 million people in
urban areas.
PNPM–urban achieves its development objectives
through: (a) strengthening and institutionalizing elected
representative organizations held accountable to
communities; (b) providing grants to communities directly
and transparently to finance an open menu of poverty
alleviation activities; (c) enhancing the capacity of central and
local governments to partner with community organizations
in service provision; and (d) increasing awareness of disaster
risk mitigation and mainstreaming of measures for resilience.
The annually disbursed block grants range in size from uS$
15,000 to uS$ 40,000 per ward.
The Bank has supported the Government since the
inception of the uPP program to the scale up of the PNPM
to nationwide coverage. In urban areas, coverage extends
to all 11,000 urban wards and 22.3 million beneficiaries.
Total funding for the PNPM–urban program, which began
in 2008 is approximately uS$ 1 billion, inclusive of uS$
442 million in world Bank loans, uS$ 242 million in Islamic
Development Bank loans, and about uS$ 316 million of
Indonesian Government funds.
In 2011, PNPM–urban was operating in 10,948 wards,
1,697 sub–districts, 504 cities (kota/kabupaten) and
33 provinces. Many of the project’s key performance
targets, which go out to 2013, were achieved including the
participation rates of women and the poorest community
members in the planning and decision meetings exceed
their targets for 40% and the percentage of infrastructure
sub–projects evaluated as having good quality exceeded its
70% target. Areas where improvements against performance
targets are needed include local government cost sharing
(only about 60% of local governments are meeting the
minimum investment levels) and riskiness of revolving loan
funds (RlFs). The uPP/PNPM–urban series have financed:
Type of sub–projectUPP/PNPM–Urban
(1999 — 2011)
km of small roads built 31,100
km of drains built 8,800
# of houses rehabilitated for the poorest
126,800
# of solid waste units and sanitation facilities built
164,800
# of health facilities built 9,450
# of revolving loan fund activities supported
222,180
23 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
or 43% of the total, of PAPG investment, which has
exceeded the target of 25%. Most performance indicators
have been achieved. As of December 2011, about uS$
135 million of funds from grants, local government, and
community contributions had been utilized, mainly for
roads (52%), drainage (12%), and house rehabilitation
(8%). About 3,500 km of small roads, 480 km of drainage,
and 16,800 housing units have been rehabilitated. The
remaining funds were utilized for education facilities,
water supply and sanitation, excreta; and
zz Neighborhood Development (ND): ND promotes
urban upgrading by significantly increasing the size
of kelurahan grants (to uS$ 111,000 per ward) and
neighborhood level interventions will target the
poorest areas. Eighteen pilot wards are in the process
of completing the physical construction of projects. In
addition, 255 wards have completed their plan and are
preparing for physical construction. As of December
2011, about uS$ 15 million in ND grants had been
disbursed, amounting to 60% of the allocated funds, to
the 273 participating ward.
In addition, in 2011 the PNPM–urban project continued to
implement two pilots.
zz Poverty Alleviation Partnership Program (PAPG):
The PAPG encourages partnerships between local
government and communities to institutionalize a
consultative process between the two for future activities
undertaken by local governments using their own funds.
It allows local governments to access matching grants
for city–level poverty reduction activities and will finance
poverty alleviation sub–projects that are too big to be
financed by the kelurahan grants, or that require local
government involvement (e.g., networked infrastructure
or operations and maintenance) and that cover more
than one ward. PAPG covers 118 cities. By December
2011, implementation of PAPG had been completed in
64 cities, or 54% of participating cities. Implementation
in the remaining cities is expected to be completed by
mid 2012. As of June 2011, approximately uS$ 58 million
of PAPG funds had been utilized. The number of local
governments willing to participate in the program
has well exceeded the project targets. So far, local
government contribution has reached uS$ 58 million,
pnpM–urban supports the creation of small home based businesses. these ‘nata de coco’ producers from south sulawesi started from scratch and now supply mini-markets in the city.
24PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
like PNPM–Rural, which was developed by scaling up the
predecessor kDP program in 2007 to achieve nationwide
coverage, PNPM–urban’s predecessor program, uPP, was
also scaled up at the same time with the goal of achieving
nationwide coverage. As in the case of PNPM–Rural, while the
expansion of the program has been successful, the process
has strained the management and governance frameworks
upon. key areas where continued focus will paid include:
zz Project Management: Most of the consultant contracts
will end soon, as the consultants — both NMC and
outside consultants — have been contracted based
on the timeframe of particular loans instead of the
PNPM program timeframe, which is expected to
conclude in 2015. while world Bank and Indonesian
procurement guidelines allow for multi–year contracts
and extension of contracts for continuity purposes, the
executing agency, the Directorate General of human
Settlements (DGhS) within the Ministry of Public works,
will carry out a new selection for all consultants instead
of extending the existing contracts. To mitigate the
resulting discontinuity, DGhS, within the parameters of
its oversight structures need to decide on consultant
contracts and provide legal frameworks for the ensuring
continuity of services. The new selection of consultants
should incorporate this new framework for continuity.
In the case of the project facilitators, contracts are made
on an annual basis, which tend to result in relatively high
turnover of facilitators. The project is seeking to align
facilitator contracts more closely to the project cycle to
minimize continuity issues arising from rapid turnover
during the project.
zz Capacity Building: The capacity across all levels of
government and of communities to implement the
program remains limited. The project will scale up
capacity building at the local level, including training
programs for local government officials (e.g., lurah/head
of ward, and officials at the sub–district, district and city
levels). Implementation support, guidelines, and manuals
will also be updated.
zz Delivery quality and implementation: The ability to
implement the program in a timely manner and with
quality could be compromised by a few key risks. Two
are: (a) the timely authorization and release of the
budget by Ministry of Finance; and (b) procurement
processes and the nature of facilitator contracts, which
tend to be renewed on an annual basis and do not
Many of pnpM–urban’s key performance targets were achieved. the participation rate of women and the poorest community members in planning and decision-making meetings, for example, exceeded 40%.
25 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
In 2012, PNPM–urban IV is expected to begin implementation
and will continue to provide nationwide coverage. In addition
to its activities, PNPM–urban plans to begin two pilots that
will cater to the poorest:
zz Specialized Program to target the poorest at
the neighborhood level in selected participating
kelurahan: The specialized program for the poorest
will aim to improve living conditions for the poor on a
programmatic (three year plan), integrative (a “package”
of investments — e.g., housing, drainage, roads), and
spatial (using evidence based on urban planning
expertise) basis. The program will target the poorest
wards in local governments that would like to participate
in the program (and sign an MOu committing matching
funds as well as a commitment for channeling other
local government poverty programs). Communities will
be selected based on population density and poverty
incidence. The size of the grant per kelurahan will be Rp
1 billion (uS$ 111,000, of which a maximum of 20% can
be used for planning). The grant will be matched by at
least the same amount of funds or programs from the
participating local government.
zz Pilot interventions for women’s groups to enhance
participation: This program will aim to provide a greater
emphasis on the participation of women in the program,
especially in terms of the quality of participation. It will
include specialized training for facilitators and BkMs
(community organizations) on gender issues, additional
oversight and mentoring from the Oversight Consultants
in historically poor performing areas, and a pilot grant
allocation from the kelurahan grant to be managed by
women’s groups in selected wards. These programs will
be further assessed by the GoI and the Bank to inform
implementation and potential scale–up.
Additional funding will be channeled through PNPM–urban
for Aceh and disaster management support.
zz Support for Aceh: The PSF will finance uS$ 24.8 million
to support PNPM–urban in Aceh for three years. The
funding will be used for kelurahan grants and capacity
building of community and local Government in Aceh.
zz Disaster management support. The Global Facility for
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is providing
a uS$ 5 million grant to MoPw to facilitate the raising of
provide certainty or reliability (high rates of attrition).
Discussions are underway with MoPw on how to have
a contracting process more aligned with the timeline of
community development plans rather than an annual
basis. A third risk is maintaining infrastructure quality
while sustaining such a large program as PNPM–urban.
while a study carried out by MoPw to determine
the quality of infrastructure and identify areas for
improvement/strengthening, as well as the PNPM–urban
process evaluation, confirmed that infrastructure
built is of good quality; there is still significant room
for improvement.
Approximately 19 evaluations, studies, and reviews of the
uPP program have been carried out since 2001. These studies
have brought significant improvement to the quality of
project design and implementation over time. key findings
point to the need for improvement in key areas such as:
women’s participation, local government involvement, the
quality of infrastructure, more rigorous oversight of revolving
loan funds in line with existing financial systems, improving
complaints handling and MIS reporting, the negligible
impact on household level expenditures, leadership and
“benevolent” elite capture, and the need for enhanced social
and economic programs beyond the scope of the revolving
loan funds.
under the ongoing PNPM–urban III, a comprehensive process
evaluation, financed by the PSF and discussed later in this
report, was conducted. The evaluation goes into some depth
on a number of key issues related to project design and
implementation, including: (a) how the CDD approach has
evolved and how it is addressing the needs of the urban
poor; (b) the PNPM–urban Program in the context of other
urban poverty programs in Indonesia; (c) institutional issues;
(d) the role of local government; (e) approaches to capacity
building; and (f ) the quality of PNPM–urban infrastructure.
The findings of these evaluations are being addressed
through changes in design for next project, PNPM–urban IV
project, and will include increasing the election threshold
for BkMs, requirements of local government counterpart
funding, introduction of special facilitators for infrastructure,
changes in the composition of facilitator teams,
strengthening of the Complaint handling unit, and the use of
web–based MIS.
26PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
community awareness on issues related to disaster risk
reduction and mainstreaming resilience into investments
financed under the project. This program will support
PNPM–urban by focusing on activities related to
preparedness and risk mitigation and will be augmented
with uS$ 700 thousand from the PSF.
suPPoRT foR PooR anD DIsaDVanTageD aReas In aCeh anD nIas (sPaDa)
scope: spADA comprises two projects: spADA national
which covers 186 sub–districts in 32 disadvantaged district
in eight provinces; and Aceh–nias which covers 19 tsunami,
earthquake and conflict–affected district in Aceh and north
sumatra provinces.
SPADA is designed to bring PNPM–Rural experiences in
participatory development planning and implementation
mechanisms to the district level and to build the capacity of
local governments to deliver basic services in disadvantaged
and post–conflict areas of the country. SPADA provides block
grants for local planning and investment at the district and
sub–district levels, with sub–projects determined through
participatory planning processes involving communities
and multi–stakeholder groups at the district level. The
project provides intensive technical assistance and training
to local governments and citizen groups to improve the
local government planning process, specifically to increase
accountability, transparency and community participation.
SPADA operates on the basis of an open menu system to
determine the use of the block grants, but at least 30% of
the district block grants must fund health and education
sub–projects and at least 5% of sub–district grants are
targeted to meet the needs of youth. Both SPADA National
and SPADA Aceh–Nias are implemented by the Ministry of
Disadvantaged Areas (kPDT ).
SPADA was already scheduled for implementation in five
of the poorest districts of Aceh before the tsunami and
earthquakes struck in the Indian Ocean region on December
26, 2004, resulting in one of the worst natural disasters in
recorded human history. In Aceh and North Sumatera, the
disaster left more than 230,000 people dead or missing,
caused an additional 700,000 to become homeless, washed
away hundreds of communities, collapsed many local
governments, and devastated normal social, economic and
political life in the affected areas. Three months later, another
earthquake struck the island of Nias in North Sumatra on
March 28, 2005, killed more than 700 people, leveled or badly
damaged some 10,000 houses, and significantly changed the
very physical layout of the island.
Following the tsunami and the subsequent establishment
of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency8 (BRR),
the Government accelerated SPADA’s launch preparation
and proposed that the project be expanded to cover
all 17 districts in Aceh, and the two districts in Nias.
The Government also asked that SPADA’s programs for
post–conflict reintegration and development be substantially
strengthened for Aceh by including damage and vulnerability
assessments, support for local justice sector reform, and
practical training to help local governments mediate conflict
successfully. with SPADA’s design fitting well with BRR’s
reconstruction strategy, BRR requested the Multi Donor Trust
Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra (MDTFANS) to provide a
grant a special SPADA project in Aceh and Nias.
SPADA Aceh–Nias closed in December 2011, while SPADA
National has been extended to June 2012 with an additional
top–up cycle of block grants in seven districts in two
provinces. Preparations for a follow–up project are underway.
The SPADA National project amounts to uS$ 134 million, of
which 78% is financed through a world Bank loan and credit,
and 22% is financed from national and local government
resources and community contributions. The SPADA
Aceh–Nias amounts to uS$ 51.6 million, of which 72% is
donor financed through trust funds and 28% Indonesian
Government financed.
After a slow start in 2007 and 2008, SPADA has significantly
increased disbursements and utilization rates. The program
has achieved most of its development objectives, with more
than 10,000 sub–projects implemented in 51 of Indonesia’s
kabupaten and for 186 of Indonesia’s kecamatan from 2007 to
2011 out of a targeted 199 districts listed as disadvantaged
areas by the Indonesian Government. SPADA have financed:
8 BRR was charged with coordinating and implementing rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the Province of Aceh and on the island of Nias (in the Province of North Sumatra)
Type of sub–project
SPADA
2007–2011
km of rural roads built 1,283
# bridges built 629
# clean water systems built 3,090
# public toilets and washing facilities built 5,490
# school buildings built or rehabilitated 971
# health facilities built or rehabilitated 414
# health and education government workers trained
32,943
# persons benefiting from legal aid case handling assistance
69,800
# school based management training conducted
161
% increase in new business registrations 72
# vulnerable women, IDPs, and ex combatants provided technical assistance and financial support to rebuild their lives
233,115
# District adopting recommendations for improvements in their regulatory environment
17
27 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
In 2011, all of the remaining investment block grant
resources, totaling uS$ 1.5 million, were disbursed. A
total of 2,679 sub–projects were completed in 2011:
1,276 infrastructure, 677 education, 526 health and
200 targeted to youth. local governments provided
administrative funds to support the project, and all targeted
districts committed to allocate recurrent funding for
operations and maintenance.
SPADA block grants complemented local government
resources for health, education, and basic infrastructure
development, and helped support community and local
government priorities. In 2011, more than 300 health clinics
and schools were rehabilitated or provided with improved
access through roads and footpaths. The block grants have
opened up access to previously isolated villages, improved
opportunities to start small businesses, and improved
access to health and education services in disadvantaged
communities. A December 2011 sample review of completed
infrastructure sub–projects in six districts found mostly
adequate quality although some road sub–projects showed
the results of poor design or lack of maintenance. Operations
and maintenance appeared to be considerably better for
irrigation systems and public service buildings, such as
schools and clinics.
spADA financed the building of over 1,200km of rural roads.
caused an additional 700,000 to become homeless, washed
away hundreds of communities, collapsed many local
governments, and devastated normal social, economic and
political life in the affected areas. Three months later, another
earthquake struck the island of Nias in North Sumatra on
March 28, 2005, killed more than 700 people, leveled or badly
damaged some 10,000 houses, and significantly changed the
very physical layout of the island.
Following the tsunami and the subsequent establishment
of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency8 (BRR),
the Government accelerated SPADA’s launch preparation
and proposed that the project be expanded to cover
all 17 districts in Aceh, and the two districts in Nias.
The Government also asked that SPADA’s programs for
post–conflict reintegration and development be substantially
strengthened for Aceh by including damage and vulnerability
assessments, support for local justice sector reform, and
practical training to help local governments mediate conflict
successfully. with SPADA’s design fitting well with BRR’s
reconstruction strategy, BRR requested the Multi Donor Trust
Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra (MDTFANS) to provide a
grant a special SPADA project in Aceh and Nias.
SPADA Aceh–Nias closed in December 2011, while SPADA
National has been extended to June 2012 with an additional
top–up cycle of block grants in seven districts in two
provinces. Preparations for a follow–up project are underway.
The SPADA National project amounts to uS$ 134 million, of
which 78% is financed through a world Bank loan and credit,
and 22% is financed from national and local government
resources and community contributions. The SPADA
Aceh–Nias amounts to uS$ 51.6 million, of which 72% is
donor financed through trust funds and 28% Indonesian
Government financed.
After a slow start in 2007 and 2008, SPADA has significantly
increased disbursements and utilization rates. The program
has achieved most of its development objectives, with more
than 10,000 sub–projects implemented in 51 of Indonesia’s
kabupaten and for 186 of Indonesia’s kecamatan from 2007 to
2011 out of a targeted 199 districts listed as disadvantaged
areas by the Indonesian Government. SPADA have financed:
8 BRR was charged with coordinating and implementing rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the Province of Aceh and on the island of Nias (in the Province of North Sumatra)
Type of sub–project
SPADA
2007–2011
km of rural roads built 1,283
# bridges built 629
# clean water systems built 3,090
# public toilets and washing facilities built 5,490
# school buildings built or rehabilitated 971
# health facilities built or rehabilitated 414
# health and education government workers trained
32,943
# persons benefiting from legal aid case handling assistance
69,800
# school based management training conducted
161
% increase in new business registrations 72
# vulnerable women, IDPs, and ex combatants provided technical assistance and financial support to rebuild their lives
233,115
# District adopting recommendations for improvements in their regulatory environment
17
28PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
As part of SPADA’s capacity development program, more
than 33,500 teachers and health workers have been trained
since 2007 (over 40% women). Others who have benefitted
from capacity development under SPADA include members
of health and education committees, village facilitators
and empowerment cadres. The training helped to improve
school management and health techniques, business
development applications, and sub–project preparation and
implementation. District governments have reported that this
has improved access to water, markets, and education, and
improved the health of young children and mothers.
The SPADA Aceh–Nias project closed in December 2011. The
national SPADA program will close in June 2012. Much effort
was put into project closure in 2011, including sub–project
hand over to district governments, final resolution of
audit findings and the development of lessons learned
studies and workshops. The formal registration and budget
allocation for operations and maintenance are expected
to be implemented in each district and all districts have
committed themselves to provide budgets for operations
and maintenance in 2012. SPADA Maintenance Teams have
been established in all districts, and guidelines and training
provided by kPDT. As of December 2011, 90% of 1,899 audit
cases and complaints reported since 2007 have been
satisfactorily resolved (98% in March 2012, at the time of
reporting). A workshop on lessons learned was conducted
in December 2011, with invited participants including key
stakeholders from community groups, local governments,
and central government. In addition, an additional cycle of
kecamatan block grants in seven high–performing districts in
west kalimantan and Central Sulawesi was finalized in 2011.
Discussions are under way for the preparation of a new
project, SPADA 2, which will build on SPADA’s strengths
and learn from its experiences. SPADA 2, the preparation
of which is being supported with PSF–financed technical
assistance, will focus on local economic development and
rural livelihoods with the aim to increase incomes and
improve livelihoods for poor households and create business
opportunities in targeted poor and disadvantaged districts.
RuRal InfRasTRuCTuRe suPPoRT To PnPM ManDIRI (RIs–PnPM)
scope: Ris pnpM i: 1,724 villages in Jambi, lampung, Riau, and
south sumatra provinces.
Ris pnpM ii: 1,500 villages in Jambi, lampung, Riau, and south
sumatra provinces
The project builds on the existing PNPM Mandiri platform
and the Rural Infrastructure Support Project program that
ended in 2008. RIS–PNPM I was approved in 2008 and has a
total budget of uS$ 62.5 million, comprising a uS$ 50 million
loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), uS$ 6.7 million
from the Indonesian Government, and an estimated uS$
5.8 million from community contributions. RIS–PNPM II was
approved in November 2009, and has a total project cost of
uS$ 113.5 million, including a uS$ 84.2 million loan from the
ADB, uS$ 21.8 million from government counterparts and
uS$ 7.5 million in community contributions.
The overarching objective of RIS–PNPM is to reduce poverty
and improve local governance in rural communities by
improving access to services for the poor, near poor, and
women. To support this objective RIS–PNPM aims to:
zz Strengthen capacity for community planning
and development, which includes supporting and
strengthening community participation, empowerment
and the capacity to prioritize, design, implement, manage
and monitor community–based projects.
zz Improve village services and infrastructure through
community development grants. Block grants
are provided to villages to support investments in
priority physical, social and economic infrastructure
areas to meet the local needs that were identified in
the village’s medium–term poverty reduction plans.
Consistent with the PNPM guidelines, the menu of
investment opportunities for communities is open,
except for a short list of activities prohibited by the
Indonesian Government or ADB policies. The selection
of community investments is based on the guidelines
prepared for RIS–PNPM. Block grants are transferred
directly to community bank accounts specifically
opened for the project and managed by the community
implementation organizations.
29 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
technical facilitators play a crucial role in the design and implementation of sub-projects. they help communities in assessing whether they have the capacity to build the proposed infrastructure and whether it is useful.
31 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
zz Improve capacity for project implementation and
monitoring and evaluation, which supports project
management and implementation support at national,
provincial, and district levels, including monitoring
and evaluation.
By the time of the completion of the project in June 2011,
all 1,724 villages included in RIS–PNPM had completed their
respective projects; 1,082 community facilitators (CFs) had
been engaged and trained; community awareness campaigns
had been completed in 1,500 villages; poverty mapping and
need assessments had been completed in 1,500 villages;
and village medium–term poverty reduction plans had been
completed for 1,500 villages.
RegIonal InfRasTRuCTuRe foR soCIal anD eConoMIC DeVeloPMenT (RIse)
scope: 237 sub–districts/34 districts in the nine provinces of
north sumatra, Jambi, Bengkulu, Bangka Belitung, west nusa
tenggara, west kalimantan, south kalimantan, south sulawesi,
and west sulawesi.
Building on the existing PNPM–Rural platform, the program
aims to accelerate social and economic infrastructure
development by improving access of the poor to the
following: transportation facilities; water supply and
sanitation facilities; irrigation facilities; market facilities;
health facilities and education facilities; and by introducing
micro–credit services on a pilot basis. The project in
this way contributes to: rural poverty alleviation efforts,
the autonomous development of regional economies,
the increasingly self–reliant capacity building of local
communities, and strengthening the administrative capacity
of local governments.
RISE is financed through a International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) loan in the amount JPY 23.5 billion or uS$ 252.2 million.
The project has provided community grants for 2,355 villages
disbursing more than uS$ 42 million over 9,485 packages.
In 2011, these community grants directly benefited
142,275 households (711,375 persons). ∞
Basic tertiary infrastructure, such as water supply systems, is usually the highest priority of poor communities.
32PNPM MANDIRI: CORE PROGRAMS
Bito WiKantosahEAD OF SECTION, METhOD DEVElOPMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAl FOR COMMuNITY AND VIllAGE EMPOwERMENT, ThE MINISTRY OF hOME AFFAIRS
COMMuNITY–DRIVEN development is not something that
was created through the PNPM program. At least at the
level of theory, input from the community has been sought
for village level development programs since the New
Order period and before. Village level meetings at which
community aspirations are expressed through consensus
have been a standard component of all of these programs.
however, in these earlier
programs, proposals made
at the local village level were
submitted for approval to
the district level, and then
to the central level. Often,
central level decisions did
not really take account of
the local aspirations. That
was a characteristic of the
highly centralized New Order
system of government.
In many cases, seeking
community input was merely
a formality.
Even so, and with many
imperfections, beginning
with the Inpres Desa
Tertinggal program and
the Village Infrastructure
Program, village level
development plans were
increasingly guided by
community input, supported
by village level meetings
and forums. The biggest
innovation of kDP was the
system of disbursement of
funds directly to community
groups and the deployment
of a large force of facilitators.
The facilitators played a highly significant role by providing
training and assistance to the villages to empower them to
formulate realistic plans and to oversee their implementation
to ensure that they achieved satisfactory results. These
innovations were intended to transform the formal
commitment to community–driven development into
a reality.
To a large degree, the innovations did achieve their intended
purpose. Certainly, the kDP and PNPM Mandiri create a
vehicle for expressing community aspirations far more
effectively than preceding programs. however, there is
some danger that the participatory processes upon which
the PNPM program is based upon may also degenerate
into a formality or, at least, not have an optimal impact on
Indonesia’s social, political
and economic development.
If participatory processes
become regarded as merely
a specific characteristic of
a particular program, rather
than being integrated into
the standard procedures
by which government
is conducted, then
participatory processes may
become little more than
window dressing.
we originally saw the PNPM
program as a means to
change the development
paradigm and transform
the relationship between
government and civil
society. I don’t think that
goal has been entirely
achieved, despite positive
progress in many areas. At
present, community–driven
development is not the
dominant principle by
which the processes of
government are conducted,
it is one approach amongst
many, with other village
infrastructure and other
development programs adopting other approaches. In some
cases, even small scale village level projects are planned by
government agents and perhaps implemented by private
contractors, without community input. Communities have
to be clever at adapting to the guiding principles and
practices of each of the different programs. To be really
meaningful, the principle of community–driven development
33 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
the development of a culture of democracy, in which
community members have the power to demand a high
quality of leadership that is capable of ensuring that their
aspirations are met through the regular provision of services
by government. This culture will only emerge when the
community becomes aware, well informed, and organized.
Even in a highly decentralized context, where the role of
local level government representatives and duty bearers
is the most important factor, there is still a strong role
for the central government and its agencies. Central
government and its agencies still retain much control
over local government budgets. Through the power over
these budgets, the center can create a strong system of
regulations, with incentives and disincentives, to encourage
local governments to move in
the right direction. however,
just as change requires political
commitment at the local level,
it also requires ongoing political
commitment at the central
level. In the end, the quality
of local leadership and the
degree to which a strong civil
society emerges throughout the
provinces is highly dependent
on the quality of central
level leadership.
I have been very glad to
participate in the scaling up of
the kDP program to become the
national PNPM Mandiri program.
The scaling up of the program throughout Indonesia has
created a vast body of experiences through which everyone
involved has learned enormously. Everyone involved has
come to understand what works and what doesn’t. In
some ways, the implementation of community–driven
development through the PNPM program has been limiting.
After more than a decade’s experience, it’s time that the
underlying principles that drive the program become
mainstreamed and fully integrated not just into the system
of government in Indonesia, but into its culture, its systems
of social interaction, and its way of thinking. Speaking
personally, I believe that the success of our endeavors over
the years can only be measured in those terms. ∞
has to be adopted as the fundamental guiding principle
of government, not merely as a formal step in a specific
project. The community’s right to determine its own priorities
and to access the resources to implement them must be
institutionalized as a fundamental human right.
The only way that this can be achieved is through a
strengthening of civil society. without this, the impact
of community–driven development will be confined to
specific programs intended to achieve limited and specific
goals, such as the improvement of village infrastructure. By
strengthening civil society, we can facilitate collective action
to ensure that government duty bearers provide services
that meet the aspirations of all members of all communities,
not just through the PNPM program, but through all of
the Government’s activities.
At present, this is not being
achieved. This means that if and
when the PNPM program comes
to an end, the development
of community health centers,
schools, and other basic
services may no longer be
fully guided on the basis of
community input.
At present, to encourage the
mainstreaming of participatory
principles, we are experimenting
with a pilot study to encourage
the full integration of these
principles into government
processes, particularly at the
local level. Through PNPM Integration, we are trying to
develop a system that recognizes and rewards the degree
to which local governments take account of community
aspirations. From what I’ve seen, not every district in the pilot
study has performed well. The quality of leadership in each
district is a vital factor. In districts where the executive has
visionary qualities and is fully committed to the program,
good results can be achieved. without that quality of
leadership, the program is often unsuccessful.
however, we can’t assume that every district will somehow
be blessed with a visionary leader. we have to empower
communities so that they can insist on high quality leaders.
This goes back to strengthening civil society. It involves
“By strengthening civil society, we can facilitate
collective action to ensure that government duty bearers provide services that meet the
aspirations of all members of all communities, not just through the PNPM program
but through all of the Government’s activities.”
34
ThROuGh window One, PSF provides direct budget and
co–financing support for Indonesian Government community
empowerment programs. In particular, PSF provides financial
and other assistance to implement pilot projects. These pilot
programs are intended to test strategies and approaches
that are considered to have the potential to improve the
Indonesian Government’s community–driven development
approach but that have not yet been thoroughly tested
through wide–scale implementation. Examples of innovative
pilot programs whose coverage has been expanded include
PNPM Generasi and Green PNPM. PNPM Generasi uses an
incentivized block grant mechanism to fund community
initiatives related to health care and education to help
Indonesia meet its millennium development goals. To this
point, it is the only program of this kind in the world. Green
PNPM uses an incentivized block grant mechanism to fund
community investments in natural resource management,
environmental conservation, and renewable energy, and
thus supports a diverse range of activities which might
otherwise not have been selected through the core
PNPM–Rural program.
In addition, through this window, PSF resources are used
to provide additional support to communities who face
particular challenges, such as those impacted by natural
disasters and to those particularly vulnerable to falling into
poverty as a result of significant economic disruptions.
Projects funded through window One include the following:
zz Green PNPM
zz PNPM Generasi
zz Disaster Management Support
zz PNPM–Rural III Additional Financing (Crisis)
gReen PnPM
There is a clear and pressing need to enlist Indonesia’s
communities in an endeavor to achieve green,
environmentally sustainable development and growth
for this generation of Indonesians and those that follow.
Since Independence, the exploitation of natural resources
has been a major driver of Indonesia’s economic growth,
but deforestation and wetland destruction, exacerbated
by illegal logging and a poorly controlled expansion of oil
palm and pulpwood plantations, threaten Indonesia’s social
stability, national security, environment, health, and future
economic growth.
Across Indonesia, the demand from pulp and paper
mill operations drives illegal logging, resulting in the
disappearance of old–growth native forests and costing
the Government nearly uS$ 2 billion in lost tax revenue
annually.9 Rapidly expanding palm oil plantations also
are exacerbating the depletion of forests and wetlands.
Deforestation in Indonesia is so prevalent that at current rates
of destruction, old–growth native forests could disappear
within 30 years10. This would have devastating consequences
for the poor, wildlife and the world’s climate. Indonesia is
the third–largest greenhouse gas emitter, behind only China
and the united States,11 and destructive land–use practices
account for 85% of Indonesia’s emissions, while the resulting
oil palm and forest products sectors contribute less than
8% to its GDP12. Fires caused by the draining of peat–land
soils are not only an exceptionally large source of emissions,
but also result in economic losses estimated at uS$ 4 billion
annually, causing major health problems in local populations
through smoke inhalation13.
wINDOw ONEDIRECT BuDGET SuPPORT AND CO–FINANCING FOR COMMuNITY EMPOwERMENT
9 USAID, Growing Conflict and Unrest in Indonesian Forests, 2004; Human Rights Watch, Wild Money, 2009.10 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.11 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; World Resources Institute.12 The National Development and Planning Agency of Indonesia (Bappenas), Reducing carbon emissions from Indonesia‘s peat lands, 2009.13 The Indonesian National Board on Climate Change, Fact Sheet — Carbon Emissions and Development, 9–6–2010.
36wINDOw ONE
At least until very recently, national legislation regulating
both village governance and natural resource management
has been based on the primacy of centralized state authority
as the ultimate arbiter of “the national good.” while recent
decentralization initiatives have devolved certain powers
and responsibilities to local governments, they have not
yet fundamentally altered this enduring fact. Especially
during the New Order administration, the concept of local
community–based rights was pitted against ideas about
modernity and the national interest. This state–based
paradigm reached its pinnacle in the early 1980s when the
New Order administration classified over 75% of the total
land area as state forest, including over 90% of the Outer
Islands. The approach ignored pre–existing local rights to
millions of hectares of land, forests, coastlines and other
natural resources.
Green PNPM’s design is based largely on the recognition
that remote, rural communities are more adversely affected
by environmental degradation and climate change than
other segments of the population because they are more
dependent on proper management of natural resources
to secure their livelihoods. The pilot–project builds on
PNPM–Rural’s community–driven development model, which
emphasizes that it is rural communities themselves who
are in the best position to identify what local development
activities will lead to the greatest social, economic, and
environmental benefits. Since PNPM–Rural’s inception
participating communities have mostly opted to invest
block grant funds in small–/medium–sized infrastructure
activities which demonstrate an immediate and clear impact
on their welfare and livelihoods. however, this approach
to prioritization has seldom resulted in investments
related to improved NRM practices — as these are typically
longer–term initiatives, with benefits and linkages to
livelihood improvement unknown or less concrete to the
participating communities.
The Green PNPM pilot–project was therefore established
to promote a greater emphasis on environmental issues
in the community–driven development planning process,
and to demonstrate that there are potential investment
opportunities for communities through which they can
realize socio and economic benefits while working to
conserve Indonesia’s natural resources.
Green PNPM is the five year (2008–2012) uS$ 51.7 million
environmental pilot–project of the Indonesian Government’s
PNPM–Rural program of which the PSF finances uS$ 37.3 and
the Canadian International Development Agency finances
uS$ 14.4 million. The pilot–project disburses block grants
and provides technical assistance to target locations in eight
provinces on the Islands of Sulawesi and Sumatra which are
specifically earmarked for community investments in ‘green
sub–projects’ — activities focused on NRM, environmental
conservation, and renewable energy (RE).
In 2008 Green began operating in 33 sub–districts in 4 target
provinces on Sulawesi: North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi,
Southeast Sulawesi, and west Sulawesi. In 2010 the pilot
more than doubled its geographic coverage and expanded
to reach an additional 45 sub–districts within 4 target
provinces on Sumatra: Aceh, Bengkulu, North Sumatra, and
west Sumatra. within each of these provinces, there are three
to five target districts and nine to fifteen target sub–districts
in which Green PNPM’s technical components are currently
operational.
The majority of Green PNPM’s budget (uS$ 28.8 million,
67% of total budget) finances block grants disbursed
at the sub–district and district levels for the planning
and implementation of community–selected green
sub–projects. Every Green PNPM target sub–district receives
a community block grant of Rp 500 million (approximately
uS$ 55,600). Each of the target sub–districts also receives
an Rp 100 million (approximately uS$ 11,100) operational
planning grant to organize village meetings to facilitate the
sub–project selection process.
Since 2010, Green PNPM has been fully operational in all
planned target sub–districts on Sulawesi and Sumatra.
In 2011, a qualitative evaluation was completed and indicated
that the pilot has been effective in supporting community
investments in a broad range of activities focused on NRM,
conservation, renewable energy (RE), and environmentally
sound income generating activities. Also during 2011, an
uS$ 18 million additional financing package was finalized to
ensure sufficient funds were available to disburse two more
rounds of Green PNPM block grants (2011 and 2012). To
improve the quality of technical assistance available, two CSO
grant agreements were extended and the CSOs’ approach
37 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
refined to focus more on assisting communities in the design
and implementation of more sustainable ‘green sub–projects’.
The 2011 round of block grants activities supported
the following:
zz Income generating activities: Communities
implemented 306 sub–projects disbursing Rp 16.4 billion,
which were topped up with community contributions
totaling Rp 2 billion. The sub–projects included activities
such as training of farmer groups to increase production,
establishment of organic fertilizers small businesses,
and coconut–shell charcoal briquette production, crab
fattening, orange grove maintenance, bee–keeping,
seaweed farming, and nursery development. Over
22,500 households benefitted from these activities and
about half of the beneficiaries were women.
zz Conservation activities: The project disbursed Rp
2.4 billion, with additional community contributions
of Rp 2.6 billion and communities implemented
271 sub–projects which focused on conservation
activities, which included training communities to
select, cultivate, and plant ecologically appropriate
coastal and forest plants to rehabilitate ecologically
sensitive conservation areas, and measures to combat
erosion in watershed areas. About 30,000 households
benefitted from these activities and more than half of the
beneficiaries were women.
zz Renewable energy: RE block grants disbursed Rp
54.4 billion, with additional community contributions
of Rp 3.1 billion. Communities implemented
134 sub–projects, including 61 micro–hydro power (MhP)
schemes supporting rural electrification and providing
energy access for remote villages. The implementation
of MhP schemes such as small–scale ‘village utility’
projects differs significantly with regard to design,
construction and management from more standard
PNPM implemented sub–projects (e.g., a simple bridge or
road). The lack of qualified technical assistance provided
by the NMC to MhP construction continued to delay
implementation, with the project’s technical support
unit being stretched beyond its capacity to fill this
technical assistance gap. The contracts for 15 additional
the use of biogas from household waste illustrates how green investments can create economic benefits for communities while helping preserve indonesia’s natural resources.
38wINDOw ONE
MhP specialists to fill this gap were being finalized at the
end of the year. Construction of the MhP schemes will
accelerate in 2012 and plans to extend the project into
2013 to complete activities will be considered as needed.
Also during 2011, the NMC launched an overhauled MIS,
and associated training was delivered to the facilitators
responsible for collecting data and maintaining the system.
The MIS is vastly improved. Revised performance target
indicators for GOI executed activities and CSO executed
activities were also agreed in 2011, and the Monitoring
Plan and Qualitative Evaluation Plan were finalized. The
GOI and world Bank agreed on a number of qualitative
evaluations and studies to be conducted over the next
nine months. These studies are designed to assess: (a) the
cost–effectiveness/return on investment on MhP schemes;
(b) economic impact of ‘income–generating activities’; and
(c) possible positive spillover effects from Green PNPM in
other areas. They will used as input for concept development
for a ‘performance based’ model for NRM/RE Block Grant
disbursements in the future.
In 2012, as the current pilot draws to a close, the GoI with
support from the PSF will assess its progress, draw on lessons
learned, and innovate further the green agenda under Cluster
II, including through the core PNPM–Rural program. Thus
the priorities for 2012 include: (a) completing studies on the
quality of ‘green sub–projects’ implementation during the
pilot phase. These studies will be consolidated to produce a
comprehensive evaluation of Green PNPM. The evaluation will
inform decision–making around which current PNPM Green
activities should become a part of mainstream PNPM–Rural,
and which should be phased out, as well as new initiatives for
future piloting; (b) developing concrete ideas on how best
PNPM–Rural may address pressing environmental issues such
as climate change, and the viability of new activities such
as incentive based payments of improved environmental
outcomes; and (c) working with the GoI and involved CSOs
to ensure disbursement of the remaining block grants for
green sub–projects. Particular focus will be paid to MhP
sub–projects to ensure that they can be completed by
December 2012.
this community is being trained by pnpM Green on how to make charcoal briquettes. it will thus be able to access an alternative source of energy.
39 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Project Development Objective: To make the utilization of natural resources by rural communities sustainable.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 37.34 million; Total Disbursements: uS$ 16.24 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
# of project beneficiaries (cumulative) 863,957 1,106,397 912,000 (original target to be revised)
# of environmentally–sound and/or natural resource management sub–projects implemented by communities in target location (cumulative)
1,610 2,243 2,500
# of households deriving energy from renewable sources (cumulative)
15,235 25,678 30,000
Component 1. Block Grants for ‘Green–Sub–Projects’
uS$ million of Block Grant funding disbursed to finance community selected subprojects in target sub–districts (cumulative)
PSF 7.22 16.02 26.00
CIDA+PSF 14.63 24.88 32.40
# of renewable energy (RE) sub–projects financed and being properly managed by participating communities (cumulative)
74 208 250
# of households receiving electricity through MhP schemes (cumulative)
9,249 13,824 19,098
Sustained community maintenance of green subprojects after annual block grant funding is fully disbursed
n/a 40% 75%
Component 2. Facilitation support
# of green facilitators trained 133 146 160
level of participating villages demonstrate that green sub–projects are aligned with RPJM–Desa
n/a 30% 80%
level of community and local government awareness of links between improved NRM practices and enhanced livelihood
n/a 60% 70%
level of community satisfaction with quality of NRM TA provided by facilitators
n/a 60% (estimated; to be confirmed by
planned study)
70%
Component 3. Monitoring, Evaluation and Studies
MIS redesign Ongoing Completed n/a
40wINDOw ONE
uNlIkE on the crowded, fertile island of Java, many of the
districts in Indonesia’s sparsely populated outer islands, in
Sumatra, Sulawesi, kalimantan and Papua, cover wide areas.
In these districts, small communities are spread out and
separated by great distances. This adds expense and creates
serious challenges for the development of road systems,
power and water supplies, as well as health and educational
systems. As a result, people in these outer islands are often
deprived of basic services that people in towns or densely
populated rural areas take for granted.
Amongst other disadvantages, it is often prohibitively
expensive for PlN, the state electricity company, to provide
electric power to isolated communities. Thus, without
resorting to expensive, diesel fueled generators, craft workers
and home industries cannot use power tools to drive their
enterprises. It is hard for farmers to store or process their
produce, which often means that they are often forced to
sell it under duress and at low prices. Poor householders
must either limit their activities to daylight hours or spend a
significant proportion of their income on kerosene for lamps.
Schools cannot light class rooms or operate computers or
other equipment. health workers cannot safely store vaccines
and other sensitive chemicals. It is hardly surprising, then,
that one of the top priorities of local communities in remote
areas is to develop a steady, reliable and affordable supply of
electric power.
Abdul Aziz is the head of a team elected in 2008 by members
of his community to devise and implement a micro hydro
electric power generation system in the village of Peradun
Temeras in Jambi province, Sumatra. A respected member
of the community who makes a modest living as a farmer
and carpenter, he describes his community as follows: “The
village consists of 130 family units. Most of the people here
are farmers, growing rubber or coconut for sale in Bangko,
the nearest major town. By road, in the dry season, it takes
about four hours to reach. Before the Rural PNPM Mandiri
project, the only electricity here came from generators. Only
a handful of the richest households could afford a generator.
A television was a luxury beyond the reach of practically
everyone. Just to light a small house with kerosene lamps
cost Rp 450,000 per month, about a half of the basic wage in
the district. Poor families had to live in the dark.”
when communities in the sub–district were invited to
submit a proposal for funds under the Rural PNPM Mandiri
program, the villagers in Peradun Temeras were unanimous
that there top priority was to secure a supply of electricity.
Abdul Aziz says that they considered a number of proposals:
“The foliage here is thick and the rainy seasons are long. Solar
power would be too unreliable. however, we have a plentiful
supply of rivers. we believed we could harness those rivers to
create power.”
under the Rural PNPM Mandiri program, a community is
usually required to utilize its own resources, in terms of
building materials, labor, and existing facilities to develop
the facilities to which it aspires. Additional funds are then
provided by the program to secure equipment, materials or
other resources required to facilitate the program. As Abdul
Aziz says: “we have a river that flows in all seasons. we have
an abundant supply of rocks and clay. And we have farmers
and laborers who are used to hard work. we proposed that if
PNPM could provide us with the funds to buy the generator,
the community could build a 250 meter course way to direct
the water with our own resources. Alhamdulillah, because
we could demonstrate a clear need for the facilities and a
willingness to dedicate our own resources to obtaining them,
our project was approved.”
lET ThERE BE lIGhT
41 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
The project required a massive effort on behalf of all
members of the community. To build the course way, groups
of local women carried a total of 580 cubic meters of rock,
while men dug a wide trench in the hard, clay ground with
spades and shovels. Abdul Aziz describes how the villagers
were deployed: “we set up 21 small working groups, with
each group responsible for an eleven meter stretch of the
course way. That way, the whole village could monitor and
assess the work of each small group. If one group failed to
keep up, the rest of the village could put pressure on them.
But no–one was paid for their labor. we all knew that the
reward would come when the village had electricity.”
when the community had demonstrated sufficient progress,
the PNPM program released funds amounting to Rp
341 million to purchase the generator and other equipment.
Abdul Aziz describes the tendering process as follows: “The
whole village was involved in selecting the supplier from
three tenders. It was a stressful and emotional process. After
all the work we had put in, it would have broken our hearts
if the project failed because the supplier wasn’t able to fulfill
his promises.”
The community was not disappointed. By 2009, the generator
was supplying electricity to 130 families from the village,
with a total capacity of 50,000 Mw. As Abdul Aziz says: “That
is enough for power from 3pm to 7am every day. we’ve only
had blackouts twice this year. Each family pays Rp 500 per
watt, which is less than a city dweller pays. To light a small
house, it now costs less than Rp 40,000 per month. Children
can study at night. women use electric tools to make
coconut milk. The school has a computer now. As a carpenter,
I’ve purchased power tools that I use to make door frames
and other timber products. Because of that, my income has
gone up significantly. I was never paid a single rupiah for
the work I did and neither was anyone else. But the entire
community has benefitted. we did it through our own hard
work, it wasn’t something the Government did for us.” ∞
‘we offered to build a 250 meter canal with our own resources if pnpM provided us with funding to buy the generator’, says Abdul Aziz, illustrating how villagers prioritize access to electricity.
42
PnPM geneRasI14
A cursory examination of the Report on the Achievement of
the Millennium Development Goals in indonesia shows that,
looking at the nation as a whole, apart from a few small
bumps in the road, Indonesia has made significant progress
towards reducing poverty, improving gender equality
at schools, reducing tuberculosis and the prevalence of
malnutrition amongst children, achieving universal literacy
and primary enrolment, and developing more open markets.
unfortunately, development indices and the MDG report
cards focus on data aggregated at the national level.
while the achievements listed in the report may reflect
real economic growth and improved living conditions for
the majority of Indonesians, they hide the fact that not
all Indonesians have benefitted to the same extent. Even
looking at the aggregated national data, it is clear that the
country continues to be characterized by a high rate of
14 The full English title of this program is “National Community Empowerment Program — Healthy and Smart Generation” . However, it is usually referred to by its short Indonesian title, PNPM Generasi.
poverty and a lack of services for its most vulnerable citizens,
including women and children.
The report claims to have “already achieved” a major step
towards Goal 1 (“Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”),
with a reduction in the proportion of people with a per
capita income of less than one dollar per day declining from
20.6% in 1990 to 5.9% in 2008. however, serious questions
remain about whether this indicates a comprehensive
reduction in the proportion of people living either in
poverty or highly vulnerable to price and income shocks.
There is broad consensus that the line of “one dollar a day”
underestimates the total number of poor: consequently, the
Indonesian Government has set its own poverty level slightly
higher. Even when the poverty line is set at one dollar per
day, 13% of Indonesia’s population of 240 million people still
lives below the national poverty line. In addition, nearly half
the population remains extremely vulnerable to poverty,
living on less than two dollars per day.15
15 United Nations Development Programme: Indonesia: MDG, accessed at http://www.undp.or.id/mdg/index.asp
pnpM Generasi supports the realization of Millennium Development Goals in the education and health sectors. investments in early childhood education are one of the strategies chosen by communities to improve their education outcomes.
43 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Before children had to walk 7km to go to school. women proposed the building of 3 semi-permanent classrooms in the village to pnpM Generasi, and children are now able to study close to home.
In 2007, the Ministry of health’s Basic health Research
survey reported that Indonesia had achieved the first
Millennium Development Goal of reducing the prevalence
of underweight among under–five children to 18%. The
same survey, however, demonstrated an alarmingly high
rate of stunting, with 37% of children under five years old
suffering. This means that one out of every three children in
this age group is shorter than the standard height for their
age. In some provinces such as East Nusa Tenggara (NTT )
the stunting rate rises to 47%, which means that nearly every
second child in this province is stunted. while globally there
is obviously a relationship between income levels and rates
of stunting, it is also true that other factors, such as the level
of awareness of good parenting and nutritional factors,
has a strong impact on rates of malnutrition, and that this
awareness can be improved even in the absence of increases
in income. Indonesia still has room to make significant
progress, as shown by the fact that countries such as Togo
and Ghana, which have lower average income levels than
Indonesia, nonetheless have a better record in reducing rates
of stunting.
while there has been measured progress towards achieving
its maternal health MDG with the maternal mortality rate
falling from 390 deaths amongst mothers per 100,000 live
births in 1991, to 228 deaths in 2007, the rate is still higher
than any other country in Southeast Asia. The rate is more
than twice the figure considered “acceptable” according to
MDG’s defined sub–goals16.
Significant inequalities and imbalances in the level of human
development, particularly between major cities and isolated
rural areas and between the resource–rich and economically
developed western regions and the deeply impoverished
east persist. For example, the current maternal mortality
rate in NTT is 306 per 100,000. This figure, which is 34%
16 The defined target for 2015 is 102 deaths per 100,000 live births.
the community in tenilo Village in Gorontalo proposed a different solution, with the purchase of a boat to transport kids to school. children used to have to walk 4km to go to school, resulting in high drop out rates.
45 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
the regular monitoring of the health of children under five is crucial to ensure they stay healthy.
higher than the national average, has remained stubbornly
unchanging for more than a decade and is comparable to
the rate recorded across sub–Saharan Africa. Similar figures
exist for Papua and a number of the “outer islands”. It is hardly
surprising that the areas with the worst rates of maternal
mortality also have the lowest incomes, a greater number
of children who are short, skinny and undernourished, the
worst record for the provision of health services, including
vaccinations, and the worst levels of education.
however, it is also true that significant pockets of poverty
with poor access to decent services persist even within the
relatively better off provinces, with some provinces, such as
west Java, having a particularly poor record in the area of
maternal and child health, despite relatively high average
income levels. Again, this indicates that while income
poverty is an important factor, low levels of community
awareness, a failure to ensure inclusion of the poorest and
most vulnerable, and other factors can also continue to
exert a negative effect on mortality rates and other health
outcomes. In education, Indonesia has come very close
to achieving universal primary school enrolment, but real
challenges remain with quality of education received.
Again, it is Indonesia’s isolated rural regions and its eastern
provinces where the quality of education is lowest. Despite
some reforms to encourage the deployment of teachers in
these areas, schools in these zones are often characterized by
poor standards and facilities, particularly a lack of qualified,
dedicated teachers and teaching materials.
Access to secondary schools in some areas remains limited
as demonstrated by the fact that since the implementation
of minimum educational standards for village heads and
other positions, these positions can stay vacant for years —
simply because no–one in the community has completed
secondary school. One reason for this is that while access to
primary schools has improved dramatically over the past two
decades, access to secondary schools is still limited. while
school fees at the secondary level are now being abolished or
reduced in many districts, many young people remain unable
to access higher education because they cannot afford other
costs associated with education, including transportation to
school, uniforms, books, and other materials.
So, persistent imbalances remain both between large regions
and at lower levels, with certain villages or communities,
particularly those living in mountainous or isolated areas
or otherwise with limited access to transport infrastructure,
having a far higher than average level of poverty, regardless
of how it is measured. Even in relatively prosperous areas
with good facilities, a significant portion of the population,
including women, disabled people, landless laborers,
and ethnic out groups, and others from marginal and
disadvantaged groups, derive few direct benefits from
development initiatives.
In 2007, as part of its efforts to achieve its health– and
education–related MDGs, the Indonesian Government
launched the PNPM Generasi pilot program to reduce
poverty, maternal mortality, child mortality, and to ensure
universal coverage of basic education. PNPM Generasi uses
participatory planning and community block grant funds
to facilitate the achievement of 12 education and health
target indicators. The program uses community–based
targeting mechanisms and performance bonuses to provide
incentives to communities to allocate resources to poor and
disadvantaged households who are unwilling or unable to
use health and education services available locally.
An impact evaluation completed in 2010 showed that PNPM
Generasi was successful in facilitating the achievement of
target outcomes for immunization coverage, prenatal care
visits and assisted deliveries, with increases ranging from
10–11%. Child malnutrition rates fell 2.2% as a result of the
program. PNPM Generasi led to strong increases in coverage
of all types of maternal and child health services delivered
through village health post activities.
In addition to stimulating community demand for
and utilization of services, the program has improved
communities’ levels of awareness and commitment to
providing and monitoring services, as evidenced by the
increase in the number of health volunteers active in
PNPM Generasi communities and increased community
participation in activities such as junior secondary school
committee meetings. The program has even led to increases
in provider effort and quantities, including an increase in
the number of hours midwives spent providing services
47 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Among other goals, pnpM Generasi is designed to support the achievement of universal primary education.
in villages; an increase in the number of junior secondary
schools available (through the construction of satellite
classrooms); and an increase in the number of contract
teachers working at junior secondary schools.
In education, the program increased junior secondary school
enrollment rates in NTT province. however, the program’s
overall contribution to improving education indicators has
been less pronounced, perhaps due to the already high levels
of primary school enrollment in many program locations. As
a result, the PSF is working with the Government’s executing
agency for PNPM Generasi, PMD, and the Ministry of
Education to improve program responsiveness to community
demands for early childhood education, and to leverage the
program’s community approaches to improving awareness
of children with disabilities’ right to an education, and to
support community investments in activities that improve
access to education among the disabled.
As of 2011, PNPM Generasi operates in 2,401 villages in
231 sub–districts across six provinces: west Java, East Java,
Gorontalo, North Sulawesi, NTT and west Nusa Tenggara
(NTB). In 2011, community block grants worth approximately
uS$ 37.5 million were disbursed. Communities spent 36% of
these funds on initiatives to support education and 62% on
activities related to health. Roughly half of the block grant
funds in education were spent on school supplies, including
textbooks and uniforms for poor students. A further 28%
of funds were spent on scholarships and transportation
subsidies for poor students. In health, around half of block
grant funds were spent on supplementary feeding for
lactating mothers, infants, and children under the age of five.
15% of funds in health were used to upgrade local health
facilities, while 13% was used to subsidize transportation
costs of poor households to use pre–natal and neonatal
health services. MIS data on direct beneficiaries is currently
being compiled, quality checked, and uploaded to the
web–based server. however, Initial MIS reports show that
over 212,000 women and children received nutrition
counseling and support, 16,000 cases of underweight
children were eliminated through supplementary feeding
interventions, and 25,600 community health volunteers
pnpM Generasi led to strong increases in coverage of all types of maternal and child health services, delivered through village health post activities.
49 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
received training and operational support in 2011. Data on
2011 program outputs will be revised and updated as data
becomes available.
The declining share of block grant resources allocated to
education relative to health in 2011 compared with previous
years suggests that communities are spending funds where
they are most needed. while access is a challenge for the
poorest and disabled, primary school enrollment tends to
be high in participating villages. Funding from education
programs like BOS and BSM (Bantuan Siswa Miskin) can
help poor households cover the costs of primary school
enrollment and attendance. Two of the programs target
education indicators are therefore relatively easy for
communities to achieve. In contrast to education fewer
Indonesian Government resources are invested in health
service delivery and in programs that improve access to
health services among the poor. As a result communities
are investing a larger share of PNPM Generasi resources
in activities that improve performance in target health
indicators that are more difficult to achieve.
On the downside, delays in processing revisions to the
executing agency’s budget document hampered program
expansion in 2011. To avoid risks associated with the
bunching of disbursement of program budgets late in the
Indonesian Government’s fiscal year, the implementing
agency took the decision to reallocate funds for
57 sub–districts to the 2012 budget. As a result performance
in mobilizing sub–district facilitators and computer operators,
training district and sub–district facilitators, and MIS data
entry dipped in 2011. To avoid similar difficulties in 2012,
the executing agency has established a dedicated PNPM
Generasi Program Secretariat within the Directorate for
Empowerment of Community Social and Cultural Institutions
(pemberdayaan Adat dan sosial Budaya Masyarakat—
Sosbud). This is the centerpiece of a series of actions aimed
strengthening internal management capacity required to
support PNPM Generasi expansion.
In August 2011, the Millennium Challenge Corporation
negotiated a compact with The Indonesian Government,
which includes a grant of uS$ 90 million to be disbursed
pnpM Generasi has also supported improvements in service provision, e.g., an increase in the number of hours spent by midwives providing health care and reproductive services in targeted villages.
50wINDOw ONE
through to 2017 to support the further expansion of
PNPM Generasi. The program is part of the Government’s
strategy for improving nutrition outcomes and reducing
stunting, which recognizes the importance of improving
health provider capacity and incentives to respond to
increased community demand with high quality nutrition
education, parental counseling and sanitation services.
while detailed design and implementation arrangements
are being discussed with the Government, the program
will consist of an expansion of PNPM Generasi to
125 sub–districts in districts with high prevalence of stunted
children. On the supply–side, the program will support
intensive technical training for local nutrition workers, a
behavioral change and community outreach campaign,
micronutrient supplementation, and performance based
incentives for service providers grounded in PNPM Generasi
community–generated information on service delivery status.
In 2012 and following years, the Indonesian Government
plans to expand the coverage of the PNPM Generasi program,
particularly in areas with poor health and education facilities
and limited coverage. The Government recognizes the
potential impacts of rolling out PNPM Generasi’s flexible
model in parallel with the program keluarga harapan (Pkh),
a household–based conditional cash transfer targeting
coverage of three million of the poorest households
throughout the country by 2014. PNPM Generasi will
complement Pkh by enabling communities to fill small–scale
supply gaps that generate higher costs and create barriers to
access among the poorest households, organizing collective
awareness–raising and health and nutrition education
sessions, and targeting resources to households who may not
be recorded in Pkh’s beneficiary registry. In June 2011, the
Indonesian Government countersigned a grant agreement
for uS$ 28.1 million in additional financing from PSF to
expand PNPM Generasi coverage to 79 poor sub–districts
in NTT, west Sulawesi, and Maluku provinces. A follow–up
tranche of uS$ 35 million was submitted for JMC approval,
and will expand PNPM Generasi to a further 150 sub–districts
by 2013.
pnpM Generasi has improved communities’ level of awareness and commitment to providing and monitoring services, as evidenced by the increase of health volunteers in pnpM Generasi communities.
51 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
*estimated based on extrapolations from data from 65% of participating communities uploaded to program Mis.
project development objective: The development objective of PNPM Generasi is that villagers in PNPM–Rural locations benefit from improved socio–economic and local governance conditions. The program targets three Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) lagging in Indonesia: achievement of universal basic education, reduction in child mortality, and improvement in maternal health.
approved Commitments: uS$ 42.73 million; Total Disbursements: uS$ 35.95 million
Closing date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 Est 2012 Target
# of direct project beneficiaries (male) 1,941,430* 1,795,598 2,200,000
# of direct project beneficiaries (female) 1,482,696* 1,835,220 2,300,000
# of sub–districts with communities benefiting from improved access to health and education services
212 231 370
Component 1. Sub–districts grants
uS$ million amount disbursed 32.6 37.5 52.4
% of sub–districts benefiting from increased investments in priority health and education targets
100 80 95
% of women and poorest community members participating in planning and decision–making meetings
63 64 65
Component 2. Capacity–building
% of planned facilitator and computer operator positions (district and sub–district) filled
89 70 90
% of program facilitators (district and sub–district) receive agreed upon training days in participatory planning methods and health and education topics
89 65 90
% of data from target communities uploaded to the program web–based MIS
65 52 85
Component 3. Project Management Support
90% of planned program consultant positions (province and national) filled
88 70 90
70% of sub–districts receive program operations manual and health and education information materials
100 100 70
Program impact evaluation reports finalized and disseminated Mid–term report
published
Final report finalized
Final report published
and disseminated
by Q1
# of implementation support missions completed with participation from Government
11 14 17
# of program facilitators (district and sub–district) receiving supplementary training and capacity building support
n/a 44 76
# of thematic, multi–sectoral workshops involving national and local departments of health and education held
n/a 3 3
52wINDOw ONE
ThE district of larantuka in East Flores is sparse and dry,
one of the poorest places in Indonesia. while corn, sago,
vegetables and fruits grow in the gardens on the thin land
around the villages, incomes are low and people often
spend what little spare cash they have on junk food and
snacks. when the Government implements food distribution
programs for the poor, it hands out sacks of low quality rice
shipped in from Java. Instead of providing gifts of free food,
Delegatus Sosial, a non–prostelyzing Catholic social welfare
agency receiving support through the PNPM Generasi
program, encourages farmers to grow traditional crops with
minimal use of pesticides and artificial fertilizers. The villagers
use these crops to produce tasty, nutritious cakes and
savories that the kids love.
when infants and children are badly nourished, it has a
devastating impact on their health, educational achievement
and productivity for the rest of their life. In the rural districts
of NTT, acute starvation of the sort that occurs after a long
famine is now relatively rare, although it still occasionally
occurs. Rather, a huge proportion of children are chronically
malnourished. Across the district of East Flores, children are
too skinny and too short for their age. Often, it is not the
case that their families have no food or cash resources at all.
Rather, available resources are not used optimally to ensure
that children are well nourished.
The director of DelSos, Rosarius Yansen Raring, generally
known as Father Yansen, says that the poverty in the areas
around larantuka is not due to lack of natural resources.
Rather, he says, the poverty of the district has been due to
the failure to tap traditional wisdom to use these resources
optimally. Rather than being helped by government and
aid agency programs, the problem has been exacerbated
by programs that foster an attitude of dependence. “A
few years ago, a big aid agency sent special biscuits from
overseas for children suffering malnutrition. They sent the
same biscuits from the same factory to Indonesia, Africa,
haiti and Cambodia. No–one here could eat them. Parents
left them on the floor and kids just ate a handful of rice and
salt instead of the biscuit. Instead of spending money on
expensive biscuits from overseas, the Government should be
allocating resources to encourage people to develop their
own resources,” Father Yansen says.
In the areas where DelSos is conducting its programs, it
is very rare for funds to be assigned for food handouts.
Rather, aid is directed towards the provision of training in
agricultural techniques and agricultural equipment which is
managed, owned and operated by small groups of farmers,
often consisting of between fifteen to thirty ‘household
heads’. These small neighborhood groups form the unit
through which training is provided. Each group will have
an organizer, who is usually one of the group’s members
who can read and write and therefore fulfill administrative
tasks. In addition, each village has three local kader, or local
community facilitators, each with their own responsibilities.
These kader have been given special training in organic
and environmentally friendly agricultural techniques that
emphasize the maximal use of natural resources to yield
crops that are best suited to the terrain. Almost invariably,
these are traditional crops that were grown and consumed
almost exclusively even a generation ago, but have more
recently been disparaged as unfashionable and kampungan
(or ‘hick’).
“Only some parts of NTT are really suitable for cultivating rice,”
says Father Yansen. “A generation ago, people mostly ate corn,
coconut, green vegetables, fruits, and palm sugar. The public
health department used to say that rice was more nutritious
than corn. That depends on how it’s combined with other
food and vegetables. Corn can be just as nutritious as rice.”
hARVESTING AND EATING lOCAllY IN lARANTukA, EAST FlORES
53 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
however, Father Yansen acknowledges that there is no point
encouraging farmers to grow traditional crops if they don’t
want to eat them. Therefore, the DelSos program strives to
increase demand for healthy food products by encouraging
the production of food that people want to eat. This involves
both rediscovering traditional recipes and exploring new
ones. The neighborhood groups involve people, mostly
women, remembering dishes from their youths and deciding
if they are worth resuscitating. They also involve finding
recipes for modern Indonesian dishes on the internet to see
if the ingredients could be replaced with local ingredients to
produce interesting innovations. DelSos has now prepared
a recipe book which evolves as new creations are added.
The book can be transferred between different villages and
communities, enabling a sharing of local traditions.
One means of establishing and expanding the demand for
local foods has been the monthly feast held on days mothers
and infants visit posyandu (village health posts). Prior to
these meetings, participants pool local ingredients produced
in their own gardens. For the recipes used, very few extra
ingredients unavailable locally are needed, although there is
often a shortage of eggs and other sources of protein. with a
small cash contribution, usually only Rp 1000 per family, and
the local resources, an impressive array of cakes and snacks
can be produced. while in other areas, children have to be
dragged to the local clinic, in areas where DelSos operates,
the day is regarded as a treat and a picnic, swarming with
children chewing on healthy cakes. The event serves to
introduce and share new dishes which other women may
want to try themselves.
The mothers and infants days were held only once a month,
so the food provided at these events was not regular
enough in itself to sustain good nutrition. however, in 2009,
the PNPM Generasi program provided funding to allow
the midwives and community volunteer health workers, or
kader, to provide more intensive supplementary feeding to
children identified as malnourished. By utilizing the recipes
and principles espoused in DelSos’ local harvest program,
small amounts of cash could be matched and leveraged with
community contributions, making this an extremely cost
effective means of treating malnutrition. “Actually, for any
program to be hsuccessful, most of the contribution has to
come from the community itself,” Father Yansen says, “The aid
provided by DelSos or by any charity or government agency
should just be a catalyst to help the community use its own
resources effectively.” ∞
A little girl enjoys her meal during the ‘mother and children’ day, Rangkaha, nurri, ilebura, flores timur. photo: Josh estey.
54
DIsasTeR ManageMenT suPPoRT
On December 26, 2004, the deadliest tsunami in human
history resulted in the deaths of almost quarter of a million
people in 13 countries in a 30 minute period when a
series of waves struck coastal communities. Of these, the
overwhelming majority of deaths occurred in Aceh province,
with the total number amounting to an estimated 167,736, in
addition to more than half a million people being displaced
or losing their homes.
while this tsunami was the most catastrophic natural disaster
to strike Indonesia in history, the country has also been
subject to a number of other major natural disasters since,
including earthquakes, floods, forest fires, landslides, mud
volcanoes, mudflows and storms. These have resulted in
major losses of life and destruction of property. The 2010 Asia
pacific Disaster Report states that people in the Asia Pacific
region are four times more likely to be effected by natural
catastrophes than those in Africa and 25 times more likely
than those in North America or Europe. This report estimates
that more than 18 million people were affected by natural
disasters in Indonesia from 1980 to 2009. The same report
ranks Indonesia fourth highest amongst Asia Pacific countries
that have been hit by natural disasters from 1980 to 2009. The
2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction
also ranked Indonesia highly on its level of human exposure
to disasters — ranking third out of 153 for earthquakes and
first out of 265 for tsunamis.
In 2010, in wasior, west Papua, heavy rains resulted in a river
overflowing its banks, causing landslides and killing at least
145 people. In the same year, an earthquake measuring 7.7 on
the Richter scale occurred off the western coast of Sumatra,
causing widespread destruction on the Mentawai islands.
During this earthquake, approximately 20,000 people were
displaced and up to 500 people killed. Finally, in October,
Mount Merapi in Central Java erupted violently, causing
numerous pyroclastic flows down the heavily populated
slopes of the volcano. More than 350,000 people were
evacuated from the affected area. however, many remained
behind or returned to their homes while the eruptions were
continuing, resulting in the deaths of at least 353 people.
The lessons from Aceh and recovery from natural disasters
elsewhere affirm that the sooner reconstruction and
development can begin the more successful it will be.
Since the Aceh/Nias recovery effort, PNPM has developed a
comprehensive set of operational procedures to expedite
and support disaster recovery. The essence of these special
procedures is a series of modifications to PNPM’s normal
operational manual that speeds up planning and expands
the menu of support to account for the special needs of
emergency situations.
The reason to include PNPM as a key pillar in the country’s
broader disaster recovery efforts is that, typically, during
the period after the initial emergency response, and before
various institutions and line ministries are equipped to
finance full–fledged disaster recovery, communities have little
help in restoring their social and economic infrastructure.
This period can take often more than a year. The Disaster
Management Support project provides a platform and
implementation mechanism to (a) access trust funds
through the PSF; and (b) transfer these resources directly
to communities through block grants to finance disaster
recovery activities.
community members employed by pnpM for the clean up of a village devastated by the eruption of Mount Merapi in wonokerto, yogyakarta.
55 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
On December 9, 2010, the JMC approved three grants
totaling uS$ 27 million to support communities affected
by the Merapi and Mentawai disasters through three
ongoing operations: PNPM–Rural, PNPM–urban and
the Community–Based Settlement Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction (Rekompak) project.. while the projects
pre–financed recovery activities, there were significant
delays in JMC–approved resources reaching disaster–affected
communities because of the rigidity of Government budget
systems and procedures. More engineers are also needed in
all post–disaster locations to ensure the quality of design and
construction and to help avoid delays in disaster responses.
A case study is being carried out to draw lessons on how to
avoid similar situations in the future, and to clarify a critical
path for the timely disbursement of grants that go through
the DIPA.
The PSF resources began disbursing in August 2011. As of
yearend, uS$ 11.8 million had been disbursed, generating
over 830,000 employment paid days through cash–for–work
programs which supported clean–up activities as well as the
reconstruction of basic infrastructure and housing units in
disaster affected communities, with the following geographic
coverage: 196 villages (PNPM–Rural), 38 keluharans
(PNPM–urban), and 45 villages (Rekompak).
Cash for work activities were closed in 2011, and the
remaining funds will be used as follows in 2012:
zz PNPM–Rural: Over uS$ 8 million will be allocated for
rehabilitation and reconstruction.
zz PNPM–urban: uS$ 700,000 will be used for Disaster Risk
Reduction (DRR) Activities, once site plans (currently
under preparation) are finalized.
zz Rekompak: Over uS$ 6 million will be disbursed for
housing and infrastructure assistance to 45 villages
based on community settlement plans (currently being
finalized). Over 1,150 houses will be constructed in 2012.
Project Development Objective: To support the Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) disaster management efforts at the community level through three ongoing operations: PNPM–Rural, PNPM–urban and the Community–Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Rekompak) projects.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 27.00 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 11.82 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
# of individuals enrolled in cash–for–work programs (cumulative) n/a 177,411 185,000
# of employment days generated (cumulative) n/a 831,795 892,000
PNPM–Rural
uS$ million disbursed (cumulative) n/a 5.87 14.10
# of individuals enrolled in cash–for–work programs (cumulative) n/a 163,411 165,000
# of employment days generated (cumulative) n/a 750,000 790,000
PNPM–Urban
uS$ million disbursed (cumulative) n/a 0.70 1.40
# of individuals enrolled in cash–for–work programs (cumulative) n/a 14,000 20,000
# of employment days generated (cumulative) n/a 82,000 102,000
# Disaster Risk Reduction activities implemented n/a Site plans under development
25
Rekompak
uS$ million disbursed (cumulative) n/a 5.25 11.50
# of community settlement plans completed n/a Ongoing 45
# of houses built n/a 0 1,156
56wINDOw ONE
PnPM–RuRal III aDDITIonal fInanCIng (CRIsIs)
while Indonesia weathered the global financial crisis and
subsequent global economic volatilities better than many
countries, it still incurred negative economic impacts,
including a reduction in employment and incomes. Nearly
50% of Indonesians live on less than uS$ 2 per day and
14% of the population is below the official national poverty
line. Sixty percent of those below the poverty line are in
rural areas. The rural poor are particularly vulnerable to rice
price shocks, with two thirds of their income spending on
food and one quarter on rice, consuming more than they
produce. workers in rural areas tend to be employed in
the informal and agricultural jobs, which tend to not offer
as much income security. Approximately 67% of informal
workers in Indonesia live in rural areas. Given Indonesia’
strong economic growth, non–agricultural employment
growth has been disappointing, providing rural workers
with limited opportunities to find better jobs and improve
household incomes.
The Indonesian Government has identified and requested
PSF financing for seven provinces where significant
percentages of rural households live below the national
poverty line and where a majority of the sub–districts in
the provinces perform well under the PNPM–Rural program.
This is expected to increase the impact of the program in
these areas. The seven provinces are: Bengkulu, Gorontalo,
Central Java, East Java, Maluku, NTT, and Central Sulawesi. In
these provinces, 433 sub–districts in 86 districts will receive
additional financing allocations based on the population size
of the sub–district.
The grant is financing the incremental scale up of
PNPM–Rural project activities to enhance the poverty
impact of the project in seven poor provinces in Indonesia.
The project provides grants to beneficiaries for (a) planning
for community development, including the preparation
of sub–grant proposals, (b) training and capacity building,
including in development planning and investment, (c)
investment in social and economic infrastructure identified
through community development planning, and (d) investing
in activities identified through community development
planning using revolving funds.
Funding for this project was approved in June 2011. Of the
total allocation, uS$ 12.3 million in sub–district block grants
(or 38% of the total allocation) has already been disbursed
to uPk accounts in 354 sub–districts in the seven target
provinces. Allocations for each province vary based on needs,
with sub–district grants ranging from Rp 500 to 800 million.
Field supervision suggests that criteria used to target funds
were not optimal, as some of the poorest sub–districts
in target provinces did not receive funding, while richer
sub–districts did — particularly in pemekaran areas.
The regular PNPM processes and systems are being used for
sub–project selection, implementation and accountability.
Feedback from the field suggests that sub–project
implementation is progressing well, although late DIPAs have
created delays in some areas. As with PNPM and its linked
pilots, investments in facilitation and training are less than
needed and planned for. The additional facilitators budgeted
for were not provided. In a context where PNPM facilitators
are already overloaded and oversight systems stretched
thin, adding sub–projects without adding human resources
creates a risk of accentuating implementation challenges
in target sub–districts (e.g., lack of proper oversight
of community procurement or of adequate technical
supervision of construction works).
Data on funded sub–projects is currently available for
four provinces out of the seven targeted. In these four
provinces alone, 2,854 sub–projects have been selected by
communities to receive financing under this Project. The vast
majority of these involve the construction of basic village
infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, irrigation and water supply,
markets), followed by health and education activities (e.g.,
construction of schools and health posts, procurement of
equipment, scholarships and incentives etc).
The remainder of the allocation for sub–district block grants
(uS$ 19.2 million) will be fully disbursed and utilized in 2012.
PMD may also request a no objection to reallocate funds
from TA to block grants. The total number of completed
sub–projects by the end of 2012 should be around 3,200.
Interim measures may be needed to assure better data
on post–crisis funds and activities as the approved major
redesign of the PNPM Rural MIS and reporting set–up is
carried out. ∞
57 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Project Development Objective: To help finance the incremental scale up of PNPM–Rural III activities to enhance the poverty impact of the project in 7 poor provinces in Indonesia.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 32.7million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 12.3 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2012.
KPI 2010 2011 2012 target
uS$ million disbursed in sub–district grants (cumulative) n/a 12.3 31.5
# of sub–districts benefiting from post–crisis support n/a 354 433
# of sub–projects funded n/a > 2,854
[data not yet available for 3 provinces out of 7]
3,200
# of employment days generated n/a > 100.813
[data not yet available for 5 provinces out of 7]
750,000
in Gorontalo, one of the seven provinces receiving additional grants for post-crisis support, a woman uses a sewing machine in the community learning center built by pnpM. (photo: courtesy of the european union).
58wINDOw ONE
improve school buildings, but that doesn’t necessarily make
education more accessible to the poor. If you talk to poor
members of communities in remote areas, they may tell
you that the greatest difficulty that they face in accessing
educational facilities is the lack of affordable transportation
to take children to the nearest school. The increased budget
allocation for education
has not improved that
situation. PNPM Generasi
recognizes that different
communities face different
challenges. It empowers
each community to create its
own solution for overcoming
these challenges. In rural
communities where the lack
of transportation facilities
is the major issue, then
community groups may
decide that funds made
available through PNPM
Generasi might best be
invested in a minivan that
can serve as a school bus.
Initiatives of that sort have
been implemented through
PNPM Generasi even in areas
such as Banten, less than an
hour’s drive from Jakarta.
while this region might have
a good major road system,
there are still pockets of
the population for whom
the lack of transportation
facilities is the major obstacle
in seeking an education.
In other areas, particularly
in fishing communities
or rural communities
with seasonal crops, the
main factor keeping children out of school may be on the
demand side. At particular times of the year, parents may
require their children to work in the fields. This may prevent
them from attending school. In such areas, mainstream
educational facilities, with rigidly scheduled classes and
vivi yulasWatiDIRECTOR FOR SOCIAl PROTECTION AND wElFARE, ThE NATIONAl DEVElOPMENT PlANNING AGENCY/BAPPENAS
PNPM Generasi is a new instrument for achieving poverty
reduction in this country. The idea was partly inspired by
the experiences of latin American countries with programs
intended to reach the very poorest of the poor, particularly
women and children. The program builds upon Indonesia’s
experience with major community–driven development
programs, gained through
more than a decade of
involvement in PNPM–Rural,
PNPM–urban, and other
programs that preceded
them, to meet the
special needs of women
and children.
PNPM Generasi operates
on the understanding
that the community itself
can develop a process to
identify which among certain
problems is most pressing
and then determine how
that problem can be solved.
The community itself has
to identify the constraints
and determine how to
overcome them. So long as
the community addresses
that problem, they can do it
in any way they choose and
the Indonesian Government
will provide the required
resources. If the community
achieves good results,
then they will be given an
increased allocation in the
next cycle.
Community–driven
development can be a
powerful tool for meeting
the needs of the poorest of the poor, whose needs are often
not met by sectoral programs. For example, despite the huge
increase in the overall educational budget, there are still
more than three million school aged children outside the
formal education system. This increased budget allocation
is being used mainly to pay teachers better salaries and to
59 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
syllabuses, may not be suitable to local community needs.
Instead, communities need to be empowered to create their
own solutions, perhaps involving part–time evening classes
open to older students, or with classes scheduled around
harvest time.
In other areas, such as in the forests of Jambi, special schools
have been created to meet the needs of semi–nomadic forest
dwellers, some of whom have traditionally been resistant
to education. Special schools may be necessary to serve
these communities, with the
syllabus and organization
of the school structured to
meet their needs. These are
the kinds of initiatives that
could be supported through
PNPM Generasi because they
involve solutions tailored
to meet highly specific
community needs.
There are a number of
reasons why issues related to
education and mother–and–
child health are better
addressed through a specific
program intended to address
them than through the core
PNPM Mandiri programs,
such as PNPM–Rural and
PNPM–urban. These
programs operate on the
‘open menu’ principle, with a
broad community consensus
required to determine the
allocation of PNPM funds.
Impact studies show that
these programs are quite
effective for building village infrastructure that provides
overall benefits for the community, but not specifically for
the poorest members of the community. It is easier to create
consensus for village infrastructure projects: they involve real,
tangible results that can be appreciated by all members of
the community. Overall, the community may not place such a
high level of priority on maternal health or education.
Part of the reason for this is cultural. Many areas of Indonesia
are still characterized by a patriarchical culture. In some areas,
even relatively prosperous areas, men may traditionally make
all decisions related to a woman’s health. A husband may
resist the idea of his wife being examined by a male doctor
and decide that there is no need. Even an open discussion
of women’s health issues may be taboo. Even in prosperous
areas, this can result in avoidable, unnecessary deaths of
women in labor. To address these issues, it is preferable to
have a specific program involving women’s–only groups
and meetings, with clearly
defined goals and with
technical assistance from
facilitators with a high
level of awareness of the
relevant issues.
PNPM Generasi is not just
about making funds available
to women’s groups, it is
about raising their level of
awareness and knowledge
of issues that affect them.
For example, there is still
a lack of awareness about
the importance of seeking
medical attention in the
case of difficulties while
giving birth. Firstly, group
discussion of this can raise
women’s awareness, then
the discussion can be used
to find creative solutions.
In small districts on remote
islands, PNPM Generasi
funds have been used to
develop a network of boat
“ambulances”, with at least one boat on standby in case a
woman needs to be taken to a community medical center
or other facility. Again, each community must find its own
solution, based on its own assets and potential. PNPM
Generasi and other PNPM programs merely provide support
to enable the communities to achieve this. ∞
“PNPM Generasi operates on the understanding that the
community itself can develop a process to identify which among certain problems is most pressing
and then determine how that problem can be solved. The
community itself has to identify the constraints and determine how to overcome them. So long
as the community addresses that problem, they can do it in
any way they choose and the Indonesian Government will
provide the required resources.”
60
ThROuGh window Two, PSF provides incremental
implementation and coordination support to PNPM’s
oversight bodies and executing agencies, with a focus
on assisting the Indonesian Government to strengthen
PNPM’s core management systems, to mitigate corruption
risks, and to maintain program quality and efficiency.
with the establishment of PNPM Mandiri as a nation–wide
program, there is a need for increased oversight and action
by multiple stakeholders to ensure the ongoing integrity
and transparency of the program and to ensure that its
design and implementation support the achievement of
the program’s objectives. Activities under this window
include the provision of specialized training, deployment
of additional staff/consultants for field supervision and the
conduct of systems audits, dissemination and awareness
raising activities as well as information management
programs and institutional strengthening.
PSF deploys field analysts to strengthen the supervision
and monitoring of PNPM Mandiri, with supervision missions
now routinely conducted in over 20 provinces and
200 sub–districts each quarter. Special attention has been
paid to involving multiple stakeholders in field supervision,
fostering cross–learning and supporting systems reviews
and audits. In this area, PSF can play a role through its
convening power to support consensus–building on reform
priorities and corrective actions. PSF also provides technical
assistance to follow–up on supervision findings in the field
and to support the design and implementation of new
policies, standard operating procedures and operational
instruments for the strengthening of core management
systems at all levels. Over the last year, the implementing
agencies completed a number of critical benchmarks, leading
to upgrades in PNPM’s overall performance ratings at both
national and province levels.
Typical activities funded by PSF through this window
include specialized training, the provision of consultants
to support community facilitators, support for PNPM
information dissemination and campaigns, workshops,
information management programs, evaluations, and
institutional strengthening.
For organizational purposes, these activities are conducted
through a number of projects, as follows:
zz PSF Secretariat
zz PNPM Communications
zz PNPM Supervision and Monitoring
zz Integrated Management Information System (MIS) for
PNPM Mandiri: SIMPADu (Phase 2)
zz Training of local Auditors in PNPM–urban
zz Technical Assistance to BAPPENAS and the Steering
Committee of PNPM (Pokja Pengendali)
Psf seCReTaRIaT
The PSF Secretariat provides operational and administrative
services to the PSF to sustain an effective framework for the
implementation of PNPM Mandiri. In addition to supporting
the management of the PSF and coordinating the Joint
Management Committee (JMC), the Secretariat provides
fiduciary oversight and reporting for all PSF programs and
supports the Technical Secretariat.
Specific activities undertaken by the Secretariat include:
zz Administering grant agreements issued through the PSF
Trust Fund.
zz Coordinating program supervision missions
and appraisals.
zz Providing operational and technical assistance to
Indonesian Government agencies managing PNPM
Mandiri programs.
wINDOw TwOPROVIDING IMPlEMENTATION AND COORDINATION SuPPORT
62wINDOw TwO
zz Preparing quarterly progress and financial reports as well
as annual project progress reports.
zz Documenting and disseminating minutes of
JMC proceedings.
In 2011, the Secretariat worked to improve the reporting of
PSF–funded activities through the introduction of quarterly
reporting (http://pnpm–support.org/) and a comprehensive
review of PNPM’s anti–corruption efforts. It also initiated
the extension of the PSF, which is envisaged to run through
2015. In addition, The Secretariat helped prepare and
guide the approval process for ten new PSF projects or
top–ups to ongoing projects. The Secretariat also continued
its day–to–day operational support and oversight of
PSF–funded projects.
In 2012, the Secretariat will focus on: (a) supporting the
decision making process for the development of a Road
Map for PNPM’s future beyond 2014; (b) improving the
quality of the portfolio, including the preparation of project
proposals, timely processing of projects in the pipeline, and,
in coordination with the supervision and monitoring team,
ensure that project progress is being reported and captured
in internal systems; (c) supporting the JMC‘s Technical
Committee in the development of the PSF project pipeline;
(d) extending, in line with the recent extension of the PSF
Secretariat, appropriate PSF ongoing activities; and (e)
supporting JMC meetings.
participants at a 2012 psf Joint Management committee (JMc) meeting. the JMc includes representatives of the major indonesian Government agencies and ministries responsible for the design, management and implementation of pnpM Mandiri. the JMc is chaired by BAppenAs and co–chaired by the world Bank and includes the coordinating Ministry for people’s welfare, the Ministry of finance as well as representatives from agencies of the goverments of Australia, Denmark, the european union, the netherlands, the united kingdom and the united states.
63 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Project Development Objective: To provide operational and administrative services to the PSF to sustain an effective framework for the implementation of PNPM Mandiri. In addition to supporting the management of the PSF and coordinating the JMC, the Secretariat provides fiduciary oversight and reporting for all PSF programs and supports the Technical Secretariat.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 8.34 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 4.71 million
Closing date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
New or amended administration agreements
1 1 6
# of JMC meetings held within the year
2 2 6
New contributions to the PSF (uS$ mil)
90 76 100
Disbursement performance (Disbursed during the CY/undisbursed amount at beginning of CY) (%)
82 157 80–120
# of active disbursement funds
32 30 n/a (JMC decision)
Value of newly approved project proposals (uS$ mil)
48 104 n/a (JMC decision)
# and type of reports to the JMC
1 annual report
1 annual report
2 PNPM semi–annual Governance Reports
Quarterly updates for 17–19 Projects
1 annual report
2 PNPM semi–annual Governance Reports
Quarterly updates for all projects
64wINDOw TwO
PnPM CoMMunICaTIons
The PNPM Mandiri program is a constantly evolving,
innovative program that requires an intensive
communications process if members of the community,
press, government officials, academics, activists, development
sector workers and other key stakeholders are to become
aware of the program’s development and supportive of
efforts to implement its activities.
In order to achieve this aim, the communications program
was established to promote awareness of and facilitate
knowledge sharing within PNPM Mandiri among all
stakeholders by:
zz working closely with media organizations and national
and local civil society organizations to disseminate
the latest news and information on PNPM, enhance
community–based monitoring, and facilitate
community participation.
zz Building the capacity of Government institutions involved
in PNPM in the area of information and communications.
zz Supporting various stakeholders to codify, organize
and share their knowledge through innovative tools
and approaches.
Throughout 2011, the communications team worked with
PSF teams to develop enhanced tools for displaying key
PNPM data; design activities to extend and deepen the
impact of learning events; codify, disseminate, and apply
key lessons learned and best practices as a way to improve
aspects of PNPM; and collect and organize relevant materials
for a website devoted specifically to JMC members. In
addition, a website providing access to comprehensive
information regarding PSF and its activities is currently under
development and will be launched in 2012. In addition,
throughout the year, the program placed an increased
the pnpM communication team organizes quarterly field visits for the media since 2008 to increase their understanding of how pnpM works and promote good practices.
65 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
emphasis on knowledge sharing and learning events,
examples include:
zz Sustaining a network of 149 radio stations in
9 provinces to facilitate discussion and promote
the community–based monitoring throughout the
implementation of PNPM Mandiri.
zz Supporting, through the use of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT ) (e.g., social media
and geo–applications), PNPM governance improvement
and bringing the voice of villagers to the national level.
zz Organizing events to: (a) identify and document smart
field practices (PNPM Generasi National Strategic
Planning workshop); (b) involve a broad range of PNPM
stakeholders in the development a Road Map for PNPM’s
future beyond 2014 (PNPM Mandiri National Congress);
and (c)establish stronger linkages across PNPM programs
to support women empowerment throughout PNPM
Mandiri implementation (Coordination workshop for
women Empowerment).
zz Documenting success stories innovative practices in
PNPM, including in the remote areas which have their
own unique set of challenges (e.g., Papua).
zz Collaborating with the Indonesian Government to
receive delegations from other countries to learn and
share experiences with PNPM stakeholders. In 2011, GoI
hosted delegations from Afghanistan, the China–ASEAN
Forum, China and India. The study visits included a series
of discussions with representatives of national and local
governments, program stakeholders, PNPM actors and
beneficiaries and field visits to PNPM locations to observe
program implementation at first hand. In addition,
there were four high level visits from parliamentary
representatives from the uS, Japan, the European union
and Germany.
zz Reaching out to media organizations to increase their
level of familiarity with PNPM and stimulating greater
transparency and public debate on PNPM. Twenty five
media organizations visited PNPM project location
throughout Indonesia. The media outreach also
resulted in an Op–ed on PNPM in kompas (a national
Indonesian newspaper) by the university of Indonesia;
four high–level events promoting the Invisible People
Book; national media coverage of the launching of PNPM
Peduli; , and PNPM exposure in over 150 national and
local media outlets.
In 2011, news media generated 1,640 articles on PNPM, of
which 833 (51%) were positive, 654 (40%) were neutral, and
153 (9%) were negative in tone.
In 2012, the communication team priorities include: (a)
developing integrated ICT platform, including websites,
social media and geo–applications, to support the
transparency and accountability agendas ; (b) establishing
aninternship/engagement platform with Indonesia
universities, to strengthen awareness and the capacity
ndonesia’s younger generation to engage in country’s
poverty reduction efforts;; (c) enhancing knowledge sharing
through best practices and lessons learned from various
PNPM programs; (d) promoting south–south knowledge
exchange by organizing study visits for delegations from
countries such as Madagascar, Pakistan, Timor leste, and
Afghanistan; (e) strengthening the media outreach and
public diplomacy efforts; and (f ) continuing its information
dissemination and publication activities. ∞
66wINDOw TwO
project development objective: To strengthen PNPM’s overarching communications and learning platform, which supports continuous program improvements through information dissemination, capacity–building and enhanced knowledge sharing among all PNPM stakeholders.
approved Commitments: uS$ 4.35 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 1.90 million
Closing date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
Component 1. Media outreach and other dissemination activities
# of media organizations participating in field visits and media events
23 25 28
# of ads published in the press, # of radio talk shows produced, # of partner radio stations, # of inquiries made
25 ads
12 radio talk shows
141 radio stations
250 inquiries
27 ads
12 radio talk shows
141 radio stations
300 inquiries
Activity transitioned to GoI
# of national and local media sources monitored daily
49 101 101
# of news articles on PNPM analyzed and reported to its oversight bodies
1,300 1,650 1,800
# of active partnerships with CSOs, Academic Community and other interest groups.
3 (CRI, kBR 68 h, Ontrack Media Indonesia)
1 (kBR 68h) 6 (BakTI, kIPRA, lPPM Cendrawasih, Inspirit,
Internews, CRI)
Component 2. Learning
# of high profile learning events/workshops
5 3 5
# of ICT platforms used to support learning
1 (community radio program)
2 (geo–application for field stories and Facebook
accounts for uPks)
3 (community radio program, geo–application
for field stories and Facebook accounts for uPks)
# of visits/study tours from foreign delegations
4 (Mongolia, kenya, haiti, Timor leste)
5 (Afghanistan twice visits, China–ASEAN Forum, China,
India)
6 (Madagascar, Pakistan, Timor leste, Afghanistan,
and others TBC)
# of titles and exemplars published
25 titles
20,500 exemplars
24 titles
11,000 exemplars
25 titles
10,000 exemplars
Component 3. Accessibility of information
PSF websites (status) PSF library website under development
PSF library website and JMC website up and running
PSF website under development
PSF website up and running and linked to library/JMC websites and ICT learning
platforms.
67 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
technical evaluation of the quality of infrastructure built by pnpM.
PnPM suPeRVIsIon anD MonIToRIng
The massive scaling up of PNPM Mandiri since its
establishment as a mainstream, nationwide program has
increased the need for oversight and action by multiple
stakeholders, but also put strain on the management and
governance frameworks. The PSF provides critically needed
implementation support to Government to strengthen core
PNPM management and oversight systems. key elements
include: incremental field supervision and monitoring;
systems audit and fiduciary assessments; dialogue on
systemic issues and collective identification of reform
priorities; follow–up on findings and corrective actions; TA
to support the design and implementation of new policies,
standard operating procedures and operational instruments;
and associated program of analytical work to explore
determinants of program performance.
In 2011, a restructuration of the PSF and additional
human resources improved the breadth and depth of
implementation support services provided to Government.
highlights include:
zz PSF supported consensus–building on five reform
priorities or areas for the strengthening for PNPM–Rural:
(a) ability of PMD to appropriately manage the program;
(b) redesign of the Management Information System
(MIS); (c) strengthening of Complaints handling System;
(d) reinforcing formal and informal fiduciary controls;
and (e) improving facilitation. Formal monthly and
quarterly meetings with PMD and pokja pengadali have
been used to review progress, identify delays and agree
on corrective actions. Six–monthly updates on PNPM
Governance are also used to report and discuss progress
with concerned stakeholders.
zz The PSF Governance and Anti–Corruption team was
further strengthened to limit the exposure of donors
and the Indonesian Government to corruption risks.
Fiduciary assessments are used to identify weaknesses
in mandated formal and social controls, both in terms
of systems design and compliance with existing policies
and procedures in the field. Findings are responded to
through an ongoing program of TA to strengthen the
complaints handling and audit systems as well as village
controls and civil society oversight.
zz The PSF field team recruited additional staff and
intensified field–based supervision, with a minimum
of 21 provinces and 160 sub–districts visited each
quarter. locations for supervision continued to be
prioritized based on well–known risk factors (e.g., high
disbursement, multiple block grants, high turn–over,
remote areas etc.) and covered most of the PNPM
portfolio including PNPM–Rural (including Disaster
and Post–Crisis Funds block grants), PNPM–Generasi,
PNPM–Green, PNPM–Respek, PNPM–Integrasi and SPADA.
Special attention went to increasing participation of
national and local governments in both regular and
thematic missions, and on building the supervisory
capacity of local governments in visited areas, particularly
as regards fiduciary controls and safeguards. The
development of a web–based application for monitoring
and reporting — which integrates supervision findings,
updates on corrective actions and systemic issues, and
risk mapping for each region — is being completed.
zz Special attention has been paid to fostering
cross–learning between PNPM implementers and
stakeholders, including through the organization of
national knowledge sharing workshops involving PNPM
implementers and stakeholders from all levels.
zz An analysis of management and systems at the
community level has also been completed to identify
what can be done to improve governance in PNPM at
the community level. Findings will be disseminated and
discussed in 2012.
This program of support contributed to the achievement of
a number of critical benchmarks by implementing agencies
in 2011, including a recommitment on 21 days of service
training for facilitators, increase in audit sample size to 20%
of sub–districts and marked progress on serious corruption
cases (>uS$ 21,000). There is a clear need to sustain reforms in
2012, however, and hands–on assistance for the operation of
the complaints handling system, continuous assessments of
the robustness of core management systems and mandated
controls and follow–up of corrective actions will still be
needed. Attention may need to be refocused on narrower
set of priority actions, including improved deployment of
technical facilitators, adequate staffing of management units
and MIS overhaul.
70wINDOw TwO
As a national program, PNPM is at a critical juncture.
Although PNPM continues to deliver tremendous results in
communities, ongoing analysis shows the fragility of some of
PNPM’s institutions, both nationally and locally. In 2012, the
PSF will develop an ambitious program of analytical work to
inform improvements in program design and the Road Map
process on the future of PNPM beyond 2014. Planned work
includes: (a) a review of lessons learned as part of the writing
of the Implementation Completion Report for PNPM–Rural
I and II; (b) implementation uPP 2 and uPP 3 evaluation; (c)
a technical evaluation of the quality of the infrastructure
financed by the program in 12 provinces, which includes
a review of fiduciary arrangements and safeguards
implementation; (d) a rapid field assessment of Revolving
loan Funds (RlFs) in 14 provinces, which complements
the analytical work conducted under the PSF–funded RlF
capacity–building project by focusing on social impacts of
RlFs; (e) a review of implementation progress in Papua, which
focuses on Papua–specific implementation challenges; (f ) a
small scale study on Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR)
to allow for time series analyses; and (g) a gender study to
look at levels of female participation and involvement in
decision–making to expand good practices and inform a
more ambitious program of gender–related analytical and
operational work downstream.
Project Development Objective: This fund provides for incremental supervision and monitoring of the various aspects of PNPM in order to respond to the increased need for oversight and action by multiple stakeholders under a scaled–up program, while building Government capacity to undertake integrated, risk–based supervision in support of its priority objectives.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 8.45 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 4.83 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
% of corrective actions delivered (vs. agreed upon) 109 436 500
# of meetings/workshops to discuss systemic implementation issues at national and regional levels
22 80 80
Component 1. Implementation Support
At least 160 sub–districts visited every quarter n/a Achieved I60 sub–districts
# of joint–supervision missions involving GoI/lG 16 40 40
Component 2. Follow–up and action on systemic issues
# of action plans/program quality improvement plans
15 45 45
web–based project performance management platform (stage)
Identification Design, tested and improvement
Finalized and running
# and type of sanctions applied as a result of findings (e.g., suspension of payments etc.)
Suspension of 2 provinces
Suspension of one district and 32
kecamatans 0
Component 3. TA to strengthen controls
# and type of SOPs/Guidelines etc. revised with inputs from field supervision?
7 9 9
web–based complaints handling Problem identification
Re–design and testing
Finalized and running
71 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
TRaInIng of loCal auDIToRs In PnPM–uRban
Several layers of financial and technical oversight exist
in PNPM–urban, including community self–monitoring,
project facilitation and oversight consultants, local
government monitoring, world Bank implementation support
missions and annual audits conducted by the Indonesian
Government’s Development and Finance Surveillance
Agency (BPkP), which is responsible for conducting annual
audits of public expenditure programs.
BPkP has undertaken annual audits of the urban Poverty
Project (and later of PNPM–urban) since 2000. In fiscal
years 2009 and 2010, their audits covered 14% and 16%
of participating urban districts. Studies and experience
across PNPM have shown that higher audit sample sizes are
associated with a lower level of misuse of funds, particularly
if all stakeholders are informed of the audit and planned
audit rates before the annual project cycle. Based on this, the
Indonesian Government wanted audit coverage to increase
to 20% for fiscal year 2011. As a result the Training of local
Auditors in PNPM–urban was approved to improve the
fiduciary controls in PNPM–urban by building the capacity of
local government auditors (inspektorat kota/kabupaten) and
promoting synergies with BPkP.
Building capacity of local government auditors addresses
current Indonesian Government and Development Partner
priorities of both (a) reducing incidence of corruption at
all administrative government levels and (b) supporting
the process of decentralization through strengthening the
capacity of local government institutions.
The project which began in the second half of 2010 got
off to a strong start: (a) it secured a Mou among the
Directorate General of human Settlements (DGhS), the
executing agency of PNPM–urban in MoPw, Inspectorate
General of MoPw and MohA, and the Deputy of BPkP on
their roles in auditing PNPM–urban as well as Rural; and (b)
prepared, in coordination with BPkP, DGhS, and PMD, auditor
training materials.
In 2011, training was provided in 196 cities and district and
445 auditors were trained. The Inspectorate General of MoPw
committed approximately Rp 1.8 Billion (uS$ 200,000) to
support the implementation of audits in cities and districts.
with BPkP providing quality control, local government
auditors carried out the fiscal year 2011 audits in 21% of
PNPM–urban districts.
All project activities were completed as planned.
project development objective: To improve fiduciary controls in PNPM–urban by building the capacity of local Government Auditors (Inspektorat kota/kabupaten) to conduct transparent audits of PNPM program activities and promoting synergies among the Development and Finance Surveillance Agency (Badan Pengawas keuangan dan Pembangunan, BPkP) and local Government Auditors.
approved Commitments: uS$ 0.30 million
total disbursements: uS$ 0.29 million
Closing date: October 31, 2011
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
Design of curriculum and training materials Ongoing Completed n/a
# of BPkP auditors trained n/a 59 n/a
# of BPkP regional offices which participated in the training n/a 26 n/a
# of cities and districts from where local auditors were trained n/a 196 n/a
# of local auditors trained n/a 386 n/a
# of cities and districts where local auditors conducted audit of PNPM–urban
n/a 97 n/a
72wINDOw TwO
InTegRaTeD ManageMenT InfoRMaTIon sYsTeM (MIs) foR PnPM ManDIRI: (sIMPaDu Phase 2)
Indonesian policymakers need access to reliable data
related to Indonesia’s community empowerment and
poverty alleviation programs if they are to formulate, revise
and implement such programs efficiently and effectively.
SIMPADu PNPM, or PNPM Mandiri’s Integrated Management
Information System, was first launched by the Minister of
National Development Planning and the head of BAPPENAS
in August 2009. The system is designed to manage data
related to the implementation of PNPM Mandiri and to make
this data accessible to the program’s stakeholders and the
general public.
The primary objective of SIMPADu PNPM Phase II is to
improve the system’s ability to facilitate access to information
related to Indonesia’s poverty alleviation and community
empowerment programs. This objective will be achieved
through analysis of the existing PNPM MIS systems, and
the design, installation, and operation of an integrated MIS
for all of PNPM Mandiri’s core and support/pilot programs.
The enhanced SIMPADu PNPM will be complemented
with improved and appropriate operating procedures and
capacity building training at all levels to ensure the quality
and verification of data collection, storage, and reporting.
Building on the work done during Phase I, Phase II of this
project consists of two major components:
Component One focuses on improving data collection and
analytical capabilities, includes:
zz Improving the current SIMPADu PNPM analytical
capabilities and data accuracy. This component includes
data verification and development of more enhanced
data entry applications to establish full integration with
all PNPM program sectors.
zz Developing a PNPM MIS Road Map consisting of a
thorough needs assessment at all levels and detailed
plans for integrating SIMPADu PNPM with other MIS at
national and local government institutions; and support
software/hardware procurement and installation,
development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for
collecting, verifying, storing, and reporting programmatic
and financial data, and training of the Indonesian
Government staff.
Component Two involves the implementation of the
Road Map developed during the first year of the project.
This component will provide local government and PNPM
sector programs integrated MIS system of PNPM with
their own program/data as well as knowledge transfer and
technical expertise.
Project Development Objective: To improve the Government’s ability to facilitate access to information related to Indonesia’s poverty alleviation and community empowerment programs.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 0.98 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 0.10 million
Closing date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2011 2012 Target
# of MIS experts providing technical assistance 4 4
Identification of requirements to roll out the SIMPADu PNPM in pilot provinces Ongoing Criteria for province selection identified
Road Map for SIMPADu PNPM–Mandiri Development ongoing
Completed
Number of MIS units from PNPM–Mandiri programs receiving technical assistance
2 5
# of support/pilot programs for which MIS data can be uploaded into the PNPM central data warehouse as a result of systems compatibility
2 5
Number of province governments receiving technical assistance to improve their MIS
n/a 5
73 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
under the project, which begin in mid–2011, MIS experts
were contracted to begin assessing: (a) the quality of MIS data
collection and verification procedures being used through
PNPM’s core and pilot programs; and (b) the statistical
capacity of SIMPADu PNPM Mandiri. Technical assistance to
increase capacity of the MIS departments/staff to manage an
integrated MIS and collect more complete and accurate data
from the field also began.
In 2012, the project will focus on finished the data collection
and capacity enhancements, including: completing all
ongoing assessments, making recommendations for MIS
improvements, and developing a SIMPADu PNPM Mandiri
Road Map; and expanding technical assistance to all PNPM
core programs. The project also anticipates the start up of
the piloting of the SIMPADu PNPM Mandiri Road Map in
five provinces.
TeChnICal assIsTanCe To baPPenas anD The sTeeRIng CoMMITTee of PnPM (Pokja PengenDalI)
Over the past fourteen years, since 1997, the PNPM Mandiri
program has grown out of a small pilot study which involved
25 villages into Indonesia’s flagship poverty alleviation and
community empowerment program which involves over
70,000 villages and urban wards in every sub–district in the
country. This scale–up has created special challenges for the
Government agencies responsible for managing the program.
Pokja Pengendali, the Steering Committee of PNPM
responsible for the overall management and implementation
of PNPM Mandiri, and BAPPENAS, National Development
Planning Agency and Chair of the PSF, are critical to the
success of the program. To support the daily operations of
Pokja Pengendali, a Secretariat has been established under
the coordination of the Deputy Minister for the Coordination
of Poverty Reduction. This Secretariat conducts analysis
and implements administrative and technical services to
support Pokja Pengendali. Its responsibilities include: (a) the
formulation of policy recommendations; (b) the monitoring
and oversight of PNPM throughout its project cycle; (c) the
preparation of reports related to PNPM for cabinet meetings,
minister–level meetings, and the public; (d) supervision of line
ministries’ integration of community–driven development;
(e) coordination of complaints handling with line agencies,
executive staff, and enforcement agencies; and (f ) public
campaigns and socialization. BAPPENAS is responsible for the
planning and budget allocations of PNPM Mandiri.
PSF provides support to Pokja Pengendali to enable it to
perform its functions and tasks in coordination of policy
implementation, planning, supervision, oversight and
increase awareness of the public and local stakeholders
on PNPM Mandiri. Given the special role of BAPPENAS in
the planning, monitoring and evaluation of PNPM Mandiri,
PSF also provides specific support for BAPPENAS including
the provision of technical staff and training to improve the
quality of planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation
process for poverty reduction policy and programs. In 2011,
through this project, PSF provided technical assistance to
support the development of a PNPM Road Map, the purpose
of which was to ensure that the program continues to reflect
the aspirations and hopes of its intended beneficiaries.
As a major part of the formulation of this Road Map, a
participatory workshop was conducted in November. This
workshop involved 150 beneficiaries, facilitators, consultants
and representatives of local governments and their agencies
met with 150 representatives of central–level agencies and
ministries involved with the implementation of the PNPM
Mandiri program, as well as representatives of international
donor agencies and civil society organizations.
In addition, PSF provided support for activities related to
the monitoring, supervision and control of executive–level
decisions, including the preparation of a draft decree
prepared by the TNP2k to implement executive–level
action plans for PNPM; the development of related work
plans; the socialization of these plans; the integration
of line ministries’ community–driven development
activities and programs with the PNPM program; and the
monitoring of the implementation of these plans at the
community/local level. ∞
74wINDOw TwO
project development objective: To provide support to Bappenas and Pokja Pengendali in the aspects of coordination, management and oversight of PNPM Mandiri.
approved Commitments: uS$ 1.66 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 0.12 million
Closing date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2011 2012 Target
BAPPENAS
Number of analysts providing technical assistance (cumulative)
2 2
Number of people trained in the formulation of poverty reduction policies and programs
n/a 3–4
Number of people attending seminars/workshops on the planning/monitoring of poverty programs
n/a 2–3 people/ one event
Pokja Pengendali
Number of TA positions filled in Pokja Pengendali
12 13
Number of kabupaten/kota where new regulations and policies on poverty reduction have been socialized
None (delayed) 1,858 kabupaten/kota
Progress on actions plans for Inpres 1/2010 and 3/2010 is updated on quarterly basis (status/stage)
Action plans and monitoring and oversight mechanisms prepared for
TNP2k approval.
Socialization to 495 local governments kabupaten/ kota
Annual PNPM National Congress/Community Empowerment Exhibition organized
Completed Delivery planned
Recommendations from the National Congress are analyzed and taken into account for the design of the PNPM Road Map (status/stage)
PNPM Mandiri — The People’s Dream was visualized in 27 graphic recordings
based on the dreams of Temnas participants.
The National Congress produced 27 illustrations of people’s dream on
PNPM.
There are 25 recommendations from the Temnas and those have been
incorporated into the design of PNPM Road Map.
The National Congress resulted 25 points of recommendations that have been incorporated into the design of
PNPM Road Map.
Detailed Road Map concept is being finalized (book–1). Second book (for
general public is being drafted (book–2).
Road Map concept will be published into 2 books for internal use and public
use.
Public consultation is scheduled for August 2012 (national level, and
regional level)
Public consultation for Road Map design will be conducted in regional
and national level on August 2012
75 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
pnpM peduli aims to reach and empower marginalized groups.
INDONESIA may be reaching a tipping point where its
people are about to take control of development initiatives
that affect all aspects of their lives. Through the PNPM
programs, communities have been given resources to enable
them to determine their own development priorities and
to implement plans to achieve their aspirations. People
have been doing that with a great deal of success. working
collectively and using
their block grants, they
have built more than
100,000 km of roads, more
than 17,000 bridges, and more
than 14,000 hospitals to name
just a few achievements.
More importantly,
they have managed to
significantly reduce poverty
in their communities. It’s
simply staggering to see
how people have been
able to transform their
communities when the
necessary resources are put
under their control.
however, to me the real
revelation of the PNPM
program is not these
achievements: it is the
discovery by people of
their own potential. The
real achievement is that
people, individually and
collectively, have begun to
realize that they are actually
entitled to ask questions
and demand answers
regarding the deployment
of all public resources,
including resources outside
the boundaries of the PNPM program.
Gradually, communities are finding that they are able,
capable and entitled to demand that all public resources
are accounted for and used for the intended purposes. In
that way, PNPM is becoming a platform for demanding
accountability across the board, not just for resources
controlled by the PNPM program, but for the management of
public resources in general.
we should be aware, though, that this growing awareness of
communities about their rights is still in its early stages. we
haven’t yet seen measureable, large scale spillover of PNPM
processes into other areas of government. Nevertheless, in
some areas, this process
has already begun. Many
villages use participatory,
inclusive processes similar
to those developed and
tested through PNPM to
formulate and implement
comprehensive village
development plans. On
a wider scale, similar
community–driven
processes have been utilized
to rebuild communities
in Aceh and Papua in
post–disaster, post–conflict,
and other special
circumstances. Even so, that
approach is certainly not
general across all areas of
government. Much more
could be achieved both
in terms of communities
becoming aware of
their ability to hold local
governments accountable,
and in terms of sector
agencies to develop simple
and effective mechanisms
that can put this
accountability into practice.
Moving forward, I see the
more solid entrenchment
of the basic concepts of participation and inclusion as one
of the great areas of potential of the program. we need to
tap into the vast social capital that exists in Indonesia not
only to ensure the success of PNPM programs, but to ensure
that teachers are at school and teaching students properly,
that there are nurses in the community health centers to
Jan WeetJenshEAD OF PNPM SuPPORT FACIlITY
77 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
ensure the health of the community, that the full range of
basic, essential services are available and meet the needs of
the community.
One example of a way in which the basic PNPM approach
has been adapted to ensure that communities have full
access to well administered essential services is through the
PNPM Generasi program. Essentially, this program provides
incentives for communities to improve health and education
services. Communities are given resources to identify
constraints in these area and to plan and implement activities
to overcome these constraints. The program rewards their
achievement of specific goals, such as achieving better
nutrition amongst children
or reducing maternal
mortality, through increased
budget allocations in
following cycles.
what’s interesting here is
that this program not only
effectively achieved the
mobilization of communities,
it also had a distinct impact
on the supply–side: in areas
where the program has been
implemented, community
health centers and schools
respond by proactively
improving their standards,
above and beyond
the specific demands
made upon them by the
community. By offering
incentives to communities,
the program creates a
virtuous cycle and a potential dynamic for the improvement
of services.
At the moment, we are also conducting work to test
mechanisms whereby health workers can receive an
incentive if they reach specific results to reduce stunting.
The hypothesis is that a combination of incentives for
both communities on the demand side and health service
providers on the supply side can further improve results on
the ground. It’s a matter of trying to create the conditions
so that when people do well, their good performance is
recognized. Basically, I believe that people by and large
want to do the right thing and fulfill their professional
responsibilities, but it is also essential to nurture and foster
that by creating the right incentives to reward and recognize
good work. while there is a body of research that supports
this hypothesis, we do need to test in the Indonesian context
which mechanisms can have the highest impact. hopefully,
the rigorous evaluation of these experiences will provide the
necessary data to Indonesian decision makers to determine
whether and how these experiments can be brought to scale.
Testing and developing programs of this sort are part of an
ongoing process to ensure that PNPM remains fresh and
focused on the achievement
of its fundamental aims
and goals: the fostering
of empowered, inclusive
communities across
the archipelago so that
Indonesia can become
a country where all
Indonesians can thrive.
As PNPM has become a more
mature program, the need to
ensure that it remains fresh
and vigorous becomes more
apparent. when the program
was still new, participation
was an exciting concept. As
the program becomes more
established and its ideas
more accepted, there is a
danger of routine settling
in and processes becoming
stale. One of the many
ways in which the Government tries to keep participation
fresh and alive is through the “Creative Communities” pilot,
whereby PNPM taps into the cultural richness of communities
to keep participation in community affairs interesting. This is
for me personally one of the most satisfying aspects of this
job: being part of the team that helps the program to stay “on
the tips of its toes” and to continuously innovate so that the
program can make a difference in the lives of the poor.
Another source of great personal appreciation is the fact that
so many partners decided to pull their efforts and resources
“The real revelation of the PNPM program is the discovery by people of their own potential.
The real achievement is that people, individually and
collectively, have begun to realize that they are actually entitled to ask questions and demand answers regarding the deployment of all public resources, including resources outside the boundaries of the
PNPM program.”
78
as anticorruption, procurement, monitoring and evaluation,
gender, communication and knowledge Management,
amongst others. As we experienced over the last year, this
organization enables a more systemic evaluation and greater
cross learning between programs. As we learned, the key
to facilitating improvements in the way PSF supports the
Government’s PNPM program, was the development of a
more integrated, inclusive and focused unit.
The role of PSF is really to serve as a platform and forum for
the various actors and stakeholders in social development
in Indonesia to come together, to learn from each other, to
share experiences, to be creative. At present, reviving the
spirit of PSF so that it fulfills this role is our primary task. we
need to focus on our relationship with our client: we are a
support function, providing space to try new ideas, initiatives
that push the envelope, approaches that might be too
difficult to test through the normal systems.
To play this role, we need to be more active and engaged
in an intensive dialog with other stakeholders, with
representatives of civil society, with activists, and with people
who work for change across Indonesia. we need to provide
support not just to the Government, but to the whole social
development movement in Indonesia. we need to do that to
put PSF on a sustainable footing for the long haul.
At present, the world Bank serves as PSF’s Trustee. I envision
the world Bank having an ongoing role supporting
Indonesia in the implementation of PNPM. At the same
time, it is becoming clear that some form of community
empowerment program will continue beyond PNPM. The
need for support for such a program will also continue. But
in the long term, that support might well be provided by a
national institution. Such an institution would need good
governance, the ability to formulate strategic vision, the
ability to navigate the political environment, and the ability
to attract resources. It would also need strong leadership
to ensure the institution can meet the challenges at hand
and deliver on its commitments. Finally, it would need solid
systems (administration, hR, resource management, etc.)
so that it can be effective and so that partners can trust
the robustness of its fiduciary processes. working with our
partners in Government, the development community,
and civil society to foster the emergence of such a national
institution is an exciting prospect and will be high on the
agenda for the months and years to come. ∞
together and to join forces to support Indonesia’s PNPM
program. The efforts and results described in this report
would simply be unthinkable without the steadfast support
from AusAID, CIDA, DANIDA, DfID, Eu, the Netherlands,
and uSAID. without the very important contributions from
each and every one of the development partners, it would
just not be possible for the PSF to provide the current
levels of analytical and operational support. The fact that
these development partners decided to contribute to
PSF is a vote of confidence in the PNPM Program and the
PSF team. It also constitutes a tremendous challenge to
honor the trust invested in the team and to live up to the
rightful expectations to deliver high quality services and
tangible results.
My own period of tenure as head of PSF began just as the
massive scale up of PNPM was nearing completion. The
successful scale up of the PNPM program was a great source
of pride for all the stakeholders who facilitated it. At the same
time, the scale–up created massive challenges and placed
serious stresses on the capacities of all involved and on the
core systems needed to manage the program. while I am
impressed with the efforts of our partners in Government to
successfully address these challenges, in spite of often very
difficult working conditions, there is clearly an urgent need
to further strengthen the systems and to ensure that the
people and mechanisms are in place to bring PNPM to its
fullest potential.
Similar to the challenges in PNPM, there are also important
challenges in PSF that require attention. when I arrived in
2009, we had approximately 13 different teams, each with
their own project–specific focus. while this set–up had
its own merits, it made it difficult to approach the various
programs supported by PSF as a portfolio, to address
systemic issues cutting across the portfolio, and to create
critical mass so that we could provide the necessary support
to our clients and counterparts. To overcome the isolation
of individual projects, PSF went through a full restructuring.
First of all, we established a group of staff who specialized
in field supervision and who constitute our “eyes and ears”
on the ground. The Field Team provides support to all the
programs in the PSF portfolio in a given area. In this way,
the organization of PSF mirrors the Government’s decision
to push for the integration of the various PNPM programs.
we also established a number of crosscutting functions to
provide support to the various program in specific areas such
79 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
PnPM PeDulI: suPPoRTIng The woRk of CIVIl soCIeTY oRganIzaTIons
Through window Three and its sole component, the PNPM
Peduli program, PSF provides support for Indonesian civil
society organizations (CSOs) that work to alleviate poverty
and to empower communities, particularly those working
with marginal, disenfranchised and vulnerable groups. The
PNPM Peduli program was established in recognition of
the important role that grass–roots CSOs play in promoting
inclusive poverty reduction. These organizations are uniquely
qualified to reach and work with marginalized groups
and people, many of whom derive only limited or indirect
benefits from government programs, including PNPM
Mandiri’s core programs, PNPM–Rural and PNPM–urban.
In the past decade, donor funding has tended to be
project–based, with little core funding or support for
strengthening the CSO sector. The PNPM Peduli model aims
to provide support to CSOs that work with marginalized
groups. Funding aims to strengthen CSO organizational
capacities and, together with their beneficiaries, enables
them to set their own priorities in their work. The program
design and mechanisms have therefore been developed
in partnership with CSOs. CSOs developed Peduli program
targets to achieve the broad changes they hope to see in
their organizations and in the lives of those with whom they
work. Simplified project tools and mechanisms are being
developed to not only to ensure that projects run well,
but to facilitate the strengthening of CSOs’ management
capacity, transparency and accountability and to help
ensure sustainability.
while impact studies have shown that PNPM Mandiri’s core
programs are an extremely efficient means of improving
the infrastructure of villages, including poor villages in poor
regions, there have been questions raised as to whether
these core programs have a specific, significant positive
impact on the poorest or most marginal members of the
community in these areas and elsewhere.17 Despite PNPM
Mandiri’s core programs’ commitment to participatory
process, these programs have not always been able to meet
the special needs of members of groups including street
children, domestic workers, orphans, migrant workers, sex
workers, youth in conflict with the law, drug users, street
beggars, female–headed households, landless farmers,
victims of domestic or community abuse, rural fisher folk,
trafficked women, victims of conflict, people with disabilities
related to leprosy and people living with hIV and AIDS,
and other disabilities. In addition to special needs arising
out of their conditions and circumstances, members of
communities with disabilities of these sorts often face
systemic social, institutional and legal discrimination which
mitigate against their full involvement in community level
participatory processes.
At the same time, a number of CSOs have an excellent
network of contacts among specific excluded groups and a
high level of commitment to advocating for their rights and
improving their welfare. Operating without the constraints
that govern government agencies, these groups are often
in the best position to truly determine the aspirations of
the group that they represent and can test and implement
innovative approaches. with these approaches, they have
often had significant successes in dealing with groups that
have traditionally been left out of the local development
planning and processes.
wINDOw ThREESTRENGThENING CIVIl SOCIETY ORGANIzATIONS wORkING wITh MARGINAl, DISENFRANChISED AND VulNERABlE GROuPS
17 For example, see A Qualitative Study on the Impact of the 2010 PNPM–Rural in East Java, West Sumatra, and Southeast Sulawesi, Muhammad Syukri, Sulton Mawardi, Akhmadi; The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta, June 2011.
82wINDOw ThREE
In order to facilitate the funding and capacity development
of small CSOs while at the same time keeping overhead costs
to a minimum, the PNPM Peduli program works by providing
grants to a number of major, established Indonesian CSOs
(Executing Organizations, or EOs), who either make grants to
other, smaller, less established CSOs, or, when the major CSO
is a nation–wide membership–based organization, to qualified
branches, to implement activities related to economic
development, access to services and rights and social justice.
In 2010, the design of PNPM Peduli was completed, with
broad agreement on the basic implementation structure.
Extensive stakeholder consultations on the design also took
place with Indonesian CSOs, the Indonesian Government, and
international development partners.
In the early start up phase, local governments have shown
interest in supporting local activities, for example in Silanu
Mountain Village local government offered financial support
for the baseline data collection of the CSO partner in
their region. In Sigi district, local government participated
in a launch of PNPM Peduli activities in their district. In
East lombok, Samanta (a local CSO) is working with local
government and other NGOs to identify key poverty indicators
for assessing and monitoring their activities.
During the start–up phase, the program continued to
collect and record good practices to inform project
activities and mechanisms for working with CSOs to reach
marginalized groups. In partnership with the CSOs, project
officers developed monitoring and reporting systems and
a complaint handling system. They also laid foundations for
a MIS to be tested in the field and finalized by the end of
the pilot phase in December 2012. In particular, following
feedback from the CSOs regarding the challenges that they
faced, procurement processes and related forms were revised
to make them easier to use in the contexts that the CSOs
operated. Adjustments were made to the structure of the
EOs’ banking accounts to accommodate smaller transactions,
reflecting the nature of financing between national Executing
Organizations and their local partners. Also, administrative
processes for approvals were reduced to allow EOs to use
their own approval processes for clearing local procurement
plans, given their demonstrated capacity to manage such
processes. Getting these processes right has been a challenge
and improvements will be made through joint learning and
feedback during the pilot phase.
The Minister for People’s welfare launched PNPM Peduli in
March 2011. later in the year, three EOs were selected through
a competitive process, with grant agreements being signed
in June 2011. Two of the EOs are Indonesian grant–making
organizations (kemitraan and Association for Community
Empowerment — ACE), while the third one is lakpesdam
(the Institute of human Resources Study and Development),
an institute within the Nahdlatul ulama organizational
framework. A Technical Support Group was contracted in
November 2011 to provide technical and financial auditing
to the program as well as managing communications,
knowledge management, complaint handling, monitoring
and evaluation and the MIS. uS$ 1.2 million was disbursed
to these organizations in September 2011. By the end of the
year, 72 Indonesian CSOs (6 national grant makers and 66 local
pnpM peduli works with marginalized people to improve their access to public services, justice and economic opportunities.
83 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
project development objective: To strengthen the capacities of Indonesian CSOs to reach and empower marginalized groups to improve their socio–economic conditions.
approved Commitments: uS$ 4.27 million
total disbursements: uS$ 1.43 million
Closing date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2011 2012 Target
# Funded CSOs working with marginalized groups 50 66
# Number of direct beneficiaries from marginalized groups n/a 15,000
# Provinces/districts in which Peduli projects are working 27 provinces
90 districts
24 provinces
90 districts
# Community cadres/facilitators from marginalized groups 579 579
# Marginalized women/men trained by CSO/Branch partners 197 women
65 men
15,000
% CSO/Branch engaging with local government related to marginalized people n/a < 6 (10)
% CSO/Branch partners showing significant improvement in organizational capacity (ie financial, planning, implementation, monev and learning)
n/a 60
# EOs managing grants and capacity building for CSOs 3 3
% EO and CSO/Branch partners complying fully with PSF fiduciary Standards n/a 100
n/a 75
partners receiving sub–grants) were engaged in the program.
Together they will implement activities that will benefit more
than 15,000 marginalized people across 24 provinces.
Project priorities for 2012 will be to: (a) analyze current
interventions and refine activities and approaches to
enhance the project’s impact on marginalized people and
its sustainability; (b) test and refine systems developed
for working with CSOs that ensure overheads are kept
at a minimum, but that transparency and accountability
maintained; (c) develop a specific channel of funding for
Development People’s Organizations to facilitate inclusion in
the program of people living with disabilities; (d) complete an
external pilot phase evaluation in the second half of the year;
and (e) extend the grant agreements of the three EOs from
July to December 2012.
84wINDOw ThREE
PNPM Peduli was established to create opportunities for
members of vulnerable, marginalized groups, to improve
their welfare and to enable them to escape the poverty
trap and to live more dignified lives. PNPM Peduli was
established because members of vulnerable groups did not
receive a fair share of benefits from empowerment processes
implemented by “normal” members of the community
under PNPM. Members of
vulnerable groups often
face discrimination and are
shunned by other members
of the community. Members
of such vulnerable groups
are still stigmatized and
discriminated against.
In the face of this rejection
of members of vulnerable
groups, my colleagues and
I felt compelled to act. we
felt that there was an urgent
need for a specific scheme
within the PNPM framework
to meet the needs of
members of these groups.
Such a scheme to benefit
members of vulnerable
groups had to be designed
and implemented to meet
their special needs and in
consideration of the special
challenges that they faced.
we felt that those most
qualified to design and
implement these programs
were the community–based
civil society organizations
that have extensive
experience working with them.
while the specific details of the PNPM Peduli program may
vary from those of the core programs, it reflected the same
general principles. Firstly, it was designed to enable members
of the target group to achieve their aspirations. I call this The
Power of Dreams. The second principle revolved around the
motivation of members of vulnerable groups to advance and
move forward, to improve their lives and to live in dignity. I
call this The Power of Motivation. The third principle is that for
suJana royatDEPuTY MINISTER FOR POVERTY AllEVIATION AND COMMuNITY EMPOwERMENT, COORDINATING MINISTRY FOR PEOPlE’S wElFARE
members of vulnerable groups to fulfill their aspirations, they
must act collectively to assist each through gotong royong, or
mutual assistance. So, I call this The Power of Togetherness.
Through PNPM Peduli, members of vulnerable groups should
have the same opportunities as other members of the
community to develop their potential and to improve their
lives, to achieve dignity. PNPM Peduli enables vulnerable
members of the community
who were previously forced
to live and work through
socially unacceptable
activities in liminal spaces
in the community to leave
such activities behind, to find
self worth and respectability,
and to free themselves of
feelings of inferiority in
their dealings with “normal”
members of the community.
The unique power of the
PNPM Peduli program
is its ability to build the
spiritual and psychological
strength of members of such
vulnerable groups. when
members of vulnerable
groups are empowered in
this fashion, they are enabled
to engage in dignified work
and trade and thereby to
gain acceptance within the
broader community.
The second goal of PNPM
Peduli is to build the
capacity of civil society
and its organizations. Civil
society and its organizations,
including but not limited to those dealing specifically with
vulnerable groups, can play an extremely important role
in improving the delivery of services to the people they
represent and advocate for. In addition, they play a strong
role in improving governance within PNPM and more
generally by monitoring programs and ensuring that they are
implemented appropriately, without corruption or misuse of
funds, to facilitate the achievement of their intended goals. In
general, we are extremely concerned at the current low level
85 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
of participation of CSOs in matters related to governance,
particularly as it affects the implementation of development
initiatives at the local level.
At present, such matters too often remain under the control
of elite groups, including political, bureaucratic and other
elites. According to the world view of these elites, the vast
majority of the community are merely passive recipients of
assistance. The community is not even given the space to
dream, let alone to actually strive to fulfill its dreams and
achieve its aspirations. The dreams of the community have
been hijacked by the elites, who have attempted to control
and define these dreams. Parliamentary representatives also
express their own dreams or those of their political party,
rather than the dreams of the community they are meant
to represent. So, to whom can the community entrust its
dreams? There is not a single
person or institution that can
truly speak on behalf of the
community in this fashion.
Rather, the community itself
must become sufficiently
articulate to express its
dreams by itself, to express
its hopes and aspirations.
It can articulate itself best
through civil society and
its organizations. PEkkA, a
civil society organization
that strives to achieve the
empowerment of women
headed households, is an excellent example of how a CSO
can empower the community of which it forms a part.
The community, particularly divorced, widowed, singled
and abandoned women, implement activities through
PEkkA. It is their organization: they are PEkkA. PEkkA has
achieved success by working with the community, for the
community, and by the community. PEkkA has worked with
the community and as part of the community to achieve
the dreams and aspirations of the community. It has helped
women leave poverty as farm laborers behind to become
small businesswomen, it has worked so that elderly women
who have never been to school can learn how to read and
write and understand laws that affect them, it has lobbied for
the election of women village heads in regions where not a
single woman has held such an office.
Through a strong civil society, the sovereignty of the
community can be achieved. It is the community that should
determine the direction of political leaders, rather than the
other way round. with the sovereignty of the community, the
community can ensure that Parliamentary representatives
work to achieve the aspirations of the community, rather
than the aspirations of their party or those of political elites.
If a candidate comes to the community for their support and
offers them promises, the community will be empowered
to ensure that the candidate truly strives to fulfill their
aspirations so that he or she can achieve election. At
present, Parliamentary representatives can make promises
to the community and as soon as they are elected, they
can abandon them. To address that, CSOs need to be
able to play a strong role in monitoring and assessing the
performance of elected
officials, in publicizing their
findings, and in articulating
community responses.
within PNPM, CSOs can play
an important role to make
sure that the PNPM Mandiri
program serves members
of the community, who in
the end are its true owners.
with PNPM, but also more
generally, the elimination
of corruption is not the
task of law enforcement
agencies alone. Rather,
the community as a whole
must be involved. In order to play this role effectively,
the community must be fully aware of the negative
impact that corruption has on the lives of everyone in the
community. when they are fully aware of this, they will be
prepared to fight all cases of corruption, minor or major.
Thus, socialization and education concerning the impact
of corruption and on the means for eliminating it must be
intensified. The prevention of corruption through community
monitoring must be assigned the same level of priority
as enforcement of anticorruption measures through the
legal system.
For this reason, according to our agenda, PNPM Mandiri
must be increasingly placed under the full control of the
community. According to this agenda, PNPM Mandiri must
cease to become a government–driven program and become
“PNPM Peduli enables vulnerable members of the
community who were previously forced to live and work through socially unacceptable activities in the community to leave such
activites behind to find self worth and respectability.”
86
a civil society–driven program. we have designed PNPM
Peduli and other PNPM programs to facilitate full community
ownership, because this is the model that will ensure that we
achieve this system of ownership and management over the
PNPM Mandiri to which we aspire.
After only one year, it is not easy to determine whether PNPM
Peduli is a success. however, after engaging in dialogue with
beneficiaries of the program, I am convinced that there is
hope. There is a light at the end of the tunnel. At the very
least, beneficiaries believe that the program might possibly
assist them to achieve better lives. At the very least, this
hope gives them strength to start to act and to believe in
themselves, to believe in the possibility of a better life.
I believe that the PSF has played a strong, positive role in
facilitating the development of this program. At first, I was
annoyed because I had requested that the PNPM Peduli
program include revolving funds to facilitate economic
empowerment, rather than merely providing capacity
building and other training. however, I was finally convinced
by the PSF team that it was necessary to ensure that the
groups were psychologically and mentally prepared and have
the capacities required to engage in productive activities
facilitated through such funding. In the end, I agreed that
if members of vulnerable groups weren’t ready to access
funding through community block grants or stimulant funds,
it was better to work to strengthen their abilities first.
There have been many complaints about the financial
reporting mechanisms required by the PSF in the
implementation of PNPM Peduli. A number of mediators
have presented their protests to me. while I understand
their objections fully, I have worked to convince them
that procedures to ensure financial accountability are
necessary and standard across the world, and that it is
entirely appropriate to implement a system that ensures
accountability over all expenditure, no matter for what it is
used. If the financial systems do not ensure full accountability
over every cent spent, these systems are inappropriate and
may lead to misuse of funds. One of the dangers of programs
such as PNPM Peduli is that beneficiaries will consider funds
provided for their use as an unconditional grant for which
they are not accountable. To overcome this mistaken view, I
have insisted that they implement the appropriate financial
controls right from the beginning. If the organizations
representing vulnerable groups become accustomed to
these procedures, financial accountability will become part
of their culture and will guide their conduct in all matters. In
this fashion, they will win the trust of all the parties that they
deal with.
In my opinion, the PSF has very strict auditing and financial
accountability standards. But the implementation of such
strict standards comes specifically at the request of the
Indonesian Government, which requested that the world
Bank serve as the trustee of the multi–donor trust fund
through PSF precisely because of those standards. The
government has requested that the world Bank apply
best–practice accounting standards through which every
cent provided by donor agencies can be clearly accounted
for. why did the Government make this request? It was
because we wanted mechanisms and systems to ensure
that the standards of financial accountability at PSF were
impeccable. we hoped they would form the basis for a trust
fund that could serve as a model, a benchmark for other trust
funds which may be established for other purposes. There are
many trust funds that have looked to PSF as a guide in such
matters, including the Millennium Challenges Corporation
Trust Fund, amongst others.
Nonetheless, in my opinion, the PSF should strive to improve
its level of service and the quality of facilities and assistance
it provides to beneficiaries so that these beneficiaries
truly understand the importance of a system that ensures
accountability. It is not sufficient merely to impose sanctions
when groups fail to meet standards of accountability. Rather,
it is a matter of finding a balance between facilitating the
correct behavior and imposing sanctions for failures to
comply with the established standards. In order to achieve
this, PSF should increase the number facilitators and trainers
who can address financial management issues so that
beneficiaries have a better understanding and are able to
participate in the program in compliance with the standards
of accountability.
In the end, accountability forms the basis for a sense
of ownership by the community. It is awareness by the
community of their ownership of PNPM Mandiri that will
keep the program alive and relevant. The community must
realize that they own the PNPM Mandiri program, not the
Government, not the Joint Management Committee, and not
any particular cabinets under a given political regime. If the
community feels it truly owns PNPM Mandiri, then it will strive
to achieve the ongoing development and success of the
program into the future. ∞
87 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Through window Four, PSF provides technical assistance
to enable the Indonesian Government to access global
experience and expertise in poverty reduction and
community–driven development as well as technical
and financial resources for rigorous evidence gathering.
PSF also offers an objective platform to review, share and
apply lessons across poverty programs and foster debate
on solutions to poverty programs. Activities implemented
through window Four consist primarily of monitoring
and evaluation, special studies, and technical assistance
to national and local government. A built–in function of
this window is to develop the capacities of Indonesian
organizations such as universities and think–tanks to provide
specialized services for PNPM and poverty reduction.
PSF’s strategy links operations with applied research to
optimize the design of community–based programs to
improve their effectiveness in alleviating poverty and to
better understand social dynamics in Indonesia and their
influence on development and poverty reduction. Several
rounds of impact surveys for PNPM–Rural and PNPM Generasi
have demonstrated positive impacts on household’s income,
including the poor, access to services and employment as
well as strong economic returns to infrastructure investments
and social accountability within the program. Special studies
(such as the Stock — taking study on local Governance,
Revolving loan funds study or urban poverty Analysis)
complement the monitoring and evaluation work to foster
program innovation and inform policy formulation.
In 2011, PSF programs, projects and activities conducted
through window Four included the following:
zz PNPM Monitoring and Evaluation and Special Studies
zz PNPM Delivering Services to the Poor
zz PNPM Poverty Engagement, knowledge and Action
zz PNPM Revolving loan Fund (RlF) Capacity Building and
Sustainability Projects
zz local Government Capacity Development Project
zz Indonesia urban Poverty Analysis, Program Review and
PNPM–urban Evaluation
MonIToRIng anD eValuaTIon
The monitoring and evaluation of the Indonesian
Government’s poverty alleviation and community
empowerment program provides a solid evidence–based
foundation for learning from past and ongoing experience,
improving implementation and service delivery, planning
and allocating resources, and demonstrating results as part of
accountability to key stakeholders. As such, it plays a critically
important role in the successful development of these
constantly evolving programs.
PSF therefore conducts M&E activities to provide stakeholders
with empirical data regarding the results and impact of PNPM
Mandiri, and with more in–depth and operational research
on special topics related to community empowerment and
poverty alleviation. Amongst other goals, these activities are
intended as the analytical underpinning of PNPM, providing
key decision makers for PNPM and the broader poverty and
community empowerment agenda in Indonesia with timely
and relevant evidence, and doing so in partnership with local
agencies so as to build social science research capacity in
the country.
PSF has been working with the Indonesian Government
to conduct full scale and robust impact evaluations for
kDP/PNPM programs since 2008. The evaluations shed light
on the impact of CDD programs on several key welfare
indicators such as consumption, moving out of poverty,
long–term employment, and access to services. The PSF
established practice of conducting robust imact evaluations,
complemented by a range of mixed methods analytic work,
indicates strong commitment, both from the Indonesian
Government and donors, to support the knowledge–to–
practice feedback loop for its key programs.
wINDOw FOuRSTRENGThENING PNPM MANDIRI ThROuGh TEChNICAl ASSISTANCE
90wINDOw FOuR
Given the high emphasis placed on evaluations and
analysis, it is important to have research partners that
are capable and well recognized for their social science
capacity. unfortunately, the capacity to conduct highly
technical studies among Indonesian research organizations
is somewhat limited and insufficient to meet the demand.
while international expertise is an option in some cases, it
is often too expensive to be mobilized for all activities and,
more importantly, may have little impact on the building
of local capacity. PSF has always focused its approach to
research and impact evaluation on working with and through
national research institutes and, by doing so, tries to foster
capacity in these organizations. To intensify this effort,
particular attention goes to diversification of partners and
working closely on initiatives to strengthen the knowledge
sector in Indonesia, including building on AusAID’s efforts in
this sector.
In 2011, a number of studies were finalized and presented to
the Government, with the findings of these studies reviewed
as part of the PNPM Road Map process. The full studies can
be found on the PSF website (http://pnpm–support.org) and
executive summaries of each are included in annexes to this
report. The studies include:
zz PNPM–Rural Impact Evaluation (Quantitative and
Qualitative): This study estimates and analyses the
impact of the project on household welfare, poverty,
employment access to services, social dynamics and
governance. The results will be used as inputs for the
future PNPM–Rural design and to inform strategic
decision making (including as inputs to the PNPM Road
Map).
zz PNPM Generasi Impact Evaluations (Quantitative
and Qualitative): This study assesses the impact of
incentivized and non–incentivized community cash
ongoing monitoring and evaluation work in papua will inform future design improvements for pnpM-Respek.
91 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
transfers on twelve key health and education indicators.
Results from these evaluations are used to improve the
project’s design (including project kPIs) and to inform
decision makers on the design of the expanded PNPM
Generasi (Generasi “Plus”).
zz Women Headed Household Empowerment (PEKKA)
Baseline Survey: This study contains baseline data for
PEkkA, the female–headed household empowerment
project, on basic household welfare information (e.g.,
consumption, access to services, access to credit) to be
used to assess project impact.
zz PNPM RESPEK Evaluation of Village Infrastructure and
Institutional Capacity: This study evaluates the quality
of village infrastructure built by PNPM RESPEk in Papua
and the capacity of local institutions related to PNPM
RESPEk implementation to be used to improve project
design as well as to provide information for development
partners of the opportunities and challenges associated
with implementing development projects in Papua and
west Papua.
In continuing to improve the strategic relevance of PSF M&E
works to the Indonesian Government development priorities,
the PSF has undertaken several key evaluations and studies to
be completed in 2012. These include:
zz Infrastructure Census 2011–2012: This study contains
data on the availability of basic infrastructure (e.g., road,
bridges, health and education facilities) in more than
68,000 villages in Indonesia. Data collection was carried
out in coordination with BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik,
Central Bureau of Statistics) during PODES 2011. The
data will be used to provide the Indonesian Government
with estimation of the financing gap needed to ensure
availability of basic infrastructure in all villages in
Indonesia as well as a Supply Readiness Index for health
and education facilities in Indonesia.
zz Impact evaluations: These studies evaluate the impacts
of the Revolving loan Fund (RlF) pilot project, as well as
a proposed addition to the Generasi program to focus
on stunting to inform project implementers on the
achievements of projects, challenges in implementation,
and lessons–learned/best practices to improve
future projects.
zz The Community Management of Development
Portfolio Study: This study analyzes potential and
challenges for integration of various CDD programs at
the community level. It will support Pokja Pengendali
decision making in this area.
zz The Local Level Institutions III Study: This study analyzes
changes in local capacity and social capital in several
areas in Indonesia since 2001. The information from
this study will provide the Indonesian Government
and development communities with an understanding
of how local capacity influences welfare and
development outcomes.
zz Incidence of Benefits Study: This study addresses issues
related to who benefits from PNPM and who doesn’t and
what factors influence the perception of who benefits
in order to help project implementers improve project
targeting and poverty impact.
zz The Governance Review of PNPM Rural:
Community–Level Analysis: This review analyzes issues
related to the governance of PNPM–Rural at kecamatan
and village levels and will be used to improve the design
of PNPM–Rural V.
In 2012, the following studies and activities will
be undertaken:
zz Development of a framework for PSF’s analytical
work program: As the Government’s efforts to clarify
its strategy for PNPM up to 2014 and beyond becomes
clearer, it will be important to articulate the framework
for analytical work that will be needed to support the
implementation of the program.
zz Infrastructure Census: completion of a summary report
and related database on the existence and quality of rural
infrastructure (e.g., main roads, bridges, water supply,
schools and health facilities) for every village in Indonesia.
The report will describe the remaining infrastructure
deficit at the national, regional and local levels and
demonstrate the financing gap in addressing the deficit,
to inform Government planning and targeting, and
allow the Government and public to track and monitor
progress over time.
92wINDOw FOuR
zz Incidence of Benefit Study: completion of data
collection and final report on the incidence of household
welfare benefits at the village level under PNPM (i.e., who
actually benefits from the program), in collaboration with
the world Bank Jakarta Poverty Team.
zz Economic Impact Analysis (EIRR Plus): Delivery of
a study of PNPM Mandiri and SPADA sub–projects’
economic internal rates of returns, cost effectiveness,
and the economic multiplier effects on employment and
poverty
zz Local Level Institutions III: A mixed method study,
continuing the methodology of two previous studies on
local institutions to observe changes in local capacity
(since 2001) and the extent to which state and local
government structures support or impede community
efforts to organize and problem solve.
zz Community Management of the Development
Portfolio: A qualitative study of community capacity to
manage the diverse development portfolio at the local
level and to find lessons learned as inputs to a strategy of
program integration at community level
zz Papua–focused operational research and evaluation:
A qualitative and quantitative studies for PNPM RESPEk, a
special PNPM–Rural program for Papua and west Papua,
to determine the perspectives and participation levels
among beneficiaries and benchmark key program and
social development indicators for future evaluation.
zz Rapid Gender Assessment for PNPM: A review of
gender related indicators and practices under PNPM
Rural to critically examine strategies that have been
identified and/or used over time with regards to women’s
participation and factors that impact their uptake,
success, sustainability, and outcomes.
zz Development of a strategy and mechanism for
capacity–building to Indonesian research institutions to
improve their ability to conduct impact evaluation work,
including research design, analysis and report writing,
and with a particular focus on qualitative methodologies.
A rapid gender assessment will be conducted in 2012 to look at, among other things, the determinants of women participation and factors that affect pnpM’s gender outcomes.
93 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Project Development Objective: To provide stakeholders with empirical data regarding the results and impact of PNPM Mandiri; research in greater depth special topics of concern to PNPM and the social development field in Indonesia; and enhance the ability of Indonesian social science research organizations to conduct M&E and special studies.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 9.66 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 6.82 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 target
Objective 1: Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities provide stakeholders with empirical data regarding the results and impact of PNPM Mandiri.
Findings/evidence from 2010–2011 round of evaluations reviewed as part of PNPM Road Map process
5 evaluations launched
2 evaluations completed
Evaluation results disseminated to PNPM Road Map team and
JMC
Government accepts infrastructure database for use in planning/decision–making for TNP2k and BAPPENAS poverty reduction portfolio, in addition to PNPM Generasi and Pkh programming
Infrastructure Census
completed
Database and report submitted to TNP2k and BAPPENAS
Revised Results Framework and associated program of evaluation for PNPM Rural V
RF completed and endorsed by PMD; concept/strategy for
PNPM V evaluation finalized
Objective 2: Research in greater depth undertaken regarding special topics of concern to PNPM and the social development field in Indonesia.
# of studies completed as part of the 2009–2011 round of evaluations
6 3 All studies (9) completed and published
New 2012 studies launched (llI3; gender; ComMgt; EIRR+; Papua)
Concept notes prepared
5 studies launched and fieldwork completed
Pipeline for analytic work (AAA) 2013–2014 finalized in consultation with key partners
AAA pipeline 2013–14 finalized and endorsed by JMC
Objective 3: Ability of Indonesian social science research organizations to conduct M&E and special studies enhanced.
Strategy for the capacity–building of Indonesian research institutions endorsed by JMC
Consultations initiated
Concept note/strategy reviewed, finalized and
endorsed by JMC
Qualitative methodology ‘community of practice’ network up and running
Network established electronically and meeting on
4–monthly basis
94wINDOw FOuR
DelIVeRIng seRVICes To The PooR
when Indonesia’s ambitious decentralization program was
first implemented in 2001, it was argued that the devolution
of authority and responsibility for matters related to health,
education, and other matters would improve service delivery,
primarily by increasing user participation, facilitating local
responsiveness and encouraging accountability. however,
experience since the implementation of this program has
demonstrated that challenges at the district level, such
as mixed political incentives, weak capacity and limited
financial resources, can mean that decentralization does not
automatically lead to service delivery improvements. District
governments are possibly even more susceptible to elite
capture now than prior to decentralization: that is, public
decision making often reflects disproportionate influence by
well–off and well–connected groups.
Standard mechanisms for accountability, such as elections,
audits, and performance benchmarking, often do not work
well in environments where information is scarce, open
elections are unfamiliar or rare, and clarity about performance
standards is lacking. Decentralization can also aggravate
existing social problems. Polarized local environments
can erupt into open conflict when decentralization
leads to the exclusion of one group from government.
Marginalized groups, particularly the poor, often fare worse
under decentralization when local governments do not
see redistributive or highly targeted social programs as
priorities—particularly if the primary beneficiaries of such
programs are people least likely to vote. A great deal of
work is needed to introduce transparency, consultation,
participation, and accountability mechanisms that can link
public administrations with their surrounding communities
and give the poor a greater voice.
Reducing poverty requires significantly improved
coordination with local government service providers.
with governors who strongly support reforms, Gorontalo
and Papua sought assistance to pilot performance–based
incentive mechanisms to stimulate local governments to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery,
particularly in the health and educational sectors. In 2008, the
PSF agreed to finance a pilot project in Gorontalo province
(Gorontalo City, Gorontalo and Pohuwato districts) and
Papua province (Jayapura City, Jayapura and Biak districts)
to facilitate the coordination of reforms in public financial
management to ensure more efficient, well targeted
and transparent planning and budgeting processes. The
program also supports the Delivery Improvements and local
Governance (DIAlOG) program, which provides technical
assistance to the six participating local governments
to identify the challenges in delivering public services.
Following this, the program facilitated a series of workshops
to establish medium–term strategies to improve public
service delivery, particularly in health and education.
In 2011, the program provided technical assistance to
local governments to develop these strategies and helped
deliver the following key outputs: (a) medium–term
strategies for the health and education sectors developed
by the six participating districts with TA from the project
— implementation of the strategies is expected to start
following their dissemination; (b) a consolidated report for
the health and education sectors; and (c) a gender report
which was discussed with key stakeholders, including
BAPPENAS, AusAID and local governments (http://
pnpm–support.org/study/health–gender). These project
outputs are expected to help local governments improve
the quality of public service delivery, although capacity
constraints may hinder the implementation of medium–term
strategies. This suggests the need for follow–on technical
assistance to participating local governments and
implementation of the medium–term strategies. All project
components were completed by the end of 2011, and the
balance of unused resources returned to the PSF.
95 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Project Development Objective: To improve the quality of public service delivery and financial management at the local government level by piloting a performance based incentive system to improve their ability to deliver poverty services and implementing their monitoring and evaluation systems.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 0.94 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 0.76 million
Closing Date: June 30, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
Completed kabupaten/City mid–term strategies for health and education sectors
Facilitation and Technical Assistance
12 draft mid–term strategies
12 completed mid–term strategies
Completed consolidated health and education report
Facilitation and Technical Assistance
Consolidated health and education report
Completed consolidated health
and education report
Completed Gender report Gender Review and assessment to local
governments
Completed gender report
Completed gender report
kemitraan, one of the csos supported by pnpM-peduli, organized a training in Bangsal Village, lomobok.
96wINDOw FOuR
PoVeRTY engageMenT, knowleDge anD aCTIon
In the period following the Asian Economic Crisis, Indonesia’s
official poverty rate has fallen dramatically, with the
proportion of the population recognized as living below the
poverty line falling from a peak of 23.4% in 1999 during the
crisis to 12.5% in 201118
however, an almost equal proportion of the population have
been categorized as “vulnerable” or “almost poor”, having a
per capita household expenditure only slightly above the
level that defines poverty. Vulnerability is defined here as
the probability or risk today of being in poverty or of falling
into deeper poverty in the future. At any time in the future,
vulnerable members of the community may fall below the
poverty line as a result of any one of a number of personal or
communal calamities, including losing a job, business failure,
harvest failures, illness, accidents, natural disasters, or social
conflict, to name but a few.
In order to be able to successfully protect the vulnerable,
efforts to identify critical constraints and to address these
constraints need to be carefully formulated and effectively
implemented. This requires cooperation between various
actors involved in poverty reduction, including the
central and local governments, civil society, private sector,
international agencies, and communities.
Established in 2009, the four–year Poverty Engagement,
knowledge and Action program was designed to reduce
poverty, promote pro–poor growth and improve social
protection for vulnerable groups. The program’s stated aims
are to:
zz Strengthen poverty and social protection programming.
zz Deepen analysis of pro–poor growth, poverty
and vulnerability.
zz Build technical capacity and know–how.
zz Stimulate policy dialogue and providing inputs to
policy–makers.
In 2010, through this project, the most comprehensive,
empirical analysis of Indonesia’s labor market in the past
twenty year, the indonesia Jobs Report (http://ddp-ext.
worldbank.org/EdStats/IDNwp10b.pdf )
18 Accelerating Poverty and Vulnerability Reduction: Trends, Opportunities, and Constraints, SMERU, NOVEMBER 2010, p i
) was completed. The report recommends that three main
steps be taken to spur job creation in sectors with the
highest possibility of growth. These steps involve: (a) the
design of an integrated welfare program that can provide
an effective social safety net for workers vulnerable to
wage and employment shocks; (b) the negotiation of
lowered severance pay in exchange for a higher level of
unemployment benefits; and (c) an expansion of training
programs to provide valuable employment skills. In 2011, the
report was disseminated to stakeholders for comment and as
input for policy formulation.
In addition, the project co–financed a social assistance public
expenditure review, which includes an assessment of the
major household–based social assistance programs and of
the conditional cash transfer system. This expenditure review
will serve as input for the development of an integrated
family–centered social assistance system by the Government.
Another major output of this project in
2011 was the protecting poor and Vulnerable families
in indonesia report (http://documents.worldbank.
org/curated/en/2012/02/15879721/protecting–poor–
vulnerable–households–indonesia). This report finds many
of the programs intended to achieve poverty alleviation
amongst the targeted groups demonstrate promise, but
that much remains to be done to develop an effective
social safety net. Each program faces design and delivery
challenges and there are significant gaps, leaving many
vulnerable households exposed to the risk of falling into
poverty. The report identifies key reforms that aim to improve
the performance of individual programs. It also proposes
a vision of how social assistance can be reformed and
scaled–up to provide a true safety net and encourages the
Indonesian Government to continue efforts to integrate and
unify programs into a coherent and coordinated system.
An impact evaluation of the pilot household–based
conditional cash transfer program, Pkh, provided the
Indonesian Government with empirical evidence about one
of its priority social assistance programs. The 2011 evaluation
found that Pkh was effective in improving the welfare (i.e.,
consumption) of beneficiary households and their usage
of primary healthcare services, but less positive changes in
education outcomes. Progress has been made to address
97 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
several implementation challenges, which will likely increase
the program’s impact in encouraging positive health and
education behaviors.
The program also contributed to the preparation of a report
on targeting the poor and Vulnerable in indonesia (http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/15879773/
targeting–poor–vulnerable–households–indonesia), which
was to be completed in 2012. Around 40% of Indonesians
remain vulnerable to poverty and there is a high level of
churning around the poverty line, making it difficult to
identify which households should receive social assistance
benefits. The analysis finds that programs use suboptimal
targeting due to flaws in the methods used, as well as
poor information and awareness–raising activities at all
levels, which has contributed to a lack of understanding
about program objectives and intended beneficiaries.
Recommendations include developing a national targeting
system featuring a unified registry, involving beneficiary
communities in targeting methods, and introducing
methods to keep the registry current given the high level of
movement in and out of poverty.
The project also provided technical assistance to reform
the national socioeconomic survey (Susenas) as a means of
improving data dissemination. At present, many universities
and research agencies cannot afford to buy Susenas data
on which to base a quantitative analysis of poverty and
vulnerability. To overcome this, the project facilitated
the formulation of a Memorandum of understanding
that guarantees free usage of national data by all
Indonesian universities.
A program and public expenditure review of the
Indonesian Government’s eight major household–based
social assistance programs was co–financed by the
project. The 2012 report, protecting poor and Vulnerable
families in indonesia (http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/external/default/wDSContentServer/wDSP/IB/2012/0
2/29/000333037_20120229231135/Rendered/PDF/672170wP
00PuBl0T00English000PuBlIC0.pdf), finds that many of these
programs demonstrate promise, but that much remains to be
done to develop a true social safety net. Each program faces
design and delivery challenges and there are significant gaps,
leaving many vulnerable households exposed to the risk of
the poverty engagement, knowledge and action project supported the most comprehensive analysis of the indonesia’s labor market in 20 years.
98wINDOw FOuR
falling into poverty. The report identifies key reforms that aim
to improve the performance of individual programs. It also
proposes a vision of how social assistance can be reformed
and scaled–up to provide a true safety net and encourages
the Indonesian Government to continue efforts to integrate
and unify programs into a coherent and coordinated system.
An impact evaluation of the pilot household–based
conditional cash transfer program, Pkh, provided the
Indonesian Government with empirical evidence about one
of its priority social assistance programs. The 2011 evaluation
found that Pkh was effective in improving the welfare (i.e.,
consumption) of beneficiary households and their usage
of primary healthcare services, but less positive changes in
education outcomes. Progress has been made to address
several implementation challenges, which will likely increase
the program’s impact in encouraging positive health and
education behaviors.
Project activities were completed in 2011, and the project
is being closed. Overall, the Project has achieved its
development objective of improving the understanding of
poverty and vulnerability in Indonesia and promoting the
policy dialogue on key reforms areas. knowledge generation
has taken place through the production of a series of flagship
reports, which were prepared in close cooperation with
Indonesian Government partners.
Project Development Objective: To enhance the capacity of government agencies and local think tanks to use poverty analysis as a basis for action in promoting equitable growth, through “stand–alone” projects as well as integrated approaches across all platform activities.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 2.00 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 2.00 million
Closing Date: July 30, 2012
KPI 2010 20112012
Target
Reforms to the household–based conditional cash transfer program (program keluarga harapan) based on findings from assessments
n/a Achieved n/a
# of programs taking concrete steps to improve targeting performance n/a 3 4
Agreement for free access for all public universities in Indonesia to survey data produced by BPS
n/a Completed n/a
Program and public expenditure review for the GoI’s 8 major household–based social protection programs
n/a Completed n/a
Impact evaluation of the Pkh program n/a Completed n/a
Report on “Targeting the Poor and Vulnerable in Indonesia” n/a Completed n/a
Indonesia Jobs Report Completed n/a n/a
99 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
PnPM ReVolVIng loan funD (Rlf) CaPaCITY buIlDIng anD susTaInabIlITY PRojeCT
The provision of access to micro–credit facilities, particularly
micro–credit facilities accommodated through revolving loan
funds (RlF), has been a significant component in a number of
major Indonesian Government poverty alleviation programs
launched since the later stages of the Suharto era, including
PNPM. The RlF components of this program and others
have been intended to provide small loans to poor people
in rural and urban areas who wanted to start or improve
businesses but who have no credit history and limited or no
access to commercial loans provided by banks and other
formal financial institutions, and thereby contribute to the
overarching goal of poverty reduction.
By the end of December 2009, under PNPM–Rural, there were
3,145 sub–districts with uPks (the financial management
units managing both RlF and block grant resources)
operating RlFs, with a total capital of uS$ 332 million.
These RlFs provided loans to 258,779 groups (58% of
them women–only) with an estimated outreach of at least
1.7 million individual borrowers. According to client surveys,
these loans have had positive impacts on household
income, business development, job creation and children’s
education.19 By the end of 2010, an additional amount of
about uS$ 160 million was to be provided as block grants to
the rural RlFs, thus raising the total capital under PNPM–Rural
to at least uS$ 492 million. Together with PNPM–urban,
the total value of revolving funds under the PNPM
program reached more than uS$ 610 million by the end of
2010 (2011 data not yet available but estimated at about uS$
750 million).
while these government programs have contributed towards
poverty alleviation and overall economic growth, a persistent
criticism is that they have often been managed without
consideration of microfinance best practices, creating an
unsustainable source of cheap funds and unfair competition
to commercial microfinance providers.20 Other issues
identified with RlFs under PNPM–Rural and PNPM–urban
include: (a) failure to meet accepted practices for microcredit
management and monitoring; (b) mixed levels of capacity
19 See MICRA Microcredit Strategy Formulation Mission for PNPM, November 2008, page 39 “Program Impact”.
20 Indonesian Country Profile, Asia Resource Center for Microfinance (ARCM), http://www.bwtp.org/arcm/indonesia/I_Country_Profile/Indonesia_country_profile.htm
and skills on the part of uPks, including failure to separate
the management of grants from that of loans; and (c) lack
of clarity on the legal ownership of RlFs. These issues and
the large volume of funds currently revolving in PNPM
communities reinforce the need to put the RlFs on a clear
path towards sustainability. RlFs present an inherently high
potential risk of misuse and corruption, as well as a high
potential for non–performing loans.
In view of these issues, the JMC approved in 2010 the PNPM
Revolving loan Fund Capacity–Building and Sustainability
project to support the capacity building, restructuring
and institutionalization of the PNPM RlF scheme and to
strengthen the linkages between RlFs and the commercial
microfinance sector. By scaling–up sustainable access
to financial services to a larger underserved population
and the development of microenterprises, the project is
expected to contribute to poverty reduction initiatives and
improve livelihoods in PNPM communities. The project is
implemented in three phases. Phase One began in 2010 and
Phase Three will conclude in 2014.
Building on the start–up activities completed in 2010, in the
2011 the project:
zz Completed independent assessments of RLF
performance: Detailed on–site assessments of
governance, management and financial performance
of 508 PNPM–Rural and PNPM–urban RlFs were
completed by an international firm and results reported
for each RlF and consolidated into six provincial
reports. A report summarizing overall results and
recommendations is being finalized for dissemination
in 2012. The assessments confirmed that: (a) RlFs have
provided poor households with access to financing; (b)
there is widespread perception among borrowers and
community leaders that “loans” from RlFs are effectively
“grants” from the government; (c) governance of RlFs
is weak (e.g., accounting requirements not followed
systematically and only 2–3% of RlFs were audited
in the last two years); (d) management capacity in
operating RlFs is low (e.g., inadequate staffing and
significant weaknesses in MIS); and (d) while financial
performance of RlFs varies regionally and between
100wINDOw FOuR
programs (e.g., PNPM–Rural RlFs and those in Java are
substantially better performing than PNPM–urban and
off–Java RlFs generally), overall loan recovery, cost
efficiency and profitability were not at sustainable levels
in a majority of RlFs. In fact, the assessment found
that 45% of PNPM–Rural Rural RlFs and only 15% of
PNPM–urban RlFs may be sustainable or potentially
sustainable. The results of the assessment suggest a
differentiated approach and strategy is needed for
sustainable, potentially sustainable, and non–sustainable
RlFs. The results of the assessment and follow on work
are expected to inform policy discussions around RlFs
in 2012.
zz Expanded project activities: Project activities were
expanded to PNPM–Rural off–Java locations and all
PNPM–urban locations in 2011, including socialization
workshops for more than 350 urban economic
facilitators, city coordinators and other stakeholders, and
80 PNPM–Rural stakeholders.
zz Developed tool to assess RLF performance: An
analytical framework was developed and tested to assess
financial performance of the broader population of
PNPM–Rural RlFs using existing MIS data. The framework
will support project–level decision making, including
capacity building and MIS activities in the pilot provinces.
zz Explored linkages with the formal financial sector: A
dialogue was initiated with commercial banks to explore
opportunities for linkages between the PNPM RlF
scheme and the formal financial sector. A stock–taking
study on lessons learned from PNPM RlFs that have
established cooperation with bank and non–bank
financial institutions was designed for implementation
in early 2012. Results from the study will be used to
develop the linkage strategy for RlFs and support project
implementation more broadly.
In 2012, the project will focus on: (a) implementing MIS
activities and building capacity of RlF staff according to
needs identified in the RlF performance assessments; (b)
determining legal ownership of RlF funds and considering
models for possible transformation of eligible RlFs into new
legal forms for sustainability; (c) developing a differentiated
approach and strategies for sustainable, potentially
sustainable, and non–sustainable RlFs; and (d) providing
technical and policy recommendations and tools to assess
and improve RlF performance.
pnpM Revolving loan funds have helped poor community members, particularly women, in creating small businesses.
101 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Project Development Objective: To support the capacity building, restructuring and institutionalization of sustainable PNPM RlFs and to strengthen linkages between them and the commercial microfinance sector.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 8.89 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 2.00 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
% increase in no. and amount of loans to groups and their members in RlFs receiving support under the project.
n/a Baseline data collected. TA to RlF staff ongoing.
# of RlFs supported by the project that have institutionalized in a legal form that is appropriate to the local context.
n/a Desk review of relevant laws completed.
Procurement of local legal firm in process.
Available legal structures and process identified. Socialization to eligible
RlFs started.
# of RlFs with increased non–government financial resources and that achieve financial self–sufficiency (for well performing RlFs).
n/a Too early to report Too early to report in 2012. This outcome is expected
to materialize in 2013.
Component 1. Capacity Building and Institutionalization
# of RlFs for which sustainability assessments have been completed
Ongoing 508 Consolidated and individual reports
completed
legal review completed (to determine the appropriate legal structure for RlFs based on a menu of institutional options).
Planned Procurement in process Ownership status of RlFs clarified. Options and process specified for
transformation of RlFs into other legal structures.
# of RlFs supported by the project that have received high quality microfinance technical assistance and training.
n/a Procurement of TA in process
Capacity building ongoing.
% of RlFs supported by the project that have improved in their rating based on key performance indicators.
n/a Baseline ratings provided for sample of RlFs. System
for ongoing ratings being developed. TA
procurement in process.
New rating system established. Capacity
Outcomes are expected to materialize in 2013.
Component 2. Bank Linkages
Stock take on lessons learned from the PNPM RlFs that have established cooperation with bank and non–bank financial institutions.
Planned Review initiated Case studies of good practice socialized to RlFs.
# of RlFs supported by the project with linkages with commercial banks.
n/a Too early to report. Dialogue with Banks
initiated.
Increases are expected for 2013 with capacity
building support.
Revision of current SOPs on PNPM–RlF completed. n/a Ongoing assessment showed which areas need
strengthening.
Revised SOP or technical guidelines issued for RlFs
supported by pilot.
Component 3. Monitoring and Supervision System
Impact assessment designed n/a Design completed Data collection ongoing
% of RlFs supported by the project for which regular, complete and timely performance rating results are available.
n/a Ratings provided for sample of RlFs and system
for ongoing ratings being developed. MIS support
being procured.
Rating system established and RlFs in pilot provinces
routinely assessed. MIS solution deployed to test
RlFs and support more sophisticated ratings.
Component 4. Policy and Strategy
key stakeholders agree on long–term strategy and phasing–out of direct government support.
n/a workshops held with key national level stakeholders
held to discuss progress and future actions.
Strategy reflected in PNPM–urban and
PNPM–Rural 2012 Project Appraisal Documents.
102wINDOw FOuR
wOMEN in Central Java receive loans from the PNPM Mandiri program to establish and expand a number of small businesses, including those producing traditional textiles such as lurik and batik.
Ibu Sunarmi lives in the village of Cabean, in the Central Javanese district of klaten. Since longer than any living member of the village remembers, the women of this village have produced a colorful, stripy cloth known as lurik. It is hand–woven on simple, manually powered and operated machinery. In the past, women mostly produced this cloth for the use of their family, occasionally selling surpluses at local markets. however, as appreciation for fine handicrafts has grown across Indonesia, so has the market value of this cloth, which is now often sold at handicraft and fine textile stores in Jakarta and across the nation.
Ibu Sunarmi describes the growth and development of her business as follows: “until 2006, my weaving business was doing well. Then, the earthquake struck. Thank God, practically no–one in the village was badly hurt. But many of us suffered damage to our houses and to our businesses. Prior to the earthquake, I owned four looms. Two were completely destroyed. At the same time, we had to spend a lot on repairing the house.”
In 2008, the PNPM–Rural Mandiri program was established in a sub–districts and villages throughout klaten. Through this program, cheap business credit was made available to women, many of them weavers. Ibu Sunarmi says: “It was a God–send. The program offered credit at around one or two per cent per month. Before that, a lot of women relied on money lenders, who charged ten or fifteen percent. If you had a bad month, you might be working just to pay the interest. The PNPM program makes loans available to a group, not to an individual. The group takes collective responsibility
wEAVING A lIVING
for the repayment of the members’ loans. If one woman is late, then the others cover her debt. There are eleven women in my group, and fifteen groups in the village. we all know each other and trust each other. we work together and help each other. we want our friends to do well, so that they can each meet their commitments. we’ve never had anyone act irresponsibly.”
“In 2008, I received a loan of Rp 1 million. with some of my own funds, I was able to buy a new loom. That loom helped me increase my income, so the next year I applied for a higher loan, of Rp 1.5 million. As everyone’s business has grown and we’ve established the habit of saving, we’ve become eligible for higher loans. This year, I applied for Rp 3.5 million. Each year, I’ve bought a new loom or expanded my production facility. My business is going well now. we employ 15 workers, as well as providing employment to outworkers, who weave at their own homes. we’ve almost forgotten the earthquake now. we’ve moved on,” says Ibu Sunarmi.
Ibu Sunarmi admits that the growth of her business is hampered by her lack of skills in business administration and marketing. She says: “we realize that to make money, we have to present our cloth in packaging to make it attractive to modern, urban consumers. we also need to be able to keep good records so that we can register our businesses and apply for loans. In 2012 the PNPM program is going to concentrate on developing our skills in those areas. we need to move forward. Even though we are making traditional Javanese cloth, we need to be able to operate in a modern, business context.”
Ibu Sunarmi maintains a website showcasing the lurik cloth she produces at http://luriklaten.blogspot.com/
photo: Josh estey.
103 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
loCal goVeRnMenT CaPaCITY DeVeloPMenT PRojeCT
Indonesia has a three–tier unitary government structure,
with 33 provinces and 498 rural districts and urban cities
spread over some 17,000 islands containing more than
300 ethnic groups. Prior to the end of the New Order era,
despite its diversity and size, Indonesia had one of the
world’s most centralized fiscal and administrative systems,
which resulted in tenuous links between local demands and
decisions on local public services, weak mechanisms for
local accountability and ad hoc allocation of fiscal resources
across regions.
In 2001, the Indonesian Government implemented a
massive decentralization program under which authority
and responsibility for the delivery of education, health, and
many other basic services was devolved to the district level.
In 2005, the previous system of central–level appointment of
district executive heads was replaced by a system of direct,
popular elections. Decentralization was carried out with a
“big bang,” often without adequate preparation or capacity
development at either the local or central level and many
gaps remain. There is considerable variation across provinces
and districts in their capacity to implement decentralized
responsibilities, and a discrepancy between the standards for
public services and the resources allocated to them.
One of the objectives of decentralization is for local
governments to become more responsive to the needs
of their constituents. In Indonesia this goal is hampered
by a number of constraints. At the local government level,
the capacity to implement new responsibilities is often
low. Furthermore, local responsibilities are not always
clear. The lack of responsiveness to community priorities
by local government agencies is a main impediment
to mainstreaming and sustaining PNPM and other
community–driven approaches to poverty reduction. The
government’s musrenbang (multi stakeholder consultation
forum for development planning) process does not result
in a large proportion of community–level priorities being
funded through district budgets. Community needs have
largely failed to shape or inform district budgets or poverty
reduction strategies, which result in only a small percentage
of community priorities being incorporated into district level
development plans.
The local Government Capacity Development (lGCD) project
aims to improve pro–poor planning and service delivery
and promote social accountability approaches to foster
local government responsiveness to community demand.
Activities aim to improve the participatory planning process
from communities up to the district level, focusing on
improving pro–poor planning and budgeting and building
better linkages between the community planning in PNPM
and line agency service delivery. Through this program, it is
hoped that improved responsiveness to community level
demand will strengthen local level governance and improve
service delivery, resulting in services that are less expensive,
of better quality, and more responsive to local needs
and preferences.
Phase One of the lGCD project, which ended at the end
of 2011, focused on analytical studies of lessons learned
from various community driven development programs
and piloting of a toolkit for Pro–Poor Planning, Budgeting
and Monitoring (P3BM). All four analytical studies under this
project (local Government stocktaking study, spADA study,
p2spp study, and impact Assessment of p3BM) were completed
in 2011 (http://pnpm–support.org/lG–analytical–study).
Policy notes based on these studies have already been
discussed with key stakeholders, while final reports are being
reviewed by peers prior to publication.
To facilitate the discussion of lessons learned, the findings
from these studies which are most relevant to ongoing
poverty reduction efforts were disseminated in a regional
workshops in May 2011 and a national conference in August
2011, are being consolidated into a single report which
focuses on: (a) the link between community needs and
planning processes; (b) barriers and impediments to the
delivery of quality public services to communities by local
governments; and (c) the interaction between PNPM with
regular development planning, and the preparation of local
government to a transition in PNPM after 2014. This report
will formulate a set of policy recommendations on how local
government service delivery can be made more responsive
and accountable, and thus serve as a foundation for the
design of the Phase Two of the Project.
Following–up on the P3BM training, the provincial and
district governments in Banten, west Nusa Tenggara
and Central Java financed a series of workshops to
105 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Project Development Objective: To improve pro–poor planning and service delivery and pilot social accountability approaches to foster local government responsiveness to community demand.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 1.43 million
Total Disbursements: uS$ 0.96 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2011
KPI 2010 20112012 target
(For phase 2)
Component 1. Analytical studies
# of studies on lessons learned from various CDD programs completed to support roll–out of good practices
0 4 1
# of policy notes prepared 0 4 1
# of participants in discussion of policy relevant findings 100 410 750
Component 2. Piloting of P3BM tool kit
# of national and provincial master trainers 26 99 200
# of local government officials trained in P3BM toolkit 0 189 1,250
# of provinces that establish P3BM clinics 0 2 7
# of districts that use P3BM tool to monitor poverty data 0 1 15
support the rolling–out of the P3BM toolkit and improve
pro–poor planning and budgeting. Outcomes included
the establishment of a database system on MDGs and local
development, which feeds into the district planning and
budgeting document. Poverty data will be verified and
validated through a multi–stakeholder forum, while a P3BM
Clinic will be established through a Gubernatorial Decree
to institutionalize pro–poor planning and support village
planning processes. A proposal for a national roll–out during
Phase Two will be submitted to JMC approval in April 2012.
The analytical studies under Phase One focusing on
improving participatory and sector planning, documenting
and analyzing best practices, and identifying and managing
capacity gaps have been completed. The studies build on a
recent shift away from debates about allocations and analysis
of supply side spending to a focus on the quality of service
delivery, and the role that citizen groups and communities
have to ensure that services are provided responsibly and
accountable. They showed that demand–side governance,
including downwards accountability and access to
information, is starting to take root among civil society and
local governments. As a result, there are opportunities for
piloting a range of reform triggers and tweaking the incentive
structure for public service improvements. The studies found
that, when local–level reforms occur, triggers for performance
are commonly a combination of public entrepreneurship,
civil society activism and tweaking of the incentive structure.
Reform–minded government officials can thus integrate
CDD approaches and find traction for performance if they
are backed by civil society action groups and are provided
with recognition and public support. however, there are few
institutionalized mechanisms for citizens to hold government
actors to account.PNPM practices can act as a catalyst for
improvement of these processes.
In Phase Two of this project, which will commence in
2012, the focus will be on the scaling–up of best practices,
supporting networks of reform–minded district governments,
and addressing skill gaps and context gaps identified during
Phase One, with a particular focus on fostering community
demand for improved service delivery through social
accountability and community monitoring.
106wINDOw FOuR
InDonesIa uRban PoVeRTY analYsIs, PRogRaM ReVIew anD PnPM–uRban eValuaTIon
like other developing countries throughout the world,
Indonesia is steadily urbanizing. The proportion of the
population living in cities has increased from 19.4% in 1975,
to 30.9% (or 55 million people) in 1990 to 39.4% at the end of
the millennium. Population projections indicate that urban
dwellers will surpass their rural counterparts as a percentage
of the population between 2010 and 2015, rising to a total of
60.7% by the year 2025 (or a total of 167 million in a projected
population of 276 million) (BPS Susenas data in ADB, 2001).
how many poor people actually live in Jakarta and
Indonesia’s other major cities depends, of course, on one’s
definition of poverty. The truth is no one knows for sure.
Indonesia has used varying — sometimes conflicting —
methodologies to measure poverty. In some cases, it is not
clear that these methodologies draw an accurate, meaningful
picture of poverty in the urban context, where the poor rely
heavily on the cash economy and thus are more vulnerable
to fluctuations in income than the rural poor, who may be
able to supplement their household supplies with kitchen
crops. In addition, there are severe environmental and health
hazards due to crowded living conditions in urban slums,
and no tenure security. Other multidimensional aspects
of poverty relate to access to basic services such as water,
sewage, health and education. Thus, urban poverty is a
multidimensional phenomenon that escapes facile analysis.
The Indonesia urban Poverty Analysis, Program Review and
PNPM–urban Evaluation project has three main objectives:
(a) to provide a basis for understanding the dynamics and
characteristics of urban poverty in Indonesia; (b) to review
urban poverty programs in Indonesia to assess the extent to
which they address the needs of the urban poor; and (c) to
undertake a process evaluation of the PNPM–urban program
which examines internal efficiency, documents good
practice, distills lessons learned, and identifies options for
program reform that could increase its effectiveness.
pnpM-urban financed free health care services in central Java.
107 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
The program consists of three major
inter–related components:
1. Urban Poverty Profile: The purpose of this profile is to
provide a basis for understanding the characteristics
and dynamics of urban poverty in Indonesia and to help
identify the needs of the urban poor.
2. Review of Urban Poverty Programs: This review will
involve the compilation of a master list of government
programs aimed at poverty alleviation in urban areas
and a comparison between several of these programs
to determine the extent to which the various programs
meet the needs of poor people in cities.
3. Process Evaluation of the PNPM–Urban Program: This
evaluation is intended to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the PNPM–urban program, especially in
terms of governance and the facilitation of access to
services. In addition, it will document good practices
and distill lessons learned as input for further program
modifications and design.
In 2011, the Rand Corporation, to which the project was
contracted, completed a version of the process evaluation
of the pnpM–urban program, which has been revised on the
basis of input from the PNPM–urban team. A first draft of
the urban poverty profile and program Review, conducted by
the same contractor, was submitted in November 2011, with
extensive comments provided by the task team and peer
reviews (http://pnpm–support.org/evaluations). A revised
version was submitted in March 2012. key findings from
these documents were incorporated as input for the concept
note for the PNPM–urban IV project, and the task team is
preparing a policy note. while some of the intended analysis
for the urban poverty profile has not been possible due
to unforeseen data limitations, the full study is tabled for
completion in 2012.
During 2012 the key priorities for the project will be to
finalize the work and ensure that the key findings are
incorporated into the design of the PNPM–urban Program
and strategic directions on urban poverty are discussed
with key stakeholders. Two policy notes are being prepared
by the world Bank and will be ready in May 2012 along with
the final RAND reports. In early 2012 a rapid assessment was
also commissioned on the Neighborhood Development pilot
program given that there was a request for more information
on the topic following the November 2011 workshop and
during the project preparation process. This study will be
incorporated into the policy notes and finalized along with
the full package which will be ready for broad dissemination
in June 2012. In May, further plans for dissemination will be
identified. The need for further identifying improvements to
the MIS was also identified and a consultant would be hired to
guide the team on how to enhance the current system. ∞
Project Development Objective: To understand the PNPM–urban approach in the context of urban poverty in Indonesia today, its strengths and weaknesses and links to other urban poverty programs, and bring in global experiences in urban CDD–based poverty interventions.
Approved Commitments: uS$ 0.64 million
total disbursements: uS$ 0.39 million
Closing Date: December 31, 2012
KPI 2010 2011 2012 Target
Incorporation of key recommendations into the design of PNPM–urban
n/a Ongoing Completed
PNPM–urban process evaluation n/a Final report under review
Completed
urban Poverty Analysis and Program Review n/a Final report under review
Completed
108wINDOw FOuR
however, the first programs in which community–driven
development were really the central and driving principle
were kDP and uPP. In both these, development initiatives
and planning were one hundred percent community–driven.
In addition, funds were disbursed directly to community
groups. The mechanism of channeling funds directly to
these groups was the unique innovation that made these
programs different from all those that preceded them. Right
from the beginning, this has had a dramatic positive impact
on reducing corruption and
achieving better results.
Of course, there are still
incidences of corruption
within the PNPM program,
but a much lower rate than in
other, previous government
programs. Systems are in place
in PNPM to detect corruption
if and when it occurs and
to recover funds and take
actions accordingly.
The other major innovation
of the program was the
deployment of a huge force
of village level facilitators.
These facilitators didn’t create
village level institutions, they
worked with existing ones.
Actually, I believe that what
they do is very natural and
simple: they are helping to
facilitate a process that has
deep roots in Indonesian
culture. In almost every
single region of Indonesia,
there are strong, local level
village organizations that
have always been used
to address matters of community concern. If you go to
any village in Indonesia, you’ll find a community hall or a
public meeting place. Those facilities weren’t created by
the Government, they have existed throughout history.
The exact nature of the organization may vary from place
to place, in Bali it is the banjar, while in west Sumatra it is
the negara, but these institutions exist all over Indonesia.
COMMuNITY–DRIVEN development is a very powerful
force in Indonesia. Indonesia is composed of a multitude
of ethnic groups, each with its own culture. In the past,
development in Indonesia was driven by a top–down
paradigm, with decision–making made at the center. This
meant that development programs were often characterized
by a one size fits all approach. In Indonesia, not only does
each community have a different culture, it has its own
economic and social needs. You can’t apply a single solution
for all of the country’s
different communities.
But community–driven
development gives each
community the space to
determine its own needs.
The top–down development
paradigm was dominant
in Indonesia at least until
the 1980s. At about that
time, the Government
began to experiment with
a more community–driven
approach. One of the first
big government programs
to attempt to include
the principles of
community–driven
development was the program
pembangunan kawasan
terpadu (Integrated zone
Development Program),
which began under
former President Suharto’s
administration. Even though
the term ‘community–driven
development’ wasn’t used
at the time, the program
was designed to canvass the
opinion of local community members and to integrate their
inputs into the implementation of associated projects. later,
the Village Infrastructure Project and Inpres Desa Tertinggal
also moved towards a greater inclusion of input from the
community, with broad input from community members
regarding the design and implementation of projects under
this program.
rudy praWiradinataDIRECTOR OF POVERTY REDuCTION, ThE NATIONAl DEVElOPMENT PlANNING AGENCY/BAPPENAS
109 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
different culture. At the level of implementation, PNPM
is always guided by local wisdom. People always say that
you can’t design a single program to meet all Indonesians’
needs, and that’s true if the center enforces its own ideas
and priorities, as under top–down development. It’s the
bottom–up approach that has allowed this program to be
scaled up and implemented across Indonesia.
PNPM is an extremely adaptable and flexible program. It can
be adjusted not just to meet the needs of different cultures
and communities under normal circumstances, but also
to meet the needs of communities devastated by natural
disaster or in other extreme and unusual circumstances.
Following the 2004 Tsunami, I served as the Director of local
Government Capacity Building in Aceh. I saw at firsthand how
the urban Poverty Program could be utilized to solve issues
that could not be solved
by a top–down approach. I
remember that there were
proposals to build new road
systems that led inland
and uphill to make them
more suitable to facilitate
evacuation and escape in the
event of future tsunami or
similar disasters. The problem
was that these roads had to
be built over private land,
for which no funds were
available for compensation.
uPP facilitated a redivision of
land titles to ensure that the burden of the costs was shared
equitably. The process involved a community mapping of the
lands to determine how the redivision was to be conducted.
while it was a time–consuming process, the end result was
far better than any top down process could ever have been.
I believe that community–driven development goes way
beyond the PNPM program. The PNPM program is intended
to run at least until 2014, but whether or not it continues
in its current form, the Indonesian Government will have
to continue to be guided by its underlying principles.
In the end, it’s the approach that works for Indonesia.
Through community–driven development, Indonesia can
achieve the national vision of Bhinneka Eka Tunggal, or
‘unity in Diversity’. ∞
It is not the role of PNPM to create these institutions,
except in rare cases where such institutions have become
dysfunctional or do not exist. Rather, PNPM has to work
with these institutions and through these institutions. PNPM
works by encouraging the community to use these facilities
to determine why they are poor and what they can do
about it. The facilitators really only support the community’s
initiatives and help its members to shape their plans so that
they can be implemented. Of course, that’s a vital role: the
quality of PNPM is highly dependent on the quality of its
facilitators. Ensuring that we have a strong, dedicated corps
of facilitators is vital to the program, and building this corps is
a challenging task. But the primary assets for the program are
the community institutions.
Of course, this does not mean that local governments are
irrelevant under the PNPM
program. They also have a
vital role to play, particularly
as the provider of essential
health, education and other
services. Our goal is to ensure
that with the implementation
of decentralization, these
local governments have
the capacities that enable
them to be responsive
to community needs.
For that reason, we have
implemented a wide range
of pro–poor planning and
budgeting programs and other building capacities for
local governments. One tool that we are experimenting
with now is PNPM–Integrasi, a project within PNPM–Rural,
which provides incentives in the form of increased budget
allocations for local and district governments if their planning
processes are designed to accommodate community–driven
plans developed through participatory approaches under
the PNPM program. Of course, the means by which they
achieve these goals may also vary from district to district
and region to region, because they must be aligned with
community priorities.
So, even though PNPM uses the same basic mechanisms
across Indonesia, with the same operational guidelines,
the way that it is implemented in every village is different,
reflecting the different needs of each community and their
“In the end, community–driven development is the approach
that works for Indonesia. Through community–driven development, Indonesia can achieve the national vision
of Bhinneka Eka Tunggal, or ‘Unity in Diversity’.”
110
STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR 2012 AND BEYOND
ThE 2011 National PNPM Congress provided a platform
for representatives from communities, local governments
and various other stakeholders to share and discuss with
the senior leadership in Menko kesra, TNP2k, BAPPENAS,
the MohA, and the MoPw what their views, dreams and
aspirations are for the PNPM Mandiri program up to 2014 and
beyond. The result of this and various other discussions
are being encapsulated in the PNPM Road Map, which is
scheduled for finalization in October 2012. when completed,
this Road Map will provide a clear articulation of the strategic
directions for PNPM.
while the formulation of the Road Map is not yet complete,
a number of themes have already emerged. In general terms,
a major area of focus is on the provision of the necessary
support so that other areas of local government can adapt
and emulate the lessons learned from PNPM. Another
major theme is ensuring that villages receive the support
and financing needed so that (a) the planning of service
delivery responds to communities’ priority needs; and (b)
communities can hold the local governments and service
providers accountable for the effective implementation of
the plans that were agreed upon, and for the transparent
use of the budget. Much of the practical implications of this
broad direction remain to be developed, but at this point,
the Indonesian Government representatives in the JMC have
already indicated the intention to move forward with the
establishment of “One village, one plan”, through which all
budgets formulated at the village level will be fully accessible
to all members of the community, enabling community
members to actively monitor the use of these resources.
Much of PSF’s focus in 2012 will be on supporting the
formulation and implementation of the Indonesian
Government’s PNPM Road Map. The lessons from the
consultations to date indicate that empowered local
institutions, participatory planning, and accountable
budget execution and service delivery will be the major
focus of these activities. In line with this, the working
hypothesis underpinning PSF’s program is that community
empowerment leads to better welfare outcomes and social
justice. To foster these welfare outcomes, special attention
will go to: (a) making sure that the most vulnerable and
marginalized groups have a say in the development process;
(b) adapting the PNPM program so that it is better able to
respond to the different needs of specific communities;
(c) empowering women; and (d) supporting the economic
empowerment of the poor, especially women’s groups. In
terms of social justice, there will be an increasing focus on:
(a) improving the basic rights of the poor and vulnerable;
(b) strengthening the accountability of local authorities to
communities and beneficiaries; (c) addressing inequality; and
(d) establishing or strengthening the channels for recourse if
and when the rights of the poor are not honored.
Community empowerment by itself has its limits. while it can
increase demand for better services and better governance,
empowered communities on their own can only achieve so
much if they are not supported by their local governments
or if they don’t receive the services they need to support
their development efforts. In other words, the results that
can be achieved through community empowerment alone
are limited if there is no clear accountability on the part of
duty bearers or if there is no transparency in the budgets
that are intended to support these communities. To foster
this transparency and accountability, PSF will continue
to strive to: (a) support the Indonesian Government’s
governance and anti–corruption initiatives for its Cluster Two
poverty reduction programs; (b) strengthen mechanisms
for the effective and transparent transfer of resources to
112STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR 2012 AND BEYOND
communities; and (c) improve core systems and procedures
for the effective management of the PNPM Mandiri program.
In addition, PSF will increasingly focus on supporting leaders
at various levels in government and civil society to ensure
that they can learn from each other’s experiences and that
all stakeholders have access to the data necessary to inform
policy making. To further foster accountability on the part
of local governments and service providers, efforts will be
made to address the information asymmetries between
communities and those who serve and govern them.
The governance and anti–corruption work will also play
an important role, as will a thorough examination of the
internal dynamics and power structures within communities
and households.
Pursuing these various areas of work is a massive undertaking
that will require strong partnerships with a range of
organizations that are active in these areas. At the time of the
printing of this report, PSF is actively involved in discussions
with these partners to determine how the respective
efforts of all stakeholders can complement each other, and
who is best equipped and positioned to do what. It is our
ambition that establishing this collaboration can not only
help to galvanize support of various actors involved in social
development in Indonesia, but that it can also lead to an
increasingly meaningful dialogue between these actors. By
doing so, PSF can move towards achieving the role for which
it was created: to foster the emergence of a social movement
for social development. ∞
113 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
sCott guggenheiMFORMER hEAD OF PNPM SuPPORT FACIlITY
whAT I like about PNPM is that when it works it broadens the
way we think about development. Deep beneath the surface,
the PNPM program is founded on a fundamental contract
between government and communities: the understanding
is that if the Government provides money to communities,
the communities will use it well. One of the greatest
achievements of PNPM, above and beyond any of the specific
achievements of any particular project towards achieving
specific goals, has been the
legitimation of a discourse
in which communities are
regarded as valuable, one
in which we recognize that
poor people are capable
of making smart decisions
about the issues that
affect them most critically.
PNPM has legitimated a
discourse in which we
think about partnerships
between governments and
communities, rather than
thinking of government
as above society, and in
that sense the program
symbolizes a break from how
New Order development
programs thought
about society.
By itself, the idea of
community development is
nothing new in Indonesia.
PNPM fits into a long
trajectory of Indonesian
thinking about how to utilize
Indonesia’s vast social capital.
Even so, at the time when
what later became PNPM
first began, a lot of New
Order, top–down, centralized, authoritarian thinking about
the vertical relationship between the Government and the
community was extremely entrenched. The idea of direct
cash transfers to communities was a near heresy. The fact that
this mechanism is no longer controversial shows how far we
have come.
You can see that from the way the PNPM program has spilt
out over its own sides and influenced other government
activities how its ideas have become more widely accepted.
For example, the BOS program, the Indonesian Education
Department’s School Operational Assistance program,
structurally has nothing to
do with the PNPM program
and is administered through
a completely different
bureaucracy. At the same
time, it has adopted many
of the principles and
mechanisms of the PNPM
program, such as the
disbursement of funds for
operational expenses to
schools to utilize according
to the priorities determined
by a school council that
includes parent and
community representatives.
Many provincial
governments have also
established programs that
are run on similar principles
to achieve all sorts of goals in
many different fields.
PNPM had the potential to
change the way we think
about development, and
it has already come some
way. But we aren’t there yet.
I think a sign that PNPM will
have achieved its ultimate
goals will be when people
eventually take participation
and accountability for granted. People should see the
delivery of services as a fundamental right that they can
enforce in the political arena. At the moment, participation is
still regarded as something special, a significant achievement
in its own right. PNPM will have succeeded when people
115 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
and worries that something, somewhere, will bring down the
whole house of cards!
keep in mind that absolutely nobody was well prepared for
that scale–up. while the lack of integrated management and
information systems didn’t matter much when the program
was a small pilot, that lack had a qualitatively different
impact when the program was scaled up. Integrating those
systems has taken years, and is only just being achieved.
Another issue relates to human resources. The actual size of
the core team managing PNPM at MohA didn’t increase by
much through the scale–up, although their responsibilities
and duties grew by several
orders of magnitude. All
of the sudden, they had
to coordinate between a
vastly greater number of
stakeholders and oversee a
program that covers some
60,000 villages, three time
zones, and the world’s most
diverse country, all in a
context of political turmoil,
endless fiduciary risk, and
the normal Indonesian challenges of tsunamis, earthquakes,
and floods. They’ve done a surprisingly good job given all
of the constraints facing them — but they shouldn’t have to
be facing so many constraints in the first place. Thirdly, the
scale–up happened in the context of decentralization, when
who is supposed to do what for this program became fuzzier
rather than clearer. Finally, and this is something that we
realized only when senior officials asked us to increase field
oversight, Indonesia has no formal body with the ultimate
responsibility for the coordination and management of
its development initiatives. BAPPENAS does planning, the
Finance Ministry looks after finance, but no single, high level
body is responsible for the coordination of all the elements.
That’s one major reason why the Government first formed the
PSF, and why it continues to play an important role.
we shouldn’t be surprised by the fact that PNPM is not
yet complete. For some reason, people expect that the
social reforms and improvements that took fifty years to
achieve in Germany, England or the united States should
can almost stop thinking about participation, because
it is regarded as the completely normal, standard way of
doing things.
how likely is this to happen? To be honest, I’m not sure.
There are many ways for PNPM to fail. PNPM began with
the idea that it was the first step in a large social reform
movement. Instead, as the program has grown and become
institutionalized, there is an increasing tendency for it to
become viewed as a merely a project, another way for the
Government and development agencies to invest money.
You can see that by how people involved with the project
spend their time. A lot of
the time people are focused
on project–type issues:
what are the mechanisms
to integrate this project with
that local district agency’s
activities? how do we develop
a fair system of remuneration
for facilitators? how do we
pay transport allowances?
Those are all important and
legitimate issues, but they
are specifically bahasa project issues. Too much attention
to these issues on the part of the people involved takes the
focus away from the big picture challenges that a high level
body like the Joint Management Committee must also be
thinking about: what is the role of civil society? how do we deal
with marginality and social exclusion? how is the social contract
between the community and government to be redefined? Those
aren’t questions addressed through a project, they have
to be addressed through a social movement that involves
communities, governments and their agencies, and civil
society organizations in a contested and dynamic process.
Of course, you have to remember what’s happened since
2007. PNPM was actually at the point of being wound up in
2006. Then the Government turned around and decided to
transform a pilot project into a nationwide program by 2010.
People forget what a large country Indonesia is: That’s like
trying to set up a comprehensive, nationwide program that
involves every town and village in the united States. It’s not a
surprise that virtually every person and system involved with
PNPM has been living five years of constant stress, overwork,
“PNPM will have succeeded when people can almost stop
thinking about participation, because it is regarded as the completely normal, standard
way of doing things.”
116
be implemented in a decade or less in Indonesia. long
term institutional and social change takes a long time to
achieve. The idea that you can go from the 1998 New Order
— hyper–centralized, deeply militarized, pretty corrupt and
very authoritarian — to something participatory, inclusive
and transparent in less than 15 years is not realistic, yet
people expect social transformations to happen because
somebody passed a law decreeing them to appear. Still,
if PNPM is to survive as an idea, it needs to keep coming
back to that vision of making community development a
pillar of Indonesia’s democracy and not just a cheap way to
build roads.
Asking me to assess my own and the Bank’s role in this
theater is a little unfair! In one sense it’s been a great
adventure for all of us. I love knowing that all of the pain,
heartache, and stress in the end still mean that villages
in Maluku can for the first time make open, transparent,
harmonious decisions about what development should mean
for them — and then get the resources and freedom to do
it. And I love watching so many young, idealistic Indonesians
take part in the program and visibly blossom at the chance
to help people make development something substantive
and real. Overall I think that PSF has played and continues to
play a useful role as an important technical support unit for
the Government but also, when it works, PSF is a place where
new ideas can be discussed, tested, and used. So no regrets,
and ongoing optimism on the future of PSF.
At the same time, I’m not going to gloss over the problems.
The world Bank’s been as unprepared as anyone else to cope
with the scale–up of a national program. Some problems
have been just been part of the process. But others could
and should have been avoided, such as the large gaps in
senior staffing and effective management decision–making
that happened just when a steady hand was most needed.
The world Bank’s internal coordination is nowhere near as
good as it should be, and I think that there were far too many
missed opportunities when clear, consistent, and relevant
advice would have helped Indonesia more than what they
got. PSF — and here I fault myself more than anyone else
— has also spent so much time on the day to day parts of
running the program that it’s let too much of the long–term
capacity work languish. On balance, I’d give us a B– : okay
performance, plenty of room to improve. ∞
117 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
communities decide on their own development priorities through a democratic, transparent process. they often prioritize education to build a better future for the next generation.
The goals of PNPM Mandiri are:
zz To alleviate poverty by raising rural incomes.
zz To strengthen local government and
community institutions.
zz To promote good governance.
The PNPM Mandiri program is based on an understanding
that the process through which development initiatives are
conducted, rather than the end results of these initiatives, is
the key to achieving community empowerment. By pushing
decision–making down to the lowest levels, the PNPM
Mandiri program aims to allow villagers to participate in
decision–making. The program in essence seeks to empower
the rural poor and encourage more democratic and
participatory forms of local governance. All PNPM Mandiri
activities aim at allowing villagers to make their own choices
about the kinds of projects that they need and want. The
program gives power to communities by placing funds and
the planning and decision–making process directly in the
hands of villagers.
PNPM Mandiri’s core programs provide funds to community
groups at the sub–district level. A facilitated planning
process helps villagers decide whether to use these funds for
infrastructure, social or economic activities. These funds are
available to each sub–district each year for up to five years.
The distribution of funds within the sub–district is through a
sub–district forum to a village. The sub–district forum consists
of village heads plus additional, broadly respected persons
(such as religious and traditional leaders, teachers, etc) and
three additional representatives (one man and two women)
selected from each participating village. The sub–district
forum also creates a unit called an Activity Management unit
or uPk to manage PNPM Mandiri funds and to oversee any
large procurement.
PnPM ManDIRI PRojeCT aCTIVITY CYCle
The project cycle goes through various stages: information
dissemination; planning; proposal preparation and
verification; funding decisions; implementation; and
follow–up. The full project cycle generally takes 12 to
16 months to complete although there is variation among
provinces. The socialization and planning stages take
approximately four to six months. All stages aim to have a
high degree of community participation and transparency
throughout the process.
InfoRMaTIon DIsseMInaTIon
Information dissemination occurs in several ways. workshops
are held at the provincial, district and sub–district levels to
disseminate information and popularize the program. The
workshops involve community leaders, local government
officials, local press, universities and NGOs.
Dissemination of information at the village level occurs
through large village meetings as well as through group
and sub–village level meetings to disseminate information
and encourage people to propose ideas for PNPM Mandiri
support. On average, approximately 50 to 100 villagers attend
village meetings, although in some areas, attendance is
reported to be several hundred participants.
PlannIng
Planning meetings occur at the sub–village and village
levels. The village and sub–districtfFacilitators disseminate
information about PNPM Mandiri procedures and encourage
villagers to submit ideas for PNPM Mandiri funding. women
also hold their own separate meetings to decide upon
women’s proposals.
At the second village meeting, villagers’ ideas are discussed
and the forum decides which ideas the village should put
forward to the sub–district inter–village forum as proposals.
The planning stage of PNPM Mandiri usually takes one to two
months for villagers to learn about PNPM Mandiri procedures
and submit ideas for funding.
PRoPosal PRePaRaTIon anD VeRIfICaTIon
Each village can submit up to three proposals to the
inter–village forum, one of which must come from village
women and a second from women’s savings and loan group.
Each proposal is put into written form, to be discussed at
an inter–village forum in the sub–district. The format will
be very simple, only provides minimum information such
as: proposed location, number of beneficiaries, volume/
dimension, and may include rough cost estimates. The
ANNEx ONE:
hOw PNPM–RuRAl wORkS
121 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
community selects a proposal preparation team, who are
trained by a facilitator.
PNPM Mandiri has an open menu; project proposals
can include a mixture of various social, economic and
infrastructure activities if the villagers so choose. Project
menus are open to all productive investments except
those on a negative short list. Verification of the proposals’
technical elements occurs during the proposal review stage
prior to projects being chosen. A sub–district verification
team usually includes community leaders, the sub–district
facilitators, and appropriate technical staff recommended by
the District Engineer. The district engineer also does a final
check before the results of the verification are presented and
considered in the sub–district decision forum. The verification
team reviews such criteria as:
zz Are proposals technically and economically feasible?
zz Do they benefit large numbers of people, especially
the poor?
zz Are there maintenance plans (or repayment plans in the
case of economic loans) in place?
zz Do people genuinely participate in the formulation of
proposal ideas?
zz Is there local community contribution?
Verification reports are presented to the sub–district forum,
which must then select through consensus which proposals
get funded. The team does not determine rankings or
priorities. If there were any proposals found to be unfeasible,
these would be discussed with the communities at the time
of the visit, so that the proposal could be modified or at least
the community could understand the reason for rejection by
the facilitators. however, while facilitators can recommend
rejection, the communities must still make the decision
themselves. This verification phase, that usually takes three to
four weeks, is seen as crucial to screen for projects that are of
sound design and quality.
PRojeCT seleCTIon
All proposals are discussed in the 2nd Inter–village meeting
to determine priority ranking. high ranking proposals will
be subject to detailed design and cost estimation. Designs
are made by the village with assistance from the social and
technical facilators. The designs are based on the results of
technical surveys and measurement in the field together with
the communities. Designs will be discussed and approved by
the village and the coach, and then inspected by the district
engineer.
After the designs are ready, the villages assemble one more
time to determine which proposals are funded. A grant
agreement is prepared for those activities that will be funded.
Attachments to this grant agreement include the design,
budget, a map, commitment for community contributions,
and other requirements. It is signed by the PNPM facilitator,
the person–in–charge from the village, the village chief,
and the head of the uPk. At this time the Forum selects a
sub–district–wide independent oversight team that will
monitor all aspects of PNPM Mandiri implementation.
On average, a minimum of six elected representatives
(three of whom must be women) from each village in the
sub–district attend these meetings. Final decisions from the
forum meeting are posted on PNPM Mandiri Information
Boards and shared with the villagers through a third village
level meeting, and smaller sub–village and group meetings.
fInanCIal ManageMenT anD aCCounTs
The head of the uPk, the sub–district facilitator and a village
representative open a PNPM Mandiri account at a legally
registered bank. when the sub–project agreements are
finalized, they are endorsed by the local government project
officer, and a copy is sent to the Government treasury office.
The Treasury then orders an initial transfer to the PNPM
Mandiri bank account. The installments are made in 40%–
40%–20% installments. Villages must report to the community
on the use of the funds after each installment has been
utilized. The last 20% payment to villages cannot be released
until a progress certificate has been signed by the district
engineer.
At the national level, the Deputy for Regional Development
at BAPPENAS heads the National Coordination Team that
provides oversight, strategic planning, and evaluation. The
management of PNPM–Rural is the responsibility of the
PMD. At the national level, PMD deals with the day–to–day
operations of the Program. Government coordination teams,
representing various ministries also assist with PNPM Mandiri.
This structure is replicated at the province and district, with
BAPPENAS’s coordinating role replaced there by provincial
and district planning boards.
Each level of government is supported by teams of
consultants who implement the technical aspects of the
project. Some 25,000 thousand Indonesian facilitators at the
national, provincial, district and sub–district levels provide
technical assistance and guidance to the project. In addition,
every village elects two village facilitators, one man and one
woman. using consultants rather than government staff
provides more flexibility, and it also avoids inflating the civil
service payroll.
122hOw PNPM–RuRAl wORkS
IN 2011 the PSF responded to Indonesian Government
requests for increased financial and technical assistance to
support its poverty reduction efforts and sustain and expand
the achievements already made through the PNPM programs.
Donor partners pledged an additional uS$ 107 million and
the JMC approved uS$ 104 million in new commitments. The
bulk of these commitments (almost 85%) are being delivered
by the Government through PNPM pilot or support programs
directly to communities across Indonesia. About 15% of
the new commitments are being invested in sustaining
the building blocks of PNPM, including building capacity
across all levels of government, strengthening management
systems, and producing high quality analytical work to
support key decision makers.
PleDges anD ConTRIbuTIons To The Psf
Pledges to PSF in 2011 reached over uS$ 262 million and
receipt of cash contributions reached uS$ 207 million.
CoMMITMenTs
with the realization of the project pipeline and topping
up of existing activities, project and activity commitments
grew from uS$ 90 million at the end of 2010 to uS$
195 million at the end of 2011. Almost 85% of the uS$
104 new commitments are for Government executed pilot
projects, including Green PNPM, PNPM Generasi, and Disaster
Management Support as well as for Post Crisis Support for
poorer sub–districts. The remaining 15% was approved for
new and the topping up of ongoing activities, including
the third phases of the national Community Facilitators
Development Program and the Barefoot Engineers Training
in Papua, technical assistance as well as monitoring and
evaluation and special studies to support and help inform
the Government’s and other Development Partner’s
strategic decision making on PNPM and the larger poverty
reduction strategy.
DIsbuRseMenTs
PSF projects and activities have disbursed uS$ 103 million
out of approved commitments of uS$ 195 million. In
2011 uS$ 66 million was disbursed. Disbursements were
strong across all the four PSF windows, especially window
One which utilizes the existing PNPM platform to finance
the expanding green and health and education pilots as
well as emergency/crisis support projects. The four active
ANNEx TwO:
FINANCIAl OVERVIEw
$0
$75
$150
$225
$300
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011
207
7690
1824
Donor Contributions US$ millions
Total Disbursement US$ millions
projects under window One disbursed uS$ 54 million in 2011.
Though less salient, the other three PSF windows had solid
disbursement performances as well.
$0
$35
$70
$105
$140
2008 2009 2010 2011
29
36
103
$0
$25
$50
$75
$100
2009 2010 2011
66
28
7
54
3436
Undisbursed Commitments at Year StartDisbursed within the Year
DISBURSEMENT PERFORMANCE US$ millions
124FINANCIAl OVERVIEw
PSF FINANCIAL STATEMENT AT END 2011 MILLIONS OF US$
2008 2009 2010 2011OPERATIONAL SUMMARY (CUMULATIVE)
Approved Commitments 37.39 42.24 90.27 194.68Disbursements 1.84 8.50 36.17 102.58undisbursed trust funds and grants 35.55 33.74 54.10 92.10
WINDOW 1: DIRECT BUDGET SUPORT AND CO–FINANCINGApproved Commitments 16.00 16.00 44.25 132.07Green PNPM 16.00 16.00 34.05 34.05PNPM Generasi (Community CCT ) Scale up – – 10.20 38.32Disaster Management Support – – – 27.00PNPM Rural Post Crisis – – – 32.70
Disbursements 0.00 1.60 19.39 72.96Green PNPM 0.00 1.60 9.19 16.00PNPM Generasi (Community CCT ) Scale up – – 10.20 32.84Disaster Management Support – – – 11.82PNPM Rural Post Crisis – – – 12.30
undisbursed Funds 16.00 14.40 24.86 59.11Green PNPM 16.00 14.40 24.86 18.05PNPM Generasi (Community CCT ) Scale up – – 0.00 5.48Disaster Management Support – – – 15.18PNPM Rural Post Crisis – – – 20.40
RECEIPTS (ACTUAL) 2008 2009 2010 2011 TotalGovernment of Australia 6.20 3.14 14.89 34.09 58.32Government of Denmark 2.70 4.54 4.27 3.60 15.12Government of the Netherlands 14.68 4.50 0.83 11.90 31.90Government of the united kingdom – 5.63 2.31 0.00 7.93Government of the untied States of America – – 64.70 24.81 89.51European union – – 3.35 1.35 4.71
SuB–TOTAl 23.58 17.81 90.35 75.75 207.49Investment Income 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.18 1.36
SuB–TOTAl 24.02 18.21 90.69 75.93 208.84Administration Fee (1%) 0.24 0.18 0.91 0.76 2.09
TOTAL 23.78 18.02 89.78 75.17 206.76
125 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
2008 2009 2010 2011WINDOW 2: COORDINATION AND SUPERVISORY SUPPORT
Approved Commitments 11.95 12.89 19.37 29.37PSF Secretariat 3.65 3.65 5.35 8.39PNPM Communications 2.00 2.00 2.50 4.35PNPM Supervision and Monitoring (Rural) 4.00 4.00 6.00 7.65PNPM Supervision and Monitoring (urban) – 0.00 0.50 0.80PNPM Integrated MIS (SIMPADu PhASE II) – – 0.98 0.98PNPM Community Facilitator Development Program – 0.95 0.95 –PNPM Community Facilitator Development Program Phase III 1.19Green PNPM—awareness training pilot 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30Training of local Auditors in PNPM Mandiri Perkotaan – – 0.30 0.30TA for Bappenas and Pokja Pengendali – – – 1.66Barefoot Engineers Training wave III – – – 1.75PNPM Policy workshops and Coordination – – 0.50 0.00
Disbursements 0.92 3.21 8.05 11.95PSF Secretariat 0.60 1.56 2.98 4.71PNPM Communications 0.11 0.35 1.26 1.90PNPM Supervision and Monitoring (Rural) 0.22 1.29 2.65 4.24PNPM Supervision and Monitoring (urban) – – 0.22 0.59PNPM Integrated MIS (SIMPADu PhASE II) – – 0.00 0.10PNPM Community Facilitator Development Program 0.01 0.94 –PNPM Community Facilitator Development Program Phase III – – – 0.00Green PNPM—awareness training pilot 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Training of local Auditors in PNPM Mandiri Perkotaan – – 0.00 0.29TA for Bappenas and Pokja Pengendali – – – 0.12Barefoot Engineers Training wave III – – – 0.00PNPM Policy workshops and Coordination – – 0.00 0.00
undisbursed Funds 11.02 9.68 11.32 17.42PSF Secretariat 3.05 2.09 2.37 3.68PNPM Communications 1.89 1.65 1.24 2.45PNPM Supervision and Monitoring (Rural) 3.78 2.71 3.35 3.41PNPM Supervision and Monitoring (urban) – – 0.28 0.21PNPM Integrated MIS (SIMPADu PhASE II) – – 0.98 0.88PNPM Community Facilitator Development Program – 0.94 0.01 –PNPM Community Facilitator Development Program Phase III – – – 1.19Green PNPM—awareness training pilot 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30Training of local Auditors in PNPM Mandiri Perkotaan – – 0.30 0.01TA for Bappenas and Pokja Pengendali – – – 1.54Barefoot Engineers Training wave III – – – 1.75PNPM Policy workshops and Coordination – – 0.50 0.00
PSF FINANCIAL STATEMENT AT END 2011 MILLIONS OF US$
126FINANCIAl OVERVIEw
2008 2009 2010 2011WINDOW 3: ON–GRANTING TO INDONESIAN CIVIL SOCIETY
Approved Commitments – – 4.22 4.27window 3 Phase I Preparation – – 0.22 0.22PNPM Peduli Phase 1 – – 4.00 4.06
Disbursements – – 0.05 1.43window 3 Phase I Preparation – – 0.05 0.17PNPM Peduli Phase 1 – – 0.00 1.27
undisbursed Funds – – 4.17 2.84window 3 Phase I Preparation – – 0.17 0.05PNPM Peduli Phase 1 – – 4.00 2.79
WINDOW 4: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO PNPM MANDIRIApproved Commitments 9.44 13.35 22.44 28.97TA for PNPM GENERASI 1.25 3.16 4.41 4.41TA for Green PNPM 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.00PNPM Monitoring and Evaluations and Special Studies 5.00 5.00 6.56 9.66PNPM Delivering Services to Poor Communities 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94PNPM Poverty Engagement, knowledge and Action – 2.00 2.00 2.00PNPM Mandiri Revolving loan Fund (RlF) – – 4.21 8.89local Government Capacity Development – – 1.43 1.43urban Poverty Analysis, Program Review and PNPM–urban Evaluation – – 0.64 0.64
Disbursements 0.92 3.70 8.69 16.24TA for PNPM GENERASI 0.62 1.77 2.80 3.11TA for Green PNPM 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.24PNPM Monitoring and Evaluations and Special Studies 0.29 1.27 3.13 6.82PNPM Delivering Services to Poor Communities 0.00 0.30 0.59 0.76PNPM Poverty Engagement, knowledge and Action 0.35 1.73 2.00PNPM Mandiri Revolving loan Fund (RlF) – 0.32 1.97local Government Capacity Development – 0.00 0.96urban Poverty Analysis, Program Review and PNPM–urban Evaluation – 0.00 0.39
undisbursed Funds 8.53 9.65 13.75 12.73TA for PNPM GENERASI 0.63 1.39 1.61 1.30TA for Green PNPM 2.25 2.24 2.13 0.76PNPM Monitoring and Evaluations and Special Studies 4.71 3.73 3.43 2.84PNPM Delivering Services to Poor Communities 0.94 0.65 0.35 0.19PNPM Poverty Engagement, knowledge and Action 1.65 0.27 0.00PNPM Mandiri Revolving loan Fund (RlF) 3.89 6.92local Government Capacity Development 1.43 0.47urban Poverty Analysis, Program Review and PNPM–urban Evaluation 0.64 0.25
127 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
ThIS section contains summaries of the major analytical work
conducted and/or published by PSF in 2011. Specifically, this
section contains summaries of the following:
zz PNPM–Rural Impact Evaluation
zz Governance Review of PNPM–Rural:
Community–level Analysis
zz PNPM Generasi Impact Evaluation
zz PNPM RESPEk Evaluation of Village Infrastructure and
Institutional Capacity
zz women headed household Empowerment (PEkkA)
Baseline Survey
zz Targeting Poor and Vulnerable households in
Indonesia Report
zz Protecting Poor and Vulnerable households in
Indonesia Report
PnPM–RuRal IMPaCT eValuaTIon
Background
The pnpM–Rural impact evaluation was designed in concert
with the evaluation for its predecessor, kDP, to ensure
comparability and continuity of impacts and indicators over
the lifetime of the program. Following on the evaluation
of kDP conducted in 2008, the PNPM impact evaluation
was designed to evaluate whether similar impacts were
occurring given the scale up of the program nationwide
as well as look at social capital and governance indicators
which were unavailable for the previous study. In addition,
a qualitative component was included to develop a deeper
understanding of impacts and factors related to social capital
and governance, poverty perception and poverty targeting
and community empowerment.
Research questions and designzz Does PNPM–Rural increase household welfare (measured
as real per capita consumption)?
zz Does PNPM–Rural move households out of poverty and
how well does PNPM–Rural target the poor?
zz Do individuals in PNPM–Rural sub–districts experience
increased access to education and health care services,
and employment opportunities?
zz what is the impact for these indicators for poor and
disadvantaged groups?
zz how does PNPM–Rural impact governance, transparency
and participation in community development activities?
zz Does PNPM–Rural impact social capital in the community
and the quality of local governance?
zz has PNPM–Rural increased the ability of communities to
manage their own development needs and priorities?
The study utilizes two components:
Quantitative: A longitudinal household panel was
established via surveys in 2007 and 2009/2010 consisting
of 6250 households in seventeen provinces and
300 sub–districts. The sample was divided into treatment
and control groups using a propensity score matching
method in which sub–districts beginning participation in
PNPM–Rural in 2007 were designated as the treatment group
and sub–districts beginning participation in PNPM–Rural
in 2009/2010 as control. The survey instrument consisted
of household consumption, education, use of health
services, employment, social capital and governance. A
difference–in–differences matching estimator was used to
determine impact.
Qualitative: key informant interviews, including project and
village leaders, households (including poor and non–poor)
as well as focus group discussions were conducted in
18 villages across three provinces selected from the
quantitative sample and including treatment and control, and
poor/non–poor villages.
Key findingsQuantitative
1. Positive impact on consumption and poverty
reduction: Impacts were found for changes in real
per capita consumption and transition out of poverty.
Impacts were stronger among poor households and in
poor and remote areas. In contrast with the previous
evaluation, impacts were seen for the entire sample
rather than limited to poor households and households
in poor areas.
ANNEx ThREE:
SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
128SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
2. Access to services and employment: PNPM saw
strong impacts on access to health care. The impact
on transition out of unemployment was positive and
significant. No significant impacts were found on access
to education including school enrollment.
3. Limited impacts on marginalized groups: the impacts
noted above did not extend to disadvantaged and
marginalized groups.
4. Limited impact on social capital, governance: Impacts
on social capital and governance indicators were limited
with no pattern of significant impacts.
Qualitative
1. Participation, transparency and accountability
built up within program do not spillover to
other development and governance activities:
key PNPM core values were present within program
processes as participation among the poor, women
and disadvantaged groups was high, and access to
information concerning planning and implementation
was significant. however, PNPM approach/procedures do
not spill over into planning and implementation of other
village and local government development activities.
2. Existing power structures are not impacted
significantly by the program: A key factor in the lack of
spillover is that the program was unable to change the
existing power structure which controls decision–making
at the community level, including government and
sometimes religious/traditional elites.
3. Communities do not perceive PNPM as a poverty
reduction program: In contrast to household–targeted
programs (BlT, RASkIN, etc.) PNPM–Rural is not viewed
as a poverty program, but one designed for the entire
community. Thus, projects selected by the community
are not always in line with needs of poor households,
particularly in areas with good existing infrastructure.
In these communities, needs identified by the poor
include training and capacity building, access to credit
and other income/employment generating activities
do not become approved proposals because they are
viewed as targeted toward particular groups. PNPM is
likely most effective in areas where existing infrastructure
is inadequate leading to closer alignment between
interests of the poor and the overall community.
Policy recommendations1. Continued funding for infrastructure with a focus
on maintenance and sustainability of infrastructure:
PNPM remains an effective means of delivering needed
infrastructure to rural communities which improves
household welfare. The project should continue
given the existing infrastructure gap in rural areas.
however, these benefits will only be sustained if the
infrastructure is of sufficient quality to continue to be
utilized effectively. Future research should focus on the
quality of maintenance and overall sustainability of use
for infrastructure built by the project as well as current
mechanisms and procedures in place to ensure proper
maintenance is conducted.
2. Targeted approach to Block Grant allocation: As
noted above, the largest gains are made in poor and
remote areas. Block grant amounts should be targeted
toward areas with low levels of existing infrastructure in
order to maximize household welfare impacts. Additional
research is needed to understand the effectiveness
of project in a wider range of contexts (poverty,
infrastructure, regional) and implementation procedures
(BlM size, length of participation in the project) and
consideration given to how to customize the block grant
size menu to meet the needs of different local contexts.
3. Strategy to address constraints to stronger
downward social accountability from local
government: The fact that institutions other than PNPM
do not yet emulate the transparency and governance
features of the program indicates that a key objective of
increased social accountability is not being met. while
PNPM is not the sole vehicle nor primarily responsible
for changes in the local government environment, it
is included as one means to introduce and institute
good governance practices in the rural space. Further
research on the barriers to adoption of PNPM principles
of transparency and accountability and potential design
changes to address identified barriers are needed.
4. Continued focus on marginalized groups: The project
should determine whether the project is best–placed to
address the needs of marginalized groups and consider
additional design changes or other development
approaches to address their needs.
129 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
5. Renewed focus on strength of participation and
inclusion of the poor and disadvantaged groups in
project decision–making: To overcome the “routine”
approach to project implementation that has developed
due to scale up and the long period of implementation
in many locations, the project needs a renewed effort to
strengthen its core approach of community engagement
in project activities to ensure that all groups are included
in and participate fully decision–making over the project
cycle.
6. Continued collection of data: Although the expansion
of PNPM–Rural to cover all rural sub–districts in the
country necessitates the loss of control areas, the panel
nature of the survey can still be valuable in tracking the
progress of key indicators going forward. Subsequent
survey rounds in 2012 and 2014 should be conducted to
ensure continued examination of project effectiveness.
goVeRnanCe ReVIew of PnPM–RuRal: CoMMunITY–leVel analYsIs
Background
Since 2009, supervision missions for PNPM have identified a
growing number of governance problems in the program.
These include a rise in serious fraud and corruption cases21
and evidence of problems at community level with the
quality of facilitation and participation and other key
elements of governance in the program. the Governance
Review of pnpM–Rural: community–level Analysis is an
attempt to assist the Government in better understanding
the extent and causes of such problems and to generate
recommendations for improvement.
Research Questions and Methodology
The overall objective of the community governance review
is to identify practical recommendations to support the
PNPM Pokja Pengendali in its decision–making to strengthen
governance in the program. This involves gaining a better
understanding of:
21 Reported rates of corruption are overall still low, though are thought to under–report the true extent of the problem.
zz what is the nature and extent of the community
governance challenges facing PNPM?
zz why do existing governance challenges exist?
zz how can governance in PNPM be improved?
The review is a practical exercise intended to generate
discussion, exchange ideas and identify recommendations
for improvement. The methodology was thus based on a
program of ‘action research’ and cross learning in which a
wide range of people with different areas of expertise visited
field locations, shared their observations and generated
ideas and discussion through a series of workshops. The
desk–review, interview, and field visits were conducted
from October–November 2011. Field visits were conducted
in two provinces: west Sumatera and west Java. locations
were chosen to ensure the maximum diversity in the kinds
of factors that might affect local governance and to see how
PNPM functions in a range of contexts.
Key Findings1. The state of local governance in PNPM is mixed. It is still
remarkably strong, but faces problems;
2. Participation rates are still mostly high, but the quality of
participation has in some places declined.
3. There are weaknesses in transparency and information
sharing. The performance of accountability mechanisms
in the program — such as the village accountability
meetings and the creation of the BkAD and BP–uPk —
varies, and the incidence of serious corruption is up.
4. Despite this, the ‘foundations’ of PNPM are still strong.
These foundations, though, are being eroded by
serious pressure from ‘higher–up’ problems related to
the broader governance environment, changes in the
program design, and problems with implementation
and management.
5. Although the foundations of PNPM are mostly still strong
enough to withstand these challenges, in some places,
they have combined to cause multiple accountability
and local governance failures. PNPM must address these
program design, implementation and management
issues to avoid undoing its years of good work at
community level.
130SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
Policy Recommendations
There report comes up with a series of recommendations
focused on five key themes: social accountability, financial
management, facilitators, complaints handling, and MIS &
reporting. Some of the key recommendations are:
1. Social accountability: Strengthening BkAD and BP–uPk
through better institutionalization; institute social audits
at village level; provide assistance in prosecuting cases
through legal system.
2. Financial management: Strengthening financial
oversight by improving transaction process (e.g.,
reducing cash transaction, opening village account for
TPk, “barefoot bankers” to provide services directly to the
village); improving capacity of BP–uPk; and increasing
community monitoring (including cross–audits).
3. Facilitators: Improving quality of facilitators through
better learning opportunity (facilitators “learning house”),
certification, and sanctions for poor performance
(through association or “social control”).
4. Complaints handling: Improving quality of socialization,
protecting whistle–blower and ensuring the complaints
handling system is functional.
5. MIS and reporting: Improving the system by simplifying
reporting formats, separating routine reports with urgent
ones (especially related to corruption cases), and
ensuring quality of reports (e.g., by involving external
parties for control).
PnPM geneRasI IMPaCT eValuaTIon
Background
In 2007, the Indonesian Government launched two
large–scale pilots of programs designed to tackle these
issues: (1) conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to households,
known as the hopeful Family Program or Pkh; and (2) an
incentivized community block grant program, known as
PNPM Generasi22. These two complementary pilot projects
began in six provinces and are designed to target the
same health and education indicators. They are consistent
with both the Indonesian Government’s priorities and
the Millennium Development Goals: to reduce poverty,
maternal mortality, and child mortality, and to ensure
universal coverage of basic education. Pkh focused more
on supply–side ready areas, predominantly urban and in
Java, while PNPM Generasi operated in rural areas. The pnpM
Generasi impact evaluation reports on the final evaluation
of the incentivized community block grant program, PNPM
Generasi. A separate report has been prepared by the world
Bank on the results of the Pkh program.
Research Questions and Methodology
The impact evaluation was designed to evaluate the impact
and effectiveness of PNPM Generasi in addressing 12 health
and education indicators as follows:
Health Indicators
zz Four prenatal care visits for pregnant women
zz Taking iron tablets during pregnancy
zz Delivery assisted by a trained professional
zz Two postnatal care visits
zz Complete childhood immunizations
zz Ensuring monthly weight increases for infants.
zz Monthly weighing for children under three and
biannually for under–fives.
zz Vitamin A twice a year for under–fives.
Education Indicators
zz Primary school enrollment of all children 7 to
12 years old.
zz Minimum attendance rate of 85% for all primary
school–aged children.
zz Junior secondary school enrollment of all 13 to
15 years old.
zz Minimum attendance rate of 85% for all junior secondary
school–aged children.
22 The full English title of this program is “National Community Empowerment Program–Healthy and Smart Generation”. However, it is usually referred to by its short Indonesian title, PNPM Generasi.
131 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
To allow for a rigorous, randomized evaluation of PNPM
Generasi, the Indonesian Government incorporated random
assignment into the selection of PNPM Generasi locations.
within the districts selected by the Government for the
program, entire sub–districts were randomly allocated
to either receive PNPM Generasi or to be in a control
group. Each PNPM Generasi location was further randomly
allocated to one of two versions of the program: one
“incentivized” treatment with the pay–for–performance
component (treatment A), and a second, otherwise
identical “non–incentivized” treatment without the pay–for–
performance incentives (treatment B).
The evaluation series also included a qualitative component.
To the extent possible, the report has incorporated findings
from the complementary qualitative study in 12 villages in
two provinces; this qualitative component was conducted
in 2007 and 2009. The qualitative study (using focus group
discussions, in–depth key informant interviews, and direct
observation—provided deeper insights into processes, causal
chains, and villagers’ values, motivations, and reactions.
Key Findings1. After 30 months of program implementation, PNPM
Generasi had a statistically significant positive
impact on average across the 12 indicators it was
designed to address: The strongest improvements
among the health indicators were in the frequency
of weight checks for young children. The program
also increased the number of iron sachets pregnant
mothers received through antenatal care visits. These
improvements were supported by dramatic increases
in mothers and children participating in posyandu activities to receive the targeted maternal, neonatal,
and child health services. Education indicators also saw
improvements in the final evaluation, reversing the zero
or negative impact found at the interim evaluation. The
improvement in education indicators was most notable
in the increased school participation rate among the
primary school–age group.
2. The main long–term impact was a decrease in
malnutrition: The latest wave III survey shows that
childhood malnutrition23 was reduced by 2.2%, about
a 10% reduction from the control level. This reduction
in malnutrition was strongest in areas with a higher
malnutrition rate prior to project implementation, most
notably in the NTT Province, where underweight rates
were reduced by 8.8%, a 20% decline compared to
control areas; severe underweight rates were reduced
by 5.5%, a 33% decline; and severe stunting was
reduced by 6.6%, a 21% decline compared to control
areas. Surprisingly, in Java, there was a negative impact
on stunting and severe stunting which needs to be
explored further. Although reductions in infant and child
mortalities were observed in the interim evaluation, the
same levels of reduction in mortality were not sustained
in the final evaluation. In terms of the longer–term
education learning outcomes, the program did not
improve childhood test scores as yet.
3. Making grants conditional on performance improves
program effectiveness in health but not in education: On average, the incentivized group outperformed the
non–incentivized group in improving health indicators,
particularly in increasing antenatal care services. On
net, between 50–75% of the total impact of the block
grant program on health indicators can be attributed
to the performance incentives. however, for education
indicators the incentivized group did not appear to
perform better than the non–incentivized group. There
may be several reasons for this. The data shows two
results: first, the impact of incentives became weaker
over time; and second, the positive impacts on education
only occurred in Year Two of the program, probably
due to time lags in implementation of the education
interventions. Thus, by Year Two, the incentives were less
strong just when the program was beginning to have
impacts on education. Another factor may have been
that gains in health were easier to attain than gains in
education. Baseline levels for health indicators were
lower than for education, making it perhaps easier to
make gains in health. In addition, education targets may
23 Childhood malnutrition was measured by weight–for–age of children under three.
132SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
have been more difficult to achieve since those targets
involved more people and involved school enrollment
and attendance every day, as opposed to once–a–month
for health targets, with fewer villagers involved. The
qualitative report also suggests that communities favored
giving school assistance directly to the greatest number
of students, rather than out–of–school children, and that
motivation may have dampened any effects from the
incentives. lastly, the qualitative report indicates that the
incentives rules were sometimes difficult for communities
to understand.
4. PNPM Generasi had the greatest impact in areas
with low baseline health and education indicators: Areas with lower pre–project health and education
indicators have more room for improvements. The
greater impacts in areas with lower baseline indicators
appear more prominently in the final evaluation survey
than the interim results, with stronger improvements
found in education indicators in these areas. On average,
the program was about twice as effective in areas at
the 10th percentile of service provision (very low health
and education status) at baseline as it was on average.
however, these improvements in health and education
indicators in areas with low baseline coverage did
not appear to have resulted in improving long–term
health and education outcomes in these areas outside
of malnutrition. Furthermore, the greater impacts
observed in health and education indicators were not
simply correlated with pre–project levels of poverty, but
instead were driven by the level of health and education
indicators in the area.
Policy Recommendations
The evaluation results point to several relevant policy
implications and conclusions:
1. PNPM Generasi is most effective in areas with low
health and education status: The impact evaluation
found that PNPM Generasi impacts are stronger in
areas where health and education indicators are low.
This suggests that future expansion of PNPM Generasi
implementation should prioritize areas where these
indicators are lagging behind and not necessarily in areas
identified as poor.
2. Community incentives had mixed results: health
responded more favorably than education: As a
result of the two–year project implementation, health
indicators responded positively to community incentives,
but education indicators saw no positive or negative
response to community incentives. learning from this
experience, the Government may wish to see how
community incentive interventions can work in other
lagging areas, e.g., water and sanitation access. The
policy implications are that poverty programs may wish
to experiment more with embedding incentives into
the designs. however, the interventions and incentives
will need to be monitored and evaluated over time.
One possibility is that the conditionalities may work
less well over time, as there may be more “gaming” of
the system as the program progresses and the rules
become more familiar. Alternatively, the program may
work better over time as it continues to incentivize
communities to work harder toward the specified targets.
In addition, qualitative evidence suggests that simplifying
the incentive scheme may make it much easier for
communities to understand.
3. The Government’s existing national
community–driven development architecture
and network (PNPM) was useful as a platform for
other forms of local assistance: PNPM Generasi was
started as an experiment in adapting the community
participatory planning and block grant process to focus
on specific education and health targets that were not
being addressed sufficiently in the existing community
program. This project has illustrated the flexibility
and adaptability of this community model once the
architecture and machinery are established. It also serves
as a possible vehicle for improving health and education
indicators in supply–deficient areas, where the traditional
household conditional cash transfer model may not be as
effective due to supply constraints.
4. The project should regularly review the
appropriateness of the targets: Target indicators must
be relevant to communities, yet reflect development
133 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
priorities of the Government. Although it is important not
to overload the project with too many target indicators,
PNPM Generasi should regularly review its 12 target
indicators and assess if existing ones should be replaced
or added. For example, school participation for children
ages 7–12 has now reached nearly universal coverage
at 98.5% and higher, and the program may wish to add
other targets to capture other priority areas that are
lagging, such as education learning achievement, early
childhood development, or water and sanitation.
5. A follow–up evaluation may be needed in the
future to examine the longer term sustainability
of interventions and impacts: The final round of
evaluation took place after 2.5 to three years of project
implementation. This three–year evaluation series was
useful in providing empirical evidence to inform project
implementation and learn lessons for the next phase.
Should the program continue in the original treatment
sites and should the original control sites remain as such,
the Government may wish to consider the possibility
of another evaluation in a few years to examine if the
impacts of this program are indeed sustainable over time
and if additional progress can be made on learning and
health outcomes.
PnPM ResPek eValuaTIon of VIllage InfRasTRuCTuRe anD InsTITuTIonal CaPaCITY
Background
The evaluation of pnpM Respek: Village infrastructure and
institutional capacity study was conducted to evaluate the
implementation of the PNPM Mandiri RESPEk Program in the
provinces of Papua and west Papua. By 2012, PNPM RESPEk
has reached 87% of villages (4000 villages) in Papua and
west Papua. In this program, which started in 2008, special
autonomy funds of Rp 100 million are directly provided
to villages and can be used for five priority programs,
one of which is village infrastructure. within the funding
provided to the five priority programs, 70% is used for
village infrastructure. This report provides analysis of three
aspects of the implementation of the PNPM RESPEk program:
quality of infrastructure, utilization of infrastructure and the
development of village institutions.
Research Questions and Methodology
The evaluation aims to answer the following questions:
zz how is the quality of village infrastructure developed
through PNPM RESPEk funding?
zz Is the infrastructure developed through PNPM RESPEk
effective? what benefits does the infrastructure provide
for the local community (for example, improved access
to primary education, health services and access to
livelihood resources)?
zz what are the impacts of PNPM RESPEk on local
institutions and the implementers (district facilitators
— PD, village facilitators — Pk and Village Activity
Operational Teams — TPkk)? In particular with TPkk,
what institutional aspects improve the most as a result of
PNPM RESPEk? what are the related challenges?
To answer the research questions above, a combination
of quantitative and qualitative approaches was used.
Quantitative approaches (surveys and measurements based
on civil engineering expertise and standards) are used to
measure the technical quality of the infrastructure and the
effectiveness and the extent to which the infrastructure is
utilized. Qualitative approaches (secondary data studies,
social mapping, observation, in–depth interviews) are
used to provide an in–depth study on the quality of
infrastructure utilization and the development of institutions
and to understand causal relationships between quality
of infrastructure, the utilization of infrastructure, and the
capacity of institutions.
The research was conducted in 16 villages in eight
sub–districts from four districts in the two provinces
from November 2010 to the beginning of January
2011 (2–2.5 months). The locations were selected to
represent geographically different areas with various levels
of accessibility.
134SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
Key Findings1. PNPM RESPEk has successfully built infrastructure
(particularly dry infrastructure) that is of good and
relatively equal quality in all of the villages. Furthermore,
infrastructure built through PNPM RESPEk is 60% cheaper
than infrastructure built by the Regional government.
2. The challenges of building infrastructure are more
pronounced in the wet infrastructure projects (related
to water such as latrines, MCk–public bathing–washing–
toilet facilities or PAh–rain reservoirs). These infrastructure
projects have some functional quality problems
(moderate quality), for example leakage in the piping
system and reservoirs as well as insufficient water
resources. Even though there are some functional
problems, the quality of the infrastructure is generally
sufficient because they are usable. Thus, in Papua and
west Papua, capacity to build dry infrastructure with a
sufficient level of quality exists but capacity to build wet
infrastructure is more limited.
3. Among the infrastructure that is technically useable, 33%
is effectively utilized and capable of reaching both the
majority and poor groups. The quality of infrastructure
has also significantly improved the living quality for these
groups (from the health and economic point of view).
Meanwhile, 50% of infrastructure is utilized only by a
small group within the general community, namely the
village elite. The rest (17%) is not utilized at all.
4. There are three main reasons that 67% of the
infrastructure is not utilized by the majority of the
community:
a. The first reason is institutional issues related to the
village elite group domination. This has not been
handled well by the facilitators because of the limited
facilitation quality;
b. A second reason is the weak operational systems of
infrastructure projects especially for infrastructure
that requires fee such as a generator house, and
infrastructure that needs frequent maintenance
such as MCk (public bathing–washing facilities) and
PAh (rain reservoirs). As a result of these operational
issues, utilization is decreased; and
c. The last reason is technical. Most of the wet
infrastructure have functional problems (leaking
and insufficient water resources), which in turn
lowers utilization.
After 2–3 years, on the institutional side, PNPM RESPEk
has strengthened the potential for accountability
through the enhancement of financial record capabilities,
the emergence of questions from community elements
on the usage of development funds and — although
still at a very limited scale — the emergence of village
chiefs that are copying the accountability model of PNPM
RESPEk to responsibly handle ADD (village allocation)
funds. Aside from accountability, PNPM RESPEk has
succeeded in enhancing the administrative capacity at
the PD level. The challenge is that, similar with PNPM
Mandiri Rural, PNPM RESPEk has not been able to
increase community participation especially among
the poor population. with the limited participation of
community groups outside the elite, the hope for PNPM
RESPEk to be able to build community’s capacity has not
been realized. The capacity enhancement process has
only been enjoyed by implementer groups (TPkk, Pk or
PD), which are the activist groups in the community.
5. The design and mechanisms of PNPM RESPEk that
prioritize administration and accountability allowed for
the enhancement of PD and TPkk administrative capacity
(recording and reporting), but not the capability to
handle domination by the village’s elite or to strengthen
community groups. The limited quality of participation
of the facilitator has been caused by a combination of
factors: the design of PNPM RESPEk (the broad scale and
focus on administration related incentives), the limited
planning process (the facilitators are not following the
whole process well, particularly the planning phase), the
assistance/support to the facilitation is limited, and the
specific challenges in the context of Papua and west
Papua (limited accessibility, insufficient number of local
facilitators, wrong perception of special autonomy fund
by some of the community group).
135 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Policy Recommendations 1. Enhancing Community’s Participation and
Strengthening Village’s Institution through: (a) the
enhancement of facilitation quality offered by the
facilitator through the Facilitator Capacity Building
Program (can be modeled after the barefoot engineer
program in Papua/west Papua); (b) developing PNPM
RESPEk mechanisms that give incentives for facilitation
capacity building (not only for administrative capacity);
(c) creating spaces for community participation outside
the village’s elite (for example, by targeting specific —
usually marginalized — groups as beneficiaries) as well
as strengthening the village’s elite’s ability to support the
needs of the poor groups; and (d) synchronizing PNPM
RESPEk activities with the policy of regional Government
(Province and District), especially regarding block grant
channeling mechanism.
2. Increasing the Function of Wet Infrastructure through: (a) employ stricter selectivity for wet infrastructure projects proposals. There is a need to have a stricter
verification in the planning phase with additional
preconditions such as verifying sufficient water resource
before agreeing to wet infrastructure proposals; (b)
conduct special training for technical facilitators, especially
at the sub–district level, for wet infrastructure projects
bearing in mind the high risk of failure at the field. Based
on experiences of technical facilitators in handling wet
infrastructure projects, module and training materials
can be developed in a more contextual way by learning
from general mistakes made during the past and
providing lessons on how to handle them; and (c) put
together templates of various technical plans/designs
for wet infrastructure. The provincial and district
technical consultants can put together templates of
various alternatives for technical plans/designs for wet
infrastructure. The templates consist of technical design
scenarios that could accommodate the various local
condition and types as well as physical forms that are
best suited to be implemented under each condition.
These alternatives will complement the existing
technical templates.
3. Developing Infrastructure Management System:
so far the existing operational system (infrastructure
management) is slowing the optimization of
infrastructure benefits in Papua and west Papua.
Ideally, we can overcome this problem by building
an institutional system or a group that is responsible
to manage the infrastructure, including the funding
support. According to the recommendations suggested
by the NMC, the institution can be developed with the
support of special autonomy funds. This community
group, with TPkk and Pk facilitation, can propose
maintenance funds through the special autonomy
funds of Papua Province. Another alternative that could
be implemented is the development and building of
infrastructure designs (technical drawings/templates)
that utilize less complicated operational systems and
minimal maintenance fee. Technically it is very possible
to develop various simple designs. For example, for
areas where water is scarce or where a wet infrastructure
project has to be built far away from the water resource,
the type of infrastructure operational design applied
should be one that requires less water. Currently there
are various technical designs (structural and material) for
public bathing–washing–toilets that do not need a lot
of water, for example latrines with larger capacities or
material selections that make it possible to not use a lot
of water.
woMen heaDeD householD eMPoweRMenT (Pekka) baselIne suRVeY
Background
Female–headed households have long been known to be
among the poorest in many societies (Quisumbing, haddad,
and Peña 2001; Drèze and Srinivasan 1997). In response, some
donor agencies target female–headed households in their
poverty reduction projects. In Indonesia, one such program is
the perempuan kepala keluarga (or PEkkA, literally translated
as the female–headed household) program. The program
136SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
began in 2001, initially as a pilot project funded by the world
Bank in Jakarta that focused on addressing the plights of
poor widows in Indonesia’s conflict regions. Over the years,
the program has evolved into a program oriented towards
addressing the poverty of many female–headed households
in Indonesia’s various regions. It comprises an economic as
well as a legal–political component. Despite having been
around for almost a decade, its impact has never been study
rigorously. The program’s expansion in 2010 provides an
excellent opportunity to portrait how PEkkA achieve their
objectives. The pekkA Baseline survey was conducted to
collect baseline data on income, expenditure, saving and
transfer, and access of households in both treatment and
control areas.
Research Question and Methodology
The research question of this study is how PEkkA reduced
the marginalized aspect — limited access and control over
resources and policies — of the female headed households
and achieve their objectives. The study will also analyze why
some groups successful implementing the PEkkA program
and why some groups do not.
The study utilizes mixed methods (quantitative and
qualitative) to compare between treatment and
control villages:
1. Key Informant interviews: the research team interviews
key informants, including projects consultants/facilitators,
Village head, hamlet head (dusun or RT ), community
leaders (religious, adat, women) and local communities
and villagers, with focus on female headed households.
2. Focus Group discussion (FGDs): the focus group
discussions are conducted with poor female headed
households, women from poor male headed households,
and women from non–poor households.
3. Household survey: household surveys are conducted
to get detail information on income, expenditure,
saving and transfer. In each sub village 100 households
are surveyed.
The study is conducted in four provinces, four kabupaten,
eight sub–districts and 22 villages.
Key Findings
This report presents the results from the baseline
household survey:
1. Individual female household heads (Fhhs) are older,
less educated, more risk averse, and more patient than
male household heads (Mhhs). They also tend to choose
different employment sectors. Part of the differences can
be accounted by age and sex differences.
2. For objective measures of welfare, there is little evidence
that female headed (Fh) households are worse off than
male headed (Mh) households.
3. For some measures of subjective welfare such as anxiety
and depression, there are some evidence that Fhhs are
worse off than Mhhs and their spouses.
4. On social capital, individual Fhhs participate less in
community groups and village meetings, but are equally
likely to hold leadership positions compared to individual
Mhhs and their spouses. however, Fhhs tend to have
more friends.
5. On the understanding of legal issues, Fhh have similar
knowledge to Mhh, except in terms of child custody and
domestic violence.
6. In terms of balance between treatment and control
villages, treatment villages are somewhat more
prosperous than control villages. This may be due to the
small sample size. Village–level differences need to be
accounted for in the final analysis.
Policy Recommendations
Since this report only provides data from baseline survey, no
policy recommendation is available.
TaRgeTIng PooR anD VulneRable householDs In InDonesIa RePoRT
Background
In the last ten years Indonesia has returned to strong
economic growth. The poverty rate has fallen from 23.4%
of all Indonesians in 1999 to 12.5% by 2011. however, half
of the country still lives on less than Rp 15,000 per day, and
137 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
small shocks can move them into poverty. Because of this,
people move into and out of poverty easily in Indonesia. Of
the all poor in each year, over half were not poor the year
before; they are newly poor. Thus social assistance is vital
in Indonesia. however, to work effectively, it needs to be
received by households who need it most. Trying to identify
these households is called targeting. The Government
of Indonesia recognizes has made improving targeting a
key priority. The world Bank recently completed the first
major report to comprehensively assess current targeting
and to outline how a national system can be established
in Indonesia.
Key Research Questions and Design
The report examines six main questions:
1. what methods have been used to target social assistance
in Indonesia? how have they been implemented?
2. how accurate have the targeting outcomes been for
each program?
3. how have targeting and targeted programs been
socialized by government, represented in the media, and
perceived by communities?
4. how effective has community involvement been
in targeting?
5. how could a national targeting system improve targeting
in Indonesia?
6. what are the steps in developing such a system?
These questions are addressed through a range of analysis
and methods. First, operating procedures for each program
are assessed from a range of primary and secondary
research. Existing qualitative research is synthesised, and
original quantitative analysis performed to assess current
targeting outcomes. Media analysis was conducted spanning
a three year period, and was supported with analysis of
community survey data. The results of two recent field
experiments on community targeting conducted by the
world Bank in collaboration with the Government and
international academics were included. Finally, the many
lessons and experiences of targeting in other countries
were brought to bear on how a national targeting
system would benefit Indonesia and the design and
implementation considerations.
Key Findings1. Current programs target the poor using different
methods, resulting in different beneficiaries being selected for different programs, even when the target population is the same.
2. Current targeting reaches many poor households but excludes many more. Around half of the poorest 30% of households are excluded from each program, and half of all benefits go to non–target households.
3. Targeting outcomes can be improved if methods are better designed. The methods used for both data collection and beneficiary selection have flaws and can be improved with lessons from overseas.
4. Targeting methods also depend on successful implementation. In particular, poor socialisation of programs and their targeting has led to low awareness of the purpose of social assistance and who should receive it. This can result in deviation from official guidelines.
5. Greater coordination between programs would improve both targeting and program effectiveness. Targeting would work better if coordinated across programs. Programs with objectives that overlap can make sure that poor households who receive one program also receive the other
6. Targeting in Indonesia could be made more effective by building a National Targeting System (NTS), based on a unified registry of poor and vulnerable households. This has already been done in many other countries and has several benefits: (a) the registry can be built using the best targeting methods, providing quality data for all programs, at a lower cost; (b) social assistance can be coordinated across programs; and (c) duplication, fraud and corruption can be reduced.
7. Indonesia has already made good progress on building a unified registry of poor and vulnerable households. A unified registry has already been mandated by government plans and regulations. A very large–scale survey of poor households was conducted in 2011, covering around 45% of the population. Improved data collection and selection methods mean the PPlS11 will make a good basis for the unified registry.
138SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
8. The unified registry is an important part of an NTS, but is only part of a broader system. It needs to reach the right people by being used by all programs. It needs to stay current because of the fluid nature of poverty in Indonesia, so updating the registry is vital. It also needs to be managed well to ensure effectiveness and legitimacy. A key long–term challenge for the NTS is deciding its institutional framework.
9. Recent field experiments demonstrate that incorporating a well–designed and facilitated role for communities in targeting can increase both accuracy and community satisfaction, as can self–targeting.
10. Building an NTS is only a small part of the cost of social assistance. Constructing the unified registry will cost about Rp 600 billion, which is just over 1% of the combined annual program costs of BlT, Raskin and Jamkesmas.
Accompanying Background Papers
Much of the material in the report comes from a range of
background papers and notes produced over a two year
period covering a range of topics. These include:
zz Current Targeting Performance in Indonesia
zz The Role of Community Targeting in Indonesia
zz Optimal Proxy Means Tests in Indonesia
zz Socialisation, Perception and Satisfaction of Targeted
Programs in Indonesia
zz Establishing a unified Database in Indonesia
zz Establishing a National Targeting System in Indonesia
zz Targeting Metrics
PRoTeCTIng PooR anD VulneRable householDs In InDonesIa RePoRT
Background
In the last 12 years, the headcount poverty rate in Indonesia
has fallen by nearly half from 23.4% in 1999 to 12.5% by 2011.
Nonetheless, half of the country still lives on less than Rp
15,000 per day (about uS$ 1.67) and are at risk of exposure
to poverty–inducing shocks that can be either idiosyncratic
or more universal in nature. In Indonesia, rates of entry into
poverty remain substantial: of all households measured
as poor in a given year, over half were not poor the year
before. Social assistance and social insurance is vital for
such households as well as chronically poor households as
they try to mitigate the effects of shocks and idiosyncratic
crises on well–being, assets and savings, and investments in
human capital.
In 2010, the Government of Indonesia outlined an ambitious
plan to reform its collection of social assistance programs. The
national medium–term development plan outlined a series of
concrete actions towards the development of an integrated
family–centered social assistance system, including reforms
to improve the reach and performance of priority programs.
To support the Government’s reform agenda, the world Bank
initiated a major research project examining the country’s
social assistance sector. The intent was to provide Indonesian
policy makers with high–quality and independent research
that could be used to help inform and guide key policy
decisions. The project was designed in coordination with
partners in the Government of Indonesia, was implemented
in conjunction with several local research institutes, and was
generously supported by partner development agencies.
The first major product of the project is a report on protecting
poor and Vulnerable households in indonesia, a comprehensive
public expenditure and program review of all the main
social assistance programs that are currently implemented
in the country. Based on the findings from performance
assessments of each program, the report also provide reform
recommendations to build a true social safety net that
provides real protection for poor and vulnerable households.
The main report is accompanied by series of papers that
examine specific issues or common issues in specific
programs including:
zz Public Expenditure Review
zz unconditional Cash Transfers
zz Conditional Cash Transfer
zz health Fee waivers
zz Scholarships for the Poor
zz Subsidized Rice Distribution
zz Programs For Especially Vulnerable Groups
zz history of Social Assistance
139 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT
Key Research Questions and Design
The report examines six main questions:
1. Does Indonesia allocate the right level of resources to
household social assistance?
2. Do programs provide the right benefits?
3. Are benefits reaching the right people?
4. Do people receive the benefits at the right time?
5. Are programs implemented in the right way?
6. Does Indonesia have the right programs and system
in place?
These questions are addressed through a range of
analysis and methods. First, operating procedures for each
program are assessed by primary and secondary research
including direct observation, commissioning of field–based
implementation spot checks, commissioning Jakarta–based
evaluations by international experts, and conversations
with implementing agencies and coordinating agencies
at all levels of government. Existing qualitative research
was synthesized, and original quantitative analysis is
performed to assess current outcomes in targeting, benefit
incidence, actual benefit levels, benefit disbursement timing,
implementation, and socialization reach and effectiveness
(among other topics, and depending on data availability
by program). where possible, original impact analysis
was completed for several different household–level
outcomes like health and education, labor market activities,
consumption and composition of expenditures, and others.
Impact analysis for Indonesian social assistance programs
already completed (by both world Bank and non–world Bank
affiliated authors) was also summarized and incorporated.
Finally, media analysis summarizing popular opinion across
a variety of stakeholders was conducted spanning a three
year period and was supported with analysis of community
survey data.
Key Findings
Despite demonstrated promise, much work remains
to be done in the loose collection of household–based
programs. The current range of household–centered social
assistance programs does not go far enough in protecting
the 40% of the population with the highest risk of falling
into poverty. In addition to significant gaps in both risk and
population coverage, all of the household–based programs
have been limited in their effectiveness due to (a) an
insufficient ability to find and prioritize poor or vulnerable
households; (b) a total benefit package that is sometimes
underfunded, sometimes inadequate for addressing
the particular household need or risk, and sometimes
delivered with less–than–optimal timing; (c) a passive and
implicit reliance on poorly–equipped local implementation
partners combined with little explicit financial or technical
support; (d) weakly–monitored and insufficiently–detailed
implementation procedures; or in many cases a combination
of all four of these. The first step on the way to a dynamic and
responsive social safety net should be reform within these
currently available programs.
Meanwhile, Indonesia will need to go beyond program
reform to create a social safety net that is capable of
providing consistent, high–quality, and comprehensive
coverage: The current range of household–centered social
assistance programs provides partial and non–guaranteed
protection to the poor and vulnerable from some, but
not all, of the risks faced. In the current collection of
household–targeted programs, there are risks that are not yet
covered by any program — for example, risks due to sudden
job loss or underinvestment in early childhood education.
however, even among the important risks that are addressed
by current programming, the likelihood that an eligible
household will consistently receive all benefits is small, while
the facilitation, outreach, and information dissemination
that are necessary to ensure households with any type of
background use programs effectively are not consistently
provided. A true social safety net will involve system–wide
planning and coordination between programs and agencies
in order to ensure that all types of eligible households are
reliably protected for all important risks. Suggested reforms
will contribute to Indonesia’s continued economic strength
by promoting pro–poor investments in human capital and
a healthy, educated, and productive workforce. An effective
and efficient social safety net will also enable further
government policy reform by alleviating the burdens that
reform can create for the least well–off.
140SuMMARIES OF MAJOR ANAlYTICAl wORk CONDuCTED IN 2011
Policy Recommendations
The following recommendations outline some of the steps
necessary for the creation of a social safety net system in
Indonesia:
1. Spend better by improving programs and achieving
a more optimal mix of initiatives: Increase the benefit
levels and delivery schedule of the cost–effective
conditional cash transfer programs (e.g., Pkh); institute
a package of radical reforms for stopping leakage and
improving targeting in the subsidized rice program
(Beras untuk Keluarga Miskin, Raskin), which delivers too
little at high cost; upgrade capacity for the pilot cash
transfers targeting highly vulnerable groups; re–engineer
the scholarship program (Beasiswa untuk siswa Miskin, BSM); and redefine an appropriate benefit package
for the health fee waiver program (Jaminan kesehatan
Masyarakat, Jamkesmas) in order to provide financially
sustainable and reliable health care utilized by all
poor households.
2. Then, scale up to protect all vulnerable from health
risks, promote continuous education and protect
them from shocks that threaten their welfare: Expand
Jamkesmas and BSM to reach all vulnerable households,
and introduce a pilot early childhood education program.
Scale up Pkh to reach all chronically poor households
and the collection of programs that target marginalized
populations. Right–size Raskin to cover only poor
households. Fill existing gaps in the social safety net
by adding a coordinated emergency response system,
featuring a revised version of BlT that includes conditions
for community service. Such expansion to all vulnerable
households is estimated to require an increase in social
safety net spending levels to 1.4% of GDP; and
3. Integrate the social safety net by consolidating
program support operations under a single roof
and encouraging single window household access
to all services: Consolidate support operations (e.g.,
socialization, complaints handling and M&E) under one
roof and develop a single NTS. Create a reliable public
face for the social safety net under a single agency with
employees that perform outreach and socialization
activities and can encourage and facilitate access to all
initiatives available in the social safety net and beyond.
Accompanying Background Papers
An overview of public expenditure trends and patterns in the
social assistance sector and a summary of Indonesia’s history
with social assistance are accompanied by reports on each
of the 8 main social assistance programs currently offered in
Indonesia. These program chapters cover (in addition to all
items mentioned above):
zz Objectives, Program Size, and Benefit Adequacy
zz Targeting Performance
zz Impact Analysis of household–level outcomes
zz Cost Effectiveness and Efficiency calculations
zz Implementation assessment
zz Public Financial Management assessment
zz Fiscal Performance and Fiscal sustainability assessment
141 2011 PSF PROGRESS REPORT