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Co-funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the

European Union

Workshop1EthicsandLegalIssuesInventory

Deliverable4.1

Authors:UniversityofWarwick&TNO

PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS REPORT IS A FINAL DRAFT AND IS AWAITING FINALACCEPTANCEBYTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION.

Whencitingpleaseuse:MEDIA4SEC(2016)ReportonStateoftheArtReview

Reportleadauthors:

KatHadjimatheou(UniversityofWarwick)andArnoldRoosendaal(TNO)

Contents

ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................................................i

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................1

1.1 MEDI@4SEC......................................................................................................................................1

1.2 WorkPackage4...............................................................................................................................1

1.3 Deliverable4.1(D4.1)...................................................................................................................1

2. EthicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwithDIYpolicinginitiatives...................2

2.1 EthicalIssues.....................................................................................................................................2

2.2 LegalIssues........................................................................................................................................4

3. EthicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwithspecificDIYpolicingplatforms...8

3.1 Vigilante,Open112........................................................................................................................9

3.2 Self-Evident.....................................................................................................................................11

3.3 TrafficDroid/PrivateDashcam..............................................................................................12

3.4 DigitalPillories..............................................................................................................................13

3.5 MafiaMapping...............................................................................................................................14

3.6 Neighbourhoodwatch................................................................................................................15

3.7 Bellingcat.........................................................................................................................................16

3.8 Reddit................................................................................................................................................17

3.9 Opit,Stinson,Websleuthsetc..................................................................................................18

3.10 Doxing...............................................................................................................................................19

3.11 Crowd-sourcedmissingpersonsidentificationplatforms.........................................20

3.12 Prey,FindmySmartphone…...................................................................................................21

3.13 PolicingthePoliceApps............................................................................................................22

MEDI@4SECTheEmergingRoleofNewSocialMediainEnhancingPublicSecurityGrantAgreementno700281

i

ExecutiveSummary

This report summarises ethical and legal issues raised in connection with citizen-ledpolicingandsecurityplatformsthatmakeuseofsocialmedia.Theseissueswereraisedat theMEDI@4SEC ‘DIYPolicing’Workshop that tookplace on9th Jan2017 inBerlin,Germany. The workshop brought together 58 people, including police officers,researchers and citizen activists, to discuss digital citizen-led and citizen-influencedsecurityinitiatives.

The main ethical risks of DIY policing platforms identified in this report include:unjustified citizen interventions (vigilantism); overburdening of police with data;overburdening police with data whose utility is burdensome to verify; anddisproportionate visitation of suspicion on individuals from certain social/ethnicgroups. Benefits include: creation of a new model of ‘active citizenship’ and socialresponsibility; greater security for the public via preventive measures and betteridentificationofcriminals;and increasedtrust inpolicegeneratedthroughco-creationof security.Key legal risksofDIYpolicingplatforms include:disproportionateprivacyintrusions;dataprotectionviolations;andvigilantismleadingtoillegalacts.

Specific recommendations arising from the discussion in the workshop include thefollowing:

• Initiatives to educate people and enable cross-sector discussion and debateabouttheethicalandlegalrisksandbenefitsofDIYpolicingplatformsshouldbepursued.

• Relevantauthorities/collectiveorganisationsshouldseektocreateandenforceaglobaldigitalpolicy

• ThevisibilityofLEAsinthevirtualworldshouldbeincreased• Bestpracticesamongstsocialmediaplatformsinreactiontogrooming,bullying,

etc.shouldbeidentified.• Citizen perceptions and norms of self-regulation - their role and the role of

platforms–shouldbestudiedtoidentifywhatisseenaslegitimate.


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1. Introduction

1.1 MEDI@4SEC

MEDI@4SEC focuses upon enhancing understanding of the opportunities, challengesandethicalconsiderationofsocialmediauseforpublicsecurity:thegood,thebadandthe ugly. The good comprises using social media for problem solving, fighting crime,decreasing fear of crime and increasing the quality of life. The bad is the increase ofdigitisedcriminalityand terrorismwithnewphenomenaemerging through theuseofsocialmedia.Theuglycomprisesthegreyareaswheretrolling,cyberbullying,threats,orlive video-sharing of tactical security operations are phenomena to deal with duringincidents.Makinguseofthepossibilitiesthatsocialmediaoffer,includingsmart‘work-arounds’iskey,whilerespectingprivacy,legislation,andethics.Thischangingsituationraisesaseriesofchallengesandpossibilities forpublicsecurityplanners.MEDI@4SECwill explore this through a series of communication and dissemination activities thatengageextensivelywith a rangeof end-users tobetterunderstand theusageof socialmediaforsecurityactivities.MEDI@4SECwillseekabetterunderstandingofhowsocialmedia can, and how social media cannot be used for public security purposes andhighlight ethical, legal and data-protection-related issues and implications. Activitiescentre around six relevant themes: DIY Policing; Everyday security; Riots and massgatherings:Thedarkweb;Trolling;andInnovativemarketsolutions.MEDI@4SECwillfeedinto,supportandinfluencechangesinpolicy-makingandpolicyimplementationinpublic security that can be used by end-users to improve their decision making. Bystructuring our understanding of the impact of social media on public securityapproaches in a user-friendly way MEDI@4SEC will provide an evidence-base androadmapforbetterpolicymaking including:bestpracticereports;acatalogueofsocialmedia technologies; recommendations for EU standards; future training options; and,ethicalawarenessraising.

1.2 WorkPackage4

TheroleofWorkPackage4(WP4)istoidentifyethicalandlegalissuesarisingfromtheuse of social media for public security and policing purposes as well as to facilitateethicsprocedureswithintheproject.Ethicsandlegalissueswillbereportedforeachofthemedworkshops.1.3 Deliverable4.1(D4.1)

D4.1 Reports ethics and legal issues identified in the meeting: ‘DIY Policing - TheModern Sherlock’. Section 2 summarises themain issues that arose in the workshopdiscussion, while section 3 identifies issues arising in connection with the key DIYplatformsthatwerepresentedduringtheworkshop.


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2. Ethical and legal issues arising in connection with DIY policinginitiatives

Inthissectionwereportthecross-cuttingethicalandlegalissuesthataroseinthegroupdiscussionthroughouttheday.

2.1 EthicalIssues

2.1.1Therisksandpotentialbenefitsofareinvigorated‘activecitizenship’

DIY policing initiatives were recognised in discussions as encouraging and enablingcitizenstoparticipatemoreactivelyinthemaintenanceofpublicsecurityandthatthisis, on thewhole, apositivedevelopment. For example, itwas recognised that in somejurisdictionscitizensarereluctanttoengageinanywaywithpolice,mainlyduetoalackof trust in policing. In places such as this, inwhich reporting rates are very low, DIYplatforms cangive citizens theoptionof reporting crimes fast andanonymously, thusencouraging increased cooperation with police. Similarly, on social media platforms,initiativessuchascodesofconduct, reportingbuttons,blocking featuresand ‘counter-speak’ can help discourage what was referred to in discussion as ‘voyeuristicparticipation’ - a type of participation where citizens observe certain forms ofundesirablebehaviourbuttheydon’tact.ItwasrecognisedthatDIYpolicingplatformscanhelptoencourage-butalsorelyfortheireffectivenesson-aculturalchangeamongplatformsandtheirusers.Inparticular,itwasfeltbysomethatthelibertarianInternetculture should be replaced by a culture of active but responsible citizenship. DIYinitiativeswere seenashaving thepotential to extend trust in fellowcitizens and theintrinsic drive to act that appears to exist in groups of citizens at a local level. In sodoing, they can harness the (often detailed) knowledge citizens have of their localsituation forpublicsecurityends.Moreactivecitizenparticipation inpolicingwas feltlikely to lead to citizen empowerment and eventually to a senseof improved securityamongst citizens. Further expected benefits include the development of a sense ofresponsibility among citizens to abide by the law, as well a sense of value andconnectedness among individuals within a society, adding to social capital. Greatereducation and awareness of as well as active involvement in generating ethicalstandardswith respect to such initiativeswereseenasvital to theireffectivenessandtheirlegitimacy.

On the other hand, concerns were expressed that enabling and even encouragingcitizens to intervene in matters of crime and security via DIY platforms can riskfostering the notion that privacy is something that can be bypassed in the fight forcriminal justice- for example, while searching for people involved in illegality,paedophile hunters “phish” sensitive information about people who are not doinganything illegal. Concerns were also expressed that widespread use of DIY platformsmay increasesuspiciousnessandharmtrust relationsamongcitizensaspeopleworrytheyarebeingmistakenlysuspectedofcrimesorevenmaliciouslyidentifiedascriminalsuspects by other citizens. An increased risk of litigiousness among citizenswas alsocited as a concern. Finally, risks arising from discrimination-driven crime reporting


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targetselectionbasedonsocialprejudicewerecitedasanareaofconcern,especiallyifplatformsareusedmorefrequentlybymembersofcertainsocialgroups.Specificsocialgroupsmaybeoverrepresentedininteractionsthroughsocialmediawhileothersmaynottakepartatallorneedfurtherencouragement.Itwasfeltthatcitygovernmentandpolicesshouldpromoteparticipationofminoritiesontheplatform.

2.1.2Risksandbenefitstothelegitimacyofpoliceandlocalauthorities

Itwasproposedindiscussionthatbyenablingcitizenstomakeasocialcontributiontopolicing,DIYplatformscanbridgethegapbetweenthepoliceandthecitizensandhelpprovidemore “legitimation”ofpoliceactivities andpractices in societies.Thismaybeespeciallybeneficialinjurisdictionsinwhichthereismistrusttowardsauthorities.Thepromiseof improvedtransparencyofgovernmentandpoliceservicesofferedbysomeplatformscouldalsocontributetoimprovementsintrust.Platformsdesignedtoenablecitizenstopolicethepolicearecontroversial,especiallyamongstLEAs,buteventhoseparticipantsfeltthatthesewerelikelytoleadtoimprovedqualityofpolicingandamorelegitimatepoliceforceoverall.Forexample,insteadofpushingouttheirownstoryofadebatable police intervention, the police could pro-actively ask the public to uploadtheirvideosof the intervention, andmakeuseofbodycams to find facts and supporttheirownstory.

2.1.3Overburdeningofpolicewithdata

ItwaswidelyrecognisedthatDIYplatformscanhelprelievesometheworkburdenofLEAsbya)crowdsourcingintelligenceandevidencefromindividuals,b)raisingoverallawareness on relevant issues (safety, privacy, etc.) among citizens and c) enablingcitizens todealwithpublicsecurity issuesbefore theyescalate to theextent that theyrequirepoliceintervention.However,worriesaboutthepotentialforoverburdeningofpolicewithdataanddemandsforinterventionbothatalocalandanationallevelwereexpressed,especiallybypoliceparticipants.Therewasasharedobservation that localpolice work currently comprises a large variety of activities andmultiplicity of tasksrelated to themaintenance of public order. In jurisdictions inwhich trust in police ishigh, civilians turn to them for support regarding all kinds of issues and incidentshappening in public space, many of them unrelated to crime, because of the greatvisibility and popularity of the police forces. This was considered unfortunate, as itburdenspoliceforceswithpettyincidentsandamultiplicityofrequeststhatcouldoftenbe dealt with better by other public services. By making crime reporting easier andfaster, DIY platforms might encourage even more over-reporting, or over-sharing ofdatawithpolice.Atthesametime,theymayencourageanexpectationthatreportswillbedealtwithbypolice;whenthatexpectationisnotfulfilled,thismayunderminetrustin and discourage use of the platform. As far as possible, DIY platforms should bedesignedwiththeneedforinformationtriageinmind.

Afurthersourceofburdenforpolicearisesfromthedifficultyofvalidatingsomekindsofcitizen-generateddata.


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2.1.4 Need for education and new cross-sector forums in which ethical issues can bediscussedandnewstandardsaccepted

Nearly all discussion groups cited the need for education on ethics online in order todevelop the kind of culture in which DIY policing initiatives can pursue securityeffectivelywithoutunderminingrightsandvalues.Proposalsrangedfromeducationinschoolsandpolicerecruitmentcollegestotheestablishmentofcommittees,roundtablesand other kinds of forums involving local elected officials, police representatives,researchers, NGOs, community leaders etc. to discuss ethical and legal challengespertainingtotheuseofsocialmediainpolicingactivities.

2.2 LegalIssues

As discussed in D1.3, DIY Policing raises a number of legal issues, depending on thetechnologyortypeofplatformused.DiscussionattheDIYPolicingworkshopinBerlinidentifiedlegalissuesatstakeandchallengesandopportunities.Discussionswerelivelyand diverse. Interestingly, the main issues were mentioned several times across thevariousroundtables.However,atsomepointsopinionsdiverged.Thispartofthereportstartswithageneraloverviewofthelegalissuesandthenconnectsthesetoanumberoftechnologiesthathavebeendiscussedduringtheworkshop.

2.2.1Abilityofthelawtokeepupwithtechnicalchange

Oneofthemainissuesraisedinrelationtotheinterplaybetweenlawandtechnologyisthat lawmaking is behind the facts. Technology moves fast and it would be of greatbenefit to all stakeholders if lawswere able to keepup, bothdomestically and acrossjurisdictions.Thisdoesnotmeanthatlawsandregulationsneedtochangeeverytimeanewappcomesout.Itdoesmeantheyneedtobeabletorecognizethecommonculturesand features across apps and regulate those. For example, all apps harvest massiveamounts of data (features); all apps that involve text boxes invite the same kind ofcommunication(cultures).Policeshouldrecognizethistoo,andshouldbetrainednottobecomeconfusedbyeachnewbitoftechnology.Eventhoughthis isadifficult issue, itwasgenerallyrecognizedthatthereisaneedformoretech-savvystaffatLEAs,whoareabletokeepupwithtechnologicaldevelopmentsandcancreateabridgebetweenLEAsandDIYPolicing initiatives. LEApresence andparticipation in socialmedia platformsdedicated to DIY Policing is essential for good collaboration. And only with goodcollaborationcanpoliceensurethatDIYPolicinginitiativesenhanceusualpolicework.

2.2.2Legalclarityandunderstandingofthelaw

Itwasacknowledged that there isaneed forproperknowledgeof the lawsrelated topolicing and the use of socialmedia in general. It is not always clearwhat exactly isallowed with regard to, for instance, the processing of personal data. The lack ofknowledge or proper understanding has a few different undesirable effects. Forexample, in some cases, people working at LEAs are hesitant to share information,becausetheyareafraidthat it isnotpermittedinthe law.Thisresults in lesseffectiveuse by LEAs of DIY Policing initiatives. Strikingly, during the workshop there weredifferent viewpoints on this. Some argued that privacy laws make it very difficult to


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shareinformationandtheselawsshouldbechanged,i.e.privacyconcernsshouldbesetasideincasesofinformationsharingaboutcriminalsorcrimes.Others,however,arguedthat current laws are very well suited to protect the fundamental rights of everyoneinvolved and still allow for enough options to share the necessary information. Theyindicatedthattheproblemsaremorerelatedtoeducationandknowingwhatisallowedandwhatispossible,andnotthatthelawsassucharetoostrict.

Manyappdevelopersorprovidersareunawareofthelegalrequirementsforlegitimatedataprocessing.Inaddition,manyoftheusersofappsareunawareaswell,andinsomecasesitiseasyandevenencouragedtoshareasmuchinformationaspossible.Thelackof legal safeguards and professional oversight becomes problematic here. Since theprofessionals involved are not trained in the requirements for legitimate dataprocessing,thereisariskthatmoreinformationwillbesharedthanislegallypermitted.Dataaboutpeople’ssuspectedinvolvementincrimeiscategorizedassensitivedataandtheirprocessing isessentiallyprohibited.Onlyunderspecificcircumstances, suchasalegalprovisionallowinganentitytoprocessthesedata,orwiththeconsentofthedatasubject,isprocessingallowed.Becauseoftheapplications,itcannotalwaysbeexpectedthat there will be consent of the data subject, and non-professionals will not usuallyhaveanotherlegalbasisfortheprocessing.

Withregardtoprivacy,thereisinfactagreatopportunityathandwiththeGeneralDataProtection Regulation (GDPR), which will be effective fromMay 25th 2017 on. In theGDPR,present rightswith regard to theprotectionofpersonaldataare strengthened,and some new requirements are added. Particularly relevant in the context of socialmediause isthemandatoryapplicationofDataProtectionbyDesign(DPbD)andDataProtection by Default. This means that all new forms of personal data processingactivitieshavetobedesignedinawaythatensurestheprotectionofprivacyrights.Newappsor informationexchangesystemsthataredevelopedhave to takeaccountof thisprinciple. If DPbD is implemented properly, the risks of unlawful personal dataprocessingarereduced.

There is a need for legal clarity on the admissibility of digital evidence in court. Inparticular,thereshouldbegreaterclarityonhowtocollectandstoredigitalevidence.Ifevidence is collected and shared, but cannot be used as legal evidence due to poorprocessing,e.g.withrespecttothewayitisstored,thebenefitdisappears.Someoftheappsdescribedbelowcanhelpwiththisissue,butstillitisverydifficulttohaveacleartrailtoverifytheoriginsofdigitalevidence.

2.2.3Laxapproachestodataprotectionandprivacybyvigilantesandcitizengroups

Vigilantes tend to overlook or be unaware of legal provisions in place (they tend toknowwhat is illegalbutalso tendto ignore therightsof theperpetrators,or theycanhavepersonalbiasesor interests).DIYpolicingcanleadto intrusionsintheprivacyofsuspected criminals, but also victims of crime. From a legal perspective, the correctbalancebetweenprivacyandsecuritymustbemaintained.So,theremightbeaneedforeducation on legal aspects, perhaps by integrating legal and ethical training in schoolcurricula. Other methods of training and education identified included publiccampaigns,andinvolvinginfluentialpeoplewhoarepeersofsocialmediausers,sucha


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vloggers.EndUserLicenseAgreements(EULAs)canalsohelpinobtainingconsentandprovidingtherightinformationtoparticipantsinDIYPolicingplatforms.Lettingpeopleknow how to use the platform and what is allowed and what is not can be a majorimprovement. Without proper education and a good communication and interactionstrategy,DIYparadigms canbe a stepback in the legal standards andhow the law isappliedwithregardtoethicalandlegalissues.

TheprovidersofDIYPolicingappshaveaccesstoagreatdealofcontentandpersonaldata,andmayberesponsibleasdatacontrollers,inwhichcasetheymustbecompliantwith data protection laws. Yet itmay be difficult for them tomonitor effectively andguide the way users process personal data when using the app. The processing ofpersonal data by users includes processing of data about themselves, such asinformation on user profiles and account details, as well as data about (alleged)criminals. Currently, the processing of these personal data is not always arrangedproperlyandinaccordancewiththelaw.Fortheprocessingofdataoftheusers,thereisoftennoproperinformedconsent.Andfortheprocessingofpersonaldataaboutothers,suchas(alleged)criminals,theremaybenolegitimategroundasrequiredinArticle6oftheGeneralDataProtectionRegulation(GDPR)atall.Inasimilarway,itisnotevidentthat the basic principles fromArticle 5GDPR are reliably or even typically respected.These include fair and lawful processing, data minimization, purpose specification(whichcanbeanissueinindividualcases),andstoragelimitation.

Participants/users of socialmedia applications for DIY Policing do sometimes exposeother individuals, such as (alleged) criminals. This exposure involves the sharing ofpersonaldataabout thesepeople.This can fall foulofdataprotection laws,whichareintended to protect the fundamental rights of natural persons, notably their right toprivacy (cf. Preamble paragraph 1 and 2 of the GDPR), by providing control overinformationbeingdisclosedorotherwiseprocessed.Theimpactcanbesevere.Notonlycantheamountofinformationsharingresultinmanhuntswherepeopletakethelawintheirownhands,andsomeone’s identitybeingmadepublic,regardlessofwhethertheperson in question is really a criminal. Even if someone appears to be innocentafterwards,thedamagetotheirreputationisveryhardtoundoorevenlimit,giventhepersistenceonlineof accusations. It is stillnot clearwhether the right tobe forgotten(Article17oftheGDPR)canbehelpfulinthesecases,butitmightprovidetheindividualwiththemeanstohaveonlinematerialsremovedfromsearchresultsat least(SeetheGoogle v. Costeja case of the ECJ). Legal safeguards, such as limited disclosure andverifiedqualityandintegrityof information,asappliedbyprofessionalssuchaspolicearenotinplace.Besides,evenifthepersonwhoseprivacyisinfringeduponisindeedacriminal,thisdoesnotimplythattheindividualhasforfeitedallprivacyrights.

Information shared online remains in the digital archives forever and this is an issueworthy of attention. Once posted online, information can be copied and shared andspread over the Internet. This is particularly likely in the case of information about(alleged) criminals. As a result, the privacy rights of people are infringed over a longtimeperiodanditisextremelydifficulttogetinformationremovedtostartwithacleansheet,evenaftersomeonehas,forinstance,beeninjailafteraconviction.


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2.2.4Cross-jurisdictionalbarriers

Next to the general problems surrounding the collection and use of digital evidence,cross-jurisdictional barriers are a real challenge to the pursuit of cyber criminals.Evidence procedures are barriers to using open source and other digital data toprosecute criminals. Moreover, it can be problematic if the police and DIY Policingactors across jurisdictions try to capture the same digital evidence and end upinterferingwith eachother.The fact that someone is trying to collect digital evidencemayalsobedetectedby criminals,whomay thenblock collection. It is,however, alsopossiblethatevidencebecomeslessreliableifdifferentpolicingactorshaveaccesseditandthe logs indicatethat ithasbeeninterferedwith.Eventhoughtheseproblemsaremoreofa technicalnature, the result canbe that judgesconsidermaterialsunreliablebecause of this tampering (even if this is ultimately attributed to a lack of technicalknowledge).Thepursuitofcriminaljusticemayinthiswaybeundermined.

2.3ConclusionsandRecommendations

ThefollowingmaintakeawaysfromtheworkshopforfutureresearchandactivitiestoimprovethebenefitsofsocialmediaforDIYPolicing:

§ Initiativestoeducatepeopleandenablecross-sectordiscussionanddebateabouttheethicalandlegalrisksandbenefitsofDIYpolicingplatformsshouldbepursued.

§ Relevantauthorities/collectiveorganisationsshouldseektocreateandenforceaglobaldigitalpolicy

§ ThevisibilityofLEAsinthevirtualworldshouldbeincreased§ Bestpracticesamongstsocialmediaplatformsinreactiontogrooming,bullying,

etc.shouldbeidentified.§ Citizenperceptionsandnormsofself-regulation-theirroleandtheroleof

platforms–shouldbestudiedtoidentifywhatisseenaslegitimate.


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3. Ethical and legal issues arising in connection with specific DIYpolicingplatforms

Inthissectionweidentifyethicalandlegalissuesarisinginconnectionwiththespecificplatforms presented to the group at the start of themeeting. These are presented inbulletforminatabletoenableeasyreferenceforinterestedreaders.

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3.1 Vigilante,O

pen112

http://www.vigilante.live/#

Appsenablinglivelocation-traceableem

ergencycallstobesenttomem

bersofthepublicaswellaspoliceandfollow

eduponsocialmedia.

Vigilantehasmetw

ithcontroversy1andw

asremovedfrom

theAppleA

ppStore.

EthicalRisks• Canprom

ptdangerousinterventions(onesthatmultiplyvictim

s);• Leavesittopossiblyattention-seeking,excitem

entseekinguserstodecidew

hat’sasignificantincident;• Canencouragevoyeurism

compoundingvictim

ization;• Couldencouragepeopletocutoutpolice;

• Licensesover-film

ingandfilmingthatm

ightnotbeuseful/admissible

evidence;• Can

overburdenpolice

communications

channels,making

triageharder;

• May

beused

inways

thatreflect

preconceptionsabout

who

issuspiciousandhascrim

inalintent,causingwrongfulsuspiciontofall

morefrequentlyoncertaingroups.

LegalRisks• Them

ostobviouslegalissuewiththesekindoftechnologiesis

peopletaking

thelaw

in

theirow

nhands

without

beingprofessionallytrained.Thereisaneedforclearrulesofengagem

enthere.H

owever,theserulesofengagem

ent,oracodeofconduct,arenot

legallybinding

rules.The

lackof

legalrules

might

seem

problematicastherulesm

aynotbeenforceable,butparticipantsinthew

orkshopindicatedthatthereisusuallyaclearmechanism

ofself-correction

insocial

media

groupswhere

mem

berscorrect

misbehaviorofothers.Som

isbehaviorwillbecorrectedorpunished

bythegroupmem

bersthemselves.Ifm

embersinsistinnotabiding

therulesofengagementorim

plicitsociallyacceptablenorms,they

willbeexcludedfrom

thegroup.• Besidestherulesofengagem

entwithinthegroup,thereisthe

broaderlegalperspective.AppslikeVigilanteencouragepeopleto

makevideosofcrim

esorthreatshappening.Therisksthatoccurrelateto(incidentally)film

inginnocentpeopleandtheunlawful

streamingandsharingofvideofootage.Thism

ayviolatetheprivacyrightsofthepeoplew

hoarefilmed,eitherasacrim

inalorsupposedcrim

inal,orasavictimorw

itness.Sharingofpicturesorvideosof

1 https://w

ww

.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/01/vigilante-app-rem

oved-apple-store

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(alleged)criminalsisnotsim

plylegallyallowed.Them

erefactthatsom

ethingishappeninginapublicplacedoesnotimplythatsharing

isallowedeither.Thereasonableexpectationofprivacyonehasin

suchacasemaybelow

erthaninaclosed(home)environm

ent,butthisdoesnotleadtotheconclusionthatthereisnorighttoprivacyatall.Eventhepolice,w

hoareallowedtoprocessm

oreinformation

oncriminalactsthanordinarycitizens,areobligedtom

akeacarefulweighingofinterestsbeforem

akingapictureorvideopublic.Thepublicaccesstothesetypesofplatform

sandthewaythevideosare

storedneedtobeconsideredcarefully,takingthelegalrulesandrequirem

entsasguidance.

EthicalBenefits• Canrescuepeople;

• Canprovideevidentiallyusefulfilm

.

LegalBenefits

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3.2 Self-Evident

https://www.witnessconfident.org/self-evident-app

Appenablinguserstorecord,store,andshareevidenceandstatementsreliablyandtofileapolicereportfrom

theirsmartphone.Self-evidenthasbeen

developedincollaborationwithLondon’sM

ayorandSussexpoliceforce.

EthicalRisks• Needstrainingtobeusedeffectivelyandproportionately,w

hichusersmaynotbew

illingorabletoget(e.g.someonecouldw

ronglybelievetheyarecollectingcourt-subm

issibleevidence)• Couldcreateunrealisticexpectationsofpoliceintervention;

• Couldencouragesom

epeopletoreportinsteadofintervening,tothedetrim

entofvictims;

• Couldindirectlyencouragetheassum

ptionthatifacrimeexists,there

willbevideoofit–and,conversely,thannovideofootageofacrim

eisevidenceofitsnon-occurrence-

LegalRisks• Inordertobeadm

issibleaslegalevidence,thefootagehastomeet

certaincriteria,suchasatimestam

ptoindicatethemom

entofrecordingandaneditinglog.Inpracticeitseem

sdifficultforjudgestodeterm

inethe

reliabilityof

video.Technological

toolsallow

for

manipulationofthevideoitself.M

oreover,itisentirelypossibletorecordpartsofaview

oronlyrecordspecificscenesofanevent,which

canleadtoerroneousinterpretationofthefacts.

EthicalBenefits• Within-builttraining,couldbeusedeffectivelyandproportionately

• Caninprincipleprovideadm

issibleevidence;• Ifreportingisanonym

ous,canencouragepeopletoreportcrimethey

wouldnototherw

isereport,especiallyincountriesorcommunities

wheretrustinpoliceandcrim

inaljusticesystemislow

;• Canencourageinteractionw

ithpolicefromyoungtech-savvypeople.

LegalBenefits• Videoandaudiorecordingscanhelpinreconstructingw

hathashappened;

• Canhelpinidentifyingthecrim

inalsorvictims.

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3.3 TrafficDroid/PrivateDashcam

Someroadusersareproactivelyrecordingbehaviourontheroadsviacam

erasandotherrecordingequipment,inordertodeterandcaptureevidenceof

trafficinfringements.Thisarticledescribesanextrem

eexampleofaLondoncyclist‘droid’:http://w

ww.telegraph.co.uk/m

en/active/10851988/Traffic-Droid-the-cyclist-fighting-for-justice-on-our-roads.htm

l

EthicalRisks• Cangeneratem

oreinfothanisusablebypolice;• Morejustifiablyusedbyprofessionaldrivers,forw

homaccusationsof

illegaldrivingmaybeaprofessionalhazard;

• Duringthew

orkshopitwasstatedthatw

iththeuseofdashcams,the

publiciscontributingtobuildingapolicestate(i.e.akindofsocietyinwhichordinarycitizenstakeonaproactiveroleasinform

erstotheauthorities,

thuspotentially

creatingan

atmosphere

ofmistrust

betweencitizens).

LegalRisks• There

isaprivacy

riskin

theperm

anentrecording

bythese

applications,regardlessofwhetherthereisacrim

inalacttakingplaceornot,sincem

anyindividualscanbefilmedandhavetheirdatabeing

processedwithoutthem

knowingit.

EthicalBenefits• Alternativetoroadrage;

• Canincentivizedriverstobem

oreawareofcyclistsandthusdrive

lessdangerously.

LegalBenefits• Reduction

ofhit-and-run

accidentswhere

theperpetrator

couldalternativelyescapepunishm

entorcompensationtothevictim

.

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3.4 DigitalPillories

Thistermreferstom

easurestonameandsham

elawbreakersonlineoronsocialm

edia,asameanstodeterringandpunishingcrim

esfelttobeinsufficientlyw

elladdressedbypolice.Forexample,theow

nerofapetrolstationusesCCTV,Facebook,andwarningsignstonam

e-and-shameand

therebydiscouragepetrolthieves,whoappearedtobetargetinghisstationduetoitsproxim

itytoanationalborder,overwhichtheycanescape:

http://www.dichtbij.nl/den-bosch/112/artikel/4024142/eigenaar-pom

pstation-shell-nagelt-opnieuw-een-brandstofdief-publiekelijk-aan-de-

schandpaal-.aspx

EthicalRisks• Punishes(bysham

ing)ratherthandetects.

LegalRisks• Courtsusuallyconsideradigitalpillorydisproportionatetoitsgoals.Forinstance,theD

utchDataProtectionA

uthorityhasprohibitedthepublicationofphotosofthievesandgivesfinesifpublicationstilltakesplace

2;• Sincetheinfringem

entonprivacyrightsissignificant,thesekindofapplicationsareoftenprohibitedbydataprotectionauthorities.

• Couldprejudicetrials-e.g.byprom

ptingmistakenidentity.

EthicalBenefits• Apparentlyeffectivedeterrenttocrim

e(accordingtoreportsfromthe

specificcasepresentedattheworkshop-seelinkabove);

• Potentiallyjustifiableifpolicearetoobusyw

ithmoreseriouscrim

etoactonevidence.

LegalBenefits• CanaidinvestigationsifCCTVm

aterialsimplypassedtopolicerather

thanbeingposted.

2 https://tw

eakers.net/nieuws/75941/cbp-digitale-schandpaal-w

ordt-in-de-toekomst-zw

aar-beboet.html

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3.5 MafiaM

apping

MafiaM

apswasacrow

dfundedapplicationenablinganonymoussharingofinform

ationaboutmafialocationsinacity.Itsdevelopm

entiscurrentlyonholdduetoadisputew

iththesoftwaredevelopers.

EthicalRisks• Thereisariskoferroneousreportingoflocations.Sinceanyonecanindicatelocationsofthem

afia,itisfairlyeasytoindicatewrong

locations.Basically,thesuspicionsm

aybewrong,buttheuseofanapp

toreportremovesthenaturalbarrieroftakingactionandgoingtothe

police.So,reportingismadeeasier,butthism

ayalsoresultintooeasilyreporting

whatever

suspiciousaspect

without

furthercare

andresponsibility.Theanonym

ousaspectcontributestothis.Opento

malicious,inaccuratereporting;

• Mightattractinfiltrationand/orinvestigationsbym

afia.

LegalRisks• Mistakenorm

aliciousreportingmayleadtofalseaccusationsifpeople

areclearlyconnectedtoindicatedlocations;• Canbeinfiltratedbym

afiaparticipatingintheappthemselves.The

targetsareabletolookwhethertheyaretargeted.A

ndtheymayalso

intentionallyreporttheirrivals,leadingtopotentiallymorerisksfor

publicsecurityifviolenceincreasesasaresultoftheseprovocativeactions.O

rinnocentpeopleorlocationscanbereportedtoblurreallocationsandtom

akethetoollessvaluable,becausethedataispolluted;

• Thelaw

fulnessofthedataprocessingbytheprovidersoftheappisquestionable;

• IMEInum

bersorotherphoneidentifierscaneasilybeusedtoidentifyindividualsw

housedtheapp,soeventhoughthedatamightappear

anonymous,itstillqualifiesaspersonaldataandisthereforesubjectto

anddataprotectionlaws.

EthicalBenefits• Givesup-to-datelocationinform

ationtopolice;• Anonym

ityoftheappallowspeopletocom

municatew

hat‘everyoneknow

sbutcannotsay’,thusprovidingsomeforum

forcommunity

solidarityandresistance.

LegalBenefits• Theanonym

itywithintheapplication(oratleastthevisiblem

apsgenerated)

protectsthose

who

shareinform

ationand

therewith

providessafeguardsfortheirfundamentalrights,suchastherightto

privacyandtherighttobeprotectedagainstviolence.

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3.6 Neighbourhoodw

atch

Inneighbourhoodwatchapplications,peoplelivinginaneighbourhoodareencouragedtobealerttocrim

inalorsuspiciousactivityandreportittoothersonthenetw

ork.

EthicalRisks• Canleadtoinform

ation-sharingwaybeyondsecuritypurposes;

• Possiblepressureforpeopletojoinorseem

suspect;• Canleadtosuspicionbeingvisitedonpeopleofcertainsocialorethnicbackgrounds,reflectinglocalprejudicesandpreconceptions;

• Canbeusedtofurtherpersonalvendettas.

LegalRisks• Surveillanceofpeoplew

hoarenotsuspectsbutmerelyhappentobe

inthe

vicinityof

recordinginfringes

onthe

privacyand

dataprotectionrightsofthosepeopleinw

aysthatmightbeillegal(thisis

knownas‘collateralintrusion’intheU

K);

• Peoplew

hoarenottrainedprofessionallyinrecognizingcrimecan

misinterpret

situationsin

theirneighbourhood,

therebyunintentionallyleadingtow

rongfulaccusations.Thechallengeliesindeterm

iningwhetherasituationissuspectornot.Peoplehavetobe

awareofw

hattopayattentionto.

EthicalBenefits• Proven

toreduce

certainkinds

ofcrim

e(e.g.

burglariesin

theNetherlands,

seehttp://nltim

es.nl/2015/10/06/burglars-avoid-areas-w

hatsapp-neighbourhood-watch).

LegalBenefits• More(social)resourcesarem

adeavailableforcrimeprevention.

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3.7 Bellingcat

https://www.bellingcat.com

/

Thisisaprivate,crowdfundedinitiativeperform

ingcitizenjournalistinvestigationsinparallelwithLEA

s.Itmakesuseofalargenetw

orkofpeopleinvolvedandcrow

dsourcingtosolvepartsofthe‘puzzle’.

EthicalRisks• Ifinvestigationschosenbynew

s-worthinessratherthanharm

,thenthebenefitstosecuritym

ightbelesser;• Publicnatureofinvestigationscanleadtoevasionbycrim

inals;• Can

provokemisleading

orunderm

iningcounter-speech

(e.g.by

RussiaintheM

alaysianAirlinesshoot-dow

n,seeanexamplefrom

Russia

Today:https://w

ww.rt.com

/news/360056-m

h17-crash-bellingcat-bloggers/);

• Canleadtom

isidentificationsandinformalpunishm

entratherthanpoliceapprehension.

LegalRisks• PossiblereductionoftrustinpoliceifB

ellingcatpublishestheirresults,w

hileLEAsarestillsearchingorintentionallydonotshare

theirresults,becausetheyhavereasonstokeepthingsforthemselves

forthebenefitofthecase.Forinstance,theycanhaveindicationsforfurther

investigations,and

thesharing

ofresults

might

alarm

criminalsthattheyareinsight.Insum

,whilethew

orkmaynotbe

unlawfulitm

ayhaveunintendedsideeffectsthatcanhaveanegativeimpactonthecapacityofLEA

stoenforcethelaw.

EthicalBenefits• Canprovidereliablescrutinyoftheaccuracyofclaim

smadebystates

andotheragentsinthemedia,identifyingandexposingfakenew

s;• Transparentm

ethodsenablecounter-scrutinyandtherebylegitimacy.

LegalBenefits• Thereiscooperationw

ithLEAsandevidenceandm

aterialsarehandedovertoLEA

s,helpinginvestigations.

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3.8 Reddit

Aplatform

foruser-generatedcontent,wherepeoplecanchatandsharevideoandim

age.

EthicalRisks• Canleadtom

isidentificationsandinformalpunishm

entratherthanpoliceapprehension.

LegalRisks• privacyofpeoplebeingexposedinthecontent;

• therem

aybeariskofpeopletakingthelawintheirow

nhandswhen

triggeredbythecontentsthathavebeenuploaded.

EthicalBenefits

LegalBenefits

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3.9 Opit,Stinson,W

ebsleuthsetc.

Theseplatformsareusedtocatchchildsexoffendersonline,usuallyviatheuseof‘honeypots’orothertechniquesofentrapm

ent.

EthicalRisks• Nam

ingandshamingistoolim

itedagoalofsecurityinterventions,giventheseriousnessofgroom

ingforchildabuse;• Insteadofdirectnam

ingandshaming,itw

ouldbebettertocooperatewiththepolice,sharerelevantinform

ationandidentifyingdetailsofgroom

ers,andhavethepolicecatchthem.H

owever,thisw

ouldrequirem

oretrustinthepoliceandcasesbeingtakenupseriously,witheventuallythecrim

inalsbeingbroughtbeforethecourt;• Publicityhasunw

antedconsequenceofeducatinggroomers/alerting

themtom

ethodsofdetection;• Regardlessofw

hetherthe‘target’isindeedthecriminal,theim

pactonprivacyrightscanbesevere.M

oreover,ithastobetakenintoaccountthatoncethereisanim

pactonprivacybecausedefamatory

contentispostedonline,therearehardlyanyoptionstorepairthedam

ageoccurringfromthis.O

nlinecontentremainsonlineforever,

canbecopiedandshared,andwillbespreadovertheinternetand

storedinseverallocations.

LegalRisks• Whenerroneousaccusationsarem

adeonlineitmaybeverydifficult

toretrospectively‘correct’thereputationaldamage,w

hichbringsabarrier

toproper

protectionof

privacyrights.

Fromalegal

perspective,theseriskshavebeenrecognizedandaretobemitigated

bythenewlyintroducedrighttobeforgotteninA

rticle17oftheGDPR;

• Onlinetechniquescanleadtoentrapm

ent;• Cancom

promiseprosecutions.

EthicalBenefits• Maydeterchildabusers.

LegalBenefits• Canleadtoprosecutionsw

hererelyingonpolicewouldnot(because,

forexample,policelackresourcesorbecausereasonablesuspicion

hasnotyetbeendemonstrated).

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3.10 Doxing

Thisisthesharingofusuallyidentifiableinformation.Theaim

istofindindividualswhohavebeenaccusedofanythingunlaw

ful.

EthicalRisks• Efficientintrusionfortheaggressivehacker.

LegalRisks• Raisessignificantrisksforthosew

hohavebeenaccused,sinceitisnotrarethattheybecom

ethevictimofviolenceandm

anhunts;• Peopleattractedtothesekindofinitiativesareoftenthrillseekers;

• Legalsafeguards,suchasbalancingofinterestsandopportunitiestoobjecttodataprocessing,areusuallyabsent.

EthicalBenefits• Canbeusedasaform

ofself-protectionforthecyberstalked.LegalBenefits

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3.11 Crowd-sourcedm

issingpersonsidentificationplatforms

Theseinitiativesrecruitvolunteerstohelpidentifymissingpersonsorsolvecoldcases.A

nexampleistheD

oeNetw

ork-aUS-basedinitiativeto

identifyhistoricandrecentmissingpersonscasesviacrow

dsourcedinformation:http://w

ww.doenetw

ork.org/

EthicalRisks• Ifvolunteersdonotreceivetheguidanceandtrainingthatisneededtoreducerisksbothtothem

selvesandtothecriminaljusticeprocess,

harmmightresult;

• Itm

aynotalwaysbeclearw

hoisincharge,andthismayaffectthe

accountabilityof

measures

taken-from

minor

issuessuch

astrespassingtom

oreseriousonessuchascitizens’arrest;• Theneedforcoordinationofactivitiesm

ightconflictwiththeself-

organisingelementsinaw

aythatmakesitdifficultforsuchinitiatives

tobesuccessfulonawidescale.

LegalRisks

EthicalBenefits• Reducescostsandaddsm

anpowertoinvestigations;

• Verylow

-riskifrunbypoliceinaliberaljurisdiction(i.e.policewhose

roleistoprotectthehumanrightsofcitizensratherthanenforcethe

willofthestate).

LegalBenefits• Thesekindofapplicationscanbeusedinaproperm

annerwithout

toomanylegalissues.IfusedorcoordinatedbyLEA

s,theycangiveinform

ationandhintsaccordingtoprofessionalguidelinesandaskthepublicforhelp.Thehelpofthepublicm

aybeusefulincomingtoa

prosecutionofperpetrators,forinstancewhenvictim

sarefoundandbroughttogether.

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3.12 Prey,FindmySm

artphone…

https://www.preyproject.com

/

Thesearepiecesofsoftwarethathelppeoplefindalostlaptoporsm

artphone.Theappshowsthelocationofthestolenorlostdevice.

EthicalRisks• Invitesdangerousinterventions.

LegalRisks• Theriskisthatpeoplegoaftertheirdevicesthem

selves,whichcanbe

dangerous.Eithertheycanbeconfrontedwithcrim

inalswhoare

violent,ortheriskisthatpeopletakethelawintheirow

nhandsandexposesuspectedcrim

inalstoviolentbehaviororillegalnamingand

shaming.

EthicalBenefits• Efficientstolenphonerecoveryifusedfornotifyingpolice;

• Canbeam

eansofretrievingstolengoods(andthereforeaddressingacrim

e)thatpolicemaynotpursue;

• Ifusedw

idelyenoughmaydetercrim

inals.

LegalBenefits• Prosecutionofindividualsorgroupsofpettycrim

inalsthatsofarevadedcaptureduetolackofevidence.

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3.13 PolicingthePoliceApps

Theseapps

enablecitizens

torecord

interactionswith

police.Exam

plesinclude

theAm

ericanCivil

LibertiesUnion

(ACLU)

PoliceTape:

https://www.aclu.org/feature/aclu-apps-record-police-conduct.

EthicalRisks• Hasthepotentialtoalienatethepolicefrom

thepublicandviceversa,furtherentrenchinginsidiousm

utualassumptionsoneitherside;

• Maycreateunrealisticallynegativeim

pressionofpolicing,harming

citizen-policetrust.

LegalRisks• Caninfringeprivacyrightsofthosebeingfilm

ed.

EthicalBenefits• Candeterpolicem

isconduct;• Canenhanceaccountability;

• Canim

proveaccesstojusticebyrecordingwrongdoingforpurposes

oflitigation.

LegalBenefits

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