workplace industrial relations in british rail: change and continuity in the 1980s

Industrial Relations Journal ISSN 0019-8692 S3.00

Workplace industrial relations in British Rail: change and

continuity in the 1980s Andrew Pendleton

This article compares the findings of a recent survey of workplace industrial relations in British Rail with those from one conducted in 1980. I t is suggested that the changes observed may be unintended consequences of management policies rather than the planned outcome of explicit industrial relations strategies.

The broad consensus amongst industrial relations commentators is that the 1980s witnessed few fundamental changes in the framework of industrial relations within the firm. Most British managements neither sought nor achieved de-unionisation or major reform of collective bargaining institutions[l]. The nationalised industries, however, do not fit easily into this generalis- ation. Throughout the decade major disputes occurred in this sector, signifying a break from traditional approaches to labour management, and in some cases arising directly from managerial attempts to reform prevail- ing systems of collective bargaining and pay determination, as in the British Rail dispute in summer 1989. As Ferner has shown, public corporation industrial relations became driven by the imperative of reforming working practices and governed by new ’rules of the game’ transmitted from the political sphere. Where unions were able to obstruct the pace of change so pressure mounted for reform of industrial relations institutions and procedures[2].

0 Andrew Pendleton is Lecturer in Industrial Relations at the University of Bradford Management Centre.

In the public sector the political acceptability of ’macho management’, the perceived shortcomings of industrial relations practices, and the need to improve labour productivity did much to change the character of industrial relations during the 1980s. During the decade unions in nationalised industries complained bitterly that top managers frequently violated the spirit, and often also the letter, of agreed procedures. But what of the workplace? How far were changes in national level industrial relations, well documented by writers such as Ferner, reflected in changes at the local level? Here the evidence is somewhat inconclusive. In the coal industry, Winterton and Winterton found that after the 198485 miners’ strike aggressive pit managers terminated a number of traditional customs, procedures and agreements[3]. By contrast, Edwards and Heery found that in Freightliners the operation of local institutions had continued more or less unchanged, even though managerial style was more assertive and some changes to working practices had been secured by managementI41.

A definitive assessment of recent developments in workplace industrial relations in the public sector will require more empirical

Workplace industrial relations in British Rail 209

data than has been available so far. To this end this paper reports the findings of an investigation into workplace industrial relations in British Rail with the aim of identifying the nature and extent of recent changes. The data were derived from a postal survey, conducted in summer 1989, of staff- side secretaries of train drivers’ Local Depart- mental Committees (LDC) at 181 of BR‘s 200- plus traincrew depots, and adds to earlier research conducted by the author into BR’s industrial relations[5]. The survey was designed to permit comparison with the survey of railway workplace industrial relations conducted by Edwards and Lloyd between 1979 and 1981 (hereafter referred to as the 1980 survey)[6]. The response rate was 67% (impressive for postal questionnaires though similar to other surveys undertaken in BR) and, as far as could be determined, both the initial sample and those responding were broadly representative of BR’s traincrew depots as a whole.

As will be seen shortly, many depots reported a deterioration in industrial relations, drawing attention especially to a decline in consultation by management. Yet there is evidence also of substantial continuity in a number of respects, and even of countervailing tendencies to those above, such as increases in the provision of facilities for representatives. We may question, therefore, the assumption found in some circles that during the Thatcher years public sector organisations were uniformly characterised by the successful implementation of coherent management strategies to restrict the role of employee representatives. Furthermore, the interpretations of managerial behaviour provided by respondents suggests that many of those changes occurring in the decade may have been the unanticipated results of other management activities as much as the outcome of focused industrial relations strategies and policies.

Railway industrial relations: the systems and its critics

Before proceeding further i t will be helpful to outline the main features of BR’s workplace industrial relations institutions and practices, and to identify those aspects which were viewed as problematic by management during the 1980s. As is well known, railway industrial relations are governed by a comprehensive procedural agreement. Joint ins-

titutions are found at the workplace, the Region (of which there were five for most of the 1 9 8 0 ~ ) ~ and at national level. The main workplace unit is the Local Departmental Committee (LDC), composed of four representatives (two when employee numbers are below 35) and local management, whose function is to determine ’link’ (ie. workgroup) arrangements and work rosters, piecework and bonus arrangements, health and safety, local seniority and accommo- dation. A notable feature of these workplace institutions (and of higher levels of the ‘machinery’) is their specialist basis: there can be separate LDCs ( i f numbers permit) for each grade of manual, clerical and super- visory staff. As befits their claim to craft exclusivity, train drivers always have their own LDC. By contrast, other grades often ’share’ their LDC representation with others.

The comprehensive framework for consultation and grievance resolution provided by BR’s ’machinery’ has contributed to good industrial relations in the industry as else- where in the public sector[7]. One indicator of this has been the low level of industrial conflict; during the 1970s the incidence of strikes per 100,000 employees was generally less than half of the national average[8]. Consensual industrial relations were main- tained despite a massive contraction of employee numbers, from 605,455 in 1950 to 182,031 in 1979[9]. Another indicator is provided by representatives‘ assessment of industrial relations: Edwards and Lloyd’s 1980 survey found that 70% of workplace representatives believed that industrial relations were good, and that 69% sub- scribed to a ’teamwork’ conception of their relationship with local management[lO].

Nevertheless, there have been recurrent criticisms of railway industrial relations procedures from both within and without the industry. One criticism is that specialist LDC representation tends to result in a profusion of LDCs which is not justified by actual employee numbers. A recent Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigation of BR’s Network South East found that, in 1986, the 25,700 strong workforce of BR’s Southern Region were represented by 280 LDC’s plus 562 individual representatives. This is a ratio

‘ BR’s regions are to be phased out from December 1990. Henceforth those management functions hith- erto located in the Regional tier will be sited within the Business Sectors (first created in 1982).

210 Industrial Relations Journal

of staff to representatives of around 15 to 1, somewhat more favourable to workers than the average in British industry of 23 manual employees per shop steward[ll]. In the same exercise it was noted that, in the financial year 1985-1986, 17,000 person-days were devoted to negotiation and consultation. This level of representation has a number of costs, including the need to provide cover for those representatives thereby released from normal work duties and the opportunity costs of diverting managers from other activities.

A second, long standing criticism is that the capacity to refer claims up through the machinery discourages rapid resolution of grievances. On the railways individual grievances can be passed from local to regional and (where a point of principle is involved) national level. As a result, in the words of McLeod (a former BR Chief Indus- trial Relations Officer). ”the machinery has become clogged, and inordinate delays occur in settling individual grievances that should have been decided one way or the other at a much earlier stage”. He recommended that limitations be set on the matters which the rail unions can pursue to higher levels of the machinery[l2]. For their part the rail unions have also complained about the time it can take to resolve grievances but have argued instead that it is the lack of managerial commitment to resolving grievances coupled with tight budgets, rather than the procedures themselves, that are primarily responsible[l3].

Thirdly, both representational specialisation and procedural formality is thought to delay the implementation of managerial plans to improve working methods and efficiency. Securing agreement to changes in working practices can require lengthy consultation and negotiation with a number of LDCs, all of whom may have different or conflicting objectives. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission report notes the com- plaint of Area Managers that minor consultative items can take up to a year to ‘go through’[ 141. Occupational specialisation at higher levels of the machinery replicates this problem at both Regional and national level, though the other side of the coin is that this can enable BR management to ‘divide and rule’ on some occasions (as in the flexible rostering episode at the start of the 1980s).

Overall the operation of the machinery at local level could be said to be costly, in-

efficient and obstructive of change. Many of these problems had been recognised for some time, but they took on extra signifi- cance in the 1980s. The Thatcher govern- ments were keen to see reform of railway industrial relations on the grounds that traditional institutions and practices had placed unwarranted restrictions on management decision-making. To this end reform of the machinery was added to BR’s formal objectives in 1983, accompanied by less formal signals from the political sphere that a more assertive approach to labour management was necessary. As has been shown by Ferner[l5], these changes to the ’rules of the game’ lie behind recurrent bouts of ’macho management’ at national level during negotiations around various work reorganisation initiatives. At the same time steady reductions in government grant to BR (the Public Service Obligation) has placed a premium on cost reductions. Within BR itself the capacity of LDCs to contest or amend recent work re-organisation initiatives has given additional impetus to the traditional criticisms of industrial relations procedures[l6]. As the case of flexible rostering shows, even when unions have been beaten on the national stage, LDCs have nevertheless been able to modify substantially national agreements during implementation, in a way which detracts from their apparent capacity to improve productivity[l7].

Two approaches could be taken by management in response to these problems. One is formal overhaul of the procedural agreement in its entirety, with or without union consent. The other is for local managers to affect informal or piecemeal change within the existing institutional framework. In an organisation such as BR, where industrial relations institutions and procedures are both comprehensive and highly formalised, the first will probably be necessary to achieve fundamental change. This avenue was taken in 1988, culminating in the industrial dispute between BR and the National Union of Railwaymen in summer 1989. In this plan, LDCs were to be replaced by local representatives, on the basis of one for each grade group corresponding with front-line management boundaries of responsibility, sup- plemented by an Area Council composed of one councillor for each grade group. Where individual grievances could not be resolved between line managers and representatives and where collective issues could not be


resolved at Area Council, then as a final stage they could be discussed by the Area Manager and a union official. No trans- mission of items to a higher level would be permitted[l81. This package of changes would no doubt have met many of the criticisms reviewed here: i t would have reduced the scale and cost of representation and diluted its specialist character. As a result management would probably have found i t easier to achieve changes in working practices, though whether i t would have accelerated grievance resolution is open to question.

Since BR‘s proposals came to grief in 1989 the first approach can be said to have failed so far. I t remains to enquire whether local managers have taken the second approach, that of seeking piecemeal, informal change within the existing framework. A number of important changes in the 1980s, both in BR’s industrial relations ’style’ and in its management structure couid well have prompted reforms of this type. Firstly, ’macho-management‘ at national level has signalled to local managers that industrial relations practices which obstruct vital management plans should be confronted or cir- cumvented[l9]. Secondly, control of day to day labour management has been devolved from the Divisional (abolished in 1984) and Regional tiers of management to Area Man- agers giving them greater opportunity to reform local industrial relations practices. At the same time, Area Managers’ budgetary accountability has been substantially tight- ened which, given the severe financial con- straints experienced by BR in the 1980s, has put a premium on reducing the costs of the industrial relations system at local level. Overall, Area-level managers have faced both pressures and opportunities to reform workplace industrial relations.

Change in workplace industrial relations: survey

results Given these factors it could well be antici- pated that a number of changes in the operation of workplace institutions and representation would have occurred in the 1980s. The survey of train drivers’ local representatives was designed to collect data on the situation in 1989 in a way that would permit comparison with the survey conducted in 1980 by Edwards and

Lloyd[20]. One major change that occurred during the decade was in the general character of industrial relations. In contrast to Edwards and Lloyd‘s survey, in which a large majority (70%) stated that depot level industrial relations were good or very good, only 30% in 1989 believed industrial relations at this level to be good. Twenty eight per cent believed industrial relations to be bad or very bad compared with 6% in 1980[21]. The following sections scrutinise various aspects of industrial relations, exam- ining the extent of managerial support for shop steward organisation, contact between LDC and management, the extent of consultation, adherence to agreements and the incidence of industrial action. The data thereby obtained provide both organis- ational and substantive indices (to use Ter- r y ‘ s words) of shop steward activity and developments in workplace industrial relations[22]. The changes observed can be seen as outcomes (in part) of management activity, but obviously the source of the data precludes a definitive assessment of managements’ intentions. Even so, respondents’ views of the causes of recent changes must allow us to question whether they are the straight-forward outcomes of coherent management strategies to reform workplace industrial relations.

Managerial support for shop steward organisation

It was widely believed in the early 1980s that economic pressures would impel employers to remove the facilities they had provided for shop steward organisations during the previous decade. ‘Macho managers’ would withdraw office facilities and reduce the amount of time allowed off from normal work duties. In a few celebrated cases managements did just that, and more (including the dismissal of shop stewards). But by and large in the private sector this approach was the exception rather than the rule. Indeed none of Paul Edwards’ factory managers had reduced shop steward facilities[23]. However, in public sector organisations, where ‘macho management’ seems to have been more pervasive, there is some evidence that managerial action was more restrictive[24]. To determine whether this was the case in BR, a number of questions were asked about provision of facilities for representatives.

212 Industrial Relations lourrial

Tnble I : Provision of facilities for LDC representntiues

Percentages: facilities available

1989 1980 1980

representatives representatives representatives Footplate Footplate All

Permanent LDC Office 58

Typing 23 Duplicating 73

Telephone 80

29 25 24 30 10 10 52 48

As Table 1 shows there was a significant growth in the facilities provided for representatives during the 1980s. For instance 58% of footplate LDC secretaries report that they have a permanent office compared with 29% in 1980. Seventy three per cent have access to duplicating facilities compared with 24% a decade earlier. Contrary to initial expectations, therefore, there is some evidence of an expansion rather than diminution of managerial support for shop steward organisation. Although the data cannot tell us why this is so, the most likely explanation is actually an efficiency-related one. Since footplate LDC representatives usually compile and allocate work schedules, i t makes good sense to provide facilities to assist them. Interestingly, there is little evidence of managers seeking to ’regain control’ of this process in the 1980s by undertaking it themselves. On the contrary, some work reorganisation initiatives, such as flexible rostering, reinforced managerial dependence on footplate representatives in this respect[25].

Another useful indicator of managerial policies towards shop steward organisation is the amount of time stewards are released from normal duties to carry out steward activities. In common with the rest of British industry, full-time workplace representation in BR is uncommon[26]. Nevertheless, LDC representatives have been allowed substantial amounts of time-off in the past. In BR’s Network SouthEast in 1985-86, 6,000 staff days were spent away from normal work duties on scrutiny of ’special’ diagrams (ie. for drivers’ representatives to check that work programmes issued for irregular rail operations complied with national and local agreements)[27]. Since at the time the number of depots on the Region was around 50,

this means that on average over two staff- days per week were spent on this activity alone at each depot.

To gauge current practices, LDC secretaries were asked how much time they were allowed off each week for LDC work. The results are summarised in Table 2. This table suggests that a large number of LDC secretaries have experienced a reduction in time-off over the decade. If anything the decline is even greater than that indicated since Edwards and Lloyd’s data is derived from all footplate representatives, not just secretaries: for obvious reasons secretaries generally have more time off than the remainder of the LDC. Much of the decline shown can be attributed to the 1986 national Manning Agreement which removed the right of LDC representatives to scrutinise the ’diagrams’ for special train workings each week and does not necessarily indicate that local managers themselves are pursuing a more restrictive approach. It is interesting to note that despite the removal of this facility, a large minority (38%) of LDC secretaries still have about a day or more off each week to conduct LDC business?

An alternative way to reduce the cost of LDC representation would be to reduce the

* The demands on footplate representatives’ time can be seasonal in nature so that phrasing the question in terms of time-off each week is by no means ideal. Footplate LDC work is generally concentrated around the bi-annual timetable change and it is common for LDC members in medium and large depots to be booked off for a week or more at this time. It was phrased in this way, however, to permit comparison with the Edwards and Lloyd data, and was premised on the assumption that respondents would take a ‘typical’ week as their benchmark.


Table 2: Time-off from work for LDC activities ~ ~

Percentages 1989 1980

Footplate Footplate representatives representatives

Less than one hour 1-3 hours 4-6 hours 7-9 hours 10+ hours

46 13 9 37 7 18

12 15 26 17

100 100 -

number of LDCs. Some local managers attempted to do this in the 1980s in response to the pressures and opportunities outlined earlier. For instance, the number of LDCs on BR’s Southern Region was reduced shortly after the enhancement of Area management authority and responsibility in the mid-l980s[28]. The 1989 survey, however, uncovered no evidence whatsoever of any change in the number of LDCs in the footplate grades. This is not altogether surprising since drivers always maintain exclusive representation and the scope for local managers to reduce the number of LDC’s through mergers with other grades‘ LDC’s or with drivers’ LDC’s from other depots is decid- edly limited. Any attempt tu change this would almost inevitably lead to confron- tation and (as far as we can tell from data on industrial action) local managers have fought shy of this option.

An alternative approach would be to influence the composition of LDCs so that the outcomes of LDC activity are more favourable to management. One way of doing this is to encourage rival candidates to those ’sponsored‘ by the union or (by fair means or foul) to exclude the latter’s candidates altogether.* In this way the influence of union policies on LDC activities could be reduced. No specific questions were

* In BR branch and workplace representation are formally separate. LDC representatives are under no obligation to report to their branch or to follow union policy. In practice many branches nominate candidates for LDC elections, especially in the footplate grades. It is common practice for the branch candidate to be returned unopposed so that in effect the branch selects workplace representatives.

asked on managerial tactics of this sort, but a wealth of data was obtained on the relationship between LDC representatives and the union branch. This shows that there has been no weakening of the linkages between them. Every respondent was a member of the drivers’ union, the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Fire- men (ASLEF) and 70% were active in the union, defined as occupying a position in the union branch (compared with 66% in 1980)[29]. Ninety five per cent attend all or most branch meetings, as did 98% in 1980. In 88% of cases at least one other member of the LDC held a branch position in 1989. Overall, then, it seems that the institutional relationship between LDC representatives and their ASLEF branch barely changed during the 1980s. We can conclude that if managers did attempt to weaken the institutional linkages between union branch and LDC they were certainly not successful.

Contact between LDC members and management

Since BR management has expressed concern about the amount of time expended on LDC activities we could anticipate that the number of formal LDC-management meetings would have declined. Such a decline could also be evidence of managerial attempts to circumvent the LDC so that issues could be settled by management without reference to LDC members. LDC secretaries were therefore asked about the incidence of formal LDC meetings with management.

As can be seen from Table 3, the majority of LDCs continued to meet formally with

214 lndustrial Relations Ioiirnal

Table 3: Incidence of formal meetings with management

Percentages 1989 1980 1980

Footplate Footplate All representatives representatives representatives

More than monthly 3 18 3

Every 2-3 months 60 64 64 Twice a year 16 - Once a year or less

Monthly 18 18 14

15 4

100 100 100

- - - - 3

management either monthly or every two- three months (78% compared with 82% in 1980). At the margins, however, there has been a steep decline in the proportion of LDCs who meet more than monthly, and a corresponding increase in those who meet twice a year or less. But overall there seems to have been little change in the incidence of formal LDC meetings in most cases.

However, we should not rely solely on this particular data as an index of management- representative contact because, as recent dis- cussions of railway industrial relations have made clear, a substantial degree of infor- mality accompanies the formal ‘system’[30]. Representatives were thus also asked how much contact they have generally with local management.

As Table 4 shows there has been something of a shift from daily to weekly contact with traincrew management. Whereas a quarter of Edwards and Lloyd’s sample regis- tered daily contact, by 1989 this had fallen to 16%. Instead, nearly half (46%) now record weekly contact compared with 32% in 1980[31]. Also the proportion recording fortnightly or monthly contact has fallen by nearly half.

Taking these findings together there does seem to be some decline in contact between LDC representatives and local management though its extent should not be over-esti- mated. In some cases it is probably the result of a hardening of management attitude. As one representative commented:

they have no interest in involving trade unionists in the running of the industry and are going out of their way to avoid meeting the LDC’s. It is their fullest intention to put cost before anything

else and to this end they need to circumvent the present LDC system.

But other representatives identified different causes:

relations between our ATCM (Area Traincrew Manager) and our LDC are reasonably good but since most of our office staff have been transferred . . . and we are now virtually a sub-depot, infor- mation in all subjects tends to arrive late or not at all. Also we get infrequent visits from the ATCM. These matters have been raised with the ATCM and he informs us he has a heavy workload and will try to keep in touch.

. . . management re-organised again in 1988 and again in 1989 and each time they re-organised it has meant that we are unable to get hold of a manager because he is away meeting higher management.

These types of comments raise the possibility that changes to BR’s management structure are as important as overt management hostility in explaining the reduction of management-LDC contact. One aspect of the enhancement of Area management authority and responsibility in the 1980s has been a steady enlargement of Area size. Whereas most depots used to be managed by an Area Traincrew Manager located at the depot, it is now common for each Traincrew Manager to oversee several depots. In fact in only 30% of cases in the 1989 survey was the Area Traincrew Manager based at the depot. As a result, for many depots, frequent, often daily, ‘on the job’ contact has been replaced by a weekly (or less) more formal visit by the Traincrew Manager. In sum, it is at least possible that recent developments in management-LDC contact may be as much the unanticipated consequence of changes


Table 4: Informal contact wi th local management ~ ~~


Contact with Area Contact with Traincrew Manager Management LDC

Chairman

Daily 16 Weekly 46 FortnightlyIMonthly 12 Few times a year 22 Once a year 1 Never - 4

100

25 32 23 15 1 4

100

NB: Edwards and Lloyd asked representatives how much contact they had with the Management Chairman (sic) of the LDC rather than the Area Traincrew Manager. In practice the two roles are virtually synonymous.

to the management structure as the intended outcome of a purposeful industrial relations strategy.

Consultation Joint consultation in BR is highly formalised and operates through the same institutions as collective bargaining. I t is therefore sus- ceptible to the same criticisms that have been levelled against the latter, namely that i t is cumbersome, obstructive and expensive. Earlier research showed that when both budgetary and industrial relations responsibility was devolved to Iocal managers in the mid-l980s, these managers (in the view of worker representatives) placed a lower premium on ‘genuine’ consultation than their predecessors, often allowing insufficient time for meaningful consultation over change[32].

In a similar vein, Table 5 suggests there has been some decline in the adequacy of consultation over the decade. There has been a three-fold reduction in the proportion of representatives who feel that they are consulted a great deal, and a parallel increase in those who report they are not consulted at all. But other than that the extent of change overall does not appear to be as great as might be expected. However, the unprompted comments of representatives provide more forceful evidence that the man-

agement approach to consultation has sig- nificantly changed:

BR seem reluctant to hold meetings under the consultation procedure until it is too late for staff reps to have an input

Consultation has become management dictat

The major problem in industrial relations is that consultation is practically non-existent.

One possibility is that local managers are following the example of managers else- where in British industry by developing more informal and less representative-based forms of communication and consultation (such as team briefing) to sidestep the formal procedures. BR has certainly expressed this philosophy recently: as the 1988 proposals to reform the procedural agreement put it:

all employees have a stake in the business and should be encouraged to know how the business is performing. British Rail will encourage direct employee involvement as a means to securing greater motivation and job satisfaction[33].

One recent example is the Performance Through Quality ‘workshops’ aimed at all operations staff, including drivers. But aside from one-off initiatives of this sort there appears to be no systematic development of regular consultative mechanisms. A major employee attitudes survey conducted for BR in 1988 found that in only 30% of cases did

216 Industrial Relations lournid

Table 5: How far are you consulted by management before they make decisions of importance?



A great deal 5 15 A moderate amount 32 22 To some extent 26 38 Hardly at all 23 21 Not at all - 13 4 -

100 100

a supervisor or boss hold a regular meeting to keep the workforce informed of changes that would affect them[34].

The failure to fully develop new consultative mechanisms suggests that the apparent down-grading of existing forms of consultation may not be the outcome of a new industrial relations strategy to radically change the nature of employee consultation. Instead, consultation may have been ’squeezed out‘ in an ad hoc way as the budgetary pressures on local managers outlined earlier have intensified. One important element here is the corporate planning and control system adopted by BR in the early 1980s. This system is based around ’action plans’ (to improve net financial results) which are disaggregated down to depot level and which incorporate (tight) timetables for their implementation and forecasts of financial resuIts. Control is achieved by regular scrutiny of budgetary outcomes against plan forecast[35]. As in other systems of this kind, the activities of local managers are highly visible to their superiors. Once a work reorganisation plan has been introduced to the system it is difficult for local managers to modify its content in response to employee concerns expressed during consultation. It may well be, therefore, that much of the apparent decline in consultation was an unintended consequence effect of changes in the management structure rather than the outcome of a purposeful industrial relations strategy[36].

Adherence to agreements and industrial action

An important feature of railway industrial relations at all levels has been a commitment to ‘constitutionalism’ amongst both managers and employee representatives. This has been manifested in a scrupulous adherence to agreements and a reluctance to use industrial action to resolve local grievances: official Iocal strikes are virtually unheard of, unofficial local strikes are also extremely rare. As has been noted by others, constitutionalism is especially strong among the footplate grades[37]. On the management side this approach to industrial relations was sus- tained by the centralised nature of the management hierarchy. Until the abolition of the Divisions in 1984, middle managers in the Divisional tier of management tightly con- trolled the industrial relations activities of Area-level management, often in conjunc- tion with employee representatives on the Sectional Council (the tier of the machinery above the LDCs). Those local managers who attempted to depart from the established way of doing things were usually brought swiftly into line[38]. During the 1980s rigid managerial adherence to formal or traditional procedures came to be viewed as undesirable by top managers because it could obstruct the implementation of change. ‘Macho management’ in national negotiations signalled that a more assertive, less procedure-based approach to industrial relations management


was to be preferred. At the same time institutional supports for constitutionalism were lifted with the reduction of controls on local managers’ industrial relations activity (except, as Ferner points out, when their actions were believed to be inimical to top management’s business strategies)[39] and the intensification of financial accountability. The encouragement of a more flexible approach to agreements can be contrasted with those organisations where management’s efforts have concentrated on tighten- ing up on custom and practice so as to achieve a more rigid interpretation of national and local agreements.

Given the contextual factors noted above, representatives were asked firstly how far managers could be relied upon to adhere to previously reach agreements. As Table 6 shows the proportion of representatives who believe that management can be relied upon to observe agreements, all or most of the time, has fallen over the decade from 81% to 54%. Nearly 10% now believe that managers rarely or never observe agreements.

An obvious limitation of this particular question is that it measures representatives’ confidence in management as much as managements’ actions themselves. We cannot easily tell whether managers are tearing up agreements as part of a management offensive or whether agreements are being broken because of other reasons, possibly even by mistake. Even so, representatives’ comments are quite illuminating:

Management agree to do something but fail to unless pressurised by industrial action. Manage- ment will t ry to break agreements if individuals o r staff are prepared to, especially if safety is not

involved

Industrial relations has declined, not so much as failing to agree but in getting management to carry out their promises once agreement has been reach, and the same item will appear on agenda after agenda.

Local management agree with numerous com- plaints from LDC’s but fail to carry out their promise after meetings.

The picture painted by these comments (which are broadly representative of unprompted comments on this topic) is not that of an aggressive, confident management decisively removing or ignoring those agreements that stand in their way. Rather the over-riding impression is one of managers under pressure, caught between the imperative of cost reduction and the constitutionalism of their subordinates, seeking room for manoeuvre in day-to-day depot management. Breaches of agreements often seem to be ad hoc responses to the intense budgetary (and in some cases labour market) pressures managers are currently under.

Circumstantial evidence to support this interpretation is provided by data on the incidence of unofficial industrial action. The experience of other public enterprises suggests that if management were openly attack- ing or consistently violating local agreements there would be a corresponding increase in local industrial action[40]. As Table 7 shows, a small majority of footplate LDCs have not taken any form of industrial action over the last five years. In fact the data indicates a decline in the incidence of such action: in 1980 41% recorded that industrial action had occurred on a few or several occasions; in

Table 6: Cali you rely O H local rizniinger to a d h e r e to agreements?



Always 3 12

Rarely 6 4

Most of the time 51 69 Some of the time 37 15

Never 3 - - - 100 100

218 lndustrial Relations journal

Table 7: lncidence of unofficial action over the last five years



None 58 50 Once 16 9 A few times 21 27

14 Several 100 100

- 5 -

1989 this had fallen to 26%. Those depots that had taken action were also asked why it had occurred. In 33% of cases (where a reason was given) it was in response to top management’s recent plans to reform the machinery. In 25% it arose from management’s breaches of agreements. But this finding should be kept in perspective: it amounts to 7 cases out of 121 depots over a five year period.

It is possible that ’macho-management’ is now so deep-rooted that footplate depots have been cowed into submission and that local managers can violate agreements with impunity. However, this explanation seems unlikely. Although train drivers have suf- fered major defeats in the 1980s the actual basis of footplate power, rooted mainly in the production process, has changed little during the decade[41]. Even in the immedi- ate aftermath of the 1982 defeat, footplate LDCs were able to secure significant con- cessions from local management during the implementation of flexible rostering[42].

A more plausible explanation, given the other findings of the survey, is that local managers are observing agreements less but that this lacks the strategic or aggressive intent likely to provoke industrial action in response. Instead violations of agreements are somewhat ad hoc in character, and take the form of wrongful treatment of individuals (eg. in the allocation of bonus work) rather than a more comprehensive attack on the agreements themselves. The comments of respondents at other points in the survey suggest that inexperienced management and inadequate administrative support may be relevant factors in addition to the budgetary

pressures mentioned earlier.* Representatives are responding to these

developments, not with industrial action but with more intensive use of existing procedures. As Table 8 shows, 43% of representatives record that the number of employee grievances submitted to the LDC have increased over the last five years or so (40% record no change). That representatives and workforces are responding to a changing pattern of management by a more intensive use of contitutional means suggests that in most instances managers have themselves not stepped too far outside the boundaries of the current system.

Conclusion Comparison of data from 1980 and 1989 suggests that recent developments in BR’s workplace industrial relations have been uneven in character. In some respects the activities of LDC representatives received favourable support from local management during the decade. Contrary possibly to expectations, the facilities now available to representatives display a marked improve- ment compared with 1980. In other respects substantial continuity can be discerned. For instance, the number of footplate LDCs remains unchanged and the incidence of forma1 LDC meetings between representatives and local management is more or less the same as in 1980. Nevertheless, the data

Table 8: Changes in the number of grievances dealt with by the LDC compared with five years

0x0

Percentages 1989

Footplate representatives

Increased a lot 22 Increased a bit 21 No change 40 Decreased a bit 10 Decreased a lot 7

NB: There is no comparable data for 1980

* A more systematic exploration of the effects of new management structures and practices on labour management is currently in preparation.


suggests significant changes in the approach to industrial relations of a sizeable number oi local managers. LDC representatives indicate that they are now much less likely to observe agreements, that they are less likely to engage in ‘adequate’ consultation, and that there has been some decline in informal contact between managers and representatives. Overall, we can conclude that during the 1980s workplace industrial relations were characterised by institutional continuity but that, on balance, the approach of local managers became less favourable to LDC activity. This could partially explain why only a minority of drivers‘ LDC representatives now believe BR‘s industrial relations to be good. These findings are arguably more or less as could be expected. Local managers have been under a number of pressures to reform workplace industrial relations but major institutional reform will require a comprehensive overhaul of existing agreements at national level, which has not yet occurred. Where institutional changes have been achieved, as in the reduction of representatives’ entitlement to time off for steward activities, it has been as a result of modifications to national agreements.

The findings reported are similar to those derived from those studies of private sector industrial relations which found that institutions have been left more or less intact by managers but that the managerial approach to representatives has changed(431. Where the difference may well lie is in the character of this approach. There is d certain amount of evidence that private sector managers have sought to develop a more consultative approach within existing industrial relations frameworks. In BR, by contrast, we find some evidence of a lrss consultative approach in local managers’ dealings with employee representatives.

An obvious limitation of the study is that, since data was obtained solely from worker representatives, any inferences about the nature and objectives of management actions must necessarily remain tentative. This point notwithstanding, the combination of data does allow us to at least question the notion that recent developments in workplace industrial relations can be unproblematically attributed to aggressive management strategies aimed at reducing the role and activities of workplace representatives. Some of the data obtained (ie. that relating to representatives‘ facilities) is incompatible with

this hypothesis. Other data is more support- ive insofar as it identifies aspects of management activity which is unfavourable to representatives. Even here, however, the comments of representatives suggest that in some cases at least the new management approach has been adopted for reasons other than hostility or an explicit concern to dimin- ish the role of LDCs.

The suggestion here which, given the source and nature of the data, could only be partially developed is that in many instances the change in managerial approach is in itself an unintended consequence of other changes, such as modifications to the management structure, as much as an expression of a purposeful industrial relations strategy. Furthermore, those very pressures which should have impelled managers to reform local industrial relations may well have pre- vented them from achieving desired changes. The imperative of reducing costs in the short term has run counter to the development of a more consultative style of industrial relations, leading instead to reduced contact between managers and representatives. Overall, it seems that the 1980s witnessed a departure from the ’traditional’ character of workplace industrial relations on the railways but that so far BR management has been largely unable to put anything in its place.

Acknowledgements

The survey was financed by a grant from the University of Bradford‘s Research Fund. The author is grateful also to Vic Cocks and Ena Macmillan for their help in administering the survey, to Christine Edwards for supplying additional data, and to Neil Carter and an anonymous referee for their comments on earlier versions of the paper.

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workplace industrial relations in british rail: change and continuity in the 1980s

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