women’s strategies in polygynous marriage

WOMEN'S STRATEGIES IN POLYGYNOUS MARRIAGE

Kipsigis, Datoga, and Other East African Cases

Monique Borgerhoff Mulder University of California at Davis

Both behavioral ecological and social anthropological analyses of polygynous marriage tend to emphasize the importance of competition among men in acquisition of mates, whereas the strategic options to women both prior to and after the establishment of a marriage have been neglected. Focusing on African marriage systems that are in some senses analogous to resource-defense polygyny, I first review the evidence of reproductive costs of polygyny to women. Then I discuss why the conflict of interests between men and women over mate number is often likely to be settled in favor of men. Using East African ethnographic data I examine the strategic responses of women and their families to polygynous marriage, focusing on four topics: mate choice (Kipsigis), attitudes toward incoming wives (Kipsigis), labor allocation and cooperation (comparative data, Kipsigis), and use of parental wealth (Datoga). The results of these quantitative analyses suggest that through a combination of judicious marriage choice and strategic responses within marriage, polygyny need not be costly to women in resource-defense polygynous systems. The conclusion is that a hierarchy of questions need to be addressed in the analysis of any polygynous marriage system.

KEY WORDS" Polygyny; Women's reproductive strategies; East Africa; Ethnographic analysis.

Received June 5, 1991; accepted July 8, 1991.

Address all correspondence to Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Deportment of Anthropology, Univer- sity of California at Davis, Davis CA 95616.

Copyright �9 1992 by Walter de Gruyter, Inc. New York Human Nature, Vol . 3, No. 1, pp. 45-70. 1045-6767/92/$1.00+.10

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46 Human Nature, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1992

Conventional applications of behavioral ecological theory to human polygynous marriage systems focus primarily on men's strategies. Al- though theorists point out the importance of both male-male competition (Emlen and Oring 1977) and female choice (Orians 1969) in polygynous mating systems, the process of male competition has drawn more attention than has female choice, probably because it is more easily examined. Correlations between men's politico-economic success and the number of their wives are commonly found (reviewed in Betzig 1988), but many of the interesting questions regarding how these patterns emerge lie largely uninvestigated. For example, how much inde- pendence in making marital choices that lead to polygynous arrange- ments do women have in different societies? What criteria do women use to choose mates in the context of polygyny? How do women act strategically to mitigate potential economic or reproductive costs associated with polygynous marriages?

Conventional anthropological models of the distribution of polygyny have also neglected women's strategic interests (White 1988). This ne- glect is strange given the much-studied positive associations between the magnitude of women's subsistence contributions and the prevalence of polygyny both within households (Grossbard 1976) and at the cross- cultural level (Lee 1979); these findings are usually interpreted in terms of the potential economic gains to men that result from being the heads of large polygynous families made up of independently productive women and children (Goody 1973). Furthermore the most recent investigation of the causes of polygyny worldwide provides stronger support for a model wherein polygyny is associated with expansionary fraternal interest groups that capture women and bridewealth through warfare (White and Burton 1988) than for the female subsistence contributions model. The authors interpret this new model as evidence of the predominance of male interests in causing polygyny; in this model, from the female perspective polygynous marriage is advantageous only to senior wives who can mobilize the labor of junior wives and their children.

Clearly much analytical rigor is lacking in both behavioral ecological and social anthropological analyses of the strategic interests of women vis-a-vis polygynous marriage. In this article I concentrate primarily on societies with "resource-defense polygyny" (Borgerhoff Mulder 1988; Emlen and Oring 1977). In these societies women are largely dependent on the resources men control for successful reproduction; thus male and female interests are likely to differ radically with respect to polygynous marriage. First I review the evidence of costs of polygyny to women in African societies. I discuss why these conflicts of interests between men and women over mate number are most likely to be settled in favor of

Women's Strategies in Polygynous Marriage 47

men. Then, in the empirical core of the paper, I use analyses from my own research in East Africa to see what kinds of strategic responses women and their families utilize, both when they enter and when they remain in polygynous marriages. Some of the data are preliminary and are presented to suggest possible future directions in research.

COSTS OF POLYGYNY

In resource-defense polygyny, males control different amounts of resources and are chosen by females on the basis of these resources. As phrased in the polygyny threshold model (Orians 1969), female choice for males with high-quality resources may contribute to the evolution and maintenance of polygyny if the difference in quality between resources held by males is sufficient to enable females to raise as many or more offspring by mating with already-paired males on superior territories than with bachelors on inferior territories. Thus females settle with males according to an "ideal free" distribution with respect to male territory quality (Fretwell 1972). Key assumptions of this model are that females are free to choose their mates and that female fitness is compro- mised by polygynous marriage because of the need to share male parental resources with other females and their progeny. Considerable support for and development of this model can be found in the literature on avian breeding systems, particularly those of passerines (e.g., Searcy and Yasukawa 1989).

Whereas males almost inevitably benefit reproductively from polygyny, the extent of costs to females seems to be more variable. Originally it was proposed that as a consequence of the ideal free distribution the fitness of monogamously and polygynously married females should be equal. Many factors limit the alternatives available to females, however, and thereby constrain the likelihood of this outcome (Davies 1989), such as male coercion, high costs of female choice, and an unbalanced sex ratio (reviewed in Borgerhoff Mulder 1990). Indeed, fitness costs to polygynous females are often mentioned in the avian literature (Witten- berger 1981).

In studies of human societies, anthropologists have recognized that the costs of polygyny to women are highly variable both within and between populations; numerous anecdotal descriptions illustrate how women can benefit or suffer in polygynous marriages (e.g., Clignet 1970; Dorjahn 1988) depending on specific circumstances. These circumstances might include situations in which resources are limited, resources are not shared equally between cowives, women have limited


access to alternative sources of subsistence (such as marketable food items), and no opportunity for cowife cooperation arises (Brabin 1984).

Data on the fertility of polygynously married women tell an equally variable and inconsistent story. The main conclusion that can be drawn from a compilation of published material for Africa (Table 1) is that polygyny is not uniformly costly to women; indeed, only 10 (or 11) out of 23 studies show lower fertility among polygynously married women, and in only 4 (or 5) of these cases is the difference significant (or of considerable magnitude).

These comparisons, however, have many limitations. First, the studies are of variable methodological quality. Second, it is often unclear whether the comparison group (monogamously married women) are comparable to polygynously married women with respect to age, wealth, or marital duration; for example, in many societies older women, or women who have low fertility for other reasons, appear more likely to be in polygynous than monogamous marriages. Third, it is not at all clear whether all of the societies listed can be characterized as resource-defense polygyny systems. The table's primary merit is to show that, as among nonhuman females, the potential costs of polygyny to women vary.

To explain this variability at least three questions need to be an- swered. First, are there theoretical grounds for predicting the conditions under which either sex should win the potential conflict of interests vis-a-vis mate number? Second, is there a possibility for an ideal free distribution of women with respect to male wealth? Third, do women act strategically within polygynous marriages in order to offset some of the costs contingent on having to share male investment? This paper explores these issues in selected East African populations. The analyses are preceded by a brief ethnographic discussion of the culture area.

ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

Polygyny in the patrilineal descent systems of eastern and southern Africa has long been linked to the family economy and property control (Schneider 1979). The major forms of property in these societies are land and livestock, and different populations rely to different extents on each of these sources of capital. The Datoga of Tanzania are almost entirely dependent on livestock (cattle, goats, and sheep), whereas since the 1920s the Kipsigis of Kenya have become increasingly dependent on land. The ultimate authority over property lies with men, although women hold rights to some types of property (Dahl 1987; also see below).

Table 1. Effects of Marital Status on Marital Fertility in Published African Studies. Marital status measured as follows: monogamous, primary polygynous, secondary polygynous, etc. (Some categories collapsed differently in different studies.) Effect measured by comparing each individual wife's rank (sole, primary, secondary, etc.) to her completed or age-specific fertility.

Reference S t u d y Group Location Effect

Culwick and Culwick 1939 Ulanga, Tanzania 0 Brito 1952 (in Adewuyi 1988) Portuguese colony 0 Brebant 1954 (in Adewuyi 1988) Belgian Congo Dorjahn 1958 18 or 23 sub-Saharan locations - Dorjahn 1959 Temne, Sierra Leone - Busia 1954 (in Adewuyi 1988) Gold Coast 0 Ohadike 1968 Lagos, Nigeria 0 E. van de Walle 1968 Congo - ++ E. van de Walle 1968 Guinea - Pool 1968 Rural and urban Ghana 0 Olusanya 1971 Rural and urban Nigeria 0 Clignet and Sween 1974 Urban Cameroon - Reyna and Bouquet 1975 Chad Podlewski 1975 Cameroon 0 Ukaegbu 1977 Rural Ibo, Nigeria -~" Chojnacka 1980 Largely rural Nigeria 0 Isaac 1980 Mende, Sierra Leone - <" Arowolo 1981 Ibadan, Nigeria 0 Ahmed 1986" Ibadan, Nigeria 0 b Adewuyi 1988" Nigeria + * Borgerhoff Mulder 1989" Kipsigis, Kenya 0"* Garenne and van de Walle Sereer, Senegal - +" 1989 ~ Johnson and Elmi 1989 ~' Urban Somali 0* Roth and Kurup 1988" Toposa, Sudan - *

Note: These locations represent the full extent of published studies on the effects of polygyny on fertility in Africa known to the author. They cannot be considered a random sample of polygynous populations in Africa. 0 = no difference in mean fertility - = polygynous mean lower than monogamous mean + = polygynous mean higher than monogamous mean * = statistically significant +' = no statistical test conducted, but > 15% difference in mean levels + Controlled for confounding factors b Varies according to religious affiliation (Christian - , Muslim +) c For consistency with other studies, this table reports the association between completed

fertility and marital status; the relationship between completed family size and number of cowives is negative (Figure 1).


The extended family is the primary property-owning unit, but complex ownership rights exist within the extended family that are adapted to polygyny. Most important in this regard are the rights to the control and inheritance of property that are (to a greater or lesser extent) de- volved to independent nuclear families, which consist of a wife and her children; this pattern is termed the "house-property" system (Gluckman 1950). Thus a large share of the property of a "house" derives from and is under the ultimate control of the woman's husband. Generally each "house" receives an approximately equal share of the husband's property, although many variants on this pattern occur. Considerable variation is also evident in the extent to which men hold a "reserve" herd (or other property) that is not allocated to wives for their use.

Women make a major contribution to subsistence. Kipsigis women cultivate maize, millet, and vegetables on the land allocated to their "house," although men are responsible for ploughing, fencing, and building; Datoga women participate in the raising of livestock and also in cultivation of maize (in years with sufficient rain). In both populations women are responsible for all secondary food processing, the collection of fuel and water, and child care. In neither of the populations discussed in this paper do women have substantial access to sources of support that are independent of their husband 's capital input, although some Kipsigis women are initiating cooperatives on public or rented land; thus women are largely dependent on the resources ultimately controlled by men for the raising of their children.

Parents have considerable control over the marriages of their offspring; this control is more marked among the Kipsigis than the Datoga. Polygyny is common and is seen as highly desirable, particularly by wealthy men; women are also generally supportive of polygynous marriage (see below). In many populations, including the Kipsigis and the Datoga, the "houses" of cowives are in close proximity. Among the Kipsigis they generally lie on the same plot of land or within the same local neighborhood (kokwet); among the Datoga cowives often reside within the same thorn-fenced homestead, although they may spend part of the year at separate seasonal cattle camps. Relationships among cowives vary from fondness to hostility (LeVine 1962); cowives in some Kipsigis families were seen to attack one anothers' children whereas others relied on each other as primary caretakers. Notwithstanding the warmth of the cowife relationship, all women are aware of the potential conflicts that arise among cowives over their husband's property, labor, and sexual attention. When they have completed their reproductive years women generally leave their husband and cowives to take up residence with a son who is old enough to establish his own household.


CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE SEXES IN R E S O U R C E - D E F E N S E P O L Y G Y N Y

Figure 1 illustrates one example of the different effects of polygynous marriage on the reproductive success of men and women-- in this case on postreproductive Kipsigis men and women. The actual values of completed family size are of little significance in this context, but the differing interests of men and women in polygynous marriage are clearly depicted (a similar analysis is described in Davies and Houston 1986) and are likely to characterize most populations with resource-defense polygyny. Although the existence of (and steepness in) the decline in female fitness with number of cowives varies across populations (as reviewed above), sex differences in the reproductive consequences of polygyny are practically inescapable insofar as males can benefit more from multiple copulations than can females.

In this population, increased number of cowives lowers female life- time reproductive success, although the decline only occurs with two or more cowives (Borgerhoff Mulder 1990); marital ranking itself (monoga-

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Figure 1. Numbers of offspring surviving to age 5 born to Kipsigis men (n--- 95) and women (n=280) according to the number of the husband's wives. Means and standard deviations are shown. Men: F3,~1 =29.02, p<0.001. Women: F3,276 ~- 4.37, p = 0.005; deviation from linearity F1.276 = ] 0 . 1 0 , p = 0.002.


mous, primary polygynous, etc.) is not associated with a reduction in female fitness (Borgerhoff Mulder 1989). Taken together, these results indicate that, in this particular ethnographic context, overall competition for resources is a more important determinant of reproductive performance than wife order per se. This finding probably reflects the fact that Kipsigis wives are not ranked according to seniority (a prevalent practice in many West African polygynous systems) and that relationships between cowives are in most cases egalitarian.

If we measure fitness in terms of numbers of offspring surviving to age 5, regression analysis shows that addition of an extra wife adds an expected 6.6 (~ coefficient) offspring to a man's fitness, whereas it reduces each woman's fitness by only -0 .55 children. The costs to a woman of an additional cowife, although not strictly linear, are never of equal magnitude to the benefits to males. Hence, if an individual is willing to incur the risks of opposing his or her spouse's wishes vis-a-vis a new partner in proportion to the fitness units gained or lost, we would expect male interests to predominate at all observed harem sizes. Fur- thermore, irrespective of sex differences in fitness consequences, men's interests will prevail where women are physically or legally unable to prevent other women from joining the household, or to desert (divorce) in protest. Only where cowives cooperate to prevent a husband from adding a new female, perhaps by threatening to withdraw their sexual or economic services, would we expect a husband to limit his harem size in accord with the wishes of his current wives (for an example from West Africa see Dorjahn 1988). This strategy would be unstable if other females offered sexual and economic services to the male in return for his investment.

If polygyny can seriously prejudice women's fitness, as this brief analysis suggests, women's strategies within polygynous marriage become a key focus of interest both in comparison to those of monogamous women and as a function of the number of their cowives. Several questions can be asked, including (a) Do women (or their parents on their behalf) act strategically in polygynous marriage systems by distrib- uting themselves according to an ideal free distribution, as predicted by the polygyny threshold model? (b) Do women (or their parents on their behalf) adopt precautionary measures when entering polygynous marriages to protect themselves against the potential negative effects of reduced male investment? After they are established in marriage we can ask: (c) Are women's attitudes toward in-marrying women influenced by their own experiences and material circumstances? (d) Do women capitalize on the greater availability of labor in polygynous households to increase productivity or leisure, thereby mitigating other potential costs associated with polygyny? The rest of this paper addresses these issues.

Women's Strategies in Polygynous Marriage

STRATEGIES IN POLYGYNOUS MARRIAGES

53

The Marriage Decision among the Kipsigis

In a previous publication (Borgerhoff Mulder 1990) I examine whether polygyny among the Kipsigis may be a consequence of women's preferences for wealthy men by documenting a sequence of marriages among a group of pioneers who established a new settlement in the territory of their traditional enemies, the Masai. The hypothesis was suggested because wealthier men have more wives than poorer men, and women with access to more land have higher reproductive success than women with less land. Access to land is important to Kipsigis women because it is associated with increased availability of cash and a variety of food items in the household and with lower incidences of illness among women and their offspring; these differences may contribute to the higher fertility and offspring survival rates of women with plentiful land (Borgerhoff Mulder 1987).

With the European influx into the Kipsigis area (1906--1907), the tradi- tionally transhumant Kipsigis pastoralists gradually began to settle on permanent farms and to cultivate maize. As population densities increased in their traditional homeland (established as a native reserve) during the next two decades, new communities were founded in the territory of the Masai: individual men, pairs, and trios would resign their inheritance rights to the small family plots on the reserve and stake out a plot of land as pioneers in the sparsely populated areas adjacent to the reserve.

In a longitudinal analysis of the reproductive careers of the first 25 pioneers to settle Abosi, I determined the amount of land available to any in-marrying woman in each year between 1932 and 1949 offered by each pioneer, coding also his age, the number of his current wives, the number of his surviving children, and whether or not he obtained a wife in that year. This last measure is used as an indicator of women's preference. Because of the strictly observed practice of dividing a man's assets, his land, and his livestock equally between cowives, the "breeding opportunity" (sensu Borgerhoff Mulder 1990) for any potentially in- marrying woman could be calculated as the number of acres owned by a man divided by the number of his currently married wives plus 1.

Data. Results of a Cox's stepwise regression analysis (Cox 1972) show that two variables (number of acres and number of wives) have an independent effect on the probability of a man being chosen: men offering larger breeding opportunities were preferred over men offering smaller breeding opportunities. Men married to fewer wives were also more likely to be chosen (Figure 2). The importance of other variables,

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Human Nature, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1992

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Figure 2. Breeding opportunities for Kipsigis women arriving in the Abosi area between 1932 and 1949. Each horizontal bar indicates a breeding opportuni ty (a certain amount of acres on the vertical axis), and triangles denote the breeding opportunities selected each year. The length of the horizontal bar shows the marital status (see key) of the man who controls those resources. Thus, in 1934 five men had already settled in Abosi. In that year one marriage occurred; the bachelor who offered a breeding opportuni ty of 100 acres was chosen over the other four men, who offered 150 (monogamist), 37.5 (trigamist), 33 (bigamist),


such as the man ' s age, his p roduc t ion of surviving offspring to date, and his overall wealth, did not reach significance wi thin the regression model and were therefore d r o p p e d from the model . In sum, w o m e n prefer m e n f rom w h o m they will receive a large allocation of land, and this preference contr ibutes to po lygyny in ways similar to those demon- strated in passerines. In addit ion, Kipsigis w o m e n prefer bachelors over married m e n once differences in breed ing oppor tun i ty are taken into considerat ion; this preference has not been no ted in the passer ine literature. Finally, the fact that a man ' s overall weal th did not affect his probabili ty of being chosen to some extent rules out a direct impact of male-male compet i t ion in gaining access to wives, a l though male competi t ion does of course occur in resource accrual.

Among the Kipsigis a girl's parents play a major role in choosing her husband f rom among what is of ten a large n u m b e r of prospect ive suitors. This fact does not u n d e r m i n e the assumpt ion of female choice: Kipsigis daughte rs are rarely forced into marriages with which they do not concur because a d iscontented wife comm o n ly deserts her husband , re turns to her natal home, and cont inues to p roduce offspring w h o mus t be fed from the produce of the parental farm. This practice can place severe economic stress on the resources of the family, particularly if the desert ing bride has brothers w h o are a l ready married. Consequen t ly a pr imary concern for Kipsigis parents in selecting a son-in-law is to find a man with w h o m their daugh te r will remain con ten ted (for suppor t ive data on pre fe r red qualities of prospect ive sons-in-law, see Borgerhoff Mulder 1988). Scope for extreme parental manipula t ion in this particular e thnographic context is, as far as I can de te rmine , quite limited.

Discussion. This analysis shows that female (or parental) preferences for males w h o offer attractive breed ing oppor tuni t ies can contr ibute to the occurrence and maintenance of po lygyny in a h u m a n popula t ion , as

and 32 (tetragamist) acres to a new wife. In 1935 the situation had changed: the bachelor who married in the preceding year was now a monogamist who could offer only 50 acres to a new wife; in addition, a new pioneer bigamist arrived who could offer 16.7 acres. The only breeding opportunity selected was that of a monogamist offering 150 acres for a second wife. Cox's stepwise regression analysis (Cox 1972) shows that the two variables have an independent effect on a man's probability of being chosen: size of breeding opportunity (~ coefficient/ standard error = 2.7046, likelihood ratio chi-square improvement value = 14.94, p<0.001) and number of currently married wives (~ coefficient/standard error = -2.2095, • = 4.35, p<0.05). From Borgerhoff Mulder, M., Kipsigis Women Prefer Wealthy Men. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 27:255-264. Copyright �9 1990. Reprinted with permission.


formulated in the polygyny threshold model. The data also indicate that once differences in the amount of resources available to a woman are taken into consideration, women marry men with fewer wives. These results suggest that whether or not polygyny is (to some extent) forced on Kipsigis women by men (or by more diffuse cultural expectations), women appear to select strategic options with respect to their fitness. These strategic decisions are of considerable importance to women's fitness insofar as remarriage is not permitted in Kipsigis society.

Kipsigis Married Women's Attitudes to Polygyny

Kipsigis women suffer reproductive costs when their husbands have more than two wives (Figure 1); previous analyses show that these costs are most severely experienced by women married to poor rather than rich polygynists (Borgerhoff Mulder 1990). Hence we might expect women's attitudes to polygyny to be affected by their husband's wealth. The question also arises whether the experience of polygyny affects a woman's attitude toward polygyny.

Data. During my 18-month fieldwork with the Kipsigis I conducted behavioral observations on a subsample of 89 extended households containing 142 married women. I visited these households at least once a week and became very familiar with many of these women, and I administered numerous unstructured interviews (n = 103) concerning, among other things, their attitudes toward polygyny. I initiated discus- sions of polygynous marriage using the pretext that it is very foreign to my own culture, and I then tried to explore what these women felt about the institution. Four women were unwilling to discuss polygyny, saying that the decision was entirely up to men. I avoided direct questions, such as "Do cowives help one another?"--rather I encouraged free- flowing conversations and noted whether their comments on various aspects of polygyny fell into predetermined categories. I subsequently identified three general responses: positive, ambivalent, or negative attitude to polygyny. Although we did not talk specifically about whether the interviewee would welcome a (or another) cowife into her home, it was clear from the conversations that women's personal experiences (and to some extent those of their friends and relatives) influence their opinions; this finding suggested that women's responses could be cross- tabulated with demographic and socioeconomic measures to explore the sources of differences in women's attitudes toward polygyny.

The interview data are presented in relation to a woman's marital


status, the number of her husband's wives, her husband's farm size, and the land available to her for maize cultivation (Figure 3). Women who fell into the ambivalent category are dropped from the analyses (n = 19); often they would state all the benefits and costs they saw in polygyny and conclude with a statement like "it all depends on x,y,z."

Perhaps the most remarkable finding is that polygyny is viewed favorably by a very high proportion (76%) of women, notwithstanding the overall negative effects of polygyny on women 's reproductive success (Figure 1); maybe women use criteria other than fitness in making marriage decisions, or maybe the measure of fitness used in this s tudy is inadequate. Nevertheless, this finding contrasts with Dorjahn's (1988) Ternne study, which shows a generally negative attitude among women toward polygyny. Although the Kipsigis result may indicate that women were simply expressing a cultural ideal in response to my questions, the variation in attitudes according to wealth (below) suggests otherwise. We are consequently left with the puzzle of why Kipsigis women seem to favor polygyny even when it is not in their fitness interests to do SO,

With regard to differences within the sample, the attitudes of women toward polygyny were not significantly affected by the experience of polygynous marital status or large numbers of cowives. Women whose husbands were rich (owned more than 8 acres) and women who themselves had above-average access to land suitable to the cultivation of maize, however, were significantly more in favor of polygyny than were other women.

Finally, of 26 polygynously married women with younger cowives, 6 reported having petitioned their husband for a cowife to help out with domestic chores, 13 reported having been consulted by their husbands and given the option to refuse, and 8 reported not having been consulted.

Discussion. Married women clearly have strong views concerning polygyny. The fact that only four women said polygyny was entirely "'men's business," as well as the incidence of women actually requesting cowives, suggests that they have considerable influence over their husband's subsequent marriages. Women are more positive toward polygyny if their husband has a large farm, clearly a strategic response insofar as women married to richer polygynists suffer less in polygynous marriages than women married to poorer polygynists. Interestingly there is no evidence that experience of polygynous marriage creates negative attitudes toward the institution; although not statistically significant, the trend is in the opposite direction.


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Figure 3. Attitudes to polygyny among Kipsigis women by (a) marital status, (b) number of husband's wives, (c) size of husband's farm, and (d) wife's access to land (n=84 Kipsigis women). Significance test results are as follows: (a) • 4.14, df= 2, not significant; (b) X 2= 3.55, df= 2, not significant; (c) • 12.86, dr=2, p<0.001; (d) • df=2, p<0.05. Wealth categories (acreage) are based on median values of the full sample. Responses indicating a positive attitude to polygyny included "polygynous wives help each other" and "should live close to one another." Negative responses included "polygynous wives argue and fight" and "should live at a distance."


Labor Allocation and Cooperation among the Kipsigis and Other East Africans

There are many ways in which cowives might derive benefits from or potentially exploit one another's presence. In West Africa, where wives are sharply differentiated according to their seniority, a pattern of ex- ploitation is clear, with senior wives relying heavily on the labor of junior wives (references listed in Table 1). Where there is less stratifica- tion by wife order, as yet no systematic analysis of how polygyny might affect a woman's activity budget has been done. Where wives are coresi- dent (or reside in close proximity) we might expect benefits resulting from an economy of scale with respect to the provision of agricultural labor or child care. If polygynously married women allocate their time differently than their monogamously married counterparts, this difference might indicate specific behavioral strategies contingent on marital status. It may also provide some explanation, at a mechanistic level, for why polygynously married Kipsigis women favor polygyny despite reproductive costs.

Previous analyses of infant care in a small sample of Kipsigis families studied with focal sampling techniques show that polygynously married women living within the same homestead spend more time away from their infants than do monogamously married women. They also benefit from a greater availability of caretakers, which is confirmed by the fact that the proportion of scans in which no caretaker was within eyesight or earshot of an infant was higher for monogamously than polygynously married mothers (Borgerhoff Mulder and Milton 1985). It is important to note that this study was not based on a random sample of polygynously married women; cowives sharing a homestead are most likely to be those who maintain particularly good relationships with one another. Nevertheless these results suggest that at least some polygynously married women might spend their time rather differently than monogamously married women, perhaps increasing their leisure or the amount of time contributed toward assisting other households.

Data. These questions about labor allocation and cooperation were addressed in an analysis of data from a 13-month (November 1982- December 1983) time allocation study of the families of 142 women. Activities of all household members were recorded during randomly timed visits within stratified time blocks for most households in four adjacent communities (for methodological details see Borgerhoff Mulder and Caro 1985). Only individual women on whom more than 40 observations were made during this period are included (n = 127).

For this very preliminary analysis, activities are simply categorized as


leisure or work. Most classifications are self-evident, bu t some less obvious decisions that were made by the analysts include the classifica- tion of eating as work whereas visiting, a t tendance at ceremonies , and sleeping (including dur ing ill-health) were classified as leisure. Assis- tance was def ined as any activity done by one individual w o m a n for any o ther individual of a different household , such as part icipating in a harvest, helping to te ther struggling calves, or cooking' for a sick neigh- bor 's children.

Results of the analysis show no t endency for po lygynous ly marr ied w o m e n to enjoy more leisure than m o n o g a m o u s l y marr ied w o m e n (Table 2). A crosstabulat ion of the p ropor t ion of cases a w o m a n was observed in leisure falling above or below the median value for the sample by the n u m b e r of her cowives living within a 5 km range p roduced a nonsignif icant chi-square value. With respect to assistance the t rend (also not significant) was in the oppos i te direction f rom that predicted: the p ropor t ion of observat ions in which a w o m a n was assisting another individual outside of her househo ld was h igher for monogamous ly marr ied w o m e n than for their po lygynous counterpar ts .

Discussion and comparative data. The data suggest that n u m b e r of cowives does not increase the a m o u n t of time w o m e n allocate to leisure, or to the assistance of individuals in o ther households . It is never the less possible that the a m o u n t of time devo ted to more specific activities, such as animal husbandry or child care, may differ; fu r thermore , m a n y o ther potential ly confound ing variables need to be considered, such as age, wealth, and family size (or househo ld d e p e n d e n c y ratio). A n y conclu- sions drawn mus t therefore be provisional.

More general ly we have yet to de te rmine the condi t ions in which cowife cooperat ion might be advantageous , both within and be tween societies. With regard to differences in coopera t ion wi th in societies, we may find that coopera t ion is favored at low parities, w h e n w o m e n have

Table 2. Leisure and Assistance Activities of Kipsigis Women by Marital Status

Percent of Activities

Leisure Assistance Wives living in 5 km range <~ median > median <- median > median

0 37 30 27 40 1-2 28 32 34 26

2 X 2 X = 0.93, df = 1, = 3.40, df = 1, not significant p = 0.065

Note: Median value for proportion of activities spent in leisure, 0.26; in assistance, 0.10.


no older chi ldren to he lp wi th caretaking. Coope ra t i on migh t also be favored a m o n g the weal thy, w h e r e cattle he rd ing dut ies are onerous , or where there are few al ternat ive potent ia l coopera t ive pa r tne r s (such as sisters-in-law). Possible differences in pa t t e rns of cowife coopera t ion in relat ion to all of these factors require fur ther invest igat ion.

With regard to differences b e t w e e n societies in cowife coopera t ion , ecological and social s t ructural factors m a y be impor tan t . A s imple cross- cultural tabulat ion of r epor ted coopera t ion or r ivalry a m o n g cowives shows that coopera t ion is m o s t c o m m o n and r ivalry least c o m m o n whe re d e p e n d e n c y on l ivestock is h igh (Table 3; this conclus ion is based on 16 East African societies classified accord ing to their p r i m a r y economic d e p e n d e n c e on l ivestock or cultivation). W h e t h e r this bias reflects the relative elasticity of l ivestock wea l th (in c o m p a r i s o n to l and -based wealth) , the potent ia l for economies of scale in l ivestock h u s b a n d r y , g rea te r weal th a m o n g pastoral is ts than agriculturalists , or o the r factors remains unclear. The fact that Kipsigis w o m e n repor t ed greater cooperation a m o n g cowives in the pas t (see also Per is t iany 1939) pr ior to the adop t ion of maize cult ivation is consis tent wi th this cross-cul tural f ind- ing.

H a k a n s s o n ' s (1989) observa t ion that societies wi th grea ter reliance on cattle are character ized by restr icted cowife a u t o n o m y in economic af-

Table 3. Effects of Subsistence on Reports of Cowife Cooperation and Rivalry in Sampled East African Populations

Primary Economic Dependence

Cooperation Rivalry

None Limited Common None Limited Common

Livestock Rendille Baggara Jie Baggara Datoga Rendille Datoga Samburu Jie Somali Somali Turkana Samburu

Turkana Land Arusha Kikuyu Kipsigis Arusha

GusiJ Kipsigis Gusi Luo Luo Taita Shambala

Note: Combining categories "none" with "limited" yields one-tailed Fisher's Exact Proba- bilities of p = 0.122 (n = 13, df = 1) and p= 0.045 (n = 12, df = 1), respectively. Combining categories "limited" with "common" yields values of p = 0.086 (n = 13, df = 1) and p = 0.07 (n = 12, df = 1), respectively.

Source: Based on a sample of societies for which appropriate data were available from the period between 1930 and 1960, which were coded by the author as part of a pilot study of inheritance practices in East Africa. Information on cooperation and rivalry missing for three and four societies, respectively.


fairs appears initially to be at odds with this finding; however, it is uncertain whether decreased cowife autonomy per se might increase or decrease cooperation. Hakansson proposes that conflict will be exacer- bated in situations in which wives have no livestock allocated to them but must, together with their cowives, depend on their husband's herd. It is equally likely that a common interest in and dependence on the family herd will increase cooperation among cowives, at least until the time when conflicts arise over their sons' inheritances. Furthermore, in the precarious livestock-based economies of low rainfall areas, cooperation and exchange among cowives might prove a good risk-aversion strategy during at least some stages of the life cycle. Clearly the scope for both conflict and cooperation among cowives in different socioecological con- texts requires further investigation.

Parental Responses to Their Daughters' Polygynous Marriages: Datoga "Dowry'" Payments

The Datoga pastoralists of Tanzania are closely related to the Kipsigis. They speak a language that has been classified as Kalenjin, and they probably split from the proto-Kalenjin Kipsigis ancestral population about 1000 years ago (Ehret 1971). Unlike the Kipsigis they are still largely pastoral and do not privately own land.

An unusual feature of marriage among the Datoga is the promise of cattle to daughters at the time of their marriage (the stock are actually transferred several years later). In a culture area in which polygyny is prevalent, women 's property rights are usually curtailed (Dahl 1987), and bridewealth (payment from a groom's to a bride's family) is common, these so-called dowry payments (Klirna 1974) of 1-13 cattle (Bor- gerhoff Mulder 1991a) seem anomalous. This phenomenon is particularly unusual given the economic insignificance of Datoga bridewealth payments (1 heifer). Women exert control over their dowry herds vis-a- vis the interests of their husbands; indeed, a woman with a large herd donated by her parents can have considerable economic power in the household with respect to the use and allocation of livestock, causing potential friction between herself and her husband (Klima 1964). In a long-term study of the relationship between marriage payments, wealth, and reproductive performance, I am attempting to determine the functional significance of bestowing property on daughters at the time of their marriage in this otherwise patrilineal society.

Datoga men own most of the livestock. At marriage they allocate some animals to their wives, but wives continue to depend on the husband 's reserve herd as well as on their own personal allocation and their


dowry. Marriages are commonly polygynous, and like most pastoralists, there is probably an association between the size of a man's cattle holding and the number of his wives, suggesting resource-defense polygyny. Relations between cowives are, as among the Kipsigis, variable; wives appear to cooperate in many activities, but during times of economic crisis they are acutely aware of the strain associated with the dependence of multiple families on the husband's reserve herd. Among the Datoga there is also considerable scope for female choice: more than half of 399 Datoga women studied (Borgerhoff Mulder 1991b) reported having chosen their husbands themselves. If, like among the Kipsigis, Datoga women assort themselves among men in accordance to their wealth, as predicted by the polygyny threshold model, why should their parents offer supplementary cattle gifts?

Do large "dowries" increase a Datoga woman's chance of finding a particularly desirable husband (mating effort), as has been proposed in Dickemann's (1981) dowry competition model? Do they increase the survival and reproductive chances (parental effort) of a daughter 's offspring? Indigenous notions emphasize parental effort, since the Datoga view these gifts to daughters as an important independent source of support for childrearing. Furthermore, it is not clear whether a man knows how many cattle a woman will be promised at the time he starts courting her, in which case the "dowry" could not be characterized as mating effort. Since dowry payments are conventionally thought of as a component of marital strategy (e.g., Harrell and Dickey 1985), the term may not be appropriate in this case.

When we focus on these cattle gifts as an investment in a daughter 's parental effort, the question arises whether the size of the payment varies with the amount of parental investment a woman might expect from her husband: specifically, do parents provide larger dowries for daughters who are likely to face problems in providing for their offspring than for daughters in more favorable circumstances? Here we examine the effects of husband's wealth and marital status on a woman's dowry.

Data. For this analysis the current size of a woman's dowry herd (dug bataid) is used as an indicator of the size of the initial "dowry" gift from her parents; this approximation is not ideal, but gift values require further verification with informants. A crosstabulation of the dug bataid of 23 Datoga women by their marital order (Figure 4) shows that the herds of polygynously married women (women who were a man's second or subsequent wife) are substantially larger than those of women who were their husband's first wife. This effect was replicated when age (using rough initial approximations) was taken into account and therefore does not reflect the growth potential of herds established many


0

16

14

12

I 0

8

6

4

2

Ist 2 n d

T _>3rd

Marital Order

Figure 4. Current size of dowry herd by marital order of Datoga women (8 first wives, 7 second wives, 8 third or higher-order wives). Counts include mature livestock only. Means and standard deviations shown. Analysis of variance F2,20=3.86, pK0.05; G=0.51, not significant.

years ago. Rather surprisingly, in light of this finding, the size of the dug bataid is not related to the husband's wealth (r S = -0 .17, n -- 23, not significant).

Discussion. The marked association between the size of the dug bataid and a woman's marital order suggests that parents may be more willing to allocate resources to daughters who enter polygynous rather than monogamous marriages; given the potential conflicts in large polygynous families that arise over increased milk and meat requirements from a man's herd (see above), Datoga "dowries" may serve to buffer women from the costs of cowife competition. Under these circumstances, a polygynously married woman's access to her own dug bataid herd may be critical to the successful raising of her offspring.

Some problems are evident, however, with viewing Datoga "dowry" payments as a parental strategy that compensates daughters who marry poor men, insofar as no negative correlation exists between the husband's wealth and the dug bataid. Why are parents not willing to protect the economic interests of daughters who marry poor men? This incon-


sistency may in part reflect the potential temporal instability of wealth differences among Datoga men. Livestock holdings (unlike privately owned land) are constantly at risk of decimation by theft, disease, or drought (Daniel Sellen and Daniela Sieff, personal communication 1991). Although the overall impact of these occurrences has not yet been determined, a man's present wealth may not necessarily be a strong indicator of his future wealth. Possibly Datoga parents view marriage into polygynous households as entailing more risk for their daughters than monogamous marriage to a poor man.

These data require more analysis to control for the wealth of wife- givers and wife-takers at the time of marriage in a larger sample, for example, and to examine actual "dowry" transfers rather than current dug bataid herds. Furthermore, many proximate contingencies may affect the size of these transfers and need to be considered, such as the availability of stock in the wife's family herd, the potential health and welfare of the natal stock in the ecological zone of the marital household, the availability of labor in the two households, and other factors (discussed qualitatively in Borgerhoff Mulder 1991a). Nevertheless, these preliminary findings suggest that differences in Datoga "dowry" payments may in part reflect strategic parental behavior on behalf of their daughters in response to the potential for increased economic conflicts in polygynous households.

This conclusion raises many comparative questions for research per- taining to the socioecological conditions under which we would expect women to be recipients of parental property. Although true dowries have not been reported previously in East Africa, the marked variation in the rights women have to parental property (Dahl 1987) may be associated with the temporal stability of wealth differences among families.

CONCLUSION

These analyses merely scratch the surface of the topic of how women or their parents might make strategic decisions regarding polygynous marriages. The data presented indicate that women in at least some polygynous societies are not necessarily passive pawns in men's reproductive strategies but can be viewed as strategists both prior to and after marriage. This finding is hardly surprising. The female as strategist has long been a theme in the sociobiological literature (Hrdy 1981); however, the importance of this topic has been overlooked in the literature on polygyny.

This paper addresses only superficially the difficulties in determina-


tion of the costs to females of polygyny. Data on the completed reproductive performance of women of different marital status is a poor indicator of the costs of po lygyny- -no t only because women of different phenotypic quality may be more likely to be married polygynously, but also because polygyny may be advantageous for some females and disadvantageous for others; mean fitness outcomes may therefore ob- scure the costs. Furthermore, the potential costs associated with polygyny may be hidden from anthropologists by compensatory behavioral tactics. Hence, as in the study of all life-history decisions, only experi- mental manipulations can provide conclusive evidence of fitness costs (e.g., Gustafsson and Sutherland 1988).

The analyses in this paper focus exclusively on East African examples that are in some respects analogous to resource-defense polygyny. Polygyny can take many different forms (White 1988), perhaps resulting from very different kinds of competitive and selective processes in different parts of the world. Nevertheless, these analyses suggest a hierarchy of questions (cf. Searcy and Yasukawa 1989) that should be addressed in the analysis of any polygynous marriage system. First, are there reproductive costs associated with polygyny for women, and how do women's interests regarding number of co-mates conflict with those of men? Second, if fitness costs do exist, are there opportunities for women to assort themselves according to an ideal free distribution, and to what extent are they successful? Third, if women are not entirely successful in approximating an ideal free distribution, what strategies can women adopt in polygynous marriages that minimize or even offset any reproductive costs associated with polygyny?

The National Geographic Society funded both Kipsigis and Datoga fieldwork. Claudia Engel, Sarah Hrdy, and Douglas Mock made helpful suggestions on an early draft of this paper. Momoya Merus, Daniel SeUen, and Daniela Sieff are collaborators in the Datoga project, and Andy Kerr assisted with data analysis and manuscript preparation.

Monique Borgerhoff Mulder is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of California, Davis, and a member of the Graduate Group in Ecology and the Animal Behavior Graduate Group. She is currently preparing a monograph on a study of Kipsigis time allocation and conducting fieldwork with the Datoga.

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