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    Women's Rights and Public Policy in Islam: Report of a ConferenceAuthor(s): Gordon MeansReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Mar., 1987), pp. 340-354Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644808 .

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    WOMEN'SRIGHTSAND PUBLICPOLICY N ISLAMReport of a Conference

    GordonMeansMost of the Muslim world has experienced a long pe-riod of colonial domination during which nationalist movements werespawned. As states gained their independence, mostly in the post-WorldWar II era, they inherited from colonial regimes legal systems and politicalinstitutions that were slightly modified to meet the demands of the earlynationalist leaders, who were themselves often the products of the Euro-pean-style educational system of the colonial era. Upon obtaining inde-pendence, most of the new Islamic states suffered from political instabilityand crises of legitimacy. The combinationof westernized nationalist elites,

    fragile transplanted western institutions, and competitive political mobili-zation thrust religion into the center of the political arena. Islam repre-sented the "primordial sentiments," the core values and the ideals of themasses, while westernized elites frequently became isolated from masspopular support. Many political elites ultimately turned to Islam as themost effective idiom to attract public support for their faltering regimes.The intense politicization of religion, particularly in Islamic countries,has led to severe disputes over basic principles of political organization,legitimacy, political institutions, and public policies. These conflicts areespecially intense in the Muslim world because Islam is based on the idealof a complete political and social system encompassing all aspects of so-cial, political, economic, and religious life. Because of its claim to be atotal system, Islam provides a basis for challenging the edifice of most ofthe institutions and the public policies of contemporary states within theIslamic world.

    Gordon Means is Professor of Political Science, McMasterUniversity, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.? 1987 by The Regents of the University of California

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    GORDON MEANS 341Most Muslims assume that there is only one Islam, consisting of onecommunity that follows one set of absolute and universal laws for the gov-ernance of that community. In actual practice, Islam has divided into var-ious sects, alternative schools of jurisprudence, and political systems thatembrace widely divergent practices and policies. Throughout its history,Islam has made accommodation with diverse cultural traditions, in somecases absorbing pre-Islamic or non-Islamic principles and practices. Theideal of centralization and unity in Islam has been kept, while in practicedecentralization and diversityhas been the norm. Adjustment and accom-modation have been facilitated by the Islamic principle of the unity ofmosque and state. The Muslim ruler is enjoined to be the "protector of

    Islam" and thereby acquires the right to support and control Islamic insti-tutions, and to interpret Islamic law authoritatively to adapt to local cir-cumstances. The ideals of Islamic unity, universality, and centralizedauthority (under God) contrast with the reality of Islamic disunity, partic-ularistic practices, and the decentralization of authority under diversepolitical regimes, each of which can and does claim that it speaks for God.Such regimes have one great advantage: they can use the power of thestate under Islamic principles to make authoritative declarations (fatwa)interpreting Muslim law and doctrine, and enforce Islamic law and doc-trine within their state. This gives the governmentand incumbentpoliticalelites greater power over the institutional structure of Islam, but counter-elites also have the capacity to raise issues of orthodoxy and can challengeMuslim incumbents for failing to defend the interests of the Islamic com-munity as defined by orthodox doctrines of Islamic purity. With modernmass communication, incumbent elites may have the powers of state en-forcement, but they can no longer monopolize the debate.

    Much of the religious-ideological debate arises from the internationalIslamic revival movement that has been gaining momentum and hasplaced its imprint on politics and public policy. This movement is knownunder the broad term of dakwah-which translatedliterally means "call."It refers to the call made to Muslims to return to a "pure"Muslim faithand to strengthen the Islamic community-the ummah-against threats toits Islamic purity from corrupt and infidel sources. The Dakwah move-ment has two aspects to its demands: first, the reaffirmationof Islamicprinciples and faith by Muslims, and second, the mobilization of Islamagainst perceivedexternal threats and challenges.In recent years, Muslim politicians and leaders have learned that, inpolitics, Islam is a two-edged sword. It can be used to provide mass sup-port and legitimacy among Muslims. It can also be used almost as easilyby opposition elites to undermine legitimacy and to facilitate revolutionary

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    342 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987movements. This contest between the establishment and the antiestablish-ment Muslim elites is engaging much of the Muslim world. The debate isconducted in a religious idiom, with the trappings of piety and self-right-eous justification. The references are to the Koran, the Sunnah,l and toestablished Muslim theologians, jurists, and polemicists. The audience isthe masses of Muslims, most of whom have an intense affectiveorientationtoward the rituals and symbols of Islam, but who also have difficulty un-derstandingthe complex and esoteric theological and juridical issues raisedby the Dakwah Movement.In this circumstance, Islamic states have tended to make concessions toclaims of Islamic universalism and orthodoxy, without making too disrup-tive a break with local cultural practices. Islamic political leaders havehad to learn the art of Islamic juridical disputation and the manipulationof Islamic symbolism to retain their legitimacy among the Muslim masses.The parameters of the debate have been narrowed by Islamic political cur-rents that arise from outside any individual Islamic state. Furthermore,leaders are forced to grapple with those very issues raised by Islamic polit-ical polemicists who challenge existing public policies and the very legiti-macy of contemporary regimes within the Muslim world.

    Because of the heightened debate over Islam and public policy generatedby these Islamic religio-political movements, governments in Muslimcountries have had to put more effort into justifying their policies in aMuslim idiom. In the name of Islam, some extremely contentious issueshave been raised. For example, the argument has been made that politicaland civil rights should be granted only to the community of believers-theummah. Some also argue that parliamentary nstitutions and elected gov-ernment are "un-Islamic" since such institutions were not present ill thefirst Muslim community under Muhammad and since ultimately all lawsare derived from God, not man. A listing of the issues raised in the nameof Islam would be a formidable task. One of the many important andcontroversial issues has been the role, status, and rights of women, whichis the subject of this article.

    The Basis of ConflictoverWomen's RightsAs in most other aspects of life, the Muslim ideal of unity and uniformitywithin the ummah confronts the reality of great diversity of practices andnorms related to the role and status of contemporary Muslim women. In

    1. The Sunnah are reports on the actions of Muhammad that are used as precedents forMuslim law. A Hadith is a single precedent or report.

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    GORDON MEANS 343some countries, urbanization and industrial development have drasticallychanged the roles and economic opportunities for women. The growth ofmodern educational systems has enabled some women to attain higher de-grees and thereby enter highly skilled and technical professions. The paceof social change within the Muslim world has increased the diversity ofroles assumed by Muslim women. Despite these trends, some Islamic fun-damentalistshave argued for the enforcement of very restrictive roles andcodes of behavior for women according to their interpretationof Islamiclaw. The dispute over the role and status of women has simmered foryears in most Muslim countries; in Pakistan the issue eventually becameentangled with a constitutional crisis in 1983 and 1984.2

    Most Muslim states have sought to mute disputes over the status of wo-men, while making certain concessions to the demands for symbolic con-formity to Islamic behavioral norms. The key issues of improved statusfor women and the definition of women's rights, however, have usuallybeen carefully avoided. Some Muslim women have become more vocal indemanding rights, while militant religious polemicists have also been quickto criticize governments for failure to abide by and enforce orthodox Is-lamic law and moral principles in regard to women.It is against this background that the Malaysian government in 1982sponsored a pan-Islamic conference on "Muslim Women in Develop-ment." The official host of the conference was PERKIM,3 the govern-ment-sponsored dakwah organization whose leading patron is TunkuAbdul Rahman, the first prime minister of Malaysia and the "Father ofMalaysia." The remainderof this article reportson this conference, whichsupposedlywas convened to explore public policy issues related to Muslimwomen in the modern world.

    Conference OrganizationThe president of the Women's Committee of PERKIM, Laila Taib, ap-proached King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and received from him a grant ofM$500,000 (US$200,000) to hold a pan-Islamicconference on Muslim wo-men. The Malaysian government and other sources granted additionalmoney and support. A large administrative structure was established to

    2. See J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, "Islamization and Social Policy in Paki-stan: The ConstitutionalCrisis and the Status of Women," Asian Survey,25:8 (August 1985),pp. 863-880.3. PERKIM is the abbreviation for the Islamic Welfare and Missionary Association ofMalaysia. The cosponsor of the conference was the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council ofSouth East Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP).

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    344 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987organize the conference, with some 13 committees and several hundredpeople involved in some way with conference planning and arrangements.Invitations were extended to Islamic organizations in some 33 countriesto send delegates or observers to the conference, which was scheduled forOctober 3-9, 1982, in Malaysia. Some 26 countries sent representativesorofficial observers, while a few additional countries were representedby in-dividual and unofficial participants. All official delegates were women, butmore than half of the invited participants who presented papersor reportswere men. All delegates and invited participants received full travel costs,food, accommodation, and M$100 per day spending money in addition toreceiving gifts of a briefcase, a prayer rug with a built-in compass, andother souvenirs of Malaysia. There were 260 delegates, 16 invited partici-pants who presented papersor addresses,and about 30 invited discussants.There were also about 150 observers, including the press.The rules of the conference gave the chairman extraordinarypowers toprevent any contentious political issue from being raised or debated with-out prior permission. The distribution of publications was similarly con-trolled. The organizers apparently feared that political disputes in theMuslim world might deflect the delegates from the central purpose of theconference. Various scholars and Muslims in public life were invited topresent papers, which were to be followed by open discussion by discus-sants and by the delegates at large. A panel of "resource persons" satalongside the head table. Included in this category were several Muslimlegal authoritieswho could be called upon or who could intervene to enun-ciate Muslim law, doctrine, and theology. The rules of the conference notonly gave the organizersfull power over the proceedings,but also over thepreparationof the conferencereport and the final conference recommenda-tions.Malaysia's Paramount Ruler (head of state) opened the conference inthe Kuala Lumpur Municipal Auditorium on October 3, 1982. The con-ference proceedings continued for seven days, with the main sessions andthe presentation of papers being held at the Haj Complex near SubangAirport, where there are extensive facilities for those Muslims making thepilgrimage to Mecca. Each evening a banquetwas held, after which someprominent public figureusually addressedthe delegates. One evening, theParamount Ruler hosted a banquet at the royal palace.On the fifth day, the delegates were divided into "workshopsessions" todraft proposals for the final report. The conference drafting committeemet separatelyto discuss issues on the sixth day, and finally the conferenceclosed with a speech and an official closing ceremony by Malaysian Dep-uty Prime Minister Musa Hitam. The conference proceedingsand recom-

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    GORDON MEANS 345mendations4 were supposed to be available within a few weeks, but theyactually weren't available to delegates until about five months after theconferenceconvened. Whether this was due to the controversial nature ofthe conference and its topics can only be a matter of speculation.

    ParticipantsMost delegates were young women, usually in the 20-35 age bracket.Most were educated, at least through secondary school, and many wereeither enrolled in or had been to a university. Nearly all had a fair to goodcommand of English, but only a small minority (perhaps less than 15%)had a working knowledge of Arabic. All proceedings were in English,although some prayers, greetings, and Koran readings were in Arabic.None of the delegates wore the chador orpurdah (complete veil), less thanhalf wore the tudong (mini-veil) head covering, a third wore a light headscarf, and about one-fifth wore no head covering. All delegates were con-servativelydressed with a majority wearing longer skirts or more conserva-tive flowing floor-length skirts.The paper presenters included a number of Malay academics from localuniversities, some internationally known Muslim professionals, both menand women, and some who appear frequentlyat international Muslim con-ferences.

    The Main ThemesRather than summarize all the papers and the discussion, I will presentsome overall impressions derived from my attendance at all the workingsessions of the conference and two of the four workshop groups. I madetape recordings of many of the discussions as an aid to memory. Overallimpressionsinvolve far more than the formal papersand discussions, how-ever, since the numerous breaks permitted individual discussion withmany of the delegates on issues raised at the conference or on issues theywished to raise but had not had the opportunityin the formal proceedings.The presentations fall into three general categories: political speeches,technical or comparative studies, and papers that raisedissues of reform orpolicy within the Muslim community. The Paramount Ruler of Malaysiaand Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam gave the main political speechesat the opening and closing ceremonies. The Paramount Ruler congratu-

    4. For the published text, see Muslim Womenin Development: FinialReport of the FirstRegional Conference or South East Asia and Pacific (Subang, Malaysia: Kompleks JemaahHaji, 1982), pp. 88-94. For the organization and responsibilitiesof various officers and com-mittees, see "Conference Guidelines: Muslim Women in Development' (Kuala Lumpur,1982, mimeo).

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    346 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987lated the conference organizers, and presented a survey of the challengesfacing the Muslim world. Stressing the need for economic developmentand for Muslim unity, he cautioned the delegates against following thelead of the women's liberation movement, which he said is based on indi-vidual selfishness and a confrontational style that lead to divisions-menversus women, labor versus management, and class conflict. Instead, hecalled on women to build Islamic unity and "to be a good neighbor toother communities."'5 Departing from his preparedtext, he mentioned theatrocities in Lebanon and also called for the defeat and punishment of''our enemies."Musa Hitam's closing speech was similar, stressing the importance ofwomen to propagate the teachings of Islam, to instill "Muslim values,"and to create solidarity. He asserted that Muslims were "under siege dueto disunity of Muslims themselves and the atrocities and barbaric acts ofthe Israelis."6 It was up to women to instill obedience and loyalty to reli-gion and society among the younger generation. Women had a responsi-bility to stop the "ugly tendency" among the young to be undisciplinedand rebellious. Furthermore,he said, "the Muslim community should notcondone the obsession with careers such that it led to the undoing ofhomes."7These political speeches sought to gain credit and legitimacy for govern-ment leaders by showing concern for women, but they were careful to de-fine women's roles as being primarily homemakers and as having aprimary responsibilityfor forging Muslim unity. There seemed to be littlesympathy or awareness that the increasing role of women in the laborforce might create real dilemmas between the demandsfor rapid economicdevelopment and the traditional roles of women confined to home andfamily. The delegates were polite in response to the political speeches, butalmost no discussion followed. Delegates appearedto be more impressedby the elaborateceremony and the status of the political figuresthan withthe content of their message.About half the papers presented descriptivedata comparingMuslim so-ciety with non-Muslim society-apparently in an effort to prove that "de-velopment" was needed. Frequently, such papers ended with a call forMuslim women to improve the ummah. Comparative studies on health,education, fertility, child care, income, and occupation constituted thebulk of such papers. A few papers described the operation of some newMuslim institution or service, such as preschools, perinatalhealth care, or

    5. Muslim Womenin Development:FinialReport.6. Sunday Times (Malaysia), October 10, 1982, p. 2F.7. Ibid.

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    GORDON MEANS 347an Islamic hospital. These papers were all rather pedantic, and for themost part elicited very little discussion except for the issue of establishingcreches and nurseries for the children of working or professional women.This theme generated spirited debate among some women and one or twoof the male "resourcepersons" who opposed nurseries with the argumentthat women would be encouraged to abandon their duties within thehome.Most of the public policy issues were raised and debated as a result ofseveral papers explaining Islamic concepts of family, family laws, and the"Islamic view of women," including the paper and the address by Dr.Nafis Sadik, the assistant executive director of the United Nations Fundfor Population Activities. As a medical doctor and a Muslim professionalwoman, she not only provided a role model of a modern woman profes-sional, but she could also more than hold her own in any debate and dis-cussion with those who advocated a restrictive and traditional role forMuslim women. Dr. Sadik was supported by Dr. Badria Al Awadi, also awoman, who is dean of the Faculty of Law and Sharia at Kuwait Univer-sity. On matters of Islamic law and doctrine, those men who claimed to belama (Muslim theological scholars) found it exceedingly difficult to makeauthoritative pronouncements when these two Muslim professional wo-men presentedalternative Islamic interpretationswith such vigor and au-thority.Dr. Nafis Sadik's firstpaper reviewed the role and status of Muslim wo-men. Her second presentationwas an evening address, hosted by Dr. SitiHasmah, the wife of Prime Minister Mahathir. In that address she re-viewed the role of women internationally,reviewing the objectives and ac-complishments of the U.N. Decade for Women, and the progress madearound the world in removing aspects of discrimination against women.Her emphasis was clearly on women's issues rather than religious identity.There was nothing anti-religious or anti-Islamic in her statements, and shewas preparedto answer her critics, but she tended to take a position con-gruent with the international women's movement. As a consequence, hertalks elicited the most interest from the delegates, and the most interestingand spirited discussion among them.Rather than review the position of various participants,I will now sum-marize the discussion and positions taken on a number of the key substan-tive issues raised at the conference.Equality of women. No one disputed that Islam established the principleof equality for women and men. The dispute centered on what equalitymeant in practice and on the rules and institutions affectingthe daily life ofMuslim women. The first speech of the conference organizer, Laila Taib,

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    348 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987stressedthe theme of equality underIslam for both men and women, citingthe Koran extensively on this issue. Even the most conservative views ex-pressed at the conference stated that the Koran provided the "firstcharterof rights" for women. From the discussion, it appeared that most of thedelegates considered the principle of equality to be an unfulfilled promiseof Islam. The conservatives were willing to concede the principle of"equalitybefore Allah," and acknowledged that traditional women's rolesin child rearing and the family should be given improved status to matchthat equality, but they also cautioned against any appreciable degree ofchange in the role of women outside the home. The dilemma is that Mus-lim women are entering the labor force in greater numbers and are contrib-uting in a substantial measure to economic development, but thediscussion left in doubt whether these trends were to be encouraged orcondemned. These fundamental differences over the meaning of "equal-ity" permeated nearly all the other policy issues raised at the conference.Family planning. Several participants asserted that it was the responsibil-ity of Muslim women "to increase the ummah." At least one male speakersuggested that birth control, especially if it went beyond "spacing"of chil-dren for health reasons, was contrary to Islam. Malaysian Prime MinisterMahathir had announced a target population size for Malaysia of 80 mil-lion-five-and-a-half times the current population. Dr. Sadik pointed outthat the increase in the ummah under Islam was expected from conver-sion-not uncontrolled birthrates. She warned that the Muslim commu-nity would always be weak and poverty-stricken if it was saddled withoverly high birthrates and the burden of a population explosion. Someparticipants expressedconcern over the population growth of non-Muslimcommunities. Most seemed to favor family "spacing"for health reasons,but were more ambiguousand divided over the issue of whether the rate ofMuslim population growth should be slowed by government-sponsoredprograms of family planning.Marriage obligationsand thepatriarchal system. A paper on family law inIslam, prepared by Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman, stimulated a spirited dis-cussion on marriage obligations in Islam. The paper gave a long accountof women's obligations and how to choose a wife, but little on the obliga-tions of the husband, and nothing on how to choose a husband. Dr.BadriaAl Awadi noted that most laws were writtenby men, and that mostpractices in Muslim societies were based on custom-not Islam. Severalspeakers challenged the notion that women were obligated to be sub-servient to male patriarchs, especially if they failed to acknowledge thereciprocal rights of women in marriage. Furthermore, international mi-

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    GORDON MEANS 349gration and unstable marriages had forced an increasing number of Mus-lim women to become heads of households and therefore many womenhad to earn a livelihood outside the home. Under such circumstances, theauthority of the woman had to be paramount. Many seemed to feel that inMuslim practice many of the obligations of males have not been ade-quately enforced and that patriarchical authority might be challenged if itviolates fundamental principles of equity.Professor Farouki argued the contrary position with considerable pas-sion:

    Yesterday he conference onsideredMuslimwomen n development.Today, tis presented s a confrontation etweendevelopment nd tradition.Thus,Mus-lim womenare now caught n a hopelessdilemma:either hey remainMuslim,or theybecomedeveloped nd modern. We heardaboutthe firstbill of rightsforwomen n this century. But,our firstbill of rights orwomen s the Koran.The Koranmust be respected nd honored n all our deliberations.We heardabout he patriarchicalystemas somethingundesirable. t shouldbe repealedby a systemof cooperation.This is nice talk. Thefactof cooperation oes notpreclude hat somebody, ne of the two, must takeresponsibility,he patriarch.The socialsystem hat Islamrecognizess the patriarchicalystem. Matriarchi-cal systems hat anthropologistsalkaboutarefigments f imagination.8A delegate from Pakistan responded to Professor Farouki's comments asfollows: "If the patriarch takes the wrong line, then it is the duty of thewife to object." She then cited examples from the Koran, and continued,"It is when and what is said, rather than who says it that makes it right."9On some of these issues, the reaction of the delegates was hard to judge,but most delegates (who were all women) seemed to desire some moreclear definition of and defense of women's rights within Islam, but withoutgenerating undue conflict or openly challenging male supremacy in thefamily or in political leadership.Polygamy, child marriage, and mixed marriage. The issue of polygamygenerated more open manifestation of delegate response than any otherissue. Dr. Badria Al Awadi and others pointed out that polygamy is bypermissionrather than a right. Certainconditions have to be met, and it isnot an exclusive male right. All wives have to be treated equally, and thehusband must be able to support all his wives. He cannot leave any wifeemotionally starved. And she added emphatically, emotional equality isimpossible! Thus, it is only out of necessity, when a woman will have noone to care for her, that polygamy can be justified. Others commented

    8. From a tape recording of the session.9. Ibid.

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    350 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987that a stable Muslim family is impossible so long as the threat of polygamyundermines the relationship.The enthusiastic responseand the spontaneous applauseof the delegatesto these comments revealeda widespreadconcern over this issue. Specificproposals for reformwere not forthcoming, beyond the general commentsthat women should be educated to know their rights so that they could bedefended.One delegate raised the issue of child marriages by noting that Muham-mad had married a nine-year-old girl. A medical view of that practice wasrequested. Dr. Sadik replied that there was no evidence that the marriagehad been consummated. She assertedthat the danger to mother and childof pregnancy is very high before the age of sixteen, thus leaving no doubtthat child marriage practices should be prohibited in all circumstances.An Indonesian delegate observed that Muslim men could marry non-Muslim women, but the reverse was prohibited. She also asked aboutnaming practices in religiously mixed marriages, but received no responseon these questions. The issue of female circumcision was also raised, butthe obvious embarrassmentabout the topic in mixed company caused thematter to be dropped. However, some informal discussion later took placeover the practice in some Muslim societies that involves the rather crudemutilation of women as a technique of male control over the sexual activ-ity of women. Again the issue was not raised for formal consideration.Women n the labor orce and professions. The conferencewas divided andsomewhat ambiguous about the growing trend of women to join the laborforce and seek a professionallife outside the home. Nearly all participantsstressed the importance of education for women, but some questionedwhether education should lead to increasing female participation in theprofessions. The role models of some of the Muslim women professionalsat the conference were no doubt a source of inspirationto many delegates.Fadlullah Wilmot, an Australian convert to Islam who is director of infor-mation for RISEAP, asserted that "Islam does not preclude women fromworking. No! But, there should be no freedom to seek whateverjob theylike. Islam defines haram10jobs. A woman cannot take the kind of jobwhich would expose her to the public gaze."11 A woman observer from anArab embassy retortedin a stage whisper, "I can think of only two profes-sions-being a telephone operator, and being a prostitute!"By their reactions, the delegates seemed to welcome the increasing eco-nomic and professionalroles of women, but were also concerned about the

    10. Hararn means "prohibitedby Islamic Law."I1. From a tape recording of the session.

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    GORDON MEANS 351possible effects on family life. An attempt by one male to secure the en-dorsement of the principle of veiling for women was quickly sidesteppedwithout open debate. For most, that was a matter of personal conviction.

    General Observations.As a rule, the papers elicited very open discussion. Many of the men, andespecially religious authorities, tended to cite the requirements of the Ko-ran and the practices of the Hadith. Very few women challenged the Ko-ran or the Hadith; instead, they used these sources to defend demands formore effective equality in practice. Some of the more outspoken womenargued that what is practiced as Islam is not Islam, but rather custom andarchaic cultural additions. They also appealed to higher principles to in-terpret the Koran, and argued that some of the detailed rules of Islam wereappropriatefor a former era and society but not for the present because"we know more today." The women noted that the administration ofMuslim law is in the hands of males, most of whom do not understand themore fundamental principles of Islam and also are unable or unwilling toprotect women's interests. Significantly, the emphasis given by womendelegates to the ritual requirements of Islam helped them to legitimizetheir grievances on specific issues.In the conference, the western-educated and, in some cases, the Euro-pean converts to Islam tended to take a prominentrole in the discussion ofissues, and in some of the leadership positions of the conference. Even so,there was ample opportunity for the expressionof views by all delegates sothat the proceedings were not dominated by any group. The conferenceprovided the opportunity also for much male preachingand posturing,butsome of the women participantsalso observed that in actual practice Islamhas depended upon implementation in practical experience largely withinthe home, and largely by women. As one participant observed:

    In fact, women in the Muslim world are deeply religious, and are committed tothese spiritual values and traditions. I don't wish to polarize the group, but Ithink that some proper education needs to be undertakenfor the male popula-tion-for example, alchoholism, women don't drink, it is the men who getdrunk. Women don't abandon their children, but it is men in Islam who oftenabandontheir wives and their children. [Clapping]My point is that all Islamicrevival has focussed on the women. Instead, Islamic revivalshould focus on therights of women, and on the need for the family and the community and allindividuals to preserve Islamic values, not just women. I think both men andwomen have a role to play, and the movement back to religious values is muchmore needed for the male populationthan for the women. [Clapping]As soon aswomen are educated and know their rights, there certainly will be equality. I

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    352 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987am sure then that the nation will progressbetterbecausemen will have beenbroughtup better hrough he pathof righteousness nd Islamicbeliefs.'2After the plenary sessions, the conferencebroke up into four workshopsto draft proposals. There were several male "resource persons" assignedto each workshop group. In these sessions, one or two males would talkover half the time in an effort to persuade the delegates what resolutionsthey should support. The male domination of these sessions prompted sev-eral female delegates to leave as a sign of protest. In any event, the finalresolutions to be formally supported by the conference were left to theorganizersof the conference, who also selected the membersof the draftingcommittee. Even without formal proposals on specific issues, this confer-ence did represent an important step in the articulation of political con-sciousness among women in the Muslim world.

    Conference RecommendationsThe "ConferenceProceedings" 3 contains a "Call for Action" and a seriesof resolutions that were never discussed in draft form during the plenarysessions. Some proposals were made by individual paper presenters andsome were discussed in draft form in the four workshop groups. However,the actual drafting of the recommendations appearedto rest with the con-ference organizers. In the "Call for Action" extensive quotes from theKoran and the Hadith are cited to determine Islamic principleson the roleof women and to call upon women to "participate in development" andcommit themselves to the uplift of the ummah.Among the resolutions passed was one calling for a women's division ofthe Regional Islamic Da'wah Council for Southeast Asia, and one con-demning atrocities in Lebanon. Finally, the report recommended im-proved services for Muslim women in areas of literacy and education,family day care, and maternal and child health. Improvedcommunicationand an improved organizational structure for women were also recom-mended. The more contentious issues of changing existing legislation ordefining women's rights were left either unmentioned, or to be resolvedwithin the general framework of Islamic law. No mention was made ofany international agencies or of principlesenunciated by international bod-ies on the status of women. On all issues, the "ConferenceProceedings"presents the image of complete unanimity among all the delegates.

    12. From a tape recording of a discussion by Dr. Sadik.13. Muslim Women in Development.Final Report.

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    GORDON MEANS 353ConclusionFrom the discussions at the plenary sessions and in informal discussionsamong delegates, it is possible to identify four basic positions on the statusof women in Islam: First is the fundamentalist position, as represented bythe writings of Maulana Al-Maudoodi of Pakistan, Maryam Jameelah ofPakistan, and the Ayatollah Khoumeini of Iran. Essentially, they proposepurging Islamic society of all non-Muslim practices and instituting a strictregimen of isolation and segregation of women and a strict sexual divisionof roles and responsibilities. This involves, among other things, the com-pulsory veiling of women and their complete subjugation to their husbandswithin the tight structure of a patriarchal family. This position was notespoused at the conference but some speakers alluded to it.A second position is that Muslim women have a prime responsibility to"increase the ummah," to socialize the next generation of Muslims, and tocontribute to Islamic unity. They should serve Islam, however, and notmake any demands that are socially disruptive or challenge the socialfabric of Islam. Their contributions to society and to the economy shouldbe given more recognition, and they should be mobilized, with all otherMuslims, to strengthen Islamic society through education and "participa-tion in development." However, any articulation of women's rights or de-mands would be a threat to Islamic unity. The role of women is definedinIslam and not subject to modification. Those Muslim women who arededicated to improvementof the ummah should be given more assistanceand recognition in the performanceof such roles. Above all, Islamic wo-men should support Muslim political leaders. Essentially, this is the posi-tion taken by active incumbent politicians who tend to view Islamicwomen as a resource to be utilized for political mobilization, but not as aseparately identifiable interest to be accommodated in public policy.A third position maintains that the ideals of Islam are not beingachieved in practice, particularly in regard to the status of women. Itseeks to identify those areasof public policy where the Islamic definitionofwomen's rights is ignored or subverted. This group views Islam as a char-ter of unfulfilledrights and obligations and rejects the notion that Muslimlaws must be interpreted and enforced exclusively by men. It insists oneducation and the provision of legal assistance to Muslim women, so that

    they are treated with the full rights definedfor the status of women. Thosewho follow this line of argument give more attention to the general princi-ple of the "equality of all believers in Islam" and treat the instances inIslamic law of gender role assignment and feminine inequality as beingallowable exceptions when certain stringent conditions are present. Forthis group, which had the largest and most vocal element in the confer-

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    354 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1987ence, Islam is the charter of rights for the improvement of the status ofMuslim women.A fourth position accepts the argument about Islam being a charter ofrights for Muslim women. But it also looks to the pronouncements ofinternational organizations, and to the international women's movementfor guidance and support. Its proponents view women's issues as tran-scending the boundariesof state, religion, or ethnicity. They make an ap-peal to Islam, especially on the fundamental principles of the equality ofbelievers, and treat the practices of domination over and inequality of wo-men in Islam as a cultural accretion that runs counter to the highest idealsof Islam. The appealsare made to international declarationsand to funda-mental principles that in broad outline can be found within the Islamictradition. Those who take this position are more than willing to reinter-pret the common assumptions about Islamic doctrine, and they are alsowilling to challenge the claims of the lama that they alone (along with thestate religious authorities) have an exclusive right to interpret Islam. Ineffect this is the more individualistic (and Protestant) view of the obliga-tions and rights of Muslim women.Of these four positions, this conference tended to reflect the second andthe third perspectives. As a government-sponsoredconference, that is un-derstandable. It is difficult and risky to predict whether Muslim attitudestoward the role of women will shift over the next decade or so. If a shiftdoes occur, it is by no means clear whether it will be in the direction of thefourth position or the first. In any event, it appearscertain that the issuesof women's rights and the role of women in Islam will remain extremelyimportant and contentious for decades into the future.