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DOI: 10.1177/004839318701700201

1987 17: 133Philosophy of the Social SciencesBrian Sayers

Wittgenstein, Relativism, and the Strong Thesis in Sociology

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Wittgenstein, Relativism, and the

Strong Thesis in Sociology*BRIAN SAYERS,

Philosophy,

Queens University

It is well known that Wittgenstein was very critical of what he termedthe vast stream ofEuropean andAmerican civilization in which all ofusstand .1 More often than not its culture dismayed him, even tormented

him with those philosophical problems which were symptomatic of itsdecay.2His professional colleagues were scant comfort to him also. Hecharacterized many of their discussions as chatter, on one occasionlikened a large gathering ofthem together as akin toan influenza zone,3and contended that many others today [were] merely &dquo;gassing&dquo;

4 in

their philosophical efforts.

Consequently, while it is clear that Wittgenstein still stood in thisculture, and while he shared many of its values and participated in manyof its practices, it seems fair to characterize his attitude as severely

critical, bordering at times on hostility and contempt. If this is anaccurate appraisal of his position, then it will be reasonable to assume

(as I do in this paper) that Wittgenstein seeks to explore and criticizebasic elements of a culture which he considered substantially alien tohimself.55

WITTGENSTEINS RELATIVISM

I suggest, however, that when he actually proceeds to do this an ironicturn of events occurs. Wittgenstein devotes the great bulk of his later

* Received 12.11.85

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks,

ed. Rush Rhees, Chicago 1975, fore-word.

2 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,

tr. G. E. M.Anscombe, Ox-ford 1974, p. viii (darkness of this time); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conver-sations onAesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, Berkeley and LosAngeles1953, p. 28;Alan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgensteins Vienna, New York 1973,chaps. 6, 7, 8; Brian McGuiness (ed.), Wittgenstein and His Times, Chicago 1982,p. 188; Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein:A Memoir, Oxford 1978, pp. 32, 72;

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright, tr. Peter Winch,Chicago 1980, p. 10; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathemat-ics, tr. G. E. M.Anscombe, Oxford 1967, Part I,App. 11, No. 4.

3 Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein

:

A Memoir, p. 99.

4 Janik and Toulmin, Wittgensteins Vienna, p. 192 (letter to Ficker).5 Usually he adopts a piecemeal approach and so seldom tackles such a large issue entire.

Instead he attacks particular beliefs in a painstaking and patient manner. Cf. Wittgen-stein, Culture and Value, pp. 6, 10, 34, 80.


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writings to showing how beliefs, arguments, and practices can be prop-erly evaluated only within a larger social context than usually consid-ered. He calls this context language-games, and form of life. How-

ever, on hisown

analysis, many of the beliefs ofa language-game orformof life turn out to be constitutive, basic, fundamental, bedrock, or

groundless, and as such cannot be challengedThus it seems that his

disgust with mainstream civilization leads him into considerationswhose conclusions rule out any acceptable basis for his disgust; appar-ent irony indeed.However, Wittgenstein is not brought up short. One can imagine him

reaching these conclusions and giving up the whole endeavour in disgust(or even despair). But, he does not do this. Instead he seems to embrace

this result and takes the (apparently) logical next step as well. That is, heseems to advocate what we may view as a kind of outright relativism-

likely closest to what has been called cultural relativism.In short,

Wittgenstein apparently accepts the relativistic notion that he has no

legitimate grounds from which to launch external criticisms against thisalien culture.

This sort of idea is not new, of course, and consequently it has been

rather thoroughly discussed within philosophical circles. However,more recently a refurbished version of such relativism has been pro-

moted within the arena of the sociology of knowledge and has fosteredfresh repercussions and debate there. It is in this context that I think

Wittgensteins position can be seen more clearly, and where his solutionto his own problem can be appreciated by sociologists.

THE STRONG THESIS IN SOCIOLOGY

As nineteenth-century ethnocentrism eroded, and as the Enlightenmentproject of supplying rational foundations for all human action continued to

founder,8 social scientists such as Boas and Herskovits led a re-appraisalof how we should best understand other cultures.9 If it was no longerlegitimate to arrange cultures in some sort of hierarchy (whites at the

top, of course), and ifwe were to adopt a more even-handed appraisalof the worlds cultural groups (they were just as rational as we, althoughmarkedly different) then the problem of vantage point arose. How

6 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 226, 654; Ludwig Wittgenstein, On

Certainty, ed. G. E. M.Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, New York 1972, 341, 358,359, 559; Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 16.

7An often despised thesisand justifiably so. However, I suggest that Wittgensteinsversion is quite unique, and not easily assimilated to any of the usual versions such as

those cited by Joseph Margolis in The Nature and Strategies ofRelativism, Mind,

92,

1983, 548-67.8 SeeAlasdair MacIntyre,After Virtue, Notre Dame 1981, esp. chaps. 4 and 5.

9 Some of the more basic issues of this development in the sociology of science are

treated in B. Barber, Science and the Social Order, New York 1952; and Robert

Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, New York 1957.


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should we, from our cultural perspective, learn reliably about such

cultures, how should we locate a position from which to avoid ethnocen-trism in our attempts to understand the diverse ways in which human

societies arrange themselves? It is within this milieu thatsome

sociologistshave adopted a programme which they frankly acknowledgeas relativistic. It is referred to sometimes as the strong thesis. (As a

result, in the literature the terms relativist and strong thesis are usedalmost interchangeably, and I shall use them so as well.) It suggests an

approach which it claims is the most adequate perspective from which toconsider the plethora of human forms of knowledge.

Its thesis is that there is no distinction to be made between the

genuinely rational on the one hand, and what is accepted as rational

within a given culture (or sub-culture), on the other hand. What isconsidered rational by a given culture, including ours, may be regardedfrom within that culture as rational in some ultimate sense, but this is

merely an ethnocentric elitism. These norms of rationality are just as

culturally derived as are those norms ofAfrican pygmies which we, inour culture, usually consider irrational. Consequently, both rationaland irrational beliefs stand in need of a sociological explanation.Astwo proponents put it,

For the relativist there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or

beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such.Because he thinks that there are no context-free or super-cultural norms ofrationality he does not see rationally and irrationally held beliefs as making uptwo distinct and qualitatively different classes ofthings. They do not fall into twodifferent natural kinds which make different sorts of appeal to the human mind,or stand in a different relationship to reality, or depend for their credibility ondifferent patterns of social organization. Hence the relativist conclusion that

they are to be explained in the same way.10

This egalitarianism among standards and beliefs is termed the equiva-lence postulate within the literature.But, this is not merely to invoke perspective. The point is not that

people see things differently, or that we believe what we do solelybecause of our background. Rather, we regard our beliefs as rational ortrue because of the reasons for them. We do give coherent accounts, wedo adduce evidence, we do give reasons as distinct from causes. We dotrace our chains of justification backwards until they reach standards of

rationality. However, the strong thesis claims that these standards of

rationality cannot be known to possess an ultimate character. Instead,

they may be merely local standards akin to what Wittgenstein calls

language-games or a form of life.And so, at this contact point, the

10 Barry Barnes and David Bloor, Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowl-edge, in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism, Boston 1982, pp.27, 28.


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controversy in sociology can provide a fresh viewing of Wittgensteinstheses, and his thoughts in turn may help clarify issues in the dispute.

THEATTACK ON THE STRONG THESIS

So far, opponents of this position have sought to demonstrate its in-

adequacies by showing either (a) that there exist universals which allowa bridge to be constructed between any two cultures, thus revealing an

underlying ultimate standard of rationality after all, or (b) the strongthesis is self-referentially incoherent and so may be dismissed as emptywords. The first approach may be further broken down into (i) the claim

that there exist universals of a conceptual nature, such as basic logicaloperations (law of non-contradiction), the making of binary distinctions

(yes-no), and the like, or (ii) the insistence that the empirical realm

provides examples of universally held beliefs or practices, such as com-mon perceptions (all people are pushed around by reality in pretty muchthe same way), or character traits (bodily adornment).

Gellner characterizes the strategy quite aptly:

A spectre haunts human thought: relativism. If truth has many faces, then notone of them deserves trust or respect. Happily, there is a remedy: humanuniversals. They are the holy water with which the spectre can be exorcised.

But,of

course,before we can use human universals to

dispelthe threat of

cognitive anarchy, which would otherwise engulf us, we first must find them.And so, the new hunt for the Holy Grail is on.ll

Thus, the almost irresistible threat of relativism is to be broken on the

immovable object of human universals.I suggest, however, that the project has promised far more than it has

delivered. First, with regard to conceptual universals, they turn out to beall form and no content. They suffer the same fate that befell candidatesfor universal innate knowledge-when they were truly universal theywere trivial, and when significant they were not universal.As Hesseputs it when referring to these alleged necessary logical truths,Whenever they are necessary they will be found to be empty, whenever

they are informative about the content of another language they will befound to be contingent .12 In short, if one stretches the concept of

rationality to include such items as the mere employment of binarydistinctions, then these universals do exist. Whether they can performthe bridgehead work required of them is quite another matter, how-ever. The mere

employmentof a common

logicalcanon seems quite

compatible with complete divergence between cultures on any otherbelief.And it is the more basic among these other beliefs that are really

11Ernest Gellner, Relativism and Universals, in Hollis and Lukes (eds.), Rationalityand Relativism, p. 181.

12 Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science, In-

dianapolis 1980, p. 39.


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at issue when standards of rationality are being discussed. When thespectre of relativism is raised we are not worrying about whether other

people accept demands of internal consistency upon their belief system.Instead we are

worryingover whether

theycount a belief as falsified

when we would. We do not wonder if others see that modus ponens

follows; we wonder whether they feel compelled to offer justificationswhen we would consider them appropriate. These considerations seemto be untouched by so-called conceptual universals.

Second, empirical universals may or may not exist, and the strongthesis be unaffected. Contrary to the assumptions of the search for them,the existence of such universals is simply irrelevant to the issue. TheHoly Grail is not holy after all.The

pointis a

simplebut often overlooked one. That

is,to do the

anti-relativist work claimed for them, these universals cannot be merelycontingent; they must be universals of necessity. If they were contin-

gent, it would be legitimate for the strong thesis to grant their existenceand simply exclaim what an amazing coincidence it was that humanshappen to agree on x, or do x always, or have developed similarly x

ability. But, if they could have developed otherwise, or if a genuinelyalien group might exist which did not develop x, then there is no non-historical, non-cultural standard of rationality after all. Even if the

human race were entirely homogenous, rather than culturally diverse,the point would remain the same.All our trains ofjustification wouldstop at some principle or alleged matter of fact which would itself have

only local credibility (even if the locale was the whole human race).And

so, if these universals are merely universal, then their adoption/use mustbe contingent. If they are contingent then they may be considered aproduct of social life, and if they are a product of social life then they are

subject to the strong thesis.Are they contingent? It is on this point that some of the best work has

been done by Wittgenstein himself. It is clear that he acknowledges thatthere are universals. He emphasizes our natural history,13 the com-mon behaviour of mankind,14 our real need,15 and the natural lawwhich our inferring apparently follows .16 So, Wittgenstein has no prob-lem in accepting the existence ofhuman universals.And, since he seemsto accept a kind of relativism, it should not be surprising that he findsthese universals to be contingent. This latter point, at least, seemsaccurate.17 Consider the universal practice of judging moral intent:

13

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

,

415.

14 Ibid., 216.

15 Ibid., 108.16 Wittgenstein, On Certainty

,

135.

17 Here is a partial list of passages where Wittgenstein analyzes the contingency ofhumanuniversals: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 83-85, 90, 130, 131, 157, 207,234, 257, 282, 528, 554, and Part II, pp. 182, 183, 213; Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 67,


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A law is given for human beings, and a jurisprudent may well be capable ofdrawing consequences for any case that ordinarly comes his way; thus the lawevidently has its use, makes sense. Nevertheless, its validity presupposes allsorts of things, and if the being that he is to judge is quite deviant from ordinaryhuman beings, then e.g. the decision whether he has done a deed with evil intentwill become not difficult but (simply) impossible.18

The point here is a relativistic one. In the face of diversity, changingconcepts, or alien situations, our ability to make universal judgementsfails and relativism seems required.What the facts are is irrelevant since they are contingent. If one can

invent other cases this point is readily revealed. Consequently, Wittgen-stein invents his alien tribes and bizarre individuals precisely, it seems,

to cast off the parameters supposedly imposed by universal facts.If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not beinterested, not in grammar, but rather in that nature which is the basis of

grammar? Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between conceptsand very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because oftheir generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes ofthe formation of concepts, we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural

history-since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. 19

And,

I am not saying: if such-and-such facts were different people would have dif-ferent concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But if anyone believes that certain

concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones wouldmean not realizing something that we realize-then let him imagine certain verygeneral facts of human nature to be different from what we are used to, andformation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible tohim. 20

Now we can see what Wittgensteins analysis comes to. His ability to

imagine deviant universals reveals that no concepts are absolutely thecorrect ones.As a consequence, he shows that the existence of empiri-cal universals causes no problems for the strong thesis.And so, we are left with the charge that the strong thesis is self-

referentially incoherent; that it is self-refuting. Putnam, for instance,insists that,

If there is such a thing as rationality at all-and we commit ourselves to believingin some notion of rationality by engaging in the activities of speaking and

92,102, 106, 117, 286; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks

,

55, 58, 66, 67, 72, 145,186;

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, Berkeley 1967, 34, 43, 103, 148, 161, 253, 340, 371, 372,380, 383, 396, 527, and esp. 103, 183, 235, 393, 528, 557, 566-68, 624.

18 Wittgenstein, Zettel, 350.19 Ibid., 69.20 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 230.


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arguing-then it is self-refuting to argue for the position that it is identical with or

properly contained in what the institutionalized norms of the culture determineto be instances of it. For no such argument can be certified to be correct, or even

probably correct, by those norms alone.21

Putnam is here assuming that a thesis which denies our possession ofanyultimate norms of rationality is tantamount to the claim that one cul-

tures norms are as good as any others, and that, accordingly, it will becorrect to characterize the strong thesis as identifying rationality with a

cultures institutionalized norms of rationality. (Apparently, Putnam is

unwilling to allow that some notion of rationality might be what I call alocal one. He assumes that such a notion must be an overarching

one.22) Later I shall reject this characterization, but for now the cited

passage is a good enough example of the self-refuting charge.I suggest, however, that the charge of self-refutation is cheap, and is a

mere dialectical trick.And I wish to make the counter-charge that these

sorts of arguments essentially misconstrue the issue and wind up castingmore aspersions on themselves than on their targets.To illustrate, consider the following presentation of the strong thesis:

Imagine two tribes quite different from one another. Both are primitive(i.e., not as sophisticated as we are about comparative anthropology).Each tribe regards the other as foolish and irrational for holding the

beliefs that it does. Each tribe forms these judgements on the basis ofassumptions, practices, and particular inferences which the other tribe

does not share. Each tribe justifies its own beliefs and practices byutilizing those norms and standards which it accepts and which the other

tribe does not. It is clear to us-and could become clear to them-that

these norms and standards have local credibility only.Now, however, imagine that one of the first two tribes eventually

conquers all other tribes in such a way that there is no significant cultural

diversity at all. There is one homogenous human race. In this scenario

the strong thesis is not self-refuted. We can see that it could be the case

that the apparently universal standards of rationality were merely local.This relativistic world is clearly imaginable without contradiction.

But, an opponent might ask, what of the claim that the issue is notwhether different standards exist, but rather whether there is not justone standard that is right in some sense? (Perhaps this is Putnams

complaint lodged above.)At this juncture it can be seen that the anti-

21 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge 1981, p. 111.

22 Putnam is quite correct to point out that shouldwe

attemptin theusual

waytojustify relativism, we would be in a ludicrous position. One cannot establish the truth of

relativism absolutely, as it were. However, this admission does nothing to diminish the

coherent possibility that even while there may be complete consensus on what is

rational, this consensus may not possess any ultimate character or be some ultimate

notion of rationality . We may not have the ability to show that some kind of relativism

obtains; it may, nonetheless, be the case for all that.


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relativist seems as bad off as he initially claimed the relativist to be.Consider the following competing claims:

Relativist

We have culturally relative criteria of [rationality] in terms of whichwe can make relative evaluations of belief systems including other

parts of our own .

Anti-Relativist

We have some absolute criteria of [rationality] in terms of which wecan make absolute evaluations of belief systems including other partsof our own .23

Given these two choices the burden ofproof certainly seems to fall uponthe latter. How can one make absolute evaluations of ones own belief

system seems to require bootstrapping at the very least.Apparently,then, the anti-relativist must presuppose the truth of his own position inorder to reach his conclusions.

And so, in the sociology of knowledge, the debate has reached this

apparent impasse. Each side charges the other with a fatal sort of

impropriety. The anti-relativist charges the relativist with a self-

defeating programme, while the relativist contends that his opponenteither begs the question against him, or else cannot indicate how boot-

strapping is to be avoided.

WITTGENSTEINS SOLUTION

It is Wittgenstein, however, who offers a way out of this impasse, and

along the way sheds considerable light on our past epistemological fail-

ings ; both in philosophy and in the social sciences. For, in fact, he doesoffer a solution; a solution which-contrary to initial appearances-doesnot require relativism, but does reject absolutism (or what I have been

calling anti-relativism).As we have noted, his position seems to demandutter tolerance towards

genuinelydifferent

positions, yetit is well

known that he is not anywhere near as tolerant as his thoughts on

language-games and form of life seem to require.

A. No Nominal Relativism

The first thing to note about Wittgensteins solution is the sharp distinc-tion he makes between what might be called internal, as opposed to

external, deviance. Some relativist claims, which might initially appearto be warranted by their alleged status in a language-game, will be

rejected by Wittgenstein because they do not form part of a coherentsystem divergent or otherwise.

All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes placealready within a system.And this sytem is not a more or less arbitrary and

23 Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions, p. 42.


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doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence ofwhat we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, asthe element in which arguments have their life.24

For instance, an apparent belief-deviant from Wittgensteins-will notbe tolerated, even as a candidate for acceptance, until its application is

clear, until we see what things look like round about it .25 Furthermore,a deviant belief must often meet special criteria even within a coherent

system. Some must, for example, be basic, control beliefs, which actu-

ally guide ones life. They must have practical consequences. But he haswhat you might call an unshakeable belief. It will show, not by reasoningor by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for inall his life .26 Here Wittgenstein is talking about belief in an afterlife (abelief which he does not hold). Merely saying that such a belief isbedrock in a different form of life is not enough. We could always look

and see (a) whether this conflicts with other beliefs in other language-games in which this person participates, or (b) whether in fact this belief

actually does play the central role that is claimed for it. Furthermore, adistinction needs to be made between different kinds of alienness. Some

differences are not radical enough to support any sort of relativism. (Asan anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper noted, It does

not follow from the fact that we cannot understand a Trekkian alien

life-form, that an old Viennese gentleman cannot understand a Liverpool

punk-rocker .27)As long as there exists a fund of shared beliefs and

assumptions, no one is entitled to invoke the sort of relativism we are

discussing.In this way, beliefs which are offered as fundamental (and hence

untouchable) to a language-game or form of life, do properly come underattack. Should such a belief fail to meet these (and other) criteria, itwould be considered an internal deviance only. It would not satisfy the

requirements ofa

genuinely deviant external systemand so

Wittgensteinwould not be bound to afford the tolerance that his analysis mightotherwise require.

B. Wittgensteins Sceptical Solution

However, Wittgenstein seems to be somewhat dogmatic and authoritar-ian even when confronted with the possibility of a legitimate systematic

24 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 105.25 Wittgenstem, Zettel, 272, 274; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 520.

26 Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations

,

p. 54.

27 This thought raises the possibility that in his talk of Our natural history, the common

behaviour of mankind, and our real need, Wittgenstein may be claiming that there is

in fact a human-wide form of life which would, after all, offer some hope of the

rational bridgehead between cultures. So far, I conclude that the bulk of Wittgensteins

writings rules out such an interpretation, but I frankly admit that it is not an unattractive

possibility.


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alternative. For instance, he would allow that if his ideas were consid-ered by you as subverting your basic bedrock beliefs, then it would bequite alright for you to respond with the dismissal, Rubbish 28 Evenmore

significantis the

followingintolerant

passage.

What we believe depends on what we learn. We all believe that it isnt possible toget to the moon [unaided by machine]; but there might be people who believethat that is possible and that it sometimes happens. We say: these people do notknow a lot that we know.And let them never be so sure of their belief-they are

wrong and we know it. If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs, thentheirs is evidently the poorer one by far. 29

So, it seems that Wittgenstein has some sort of solution for his ironicresult. He does not grant equal status to other belief systems-he doesnot accept the equivalence postulate of the strong thesis. Let us examinehis solution.

First, it is commonplace to report that Wittgenstein regards some

philosophical problems as idle, as pseudo-problems. Hence, in suchcases, dissolution rather than solution is called for. Not an answer, but

treatment is appropriate for the propounder of the problem. However,this much-abused element in Wittgenstein can seriously mislead us as towhat he really intends by it. I suggest that, in this case, his so-calleddissolution is really a solution-an answer-after all.

Following Hume (as Kripke notes), we can distinguish between a

straight and a sceptical solution to a problem. In the context of this

paper, a straight solution would be one which accepted the burden of

proof and was able to show that relativism, the strong thesis, wasunwarranted. Either an argument revealed that it was fatally flawed, orelse the non-relativist position was seen to be adequately supported afterall.A sceptical solution would begin, on the contrary, by concedingthat the relativists negative claims are unanswerable. Nevertheless, weneed not abandon our

ordinarynon-relativist beliefs because

theydo not

need the justification which the relativist points out we do not have.

Employing this distinction then, Wittgensteins sceptical solution tohis ironic result would be to show that we do not need the rationalist

bridgehead in order to escape the arbitrariness, the anything goesimplications, usually associated with relativism. What he argues is thatthe lack of some ultimate standard of rationality holds no terrors for usafter all. It is a mere bogeyman. Wittgenstein terms it a craving, andcomes close to suggesting that it is pathological. We do not need the

generality-the ultimacy-we crave. 3028 Wittgenstein, On Certainty

,

257, 498.

29 Ibid., 286.

30 More specifically, he terms it a craving for generality. Cf. Wittgenstein, Remarks on

the Foundation of Mathematics,

Part II, p. 74; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investiga-tions, 89, 91; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, New York 1965, pp. 25, 45.


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Imagine such a craver as the following: Person X notices that I looksad and asks me, Why the long face? I respond, I have been thinkingabout life. He then asks, Yes, but why so sad? I could recognize this asa

legitimate desire fora more

ultimate explanationand

tryto

provideone. Suppose, however, that in response to his first question, Why the

long face?, I respond, My wife and children were just killed in a caraccident. If person X now asks, Yes, but why so sad?, I would not

normally recognize this as a legitimate request for a more ultimate

explanation. My inability to provide anything more ultimate than ourculturally normal responses (and my participation in that culture) willnot make me suddenly reflective, or puzzled, or dubious about my beliefand practices. The same point can be made when considering more

explicitly our standards of rationality. Wittgensteins sceptical solutiontakes the form of showing that they are in order. There is no problem in

living rationally even without the longed-for ultimate standards.

If anyone should think he has solved the problem of life and feels like tellinghimself that everything is quite easy now, he can see that he is wrong just byrecalling that there was a time when this solution had not been discovered; but

it must have been possible to live then too, and the solution which has now beendiscovered seems fortuitous in relation to how things were then.... Ifthere werea solution to the problem of [norms of rationality], we should only need to

caution ourselves that therewas a

time when [it] hadnot been solved

(andeven at

that time people must have known how to live and think).31

In this passage, Wittgenstein seems to be making merely a psycholog-ical point, but there is more to it than that.Actually, his insight is a

conceptual one. While he would not deny that other orders are possible(this is part ofthe truth of the strong thesis), he insists that this should not

and actually does not weaken at all the inevitable grip of our own belief

system. (But, inevitable grip does not mean unable to accept internal

criticism.) I think that there is aparallel

in

Wittgensteinsown

thinkingbetween the compelling force of ones form of life and the priority ofones mother tongue. The fact that others speak German does notsomehow undercut my warrant for seeing the world (so to speak) in

English.But still, could not we be drastically mistaken after all? Could not our

accepted norms of rationality turn out to be markedly inferior? Does not

Wittgenstein himself assert, They are wrong and we know it? Here ishis answer:

My name is L. W.And if someone were to dispute it, I should straight-way make connexions with innumerable things which make it certain. &dquo;ButI can still imagine someone making all these connexions and none of them cor-responding to reality. Why shouldnt I be in a similar case?&dquo; If I imagine such a

31 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 40.


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person I also imagine a reality, a world that surrounds him; and I imagine himas thinking (and speaking) in contradiction to this world....Now one can offer counter-examples to all this, which show that human beings

have held this and that to be certain which later, according to our opinion, provedfalse. But the argument is worthless. To say: in the end we can only adduce suchgrounds as we hold to be grounds, it is to say nothing at all.That to my mind someone else has been wrong is no ground for assuming that I

am wrong now.-But isnt it a ground for assuming that I might be wrong? It isno ground for any unsureness in my judgment, or my actions.32

The point in all this is that uncertainty is allowed or required when thereis reason for doubt. But, since one language-game cannot combatanother, and since doubt makes sense for anyone only within hislanguage-games, then the occasion for doubt does not arise from themere existence of some alternative system. It is not mere prejudice orbias that, when the occasion arises, we evaluate an alien practice (orchallenge) in our own terms. This is a conceptual requirement. That iswhy Wittgenstein says, Certainly we must interpret the gestures of analien tribe on the analogy of ours.33 In other words, we have no ability touse concepts and standards which are not ours. The only ability I have toconsider whether or not someone elses belief and behaviour are ra-

tional, are my own (our own) norms of rationality. I can broaden my

conceptsbut I cannot eliminate

them;I can

subjectthem to

criticism,but

only by proceeding from rational procedures which I already hold, andthe concepts which I use to describe or evaluate other standards or

beliefs must be my concepts. I may attempt to appreciate some deviantnorms but can do that only by employing my own.And so now we are in a position to sift the wheat from the chaff

regarding the relativism ofboth Wittgenstein and the strong thesis. Letme summarize:

1. The strong thesis cannot be directly refuted or proven false.

2. The non-relativist or absolutist position cannot be established since itmust presuppose its own truth to succeed.

3. However, we need not despair over this, since Wittgenstein hasshown that we do not need the foundation of ultimate norms of

rationality in order for our system of beliefs and practices to be inorder.

4. Furthermore, the hope that we could ever have more than the cer-

tainty provided by our own language-games and form of life involvesan absurdity. It presupposes that we could somehow step outside ourown network andjudge it from a Gods-eye or no-eye view. Instead,although our most basic beliefs are social products, we are in them.

They are subject to internal criticism and even revision but this doesnot mean that they cannot be perfectly in order.

32 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 595, 596, 599, 606.33 Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, p. 3.


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5. Consequently, while avoiding dogmatic attitudes associated with adiscredited absolutism, we are not required to place our own beliefsin doubt nor adopt a generalized tolerance toward other belief-

systems.More specifically, however, there is a lesson for the sociology of knowl-

edge in all this. There is a truth to the strong thesis: we do not possessobjective or ultimate standards of rationality. There is also a truth to thenon-relativist critique of the strong thesis: we cannot act and believe aswe do without having some grounding for our confidence in our ownstandards of rationality. Yet, the point to be gleaned from Wittgenstein isthat the entire debate has been misconstrued. The dichotomy betweenabsolutism and relativism is a false one. Wittgensteins position between

them reveals that. While language-games and form of life seem to ruleout justified firmness in ones judgements, quite the reverse is true.

Nothing else but (something like) language-games and form of life could

provide grounding. To point out that there are other orders and otherbeliefs that also seem equally grounded, is, therefore, worthless. It islike pointing out that we are finite humans.And so, while absolutism seeks to find a non-human vantage point,relativism laments the inescapable human condition. Both misconstruewhat the human situation is and for that reason need to adopt Wittgen-

steins solution.34 That we exempt some beliefs from doubt, that we

ground our other beliefs on these, that we use them as the context in

which we argue or disagree on other matters, and that they are productsof a particular social environment which varies from group to group, isno reason to adopt relativism or seek to overcome it. This is the lesson tobe learned from Wittgenstein.

34 One could put it this way: Both absolutism and relativism face the issue of intellectual

authority, of impartiality, of a rational forum in which there are rules and procedures towhich humans must submit in order to be rational. Both apparently assume that to meet

this demand one must possess a source of rationality which was invariant. There mustbe a single, unchanging, bmding system of intellectual procedures and ideas or else wehave, after all, nothing more than a free-for-all. Neither sees that one could be part of arational forum in spite of the lack of such an ultimate bridgehead. It is Wittgensteinscontribution to show that this dilemma is a false one.

wittgenstein relativism and the strong thesis in sociology sayers academic article

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