will palestinian reconciliation lead to a hamas takeover of the plo?

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

Will Palestinian Reconciliation Lead to a Hamas

Takeover of the PLO

Jonathan D. Halevi

PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader

Khaled Mashaal reached an agreement in Cairo on 22

December on national reconciliation and a strategic

partnership. A new temporary leadership was formed

for the PLO, for the first time in tandem with Hamas

and Islamic Jihad. Hamas' joining of the PLO does

not herald a strategic shift in the movement's policy

or recognition of the agreements the PLO has signed

with Israel. The Hamas leadership keeps emphasizing

that it seeks to take over the PLO after new elections

to the Palestinian National Council and to alter the

PLO platform in accordance with its own views.

Osama Hamdan, in charge of foreign relations for

Hamas, asserted in an interview: "Whoever thinks

Hamas has changed its positions and that it accepts

the PLO's political platform of surrender is dreaming

or fooling himself." Hamdan went on to state

that "Hamas is seeking a national framework to

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reconstruct the PLO [and] reconsider its political

platform...from the standpoint of our basic principles

and rights, which do not accept bargaining,

particularly [over] the liberation of our land from the

river to the sea and the right of return."

Hamas has reached an agreement with Abbas on

adopting the "popular resistance" paradigm for the

struggle against Israel. Various political elements

view this position of Hamas as a sign of pragmatism,

heralding a process of accepting Israel's existence

including willingness to negotiate with it on a

political settlement. Yet the openly stated positions of

the Hamas leadership do not support this assessment.

An official Hamas announcement on 27 December

stated: "We underline our adherence to our right to

the struggle in all its forms, particularly the armed

struggle, for the removal of the occupation. The way

of resistance [muqawama in the original, with a

double entendre of resistance and struggle], jihad,

and martyrdom for Allah [istishhad] has proved that

it is the only way to forcefully attain our rights and

the liberation of our land, Al-Quds [Jerusalem], and

our holy places.

Hamas' growing confidence stems first and foremost

from the consequences of the Arab Spring, or more

precisely the Islamic Spring, which has empowered

the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other

countries. For years under Mubarak's regime, Egypt

gave backing to the PA. Now, in the wake of the

revolution, Egypt stands to become a huge source of

strength for Hamas, especially once the Muslim

Brotherhood forms the next government there.

The groundwork for an historic change in the Palestinian

arena was laid in Cairo at the end of December 2011.

Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian

Authority and leader of the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) and the Fatah movement, paved the

way for a new partnership with Hamas and Islamic Jihad

in running the affairs of the Palestinian people in the West

Bank and Gaza and in representing all the Palestinian

geographic communities.

The agreement on reconciliation and a strategic

partnership was reached in a meeting between Abbas and

Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in Cairo on 22 December,

and its implementation was envisaged on three levels: a

comprehensive national reconciliation, a reform of the

PLO, and accords on a strategic approach to the

challenges facing the Palestinians.1

A New Temporary Leadership for the PLO




In Cairo a new temporary leadership was formed for the

PLO in tandem with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This

temporary leadership, headed by Abbas, held its initial

meeting on 22 December and, along with the PLO

Executive Committee,2 includes, for the first time,

Mashaal, Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shalah, and four

independent representatives: Munib al-Masri, Mustafa

Barghouti, Yasser al-Wadia, and a fourth, soon to be

designated, person who will represent the Palestinian

diaspora. Also participating in the meeting were Nayef

Hawatmeh, leader of the Democratic Front for the

Liberation of Palestine, Abd al-Rahim Mallouh, deputy

secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation

of Palestine, and Salim Zaanoun, chairman of the

Palestinian National Council (PNC).3

During the meeting Abbas agreed to a reform of the PLO

including elections for its institutions beginning with the

PNC, which serves as the PLO's legislative body and is

empowered to elect the members of the Executive

Committee.

Mashaal ascribes historic importance to this first meeting

of the PLO's new temporary leadership, calling it the

organization's third birthday; the first "birthday" was its

establishment in 1965; the second, the induction of all the

Palestinian organizations under its roof in 1969.4 Mashaal

stressed that from this point "no one [in the PLO] can any

longer make decisions separately and no separate

decisions will be made on the running of the [Palestinian]

Authority and the PLO institutions."5

Azzam Ahmad, in charge of national relations for the

Fatah Central Committee, regards the agreements reached

at the meeting of the temporary leadership on the basis of

the 2005 Cairo Agreement between Fatah and Hamas, and

the inclusion of all the Palestinian organizations under the

PLO umbrella, as an important step in bolstering the

PLO's legitimacy in representing the Palestinian

people.6 A similar view was voiced by PNC Chairman

Salim Zaanoun, who also sees the reform of the PLO as

strengthening its status as "the sole legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people."7

After the meeting of the PNC's Political Committee in

Amman on 26 December, Zaanoun said it had discussed

arrangements for the elections to the PNC in the PA and

the diaspora, and that proposals on this matter were

conveyed to the different organizations with an eye to the

discussion on their concerns slated for Amman in mid-

January. Zaanoun emphasized that the Palestinian

population in Jordan will not participate in the PNC

elections.8 The explanation for this was hinted at by

Abbas, who said: "In Jordan elections will not be held for

reasons we are all familiar with and because we do not

want to find ourselves in blind alleys."9

According to the agreements reached in Cairo, the new

temporary leadership is supposed to reconvene at the

beginning of February to discuss the process of officially

incorporating additional organizations into the PLO,

along with measures to facilitate the PNC elections

envisaged for May.

Senior Hamas figures emphasize in this connection that

the creation of the new temporary PLO leadership does

not entail Hamas' formal entry into the PLO, and that a

further decision on that matter will be made after the PNC

election results are known.10

Khalil Abu Leila, one of the

top Hamas officials, told the Quds Fars news agency on

24 December that Hamas would not officially join the

PLO at this stage; in his view the main aim of the

organization's temporary leadership is to change the

PLO's political platform and keep it on the right path,

namely, the liberation of Palestine. According to Abu

Leila, the new temporary leadership has the right to

reconsider the agreements that the PLO previously signed

- including, by implication, the Interim Agreement with

Israel.11

National Reconciliation and New General Elections

The PLO temporary leadership has reached breakthrough

understandings toward national reconciliation in the

Palestinian camp that could, if they bear fruit, bring about

the end of the two-headed leadership that emerged in the

West Bank (under Fatah control) and Gaza (under Hamas

control) in the wake of Hamas' bloody coup in Gaza in

June-July 2007. At the heart of the agreed framework for

rebuilding Palestinian governmental legitimacy is the

creation of a Palestinian unity government and the

holding of new elections for the PNC and the presidency,

six years after the previous, January 2006 elections. The

general elections are also supposed to be held in May,

close in time to the PNC elections.

In an interview with Hamas' official website on 22

December, Mashaal said the condition for holding the

elections was the establishment of a national unity

government that would prepare the political atmosphere

for them in the West Bank and Gaza. He said the political

conditions for setting up a unity government would

emerge at the end of January, and in February the

practical measures would be taken.12

Abbas' seriousness about holding elections is indicated by

his presidential decree of 22 December, which speaks of

setting up a central elections committee for the parliament

and the presidency, which would conduct and supervise

the election process in accordance with the law.13

A few

days after the meeting with Mashaal and Shalah in Cairo,

Abbas met in Ramallah on 26 December with members of

parliament from the Change and Reform Party (Hamas)

headed by parliamentary chairman Dr. Aziz Duwaik

(Hamas). The aim was to update them on the

developments regarding the national reconciliation.

In a report on the meeting, the official Palestinian WAFA

news agency said Abbas thinks the elections for the

Palestinian institutions as envisaged by the reconciliation

agreement "will open the door to a real partnership of all

the [Palestinian] forces aimed at implementing the

national program and setting up a Palestinian state whose

capital is Jerusalem on the '67 borders."14

As for Hamas, it expects to achieve in the coming

elections an even more decisive victory than in January

2006. In an interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on 26

December, Hamas Political Bureau member Mahmoud al-

Zahar predicted that Hamas would win the next elections

to the Palestinian parliament by an overwhelming

majority, and also noted that Hamas has not yet made a

decision on fielding a candidate for the presidency.15

The national reconciliation agreement also stipulates

forming committees for "general freedoms" in the West

Bank and Gaza. These committees have already begun

discussing the issue of freeing the "political activists" who

were arrested by the PA of Ramallah and the Hamas

government in Gaza in the prereconciliation period, as

well as the return of Fatah activists who fled Gaza in fear

of the Hamas regime, the reopening of institutions that

were closed by the two sides, and Palestinian residents'

right of free movement.16

In addition, social reconciliation

committees have been established to discuss

governmental compensation and treatment for families of

those killed in Fatah-Hamas clashes in recent years, and

for those wounded in the clashes.17

Hamas' Motives for the National Reconciliation

In an interview with Hamas' official website on 22

December, Mashaal explained the factors that led the

movement to take major steps toward reconciliation with

Fatah and Abbas' PA:

The rift was a burden on all of us as Palestinians, a

temporary anomalous situation that was forced on

us....The political horizon is blocked....The region [the

Middle East] is occupied with the beautiful Arab Spring,

even if it means a temporary distraction from the

Palestinian problem...and this has conveyed a message to

us...that we Palestinians must deal with our domestic

affairs....The wonderful Egyptian revolution has altered

the mood in Egypt and fostered a new approach to this

issue.

Mashaal, therefore, portrays the reconciliation as

reflecting political pragmatism aimed at making the most

of the opportunities that the Arab Spring has opened for

the Palestinians - primarily a change in the regional

balance of power to Israel's detriment for the foreseeable

future, thanks to the rise of Islamist forces in Egypt and

other countries. Mashaal believes the Arab Spring has,

intentionally or by force of circumstances, provided the

Islamist elements with a successful and internationally

accepted model for taking power.

The current developments in the region are too weighty

for the United States to ignore or oppose. What has

occurred is not just a passing democratic experiment in an

Arab or Islamic state...but rather a democratic tsunami

willed by the peoples and expressing their aspirations.

And the United States in particular and the West in

general can neither ignore nor contain this, and will have

no choice but to adopt a policy in line with what reality

will dictate.18

Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh also sees the Arab

Spring as the source of Hamas' power in the new

geopolitical circumstances of the Middle East. "The

revolutions [in the Arab world] show that the future is

given to us, the Palestinians, and to our Arab and Islamic

peoples," he remarked, and further observed that Tahrir

Square and the change wrought by young people and

revolutionary forces has returned the Palestinian problem

to the forefront. In Haniyeh's view, Israel will not be able

to evade the Palestinian people's demand to establish their

state with Al-Quds as its capital.19

At his meeting in Cairo with Muslim Brotherhood leader

Muhammad Badi, Haniyeh said that "the Arab Spring will

be a bloody winter for the occupation....The Zionist

project is near its end," adding that Hamas is Egypt's first

line of defense in confronting the "cancerous entity." He

also addressed Israel: "We say [to Israel] that the time is

changing, the time of the peoples [is approaching] as they

take the reins of initiative and decision and go out to the

squares of liberation to create a reality and set orders of

priority, emphasizing to the enemy that he is not a

neighbor, and the times have changed and there is no

future for the occupation of Palestinian land."20

Yahya al-Abadsa, a Hamas member of parliament, spoke

similarly in an interview with Quds Fars about a change

in the regional balance of power favoring the Palestinian

side in the wake of the Arab Spring. As al-Abadsa put it:

"The Palestinian resistance and the regional conditions,

the states, and the revolutions of the Arabs will prevent

the Zionist entity from carrying out its plans to attack

Gaza again as in the aggression of 2008."21

Hamas' Position on Recognition of Israel

Hamas' joining of the PLO does not herald a strategic

shift in the movement's policy or recognition of the

agreements the PLO has signed with Israel, which imply

recognition of Israel. The Hamas leadership keeps

emphasizing that the movement's goal is completely

different; that it seeks to take over the PLO and alter its

platform in accordance with its own views by attaining a

majority in the PLO's institutions and in the PNC

elections.22

Haniyeh made unequivocally clear that "we will not

recognize the Zionist entity, we will not go along with

agreements that ignored our rights."23 Hamas senior

official Salah al-Bardawil likewise denied any possibility

of the movement revising its policy on the question of

recognizing Israel. As he said in an interview to Quds

Fars: "Whoever thinks our entry into the framework of

the PLO leadership will lead to surrendering our basic

principles is dreaming, and so is anyone who thinks for a

moment that the PLO is a trap for getting Hamas to

recognize Israel."

Bardawil stressed that

the question of recognition of Israel is not on the agenda

in the talks on reconstructing the PLO, and has not been a

topic of discussion whatsoever from the start, since

recognition of Israel is not only a red line but, from our

standpoint, a religious-legal prohibition even before it

enters the category of political prohibition, and therefore

anyone who thinks Hamas can be dragged into a trap of

that kind is dreaming.

Regarding Fatah, Bardawil expressed a hope that it would

be able to shake off the burden of Oslo and arrangements

with Israel:

We recognize the complexity and the obligations in which

Fatah entangled itself in past years; we understand that it

is not impossible for the Fatah organization to salvage

itself from the great error that is the Oslo [agreements];

we are interested in helping it escape this legacy...and we

want both of us to work for the liberation of the land in

keeping with the principle of full national partnership.24

Osama Hamdan, in charge of foreign relations for Hamas,

says its joining the temporary PLO leadership is not a

tactical move but a strategic step aimed at changing the

nature of the PLO and its political platform to suit the

objectives of liberation and return. In an interview

with Quds Fars, Hamdan asserted that "whoever thinks

Hamas has changed its positions and that it accepts the

PLO's political platform of surrender is dreaming or

fooling himself."

Hamdan went on to state that

Hamas is seeking a national framework to reconstruct the

PLO, reconsider its political platform, and carry out a

comprehensive political examination from the standpoint

of our basic principles and rights, which do not accept

bargaining [over basic principles], particularly the

liberation of our land from the river to the sea and the

right of return.

He underlined that "Hamas seeks to achieve unity on the

basis of a national program aimed at fulfilling the

liberation and the return."25

Hamas' Position on Fighting Israel

Hamas has reached an agreement with Abbas on adopting

the "popular resistance" paradigm for the struggle against

Israel. Various political elements view this position of

Hamas as a sign of pragmatism, heralding a process of

accepting Israel's existence including willingness to

negotiate with it on a political settlement.

Yet the openly stated positions of the Hamas leadership

do not support this assessment. On the contrary, they

portray Hamas' willingness to reach understandings with

Abbas on popular resistance as a solely tactical move that

is aimed, along with other points of agreement, at

enabling the national reconciliation - which, in turn,

facilitates Hamas' entry and takeover of the PLO

institutions without giving up its ideology and

commitment to jihad.

Mashaal explained that while Hamas does not concur with

the PA's approach to that issue, it is prepared to reach a

compromise based on an agreed common denominator

and defer dealing with the points of contention to a later

date. Hamas, Mashaal says, will strive to effectuate

popular resistance while keeping all options open,

adjusting the struggle against Israel to the

circumstances.26

In a 26 December interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, al-

Zahar remarked: "Whoever thinks that through the

reconciliation agreement one can stop settlement activity

or end the occupation is mistaken. That would require a

change in the [Palestinian] position on the West Bank and

freeing the hand of resistance to fight the occupation with

all means."27

An official Hamas announcement on 27 December, five

days after the meeting of the temporary PLO leadership in

Cairo, stated:

We underline our adherence to our right to the struggle in

all its forms, particularly the armed struggle, for the

removal of the occupation. The way of resistance

[muqawama in the original, with a double entendre of

resistance and struggle], jihad, and martyrdom for Allah

[istishhad] has proved that it is the only way to forcefully

attain our rights and the liberation of our land, Al-Quds

[Jerusalem], and our holy places.

The announcement further emphasized that Hamas seeks

"to make the PLO return to acting on the basis of

principles that protect the fundamental values, rights, and

the holy places and will lead to realizing our Palestinian

people's aspirations to liberation and return."28

Islamic Jihad's position on reconciliation and the right to

armed struggle is similar to that of Hamas. Shalah, who,

as noted, took part in the Cairo meeting on the new

temporary PLO leadership, said in an interview withAl-

Hayat on 24 December that it was "not a declaration of

the Jihad's joining the PLO....The issue will be discussed

in the next round of talks on our joining the PLO and this

meeting is only a beginning."

Shalah stressed that "joining the PLO does not mean that

any organization renounces its platform, and we have

agreed to set aside the question of the political platform so

that it will not pose an obstacle to joining the PLO." He

added: "President Mahmoud Abbas made clear that the

emphasis on resistance does not negate the Palestinian

people's right to armed struggle....He said this in the

context of the situation assessment....No one has the right

to say that the armed struggle is illegitimate or that the

Palestinians do not have the right to employ it."29

The Palestinian Authority Adopts a Strategy of

Confrontation

The PA no longer believes in the possibility of a political

process under the current circumstances. That is why it

sets preconditions for dialogue with Israel, particularly a

halt to settlement and negotiating on the basis of the 1967

lines. The talks in Jordan on 3 January, to which Israeli

and Palestinian representatives were invited by the

Hashemite Royal House, were likewise seen by the

Palestinian leadership as lacking any real chance to get

the political process back on track.

The PA chairman agreed to Palestinian participation in

the talks in Jordan but made clear that if there was no

change in the Israeli government's position by 26 January

(when the Quartet's deadline for reviving the talks

expires) and it kept rejecting the Palestinian preconditions

for negotiations, then from the Palestinians' standpoint all

options would be open.30

After the talks between Israeli representative Yitzhak

Molcho and Palestinian representative Saeb Erekat in

Jordan on 3 January, Abbas said: "The Palestinian

demand is well-known, meaning that the Israelis should

accept the defined jurisdiction of the peace process and

cease the settlement activity, and if that happens we will

be ready to return to negotiations." He warned that "if

Israel does not accept the Palestinian demands, the period

of time [designated for negotiations] will come to its end

on 26 January and we will have at our disposal other

means of action. It is unnecessary to disclose them yet, as

they are not fully deliberated, but they may be harsh."31

On 25 December, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported, based on

senior Palestinian sources, that Abbas had announced to

the secretaries-general of the Palestinian organizations a

delay in establishing the national unity government until

the Quartet's political process for negotiations with Israel

had run out. The report says Abbas explained that, despite

being totally convinced that there is no future for

negotiations with the present Israeli government, he did

not want to give Israel a pretext to attack him for setting

up a national unity government with Hamas.32

On 1 January, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riad al-Maliki

called on the Quartet to declare already the failure of its

initiative and place the full responsibility on Israel for the

dead-end in the political process, which in his view

requires a new situation assessment by the Palestinians.

"There is no avoiding a situation assessment after twenty

years....We are not interested in negotiations for the sake

of negotiations. We must define the goal of ending the

occupation and setting up the Palestinian state."33

The summation of the meeting of the Abbas-headed PLO

Executive Committee, held at the presidential

headquarters in Ramallah on 31 December, offered a

message in a similar spirit. The PLO leadership turned "to

the members of the Quartet with a request that they grant

priority [to addressing] the settlement danger...before the

discussion of a mechanism for a solution and for

negotiations, which will yield barren results in light of

Israel's ongoing settlement policy."

The Executive Committee also announced its intention to

request that the UN Security Council "discuss the

dangerous direction [of Israeli policy] that will destroy all

chances of a peace process for a two-state solution," and

also to turn to the Arab League since "this matter

[settlement] threatens the national fate and Arab national

security in light of the fact that all settlement is illegal and

no solution would be acceptable that permits their [the

settlements'] existence on the national soil."

Based on this pessimistic assessment, the Executive

Committee requested the preparation of a political

document that will analyze and present the political

options facing the Palestinian leadership after the

Quartet's 26 January deadline passes.34

The confrontational approach was adopted by Abbas and

approved in the meeting of the temporary PLO leadership

- including by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which did not

give up the "right to the armed struggle." In a closed

meeting of the PLO Executive Committee in the last week

of December, Abbas addressed (as quoted by WAFA) the

significance of popular resistance:

We have agreed on all we have agreed on, namely

peaceful popular resistance, and we want to further

discuss [with the Palestinian organizations] the

advantages of peaceful popular resistance. There is a great

need to make our voice heard every day, or at least every

week. I have said these things more than once to our

brothers, and I said that the leaders, too, need to

participate in this resistance.

If the leaders themselves take part in the demonstrations,

Israelis, Europeans, and Americans will come to them and

join demonstrations against the fence and against the

settlements and the cruel actions. This must be made clear

and must be emphasized. We must do all that we can to

make our voice heard. This is a legitimate right and no

one can say it is not a right. We choose [to realize this

right] in these difficult conditions through peaceful

popular resistance, so that the world will always know

that we are acting on the basis of our right, and a right that

is based on needs will not die.35

It emerges from his statements that what Abbas means by

"peaceful popular resistance" is clashes between

Palestinian crowds organized by the Palestinian

leadership and IDF soldiers and Israeli settlers in the West

Bank and along the Gaza-Israel border. The PA uses the

term "peaceful" to describe actions in recent years against

the security fence and the settlements which have

involved rock-throwing (including of the mechanized

kind) against Israeli security forces and civilian vehicles;

firebomb throwing; violent attacks with axes, knives, and

the like; violent attacks by mobs; and sabotage of

facilities and equipment. These "peaceful" actions are

often serious breaches of order that endanger lives.

In an interview to mark the founding of Fatah, Abbas

repeated the threat that if there is no political progress by

the end of January "the options will be open," adding that

"there are people who speak of the Third Intifada, and I

say that is not acceptable and I do not agree to it."36

In the

past Abbas has criticized the terror employed by the PA in

the Second Intifada, and he does not appear interested, at

least at this stage, in precisely replicating that campaign.

Between "popular resistance" and armed intifada there is

a large scope for violent activity. At a Fatah ceremony in

Bethlehem on 31 December, Mahmoud al-Aloul, a

member of its central committee who is in charge of

recruitment and organization, explained the adoption and

significance of the confrontation strategy:

We are tired of the present situation of foot-dragging.

Time after time we have waited for the promises of a new

American president, which he does not fulfill, telling us to

wait until the next elections....That was why President

Abu Mazen [Abbas] brought the Palestinian issue to the

UN....We have adopted a strategy centering on popular

resistance to the Israeli measures, and we will make next

year the year of dynamic popular resistance.37

In an interview with Mawtini radio, al-Aloul said that "the

coming year will be a year of confrontation and focusing

on the popular resistance, supporting it, participating in it,

and expanding it." He added: "The political confrontation

with the Israeli occupation will intensify and also with the

United States that supports and protects the Israeli policy,

isolated as that policy is from an international

standpoint."38

The PLO Executive Committee also took a decision that

speaks of "the need to broaden the framework of the

peaceful popular resistance against the settlements and the

crimes of the settlers who damage mosques and churches

and the property and daily lives of the residents."39

Hani al-Masri, a prominent political commentator who

expresses the positions of the PA, wrote in Al-Ayyam on

27 December:

We hope that 2012 will be the year of the Palestinian

Spring, the year of adopting a new alternative strategy to

the strategy of separate tracks of negotiation and

resistance, so that instead negotiations and resistance will

complement each other, a strategy of struggle that will

combine all the forms of action and struggle on the basis

that resistance sows and negotiation reaps, and he who

sows also reaps.40

The PLO's political leadership is likewise preparing for

the popular resistance and a diplomatic offensive against

Israel. Nabil Shaath, member of Fatah's Central

Committee and in charge of its foreign relations, said the

coming weeks and the coming year would see an

"unprecedented diplomatic offensive" against Israel and

that 2012 would be "the year of pressure on Israel that

will place it under a real international siege." In an

interview with the PA's official Kol Falestin (Voice of

Palestine) radio on 25 December, Shaath added that the

Palestinian leadership was planning to launch an

intensive, widely supported international campaign

against Israel similar to the struggle against apartheid and

racism in South Africa, stressing the need to escalate

"popular resistance" against Israel with all the Palestinian

organizations taking part.41

On 23 December, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam

Fayyad raised a demand for international protection for

the Palestinian people in the face of Israel's "acts of

aggression and war," calling to assign Israel full

responsibility as the "occupying power," to judge it for

"acts of terror" it had perpetrated, and to force it to

comply with international law and the resolutions of

international institutions.42

Along with refusing to resume negotiations without

preconditions and preparing for a confrontation, the PA

has, via Fatah, been preventing Palestinian elements from

opening independent channels of dialogue with Israel. For

example, Hatam abd al-Khader, head of the Al-Quds

Committee in Fatah's Department of Recruitment and

Organization, noted that Fatah in tandem with other

Palestinian organizations had thwarted an academic

gathering of Israelis and Palestinians planned for eastern

Jerusalem. It would have sought to work out terms for

forming a common parliament, to be called "the Third

Government," with 1,500 members who would have tried

to reach an agreement on an Israeli-Palestinian

confederation with American and European support.

Abd al-Khader claimed that the Palestinians involved

were "trying to circumvent the established and valid

Palestinian position, which rejects meetings or

negotiations with Israelis so long as settlement continues

and Israel continues its acts of repression." He said the

group had deviated from the national consensus and

stressed that "we are not against Palestinian intellectuals

coming up with ideas, but they cannot present them on

their own without permission of the Palestinian leadership

and the PLO." According to al-Khader the Palestinian

group included, among others, Ziad abu Ziad and Hind

Khoury.43

The Palestinian Authority Reconsiders Recognition of

Israel

Lately in the PA there have been new tones regarding

recognition of Israel and the future of the political

agreements that were signed with it. In a closed meeting

with members of the PLO Executive Committee, Abbas

raised doubts about the future of relations with Israel,

given what he called "the return of the civil

administration," meaning effective Israeli control of the

West Bank.

A WAFA report quoted some of Abbas' words in this

meeting:

I told him [President Obama] that the Palestinian

Authority is no longer an authority because they've

brought back the civil administration, and we have no

responsibility, no powers, and there is nothing we can do.

We ask ourselves an important question, the Authority is

no longer an authority! And what comes next? I want us

to think seriously about the question and we will hear

opinions and ideas in the coming meetings or in other

meetings. However, it's important that this be as soon as

possible, with the issue so pressing; this question greatly

perturbs us, what comes next? What are we to do, and

what is the next step? We must think seriously because

this is the future of a people, so that we don't make a

mistake or do something futile.44

On 23 December, at a Fatah event in the Bethlehem area,

Muhammad Shtayyeh of the Fatah Central Committee

very harshly attacked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu for his statements on the status of Jerusalem.

Shtayyeh warned Netanyahu: "If you don't want to

distinguish between Abu Ghnaim [Har Homa, a Jewish

neighborhood in southeastern Jerusalem] and Tel Aviv,

we won't make a distinction between Ramallah and

Jaffa."45

His words imply a threat to reconsider the

recognition of Israel if the Israeli government fails to

recognize the 1967 borders.

Another Fatah Central Committee member, Saeb Erekat,

said in a 25 December interview with Kol Falestin that

the temporary PLO leadership would make a decision on

future relations with Israel after 26 January.46 And Hanan

Ashrawi, also a member of the same committee, told Kol

Falestin a day later that retracting recognition of Israel

was one of the options to be discussed after all political

processes had been exhausted.47

Summary and Assessment

The Fatah-Hamas reconciliation will likely bring about a

historic change in the PLO, which for the first time will

incorporate Palestinian Islamist organizations. Since

Hamas' creation in 1987, the PLO's status as the sole and

exclusive representative of the Palestinian people has

been eroding. Talks in the 1990s on adding Hamas to the

PLO did not go smoothly because of disputes over

Hamas' representation on the PNC. During the Second

Intifada, the higher coordinating body of the Palestinian

organizations - the Islamic National Forces - fulfilled the

PLO's role as the decision-making authority in the

struggle against Israel, and it held discussions on how to

unite all the forces under one roof. But Hamas' victory in

the January 2006 parliamentary elections and the

subsequent Fatah-Hamas clash produced two Palestinian

governments in the West Bank and Gaza respectively,

which have fought each other over representing the

Palestinians.

Hamas has now agreed to join Fatah while giving up its

past preconditions of substantial representation in its

institutions. The move reflects the movement's great

confidence in its ability under present circumstances to

win considerable gains and even a decisive majority in the

PNC elections - which amounts to taking over the PLO.

This sense of growing clout stems first and foremost from

the consequences of the Arab Spring, or more precisely

the Islamic Spring, which has swept the Middle East over

the past year and empowered the Muslim Brotherhood in

Egypt and other countries. The worldwide Muslim

Brotherhood is the parent-movement of Hamas, which

serves as its Palestinian branch. For years under

Mubarak's regime, Egypt gave backing to the PA. Now, in

the wake of the revolution, Egypt is gradually switching

its loyalty and stands to become a huge source of strength

for Hamas, especially once the Muslim Brotherhood

forms the next government there after the election process

ends in January.

The uprising in Syria poses problems for Hamas, but only

of a temporary nature. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is

leading the revolt against Assad's regime and is fully

backed by Turkey. Although Hamas was supported for

years by the regimes of both Hafez and Bashar Assad,

even if the government falls, Hamas does not stand to be

damaged.

Hamas' pragmatism, as manifested in its willingness to

openly accept Abbas' authority as both president of the

PA and head of the PLO, in no way indicates a strategic

shift in Hamas' policy or acceptance of the PLO's

approach - least of all with regard to the interim

agreements with Israel and their origin in the letter of

mutual recognition signed by Israel and Arafat in

September 1993. Entering the PLO institutions through

the front door, Hamas is implementing a Trojan-horse

strategy to conquer the supreme source of Palestinian

authority from within, international recognition and all.

Hamas sees this as the shortest and most effective path to

reaping the profits of the Islamic Spring, which is

boosting antagonism toward Israel among Middle Eastern

regimes and peoples, and would make it very difficult for



the PA to negotiate with Israel absent broad domestic and

Arab support.

For Hamas, the central lesson from the Arab Spring is the

U.S. administration's and the European Union's

abandonment of the pro-Western regimes and their

readiness, even haste, to support the popular revolutions

and recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate

political actor. To Hamas this indicates that the West is

weak and can do nothing but accept the reality that the

rebelling peoples dictate, and that the more this process

accelerates and is translated into political and military

power, the greater its weight in shaping the Middle

Eastern and international arenas.

Hamas has despaired of winning Western recognition

based on its electoral victory as the leading party or for

the government it has established in Gaza; instead it seeks

to attain the great prize by taking over the PLO. Hence it

is prepared for temporary tactical flexibility, thereby

obligating Abbas to implement the reform of the PLO and

hold general parliamentary and presidential elections in

the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas believes that it is highly

likely to prevail in these elections, and that once it has a

majority in the PA and PLO institutions, it will be

internationally recognized and replace Fatah in

representing the Palestinian people both in Palestine and

the diaspora. In the interim stage, through joining the

temporary PLO leadership, Hamas has succeeded in

subverting Abbas' independence in PLO decision-making

and in binding him to decisions that the new leadership

will make.

Abbas' considerations are a mirror image of Hamas'

assessment of the effects of the Islamic Spring. He has

moved toward the radical pole to ensure his political

survival and prevent a domestic popular uprising against

the PA. His cooperation with Hamas is meant to prove his

loyalty to the bedrock national principles (Mubarak was

charged with lacking such loyalty) and to provide him

with a (temporary) insurance policy.

That, it appears, is what motivates Abbas to pose

preconditions for negotiations with Israel that he knows

are completely unacceptable to its government, and to

prepare in advance for the failure of the negotiation

channel while trying to cast the full blame on Israel. In

parallel, he is devising an alternative to the political

process by adopting a strategy of confrontation with Israel

both politically and on the ground, one that will turn the

Palestinian energies built up during the Arab and Islamic

Spring in Israel's direction.

While Abbas speaks seemingly innocently of "peaceful

popular resistance," in the PA's terminology the phrase

means protest activity that includes attempts to injure and

kill Israeli soldiers and civilians. The reception as national

heroes of Palestinian terrorists freed in exchange for

kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, and Abbas'

publicized meetings - despite Israeli protests - with

prominent Palestinian terrorists, some of whom have been

appointed to senior positions in the PA, again attest to the

PA's view of terror as legitimate and praiseworthy.

As in the Second Intifada, the PA is assigning the main

role in the conflict with Israel to Fatah, which will serve

as its subcontractor for the confrontations in tandem with

the other Palestinian organizations. Fatah, which is

preparing for the general elections in May, can capitalize

on this revived organizational activity to lead the wide-

scale strategy of conflict that Abbas has charted. Past

experience indicates that violent clashes of the "popular

resistance" kind can potentially escalate to a serious

deterioration in security.

Traditionally, the main factor in the PLO's formulation of

political strategy has been the regional balance of power.

Analysis of that balance led to decisions to resort to

political dialogue with Israel. The change in the regional

balance of power to Israel's detriment amid the

revolutions of the Arab and Islamic Spring alters the

PLO's and the PA's assessments, and is another factor

encouraging a tougher, uncompromising political line and

the strategy of confrontation, spiced with a new language

about renouncing recognition of Israel and a two-state

solution to the conflict.

From Israel's standpoint the trends in the Middle East and

in the Palestinian arena are ominous. The PA is forging a

strategic alliance with radical Islamic elements, while at

the same time the West recognizes their patron - the

Muslim Brotherhood - and pursues a policy that in the

Middle East appears as weakness. The move by Abbas

ensures his regime's stability for a short time, but will

likely emerge as cutting off the branch he sits on and

building a bridgehead to Hamas' full takeover of the PA

and the PLO institutions. That scenario would severely

challenge Israel in the Palestinian arena and carry a

potential for regional escalation.

Jordan, for its part, is closely following the Palestinian

developments. Fatah and Hamas have agreed to exclude

the Jordanian arena from the electoral process for the

PNC. If the Palestinians in Jordan, who constitute a large

majority of its population, vote for Palestinian national

institutions, tensions with Jordan are the likely result,

reopening the historical wounds in Jordanian-Palestinian

relations and raising the question of the legitimacy of the

Hashemite Royal House. Like Israel, Jordan faces an

existential "Palestinian problem" that would emerge in its

full severity after the birth of the Palestinian state, forcing

the Palestinians in Jordan to decide the question of their

loyalty.

* * *

Notes

1. http://palestine-

info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46

m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7zEDICv1ANSmCbCAPrvhodeQn

b1XEWJHPgV3cztOXBrNyuZ2t3osa2kQ0TrNZ3j05X1

%2bETRTtH%2bRwTNhO6BN%2frrKtWF%2fX%2fDg

I1v8bD3iVsR8%3d

2. The members of the committee are: Farouk Kadoumi,

Saeb Erekat, Ahmed Qureia, Taysir Khaled, Abd al-

Rahim Mallouh, Zakaria al-Agah, Ali Is'haq, Muhammad

Abu Isma'il, Hanna Amira, Salah Raafat, Yasser Abed

Rabbo, Assad Abdel Rahman, Ghassan Ash-Shakaa,

Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi, Hanan Ashrawi, and

Ahmed Majdalani.

3.

http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2011/12/22/23

0879.html,

http://www.wafa.ps/arabic/index.php?action=detail&id=1

20341



m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7zEDICv1ANSmCbCAPrvhodeQn

b1XEWJHPgV3cztOXBrNyuZ2t3osa2kQ0TrNZ3j05X1

%2bETRTtH%2bRwTNhO6BN%2frrKtWF%2fX%2fDg

I1v8bD3iVsR8%3d



m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7KY4L1SPxyWzhwwKNehRREy3

UdKCec3Y%2bx69u7DA5XBRpfQ0s5UEWBvODupLfy

o6QjAqxYbcLcWZAdYIVvM7jMKFd6ZpMcsraW8Fom

WXBkYk%3d

6.


20344

7. Falestin (Gaza), 23 Dec 11; website of the Hamas

bulletin: felesteen.ps

8.

http://almadenahnews.com/newss/news.php?c=509&id=1

24599

9.

http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/320983/date/

20111215





m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7HWi%2bCG%2fndj%2bdH5aUx

OJqx3%2f6kNwbeL3b4iE%2b45tlfE51jPiBxnIKiKeiVov

RvH1gV9AicNtcdRw0fh6hX27p5vF90p4vMc08yYFn%

2bmMHqIw%3d






WXBkYk%3d

13.


20352

14.


20570

15.

http://aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12081

&article=656062&feature=





m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7RMWXKDfdMY79nAIDPOwPL

P4gg0%2bQSo9XOJ0UdxBrd9RnKQFsXf5xkEjAI4sJoQ

H9gSzEDZ%2b4s5BmF1e31cA89%2f2Me07HqvBLeI2

OI2B1gAY%3d;Al-Hayat al-Jadida (Ramallah), 26 Dec.

11, p. 3






WXBkYk%3d



20. http://www.palestine-


m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7r9jY7jKP1jBeBLLBaiDGSb1i1z

QwBM1O%2b5%2bWzTpFs%2fTJCuENx1a7I%2fVb2n

VrVncfUKAsnlLViD7E39Jve%2f2npXHueN38I5Gbb1ea

kPyYf%2fQ%3d



m9rUxJEpMO

%2bi1s7qzzC%2fsIffK%2bf3A17QaLeoF8n7CJ2w7rWA

8F4wKEUUrz89fPVy%2b3aOcuOkm7kjAW%2fM5TyZ

4VMlTdnkperY2Mxg48vY6Y3DgN4Qpd6oCSWpGw%

3d






WXBkYk%3d



m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7r9jY7jKP1jBeBLLBaiDGSb1i1z

QwBM1O%2b5%2bWzTpFs%2fTJCuENx1a7I%2fVb2n

VrVncfUKAsnlLViD7E39Jve%2f2npXHueN38I5Gbb1ea

kPyYf%2fQ%3d

24. http://www.al-aman.com/subpage.asp?cid=14716



26. http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/88E0062F-5CEE-

4B3B-A7EA-4EA3884F269C.htm; Falestin (Gaza), 25

Dec 11; website of the Hamas bulletin: felesteen.ps

27.





http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/88E0062F-5CEE-4B3B-A7EA-4EA3884F269C.htm

http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/88E0062F-5CEE-4B3B-A7EA-4EA3884F269C.htm

m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7KkMPiVSgCCHxhVt99%2fh47Q

CZEvkL7NCdWWGshZuHoPP%2blCwuPVSNRMrDKv

hWJIepNXbwug6lVmqLjffkBQ4fVnHHbWRisKGEnrrX

79booZE%3d

29. http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/342699

30. http://www.alhayat-

j.com/newsite/details.php?opt=2&id=157975&cid=2455

31. http://www.wafa.ps/arabic/index.php?action=detail&i

d=121063

32.



33.

http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=449

260&MARK=%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D

9%84%D9%83%D9%8A



35.


20111215



37. Al-Hayat al-Jadida (Ramallah), 1 Jan 12, p. 6

38.


20776



40. Al-Ayyam (Ramallah), 27 Dec 11, p. 3

41.


20575

42.


20416



44.


20111215

45.

http://www.fatehorg.ps/index.php?action=show_page&ID

=2396&lang=ar

46.

http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.asp?

id=41379; Falestin (Gaza), 26 Dec 11; website of the

Hamas bulletin: felesteen.ps

47. http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.a

sp?id=41379; Falestin (Gaza), 26 Dec 11; website of the

Hamas bulletin: felesteen.ps

* * *

Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi is a senior researcher of

the Middle East and radical Islam at the Jerusalem Center

for Public Affairs. He is a co-founder of the Orient

Research Group Ltd. and is a former advisor to the Policy

Planning Division of the Israel Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.

http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.asp?id=41379

http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.asp?id=41379

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