wikileaks for greece, from sky.gr

8/7/2019 Wikileaks for Greece, from Sky.gr

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D : 183694

08ATHENS1692efID :

ate :

rigin :

18/12/2008 1:00:00

lassification :

Embassy Athens

SECRET

eader : VZCZCXRO9606OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV

DE RUEHTH #1692/01 3531300ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 181300Z DEC 08FM AMEMBASSY ATHENSTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2941INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITYRHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001692

IPDIS

.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018AGS: PREL, SOCI, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, TU, MK, GR UBJECT: GREEK RIOTS - WHAT HAPPENED AND HOW THEY IMPACT.S. INTERESTS

lassified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

-----UMMARY-----

(C) The riots that began in Greece following the December police shooting of a teenager have shocked even the most

ynical of Greeks, and have resulted in hundreds of millionsf Euros in economic damage. The unrest has deeply polarizedociety, with youth of all socio-economic backgroundsenerally supporting the demonstrations, and most people over hirty condemning the violence. Although it is difficult toinpoint the exact causes of the riots, major contributingactors included:

the insular, hothouse atmosphere of Greeces few hundredltra-radical "anarchists;"

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popular frustration with corruption and political leaders;the disillusionment of the youth, who see fewer economic

pportunities than previous generations did;irresponsible and inflammatory media coverage branding the

hooting as cold-blooded murder;demoralized Greek security forces, weakened by post-junta

mits and public distrust; andpopular sympathy (and in some cases nostalgia) for the

adical left and public tolerance of expressions of pposition through violent means.

(C) The government response was characterized by PMaramanlis absence, and most government announcements wereft to Minister of Interior Pavlopoulos. The government

pparently instructed the police to respond solely with aefensive posture. We believe the Prime Minister wanted tovoid any additional deaths or any platform for grievancesnd negotiations with the authorities (such as an occupiedovernment building). Many Greeks believe the Karamanlisovernment mishandled the situation -- both by not taking aougher stance against the violence but also by havinglowed socioeconomic conditions to deteriorate. Thus, mostreeks, including those who would normally be Karamanlis

upporters, now believe it is only a matter of time beforehe PM has to call new elections, although Karamanlis appearsesolutely opposed to doing so. We expect the opposition toontinue to press hard to bring down the government, and wexpect the government to take steps to show leadership andction, including likely Cabinet changes.

(S) U.S. interests will be affected. Constrained by thenrest, the Greek government will be even morenwardly-focused than usual. Greece will likely be unwillingr unable to take bold actions on regional foreign policysues, including the Macedonia name issue, relations withurkey, or pressing the Greek Cypriots on negotiations inyprus. The government bureaucracy, ever cautious, willecome even more wary in the face of political uncertainty,

making it harder to address other issues on our agenda,ncluding commercial, educational, security, and human rightssues. Finally, there are precedents in Greece for domestic

rrorist groups to strike in the wake of major civil unrest,king advantage of exhausted and demoralized security

orces. We will need to continue to monitor aggressively aotentially growing domestic terrorist threat. End Summary.

-------------What Caused It?

-------------

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(C) Although Greece is no stranger to demonstrations thatnclude destruction of property, Molotov cocktails, andoting, the riots that began on December 6 wereualitatively different. Estimates are still pending, buthe total bill is expected to amount to hundreds of millionsf Euros in damage. The rioting and demonstrations were notmited to Athens and Thessaloniki but took place throughout

he country, including in normally quiet provincial centers.lso, although the violent demonstrations were initially theork of anarchists, thousands of university and high schooludents of both sexes eventually joined in. Televised

ootage showed youths as young as 13 throwing rocks at police.

(C) Reports by major foreign news organizationsighlighted problems in the Greek economy as a cause of theoting, and these problems certainly played a role. Likether smaller European economies, Greece is being affected byhe global downturn. Its two leading industries -) shippingnd tourism -) already are feeling the impact of the credit

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ontraction and weakening consumer demand. GDP growth,elatively strong in recent years (4 percent in 2007), hasowed in 2008 (the government projection is for 3.2ercent), and is expected to decelerate further in 2009 (theovernment projection is for 2.7 percent, but privatenalysts, including the IMF, project a lower 2.0 percentrowth rate). Unemployment, especially amongst the young, is

sing, and about a fifth of the population now lives belowhe official poverty line. Unemployment numbers are likelyo spike as the economic slowdown hits Greeces real economyn the new year. But even before the current globalownturn, the Greek economy suffered from structural problemsncluding a rigid labor market and a large public share of he economy that limited its flexibility, discouragednnovation, and stymied expansion. Greece, indeed, has manyf the elements of a corporatist system, in which aelatively small group of well-known families controlconomic and political centers of power. Corruption and

onnections, rather than entrepreneurship and innovation, areeen as the keys to getting ahead. Greece is considered annattractive place to work and invest, ranking 96th -) theowest in the EU -) in the World Banks "doing business"anking.

(C) The Karamanlis government came to power in 2004 withreformist agenda, but has met with resistance fromntrenched interests and members of the public -- all for eform as long as it does not reduce their own individual

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erks. Moreover, the Karamanlis government has been plaguedy its own corruption scandals, including the currentatopedion monastery affair, which brought down some of therime Ministers closest advisors.

(C) Problems in the economy and governance have led toidespread social dissatisfaction and a sense that economicpportunities, for the first time in a generation, areontracting. These frustrations contributed to the recentoting and fostered an attitude of tolerance amongst much of

he general public for the youthful "victims" of a governmentnd society unresponsive to their needs. At the same time,QQQ%Q$ Q% Q(!Q$$ "!Q overestimate the role Q$!Q$$ "QQQQ%Q"!%Q "! SysQ%!! Qarch(QQQQ "QQQ$Q) Q%Q(!Qp severalundred and th! Q !"QQeeks are wary of theQQ !! !" QQ!QQQQQ QQQQ!aes because of their abQQ!Q!"QQQ!QQ!Q and entitlement. The "!!QQQQQQQQQQQQQ!Q Q)QQ(" Q$roscribed period du! Q! Q!"QQ! Q ) Q%Qpuptions. Universityasylum" policies prohibit state security forces fromntering campuses without permission from universitydministrators (granted very rarely), adding to thedeologically charged atmosphere of "anything goes."

(C) The anarchists, headquartered at the Athensolytechnic, have escalated their violence in recent years.

Many observers believe that this trend was a concertedtempt to provoke the police into a disproportionate

esponse, in turn sparking an even broader "uprising." Thenarchists appeared to get what they wanted in the December 6

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hooting of Grigoropoulos, and they used blogs and SMSes topread the news and mobilize their forces. As anarchistiolence escalated, other university and eventually highchool and even middle school students, some disgruntled,thers attracted by the radical chic, joined in.

------------------------inosaurs of the Hard Left------------------------

0. (C) Exacerbating the unrest was the opportunism of theftist political parties. Unlike their counterparts in manyther European countries, the leftist parties of Greece haveot evolved with the fall of the Berlin Wall, further EUntegration, and economic globalization. The ideology,ctics, and goals of the Greek "hard left" remain much as

hey were during the Cold War, and these parties have served

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s a retiring ground for many aging anarchists. Reflectinghe ideological divisions of an earlier era, the left remainsivided between the orthodox Marxist-Leninist, Soviet-styleommunist Party of Greece (KKE) and the new left SYRIZAarty, which has taken up the slogans and mindset of nti-globalization while retaining a loyalty to Marxism.oth the KKE and SYRIZA supported the recent demonstrations

n an effort to further discredit the government. While theKE publicly supported only peaceful, disciplinedemonstrations, however, SYRIZA more openly egged anarchistsnd students on to violent action.

-----------------responsible Press-----------------

1. (C) Finally, the Greek press had a role in aggravatinghe riots. Most Greek media carried breathless reportseemingly aimed at inflaming and not calming the situation.

Media hyperbole helped trample the principle of "innocentntil proven guilty" in the court of public opinion, with

many journalists reporting that the accused police officer ad fired on Grigoropoulos in cold blood, although governmentfficials made similar statements. Police explanations thathe shooting may have been accidental were derisivelyismissed.

----------------------------------What Did the Government Do About It?

----------------------------------

2. (C) One of the most striking aspects of the events washe Prime Ministers absence; Karamanlis stayed largely outf the public eye, leaving public statements to his Minister f Interior, Prokopis Pavlopoulos. At the height of theiolence, Karamanlis made just two short televisionppearances -- calling for calm in the one and laying out achnocratic, detailed plan for government assistance to

ffected businesses in the other.

3. (C) The police generally did not respond assertively tohe violence and instead assumed a defensive posture. Wessess that there are two explanations:

Initial Indecision: Initially taken by surprise, theovernment took the populist road, not wanting to be seen asfascists," and thus did not direct the police to clamp down.

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Avoid Any Additional Deaths and Deny Anarchists alatform: As the riots worsened, however, we assess thataramanlis and his advisors calculated that he must first and

oremost avoid the possibility of any additional deaths thatould fuel greater unrest. At the same time, greater forceas apparently authorized to allow police to ensure that therotestors did not occupy government buildings or significantndmarks that could be used as a basis for a prolongedublic platform for grievances and negotiations with theuthorities. The police were clearly operating under ifferent rules of engagement when defending the Parliamentr the Foreign Ministry, than the commercial establishmentsext door.

----------------What Does It Mean?

----------------

4. (C) Weaker Government: While the long-term implications

or Karamanlis are unclear, for now many Greeks believe theM and his government severely mishandled the situation.

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Most, including those who would normally be Karamanlisupporters, are openly stating that it is only a matter of me before the PM has to call new elections. Conventionalisdom holds that these events are a final "mortal blow" that

omes on the heels of other political crises, scandals, andhe global economic crisis. The opposition, criticizing theovernments response, called for the government to stepown, and we expect these calls to grow louder, particularlythe unrest continues. The opposition is smelling blood.

hat said, it is impossible to predict exactly when this shoemight drop. If/when the government does fall will depend

ss on the opposition and more on dissent within theovernments own ranks. We expect the government to takeeps to show leadership and action, including likely Cabinethanges.

5. (C) Our Interests: In short, the Karamanlis governmentill be even more inward-looking than before, and it will bether unwilling or unable to take bold actions or be out of

ync with popular sentiments on key regional foreign policysues. This means that the Greek government will likelyke defensive positions on the Macedonia name issue and

elations with Turkey. It will also likely eschew any troopeployments that could open it up to criticism -- such asending significantly increased numbers to Afghanistan.reek politicians will also be unwilling to be out of sync

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ith the Greek Cypriot leadership, and therefore loathe toress them on any aspect of the current negotiations. Thever-cautious Greek bureaucracy will, in the face of olitical uncertainty, become even more risk adverse, makingharder to address other issues on our agenda, such as

ommercial, educational, security, and human rights issues.inally, should rumors of a cabinet reshuffle or earlyections grow stronger, FM Bakoyannis may be seen by her

nterlocutors as a potential "lame duck" as she takes on theole of OSCE Chairman-in-Office in January.

6. (S) Terrorism: Most importantly, we will need tomonitor aggressively the growing domestic terrorist threat.

ollowing the public outrage that resulted from the 1985illing of a youth by police, the November 17 terrorist groupntered a renewed operational phase and carried outdditional attacks against Greek, U.S., and other targets.

We will need to sharpen our vigilance to defend ourselves ando encourage a robust Greek response to terrorism in the facef exhausted and demoralized security services, popular issatisfaction and angst, and a government that willndoubtedly have its attention focused elsewhere.PECKHARD008-12-18 13:00

PREL, SOCI, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, TU, MK, GR ags :

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