wiessner, polly (2005). norm enforcement among the ju/'hoansi bushmen: a case of strong...

Wiessner, Polly (2005). Norm Enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen: A Case of Strong Reciprocity? Human Nature, 16 (2), 115-145.

Caitlin Rogers, Casey Dudley, Elizabeth Benton and Paul FerraioloDr. Mills, Psyc 452, Fall 2007

Wiessner, Polly (2005). Norm Enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen: A Case of Strong Reciprocity? Human Nature, 16 (2), 115-145

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Current Theories of Altruism

Reciprocal Altruism: One reciprocal partner in a dyad rewards or punishes

the other, “tit-for-tat” Strong reciprocity:

Individuals sacrifice resources for rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behavior

Difference: Strong Reciprocity appears

to be distinguished from Reciprocal Altruism because there is no present or futurereward for the reciprocator


Study of “Norm Enforcement” 308 conversations The Ju/'hoansi (!Kung) Bushmen of northwest

Botswana Purpose

Examine the dynamics of reward and punishment used to enforce norms

3 Objectives dynamics of punishment costs of punishment evidence for strong reciprocity


Institutions and Norms in Foraging Societies

Social Institutions Cooperative communities

Mutual Obligations Respect for material goods, mates, & relationship Maintenance of harmony

Egalitarianism Facilitates cooperation Age hierarchy

Extensive social ties Backup resources Through kinship, exchange, or ceremony equality & respect are emphasized


Data and Methods

Conversations were taken from the field 1974 and 1996-97

Author did not have fluency in the Ju/’hoan language

Recorded the following points for each conversation: Topic(s) Setting Participants If included praise or punishment


Costs of Punishing in Forager Societies

Loss of a valuable group member

Severed social ties Escalation of disputes into

violence Time and energy costs Damaged reputation for

being too critical or mean to another


Conversation as Punishment

Four categories Put-downs through joking or mocking Mild criticism and complaint Harsh criticism and complaint Criticism plus violent acts

Table adapted from Wiessner, Polly, p 130


Analysis and Results

Most frequent behavior that elicited punishment for both

years of study was neglect of kinship obligations 53% of all issues that elicited punishment:

trouble making reclusive behavior inappropriate sexual relations Drunkenness big-shot behavior

9% for occupation and politics 6% for jealousy


Analysis and Results cont. Who punishes: Men and women punish for different issues

Men initiated criticisms 95% for issues involving politics and land 67% for troublemaking

Women initiated criticisms 93% for expression of jealousy over possessions 73% for stinginess, greediness, and failure to share 69% for inappropriate sexual behavior 65% for failure to meet kinship obligations

The targets of punishment Men more often than women The reasoning for this is that:

more likely to engage in disruptive behavior produced larger quantities of food and faced with broader demands for sharing men were reluctant to target women because of fear of spousal retribution

Strong individuals were criticized twice as often as average individuals


Analysis and Results cont.

Outcomes of punishment: verbal punishment

the message was heard by the target without visible response or apology 63% of all dyadic interaction

the rallying of group opinion against the offender 26% of cases

Self-Defense is rare prefer to avoid conflict that may lead to violence

Costs of punishment Of the 124 cases of punishment:

8% had some negative repercussions for the initiators and coalition members 15% involved visible reform or expressed intent to reform on the part of the

transgressor 10% with the outcome "message heard" involved subsequent reform


Evidence for Strong Reciprocity?

Is strong reciprocity involved in Ju/'hoansi punishment by coalitions or can willingness to punish be explained by individual interest alone? 25% of cases of punishment were aimed at regulating

reciprocal altruism in dyads the reaming cases, nepotism has some value. Second-order punishment and costly signaling appeared to

have no standing Therefore, the willingness to incur costs in punishment that

provided no direct rewards for the reciprocator lends some support to the strong reciprocity hypothesis


Conclusion

For some cases, punishing norm violators appears to involve strong reciprocity aids in creating conditions for what has been

described as stable, cooperative breeding communities

The goal of punishment was to bring transgressors back in line through punishing, without losing valuable group members

The costs were reduced through an array of cultural mechanisms that had been finely tuned and developed over centuries


Critical ReviewInteresting or Informative Facts

Longitudinal Study

Systematically eliminated other reciprocity theories

Today, punishment is less open and widespread due to fear


Critical ReviewWeak or Unclear Portions

Lack of Linguistic Fluency Only 124 cases of punishment were studied Could have attempted to follow up with the

63% of outcomes of punishment where the message was heard by the target without visible response or apology.

Did not give an definitive verdict on whether it was in fact strong reciprocity.


Discussion Questions

Why might self defense be rare in the Ju/'hoansi’s interactions but common in ours?

Do you think strong reciprocity, if encouraged at LMU, could become the norm?

Is there a parallel between men and women’s initiation of criticism in our culture?


Review Questions (True or False)

1. Strong reciprocity requires low levels of monitoring within the group and subsequent action to bring individual behavior in line through reward and punishment.

2. The author of the study was fluent in the native language

3. Women initiated conflicts involving politics and land more often then men.

F

F

F


Review Questions 4. Strong Reciprocity can be defined as:

a. One Reciprocal partner in a dyad rewards or punishes the otherb. The group rewards or punishes the individual on a tit-for-tat basisc. Individuals sacrifice resources for rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behaviord. The group sacrifices resources for rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behavior

Correct Answer: C

5. Which of the following did NOT elicit punishmenta. trouble makingb. extraverted behaviorc. inappropriate sexual relationsd. drunkenness

Correct Answer: B

6. Punishment was divided into categories:a. Twob. Threec. Fourd. Seven Correct Answer: C

wiessner, polly (2005). norm enforcement among the ju/'hoansi bushmen: a case of strong...

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