Why did Margaret Thatcher change her position regarding the European Community,

being positive for Britain to bring negative for Britain, between the formalization of the

Single European Act in June 1984, to the Bruges Speech in September 1988?

Adam Robertson

2015

Word Count: 11,323

This dissertation is submitted to the School of Politics, Social and International Studies,

University of East Anglia, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA in

International Relations and European Studies

School of Politics, Social and International Studies

University of East Anglia

Acknowledgements

Those who know me will know that I am modest in making thanks in general, as I have been

taught that modesty is a virtue to behold and to maintain. Therefore, I am usually modest in

making thanks to those who have helped me, through this thesis.

However, thanks must go to the following people, for ensuring that this thesis was

completed: Andrew Riley from the Churchill College, in Cambridge; Sharon Wilkinson from

Dean of Students and all the team at the Dean of Students, too numerous to mention; Dr

Alan Finlayson; Dr Michael Skey; Vassiliki Koutrakou and finally, Lawrence Hardy, who has

shared and developed my passion for the European Union and Britain’s role within it.

Two good friends deserve a mention, for the support they have given to me, throughout

writing this dissertation: Christian Newsome, who has always been a sounding board when I

have had a writing block or needed someone to share a pint with; Robert Mackinnon, who

has shared his experiences on writing a PhD with me, assuring me that the thesis will be

written.

My family also deserve special thanks for helping me on writing this thesis, my father Mark,

who constantly assured me that this thesis will be finished and that it will be worth it. My

stepmother, Shirley, who I have had constant debates over the thesis and Britain’s

membership of the European Union in general. Finally, my grandparents Alice and Jim, for

giving me the privilege to study and to write this thesis. I owe them a lot of gratitude for

this.

Lastly, I dedicate this thesis to those, who believe that after being expelled from school that

education is not for them. I was one of them, I got expelled, I got expelled three times, but I

say, don’t give up because with the right amount of dedication, you can be who you want to

be.

2

Table of Contents

Glossary of Abbreviations……… 1

Chapter 1 – Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology…… 2

Introduction……. 2

Thesis Statement……. 2

Road Map……… 3

Literature Review………..3

Classical Realism……. 3

Constructivism……….. 4

Historical Institutionalism………….5

Intergovernmentalism………………5

Federalism/Supranationalism…………..6

International Political Economy…………7

Methodology………………..8

Chapter 2 – The Process of Margaret Thatcher’s changing attitude from being positive to negative towards the European

Community

Chapter Introduction…………9

Thatcher’s misinterpretation and misunderstanding of European Community Norms…….9

The Balance of Power between the three most powerful states in the European Community…….13

Private Advisers……….16

Chapter 3 – Critical Discourse Analysis on Jacques Delors’ TUC and Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges Speech

Chapter Introduction…………. 18

Methodology for the Critical Discourse Analysis……….. 18

Context for Speeches……… 19

Discourse on Sub-questions…………. 20

Conclusion………. 24

Chapter 4 – Political Ramifications of Thatcher’s changed attitude towards European Integration

Chapter Introduction…………. 25

Labour’s Conversion to being the ‘Party of Europe’……… 25

The fatal division of the Conservative Party?........... 27

The Nemesis of Bruges: UKIP……….. 31

Chapter 5 – Conclusion………..33

Postscript…………. 34

Bibliography……………….35

3

4

Glossary of Abbreviations

CDA Critical Discourse Analysis

Commission European Commission

EC European Community

EEC European Economic Community

EMU Economic and Monetary Union

EP European Parliament

ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism

EU European Union

IGC Intergovernmental Conference

MP Member of Parliament

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

SEA Single European Act

TUC Trade Union Congress

UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party

US United States

1

Chapter 1: Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology

Introduction

David Cameron, the Current Prime Minister, called on the Conservative Party to stop

‘banging on about Europe’, before the 2010 General Election (Liddle 2014: 196). This was

because the Conservative Party was unsure whether Britain should remain in the European

Union. The issue of Britain’s membership of the European Union has split political parties,

seen political parties formed and even seen families divided on the issue. Britain is unsure

on where she stands within Europe. This is perfectly demonstrated with Margaret Thatcher,

Prime Minister between 1979 and 1990, who perceived that being part of the European

Community, was positive for Britain, before believing it was a detriment to British interests.

This paper seeks to understand the reason and rationale behind why Thatcher changed her

position in relation to Britain’s membership of the European Community.

Thesis Statement

This thesis will argue that Thatcher changed her mind because she primarily believed that

the identity of Britain was under threat. This will be argued through the theoretical

framework of Constructivism, which explains why Thatcher had an ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude,

with us being Britain and them, being the Continental states. Constructivism also helps to

analyse why Thatcher felt alienated from the other member states, in terms of the different

political cultures, which existed.

Nonetheless, the composition does accept that there are other theoretical frameworks,

which also help to explain Thatcher’s change of attitude towards the European Community.

Historical Institutionalism shows how Thatcher realised that Edward Heath’s actions in 1972,

of Britain becoming a member of the European Community, constrained Thatcher’s ability

regarding she could do. Thatcher realised that the European Commission has more power

than she originally thought. Historical Institutionalism helps to explains this.

Within the epistemological and ontological debate, Constructivism views International

Relations through the prism of behaviourism, looking for causality and a hypothesis (Fierke

2013: 193). However, Constructivism also accepts a social ontology of thinking about a

particular subject through identity and norms, such as Thatcher’s changing attitude towards

2

the European Community being seen through the prism of identity. Constructivism accepts

that there are different social factors, which lead human beings to think of the same subject

differently (Fierke 2013: 193).

Road Map

To ensure a substantive study of the question, this paper has been divided into five

chapters. Chapter One gives an outline of the different theoretical frameworks, which the

question asked by this paper can be answered through. Chapter Two looks at the events

behind the process of Thatcher changing her position towards the European Community.

Chapter Three is a Critical Discourse Analysis on Thatcher’s Bruges Speech and Jacques

Delors’ speech to the Trade Union Congress, which both happened in September 1988.

Chapter Four explores how Thatcher’s change affected the main political parties within

British Politics. Lastly, there is a conclusion, which will conclude the thesis.

Literature Review

Classical Realism

Britain’s relationship with Europe has been traditionally based on the Balance of Power

model, which belongs to the Classical Realist theory, where the protection of British

interests was the main policy of the British government. The Balance of Power system,

which British Governments used for its foreign policy in relation to Continental Europe,

ensured that one state on the Continent did not become a hegemonic power throughout

Europe (Young 2000: 1). This was because Britain did not want a rival to challenge its

traditional supremacy throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. For example,

Britain formed the Triple Entente with France and Russia before the First World War, to

counteract the Triple Alliance, led by Imperial Germany.

The concept of Balance of Power is still prevalent today between the three most powerful

states within the European Union (EU): Britain, France and Germany. However, the Balance

of Power is perversely against British interests, unlike before the Second World War, where

Britain ensured either France or Germany was isolated, through alliances built by Britain.

Margaret Thatcher (1993: 558-9) complains of the Franco-German axis within the EU, as it

runs against British interests for the EU. British influence has been limited because of the

3

formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), predecessor of the EU. Britain can

no longer coerce other European states to accept British preferences for the governance of

the Continent, as it could do before the Second World War. The EU has decreased British

influence within the power politics of the European Continent.

Constructivism

Britain has been traditionally hostile to the concept of Europe, believing Europe does not

share the same values and concepts as itself. Andrew Gamble (2003: 108) claims that

England then Britain, has always been deeply hostile to Europe, as its language, its

institutions, its religion and its politics demonstrates. There has always been a ‘Self’ and

‘Other’ division between Britain and Europe. The concept of Europe still being alien to

British People, as well, as British Politics, is still dominant within the European politic.

Indeed, there are two examples of Thatcher showing inherent hostility to European

Community (EC) because she did not share the same language or political culture, as

Gamble demonstrates. Firstly, Thatcher distrusted European Politicians because she could

not speak another language (Evans 2013: 84). Thatcher believed in the concept of English

exceptionalism, that Britain was still dominant throughout the world with its economic and

political structures. Thatcher could not understand why it was necessary to speak another

language.

Secondly, Thatcher, and other British Politicians, have been brought up in adversarial

politics, where the majority rule dominates, whereas European Politicians have been

nurtured in consensual politics, to find a common denominator between all parties for a

solution (Liddle 2014: xxxix-xl). This means that solutions within the EU are based on a

common denominator acceptable to all member states, not the best argument put forward.

British Politicians have struggled with the concept of consensual politics, which has led at

times to British Politicians being seen as awkward within the EU. Thatcher was seen as an

awkward partner in the British Rebate Question in the early 1980’s, by her European

partners.

4

Historical Institutionalism

Historical Institutionalism is a recent new theory to theorize the relationship between

Britain and the EU. Paul Pierson (2006: 306) defines Historical Institutionalism as

understanding political development, which is a process, which takes time. Secondly,

processes are established within institutions such as the European Commission

(Commission) in the shape of formal rules, policy structures or norms. This is important

because Thatcher did not realise that the actions of Edward Heath, Prime Minister between

1970 and 1974, circumscribed what policies she could promote within the EC. Heath was

more worried during his Premiership about getting Britain into the EC, not the long-term

effects of Britain being a member of the EC.

Pierson (2006: 309-10) argues that the member states of the EU try to rein the

supranational institutions of the EU, the Commission and European Parliament (EP).

Nonetheless, member states have not got the time to scrutinize the Commission and EP.

This means that the Commission and EP have independence on what proposals should be

put forward for the member states to discuss. This is known as Principal-Agent Theory,

where the Commission is seen as the agent for the states, with the states delegating tasks

and responsibilities to the agent. However, the agent is autonomous on how to carry out

the mandate given (Sterling - Folker 2013: 125).

Certainly, this is a credible theory to explain Thatcher’s change of attitude towards the EC;

Thatcher became to regret signing the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985 because it gave

more autonomous power to the Commission than she thought it would. Thatcher did not

realise the full impact of signing the SEA, till her Bruges Speech, where she warned of

growing supranationalism at the expense of the nation-state.

Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism argues that national governments are the key actors and that

regional organisations, such as the EU, should be seen in a global context. Stanley Hoffman

(2006: 150-1) claims that the nation-state, as the central actor in International Relations, is

an obstacle to European Integration. Hoffman (2006: 154-5) argues that for integration to

happen, there needs to be common transactions between the peoples involved. Britain has

5

no common transactions with other European states, which means that cooperation needs

to be based on intergovernmentalism, which originates from the Classical Realist school of

thought. There is no consent from the British people for a federal Europe, as there are no

common bonds.

Thatcher agreed with the analogy put forward by Hoffman, on European Integration. This

was seen towards the end of the Bruges Speech with, “Utopia never comes” (Bruges Group

1998: 25). Hoffman (2006: 156) warns of the failures of Federalism, because there was no

general consent of the peoples of Europe. It would end up in a Hobbesian state of nature,

where all the different identities and nations would resent one another within the federal

state. This is what Thatcher warned of with her Utopia comment, that uniformation of

peoples and nations will lead to a hubris effect. British Governments agree with Hoffman’s

analysis and believe that the member states should be in control of the integration process

of the EU.

Federalism/Supranationalism

Federalism is seen as a voluntary union between states. Michael Burgess (2009: 26) states

that federalism is based on consent, which allows different identities and interests to be

respected. Federalism based on cosmopolitan values, Burgess infers, is based on Immanuel

Kant’s peace theory, of perpetual peace between the states involved. Respect and Equality

is a big feature of federalism.

After the Second World War, many Europeans believed in a federal Europe. This was

because many Europeans believed it could contain Nationalism, which was seen as the main

instigator of the Second World War (Burgess 2009: 31-2). Jean Monnet, one of the original

founders of the EU, helped to formulate the EEC, based on the peoples of Europe (Burgess

2009: 36). This has developed into institutions, such as the Commission, acting on behalf of

the nation-states who have agreed to pool sovereignty, proposing legislation which will

benefit the Peoples Europe.

However, federalism within the British Political Arena means fragmentation of the state

(Burgess 2009: 25). This is partly because there are fears that federalism could lead to

Britain splitting apart, with Scotland leaving the union. This is one of the reasons why British

6

policy towards the EU is not to be in favour of a federal Europe. An ontological reason is that

federalism does not respect identities and nations within a federal state, if there are not

common bonds. Thatcher refers to this in her Bruges Group, in that Europe is stronger

because France is France, and so on (Bruges Group 1998: 17). Thatcher believed that

intergovernmentalism is the best way for cooperation within the EU, than trying to create a

federal state within Europe.

International Political Economy: Economic Liberalism v Dirigisme

Britain, historically, has believed in economic liberalism, which means a commitment to

free trade and laissez-faire markets (Gamble 2003: 102). This was based on the ideas of

Adam Smith and David Ricardo, economists in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century,

that for people and nations to prosper than there should be no interference from the state

(Jackson and Sorenson 2010: 187). The state should allow the market to find its own

equilibrium between supply and demand. This economic model had become identifiable

with Britain and the United States (US).

The end of the Second World War saw Continental Europe modify the perceived Anglo-

American model. This was because many Europeans believed that the Great Depression in

the 1930’s, led to resentment and created the conditions for the Second World War to

happen. This has seen France and Germany create corporation boards, where employers

and employees, sit on boards together to discuss wages, work conditions, among many

issues, which affect workers (Carfuny and Ryner 2009: 226). This has led to tensions

between Britain and Continental Europe on which economic model the Single Market

should follow. Thatcher was under the illusion it was going to follow the economic liberalist

model, practiced by Britain and the US. The perception was that it was following the

corporatist, dirigisme model of Continental Europe.

Methodology

7

This paper will be established through the point of view of a political scientist, emphasising

Thatcher’s changing attitude towards the EC. Research has been carried out through a

qualitative process, through various methods associated to qualitative research. To

ascertain why Thatcher changed her attitude towards the EC, primary and secondary texts

have been used. This includes her own autobiography and those of leading politicians

associated with Thatcher during the 1980’s. This will provide the raw data of information,

which is disseminated for analysis. It is accepted that there are limitations because there will

be bias from the politicians cited, but where possible, academics will be used either to

justify or question the argument being made, when citing a politician as part of an

argument.

However, the paper will also demonstrate how Thatcher’s attitude changed, through a

Critical Discourse Analysis, which will look at two speeches by Thatcher and Jacques Delors,

President of the European Commission between 1985 and 1995. More is discussed on the

methodology of using a Critical Discourse Analysis, in the relevant chapter (Chapter 3). To

back up the primary and secondary texts, journals and documents have been used where

appropriate. The documents are from the Thatcher Archives from Churchill College,

Cambridge. Selective documents were researched for the paper, due to time restraints. The

paper was also going to include interviews, which is a quantitative method, from key

academics and politicians, with a specialised knowledge on Thatcher’s attitude towards the

EC. The texts, journals, documents and Critical Discourse Analysis used, demonstrated that

interviews would not have gleaned any fresh information on the topic. Another factor was

that there was only limited time, which also prevented interviews being used within the

thesis, without giving adequate due care and attention to the content analysis within the

interviews.

Chapter 2: The process of Margaret Thatcher’s changing attitude from being

positive to negative towards the European Community

8

Chapter Introduction

There is a debate on whether Margaret Thatcher’s change of attitude was due to a

particular event, or an evolving process, throughout her Premiership. Christopher Booker

(2005: 40) asserts that the Milan Summit of June 1983, changed Thatcher’s attitude in

relation to the European Community (EC). Whereas, Richard Vinen (2009: 240) claims that

Thatcher’s attitude evolved throughout her Premiership, from positive to negative. This

chapter will show that it was an amalgamation of both, along with Thatcher’s own

theoretical prejudice, towards Continental Europe, which ensured that her attitude changed

towards the EC.

Thatcher’s misinterpretation and misunderstanding of European Community Norms

Throughout her Premiership, Thatcher signed documents or treaties, on behalf of Britain,

within the EC. Thatcher did not think at the time of the spillover effect it had on Britain and

on how the EC, became to be governed. It was at the Milan Summit in June 1985, where

Thatcher’s lack of understanding of procedural rules put herself and Britain, at a

disadvantage over how the Single European Act (SEA) should be implemented. Thatcher was

led to believe by Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary at the time, that there was no need

for treaty change for the Single Market to happen (Young 1998: 330). This was because if

treaty change was needed for the Single Market, then institutional reforms such as

extending the power of the European Parliament (EP) could be on the agenda. Thatcher did

not want to lose more sovereignty to supranational institutions, such as the EP, because she

believed it to be an ‘inchoate, inexperienced and frequently irresponsible body’ (Thatcher

1993: 551-2). Thatcher believed in intergovernmentalism, that member states should be in

control of the governing process, over the EC.

However, Thatcher and Howe were outmanoeuvred by the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino

Craxi, who called for a procedural vote at the Milan Summit, on whether an

Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) should happen for the Single Market to proceed. The

vote was carried by 9 to 3, with Britain voting against (Campbell 2003: 310). Thatcher was

left in a precious position because she knew that institutional changes, which she did not

want because of traditional British policy of intergovernmentalism, were going to be based

on supranationalism. Howe, in the BBC Documentary about Britain’s relationship with the

9

EC (Part 3, The Poisoned Chalice, 1996), admits that the Foreign Office failed to realise that

only a simple majority was needed for an IGC. Thatcher was led to believe that this could be

stopped with a veto under the Luxembourg Compromise, which was formulated in 1966,

where a member state can stop a proposal because a core national interest is at stake; but

this was not an option, in trying to stop an IGC happening, within the EC.

Due to the Foreign Office’s intransigence, Thatcher was left in a Prisoners Dilemma

situation over whether to attend the IGC, which was due to take place in Luxembourg, in

December 1985. Prisoners Dilemma, is where a state either cooperates with a process,

which is not in their interest or refuses to cooperate with the whole process. In terms of the

IGC, Thatcher could have empty chaired the IGC, as Charles De Gaulle, did on behalf of

France, during the mid-1960’s (with the then EEC), but Thatcher agreed to cooperate with

other member states. Thatcher agreed to cooperate with the IGC because British Businesses

needed EC markets to prosper (Liddle 2014: 11-12; Young 1998: 140). Thatcher was aware

of the domestic pressure which was placed on her to ensure the completion of the Single

Market.

As Pierson (2006: 319) acknowledges, Thatcher was aware of the policy preferences of

British Businesses, which was for the Single Market to be implemented, even if this meant

more power for the European Commission (Commission). Thatcher was well aware of the

increasing returns the Single Market would generate for British Businesses. Crucially, it was

Businesses who funded the Conservative Party, therefore, Thatcher had to consider this fact

before empty chairing the IGC.

Therefore, Thatcher went to the IGC in December 1985, willing to give more power to the

Commission, to enable a Single Market to be implemented (Thatcher 1993: 553). Howe

argues that Thatcher agreed without question to the proposal that the EP should have more

powers as well (Howe 1994: 455). Thatcher seems to contradict herself, as she believed that

the EP should have no more new powers. There is no logical explanation to why Thatcher

agreed to the EP having more powers, when she was vehemently against this.

Thatcher acknowledges in the BBC’s Documentary about Britain’s relationship with the EC

(Part 3, The Poisoned Chalice, 1996) that she signed SEA in good faith but realised that it

contained more supranational powers than she thought when she signed it. A letter from

10

Nigel Spearing (Letter to Margaret Thatcher from Nigel Spearing MP, on the 9th November

1988), an anti-EC Labour MP, describes to Thatcher how SEA was now viewed as a written

constitution by other member states, even by 1988. Thatcher was not aware of the strategic

nature which other member states placed in SEA. This was because Britain never has had a

written constitution, which meant to Thatcher that SEA could be adjusted at any time.

Thatcher, throughout the process of SEA, understated and misunderstood the other

members intentions in relation to SEA. Lord Cockfield, British Commissioner between 1985

and 1989, argues that this is the fault of the British political establishment, in failing to

understand that Continental Europe worked differently from Britain in its politics (Cockfield

1994: 65-6). Constructivism best explains why Thatcher misunderstood and understated

other member states intentions, in relation to SEA. Thatcher did not understand the political

context which they were coming from because it was different from Britain’s. This is

because Britain has never had a written constitution, therefore, Thatcher could not

understand the perception and reasoning from the other member states in how they

viewed SEA.

However, this was not the first time that Thatcher misunderstood the intentions of the

other member states in relation to the future governance of the EC. At the Stuttgart Council

in June 1983, Thatcher signed the Solemn Declaration on European Union (Booker 2005: 40;

Howe 1994: 307; Thatcher 1993: 314). Howe and Thatcher believed at the time that the text

of the declaration was merely perfunctory (Howe 1994: 307; Thatcher 1993: 314).

Nevertheless, this is disputed by Lord Cockfield (Cockfield 1994: 23), who argues that the

Solemn Declaration of European Union committed Britain to a federal Europe. Thatcher was

an intelligent person, in making the same mistake twice shows that she did not understand

what the other member states, placed on the declarations and treaties they signed. They

were not superfluous to them, but leading to the concept of political and economic union.

Thatcher argues that the Foreign Office misinformed her over the signing of the

declaration and the process to ensure a Single Market (Thatcher 1993: 558-9). This was

because the Foreign Office believed in consensual politics rather than adversarial politics, as

Thatcher did. This is accepted partially because the Foreign Office did want Britain to be part

of an expanding EC. The Foreign Office believed that Britain would have more influence if it

was leading a supranational EC. The Foreign Office was realistic, in that Britain needed to be

11

seen as positive about the EC going forward, whereas Thatcher firmly believed that member

states should be in control of the process. Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer at the

time, accepts that the Foreign Office were soft in standing up for Britain over how SEA was

developed (Lawson 2010: 553-4).

Nonetheless, to blame the Foreign Office for completely changing Thatcher’s attitude

towards the EC is misleading. This is because Thatcher did not inherently trust Continental

Europeans. Thatcher’s prejudice showed when she selected Lord Cockfield to be the

Conservative British Commissioner for the period of 1985-1989. Howe contends that the

reason why Thatcher selected Cockfield was because he was one of ‘us’, not one of ‘them’

(Howe 1994: 404-5). One of ‘us’ was British, where as one of ‘them’ was European. Thatcher

wanted a ‘British’ person fighting for British interests on the Commission, not someone who

agreed with ‘European’ initiatives. Thatcher failed to understand that the Commission

worked on supranational norms, not intergovernmental norms. The Commission worked for

the collective aims of the EC, not for the individual interests of member states. Thatcher

learned this when Lord Cockfield informed her, in 1985, that the Commission had the right

to harmonise Value Added Tax (VAT), when she believed it could not before being shown by

the Treaty of Rome that it can be (Cockfield 1994: 54-5).

Lord Cockfield (1994: 56-7) reasons from this experience, that Thatcher did not grasp

what the EC was about. Thatcher was not aware that she was bound by treaty obligations

made by Edward Heath, Prime Minister between 1970 and 1974, when he signed the Treaty

of Accession for Britain, to join the EC in 1972. Heath’s action constrained what Thatcher

could do to influence the process within the EC, as she first thought originally. As she

learned this through her Premiership, she became to believe that the EC was a negative

influence for Britain.

Be that as it may be, the Historical Institutionalist argument put forward in the last

paragraph should be used as an vindication for why Thatcher’s attitude changed towards

the EC. This is because one of the key reasons for Thatcher’s changing attitude towards the

EC was Thatcher’s dislike for Continental Europeans, as alluded to before. Etienne

Davingnon, a French Commissioner in 1980, states that Thatcher did not trust continental

politicians (Part 3, The Poisoned Chalice, 1996). This is important to recognise, because this

12

is a Continental Politician, picking up on the fact that Thatcher had a prejudice towards

Continental Politicians. Constructivism argues Thatcher acted like this, because there is a

sense of ‘self’ and ‘other’, in that Thatcher could not fully trust the perception and

reasoning from Continental European politicians, on why they viewed the EC in such a

different way to Britain. This is because of the fact that they had a different identity to

Thatcher.

This is not a hermetic argument; there is a Historical Structuralist argument to this in that

Thatcher believed in the splendid isolation policy of Lord Salisbury, British Prime Minister

between 1895 and 1902, which was that Britain should keep out of European affairs (May

1999: 1-2). The inference is that Thatcher was only following traditional Conservative Party

policy, in relation to Europe, whereas Heath is seen as a revisionist, by placing Britain firmly

at the centre of Europe.

The Balance of Power between the three most powerful states in the European

Community

Traditionally, British foreign policy towards the European continent was based on the

concept of Balance of Power. The Classicalist Realist definition of Balance of Power is where

states balance one another by not allowing another state to become a hegemonic power

(Ned Lebow 2013: 62-3). The Classicalist Realist concept will be used because Thatcher was

seeking to balance West Germany against France, although Britain became the isolated

state in the power relationship, between the three. Even though the EC is based on liberalist

principles such as economic integration and democracy, there is still disparity between

different member states. Lord Cockfield (1994: 8-9) concedes that the Balance of Power

approach, has simply moved into the EC, rather than disappearing within the creation of the

EC.

Thatcher believed that Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of West Germany/Germany between 1982

and 1988, supported her attempt to ensure that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

should not appear in SEA (Howe 1994: 455-6). Lawson (2010: 553), Chancellor of the

Exchequer at the time, forewarns Thatcher before the Luxembourg Summit in December

1985, not to agree to EMU. This was because Britain legally would have to adhere to the

principles agreed within SEA, in relation to EMU. Britain by agreeing to EMU, was committed

13

to a common monetary policy, as well, as a common currency. Thatcher agreed with Lawson

on all of this, especially the loss of control on interest rates. This was because Thatcher had

introduced Right-to-Buy in 1980, where tenants of council houses could buy their council

house at a reduced price. Thatcher was aware that losing control of interest rates to the EC

potentially meant interest rates could rise, without the government being able to do

anything about it. Thatcher’s idea of a property-owning democracy and making individuals

more responsible for the community they lived in, was under threat from EMU (Thatcher

1993: 691-8). This is why she placed so much trust in Kohl, to ensure that EMU would not be

incorporated into SEA.

Nevertheless, what transpired was that Kohl agreed to EMU, under pressure from his own

government, who were committed to a federal Europe (Howe 1994: 455-6). Thatcher (1993:

558-9; Part 3, The Poisoned Chalice, 1996) infers that France and West Germany had an

agenda, which was to ensure that the EC became a federal organisation, with member

states losing sovereignty to central institutions, such as the Commission. Thatcher rightly

felt aggrieved over this but fails to notice that Heath, in fact, in principle agreed to EMU in

1972, when Britain agreed to be part of the EC, but EMU was postponed because of the Yom

Kipper War between Egypt and Israel (Part 2, The Poisoned Chalice, 1996)

Therefore, the Historical Institutionalist argument that the Commission believed that EMU

was still a preferred policy, for all member states including Britain, is qualified in the context

of Heath’s actions on behalf of Britain (Pierson 2006: 309-10). This was because the

Commission was formulating the section on EMU, on behalf of the member states.

However, Thatcher saw it through the context of the Commission, abusing the mandate

given to it by the member states, interpreting the mandate broadly, rather than literally.

Also Thatcher believed that Britain was being isolated by France and West Germany, on its

policy preferences for the EC.

Thatcher, besides the EMU, thought that fellow member states agreed to her economic

philosophy for the Single Market. Thatcher postulates that the Single Market was intended

to revive the EC with ‘its liberal, free trade, regulatory purpose’ (Thatcher 1993: 547).

Thatcher believed that the Single Market should follow the economic model of classical

liberal economics, where flexible labour markets, deregulation and open competition, were

14

seen as the best economic model for the EC (Gamble 2003: 106-7). Thatcher believed that

the dirigisme model, where the state directs the economy, which the French followed, was

causing bureaucratic problems for small traders and an inflexible labour market, causing a

lack of employment opportunities (Thatcher 1993: 546).

However, Francis Mitterrand, the French President between 1981 and 1995, argued that

the Single Market should only be internal within the Community, and should have some

protectionist measures (Renwick 2013: 212). Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman (2006: 228)

question Thatcher’s assumption that the Single Market was solely going to be based on

economic liberalism. Sandholtz and Zysman contend that the Single Market was formulated

because of the United States’ (US) economic decline since the end of the Bretton Woods

system in 1971. This undermines Thatcher’s hypothesis, that the Single Market in essence,

should follow the perceived hegemonic power of the Western World, in the shape of the

US. A hegemon is a very powerful state which provides self-interested global or regional

stability, with a social dominant group, gaining consent from social groups, to lead on

ideological values within that hemisphere (Sterling-Folker 2013: 117-8). Thatcher believed

that the EC should accept the economic philosophy of the US, to ensure security and

prosperity throughout the EC and wider Western World.

Andrew Gamble (2003: 81-6) professes this is an identity issue, rather than Britain being

isolated within the EC by France and West Germany. Thatcher believed in the concept of

‘Anglo-America’ and believed its economic philosophy could be enforced on the EC.

Thatcher did not understand that the other member states, particularly France, had their

own economic philosophy of dirigisme and did not want to be lectured by Thatcher on their

economic policies.

John Campbell (2003: 304) and Hugo Young (1993: 387) challenge the notion that Thatcher

was deliberately isolated, as she claims. They infer that she made no attempt to be

diplomatic with other member states throughout her Premiership. This is true, as Roy

Jenkins states in the BBC’s Documentary about Britain’s relationship with the EC (Part 3, The

Poisoned Chalice, 1996) in that Thatcher failed to build allies in convincing them that

Britain’s contribution to the EC Budget was too high. However, Campbell and Young do not

consider the theoretical reasons behind why Thatcher did not seek allies within the EC.

15

Jeremy Rand (2000: 27-8) and Roger Liddle (2014: xxxix-ix) put forward that Britain does

not agree with the consensual politics of the EC. Liddle goes further that British politicians,

are trained in adversarial politics and find the concept of consensus politics alien. This was

true for Thatcher; she abhorred consensus politics. Thatcher believed that consensus

politics showed manufactured beliefs not natural beliefs (Evans 1999: 27). Thatcher would

never agree with the EC’s model of politics. Constructivism argues this is because of the lack

of understanding between ‘us’ and ‘them’, with ‘us’ being Britain and ‘them’ being the EC.

Clearly, Thatcher did not understand how Continental Europe worked politically. The Second

World War changed how European states viewed each other after being occupied by Nazi

Germany; whereas Britain was not occupied by Nazi Germany. Britain’s institutions were not

challenged as a result. Therefore Thatcher was brought up in adversarial politics, whereas

Continental Europe now believed in finding common solutions to problems.

Private Advisers

Howe (1994: 395) and Lawson (2010: 300), two senior Cabinet colleagues in the Thatcher

Government, infer that Thatcher’s increasing reliance on Private Advisors, then her

ministers, helped her to become negative towards the EC. Howe (1994: 395) argues that

Thatcher preferred to listen to her own advisers, rather than Foreign Office advice.

Thatcher, in her autobiography, does not contest this because she believed that the Foreign

Office was based on standing up for the EC, then rather standing up for Britain (Thatcher

1993: 558-9). Thatcher was advised by Charles Powell, on the EC, who held the same views

as her. Powell believed in upholding the Westphalian System, with the nation-state being

the main actor in International Relations (Watkins 1991: 115). Thatcher’s own prejudice was

not being challenged, in relation to the EC, because she refused to listen to Foreign Office

advice, especially after the Milan Summit in June 1985.

In Lawson’s case, it was Alan Walters, Thatcher’s economic adviser, over Britain’s entry

into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Lawson (2010: 299) puts forward that the

majority of the Cabinet agreed to enter the ERM in 1985. Lawson wanted to enter the ERM,

as he believed this could lead to Britain nullifying the EMU. However, Thatcher listened to

the advice of Walters, which was that Britain should not enter the ERM because it could

damage the Conservatives at the 1987 General Election (Lawson 2010: 300). These two

16

examples illustrate that Thatcher was not prepared to listen to reasoned arguments, even

from her own close Cabinet colleagues, which challenged her own position on the EC.

Chapter 3: Critical Discourse Analysis on Jacques Delors’ TUC Speech and

Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges Speech

17

Chapter Introduction

This part of the disquisition will look at the key speeches made by Jacques Delors and

Margaret Thatcher, within 12 days of one another during September 1988. The two

speeches fundamentally differed on how the EC, should go forward, with Delors calling for a

supranational EC, while Thatcher believed intergovernmentalism, was the right way forward

for the EC.

Methodology for the Critical Discourse Analysis

The speeches will be looked at through the concept of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

Using a CDA will provide an explanation as to why Delors and Thatcher developed different

stances on how the EC should be constructed (Bryman 2012: 537). CDA helps to explain why

the two speeches are different in construction and identity, in relation to the EC.

The CDA’s purpose is to look at why Delors and Thatcher developed different future visions

for the EC. To break this question down, three sub-questions have been established to help

answer the main question of different visions for the EC.

1) How did both Delors and Thatcher view the development of the EC, since it was

created from the Treaty of Rome in 1957?

2) How did Delors and Thatcher both view the future direction of the path, which EC

integration should follow?

3) How did Delors and Thatcher both view which economic model the Single Market

should take?

The CDA will be administrated through a ‘three-dimensional framework’, as suggested by

Alan Bryman (2012: 538). Firstly, there will be a transitory look at the social contexts the

speeches were made under. This is before examining both the structure of the speeches and

the beliefs, which both Delors and Thatcher wanted to transmit to their respective

audiences (Bryman 2012: 538). This framework will ensure a clear and precise

understanding, on why Delors and Thatcher, had different visions for the EC.

Context for Speeches

18

Delors’ Speech

The speech to the Trade Union Congress, on the 8th September 1988 (Delors 1988b), has

become synonymous for changing both the attitudes of the Trade Unions and the Labour

Party towards the EC, from being negative to positive almost instantly. In 1983, the Trade

Union Congress (TUC) called for British withdrawal from the EC (Mitchell 2012: 29). It was

under this context that the Foreign Office invited Delors to speak to the TUC Congress of

1988 (Campbell 2003: 603), despite Geoffrey Howe being against the invitation (Delors

2004: 316-7). The Foreign Office believed that Delors, speaking to the TUC, as a fellow

socialist, would help change the thinking of the TUC and, by extension, the Labour Party,

towards the EC. The reaction to Delors’ speech was more than the Foreign Office hoped for.

There will also be references to Delors’ speech to the European Parliament (EP), which

took place on the 6th July 1988 (Delors 1988a). The EP, a supranational institution within the

EC, had just gained more powers under the Single European Act (SEA). Delors, under this

context, spoke of how the EC will become more supranational, with the EP and Commission,

working more closely in the future.

Thatcher’s Speech

The Bruges Speech, made by Thatcher in the College of Bruges in Bruges, Belgium, on the

20th September 1988, was intended to be a positive speech on Britain’s relationship with the

EC. The Foreign Office booked Thatcher to speak in Bruges to reaffirm Britain’s commitment

to the EC (Campbell 2003: 603); there were concerns about Britain’s commitment to the EC,

because it had not joined the ERM or been behind the attempt to ensure full EMU, within

the EC. The context of the speech changed with Delors’ interventions, both at the EP and

TUC, but more importantly, the speech at the TUC.

The TUC speech by Delors became the catalyst for Thatcher to set her

intergovernmentalist vision for the EC. Thatcher believed ‘it was high time’ to set her vision

for the EC, in response to Delors (Thatcher 1993: 742). Thatcher set out five key doctrines

within the speech for the member states of the EC to remain in control of the process of the

EC. The speech challenged the conventional view that the EC should follow supranationalism

willingly, without the consent of the peoples of the member states. In the BBC’s

19

documentary about Britain’s relationship with the EC (Poisoned Chalice Part 3, 1996),

Michael Butler, a senior civil servant, who was intimately involved in discussions over SEA,

infers that the speech legitimised Euroscepticism, especially within the Conservative

Parliamentary Party.

Discourse on sub-questions

How did both Delors and Thatcher view the development of the EC, since it was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957?

Delors Speech

In analysing Delors’ speech, he used the word “Our” twenty-six times within his speech to

the TUC. Even though this is not directly related to the historical development of the EC, it is

very important to the construction of the speech. This is because Delors is breaking down

the perception that Britain and Continental Europe are different. Delors, by emphasizing the

word “Our” is referring to the Trade Unions having a shared future within an encompassing

EC (Fierke 2013: 190). Delors breaks down the sense of “us” and “them” by paying tribute to

the role which British Trade Unions have played throughout the European Trade Union

Movement (Delors 1988b: 3-4). Ontologically, Delors is breaking down the myth of identity

and focussing on the idea that they are all socialists and the EC has developed on this

premise.

Delors uses the common socialist view, which he and members of the TUC hold, by

referring to the “historic achievement” of the British Trade Unions which “helped to forge in

Europe a new model for society” (Delors 1988b: 3). Even though the TUC and Trade Unions

are against the EC, Delors acknowledges that they have worked with their counterparts in

France and West Germany to create a corporatist model, where both employers and

employees sit on a company board. The notion of solidarity, although not started by the EC,

is now best carried out by the EC - this is the message which Delors is trying to convey, using

history to illustrate.

Thatcher’s Speech

By contrast, Thatcher within the content of her speech, seeks to undermine the history of

the EC, by arguing that “Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Nor is the

20

European idea the property of any group or institution” (Bruges Group 1998: 14). The

semantics of this sentence infer that Thatcher believes that not being part of the EC does

not automatically make a state not ‘European’. The inference is that the EC is a

manufactured institution, whereas being ‘European’ involves cultural, religious elements.

The essence is that there will still be a ‘Europe’, with or without the institution of the EC.

Furthermore, Thatcher emphasis ‘Britain’ or ‘British’ seventeen times throughout the

speech. This underlines the key thought, in relation to the development for the EC, for

Thatcher. Thatcher still firmly believes in the nation-state, rather than a manufactured EC, in

her judgment. Thatcher believes in the Classical Realist doctrine, where the nation-states

are in control of their own destiny. For Thatcher, this means upholding the Westphalian

Order, which was established with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This set the norm that

no nation-state can interfere in the domestic relations of another nation-state. This is best

ossified when Thatcher says, “Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as

France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity”

(Bruges Group 1998: 17).

How did Delors and Thatcher both view the future direction of the path, which EC integration

should follow?

Delors Speech

Delors within both of his speeches, emphasised the need for more supranationalism

within the EC. This is most plainly seen when he tells the EP, “My own feeling is that we are

not going to manage all the decisions needed between now and 1995 unless we see the

beginnings of European government” (Delors 1988a: 4). This sentence emphasises that

Delors believes that the institutions of the EC should have more powers at the expense of

the member states. Delors believes that the European Commission and EP are the best

actors in ensuring that Europe integrates more closely. Of course, the scene and context of

Delors’ speech to the EP has to be taken into account. It is in the interest of both the

Commission and EP for supranationalism to become the norm within the EC. This is because

both institutions would be responsible for administrating power within the EC, not the

member states.

21

Although Delors, within his speech to the TUC Congress, does not emphasise the need for

supranationalism, as much as in his speech to the EP, he is provocative towards Thatcher’s

ideological views of conservatism and maintaining the status quo within the EP. In Delors’

opening remarks to the TUC, he says a ‘peaceful revolution’ is happening within Europe

(Delors 1988b: 2). This can be conveyed as a speech act, which is designed to undermine

Thatcher’s vision for the EC. Firstly, this is because the word ‘revolution’ is anathema to

Thatcher’s conservative values. Delors is insinuating that the status of the EC is changing

from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism. Secondly, Delors is changing the social

fabric of the debate on the future shape of the EC, by not only isolating Thatcher within the

heads of European governments within the EC, but domestically within Britain too. This

should not be understated.

Thatcher’s Speech

Thatcher, within her speech, is moderately pro-EC, but believes member states should be

in control of the process of integration within the EC. Thatcher believes that member states

should deploy common resources where appropriate, but retain their individual

sovereignty. Thatcher, in her autobiography, explains this was because of “intractable

political realities” between the different member states within the EC (Thatcher 1993: 745).

In essence, Thatcher is challenging the concept that the federalisation of Europe will lead to

peace, she argues instead that in effect it will create a hubris effect. This is because different

identities and cultures would be suppressed and ultimately lead to conflict. Thatcher,

therefore, believes intergovernmentalism is the way forward for the EC, where differences

in identities and cultures can be respected.

This does not mean that Thatcher is anti-EC, but can be seen as a soft Eurosceptic, as she

accepted that Europe was a “family of nations” but she was unhappy at the political

direction in which the EC was heading (Bruges Group 1998: 25). She did not want EMU to

happen, and wanted change to the Common Agriculture Policy. Historical Institutionalism

gives the best answer as to why Thatcher believed that the EC should follow

intergovernmentalism. Pierson (2006: 312-6) puts forward that most nation states do not

want to lose sovereignty and heads of government, like Thatcher, learn about this within

the European political environment. This is true of Thatcher, as she would learn that Value

22

Added Tax (VAT) could be harmonised by the European Commission (Cockfield 1994: 55-6).

Thatcher was no different to Harold Wilson, Prime Minister between 1974 and 1976, and

David Cameron, the current Prime Minister, in asserting that Britain preferred

intergovernmentalism as the future integration model of the EC.

How did Delors and Thatcher both view which economic model the Single Market should

take?

Delors Speech

Delors, in his speech to the TUC, refers to the Single Market as the Common Market. This

is important because he believes it belongs to both businesses and Trade Unions, whereas,

Thatcher primarily believes it should belong to businesses. This is a key distinction because

Delors believes that there must be safeguards for employees, whereas Thatcher is more

concerned about efficiency and profit, which is in line with her classical economic liberalist

beliefs.

Delors makes coded criticism of Thatcher’s monetarist policy, which believes in achieving

financial stability through monetary control and balanced budgets, even if this causes high

unemployment. Delors does this by stating, “It would be unacceptable for Europe to become

a source of social regression” (Delors 1988b: 8). Therefore, Delors believes that the Single

Market should follow the economic model of dirigisme, where the state directs the

economy but in relation to the Single Market, it will be the Commission. This is because

Delors believes that unemployment should be avoided at all costs. Delors states this by

stating that workers will be protected through social legislation and collective bargaining

(Delors 1988b: 9).

Thatcher’s Speech

Thatcher within her speech believes that the Single Market should be based on enterprise

and free trade (Campbell 2003: 605). Thatcher alludes to her belief that dirigisme does not

23

work, that Britain tried dirigisme policies in the 1970’s and that Francis Mitterrand, the

French President between 1981 and 1995, experimented with a state-controlled economy

between 1981 and 1983, with adverse effects on the French economy. Thatcher, therefore,

advocates that the Single Market should follow the doctrine of neo-classical liberalist

economics, synonymous with the economic preferences of Anglo-American political elites.

Thatcher emphasises this point, by saying, “And before I leave the subject of the Single

Market, may I say that we certainly do not need new regulations which raise the cost of

employment and make Europe’s labour market less flexible and less competitive with

overseas supplies” (Bruges Group 1998: 22). Without question, this sentence shows

Thatcher’s preference that the Single Market should follow neo-classical liberalist

economics, as she believes that flexible labour markets are a must for the Single Market to

prosper. The theme of neo-classical economics is made throughout the speech.

Conclusion

Thatcher incontestably had a different opinion to Delors on the future vision of the EC. It is

clear to identify that Thatcher firmly believed that supranationalism within the EC was a

stark possibility. This was only heightened, by Delors, speaking to the TUC, stating that the

EC was a different route of engagement for the Trade Unions. Therefore, it is

understandable why Thatcher changed her mind form being moderately pro-EC to being a

soft Eurosceptic, as it is discerned that the EC was changing from being predominantly from

an intergovernmentalist organisation to a supranationalist organisation. This was against

British interests, as Britain preferred for the EC to be an intergovernmentalist organisation.

Chapter 4: Political Ramifications of Thatcher’s changed attitude towards

European Integration

Chapter Introduction

24

This part of the thesis looks at the impact of Thatcher’s changed attitude towards

European Integration, on both Labour and the Conservative Parties. This Chapter will look at

how Labour managed to be perceived as the ‘Party of Europe’ by 1989 (George 1991: 80).

The split within the Conservatives will then be looked at, which happened because of

Thatcher’s legacy on further European Integration. Finally, there is a brief look at the United

Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which can be seen as a Frankenstein creature whose

creation began with from Thatcher’s Bruges Speech and its effect on the Conservatives.

Labour’s Conversion to being the ‘Party of Europe’

Neil Kinnock, the Labour Leader between 1983 and 1992, inherited a party which wanted

withdrawal from the EC, but by 1989, Labour was seen as the ‘Party of Europe’. Labour, in

the 1989 European Elections, beat the Conservatives, which was the first time since

elections to the EP were introduced (George 1991: 80). Jacques Delors’ speech to the TUC in

September 1988, was the catalyst for the change but Neil Kinnock laid down the

foundations for the change of position.

Kinnock realised that Labour’s position of withdrawal from the EC, was an electoral

hindrance in terms of it being perceived as a governing party (Daniels 1998: 79; Forster

2002: 69). Kinnock was from the ‘soft left’ faction of the Labour Parliamentary Party, which

was traditionally hostile to the EC. Kinnock, who believed that the EC was a capitalist club,

was slowly persuaded of the merits of the EC and managed to take the ‘soft left’ of the

Labour Parliamentary Party with him (Forster 2002: 69). Kinnock gradually moved the party

away from the Bennite view, that the EC only benefited capitalists and exploited workers.

Kinnock was persuaded mainly by fellow social democratic leaders within the EC, that the

Community was good for workers. This was important because workers were Labour’s

natural constituency. Kinnock learnt from Francis Mitterrand’s economic strategy for France

between 1981 and 1983, that a member state by itself could not control an ever growing

interdependent European economy (George 1991: 81). The Bennite economic strategy of

controlling the commanding heights of the economy would not work, Kinnock learned, from

the Mitterrand experiment. Therefore, Kinnock realised the importance of a Social

Democratic Europe.

25

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain between 1982 and 1996, and Francis Mitterrand,

fellow Social Democratic leaders within the EC, convinced Kinnock that the Single Market

was good for the EC and for Britain, because the European Commission (Commission) would

ensure that the Social Chapter proposed by Delors would look after workers’ rights

(Sandholtz and Zysman 2006: 215). Kinnock was aware that the Social Chapter would be

welcomed by workers because Thatcher had curbed workers’ rights throughout the 1980’s,

especially in employment rights and minimum wage agreements (Mitchell 2012: 33).

Kinnock became persuaded that Labour needed to be positive towards the EC, because in

the short term, Labour domestically could not offer hope to workers and realised that the

EC would give protection to workers. Labour, by working with fellow social democratic

parties throughout the EC, could build a better Europe for workers. Perhaps the biggest

vindication of Kinnock’s strategy was that Thatcher referred to the Social Chapter as the

‘socialists charter’ (Thatcher 1993: 750-1).

The catalyst for Labour’s change of attitude towards the EC was the Trade Union

movement. The Trade Union movement was hostile towards the EC because it perceived

that the EC was autocratic and capitalist. This was because of figures such as Konrad

Adenauer, Chancellor of West Germany between 1949 and 1963, and Charles De Gaulle

(Jenkins 1990: 133). The spectre of fascism and authoritarianism still haunted the Trade

Union movement, and inhibited belief that the EC worked in the interests of those the

Unions represented. As Kristine Mitchell (2012: 32) argues this was irrelevant because in the

1960’s and 1970’s, both Labour and Conservative governments were adopting Keynesian

economic policies and the TUC had regular access to the government of the day.

However, the Thatcher Premiership saw the TUC and Trade Unions become marginalised.

This was because Thatcher held the Trade Unions in contempt for the 1978-79 Winter of

Discontent. This led to Thatcher curbing workers’ rights including a banning on secondary

picketing (Mitchell 2012: 33-35). Mitchell (2012: 26) asserts that this helped to lead to a

political opportunity for the TUC, to reasserts its assessment of the EC. The TUC realised that

itself and individual Trade Unions had to reassess their options, after membership of Trade

Unions fell from 12 million in 1980 to 9 million in 1988 (Mitchell 2012: 35).

26

Therefore, when Delors’ came to speak to the TUC Conference in September 1988, the

Social Chapter by Delors and the EC,was the only viable option for the TUC and the Trade

Union Movement. Clive Jenkins, the General Secretary of the Association of Scientific,

Technical and Management Staffs at the time, admits that the Trade Unions turned to the

EC because they believed that the only option of curbing the Thatcher Government was

through the EC (Jenkins 1990: 138). Labour officially became pro-EC at its Party Conference

in October 1988.

The fatal division of the Conservative Party……..?

The Bruges Speech and the fall of Thatcher as Prime Minister in November 1990, split the

Conservatives on a scale not seen before. The Parliamentary Party split into three

discernible factions: Constitutional Nationalists, Free-Marketers and Euro-Enthusiasts.

Constitutional Nationalists and Free-Marketers are both against further European

integration with the European Union (EU) and at worst, want Britain to withdraw from the

EU, for different reasons respectively. On the other hand, the Euro-Enthusiasts want Britain

to play a leading role within the EU. The split has been compared with the Corn Laws of the

1840’s and the question of Tariff Reform in the 1900’s, which saw the Conservative Party

fatally split with Robert Peel and Joseph Chamberlain, despite being perceived as the

minority within the Parliamentary Party, holding great sway with the voluntary party

(Campbell 2014: 670; Gamble 2003: 115; Letwin 1992: 292; Liddle 2014: xxviii).

The Conservatives have not fatally split at the present moment but they no longer have a

monopoly on the centre-right of British Politics, with the emergence of UKIP. More crucially,

David Cameron, the current Prime Minister, is legislating for an IN/OUT referendum on

Britain’s membership of the EU. This is because Cameron is using the referendum to ensure

party unity for the moment, but when the referendum is held - either in 2016 or 2017 - one

side of the party will have fatally lost the argument (Fontana and Parsons 2015: 89).

This part of the chapter will look at the three key factions and the motives what drives

them. The three key events between Thatcher’s departure and the present, which have

exacerbated the split within the party, will also be looked at: Maastricht and Black

Wednesday, William Hague ruling out joining the Euro and David Cameron’s withdrawal of

the Conservatives from the European People’s Party and European Democrats.

27

This thesis does recognise that the split within the Conservatives is more complex than

the argument going to be put forward. Anthony Forster (2002: 70-1) contends that there are

five different Eurosceptic groups within the Conservative Parliamentary Party. This thesis

does not necessarily argue against this. However, for brevity only two Eurosceptic groups

will be looked at: Constitutional Nationalists and Free-Marketers, as alluded to before.

Forster (2002: 78) also claims that the founding of the Bruges Group in 1989, as a spillover

effect of Thatcher’s Bruges Speech, legitimised Euroscepticism. The off-shoot of pressure

groups from the Bruges Speech within the Conservative Parliamentary Party are recognised,

but is not the main argument of this thesis. Likewise, there have been more than three

events since 1990 within the Conservative Party where the EU has been a source of major

discontent. However, these three events demonstrate adequately the growing ideological

split Thatcher left for her successors as leader of the Conservative Party.

There have been Constitutional Nationalists in the party since the EC became an issue in

the 1960’s. The influence of Enoch Powell, a former anti-EC Conservative MP, is strong

within the Constitutional Nationalists (Gamble 2003: 24; Patterson 2011: 154). They believe

that England must be strong and that the EU is a false illusion in bringing peace and

prosperity (Gamble 2003: 24). The sovereignty of the House of Commons must be

maintained for England to be strong, they claim. Ontologically, they believe that England

must be a strong nation in her own right and look to when she was strong in the nineteenth

century. Bill Cash, the current MP for Stowe, who voted for the Single European Act (SEA)

became a convinced Constitutional Nationalist after Thatcher’s Bruges Speech and Thatcher

vindicates this line of thought with, “Democracy cannot function in a federal superstate

where the municipality of languages makes democratic debate and democratic

accountability mere slogans” (Thatcher 1995: 470-1).

Free-Marketers within the Conservative Parliamentary Party originally believed that the

EC was good for Britain. However, they felt betrayed that the Single Market was going to be

based on the Continental economic model of dirigisme, not the Anglo-American economic

model of economic liberalism (Forster 2002: 70-1; Patterson 2011: 155). They came to

believe Thatcher’s mantra of “the European Union was an obstacle to fruitful

internationalism” (Thatcher 1995: 470-1). What Thatcher and Free-Marketers within the

Conservative Parliamentary Party mean by fruitful internationalism, is that member states of

28

the EU should be in control of their own trade deals. This is because the EU, through the

Commission, represents the member states on bilateral trade deals and on the World Trade

Organisation (WTO). Free-Marketers believe that Britain should leave the EU and conduct its

own bilateral trade arrangements with other states. It is pertinent to note that UKIP was

originally founded on the base of ‘fruitful internationalism’, with Nigel Farage, the current

leader of UKIP, admitting that Thatcherite classical economics was a main reason for

founding UKIP (Tournier-Sol 2015: 445). The debacle over Black Wednesday, as will be

demonstrated, was the catalyst for Free-Marketers to join with the Constitutional

Nationalists, to call for Britain to take a harder stance within the EU, and eventually to the

position that Britain should leave the EU.

The Euro-Enthusiasts led by Ken Clarke, Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1993 and

1997, believe that Britain must be at the heart of Europe. They agreed with John Major’s

statement in 1991 that Britain should be at the “heart of Europe” (Patterson 2011: 182).

They believe that Britain should be part of the Eurozone. This will be shown in further detail

later within the composition. Nonetheless, one of their main arguments against Britain

leaving the EU on sovereignty grounds, then the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

signed in 1949, becomes invalid on the same grounds, because it commits Britain to

defending another state within the organisation if they are attacked under Article 4 of the

NATO Treaty. Euro-Enthusiasts argue that Britain needs to be more cosmopolitan in its

outlook, rejecting the Constitutional Nationalists, which they perceive to be of a little

Englander view.

Britain entered the ERM in October 1990, with the acquiescence of Thatcher. However, on

Wednesday 16th September 1992, Britain had to withdraw from the ERM. This became

known as ‘Black Wednesday’. This created the catalyst for Constitutional Nationalists to

argue that Major was a soft touch on Europe (Evans 2013: 135). Free-Marketers became

emboldened to join forces with the Constitutional Nationalists, as the ERM demonstrated to

them that the economics of the EU did not suit British interests. This approach by the Free-

Marketers was endorsed by Thatcher, who said at the time, “If you try to buck the market,

the market will buck you” (Campbell 2003: 770-1). This helped to create a civil war within

the Conservative Parliamentary Party, which contributed to the landslide defeat at the 1997

General Election (Gamble 2003: 124; Gowland et al 2010: 123).

29

Nonetheless, an important factor was that Thatcher at the same time was going to

oppose the Maastricht Treaty ‘root and branch’, which Major was concluding for Britain at

the time, because she believed this was going to lead to a socialist federal Europe (Thatcher

1995: 486-9). This was despite Thatcher, through SEA, having left a commitment on

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was the basis for Maastricht (Forster 2002:

84). It did not matter to Thatcher and her supporters that Thatcher had put Major in this

position. Maastricht and ‘Black Wednesday’ were used as a precursor by the Constitutional

Nationalists and Free-Marketers to reclaim the soul of the Parliamentary Party after the

perceived forced departure of Thatcher as Prime Minister.

After the 1997 General Election, William Hague was elected as leader of the Conservative

Party. Constitutional Nationalists and Free-Marketers were established within the

Parliamentary Party, as Hague beat Clarke, who was the Euro-enthusiast candidate for the

leadership. However, Hague was only elected by the Parliamentary Party, not by the

grassroots of the Party. Therefore, Hague asked the grassroots what policies they wanted

and 84% wanted the Pound to be kept as the currency for Britain, at least for two

parliamentary terms (Patterson 2011: 221). This was when the Labour Government, under

Tony Blair, was considering whether to join the Euro. Hague was bound by policy preference

to ensure that the new stance towards European integration, in relation to the single

currency, was upheld. Euro-enthusiasts led by Clarke, disagreed with Hague’s stance. They

showed their dislike for Hague’s policy by signing a letter in the Independent criticising

Hague for ruling out the Euro and supporting Blair’s approach to the EU (Gowland et al

2010: 164-5). The Euro-enthusiasts believed the communitarianism approach Hague was

taken the Party along would damage the electoral prospects for the 2001 General Election.

This was proved to be right when the Conservatives made only one net gain at the election.

In 1992, the Conservative European Parliamentary Party agreed to affiliate with the

European People’s Party (EPP), which was the main centre-right grouping within the EP, by

forming the European People’s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED) (Patterson 2011: 158).

There had been tensions between the Conservatives and their fellow centre-right colleagues

within the EP, such as the Christian Democrat Union (CDU) from Germany, on how European

integration should go forward. The Conservatives believed in intergovernmentalism, as has

30

been the British Policy since the EU has been created, but the CDU believed in

supranationalism, which has been the German Policy since the EU has been created.

David Cameron, during the Conservative Leadership Election in 2005, reopened this

debate by pledging to withdraw the Conservative European Parliamentary Party from the

EPP-ED grouping (Bale 2006: 393; Patterson 2011: 252). Cameron did this to keep the

Constitutional Nationalists within the party happy, even though he had inherited the mantle

from Clarke, for being seen as pragmatic over Europe. Tim Bale (2006: 397) argues that this

kind of gesture politics from Cameron has led him to look irresponsible. Certainly, not being

in the EPP-ED alliance has meant Cameron cannot influence with any substance any

negotiations which may be taking place on legislation within the EU. Crucially, and more

importantly, Cameron is not able to discuss with Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany,

at EPP meetings, on how he wants the EU to be governed. Cameron, by appeasing the

Eurosceptics within his party, has opened up a Pandora’s Box over Britain’s membership

within the EU.

The Nemesis of Bruges : UKIP

Thatcher’s Bruges Speech led to the foundation of the Bruges Group in 1989, which

contained Dr Alan Sked, who eventually founded UKIP in 1993 (Tournier-Sol 2015: 142).

UKIP originated from Thatcher’s Bruges Speech, as members who founded UKIP did not

believe Major after Maastricht. Nigel Farage acknowledges that UKIP perceive themselves to

be the true inheritors of Thatcherism, especially on the EU (Tournier-Sol 2015: 145). This is

apt to discuss because Farage is arguing that UKIP have taken ownership of Conservatism,

whereas, the Conservatives believe in Edward Heath’s ‘One Nation’ approach, which is seen

to be corporatist and where a federal Europe is the real aim. It is UKIP, not the

Conservatives, who believes in the Nation-State and classical economics, which Thatcher

argued for. The fight over Britain’s membership of the EU has become entwined with the

soul of Conservatism itself.

Liddle (2014: xxvi-xxviii) argues that David Cameron, despite offering an IN/OUT

referendum, will not be able to appease traditional conservatives on this issue, because they

can go to UKIP. Cameron will have to face Farage and UKIP head on during the EU

Referendum debate. Thus, an unintended consequence of Thatcher’s Bruges Speech has

31

been the founding of UKIP, which now presents a serious challenge to the Conservative

Party. Farage has said that a young Margaret Thatcher would now join UKIP (Tournier-Sol

2015: 145). Thatcher has fissured the Conservative family, then uniting them, as was her

intention. Who is the real leader of the Conservative movement: David Cameron or Nigel

Farage? This question will be answered with the EU Referendum.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Margaret Thatcher’s change of position towards the European Community was because

she did not fully understood what the European project meant to the other member states

within the Community. This was partially because there was an inherent culture, within the

32

British Political Elite, that the Community should automatically follow Anglo-American

preferences. This is aptly demonstrated with the Single European Act, where Thatcher

thought the integrated Single Market should follow the economic liberalist model, which is

identified as an Anglo-American construct. Nevertheless, the Single Market did not become

identified as Thatcher thought it should, as it became synonymous with the economic

preference of Continental Europe, of dirigisme. Thatcher did not realise that Continental

Europe believed in a different identity to Britain until it was too late for her to do anything

about it.

Consequently, this reawakened Thatcher’s prejudice against Continental Europe. Thatcher

never fully broke down the perceived barrier that existed between herself and other

European Heads of Government. She never believed in their consensual way of diplomacy,

as this was seen as unBritish. The perceived barrier is evident in the Bruges Speech, when

she refers to Britain seventeen times. The Single European Act was the main catalyst for

Thatcher to change her position on the Community, as she realised that British preferences

for the Community will always be superseded by the preference of the Franco-German

alliance. Identity and nationhood, therefore, became a big issue for Thatcher, in relation to

Britain’s membership of the European Community. Standing up against the perceived threat

of loss of sovereignty from the centre became, for Thatcher, infused with the politics of

identity.

Accordingly, the issue of identity and nationhood has seen the Conservative Party

revaluate its pragmatism towards Europe. The Conservative Party has moved towards

Thatcher’s and Lord Salisbury’s position of splendid isolation towards the politics of the

Continent, rather than engage with other states on the Continent, as Edward Heath

believed. This issue of British identity and nationhood, in relation to its place in Europe, has

become entwined with the soul of Conservatism itself.

This thesis has underlined several gaps within the literature, which would bear further

investigation. This includes how Thatcher’s Bruges Speech led to the issue of identity and

nationhood becoming an issue within Conservatism in British Politics. However, one of the

main threads of this thesis is to show that the effect of Thatcher’s Bruges Speech is that

Conservatism is no longer the monopoly of the Conservative Party, helping to explain the

33

reason why Britain, in 2016 or 2017, is going to have a referendum on its European Union

membership.

Postscript

In under less than two years, Britain will have decided whether it wants to remain in the

European Union or not. The referendum has become synonymous with the soul of

Conservatism, with David Cameron seen as representing the Heathite vision of Europe,

whereas Nigel Farage is seen representing the Thatcherite vision of Europe. Consequentially,

the debate within the Conservative family may be more important to the referendum

debate than a traditional referendum debate of YES and NO. A Television Debate between

Cameron and Farage will expose the fissures within the Conservative ideology, but more

crucially, will begin unlocking the key to the definite answer on Britain’s membership of the

European Union. It will be this debate which will determine the outcome. That is Thatcher’s

legacy.

Bibliography

Books

Booker, C. ‘Britain and Europe: Repenting at Leisure’, in Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution, edited by Clarke, J; Roy, S. (London, 2005) pp 37-49

34

Bryman, A. Social Research Methods, 4th Edition, (Oxford, 2012)

Campbell, J. Margaret Thatcher: The Grocer’s Daughter (London, 2000)

Campbell, J. Margaret Thatcher: The Iron Lady (London, 2003)

Campbell, J. Roy Jenkins: A Well-Rounded Life (London, 2014)

Cockfield, L. The European Union: Creating The Single Market (Chichester, 1994)

Delors, J. Memoires (Paris, 2004)

Evans, B. Thatcherism and British Politics: 1975-1999 (Stroud, 1999)

Evans, E.J. Thatcher and Thatcherism, 3rd Edition. (Oxon, 2013)

Fierke, K.M. ‘Constructivism’, in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, edited by Dunne, T; Kurki, M; Smith, S. (Oxford, 2013) pp 187-203

Forster, A. Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties Since 1945. (London, 2002)

Gamble, A. Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics (Basingstoke, 2003)

George, S. Britain and European Integration since 1945 (Oxford, 1991)

Green, E.H.H. Thatcher (London, 2010)

Gowland, D; Turner, A; Wright, A. Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On The Sidelines (Oxon, 2010)

Hoffman, S. ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’, in Debates on European Integration, edited by Eilstrup – Sangiovanni, M. (London, 2006) pp 134-160

Howe, G. Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1994)

Jackson, R; Sorenson, G. Introduction to International Relations: Theories & Approaches, 4th Edition, (London, 2010)

Jenkins, C. All Against the Collar: Struggles of a White-Collar Union Leader (London, 1990)

Lawson, N. Memoirs of a Tory Radical, 2nd Edition. (London, 2010)

Letwin, S.R. The Anatomy of Thatcherism (London, 1992)

Liddle, R. The Europe Dilemma: Britain and the Drama of EU Integration (London, 2014)

May, A. Britain and Europe Since 1945 (New York, 1999)

35

Ned Lebow, R. ‘Classical Realism’, in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, edited by Dunne, T; Kurki, M; Smith, S. (Oxford, 2013) pp 59-76

Patterson, B. The Conservative Party and Europe (London, 2011)

Pierson, P. ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’, in Debates on European Integration, edited by Eilstrup – Sangiovanni, M. (London, 2006) pp 304-325

Rand, J. ‘British Identity and European Integration’, in The European Union and Britain: Debating the Challenges Ahead, edited by Koutrakou, V.N; Emerson, L.A. (Basingstoke, 2000) pp 24-44

Renwick, R. A Journey with Margaret Thatcher: Foreign Policy Under The Iron Lady (London, 2013)

Sandholtz, W; Zysman, J. ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’, in Debates on European Integration, edited by Eilstrup – Sangiovanni, M. (London, 2006) pp 204-225

Steinmo, S. ‘What is Historical Institutionalism?’, in Approaches in the Social Sciences, edited by Della Porta, D; Keating, M. (Cambridge, 2008) pp 150-178

Sterling – Folker, J. ‘Neoliberalism’, in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, edited by Dunne, T; Kurki, M; Smith, S. (Oxford, 2013) pp 114 -131

Thatcher, M. The Downing Street Years (St Ives, 1993)

Thatcher, M. The Path to Power (St Ives, 1995)

Vinen, R. Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980’s (London, 2009)

Watkins, A. A Conservative Coup (London, 1991)

Young, H. One of Us, 3rd Edition (London, 1993)

Young, H. The Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London, 1998)

Young, J. Britain and European Unity 1945-1999, 2nd Edition (Basingstoke, 2000)

Documents

Delors, J. Speech to the European Parliament, on the 6th July 1988 (1988a)

Accessed on: 27th February 2015

Accessed at: http://fc95d419f4478b3b6e5f-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.r87.cf1.rackcdn.com/E8008D507B0843D2A10FD4F03205D5E0.pdf

36

Delors, J. ‘1992: The Social Dimension’, Speech to the Trade Union Congress in Bournemouth by Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, on the 8th September 1988. (1988b)

Accessed on: 23rd February 2015

Accessed at: http://fc95d419f4478b3b6e5f-3f71d0fe2b653c4f00f32175760e96e7.r87.cf1.rackcdn.com/7C4B2DDEB5CE4B4AB639943D78A556E6.pdf

Document endorsed by the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party: Labour’s Approach to the Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union and subsequent developments in the European Community, Wednesday 28th November 1990.

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

Letter to Neil Kinnock from Nigel Spearing MP, on the 10th October 1988.

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

Letter to Norman Willis from Nigel Spearing MP, on the 11th October 1988.

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

Letter to Margaret Thatcher from Nigel Spearing MP, on the 9th November 1988.

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

Note on “European Union” and Instiutional Sections of the Draft CSPEC Manifesto, February 2nd 1989.

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

Thatcher’s Letter of Reply Back to Nigel Spearing MP, on the 5th December 1988.

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

The Federalism Wrangle Notes

37

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

Spearing, N. The Treaties that Lie Behind The Speeches, October 1988. pp 1-5

Accessed on: 30th June 2015

Accessed at: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge.

Spearing, N. A Labour Policy for the Common Market: A Preliminary Draft Policy, 1st February 1989.

Accessed On: 30th June 2015

Accessed At: Thatcher Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge

The Bruges Group (1998). ‘Bruges Revisited: The text of the speech delivered in Bruges by The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, OM, FRS, on 20th September 1988’, Occasional Paper No.34. pp vii-25

Journals

Bale, T. ‘Between a Soft and a Hard Place? The Conservative Party, Valence Politics and the Need for a New ‘Eurorealism’’, Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 59, No 3, (May, 2006) pp 385-400

Daniels, P. ‘From hostility to ‘constructive engagement’: The Europeanisation of the Labour Party’, West European Politics, 21:1, (1998). pp 72-96

Fontana, C; Parsons, C. ‘‘One Woman’s Prejudice’: Did Margaret Thatcher Cause Britain’s Anti-Europeanism?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 23, Number 1, (2015). pp 89-105

Lynch, P; Whitaker, R. ‘Where There is Discord, Can They Bring Harmony? Managing Intra-Party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Volume 15, (2012). pp 317-339

Mitchell, K. ‘From Whitehall to Brussels: Thatcher, Delors and the Europeanization of the TUC’, Labor History, Vol 53, No 1, (February, 2012). pp 25-50

Tournier-Sol, K. ‘Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP’s Winning Formula?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 53, Number 1, (2015). pp 140-156

Usherwood, S. ‘Bruges as a Lodestone of British Opposition to the European Union’, Collegium, No 29, (Winter, 2004). pp 5-16

38

Magazines

Kinnock, N. (1986, November). Is there a European route to economic recovery?, New Statesman, 13.

Television

The Poisoned Chalice (1996). Directed by Ian Potts. BBC.

39