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Why did CPSU reform fail? The 28thParty Congress ReconsideredAtsushi Ogushi aa Hokkaido University ,Published online: 28 Jun 2007.

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Why Did CPSU Reform Fail? The 28th Party

Congress Reconsidered

ATSUSHI OGUSHI

Abstract

This article considers the reasons for the failure to reform the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU), which was central to the Soviet collapse. Using a wide range of party and other archives, it

challenges the conventional view that power was concentrated in the hands of a very conservative party

apparat that was able to frustrate any attempt at reform. Focusing on the issue of party renewal at the

28th Party Congress of 1990, it argues that party reformers, including many party secretaries, made

serious efforts to change a hierarchically organised vanguard party into a social democratic one at

about this time. Their eventual failure was due more than anything else to the reformers’ lack of an

organised movement and Gorbachev’s indecisiveness.

THE REASONS FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM and the extent to which it

can be regarded as inevitable continue to be actively debated.1 Some argue that the

Soviet system was intrinsically unreformable. Thus, any attempt to reform the system

was either bound to fail, that is, to return to the old regime, or lead to a total collapse.

Such an argument is strengthened by the unarguable fact that the system did eventually

come to an end. Others, however, have suggested that the system was not necessarily

unviable; at any rate, even if a reformed communist system was not a realistic option,

there was at least some possibility that the system could have been transformed into a

social democratic one, which would have alleviated the misery of the change.2

This research is in part supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B), Japan Society for the

Promotion of Science.1See, for example, Slavic Review, 63, 3, Fall 2004, which includes an article by Stephen F. Cohen

(2004) and comments by several scholars. Cohen opposes the conventional argument that the system

was impossible to reform. This view has been advanced by the Totalitarian school, including Martin

Malia. Some other scholars also argued that the party ‘proved to be unreformable’ (see Teague & Tolz

1991, p. 2). On the other hand, White states that ‘there was a real potential for Party renewal in the

early 1990s’ (White 1994, p. 663). A former apparatchik, Onikov, argued that, for the successful reform

of the system, democratisation of the party apparat should have come first, then that democratisation

of the party in general should have followed, and that democratisation of society should have come last

(see Onikov 1996, pp. 71 – 72).2Shiokawa distinguishes three phases of regime change: regeneration, euthanasia, and murder.

According to him, the possibility of regeneration of the communist system did not exist, but,

euthanasia in the sense of a voluntary social democratisation had some possibility, even though the

final act was murder or radical destruction (see Shiokawa 1994, chapter 4).

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Vol. 59, No. 5, July 2007, 709 – 733

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/07/050709-25 ª 2007 University of Glasgow

DOI: 10.1080/09668130701377318

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The discussion that follows focuses on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU), which has normally been regarded as the core of the Soviet system.3 An

investigation of the reformability of the CPSU should provide a large part of the

answer to questions that relate to the reformability of the system as a whole. It is

well known that the party prided itself on its monolithic unity, sustained through

hierarchical control from above with the help of organisational devices that included

a ban on party fractions, democratic centralism and the intra-party nomenklatura

system. The conventional view, which argues that the party was unreformable, bases

itself on the assumption that power within the party was concentrated in the hands

of a conservative party apparat that frustrated any attempt at reform. This article,

drawing on party archives as well as other archives that have become available

since the Soviet collapse, will put forward an alternative view. Party reformers, it

will be suggested, including party officials, tried to transform a hierarchically

organised vanguard party into a social democratic parliamentary party, although

their attempts eventually failed. The 28th all-union Party Congress, at which the

reform and renewal of the party were discussed, was a critical juncture for such a

social-democratising initiative. Thus this article tries to make it clear why party

reform failed, focusing on the issues of party renewal around the 28th Party

Congress.4

The emergence of party reformers

By the time of the 28th Party Congress, the party was undoubtedly losing its

traditional ruling function. Therefore the problem for the party was to find a new

function, that is, to become a ‘political’ party similar to those in liberal democracies.5

After some attempts at economic reform, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had

turned his attention to the political system. As far as the party was concerned, such an

approach took two distinct forms, whose basic ideas had been approved at the 19th

Party Conference in June – July 1988. The first was removing party control over state

organs. In particular, the reorganisation of the party apparat in autumn 1988 had a

significant effect on the work of the party. In this process the party lost its most

important mechanism for intervening in the work of executive bodies and relinquished

the ruling position it had enjoyed for seven decades.6 At the same time however, the

3This article draws upon my more extensive study of the disintegration of the CPSU. Some other

parts have appeared as separate articles and discussion papers (see Ogushi 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, pp.

268 – 295, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). This article is based on ‘Why Did CPSU Reform Fail? The Twenty-

Eighth Party Congress Reconsidered’, a paper presented to the annual conference of the Japanese

Association for Russian and East European Studies (JAREES), 16 October (Ogushi 2005b) and

Ogushi (2005c, chapter 4).4Representative works on the 28th Party Congress include the following: White (1992a, 1992b,

1997, pp. 681 – 697); Gooding (1991, pp. 237 – 253); Hahn (1995, pp. 375 – 405); Chiesa (1990,

pp. 24 – 38); Gill (1994, especially chapter 6); Ueno (1995, pp. 329 – 357); and Kimura (2000, part 2,

chapter 3).5Yurii Prokof’ev, former Moscow gorkom first secretary, advances a similar view, although he states

that the party did not have the capacity to transform itself into a ‘political organisation’ (see Prokof’ev

2005, pp. 105 – 106).6For details of the reorganisations of the party apparat, see Ogushi (2004a, 2005c, 2005d, chapter 3).

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executive bodies, which had been dependent on party direction for many years,

stopped working as well. Thus, a ‘power vacuum’ took shape after the party apparat

reorganisation. Together with the modification of article six of the Soviet

Constitution, which removed the leading role of the party, an executive presidency

was formally established in March 1990, with the task of managing what was

becoming a chaotic situation.

The other element in party reform was the competitive election of party secretaries.7

Following the 19th Party Conference in 1988, several attempts were made to organise

competitive elections through which party officials were to become more accountable to

the rank and file. However, although this led to the election of lower level party officials

on a new and competitive basis the reform was not vigorously pursued at higher levels

of the party at the same time. While nearly half of all Primary Party Organisation

(PPO) secretaries were elected by competitive elections, and 1,117 party secretaries

(including 269 first secretaries) at the raikom and gorkom level were elected on an

alternative basis in 1988, at higher levels the picture was less impressive. Only eight

party secretary elections at obkom level took place on a competitive basis in 1988 (and

none of these were for first secretary positions).8 Although in 1989 there were some

competitive elections for first secretaryships at obkom level in Chelyabinsk, Kaliningrad,

Sakhalin and elsewhere, they were very exceptional cases (Ogushi 2005d, pp. 130 – 131).

Meanwhile, democratising reforms were taking place more effectively in areas other

than in the internal affairs of the party. The elections to the Congress of the People’s

Deputies in 1989 were a first step in democratising the whole society. Although not fully

competitive, they certainly provided a powerful democratising stimulus. The republican

and lower-level soviet elections that took place in February –March 1990 were

genuinely competitive, and they saw the emergence of new movements or proto-parties

that challenged and defeated Communist Party candidates (White et al. 1993,

chapter 2). In January 1989 a Central Committee official, Leon Onikov, drew attention

to the disproportion in the pace of democratisation between party and society.9 While

society was actively democratising, the higher reaches of the party were not. In the

middle were party activists and local party officials, who understood that the public

attitude toward the party was increasingly hostile; but they felt their voices were never

listened to by the party leadership. It was a natural consequence that party activists and

lower party officials attempted to change the traditional hierarchical structure of the

party. For them, the 28th Party Congress was a crucial opportunity to do so.

Emerging fractions and controversy over party renewal

In its meeting of February 1990 the party’s Central Committee (CC) plenum discussed

and approved the leadership’s new platform ‘Toward a Humane, Democratic

Socialism’. It was rather liberal in terms of its perspective for the entire political

and economic system; that is it favoured a regulated market economy, a multi-party

system, and the establishment of a new federal state. However, it was not very

7For details of the competitive party elections, see Ogushi (2005d, chapter 4, pp. 119 – 137).8Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, 3, p. 18, and Izvestiya TsK KPSS 1990, 2, p. 67.9Pravda, 2 January 1989, p. 2. See also Pravda, 10 July 1989, p. 2.

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reformist on internal party matters: supporting the concept of a vanguard rather than

a parliamentary party, making no reference to the nomenklatura system, and retaining

the party’s longstanding ban on fractions and support for democratic centralism while

claiming to renew them (Materialy Plenuma Tsentral’nogo 1990, pp. 353 – 382).

By this time various groups or tendencies within the party were already beginning to

take shape (Shostakovskii 1989, pp. 5 – 12), and de facto ‘fractions’ were emerging and

seeking to influence the election of delegates to the Party Congress. After the Central

Committee published its proposals for a new Party Programme, two major ‘platforms’

emerged around the beginning of 1990: the Democratic Platform and the Marxist

Platform.

The Democratic Platform had its origins in the ‘Moscow Party Club’, which had

been formed in April 1989.10 The Moscow Party Club’s immediate goal was to call an

extraordinary CPSU congress. It also developed a set of more elaborate objectives

which included a reform in the procedure for electing delegates to the Congress. At the

same time, it began to formulate its basic policy, which was crystallised at the all-union

conference of the Democratic Platform in January 1990. Their basic policy was to

transform the CPSU into a social democratic parliamentary party. In order to do so

they proposed a multi-party system, a federal organisation for the CPSU itself, a

territorial basis for party branches, the replacement of democratic centralism, freedom

of fraction formation, and abolition of the nomenklatura.11

At the time of its foundation the Democratic Platform was reported to include some

100,000 communists. Among the delegates to its founding conference, some 60%

worked mainly in educational and research institutes, 20% were from industrial

enterprises, and 20% were full-time party officials. Working class delegates accounted

for no more than 5%. It quickly developed further, and by the middle of April its

branches (democratic associations and party clubs) had come into existence in all

union republics, and more than 100 cities. Coordinating bodies had also been formed

at regional and all-union levels.12

The Marxist Platform was rooted in party members who had left the Moscow Party

Club. It held its first conference on 14 – 15 April 1990 with about 300 people from 54

cities participating. At the second all-union conference, which was held on 16 – 17 June

1990, 91 delegates and 147 guests from 64 cities and eight union republics participated.

The policy of the Marxist Platform was much more moderate than that of the

Democratic Platform: it favoured a market economy, a party for workers, guaranteed

minority rights and the elimination of bureaucratic centralism, while still opposing

fraction activity and a parliamentary basis of party organisation.13

These two platforms were the first organised fractions de facto since the 10th Party

Congress of 1921. Some proposals of the Democratic Platform in particular had some

10On the Democratic Platform, the author is heavily indebted to Chubais (1991, pp. 4 – 15),

Wishnevsky and Teague (1990, pp. 7 – 9), and Gill (1994, pp. 122 – 125); see also Ueno (1995, p. 344).11Pravda, 3 March 1990, p. 3. See also an interview with Vyacheslav Shostakovskii, rector of

Moscow Higher Party School and one of the leaders of the Democratic Platform, in Komsomol’skaya

pravda, 27 January 1990, p. 1.12Moskovskie novosti, 1990, 15, 15 April, p. 7.13Pravda, 16 April 1990, p. 4; Pravda, 9 May 1990, p. 3; Pravda, 19 June 1990, p. 3; Glasnost’, 1990,

2, 21 June, pp. 4 – 5.

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resonance within the mass media, including party journals. For example, some argued

for implementation of the electoral principle in cadre work, which would have led to

the demise of the nomenklatura mechanism (Abramov 1990, pp. 62 – 66). There was

also a suggestion that cadre selection should be open to a variety of people rather than

based on a nomenklatura list (Kuz’menok 1990, pp. 30 – 31). It was even reported that

one raikom in Murmansk city had abolished its nomenklatura list, which had consisted

of 286 posts.14 It was in the context of such vigorous differences of opinion that the

rival platforms attempted to influence the selection of delegates to the 28th Party

Congress in a manner that would be to their advantage.

Delegate elections to the 28th Party Congress

Decisions on electoral procedure and their critics

One of the most important issues in delegate selection was the procedure on which

it should be based. In February 1990, the CC Commission on Questions of Party

Construction and Cadre Policy expressed the view that the procedure should be

maximally democratic and supported the direct participation of party members in the

process.15 Its proposal was submitted to the February 1990 CC plenum. The CC

platform that was approved at the plenum stated that the election of delegates to the

party congress should be conducted with the direct participation of party members on a

competitive basis (Materialy Plenuma . . . 5 – 7 fevralya 1990, pp. 37 – 38). Further to this,

the CCCommission of Party Construction and Cadre Policy prepared a draft ‘Procedure

of the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress’ that envisaged the following

points: (1) candidates would be nominated by primary party organisations; (2) elections

would be secret and competitive; (3) the candidates could be considered at raion and city

party conferences; (4) plenums of obkoms, kraikoms and union republican party

organisations would define the procedure of delegate election; (5) a large primary

organisation could directly elect the delegates if the plenums of obkoms, kraikoms, and

union republican parties allowed it; (6) oblast’, krai, and union republican party

conferences could elect delegates; and (7) delegates from the military and MVD troops

would be directly elected from party conferences in military districts.16 This draft, after

further modification, was approved at the March Central Committee plenum and

attached to its decisions (Materialy Plenuma Tsentral’nogo 1990, pp. 180 – 188).

However, there were critics of this procedure. First, although it was agreed that

delegates were to be elected basically by electoral districts and party conferences could

elect delegates in some cases, there was naturally some concern that conferences of this

kind might be used to eliminate candidates who did not suit the full-time party

officials.17 Second, delegates from the armed forces were to be elected only by party

conferences rather than electoral districts.18 Third, the plenums of obkoms, kraikoms

14Pravda, 5 May 1990, p. 4.15Pravda, 4 February 1990, p. 2.16Pravda, 27 February 1990, pp. 1 – 2.17Sovetskaya kul’tura, 21 April 1990, p. 4.18Pravda, 7 March 1990, p. 3.

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and union republican parties were allowed to modify the procedure ‘taking into

account the position of party organisations and the views of communists’. But who

were the ‘communists’ in this case: the party rank and file or party officials? And how

were party members to determine a ‘position’?19 Fourth, some argued that, without

publishing candidates’ affiliation to one or another of the platforms that were now

active in the party ranks, members would have little idea of whom to vote for.20

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that this procedure was more competitive and better

calculated to assist reformers like theDemocratic Platform than the previous procedure.

The election of delegates duly took place on the basis of these procedural rules.

The CC open letter and the election of delegates to the 28th Party Congress

As discussed above, one of the main aims of the Democratic Platform was to send

their delegates to the forthcoming 28th Party Congress. However, the party leadership

was clearly apprehensive about this platform. This became clear with the publication

of the CC open letter, ‘For Consolidation on a Principled Basis’, which appeared on

11 April 1990.21

The Politburo decided to write an open letter on 22 March, with the aim of making

clear the leadership’s antagonistic attitude towards the Democratic Platform. The

decision stated, ‘[The Politburo] consider[s] it expedient . . . to continue to differentiate

[the party] ideologically and organisationally from supporters of ‘‘Democratic

Platform’’ and other groupings whose activity is directed towards a split in the

CPSU’. The Secretariat was entrusted with the task of preparing the letter and the

draft decision on this matter.22 The Politburo discussed the content of the prepared

letter on 9 April and whether or not it should be published. As Gorbachev indicates in

his memoirs, his own preference was to send a telegram to party branches rather than

publish a letter.23 Perhaps, Gorbachev’s aide, Anatolii Chernyaev’s memorandum that

criticised the CC letter had influenced Gorbachev’s opinion,24 but only Aleksandr

Yakovlev, CC Secretary and a Politburo member—who was very critical of the

letter—supported the idea of a telegram and moderately supported the ideas of the

19Moskovskie novosti, 10, 11 March 1990, p. 3. This is a comment of Shostakovskii. See also

Sovetskaya kul’tura, 24 March 1990, p. 3.20Sovetskaya kul’tura, 12 May 1990, p. 4.21Pravda, 11 April 1990, p. 1. For details of the politics of the CC open letter, see Hahn (1995, pp.

375 – 405), to which the author is indebted.22Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond (f.) 89, perechen’ (p.)

9, delo (d.) 87, p. 1. Part of this Politburo discussion, based upon the notes of Anatolii Chernyaev,

Vadim Medvedev, and Georgii Shakhnazarov, is reported in V Politbyuro TsK KPSS . . . (2006, pp.

582 – 584), which makes it clear that Gorbachev was critical of the Democratic Platform from the

beginning. He became even more critical at the next Politburo meeting the following week (see V

Politbyuro TsK KPSS . . . 2006, pp. 584 – 585).23TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 2; Gorbachev (1995, pp. 540 – 541); Gorubachofu (1996, pp. 694 –

695). See also, V Politbyuro TsK KPSS . . . (2006, pp. 587 – 590).24Gorbachev Foundation, document 8,263, p. 1. The memorandum is dated 8 April 1990. In the

Gorbachev Foundation archives, one can read all material both in a rich text format and in a scanned

pictorial format. The author viewed documents in rich text style as this format shows the dates and

authors of documents more clearly. All page numbers of documents from the Gorbachev Foundation

archives in this article refer to rich text documents.

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Democratic Platform although he added that the CC platform was superior

theoretically and practically.25 However, other reformist participants in the meeting,

such as CC Secretary and Politburo member Vadim Medvedev, CC Secretary Ivan

Frolov, and Foreign Minister and Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze, did not

strongly oppose the letter.26 Others supported its publication because the CC—in their

view—needed to make its position clear. Without it, they argued, there would be

anxiety and confusion among party members.27 Gorbachev appears to have been

obliged to publish an open letter in these circumstances.28

The CC open letter was duly published, and it severely criticised the Democratic

Platform: ‘Declaring themselves ‘‘consistent democrats’’ . . . they attack the ideological

and organisational basis of the CPSU . . .’. The letter suggested that it had tried ‘to

convert our party to a kind of formless association with full freedom of fractions and

groupings, that is, to practically ruin it’. It also recommended the expulsion of

members of the Democratic Platform from the party.29

The open letter caused some controversy; probably its most important effect was its

influence on the election of delegates to the Party Congress. The Politburo discussed

the questions of preparation for the Congress and the Russian party conference on 3

May, when the election of delegates was just beginning. In his report Georgii

Razumovskii, a candidate member of the Politburo and CC Secretary, claimed that

the open letter had exercised a big influence on the course of delegate elections and the

report-and-election campaign.30 In addition, Gorbachev did not hide his critical view

of the Democratic Platform, stating, ‘What about the ‘‘Democratic Plat-

form?’’ . . . There is no concept, and nothing on the party is well thought out at all.

There is only a concept that will ruin the party. That is all’.31 The CC open letter was

certainly a discouragement to Democratic Platform members, some of whom

concluded that the party was impossible to reform and left it. According to a report

presented at the second all-union conference of the Democratic Platform on 16 and 17

June 1990, among the 877 delegates only 100 would also be taking part in the 28th

Party Congress. Such a situation split the Democratic Platform supporters; some

argued for leaving the party before the Congress, others thought it would be better to

await its outcome.32 Although the majority made the latter choice, they had clearly

been dismayed by the course of events. When some of Gorbachev’s aides, including

Georgii Shakhnazarov, met representatives of the Democratic Platform on the eve of

the Russian party conference (3 June), these representatives complained that

Gorbachev never tried to see them, though they had proposed meetings on several

25TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 5.26TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 7 (Medvedev), p. 9 (Shevardnadze), p. 10 (Frolov).27For example see TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, p. 12 (Prokof’ev).28TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 27, pp. 16 – 17.29Pravda, 11 April 1990, p. 1.30TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 2.31TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 6.32Glasnost’, 1990, 2, 21 June, p. 2; Pravda, 18 June 1990, p. 3; Moskovskie novosti, 1990, 25, 24 June,

p. 6. For the regional conference of the Democratic Platform in Moscow, which took place on 26 – 27

May, see Pravda, 29 May 1990, p. 1; Moskovskie novosti, 1990, 22, 3 June, p. 6.

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occasions.33 Criticism was also widespread among other organisations or movements,

and the Komsomol condemned the open letter at its all-union Congress.34 The

Marxist platform also criticised the letter because, they argued that the Central

Committee was motivated by material rather than ideological considerations.35 A

meeting of the secretaries of republican parties, kraikoms, obkoms, and some gorkoms

and raikoms, which discussed ideological – political work took place on 25 April where

the open letter came in for further criticism.36

On the other hand, Gorbachev’s prime concern about the selection of delegates was

the social composition. He appears to have assumed that worker and peasant party

members would support his reforms and that the party apparat would consistently

oppose them. Although it is not possible to measure the effect of the open letter on the

social composition of the delegates that were eventually elected, the report on the

progress of delegate election that was presented at the Politburo meeting of 3 May

shocked Gorbachev. According to Razumovskii, of the 232 delegates who had been

already elected, workers accounted for just 12.1%; peasants (kolkhoz workers) for

only 1.7%; women for 7.3%; and 24% were party officials. Among candidates,

workers accounted for 10%, peasants 4% and women 10%. Shocked at such a low

level of representation of workers and peasants, Gorbachev asked how many workers

there were among the 19,800 candidates for delegates’ elections that had not yet been

conducted, but Razumovskii did not respond.37 The passivity of workers was also

mentioned by Yuri Manaenkov, a CC Secretary and Russian bureau member. Among

the delegate candidates in the Russian republic about 13% were workers. Manaenkov

suggested that administrative pressure should be used to strengthen the representation

of workers, arguing that ‘simply no other way exists’. Gorbachev was angry with this

and said, ‘then I should speak frankly that our party apparat together with economic

managerial leaders is doing this [lowering workers’ representation]’. Manaenkov

responded, ‘Our party apparat is doing this because there are very, very many party

officials among delegate candidates. Almost a quarter. Thus, the party apparat is

connected with this’.38 Nikolai Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, noted

that many party secretaries had become candidates and had subsequently pushed out

potential working class candidates. Gorbachev responded that the problem was that

the workers had not advanced themselves as candidates.39 Consequently Gorbachev

stressed the importance of electing workers and peasants40 and the Politburo made an

appeal in favour of electing more workers and peasants to the forthcoming Party

Congress.41

33Gorbachev Foundation, document 18,096, p. 1. The meeting with Democratic Platform

representatives was reported to Gorbachev by his aides in a memorandum dated 4 June 1990.34RL/Report on the USSR, 2, 17, 27 April 1990, p. 24.35RL/Report on the USSR, 2, 17, 27 April 1990, p. 25.36Pravda, 25 April 1990, p. 2.37TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 2.38TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 8.39TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 8.40TsKhSD, f. 89, p. 42, d. 28, p. 27.41Pravda, 5 May 1990, p. 1.

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Following this, some reports on the delegates’ election began to appear in the

press.42 The results of delegates’ elections of Politburo members, candidate members

and CC secretaries were published later (see Table 1). In many regions, the results of

delegate elections were reviewed at party conferences.43 In Table 1, we can see that

delegate elections at party conferences were frequently non-competitive. In addition, it

can be inferred from a report of the Red Flag Northern Fleet party conference that

some of the delegate elections of party organisations in armed forces were not

conducted on an alternative basis.44

There were some complaints about the way in which the elections had been

organised. In Omsk oblast’, for example, more than a quarter of the candidates were

party officials who were skilled in political manoeuvring, allowing them to become

delegates at the cost of genuine workers.45 One worker delegate felt the election had

been organised in a way that was disadvantageous to him and suspected he had been

the victim of an ‘apparat game’.46 A similar report of manoeuvring was based on

developments in Zaporozh’e.47 An ill-prepared election was also reported in a letter

from Kiev city, in which there had been just a single day’s notice that the election

would be taking place. In addition, by not showing the candidates’ positions on the

platform in the electoral list, no criteria were available by which they could be

judged.48 Two weeks before the 28th Party Congress, Vladimir Lysenko, one of

leaders of the Democratic Platform and a delegate to the 28th Party Congress,

expressed his concern that 48% of delegates would be full-time party officials, and that

fewer than 7% would be workers and peasants.49

Party reformers against the party leadership

Party reform or renewal of the party was discussed in two rounds. The first was the

founding Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist

Republic (RSFSR)50 and the second round was the 28th all-union Party Congress, in

both of which the same delegates participated. The conventional view is that there was

a ‘conservative resurgence’ in the first round and some reformist recovery in the

second. However, our own view is that there was a consistent tendency throughout the

two congresses, which was a strong sentiment of hostility towards the existing party

leadership among the delegates.

42See, for example, Pravda, 12 May 1990, p. 2; Pravda, 17 May 1990, p. 2; Pravda, 27 May 1990, p. 2;

Pravda, 31 May 1990, p. 2; Pravda, 6 June 1990, p. 2; Argumenty i fakty, 1990, 21, 26 May – 1 June, p.

3; Argumenty i fakty, 1990, 22, 2 – 8 June, p. 6; RL/Report on the USSR, 2, 21, 25 May 1990, p. 27;

Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 6, p. 155.43Pravda, 4 June 1990, p. 2; 9 June 1990, p. 2.44Pravda, 7 June 1990, p. 2. Nonetheless, the Far East Military District Party Conference had a

competitive delegate election.45Pravda, 19 May 1990, p. 3.46Pravda, 2 June 1990, p. 3.47Moskovskie novosti, 1990, 24, 17 June, pp. 8 – 9.48Pravda, 9 June 1990, p. 3.49Moskovskie novosti, 1990, 24, 17 June, p. 9.50For details of this process, see Ueno (1995, pp. 339 – 342).

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TABLE 1THE RESULTS OF DELEGATE ELECTIONS OF PARTY LEADERS

Place of the election

Number ofcandidates

perconstituency

Numberof

voters

Numberof votes‘for’ (%)

Numberof votes‘against’(%)

M. S. Gorbachev Frunze raion, Moscow city(single memberconstituency)

2 2,953 1,803(61.3)

1,126(38.1)

L. N. Zaikov Donsk city, Tula oblast’(single memberconstituency)

3 4,621 2,833(61.3)

1,777(38.5)

V. A. Ivashko Solonyanskii andTomakovskii raions,Dnepropetrovsk oblast’(single memberconstituency)

2 3,834 3,681(96.0)

150(3.9)

V. A. Kryuchkov Dzerzhinskii raion, Moscowcity (multi-memberconstituency,12 mandates)

20 38,840 30,171(77.7)

8,249(21.2)

E. K. Ligachev Ivnyanskii andProkhorovskii raions,Belgorod oblast’ (singlemember constituency)

3 3,576 2,852(79.8)

708(19.8)

Yu. D. Maslyukov Frunze raion, Moscow city(single memberconstituency)

3 3,123 2,032(65.0)

1,061(34.0)

V. A. Medvedev* Dokshitskii Lepel’skiiraions, Vitebsk oblast’(single memberconstituency)

1 4,448 4,005(90.0)

441(9.9)

N. I. Ryzhkov Leningradskii raion,Moscow city (singlemember constituency)

10 2,493 1,527(61.3)

898(36.0)

E. A. Shevardnadze Kievskii raion, Moscow city(single memberconstituency)

2 2,838 2,110(74.4)

693(24.4)

A. N. Yakovlev Koroshevskii raion,Moscowcity (multi-memberconstituency, 6 mandates)

65 16,838 10,670(63.4)

6,051(35.9)

A. P. Biryukova* The Kyrgyz Party Congress(multi-memberconstituency,37 mandates)

37 937 867(92.5)

70(7.5)

A. V. Vlasov* The Rostov Oblast’ PartyConference (multi-member constituency,3 mandates)

3 982 933(74.6)

249(25.3)

A. I. Luk’yanov* Kardymovskii andSmolemnskii raions,Smolensk oblast’ (singlemandate)

1 3,579 3,438(96.1)

141(3.9)

E. M. Primakov* Severo-Osetinsk Oblast’Party Conference (multi-member constituency,10 mandates)

10 534 527(98.7)

7(1.3)

(continued)

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The social composition of delegates to the Russian conference and the 28th Party

Congress

The social composition of delegates of both congresses, which showed a high

representation of party officials, has been advanced as evidence of the ‘conservative

resurgence’. Nonetheless, a different interpretation is possible.

TABLE 1(Continued)

Place of the election

Number ofcandidates

perconstituency

Numberof

voters

Numberof votes‘for’ (%)

Numberof votes‘against’(%)

B. K. Pugo* The Dushanbe City PartyConference (multi-member constituency,6 mandates)

6 579 548(94.6)

30(5.2)

G. P. Razumovskii The Latvia Party Congress(multi-memberconstituency,16 mandates)

29 404 347(85.9)

57(14.1)

D. T. Yazov The Far East MilitaryDistrict Party Conference(multi-memberconstituency,10 mandates)

13 528 496(93.4)

32(6.0)

O. D. Baklanov Science ProductionCombine ‘Yuzhno’,Dnepropetrovsk oblast’(single memberconstituency, 1 mandate)

2 3,565 2,855(80.0)

627(18.9)

A. N. Girenko Genichskii raion, Khersonoblast’ (single memberconstituency, 1 mandate)

2 3,473 2,997(86.3)

476(13.7)

Yu. A. Manaenkov* Volovskii raion, Lipetskoblast’ (single memberconstituency, 1 mandate)

1 3,026 2,923(96.6)

103(3.4)

E. S. Stroev* Dolzhanskii, Kollnyanskii,and Maloarkhangel’skiiraions, Orlov oblast’(single memberconstituency, 1 mandate)

1 3,461 3,420(98.8)

41(1.2)

G. I. Usmanov Chistopol’ city andNovosheshminskii raion,Tatar ASSR (singlemember constituency,1 mandate)

2 2,713 2,083(76.8)

619(22.8)

I. T. Frolov* The Chimkent Oblast’ PartyConference (multi-member constituency,16 mandate)

16 733 726(99.0)

7(1.0)

Notes: V. I. Vorotnikov and N. N. Slyun’kov were politburo members but did not agree to participate in thedelegate elections of the Party Congress.

*The person was not chosen by a competitive election, i.e. was elected unopposed.

Source: Glasnost’, 1990, 2, 21 June, p. 3.

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The Russian conference/congress began on 19 June 1990. The number of delegates

was 2,768 in total. Most of the delegates were elected from single mandate electoral

districts (2,020 in number or approximately 73%); while 257 delegates were elected

(9.3%) from multi-mandate districts; and 491 delegates (17.7%) were elected from the

various party conferences.51 Thus, the party conference did not filter the delegates very

much, although, as we have seen, some critics of the electoral procedure had been

afraid of this. Nonetheless, the social composition of delegates showed some increase

in party secretaries in comparison with the 27th Party Congress and the 19th all-union

Party Conference, as shown in Table 2.52 In particular, the proportion of okrug, raion

and city party committee secretaries rose enormously.

Why did the election result in such a high level of representation of party officials?

Some argue that this was a result of the mobilisation of the party apparat. Gorbachev,

in his memoirs, suggests it was the ‘result of elections in the course of which party

apparatchiki organised vigorous pressure to simply make themselves delegates’

(Gorbachev 1995, p. 533; Gorubachofu 1996, p. 686). According to Hahn, the

preparatory committee of the Russian conference was ‘the traditional apparat filter

intended to control the delegate election process from Moscow and ensure that party

apparatchiki dominated the RCP conference’ (Hahn 2002, pp. 137 – 138). The reports

of ‘apparat games’ mentioned above seem to support this kind of argument.

This argument, however, needs some qualification. If, as Hahn suggests, the

preparatory committee had been the only filter, the proportion of officials among the

delegates would have been much higher in Russia than in other union republics. For

comparison, it is necessary to investigate the social composition of delegates to the

28th all-union Party Congress.53 The 28th Congress of the CPSU took place from 2

July to 13 July, with 4,683 delegates in attendance. The social composition of the

delegates shows that fewer full-time party officials came from other union republics

than the Russian republic. Party officials accounted for 40.7% of the total. In the

Russian republic the proportion of party officials was only slightly higher (42.3%)

than that of other republics (38.3%),54 but the 38.3% representation of party officials

from other union republics is sufficient to indicate that the same logic was in operation

everywhere, which helped party officials to advance in all cases.

Firstly, perhaps, contrary to the critics’ expectation, the single mandate electoral

district method, which was frequently used for delegates’ elections, was more

favourable to lower level party officials. As Table 1 shows, the single-mandate

electoral districts consisted of one or two raions. This might have made it easier for

51Pravda, 21 June 1990, p. 3.52As Table 2 shows, the ratio of party officials, including PPO secretaries, at the 27th Party Congress

was about 35%, while those of party officials at the Russian party congress and 28th Party Congress

were about 42% and 40% each.53XXVIII s’’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskii otchet (hereafter

XXVIII s’’ezd), 1 (Moscow, Politizdat, 1991), pp. 182 – 184.54The number of party officials to the 28th Party Congress was 1,905, and the number of party

officials to the Russian party conference was 1,171. Thus, the number of party officials from union

republics other than Russia was 734 (1,905 – 1,171). The total number of delegates to the 28th Party

Congress was 4,683, and that of delegates to the Russian party conference was 2,768. Thus, the number

of congress delegates from union republics other than Russia was 1,915 (4,683 – 2,768). Therefore,

percentage of party officials from union republics excluding Russia was 38.3% (734/1,915).

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TABLE 2THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATES TO THE 27TH PARTY CONGRESS, 19TH PARTY

CONFERENCE, FOUNDING CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN CP, AND 28TH PARTY CONGRESS

27th congress(25 February –6 March 1986)

19th conference(28 June –1 July 1988)

Foundingcongress ofRussian CP(19 – 23

June, 4 – 6September1990)

28th Congress(2 – 14 July 1990)

The place of election

Single mandateelectoral district

2,020 (73%) 2,968 (63.4%)

Multi-mandateelectoral district

257 (9.3) 497 (10.6)

The party conferences 491 (17.7) 1,218 (26)Number of ethnic groups

(e.g. Russian,

Ukrainian,

Belorussian, etc.)

72 72 47 63

Total number of

delegates

5,000 (100) 5,000 (100) 2,768 (100) 4,683 (100)

Delegates elected

for the first time

3,827 (76.5) 3934 (84.0)

Women 1,352 (27.0) 1,258 (25.2) 173 (6.3) 344 (7.3)Workers 1,705 (34.1) 1,638 (32.8) 264 (9.5) 543 (11.6)

841 (30.4)a 1,548 (33.1)b

People engaged inindustry,construction,transport,communication

1,375 (27.5) 577 (20.8) 1,005 (21.5)

Workers in the

agricultural

economy

872 (17.4) 866 (17.3) 235 (8.5) 483 (10.3)353 (12.8)? 738 (15.8)?

Kolkhoz members 118 (4.3) 255 (5.4)Economic executives 796 (17 approx.)Executives of productive

and scientific-

productive combines,

enterprises, building,

construction

organisations and

engineering-technical

services

355 (7.1) 354 (7.1) 210 (7.6)

Directors of sovkhozy 80 (1.6) 74 (1.5) 60 (2.2)Chairmen of kolkhozy 116 (2.3) 108 (2.2) 75 (2.7)

Scientific and creativeintellectuals

436 (8.7) 245 (8.9) 339 (7.2)c

392 (8.4)Writers, prominentartists, honouredteachers, doctors

156 (3.1)

Staff of scientific andhigher educationalestablishments

114 (2.3) 175 (3.5)

Educational staff 93 (1.9)

(continued)

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TABLE 2(Continued)

27th congress(25 February –6 March 1986)

19th conference(28 June –1 July 1988)

Foundingcongress ofRussian CP(19 – 23

June, 4 – 6September1990)

28th Congress(2 – 14 July 1990)

Staff in public health 41 (0.8)Staff in cultural

and artisticestablishments

69 (1.4) 129 (4.7)

Staff in mass media 43 (0.9) 34 (1.2) 53 (1.1)Party officials 1,074 (21.5) 1,171 (42.3) 1,905 (40.7)

1,772 (35.44)d

Party activists 3,153 (63.1)Secretaries of the

CC CPSU12 (0.3)

Secretaries of CCs ofthe CPs ofrepublics, kraikoms,obkoms

290 (5.8) 242 (5.2)

Secretaries ofkraikoms andobkoms

97 (3.5)

Secretaries ofokrugkoms,gorkoms, raikoms

570 (11.4) 537 (10.7) 421 (15.2) 1,075 (22.9)

Secretaries of agrarianraikoms

250 (9.0)

Secretaries of PPOs,workshop partyorganisations,party groups

698 (14.0) 762 (15.2)

Secretaries of PPOs 339 (12.2) 486 (10.4)Heads and deputy

heads ofdepartments andinstructors of partycommittees

90 (1.9)

Officials of soviet, trade

union, and

komsomol organs

682 (13.6) 629 (12.6) 336 (12.1)e

Staff of sovietinstitutions

305 (11.0)

Staff of trade unions,komsomol, andother socialorganisations

31 (1.1)

Peoples’ deputies 3,376 (67.5) 3,119 (62.4) 2,737 (58.4)Peoples’ deputies

of the USSR113 (4.1) 276 (5.9)

Peoples’ deputies ofthe union republicsand autonomousrepublics

516 (11.0)

(continued)

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party officials to exercise their influence. Secondly, lower party officials had replaced

old party officials in reports and elections since 1988 and had been newly elected by

competitive elections (Ogushi 2005d, chapter 4, pp. 119 – 137). It was natural that such

newly elected party officials became delegates. Thus, the elections to the Russian

conference/congress and the 28th Party Congress resulted in a high level of

representation of party officials. If our argument is valid, that it was party secretaries

who had been newly elected in a more democratic manner that were the most likely to

become delegates, it might in turn be expected that delegates who were party officials

would be far from ‘conservative’, in spite of the assumptions that are made by most

researchers. It is more likely that they felt responsible to their rank and file electorates,

but were frustrated with their limited influence on general party affairs, on the course

of events, and on the party leadership.

TABLE 2(Continued)

27th congress(25 February –6 March 1986)

19th conference(28 June –1 July 1988)

Foundingcongress ofRussian CP(19 – 23

June, 4 – 6September1990)

28th Congress(2 – 14 July 1990)

Peoples’ deputiesof the Russianrepublic

126 (4.6)

Peoples’ deputies ofautonomousrepublics in theRussian republic

102 (3.7)

Peoples’ deputiesof local sovietsin the Russianrepublic

1,387 (50.1)

Armed forces, ministry

of internal affairs,

KGB

More than 6%(281n)

Armed forces 183 (6.6)

Notes: aThis figure is ‘Workers’ plus ‘People engaged in industry, construction, transport, communication’calculated by the author.bThis figure is ‘Workers’ plus ‘People engaged in industry, construction, transport, communication’calculated by the author.cThis figure excludes ‘staff in mass media’ calculated by the author.dThis figure includes ‘Secretaries of PPOs, shop party organisations, party groups’ calculated by the author.eThis figure is calculated by the author from the sub-categories.

Sources: The 27th Congress, Pravda, 28 February 1986, p. 5; XXVII s’’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partiiSovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskii otchet (1986, pp. 268 – 271); The XIX conference, Pravda, 30 June 1988,p. 5; XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskii otchet(1988, pp. 132 – 134); The founding congress of Russian CP, Pravda, 21 June 1990, p. 3; The 28th Congress,Pravda, 5 July 1990, p. 4; XXVIII s’’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskii otchet(1991, pp. 182 – 184); the composition of party officials at the 28th Congress, Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 8,p. 128; see also Ueno (1995, pp. 336 – 337).

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The election of First Secretary of the CP RSFSR

One of the most significant pieces of evidence on the question of the ‘non-orthodox’ or

‘conservative’ nature of congress delegates is the election of the first secretary of the

CP RSFSR. The result has usually been interpreted as the crucial point in a

‘conservative resurgence’. It took place on an alternative basis on 22 June 1990.

Valentin Kuptsov, head of the CC Department on Work with Social and Political

Organisations, was nominated by Gorbachev (Gorbachev 1995, p. 536; Gorubachofu

1996 p. 691). The other main candidates were Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the

Krasnodar kraikom, and Oleg Lobov, second secretary of the Armenian CP.55 In the

first round none of the candidates received enough votes to secure election. Only 343

delegates voted for Kuptsov and 2,278 votes were cast against him. The vote for

Polozkov was 1,017 and 1,604 against; the vote for Lobov was 848, with 1,773 votes

against.56 So a run-off election had to be held between Polozkov and Lobov. The final

result was that Polozkov won a majority, with 1,396 votes as against 1,066.57

This was a difficult result for the all-union party leadership. Nonetheless, the

difficulty was not only that Polozkov was a well-known conservative figure, but also

that Kuptsov, the very person recommended by the leadership, had lost, and not even

reached the run-off. Was this, however, a conservative resurgence? To some degree, the

answer may be affirmative. All the same, Polozkov did not win an overwhelming

majority. If every party official had been ideologically conservative, Polozkov could

have won a first-round majority. The crucial factor appears to have been the anti-centre

feeling among communists, who were more inclined to vote against the party leadership

than in favour of ‘conservatives’: in other words, they were more inclined to vote

against Kuptsov rather than in favour of Polozkov. The voting behaviour of the

delegates shows that they were frustrated by their limited influence on general party

affairs, and they were able to make their view known in the course of the Congress itself.

Controversy over party renewal at the 28th Party Congress

In his opening address to the 28th Congress on 2 July 1990, Gorbachev mentioned the

issues of intra-party democracy. Competitive party elections were encouraged but, as

to democratic centralism, he reported that the drafts of the Programmatic Declaration

and the party rules would retain this principle, since there had to be some means of

combining democracy with obligations.58 At the same time the concept of the

vanguard party was not discarded, although its continuing relevance was questioned;59

and fractionalism was strongly condemned.60

55Lobov’s career shows his close connection with Boris Yel’tsin (see Ueno 1995, p. 356).56Uchreditel’nyi s’’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii RSFSR: Stenograficheskii otchet, 2 (Moscow,

Politizdat, 1991), pp. 169 – 170.57Uchreditel’nyi s’’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii RSFSR: Stenograficheskii otchet, 2 (Moscow,

Politizdat, 1991), p. 187. Incidentally, Gorbachev incorrectly gives the votes for Lobov as ‘1,056’ (see

Gorbachev 1995, p. 538; Gorubachofu 1996, p. 692).58XXVIII s’’ezd, 1, pp. 97 – 98.59XXVIII s’’ezd, 1, p. 91.60XXVIII s’’ezd, 1, p. 98.

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On 5 July 1990 the Congress broke into sections so that it could discuss all of these

issues in more detail. The largest section was ‘Renewal of the Party’, and it witnessed a

series of stormy debates.61 More than 1,230 delegates participated in the section

altogether; the main speakers were Polozkov as chairman, Pugo and Manaenkov, but

ordinary participants were rather more vocal. The traditional form of chairmanship

was rejected from the outset. Many participants tried to shorten the time that had been

given to Pugo and Manaenkov for their reports.62 In addition, because of the pressure

of rank and file participants, representatives of the mass media were allowed to be

present.63

The main points of controversy were the status of PPOs, the vanguard or

parliamentary nature of the party, democratic centralism, fractions within the party,

and renewal of the party leadership. Many rather radical proposals were presented by

various people. A construction engineer, O. O. Polyak, demanded that PPOs decide

the structure of raikoms, gorkoms and obkoms; that PPOs keep 80% of the

membership dues they collected; and that the Central Committee should consist of

about 200 people working on a full-time basis. If such proposals were to be approved,

he argued, and if the minority’s opinion was to be taken into consideration,

democratic centralism could be supported.64 According to the head of the military of

the north west military border, A. G. Viktorov, the crucial problem was the widening

gulf between the leadership and party masses.65 The party secretary of Ivanovo Energy

Institute, V. Yu. Khalturin, stated that the CPSU had not become a ‘political party’

in a real sense to the present day; the party, he proposed, should become a

parliamentary, rather than a vanguard party.66 The party secretary in the Central

Construction Bureau of Ocean Mechanics in Leningrad, V. N. Vasil’ev, declared that

neither the conference nor the congress but the Central Committee decided the most

important questions.67 An energy worker from Krasnoyarsk krai, I. V. Lebedintsev,

demanded that views of party rank and file should be listened to, rather than those of

first secretaries at the Congress, and proposed that the name ‘democratic centralism’

should be changed to ‘general democratic centralism’.68 D. A. Volkogonov, the head

of the Military History Institute of the Defence Ministry, stated that if the party

reform did not proceed, the party would face the risk of degeneration into a

‘secretaries’ party’.69 The deputy head of the faculty of Novosibirsk Higher Military

Political School, A. S. Podol’skii, proposed the election of congress delegates by secret,

competitive, and direct ballot; but he argued that no other platforms and fractions

should be permitted, except for the CC platform.70 The general director of a science

61For the fullest discussion on this section, see White (1997).62Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (hereafter RGASPI), Moscow,

fond (f.) 582, opis’ (O.) 6, ed. khr. 16, pp. 4 – 5.63RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 10.64RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 16.65RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 19.66RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, pp. 21 – 22. ‘Party secretary’ hereafter in this section denotes a

PPO or workshop party organisation secretary, if not specifically noted.67RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 27.68RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 28.69RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 33.70RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 36.

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production combine from Moscow, Yu. F. Yurchenko, called for the renewal of

90% of the party leadership and for raikom and gorkom plenums to be changed

into councils of PPO secretaries.71 The head of a department of a scientific

research institute in Moscow, V. A. Levchenko, insisted that PPOs were ‘the very

party, not its basis’, and proposed changing the name ‘democratic centralism’ to

‘democratic unity’.72 V. I. Drobotun, first secretary of Moskovskii raion in Kiev

city, demanded that CC members report on their activity to lower party organs,

including PPOs.73

In the afternoon, the discussion continued to be heated. The party secretary of a

chemical factory, M. P. Galkina, asked for the competitive election from below of all

party secretaries from the PPO up to the General Secretary himself.74 The party

secretary of a trust from Kazakhstan, V. P. Katkov, called for the Central Committee

to be elected by electoral districts.75 The party secretary of a metallurgy production

combine, A. V. Popelyshko, proposed the abolition of the obkom apparat, leaving the

raikom and republican party apparat.76 The head constructor of a production combine

in Khar’kov, V. M. Svishch, complained that ‘millions of communists . . . [were] not

attracted because they [did] not have any influence on party policy making’.77 A party

veteran of the Oktyabr’ raion of Moscow city, Yu. V. Votintsev, supported the idea of

a council of PPO secretaries and a reduction in the raikom apparat.78 The party

secretary of Orekhovo-Zuevo cotton spinning combine in Moscow oblast’, V. I.

Zhurina, asked for PPOs to be allowed to retain 80% of the membership dues they

collected.79 M. A. Mukhametov, first secretary of Sibai gorkom in the Bashkir ASSR,

proposed the creation of horizontal structures within the party, regarded up to this

point as entirely incompatible with democratic centralism.80 The deputy party

secretary of Ural Polytechnic Institute, D. M. Sergeev, demanded a series of rights for

PPOs to decide the PPO structure by themselves; to summon electoral organs (e.g.

party plenums and conferences); to be allowed not to implement central decisions that

did not seem appropriate; to elect party congress and conference delegates; to call

referendums at the raikom level; and to retain 75% of the membership dues they

collected.81

Such reformist views were repeated at the meeting between Gorbachev and PPO

secretaries on 6 July. For example, a party secretary of a machine building factory in

Lugansk, A. S. Efremov, reported his attempt to organise a council of PPO secretaries

(Vstrecha M. S. Gorbacheva 1990, p. 5). Another party secretary of a military unit,

L.R. Pigan,made a proposal to extend the termof office of congress delegates to the next

71RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 40.72RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, pp. 44 – 45.73RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, pp. 51 – 52.74RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 54.75RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 61.76RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 63.77RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 64.78RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 66.79RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 73.80RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, p. 76.81RGASPI, f. 582, O. 6, ed. khr. 16, pp. 77 – 78.

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congress in order to supervise the party’s activity between congresses (Vstrecha M. S.

Gorbacheva 1990, p. 8). A deputy secretary of a production combine in Krovsk, V. S.

Zaitsev, proposed replacing raikoms by councils of PPO secretaries (Vstrecha M. S.

Gorbacheva 1990, p. 13).Aparty secretary of a computing production combine inMinsk,

N. I. Shesternev, asked Gorbachev to work out a more precise Party Programme that

showed ‘what is our aim, what is the general direction, and what will wait [for us]

tomorrow’. He continued, ‘Unfortunately, I do not see it in your reporting address’

(Vstrecha M. S. Gorbacheva 1990, p. 15). A party secretary of a kolkhoz in Krasnodar

krai, V. I. Kalesnikov asked Gorbachev, ‘Why are communists leaving the party today?

How should we PPO secretaries act?’ (Vstrecha M. S. Gorbacheva 1990, p. 18). A party

secretary of Kiev University, V. I. Polokhalo, a member of the Democratic Platform,

criticised the CC open letter (Vstrecha M. S. Gorbacheva 1990, p. 44).

From these speeches it is obvious that many participants, including PPO secretaries,

were reform-oriented; in addition, it is clear that their frustration came from their

limited influence on party policy and leadership decisions. As some party officials,

including high-ranking ones such as Prokof’ev, observed, Gorbachev accepted the

necessity of democratising society, but never attempted to democratise the party

(Prokof’ev 2005, p. 95).82 When the party activists and lower officials found that they

were placed in a dilemma between a politicised society that was antagonistic towards

the party and a party leadership that had no mechanism or even intention of adopting

the opinions of party activists and local officials, they naturally became anti-centre.

Such an atmosphere among delegates may be illustrated in other ways. In the election

of the deputy general secretary, for instance, Ligachev, a well-known conservative,

suffered a humiliating defeat.83 Also, a radical proposal to elect the Politburo and

Secretariat directly by the Party Congress rather than the Central Committee was

rejected by a very narrow margin (2,174 votes were necessary for it to be approved;

1,959 delegates voted in favour, with 2,046 against).84 These developments indicate

that the delegates were not necessarily ‘conservative’, but rather anti-centre or

opposed to the existing leadership. Although some opinion surveys certainly revealed

that the majority of congress delegates supported a vanguard party, and a form of

democratic centralism that put its emphasis on the democratic, this did not mean that

their views were ‘orthodox’ or ‘conservative’.85 For example, as we have seen, some

supported democratic centralism with many conditions, which could have led to a

fundamentally different principle de facto. Certainly, the party was not necessarily a

citadel of conservatives.

Nonetheless, it is also important to note that they were frustrated individually. That

is, although their demands had some common elements, they did not organise

them beforehand. For example, some demanded that PPOs should be allowed to keep

50% of the membership dues they collected, while others demanded 75% or 80%.

82See also Onikov (1996, pp. 70 – 72).83XXVIII s’’ezd, 2, p. 391.84XXVIII s’’ezd, 2, pp. 173 – 174.85For the opinion surveys, see Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 7, p. 37; Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 8, pp.

135 – 136. For the later opinion surveys, see Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, 4, pp. 63 – 70; Voz’mitel’ (1991,

pp. 15 – 21).

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Such a wide variety of views also meant that party reformers consisted of such various

kinds of people that the Democratic Platform could not form a common front.

Therefore, the final decisions at the Party Congress inevitably became the product of

compromise. The final report of the section meeting was itself understated,86 and

discussion at the Congress itself paid little attention to the issues with which it had

been concerned, such as fractionalism, democratic centralism and the vanguard party.

The reports on the results of the discussion at the Editorial Commission of the

Programmatic Declaration and the new party Rules were made by some of the central

leaders only, and the Congress approved them with some modifications.87

Decisions on party renewal

The 28th Party Congress approved a ‘Programmatic Declaration’ and a new set of

party Rules. It also adopted a resolution that called for the abolition of the

nomenklatura system. As the Programmatic Declaration stated, ‘In its cadre work, the

party repudiates formalism and a nomenklatura approach’. Rather, ‘The congress

favours direct and, as a rule, contested elections of secretaries of party committees and

delegates to party forums, with a secret ballot and an unrestricted nomination of

candidates’.88 This suggested that the reformers’ demands had essentially been met,

although the words ‘favour’ and ‘as a rule’ were somewhat ambiguous and held out the

possibility that the discussion would have to be renewed at some point in the future.

The Programmatic Declaration rejected ‘democratic centralism in the form it took

under the administrative-command system’ (Materialy XXVIII s’’ezda 1991, p. 95).

However, the meaning of this seemed to depend on one’s interpretation. The new

party Rules stated, ‘The CPSU lives and operates on the basis of ideological unity and

party comradeship and the principle of democratic centralism’ (Materialy XXVIII

s’’ezda 1991, p. 110). As for fractions, the Programmatic Declaration and party Rules

allowed the formation of ‘platforms’ and ‘horizontal structures’ such as discussion

clubs and the councils of secretaries of party organisations. The idea of party

referendums was also approved, but the creation of fractions was still prohibited

(Materialy XXVIII s’’ezda 1991, pp. 95, 110, 114). However, no clear distinction was

provided between a fraction and a platform. Ambiguities of this kind abounded

because the two documents were the products of a compromise between alternative

conceptions of the party and its future.89 The fact that the Congress failed to approve

a new Party Programme was evidence in itself of the compromise nature of the

Congress.

86XXVIII s’’ezd, 1, pp. 565 – 568.87For Medvedev’s address on the ‘Programmatic Declaration’ see XXVIII s’’ezd, 2, pp. 255 – 260

(pp. 259 – 260 on Democratic centralism). For Gorbachev’s address on the new party Rules see XXVIII

s’’ezd, 2, pp. 394 – 402 (p. 396 on Democratic centralism, and p. 398 on fractions).88Materialy XXVIII s’’ezda (1991, pp. 95 – 96). See also the party Rules (Materialy XXVIII s’’ezda

1991, p. 111).89Regarding other respects such as territorial base of primary party organisations, and the

‘departyisation’ of the military, the results were also ambiguous. For more details see Ogushi (2005d,

chapters 3 and 6), White (1992a, 1992b) and Ueno (1995).

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After the 28th Party Congress

Losing members

After the Congress, the mass exodus of party members accelerated. Some of them had

certainly left the party for pragmatic reasons. Once the administrative function of the

party had been lost, joining the party was no longer a prerequisite for career

promotion. It was natural for members of this kind to leave, but there were others who

left because of their disappointment with the progress of party reform. The

compromise nature of the new party Rules and the Programmatic Declaration did

not satisfy such reformist party members. The new Chairman of the Russian Supreme

Soviet, Boris Yel’tsin, caught this atmosphere particularly well, storming out of the

Congress a day before it formally concluded.90 The party would lose some 4.2 million

members from 1990 to the middle of 1991, about a quarter of the total.91 As a rule

these ex-members did not join other political movements but withdrew from political

life entirely. This, later, would create considerable difficulty in developing a stable

multi-party system in Russian politics.92

Reform movements toward the 29th Extraordinary Party Congress

On the other hand, the remaining reformist elements within the party still kept trying

to transform the party into a ‘political’ or parliamentary party. The crucial issues were

the new Party Programme, and fractional or platform activity in the party.

The new Party Programme had been under discussion since the end of the Party

Congress.93 A draft was approved at a CC plenum in July 1991, and published the

following month. This document was very social democratic or ‘democratic socialist’

in its language, rather than communist. It accepted some form of market economy,

various political parties, and a plurality of political opinions. There was no reference

to such concepts as democratic centralism or the vanguard party.94 The July CC

plenum agreed to summon an Extraordinary Party Congress in November or

December 1991, at which the new Party Programme was to be approved.95 Probably it

was intended to split the party at this congress.

Among reformist groups within the party, the most progressive was the Democratic

Movement of Communists. This was the successor to the Democratic Platform which

by this stage had fallen apart. It supported social democracy, some sort of market

economy, and a split in the party on this basis. The Marxist Platform was more

90XXVIII s’’ezd, 2, pp. 500 – 501.91Pravda, 26 July 1991, p. 2.92The failure to develop a stable multi-party system is also due in part to Yel’tsin’s style of politics as

he escaped any organisation and tried to stand above all parties. This is exemplified in his ambiguous

attitude toward ‘Democratic Russia’, the largest opposition movement at that time. The outcome was

that he did not provide leadership to the opposition movement.93Various drafts of new party Programmes can be consulted in the Gorbachev Foundation. See

Gorbachev Foundation, document 14,588; 14,589; 14,593; 14,597; 14,610; 14,612; 14,614. For

Polozkov’s criticism a new party Programme, see Gorbachev Foundation, document 14,609.94Pravda, 8 August 1991, pp. 3 – 4.95Pravda, 27 July 1991, p. 1.

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moderate in terms of party issues than the Democratic Movement of Communists and

they expressed a willingness to cooperate.96 Finally the leadership’s goal became more

or less identical to that of reformist groups in the party. As Shakhnazarov urged him

to do, Gorbachev, it seems, intended to transform the CPSU into a social democratic

party (Shakhnazarov 1993, pp. 527 – 528).

It was, however, too late for Gorbachev to recover the initiative. This does not

necessarily mean that the attempted coup of August 1991 put an end to the reform

effort. Rather the party had plunged into an unprecedented crisis after the 28th Party

Congress. The party organisations were disintegrating, and the party apparat lost

confidence in its activity. Furthermore, the party faced a financial crisis because of its

loss of members and their dues, and its property was being dispersed. Gorbachev,

thus, lost the crucial machine to implement his policy well before the attempted coup.

The ideal opportunity for reform was the 28th Party Congress. Why did Gorbachev

fail to take advantage of it? Let us consider the reasons as a conclusion.

Conclusions

From our discussion above, it seems possible to understand why party reform failed at

the 28th Congress. First of all, the weakness of the opposition outside the party did

not encourage the reform movement within the party. In the Polish case, in 1980,

‘Solidarity’ pressed party reformers to organise ‘horizontal structures’ and competitive

party elections.97 In the Hungarian case in 1989, the opposition was weaker than

‘Solidarity’ but, it seems, stronger than ‘Democratic Russia’. At least the opposition

parties could seriously challenge the Hungarian Socialist Party, which led to its further

reform.98 It is instructive that in Lithuania the communist party split up and the more

reformist elements survived as a social democratic party (the Lithuanian Democratic

Labour Party). However, this factor should not be overemphasised. The opposition

outside the party was not crucial in the Hungarian case, where, nonetheless, party

reform was successful.

So a second explanation seems more important, which is the weakness of the

organised reform movement within the party. True, the Democratic Platform emerged.

True, as we have seen, many communists, including PPO secretaries, were reform-

oriented. Although their importance should be recognised, how well organised they

were is far from clear. As we have seen, those who spoke at the ‘renewal of the party’

section at the 28th Party Congress were very assertive but did not form a united front

at all. They offered a multiplicity of criticisms and proposals, but did not present a

coherent alternative. In addition, as mentioned above, ‘reformers’ in the party were

too heterogeneous for them all to be accommodated within the Democratic Platform.

Even within the Democratic Platform, while some were very radical, aiming to

transform the CPSU into a liberal or right-wing party in the Western sense, rather

than a social democratic party, others were still loyal to ‘democratic socialism’, and

others still may have been more pragmatic and only interested in retaining control of

96For details see Mann (1991, pp. 4 – 5).97The Polish case, nonetheless, showed a striking similarity with the CPSU (see Hahn 1987).98For the Hungarian case see O’Neil (1998).

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party property. Moreover, the reformers in general, including those who were

associated within the Democratic Platform, were divided by mutual suspicions, and

failed to develop a collective identity (Fish 1995, pp. 81 – 93). As a result, the

Democratic Platform quickly fell apart after the Party Congress.

Third, the reformers lacked a clear leadership. A series of famous figures were

certainly associated with the Democratic Platform, but they were unable to form a

united front.99 This was one of the reasons why so-called ‘Democrats’ failed to

command a majority at the 28th Party Congress. Probably the only possible way to

organise the reformers would have been if Gorbachev had provided the leadership that

was necessary. However, Gorbachev kept his distance. This was for two reasons. First

Gorbachev was personally very critical of the Democratic Platform, as we have seen.

Second, he had to deal with a power vacuum. He might have had some chance to lead

the reformers at the 28th Party Congress. However, if Gorbachev had combined with

the reformers, the party would have split up and lost its ties with the security organs.

This would have been a very risky choice, given the power vacuum that had been

created by the reorganisation of the party apparat. The Soviet political system moved

into this ‘power vacuum’ at the 28th Party Congress. The presidency that had formally

been established in March 1990 developed very slowly, which meant that Gorbachev

had no other power base apart from the party (Ogushi 2005c, 2005d, chapter 3,

2004a). If the party had split at the 28th Congress, an increasingly chaotic situation

might have become even worse. It seems that this was a really hard decision for

Gorbachev. Even so, party members were not satisfied with his attitude. When the

Moscow party first secretary Yurii Prokof’ev saw Gorbachev, who was facing harsh

criticisms from gorkom and raikom secretaries at the Congress, he was impressed not

only by the General Secretary’s incomprehension and non-acceptance, but also his

‘hatred of all participants and activists who did not support him’. Prokof’ev concluded

that Gorbachev ‘needed neither activists nor the party itself’ (Prokof’ev 2005, p. 225).

Such feelings were unlikely to have been limited to Prokof’ev: according to some

witness, Gorbachev was completely isolated from congress delegates (Boldin 1995,

p. 366; Chernyaev 1993, p. 356); and the exodus from the party was accelerating at this

time. This raises the question that if he had made a different choice, Gorbachev might

have been able to establish a new basis of power.

The final outcome, in this case the failure of party reform, should not always be seen

as the only possible result. The reform of the CPSU, and perhaps of the system as a

whole, was still possible, even if it was unlikely. The realisation of such an opportunity

depended more than anything else on leadership and political will. Gorbachev, in this

respect, missed an historical chance and his behaviour at the Congress can be

characterised as ‘historical indecisiveness’, although Yakovlev criticised himself

because he failed to take the initiative in splitting the party (Yakovlev 2003, p. 458).

The 28th Party Congress was a critical juncture that could have changed the course of

history. The renewed party might have been able to rally a new political resource for

the party leader, which might have allowed the party and the system as a whole to

escape their painful and total collapse. The study of the attempt to reform the party

99For example, Pravda (11 March 1990, p. 4) indicated the difference between two leaders of the

Democratic Platform (more radical Yurii Afanas’ev and moderate Shostakovskii).

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reminds us of the importance of leadership and of the choices that are made or not

made at crucial junctures in history. It also reminds us that people cannot change past

events but may be able to change future events.

Hokkaido University

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