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Who’s to blame: Populist Right-Wing and mainstream parties’ roles in adoption of welfare chauvinist policies

Please do not cite or circulate without authors’ permission

Juliana Chueri

University of Geneva, Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, [email protected]

April, 2017

Abstract

This paper aims to shed some light on PRWPs’ influence on public policies by

clarifying the mechanisms whereby these bodies influence the immigrants’ entitlement to social rights. This study tests three main hypotheses. The first is that PRWPs are able to restrict immigrants’ access to social policies by participating in the government, mechanism called direct effect. The second one is that even when PRWPs are not part of the government coalition, the increase of PRWPs participation in parliament influences the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies, the indirect effect. The third hypothesis is that welfare chauvinist policies are adopted independently of PRWPs participation in governments or parliaments. The study relies on a quantitative analysis of the legislation change from 1980 to 2014 that altered immigrants’ entitlement to social rights in 17 Western European countries. The results show that government participation is the predominant mechanism of PRWPs’ impact on immigrants’ rights. On the other hand, independently of the presence of PRWPs in politics, mainstream right-parties are likely to adopt welfare chauvinist policies.

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Introduction

Contemporary advanced welfare states have been transformed since the

1980s. Slower economic growth, aging populations, and globalization have

threatened the social commitments of the Golden Age and led several European

countries to reform their welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1996). This subject has

spurred a broad academic debate over why some countries have been more

successful than others in restructuring their welfare states. The most prominent

explanation focuses on the institutional aspects that allow public policy

retrenchment with minimal political costs (Pierson, 1994). In addition, Bonoli (2007)

argues that a retrenchment strategy generally combines expansion and

retrenchment to ensure public support, producing both winners and losers.

This background has led many academics to interpret the disproportionate

reduction of immigrants’ social rights as part of a more global process of welfare

state recalibration, which reflects governments’ aims to deal with budget constraints

and generate incentives to work. In that line, welfare state academics’ justifications

for the increasing gap between citizen and immigrant rights have generally focused

on types of welfare state (Sainsbury, 2006, 2012). Scholars argue that Liberal welfare

states are less threatened by the influx of immigrants since they do not represent a

great budgetary burden (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). On the other hand, Social

Democrat welfare states face a great dilemma between keeping the social benefits

universal and allowing an influx of immigration (Anttonen et al., 2012).

The argument of welfare generosity fails to explain the discrepancy among

cases. For example, Denmark has installed a dual welfare state system: a generous

welfare state for citizens and numerous access barriers for immigrants. On the other

hand, Sweden has implemented some minor restrictions on immigrants’ access to

social rights (Anderson, 2005; Andersen, 2007; Koning, 2013). Therefore, the

electoral success of populist right-wing party (PRWP) in Denmark must be

considered to explain completely the increasing gap between immigrants’ and

citizens’ entitlements to social rights. Although welfare chauvinism—the notion that

the welfare state should only benefit the citizens (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990)—

appears as an important component of PRWP anti-immigrant appeals (Rydgren,

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2004; de Koster, et al., 2012), literature barely explores the relationship between the

success of PRWPs and the adoption of restrictive legislation toward immigrants’

social rights (Bolin et al., 2014; Mudde, 2013).

Clarify the influence of PRWPs in the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies is

fundamental for three reasons. First, considering the governmental challenge of

ensuring inclusion of new immigrants in society, policy changes that reduce

immigrant eligibility to social rights enhance immigrants’ vulnerability to poverty and

social exclusion. Second, the deprivation of basic rights could not only harm the

integration of newcomers in the society, but also affect the integration of future

generations. Finally, integration policies are linked to solidarity towards immigration,

while restrictive integration reinforce public perception that immigrants are a threat

(Crepaz, 2008).

The few existing studies that focus on the impact of PRWPs on policies have a

broad approach, addressing, often indistinctly, immigration and integration policies

(Minkenberg, 2001; Williams, 2006; Shain, 2006; Akkerman, 2012). Exceptions are

Howard (2010), who focuses on the effect of PRWPs on immigrants’ access to

citizenship, and Koning (2013), who analyzes the impact of PRWPs on immigrants’

access to the welfare state. These works address one or few cases, with the valuable

exception of Akkerman (2012), who analyzes nine Western European countries.

The general conclusion is that the increasing presence of PRWPs in

parliaments and governments is associated with the adoption of restrictive policies.

Indeed, works that focus on party manifesto data show that the success of PRWPs

has a contagious effect on mainstream parties (Norris, 2005; van Spange, 2010; Bale

et al., 2010; Alonso and da Fonseca, 2012; Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2015).

In addition, governmental participation of PRWPs helps explain the adoption of

restrictive policies (Minkenberg, 2001; Koning, 2013).

Interestingly, rather than considering this outcome a result of the

parliamentary or ministerial activities of PRWPs’ personnel, those studies argue that

PRWPs lacked expertise and structure, and had limited bargaining power to

influence policy outcomes (Heinisch, 2003; Akkerman, 2012; Akkerman and de

Lange, 2012). Therefore, they claim that the interaction between PRWPs and

mainstream parties is the key element to explain restrictive policies towards

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immigrants (Minkenberg, 2001; Akkerman, 2012). However, the nature of this

interaction has yet to be clarified. Studies have not been clear about the different

policy responses of mainstream left and right-wing parties in light of an increasing

presence of PRWPs in politics. Also, the conditions that enable PRWPs to persuade

coalition partners to adopt an anti-immigrant agenda were not explored, and

differences in PRWPs bargaining power were far ignored.

Therefore, this study aims to shed light on the influence of PRWPs on public

policies by responding to two research questions. The first one is if PRWP had an

influence on the adoption of welfare chauvinist polices and, the second one is by

which mechanism those parties influence immigrants’ entitlement to social rights.

This paper tests three main hypotheses. The first is that PRWPs are able to restrict

immigrants’ access to social policies by participating in the government, mechanism

called direct effect. The second one is that even when PRWPs are not part of the

government coalition, the increase of PRWPs participation in parliament influences

the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies, the indirect effect. The third hypothesis is

that welfare chauvinist policies are adopted independently of PRWPs participation in

governments or parliaments.

Compared to previous studies, the scope of this study is wide. It performs a

large-N analysis with data from 17 Western European countries between 1980 and

2014. The analysis relies on a recently released database, The Determinants of

International Migration Policy data (DEMIG POLICY) Additionally, data from Support

and Opposition to Migration (SOM) and Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) are

considered for cross-validation. The study is broken into five parts. First, I discuss the

populist right-wing ideology and the role of welfare chauvinism in their agenda.

Second, I present the hypotheses of the study. Third, I outline the data and discuss

the analyses. And lastly, I discuss the next steps and conclusions.

1. Contemporary right-wing populism

The emergence of new parties on the right was one of the most important

political occurrences in contemporary advanced European democracies. In

conjunction with the Green parties, these new PRWPs ended the stability of Western

European party systems, increased polarization and party competition (Kriesi et al.,

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2006). In addition, such parties have been relatively successful in recent years,

enlarging their electoral pool, winning seats in national parliaments, and

participating in governments.

As might be expected, many scholars have studied this theme, attempting to

identify the reasons for the shift in political party systems. The literature (Betz, 1993;

Ignazi, 1992; Kitschet and McGann, 1995) explains that this transformation in the

political system was propelled by the significant changes faced by Western European

countries over the past 40 years. First, studies mention the economic crisis of the

1970s, which led to long-term unemployment and a welfare crisis. Second, there was

an increase in globalization, which led to a decrease in national governments’

authority within their own borders and an increase in competition beyond their

borders. Finally, the ‘migration crisis’ occurred, which was understood as a

significant increase in multicultural migration (Schierup et al., 2006).

This process created winners and losers, and those ‘losers of globalization’

are a core element to explain the emergence and growth of the new right (Betz,

1994). This group, composed mainly of low-skilled workers and small business

owners, could not adapt to the world’s transformation, and they perceived

modernization as a threat. They felt they had been harmed by the economic

transformations and judged that the State benefited those who did not deserve

help, while hard workers were left out (de Koster et al., 2010). From a cultural point

of view, the this group believes that national values should be celebrated, and

supports a more authoritarian attitude from the State.

From a sociological perspective of party competition, this group of

discontented created an opportunity for the emergence of populist parties on the

right. These parties were willing to address this new reality and respond to this

group’s wishes. They celebrate national identity and the superiority of the common

man, while endorsing an authoritarian solution to problems. PRWPs stress societal

issues such as violence, drug dealing, and unemployment, and attack the

mainstream parties’ inabilities to confront these challenges. In addition, they

successfully exploit anti-immigrant sentiments for electoral gain. They reinforce the

notion that immigrants are an economic and cultural danger to the nation, using

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populist arguments that are often based on false assumptions to create fear and

anxiety (Williams, 2006).

Scholars use several combinations of words, sometimes indistinctively, to

designate those parties. Most commonly, they are called radical right-wing, far right-

wing parties, extreme right-wing parties, radical right-wing populism, right-wing

populism, and neo right-wing populism (Mudde, 2015). This variety of terms also

appears in the description of the core ideology of this party’s family: authoritarian,

nationalist, xenophobic, anti-democratic, and populist. Not surprisingly, the list of

parties that are considered part of this group diverges among scholars. To avoid this

type of confusion, it is important to acknowledge the distinction between the

various terms and adopt a precise connotation (Mudde, 2002). This work uses the

term “populist right-wing party.” However, the term “populism” also suffers from

misspecification, and it is sometimes used in such a general and catchall manner that

it becomes meaningless (Mudde, 2004; Pappas, 2012).

Cas Mudde (2004: 543) defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology that

considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic

groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics

should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people.” Because

populism is a thin ideology, it is usually combined with other ideologies, such as

nationalism, socialism, and liberalism. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to parties

located on the right side of the political spectrum, excluding the populist left-wing

parties, such as the Greek SYRIZA.

Many scholars adopt the term “radical” in addition to “populist right-wing” in

order to designate parties that, besides populism, have (at least) nativism and

authoritarianism in their ideologies (Mudde, 2007). This group of parties is

considered xenophobic because they believe there is homogeneous native group in

opposition to an alien minority that represents a cultural or economic threat to the

nation. In addition, they argue that crimes should be punished severely and they

defend strict law and order policies. Those parties associate foreigners with crime

and seek stricter punishment and defend extradition of immigrants involved in

crimes.

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However, this study adopts a more general definition, analyzing all populist

right wing parties, regardless of their position on immigration (radical or not). The

main reason for this decision is to avoid selection bias; by selecting parties that are

xenophobes, I may increase the chance of finding an effect on immigration policies

or overestimate the parameters of the model. As a result, I consider all populist

parties that are located in the right spectrum without restriction. This classification

excludes populist left-wing parties, extremist or anti-democratic parties, and

mainstream parties that generally accept a pluralistic view of liberal democracy

(Mudde, 2004: 545).

The parties considered in this study originate from the list proposed by

Mudde (2013, 2015) and de Lange (2008). However, since this study has a broader

classification and focuses on populist right-wing parties and not on radical, populist,

right-wing parties, I follow Norris and Inglehart’s (2016)2 study and added three

parties to that list: Finns Party/True Finn (Ps) from Finland, the Alternative

Democratic Party (ADR) from Luxembourg, and the Progress Party (FrP) from

Norway. The complete list of right-wing populist parties considered in this study is

found in the table below:

2 I considered only the parties that had parliament representation during the period of this study.

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Table1. Populist right-wing parties with parliament representation from 1980 to 2014 Country Party Name Acronym

Austria Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ

Alliance for Austria’s Future BZO

Belgium National Front Belgium FN(b)

Flemish Interest/Flemish Block VB

Denmark Danish People's Party DF

Progress Party FRP(d)

Finland Finns Party/True Finns Ps

France National Front FN

Greece Popular Orthodoxy Rally LAOS

Independent Greeks AE

Popular Association – Golden Dawn LS-CA

Italy Italian Social Movement/National Alliance MSI/AN

Northern League LN

Luxembourg Action Committee Pensions/Alternative Democratic Reform Party

AR-ADR

Netherlands Centre Party/Centre Democrats CP/CD

Pim Fortuyn List LPF

Norway Progress Party (Norway) FRP(n)

Sweden New Democracy ND

Sweden Democrats SD

Switzerland Swiss People's Party/Democratic Union of the Centre SVP/UDC

Swiss Automobile Party/Freedom Party of Switzerland FPS

Ticino League LdT

National Action for People NA

UK UK Independence Party UKIP

2. PRWPs and welfare chauvinism

Welfare chauvinism is the notion that welfare benefits should be exclusive to

citizens (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990). However, Kolbe and Capaz (forthcoming)

state that empirical evidence shows that strict welfare chauvinism, i.e., the belief

that immigrants’ access to social services should be banned, is rare among citizens;

more commonly, people believe immigrants should receive benefits after meeting

some preconditions or making some contribution. This moderate version of welfare

chauvinism is also present in PRWP agendas. They openly argue that immigrants’

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access to the welfare state should not be equal to citizens’ access, and that

restrictions to aliens’ social rights are necessary to meet fairness criteria, avoid

abuse, and ensure the sustainability of social protections. Although it was not

explored during the emergence of PRWPs, welfare chauvinism has become an

important component of PRWP rhetoric since 1990 (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990;

Rydgren, 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Koster et al., 2013). The emergence of welfare

chauvinism as a central political platform coincides with the shift in those parties’

positions regarding distributive issues, from a liberal to a more pro-welfare state

rhetoric (Betz, 1994). Kitschelt and McGann (1995), analyzing the positioning of the

radical right-wing in socialist/capitalist and libertarian/authoritarian dimensions,

highlighted the authoritarian capitalist appeal as the ‘master strategy’ for those

parties. Alternatively, he predicted that those parties would lose votes if they

abandoned the master strategy and instead emphasized the authoritarian welfare

chauvinist strategy or issues such as immigration, xenophobia, and race. In fact, this

master strategy corresponds with the initial economic agenda of many PRWPs. For

example, the PRWPs in Scandinavia, similar to many other countries, such as the

Netherlands and Switzerland, defended a liberal agenda that included reducing

taxes. However, the master strategy that corresponded with the emergence of those

parties did not correspond with their expansion strategy (de Lange, 2007; Betz,

1994).

By the early 1990s, many PRWPs discovered the electoral appeal of an anti-

immigrant agenda, and gradually adopted anti-immigration as a primary issue.

Moreover, to expand the number of voters who were likely to be dependent on the

welfare state, those parties abandoned their strong defense of neoliberalism and

embraced instead a welfare state defense (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006). However,

this pro-welfare state platform is significantly different from the traditional left. The

strong anti-immigrant position of PRWPs prevents true egalitarianism; thus, they

defend distribution only for those who deserve it, i.e., the nationals who contribute to

the society’s wealth and have the right to fully enjoy social benefits. This welfare

chauvinism is supported by the view that immigrants abuse the welfare state, or

simply that natives should have preference in receiving benefits (de Koster et al.,

2013). Empirical studies have confirmed that welfare chauvinism has become a crucial

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component of anti-immigrant agendas (Rydgren, 2004; Koster et al., 2013).

Additionally, studies have shown that this rhetoric is an important variable for right-

wing populist voting (Koster et al., 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008). Therefore, the hypotheses

of this study hold the premise that, once in power, PRWPs will be responsible to their

voters and will have the restriction of immigrants’ entitlements to social rights as their

primary policy goals.

3. Hypotheses

Many scholars have argued that political parties have a decisive impact on

policy outcomes. Focusing generally on left-to-right positioning, studies have shown a

significant relationship between right-wing parties and welfare state retrenchment

(Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Castles, 1982; Hicks, Swank, and Ambuhl, 1989). From the

perspective that parties affect policy designs, this study argues that the recent

electoral success of PRWPs in Europe is the central explanatory element for the extent

of the gap between citizens’ and immigrants’ entitlements to social rights.

This paper has three main hypotheses. The first is that PRWPs are a central

element in understanding the restrictions on immigrants’ entitlements, and that

PRWP participation in national governments is the main channel by which they

influence other parties to adopt welfare chauvinist policies. This perspective is based

on the notion that governmental participation, as a formal member of the

government or as an informal supporter of the winning coalition, leads to the

legitimization of PRWP political platforms and constitutes a channel of communication

whereby PRWPs can persuade ally parties to adopt welfare chauvinist policies.

This interpretation is supported by Akkerman and de Lange’s study (2012),

which shows that the entrance of PRWPs does not lead to moderation in issues that

are central to PRWPs. Also, this study relies on the claim that, though junior

members of the coalition, PRWPs can sway policy outcomes because the

requirement to build majorities gives them bargaining power or allows them to

blackmail the other parties of the coalition to assert their policy preferences, which

is supported by empirical results (Strom, 1990; Downs, 1957). Therefore, as welfare

chauvinism has become one important component of PRWP political platforms and

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voting (Koster et al., 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008), it is reasonable to expect that, once in

power, PRWPs will aim to reduce immigrants’ entitlement to rights.

H1: The participation of a PRWP in the winning coalition increases the

likelihood of a reduction in immigrants’ social rights.

Due to their share of seats in a parliament, PRWPs are most frequently junior

members in the government coalition. However, in some cases, PRWPs have equitable

power with other coalition partners, for example, in Austria from 2000 to 2001, and

Switzerland from 2003. Therefore, in order to access the importance of PRWPs power

resource inside the coalition on the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies, a slightly

different model that has as PRWP participation share in coalition as dependent

variable will also be tested.

Finally, literature generally treats indistinctly the informal participation of

PRWPs in government, i.e., the support of a PRWP to the winning coalition without

receiving a portfolio, and its formal participation in the government (Akkerman, 2012;

Akkerman and de Lange, 2012; Afonso, 2015). However, recent studies have linked

informal participation to a strategy to prioritize voters over offices (Akkerman, de

Lange and Rooduijn, 2016).

Studies have shown that participation in office has given PRWPs significant

electoral backlash (Akkerman and de Lange, 2012). The lack of skilled human capital

to occupy key chairs in government and the necessity to compromise with other

parties on core issues precluded PRWPs from delivering their campaign promises.

Therefore, learning from their first experiences in government led PRWPs to

occasionally abdicate portfolios and opt to support the winning coalition from the

outside. Scholars suggest that this type of agreement reduces the setbacks of

government participation, as it enables PRWPs’ influence on their priority issues,

such as immigration and integration (Christianse and Pedersen, 2014; Thesen, 2016).

Therefore, this paper investigates if informal governmental participation of a PRWP

increases the likelihood of a reduction in immigrants’ social rights versus formal

participation.

The second hypothesis is that PRWPs influence policy outcomes indirectly.

Literature has called significant attention to the contagious effect of PRWPs in

mainstream parties (Norris, 2005; Shain, 2006; Bale, van Spange, 2010; Alonso and

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da Fonseca, 2012). Studies have posited that the electoral success of PRWPs has led

mainstream parties to adopt PRWP positions in issues such as immigration and

integration. This approach assumes that parties are maximizing agents that adapt

their policies to obtain electoral gains (Downs, 1957). Consequently, the electoral

successes of PRWPs signify to other parties, especially right-wing parties, that

immigration issues have gained significant political visibility. This may nudge

mainstream right-wing parties toward policy convergence to prevent PRWPs from

gaining ownership of the immigration issue, i.e., being considered by the electorate

as the most competent party to deal with the issue (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Meguid,

2005). Therefore, the presence of a PRWP has an indirect impact on the restriction

of immigrants’ entitlement to social rights. Mainstream right-wing parties perceive

the electoral success of PRWPs as a threat, which leads those parties to adopt PRWP

policies regarding immigration and integration (Norris, 2005; van Spange, 2010,

Meguid, 2005; Bale et al., 2010).

H2: The presence of PRWPs in a parliament increases the likelihood that

right-wing governments will adopt restrictions to immigrants’ entitlement to rights.

The mainstream left has a much more complicated choice. On one hand, those

parties casts votes from the working class, a group that has become a supporter of

PRWPs in recent years. Those voters feel particularly threatened by immigration and

wronged by the social welfare state (Koster et al., 2010). Therefore, they are generally

inclined to approve restrictions toward immigrants’ access to rights. On the other

hand, mainstream left parties attract highly educated voters and those with liberal

social-cultural values, which favor social egalitarianism policies and a broader concept

of solidarity.

Additionally, left parties are less likely to change their political positions in

response to changes in other parties’ positions in the political spectrum. Studies

attribute this behavior to left wing parties’ decentralized structure of decision, which

gives substantial power of influence to party activists (Kitschelt, 1994; Adams et al.,

2009). Therefore, left wing parties are less likely to abandon their ideological

commitments to tolerance on immigration and integration.

Empirical studies also present inconclusive results. Alonso and da Fonseca

(2012) show that the mainstream left tend to increase the salience of the immigration

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issue, and adopt a tough discourse on immigration in response to the threat of PRWP.

On the other hand, Bale and his colleagues (2001) found that the social democratic

response to the rise of the populist radical right, and to the rise of immigration and

integration issues’ salience, is not uniform. However, it rarely involves adoption of

PRWP positions. Therefore, in contrast to the mainstream right, I expect that if PRWPs

gain ground in national politics, the mainstream left will not restrict immigrants’

access to rights.

H2a: Left-wing governments are not likely to restrict immigrants’ entitlement

to social rights in response to increased PRWP parliament participation.

The third hypothesis assumes that PRWP is not a necessary element for a

restriction of immigrant social rights. This perspective assumes that mainstream

parties can access citizen sentiments regardless the electoral success of those parties.

Thus, if anti-immigrant sentiments become a salient issue in society, mainstream

parties will adapt their policies towards the medium average voter in order to

maximize their electoral results (Downs, 1957). This last hypothesis is in line with

Mudde’s perspective (2007) that the impact of PRWPs have been exaggerated by

scholars, and the fact that restrictive policies have been enacted by mainstream

governments and by governments that have faced no significant populist right

competitor.

H3: Independently of PRWPs electoral success or government participation, if

anti-immigrant sentiment became relevant, mainstreams right-wing governments will

reduce immigrants’ entitlement to social rights.

As the hypothesis 2, this study also assumes that left wing government are

unlikely to adopt restrictions on immigrants’ entitlements to social rights.

H3a: Mainstreams left-wing governments are not likely to reduce immigrants’

entitlement to social rights.

4. Data and research design

Data will be collected from the following 17 countries: Austria, Belgium,

Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United

Kingdom. The data is annual, and covers the period from 1980 to 2014. Those years

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correspond to the rise of PRWPs and growth of PRWPs for most of the

aforementioned countries. The empirical analysis involves a statistics study.

For each country, the following eight social policies will be considered:

minimum income, social pension, guaranteed income for the elderly, children’s

allowances, housing allowances, healthcare aid, compulsory education, and non-

compulsory education. These are all non-contributory policies, which means they are

generally financed by taxes and that the benefits received do not depend on

previous contributions.

The choice of non-contributory policies stems from three factors. First, they

represent a greater fiscal burden to the state because they are not linked to

contributions. Second, immigrants have a higher exposure to social risks, such as

poverty and unemployment, so they are relatively more dependent on these types

of benefits than the general population (Boeri, 2010). Therefore, such policies are

likely targets of restrictions. Finally, the literature reports that, generally, immigrant

access to contributory policies has no restrictions (Fix and Laglagaron, 2002).

The entitlements of six categories of immigrants (EU citizens, permanent

residents, temporary residents, asylum seekers, refugees, and non-documented

immigrants) will be examined separately. This distinction is fundamental because

social rights entitlements are linked to statuses of entrance, and legislation

specifically addresses the entitlements of each immigrant category. The statistical

study conducted is based on a random effect logistic regression (Logit), with an

ordinal dependent variable. I chose to apply the random effect model because I have

time-independent explanatory variables. The estimator is the method of maximum

likelihood.3

3 The ordinal logistic regression is based on the parallel-lines assumption, which is often violated. The test for parallel-lines assumption, “Brand test,” is not available in Stata for random effects ordinal logistic models. If the parallel-lines assumption is violated, the common solution is to treat the outcomes as nominals and apply the generalized order logistic regression. However, this last model, which frees all variables of the parallel-line constraint, often estimates far more parameters than necessary. For these reasons, I opted to apply a random ordinal logistic regression, regardless the parallel assumption verification, in order to simplify the interpretation of the results.

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The dependent variable of the model is the change (increase, maintenance,

or decrease) of immigrants’ rights. Note that I consider citizens’ entitlement as the

baseline, so an increase in immigrants’ entitlement is a change that equates or

approximates immigrants’ rights to citizens’ rights. Similarly, a decrease in

immigrants’ social rights represents a change that increases the gap between

immigrants’ and citizens’ entitlement to social rights. Therefore, changes in

legislation that target both immigrants’ and citizens’ rights are not considered. The

magnitude of the change is also considered. To analyze the comprehensiveness of

the change, I considered the number of immigrant groups and policies affected, as

well as the severity of the restriction.

4.1 Dependent variable

Data on immigrants’ entitlement to rights comes from three databases. First,

the DEMIG POLICY data from Oxford University a qualitative database that provides

information about legislation changes that affect immigrants’ entitlement to social

rights. Then, the explanation tables of MIPEX and SOM databases were also

consulted to crosscheck information and include missing data. In this last step, four

new legislation changes were incorporated in the study (see Appendix I).

The choice of prioritizing the DEMIG POLICY database rather than other

databases (Niessen et al., 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008; Oxford Analytica,

2008; Klugman and Pereira, 2009; Ruhs, 2011) is four-fold. First, DEMIG covers the

countries and years examined in the current study. Second, it appropriately

differentiates the diverse policy areas of immigration (immigration, integration, and

citizenship policies) and their subcategories. Third, the DEMIG POLICY database

makes a clear distinction between outputs and outcomes, and it catalogues only

legislation changes, i.e., policy outputs. Some databases mix information about

policy outputs, legislation, and norms with outcomes.4 Evidently, no superiority a

priori exists among these perspectives; they are merely different approaches, and

they answer different questions. The present study will assess the effect PRWP

participation in parliament and government has on policies. Finally, the DEMIG

4 Refer to Helbling (2013) for a full discussion about the topic.

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POLICY database provides the direction of the changes in terms of immigrants’

entitlement to social rights (more restrictive or less restrictive). This feature allows

the present study to make inferences about both movements.

The table below shows the number of legislation passed regarding

immigrants’ entitlement to social rights.5

Table 2. Number of approved legislation that increased or decreased immigrants’

entitlement to social rights from 1980 to 2014

Country Increases Decreases

Austria 3 2

Belgium 0 6

Denmark 3 5

Finland 0 1

France 2 2

Germany 2 2

Greece 4 2

Ireland 1 2

Italy 2 1

Luxembourg 1 1

Netherlands 1 2

Norway 2 0

Portugal 4 0

Spain 1 1

Sweden 0 2

Switzerland 0 3

UK 0 6

Total 26 38

Table 2 shows that, instead of a constant restriction of immigrants’

entitlement to rights, most of the countries combine expansive and restrictive

changes in legislation. The United Kingdom is one of the notable exceptions; it was

the most restrictive nation and approved five bills that reduced immigrants’

entitlement to rights. These restrictions affected different groups of immigrants;

asylum seekers had their social rights reduced in 1993, 1996, and 1999, and refugees

saw their entitlement restricted in 2004. In addition, the Borders Citizenship and

5 To maintain coherence with the hypotheses developed previously, I excluded changes in legislation that address economic rights (access to the labor market), target exclusively the rights of immigrants from the diaspora, and legislation adopted due to judicial decision.

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Immigration Act of 2009 restricted access to public services and benefits for all

immigrants during the first five years in the country.

Denmark also approved five restrictive legislations on immigrants’ social

rights, but it combined those restrictions with three expansions over the thirty-five-

year period. Interestingly, Denmark backpedaled on some of its imposed restrictions.

In 2000, it reversed the 1999 legislation that restricted refugees’ entitlement to

social benefits, and in 2012, the country approved a legislation nulling the 2002

restriction that reduced the welfare benefit for new migrants.

In order to transform the qualitative information present in DEMIG POLICY

database in a numerical variable that considers not only the direction of change but

also its magnitude, the following dimensions were considered (see Appendix 1 for a

detailed description of the database and coding):

1. The change in policy coverage, which corresponds to a comparison

between the initial degree of coverage and the policy coverage after

the legislation change. Three levels of change are considered: minor

change, mid-level change, and major change. Those categories are

respectively coded as 1, 2, and 3 if the change corresponds to an

extension of coverage, or -1, -2, and -3 if the change corresponds to a

restriction of coverage.6

2. The number of immigrant groups affected (EU members, permanent

immigrants, temporary immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and

non-documented immigrants).

3. The number of policies affected (compulsory education, non-

compulsory education, family allowances and childcare benefits, old

6 Policy coverage corresponds to rules regarding who can receive social rights and under what conditions. Policy reforms may or may not introduce fundamental changes in the criterion of social policy distribution. Introduction or removal of bureaucratic requirements to receive benefits is considered a minor change in coverage. On the other hand, exclusion or inclusion of an immigrant group from receiving the benefits and the introduction or removal of long waiting periods are considered major changes. The increase or decrease of waiting periods up to one year and exclusion or inclusion of only part of an immigrant group are considered mid- level changes.

18

age assistance, minimal income and long-term unemployment, social

housing, and public health or subsidies for insurance fees).

The dependent variable is calculated in a two-step process. First, I multiply

the values of criterion 1, 2 and 3 aforementioned. For example, if the change

corresponds to a mid-level restriction of rights, two immigrants’ groups are affected,

and the bill affects one social policy, this legislation change receives the value -4. As

a result, I have an ordinal variable with values form from -36 to 36. Second, I collapse

the outcome of the first step into an ordinal scale from -3 to 3.7 Legislations that

score less (more) than -5 (5) were considered major restrictions (expansions) and

received the code -3 (3). Legislation changes scored between -3 and -4 (3 and 4)

were considered mid-level restrictions (expansions) and were coded -2 (2).

Legislation changes scored between -1 and -2 (1 and 2) were considered minor

restrictions (expansions) and were therefore scored -1 (1).

As a result, negative values correspond to decreases in entitlement, positive

values correspond to increases in entitlement, and zeroes correspond to the absence

of change. Absolute values of 3 correspond to major changes in terms of polices and

immigrants’ groups affected, as well as the degree of change in immigrants’

entitlement to rights. Likewise, absolute values of 2 correspond to mid-level

changes, and absolute values of 1 correspond to minor modifications.

4.2 Independent variables

This study uses nine explanatory variables. The first independent variable is

the share of seats occupied by PRWPs in parliament, 8 which was taken from the

Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov). 9 The breakdown of PRWP

participation in national parliaments is shown in the table below:

7 In proportional odds models, it is common practice to collapse adjacent categories. For a detailed discussion about the pros and cons of this method, refer to Murad, Fleischman, Sadetzki, Geyer, and Freedman (2003). 8 If there is more than one PRWP in the parliament, this variable represents the share of the sum of all seats occupied by PRWPs. 9 For electoral years, I considered preponderant data, i.e., information that lasts more than six months.

19

Table 4. Share of PRWPs participation in national parliaments from 1980 to 2014.

Country Best result Last election 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2014

Austria 30,1% 21,9% 7,4% 19,4% 21,8%

Belgium 12,5% 2% 0,6% 6,6% 11,3%

Demark 13,4% 12,3% 7,2% 7,3% 12,6%

France 6,3% 0,3% 1,3% 0,1% 0,1%

Finland 19,5% 19,5% 0% 0,1% 6,4%

Germany 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Greece 12,7% 12,2% 0% 0% 3,5%

Ireland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Italy 35,9% 4,4% 5,6% 19,1% 14,5%

Luxembourg 11,7% 5% 0% 8,0% 8,5%

Netherlands 17,3% 10% 0,1% 1,3% 8,3%

Norway 24,4% 17,2% 1,6% 10,8% 19,9%

Portugal 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Spain 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Sweden 7,2% 5,7% 0% 2,2% 1,5%

Switzerland 31,5% 28% 13,5% 17,2% 27,7% UK 0,2% 0,2% 0% 0% 0%

Source: Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov)

The table above shows the power of PRWPs in national parliaments and their

presence across decades. In five cases (those of Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,

and the United Kingdom), PRWPs have neither parliament participation or a minor

participation. It also illustrates that in Greece and Finland, right-wing populism is a

recent phenomenon. However, in the other 10 nations studied herein, PWRPs

appear as a steady growing force in national parliaments over the last 35 years.

Therefore, these data contradict the idea that PRWPs are forcibly temporary. Even if

a PRWP loses seats and disappears from the national parliament, it is generally

replaced by another from the same party family.

The second variable of interest is PRWP government participation. This

variable is a dummy that assumes value 1 if PRWP participates at government

(formally or informally), and assumes value 0 otherwise. A slightly different version

of the second variable is the PRWP government participation type that considers the

following three situations: PRWP formal participation in the government, PRWP

informal support of the winning coalition, and no PRWP government participation.

20

The table below shows the years of formal and informal participation of PRWPs in

governments for the countries and period considered in this study:

Table 5. PRWP formal and informal participation in governments from 1980 to

2014.

Country Formal Informal

Austria 1985-1986

2000-2006

Denmark 2002-2011

Greece 2011

Italy 1994

2001-2005

2008-2011

Netherlands 2002-2003 2010-2011

Norway 2014- 2002-2005

Switzerland 1985-2007

2009-2014

Table 5 shows 13 examples of PRWPs participating in governments, three of

which were informal. The Netherlands and, recently, Norway had combined

experiences of formal and informal participation.

The third explanatory variable is government orientation. This variable is

equal to the sum of the product of party position in the left-right scale and its share

in cabinets for all parties in government.

Governmet orientation = ∑ party positioni

n

party=1

X government participationi

For minority governments, this study takes two approaches. The first

approach is to look for informal supporters. If the minority government had one or

more supporter parties that were not formal members of the coalition, such parties

are considered in the calculation because they were members of the coalition. If the

minority government had no informal supporters and looked for ad hoc allies to pass

bills, the calculation of this variable considers the entire parliament position in left-

right scale multiplied by its participation in the coalition, which is the additional

share necessary to build a simple majority of 50%. For example, if the government

has 35% of the parliament seats and its position is 3,5, the position of the entire

21

parliament, excluding the government parties, is 6,0. This variable will assume the

value of 4,25: ((0,35 0,50)⁄ *3,5)+((0,15 0,50)⁄ ) * 6,0.

I also considered the following four other rival explanations: welfare state

type, welfare state expenditure, public debt, and immigrant influx. For the first

variable, I classified welfare state type according to Esping-Andersen’s typology

(1990). For the second, I used The Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) data on the ratio of public welfare expenditure to the gross

domestic product (GDP). For the third variable, I considered OECD data on the ratio

of total central government debt to the GDP. For the last variable, I considered the

OCDE data on the ration of immigrant influx to the total population. The

independent variables are summarized in the table below.

Table 6. Independent variables of the study

Variable name Type of variable Explanation

Government orientation Continuous Weighted average of left-right orientation of the cabinet.

PRWP share of seats in parliament

Continuous Participation of PRWP in parliament.

PRWP share in coalition Continuous Ratio of PRWP share of seats in parliament/ share of seats of the entire coalition.

PRWP government participation

Dummy PRWP government participation (formally or informally). No participation is the baseline

PRWP government participation type

Dummy

PRWP formal member of coalition, and PRWP informal member of coalition and PRWP. No participation in the government is the baseline.

Welfare state Dummy Liberal, Social Democrat and South European welfare state types .Continental is the baseline.

Public debt Continuous Ratio debt government/GDP.

Welfare state expenditure Continuous Ratio public welfare state expenditure per

capita/GDP.

Immigrant influx Continuous Immigrant influx/total population.

4.2 Statistical analysis

22

As shown in Table 7, four models were tested. Model 1 tested the influence

of PRWP government participation on the adoption of restrictive or expansive

policies towards immigrants’ access to rights, controlled by PRWP parliament

participation, PRWP government participation, government orientation, welfare

state type, immigrant influx, government social expending, and government debt.

Model 2 tested the influence of PRWP share of participation in coalition. Model 3

includes two dummy variables for PRWP government participation, informal and

formal. Model 4 considers the interaction between PRWP parliament participation

and government orientation.

One of the downsides of the ordinal logistic regression model is that the

interpretation of the coefficients of the model is not straightforward because the

coefficients represent the log odds. Therefore, Table 7 shows the coefficients (log

odds) in the first line, and the odds ratio, i.e., the exponential transformation, in the

second line. The odds ratio represents the odds of obtaining greater values of the

dependent variable for a unit of change in the predictable variable. Therefore, if the

odds ratio is less than 1, a marginal increase in the dependent variable will increase

the odds of obtaining lower values of the dependent variable.

23

Table 7. Model result coefficients and odds ratio (N=595, 1980–2014, 17 countries). Coefficients and log-odds in parenthesis.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

PRWP parliament participation 0,019 (1,019)

0,027 (1,027)

0,018 (1,018)

0,193*** (1,212)

PRWP government participation

-1,306*** (0,291)

-0,491 (0,612)

PRWP government participation type (baseline non-participation)

Informal participation -1,708** (0,181)

Formal participation -1,114* (0,328)

Government orientation -0,239 ** (0,787)

-0,188 * (0,829)

-0,216* (0,806)

-0,063 (0,939)

PRWP coalition participation -0,05*** (0,951)

Interaction between PRWP parliament participation and government orientation

-0,036*** (0,965)

Welfare state type (baseline continental)

Liberal -0,479 (0,619)

-0,683 (0,595)

-0,538 (0,584)

-0,899 * (0,406)

Social Democrat 0,01 (1,010) -0,085 (0,918

0,075 (1,077)

-0,043 (0,958)

South European 0,921 * (2,511)

0,857* (2,909)

0,908 * (2,479)

0,814 (2,256)

Debt/GDP -0,003 (0,997)

-0,001 (0,999)

-0,003 (0,997)

0,001 (0,999)

Public social expenditure/GDP -0,02 (0,980)

-0,018 (0,982)

-0,019 (0,981)

-0,018 (0,982)

Immigrant influx/ population 0,004 (1,004)

0,004 (1,004)

0,003 (1,003)

0,002 (1,002)

Prob > chi2 0,0021 0,0004 0,0024 0,0001

Wald chi2 25,96 30,29 27,17 35,18

(*) significant at the 0.1 level, (**) significant at the 0.05 level, and (***) significant at the 0.01 level.

Model 1 supports Hypothesis 1, which states that PRWPs’ government

participation has a negative influence on immigrants’ entitlement to rights. The

model shows that PRWP government participation increases the odds of getting

lower values of the dependent variable (reduction in immigrants’ entitlement to

24

rights) in 3,4410 times. Additionally, the study indicates that government orientation

explains changes in immigrants’ access to rights. All variables held constant, marginal

increase in government orientation (toward the right) increases the odds of a

reduction in immigrants’ social rights by 1,27 times.

Model 2 considers the “PRWP coalition participation” variable. This

coefficient shows that a marginal increase in PRWPs’ participation share in the

coalition increases the odds of a decrease in immigrants’ entitlement to rights by

1,05 times. Additionally, the coefficient of the “government orientation” variable is

negative and significant. All variables held constant, a marginal increase in

government orientation (toward the right) increases the odds of reduction in

immigrants’ social rights by 1,21 times.

Model 3 tests different types of government participation. Both types of

participation, formal and informal, have negative and significant coefficients, which

mean that they increase the chance of a restriction in immigrants’ entitlement to

social rights. However, informal participation has a greater negative effect. Holding

all variables constant, the informal participation of PRWPs in the government

increases the chance of obtaining lower values in the dependent variable (reduction

of immigrants’ entitlement to rights) over higher values by 5,52 times, in comparison

to non-participation. On the other hand, formal participation increases this chance

by 3,03 times compared to non-participation. Similar to previous models, the

government orientation is negative and significant.

Model 4 includes the interaction between the participation of PRWPs in

parliament and government orientation, which slightly changes the interpretation of

the coefficients. The coefficient “PRWP parliament participation” corresponds to the

effect of the variable when government orientation is zero. This coefficient shows

that a marginal increase in PRWP parliament participation increases the odds of an

increase in immigrants’ entitlement to rights by 1,21 times when government

orientation is zero. The variable “government orientation” is not significant in this

model.

10 The calculation 1/odd gives the odds of obtaining lower values of the dependent variable given a marginal rise in the independent variable.

25

The interaction variable represents the effect of PRWPs parliament

participation mediated by the government’s position on the left/right scale. The

interpretation of an interaction between two constant variables is not

straightforward, since its coefficient may have different signs for different values of

covariates. Therefore, the graph below shows the linear marginal effect of an

increase in PRWPs participation in parliament on the dependent variable, for both

different fixed values of government orientation and no government participation.

For a simplified interpretation, the margins are based on a simplified version of the

model that excludes economic and demographic controls.

Graph 1. Linear marginal effect of the participation of PRWPs in parliament on the dependent variable for different levels of government orientation, when PRWPs do not participate in government, with 90% confidence interval.

As displayed in the above graph, the effect of PRWPs parliament participation

in immigrants’ entitlement to social rights is dependent on government orientation.

The marginal effect is positive for governments that score 5 and below in the

left/right party position dimension and negative for governments that score above 5.

-.3

-.2

-.1

0.1

.2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Government Orientation

26

Therefore, a marginal increase in PRWP participation in parliament enhances the

chance of a restriction on immigrants’ social rights when a right-wing government is

in power. On the other hand, this increase enhances the chance of expansion of

immigrants’ social rights when a center or left-wing coalition is in power. However,

those results are only significant, with a confidence level of 90%, for right-wing

governments that score below 4 in the left/right political, and for left-wing

governments that score above 8. 20% of the database falls within the first criteria,

and there is not a single case in the last criteria.

Additionally, in all models, the variables “public welfare expenditure,” “public

debt,” and “immigrant influx” are not statistically different from zero. For models 1,

2, and 3, the dummy for South European welfare states have positive and significant

coefficients. Therefore, compared to the Continental welfare states, the presence of

this South European welfare state increases the chance of an expansion of

immigrants’ access to rights. Model 4 shows that, compared to Continental welfare-

states, the presence of a Liberal welfare state increases the chances of a decrease in

immigrants’ entitlement to rights in 2,5. Finally, the Prob > chi2 test has the null

hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. The small values of

the p-value lead to the conclusion that at least one coefficient is different from zero

and the rejection of the null hypothesis.

5. Conclusions

This paper sought to clarify PRWPs’ influence on immigrants’ entitlement to

social rights and the effect of the interaction between PRWPs and mainstream

parties on the adoption of welfare chauvinist policies. In line with previous studies, it

confirmed that PRWP participation in governments increases the odds of a reduction

in immigrants’ entitlement to welfare benefits. An additional finding is that the share

of PRWP participation in the coalition increases the likelihood of changes in

immigrants’ entitlement to rights. This last point shows that simple participation of

PRWPs in governments only partially explains the restriction of social rights; their

bargaining power also explains the influence of those parties on the adoption of

welfare chauvinist policies.

27

The statistical study showed that the effect of direct and indirect PRWP

government participation on immigrants’ entitlement to social rights differs in terms

of magnitude, with the negative impact being greater when a PRWP informally

participates in a coalition. A possible explanation for this result is that PRWPs trade

offices for policy outcomes. One important limitation of this outcome, though, is

that it is mainly the result of the Danish case; therefore, it cannot be generalized for

other parties. Nevertheless, a case study is needed to identify and clarify how this

trade mechanism works to verify that hypothesis.

The impact of PRWPs’ parliamentary participation on the adoption of welfare

chauvinist policies is mediated by government orientation. Left-wing governments

respond to an increase in PRWPs in parliament by expanding immigrants’ access to

social rights. In contrast, right-wing mainstream governments respond to the

increase of PRWPs in parliament by reducing immigrants’ entitlement to rights;

however, this effect is only significant for extreme values of government

orientations, not observed in the sample.

Another finding is that mainstream parties affect immigrants’ entitlement to

social rights. All variables held constant, a marginal shift in government orientation

towards the right increases the odds of restrictions to immigrants’ rights. On the

other hand, a marginal shift to the left raises the chances of an increase in

immigrants’ entitlement to rights. This result suggests that mainstream right-wing

parties adopt welfare chauvinist measures regardless of the electoral success of

PRWPs and level of PRWPs’ government participation. This finding supports Mudde’s

observation (2007) that governments that do not face competition with a PRWP or

have a PRWP in their coalition still adopt restrictive policies towards immigrants.

It is important to note that the present research relies on a small database

made up of 17 cases studied over 35 years. It reduces the power of the statistical

tests, which increases the probability of rejecting a true hypothesis (type II error).

However, this feature does not alter the reliability of the significant results (type I

error). Therefore, the associations found in the study are likely to be true.

Additionally, due to the size of the dataset, the results are sensitive to changes in my

database. In that scenario, the accuracy of the data is even more determinative to

obtain reliable results.

28

Therefore, this study illustrates that the role of PRWPs in the adoption of

welfare chauvinist polices cannot be ignored. The analysis supports the claim that

the participation of a PRWP in the coalition is the predominant mechanism of

PRWPs’ impact on immigrants’ rights. Additionally, unlike previous studies, which

highlighted the technical incapacity of PRWPs to obtain policy results, this work

suggests that PRWPs use their bargaining power inside coalitions to implement

strategies to influence policies. Finally, traditional left and right dimensions also

explain changes to immigrants’ entitlement to rights. Controlled by the presence of

PRWPs in politics, the higher a government scores on the left-right scale, the more

likely they are to adopt welfare chauvinist policies.

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36

Appendix 1

Country Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected

Immigrant group(s)

Magnitude Explanation Source

Austria 1989 Increase

The access to emergency benefits (Notstandshilfe) has been granted to refugees and holders of a permanent work permit for a maximum of one year The emergency benefits are the prolongation of the unemployment benefits in Austria.

Minimal income

Refugees and permanent immigrants

Major change

Right acquisition with no restriction

DEMIG


Law on Federal Care for Asylum Seekers (Bundesbetreuung) stipulated that the federal government is responsible for health, nutritional and accommodation of asylum seekers. However, there is no legal entitlement to these benefits.

Heath, minimum income and housing

Asylum seekers

Mid-level change

Benefits, but no legal right

DEMIG


Revision of the Law on Unemployment assurance - made all third country nationals eligible for emergency benefits (after unemployment benefits) but enshrined the priority of people born in Austria. > This amendment is a reaction to a judgement of the ECHR, which considered the exclusion of third country nationals from emergency benefits not conform with human rights. Before, only refugees and those with permanent residence permit were eligible.

Minimal income

Temporary immigrants

Mid-level change

Right, but priority to nationals

DEMIG

Austria 2002 Decrease

Internal order of the Ministry of Interior - restricted access to state benefits to asylum seekers from certain countries which were likely to be rejected (a list of safe third countries was created) Background: In 2002, a record number of 36,990 asylum applications were lodged, exceeding the already high figures for 2001 by almost 7,000 (not counting the 16,150 applications submitted to the Austrian embassy in Islamabad in late 2001).

Minimal income

Asylum seekers

Mid-level change

Part of a immigrant group out of the benefit

DEMIG

Austria 2004 Decrease Seasonal workers are no longer eligible for unemployment benefits.

Minimal income


Mid-level change

Part of a immigrant group out of the benefit

DEMIG

Belgium 1984 Decrease

Modification to the Law of Foreigners (Dec 1980) comes into force on 16 August 1984 - restricts access to benefits for unregistered foreigners, those who did not comply with a deportation order, admitted persons for a maximum of three months and asylum seekers whose case has not been determined yet

Minimal income

Asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants

Mid-level change

Part of a immigrant group out of the benefit and bureaucratic obstacles

DEMIG


Two measures have been introduced in 2000 in the field of asylum - replacing the granting of financial assistance to asylum seekers by a material assistance distributed in open reception centers created for this purpose

Minimal income

Asylum seekers

Mid-level change

Material benefit instead of cash benefits

DEMIG

37


Immigrant group(s)



Reception Law of 12 January 2007 (entered into force on 7 May 2007) - introduced material support during the entire asylum procedure (replacing, as was the case in the past, the situation where asylum seekers could apply for financial support from social welfare centers)

Minimal income

Asylum seekers

Minor change

Fine tuning in relation to previous measure

DEMIG


Reaction to the reception crisis the right of reception and/or material aid for certain categories of asylum seekers and other foreigners > 1) Fedasil may exclude asylum seekers, who applied for asylum the third or further times 2) the end terms of material aid for asylum seekers and certain other categories of foreigners is specified: if an asylum claim is henceforth concluded with a negative decision of the appeal instance or the Court of Cassation, the material aid is ending after a term of five days after the issue date of the decision (with some exceptions). 3) in exceptional circumstances it is allowed to assign asylum seekers to a local Public Centre for Social Welfare (OCMW/CPAS) for inscription.

Minimal income

Asylum seekers

Minor change

Fine tuning in relation to previous measure. Bureaucratic impediments

DEMIG


Bill of October 27, 2011 - stipulated that asylum seekers introducing a subsequent asylum application can no longer benefit form material assistance, unless their asylum claim is deemed admissible by the Immigration office.

Minimal income

Asylum seekers

Minor change

Bureaucratic impediments

DEMIG


The Belgian Public Centre for Social Welfare (CPAS/OCMW) has restricted its support to EU citizens and their family members since 27 February 2012 - All EU citizens and their family members are excluded from entitlement to CPAS/OCMW social services, (urgent) medical assistance and employment provisions during the first 3 months of their stay in Belgium. - After the first 3 months, EU citizens and their family members are entitled to CPAS/OCMW social services, medical assistance and employment provisions, provided that they are not job seekers. Irregularly staying individuals are only entitled to urgent medical assistance. - Once they obtain an E or F card, all EU citizens and their family members qualify for social integration (income support and employment provisions) if they meet the conditions regarding the Right to Social Integration provided by Belgian Law.

Minimal income and heath assistance

EU Minor change

Waiting time of 3 months

DEMIG

Denmark 1989 Increase

Circular of 1 May 1989 - granting foreigners the right to financial support to attend high schools and other institutions of learning

High education

EU, temporary immigrants, permanent immigrants, asylum seekers

Minor change

Bureaucratic facilitation

DEMIG

38


Immigrant group(s)


Denmark 1999 Decrease

On 26 June 1998 the Danish Parliament passed its first Integration Act, which entered into effect on 1 January 1999 - created the Start Help, a very low level of social benefits for newly arrived refugees, so that their benefits were much lower than the benefits for Danish citizens. > This was a drawback from the general entitlement to social benefits enacted in 1976. The official argument was that the level of benefits should function as a positive incentive to integrate refugees into the labor market.

Minimal income

Refugees and asylum seeker

Mid-level change

Reduced level of the benefit for the entire group

DEMIG


The start help for newly arrived refugees was abolished in January 2000 only 13 months after its introduction. > The official argument was that it was not possible to demonstrate that the lower rates had given work to more refugees and that the rules might be contravening the 1951 refugee convention .

Minimal income

Refugees and asylum seeker

Mid-level change

Contrary as above

DEMIG


Amendment to the Integration Act in 2002 - reduces the amount of assistance granted to newly-arrived immigrants in order to encourage them to look for a job more rapidly.

Minimal income and housing

Temporary immigrant, asylum seeker and refugees

Mid-level change


DEMIG


In July 2003, a new law regarding asylum seekers and refugees came into effect - creating a contract that needs to be fulfilled by an applicant in order to receive basic cash allowances from the state.

Minimal income

Asylum seekers and refugees

Minor change

Bureaucratic requirements

DEMIG


Act No. 982 of 2 October 2009 Section 2: old age pension requires 10 years of legal residence in Denmark OR (convention or quota refugees). The size of the pension depends of the length of stay. Full pension is possible after 40 years of legal residence.

Unemployment assistance

EU member, permanent immigrant, temporary, refugees and asylum seeker

Mid-level change

Waiting period plus proportional reduction of the benefit

MIPEX/SOM


Law no.1609 (L79): adopted: December 12th 2010 & January 1st 2011: Introduced an earnings-principle, which was used to discriminate in the payment of child- and youth benefits to families in Denmark, effectively barring newly arrived immigrant families from receiving child- and youth benefits equivalent to that of ethnically Danish families until they had held residence in Denmark for 2 years. Newly arrived families thereby only had the right to 25% of the benefits after 6 months, 50% of the benefits after 12 months, 75% of benefits after 18 months and 100% after 2 years. Law 1382 (L31)

Family Assistance

EU member, temporary immigrants

Mid-level change

Waiting time and proportional reduction

MIPEX/SOM


From January 2012, cash allowances for newly arrived refugees and immigrants, as well as the starter allowances for persons having resided in Denmark for less than seven of the preceding eight years will be eliminated - instead, new immigrants will be entitled to social assistance from the moment they arrive in Denmark.

Minimal income

Temporary immigrant, asylum seeker and refugees

Mid-level change

Same as above

DEMIG

39


Immigrant group(s)


Finland 2010 Decrease

Amended Decree entered into force on 2 February 2010 on living allowance paid in cash to asylum seekers - reducing the cash portion of basic living allowance paid to an asylum seeker by 30% compared to other residents of Finland. > For instance, living allowance for an adult asylum seeker living alone will be EUR 292.22 per month (compared to EUR 375.11 previously).

Minimal income

Asylum seekers Mid-level change


DEMIG

France 1986 Decrease Barzach Law of 29 December 1968 - conditions access to social housing and family benefits to the regularity of the stay

Housing and family assistance

Undocumented immigrants

Major change

Exclusion of the benefit

DEMIG

France 1989 Decrease Law establishing the guaranteed minimum income (RMI) . Included certain groups of immigrants, but excluded others

Minimal income

Temporary, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented

Minor change

Right was not conceded before

DEMIG

France 1998 Increase Law 98-349 of 11 May 1998 relative to the conditions of entry and stay of foreigners (Loi Chevènement) - extends social benefits to irregular migrants.

Housing and family assistance


Major change

Inclusion in the benefit

DEMIG

France 2010 Increase Law Arête. Foringners are elegible for housing Housing

Permanent immigrants, temporary, asylum seekers and refugees

Mid-level change


MIPEX/SOM

Germany 1982 Decrease

Asylum Procedure Act of August 1982 (Asylverfahrensgesetz or 2. Beschleunigungsgesetz) - transforms the social benefits from cash into non-cash form (Sachleistungsprinzip)

Minimal income


Cash benefit to in kind benefit

DEMIG

Germany 1993 Decrease

1993 law on financial support of asylum seekers (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) - creates a specific allowance for asylum seekers which is lower than the mainstream social benefits

Minimal income

Asylum seekers Minor change


DEMIG

Germany 1993 Increase

1993 law on financial support of asylum seekers (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) - grants illegally resident migrants entitlement to medical care. In particular, medical services are granted in cases of acute sickness and pain, pregnancy and childbirth.

Health assistance

Non documented immigrants

Mid-level change

Right conceded for some medical circumstances

DEMIG

Germany 2014 Increase

In November 2014, over two years after the Constitutional Court ruling, both houses of the German Parliament finally passed revisions to the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. According to the amendment, from March 2015 onwards allowances for asylum seekers will be similar to the ones provided under the transitional arrangement.

Minimal income


Similar benefits

DEMIG

Greece 1991 Decrease

Act No 1975/1991 regulating the admission of aliens Stipulates that the local administration authorities, public utilities venture and social security fund organizations are obliged to refrain from offering their services to irregular immigrants. This obligation is also extended to hospitals, sanatoriums and clinics, unless there is an emergency or children need medical care.

Health assistance and family benefits


Major change


DEMIG

40


Immigrant group(s)


Greece 1996 Increase

Law 2452/1996 - defined the requirements and the procedure for granting assistance, both to recognized refugees and to those who have submitted a request for refugee status.

Minimal income

Asylum seekers and refugees

Major change


DEMIG

Greece 1999 Increase Presidential Decree 266/1999 - covered issues like social protection of the recognized refugees and asylum seekers.

Minimal income

Asylum seekers Major change

inclusion in the benefit

DEMIG


Act 2910/2001 on the entry, residence and naturalization of immigrants in Greece, Guarantees equal access to the courts, social services and health care to legal migrants, as well as access to education for undocumented children. Since 2001, immigrants who work and pay taxes in Greece have the same rights as Greek workers. For example, they can benefit from the housing program of the Organization of Labor Housing (OEK) as long as they fulfill certain requirements that also apply to Greek workers. This housing program is supervised by the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection and it gives immigrants the opportunity to either receive a monthly rent subsidy or reside in public (labor) housing.

Housing and basic education

Undocumented immigrants, Temporary immigrants, permanent

Major change

inclusion in the benefit

DEMIG

Greece 2005 Decrease

In February 2005, the Minister of Health issued a ministerial circular to state hospitals stating that free routine healthcare to immigrants who are not legal residents is against the law.

Health assistance


Major change


DEMIG


Act 3386/2005 on the entry, residence and integration of immigrants (voted in May 2005 and to be implemented in 2006) - made legally resident immigrants eligible for social security insurance and benefiting of the same social, labor and security rights as Greek workers.

Family assistance and social pension

Temporary and permanent immigrants

Minor change

Law of 2001 had already given legal immigrants rights

DEMIG

Ireland 2004 Decrease

The Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 - restrict access to social assistance and Child Benefit payments by introducing a ‘Habitual Residence Condition’. Migrants have to demonstrate two years of ‘habitual’ residency in Ireland and the intention to stay in the country in order to be eligible for benefits. As in the UK, Accession State nationals face restrictions on access to Ireland’s social welfare system. Ireland proposed the restrictions in February 2004 after the UK had done so. The test applies to all persons but was introduced to protect the Irish welfare system.

Minimal income, housing allowances, child benefits, pension assistance

EU member, temporary, asylum seeker

Major change

Long waiting periods

DEMIG

41

Year Event Resume Policy(s) affected

Immigrant group(s)


Ireland 2006 Increase

2006 Amendments to the Habitual Residence Condition - eased the requirement of the habitual residence condition to access social benefits nearly completely for EEA and to a certain extent for non-EEA residents. > The amendment granted all EEA workers who have work history in the State access to the Supplementary Welfare Allowance (includes a basic allowance, rent allowance, emergency payments and medical cards). Non EEA nationals must still satisfy the HRC. Also, al EEA nationals working in the State will be able to apply for One-parent Family Payment if necessary as it is considered a family payment along with child benefit under European Law. Finally, all workers, both EEA and non-EEA will be able to access Child Benefit. EEA workers will be able to draw the payment even if their children are not resident in the State. Non-EEA nationals will have to be resident in the State with their children to get payments. Child Benefit is considered a family payment under European Law and is not therefore subject to the HRC for EEA nationals. The Irish Government has made child benefit available to all non-EEA nationals working in the State, however, all non-EEA nationals must satisfy the HRC unless they have resided and worked in another EEA country (Free Legal Advice Centers, 2006). Asylum seekers will continue to have no entitlement to Child Benefit.

Minimal income, housing allowances, child benefit and social pension

EU members Major change

in line with the previous one

DEMIG

Ireland 2009 Decrease Since December 2009, asylum seekers no longer have access to the Irish welfare system.

Minimal income, housing allowance, child benefits and social pension



DEMIG

Italy 1986 Increase

First law on immigration (Act 943) passed on December 30st - declared total parity of treatment between Italian and foreign workers (it guarantees rights to social and health services, access to housing, maintaining cultural identity in school)

Family allowance, pension assistance, healthcare and housing

permanent immigrants, temporary and EU members

Major change


DEMIG

Italy 1999 Increase

“Turco-Napolitano” law (Act 40) of 6 March 1998 entered into force on 3 November 1999 - granted access to education and the national health system for all immigrants regardless of their legal status, including irregular migrants, but in this case limited to urgent and/or essential treatment.

healthcare and education


Mid-level change

Only some kind of treatments

DEMIG

42


Immigrant group(s)


Italy 2002 Decrease

(Law no. 189 called Bossi-Fini). TCNs need a two years temporary permit for an equal access to housing The claim of a permit at least two years was introduced in 2002

Housing

Temporary immigrants and EU members

Major change

Long waiting period

DEMIG

Luxembourg 2002 Increase Grand Ducal Regulation of 4 July 2002 - defines the modalities and conditions of social aid for asylum seekers

Housing and minimal income



DEMIG

Luxembourg 2012 Decrease

Grand-Ducal Regulation of 8 June 2012 on social aid for international protection applicants - significantly reduced the financial allocation they receive every month.




DEMIG

Netherlands 1983 Increase

Resettlement Program - Holders of a temporary residence permit for asylum in the Netherlands have the same access to health care, social security as Dutch citizens.

Health assistance


Enlargement of the right

DEMIG

Netherlands 1996 Decrease

Linking Act. Law passed in November 1996 and went into effect on July 1, 1998. Since then, undocumented migrants are barred from all social benefits and provisions with the exception of education for under-aged children, legal counselling, and emergency medical care.

Non-compulsory education, healthcare, housing and minimal income


Major change


MIPEX/SOM

Netherlands 2000 Decrease

Aliens Act of April 2000 (replacing the 1965 Act and its 1994 amendment). Introduced the same social benefits for all asylum seekers and disentitled asylum seekers to social assistance Koning (2013).

Minimal income and housing

Asylum seeker Mid-level change

Equal benefits for the entire group.

DEMIG

Norway 1997 Increase

1997 policy on refugees - granted those under collective protection the same rights as those granted refugee status, including the right to receive education and social security payments.

Housing, family allowances, minimal income and non-compulsory education

Asylum seeker Major change


DEMIG

Norway 2008 Increase

New Immigration Act of 15 May 2008 entered into force on 1 January 2010 - grants all asylum applicants who are entitled to protection refugee status. > Pursuant to the Act, persons who were previously granted asylum in accordance with the Geneva Convention and persons who are protected from deportation according to other conventions will be given the same status as refugees, entitling the former to the same rights as the latter.

Housing, family allowances, minimal income and non-compulsory education

Asylum seeker Minor change


DEMIG

43


Immigrant group(s)


Portugal 2001 Increase

Law establishing a framework on health (Despacho 25360/2001, December 12) - stipulates that any foreign citizen living legally in Portugal has access to health care and services of the National Health Service (NHS), like all nationals. > Those staying irregularly may have access to NHS by presenting a residence certificate (that can be obtained in the local councils) at the health service located in their area of residence, proving that they had been in Portugal for at least 90 days. Many of the irregular immigrants are not aware of their rights and are afraid of being denounced to the authorities. The residence certificate may not be also so easy to obtain because of bureaucratic procedures or the refusal of local authorities.

Health assistance

Non documented immigrants

Minor change

Limited right for undocumented

DEMIG


Decree Law 41/2006 of 21 February - extended the attribution of family social allowance to foreign children and youngsters who hold a legal title of permanence, to refugees, and to holders of temporary protection titles. > Thereby, the mentioned Decree Law puts on the same level resident foreigners, the holders of permanence permit, the refugees, and the holders of temporary protection title for attribution of family social allowance to children and youngsters. Such social benefits were formerly only granted to foreigners holding residence permits.

Family Assistance

Permanent immigrants, temporary and refugees

Major change


DEMIG


Decree-Law 204/2009 of 31 August - allows foreign students who hold a permanent residence permit or benefit from the status of long-term resident to access social action benefits in the field of higher education.

Non-compulsory education

Permanent immigrants

Mid-level change

Inclusion in the benefit for part of a group

DEMIG


Circular 11258/2010 of 7 June approved the Regulations for Advanced Training and the Qualification of Human Resources 2010 - facilitating the conditions for the applications of foreign students to Portuguese education resources



Minor change

Bureaucratic facilitation

DEMIG

Spain 2000 Increase

Law 4/2000 on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Integration (LOEX)- widened most socio-economic rights to aliens in an irregular situation, such as the right to education in the same conditions as Spanish people; the right of all aliens, whatever their legal situation might be, to emergency public health care, and the right to public health care for all aliens who are minors and for pregnant women before and after the birth; the right to assistance as regards housing for aliens registered in the municipal census; and the right to basic social services and facilities (although such basic facilities were not clarified) > Only the right to work and to receive facilities and services of the Social Security under the same conditions as Spanish nationals and the right to family reunion were restricted to aliens who were residents in regular situations.

healthcare, housing, compulsory education


Major change


DEMIG

44


Immigrant group(s)


Spain 2001 Decrease

Law 8/2000 amending Law 4/2000 (came into force in January 2001) - makes the Immigration Law more restrictive by removing nearly all socio-economic rights that had been granted to irregular migrants under the January 2000 Law, except the right to health care and access to education for minors > The most important exception is the right to public health care which remains unaltered by the modification, so, Spanish legislation on aliens in force still recognizes the right of irregular aliens to public health care on condition that it is an emergency situation, the aliens are minors or women requiring pregnancy, obstetric or post-natal care and all aliens in irregular situations if they are registered in the Municipal Population Register.

Housing, and non-emergency healthcare


Major change

Inverse as above

DEMIG

Sweden 2003 Decrease

Bill “Measures to clarify the identity of asylum seekers, etc” entered into force on 1 July 2004 - allowed to partially reduce or entirely remove the daily allowance and housing allowance of an alien over the age of 18 under the Act on the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others Act (1994) if she or he hinders the investigation of a case concerning a residence permit by not assisting in clarifying his or her identity.



Remove benefit for part of the group

DEMIG

Sweden 2009 Decrease

In late 2009, the government in Stockholm announced that students from abroad will have to pay for university studies in Sweden from the winter semester 2011 onwards.


Temporary and permanent immigrants

Mid-level change

Introduction of fees

DEMIG

Switzerland 2004 Decrease

Asylum seekers with a decision to dismiss an application without entering into the substance of the case (DAWES) have been excluded from social assistance since 2004. They are only eligible to emergency assistance and in some cantons they only get access to the public health system in case of emergency.

Healthcare, minimum income and housing


Part of an immigrant group excluded from the benefit

DEMIG


New Asylum Act approved in a referendum in September 2006 (phased in between 2007-2008) - excludes individuals with a legally binding rejected decision on asylum from social assistance. They are only eligible for emergency assistance (Nothilfe) and have limited access to health care

Healthcare and minimum income


Only a legal adjustment of the previous law

DEMIG


In February 2010, the Federal Council approved a number of measures aimed at limiting potential abuses in the framework of the freedom of movement - including restrictions of access to the welfare system of persons from the EU/EEA.

family allowances and minimal income

EU members Minor change

Bureaucratic requirements

DEMIG

45


Immigrant group(s)


UK 1993 Decrease Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 - reduced the benefit entitlements of persons who claim asylum in the UK, as well as their dependents

Minimal income


Reduction for part of a group and bureaucratic requirement

DEMIG

UK 1996 Decrease

Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 - withdraw eligibility to non-contributory benefits from asylum seekers who did not lodge their application at the port of entry or who are appealing on a negative decision on their claim. > This resulted in a High Court judgement in October 1996 which established that local authorities have a duty under the National Assistance Act to provide services to asylum seekers with no other means of support.

Minimal income


Exclusion of the benefit for part of a group

DEMIG

UK 1999 Decrease

Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 - introduces the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) to co-ordinate the arrangements for supporting asylum seekers and dispersing them to different areas of the UK. > The act replaces welfare benefits for asylum seekers with vouchers worth £35 a week for an adult and provides accommodation on a no-choice basis around the United Kingdom.

Housing and minimum income


Equalization of the benefit and restriction of choice for accommodation

DEMIG

UK 2004 Decrease

2004 EU enlargement - workers from the new EU countries only become eligible for benefits such as Jobseeker's Allowance and income support after working continuously in the UK for at least a year.

Minimal income

EU member Mid-level change

Waiting period for benefits for part of the group

DEMIG

UK 2004 Decrease

Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 - Limits eligibility for refugee support. > Failed asylum seekers with children can be refused support if they are not "cooperating with the removals process".

Minimal income


Bureaucratic DEMIG

UK 2009 Decrease Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 - restricts the access to public services and benefits during Probationary Citizenship

Housing, old age assistance, minimum income and family allowances

EU members and temporary immigrants

Mid-level change

Waiting period

DEMIG

Source: DEMIG (2015) and author

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