white paper on china || the white paper in brief

Institute of Pacific Relations

The White Paper in BriefAuthor(s): Lawrence K. RosingerSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 18, No. 18, White Paper on China (Sep. 7, 1949), pp. 205-208Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3024596 .

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AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WHITE PAPER ON CHINA

A capsule digest of the now famous document, and two divergent critiques.

Secretary Acheson holds that recent events in China were beyond American

control. Professor Linebarger calls on the State Department to deal frankly with the American public. Professor Fairbank urges a policy based on faith

in democracy, geared to Asian realities and not limited to official channels.

The White Paper in Brief

T

BY LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

'he White Paper on United States relations with

China/ released by the State Department on August

5, is the product of many factors. The two most im?

portant are the recent debacle of American policy in

China, and the conflict between the Department and a critical segment of Congressional, press, and other

opinion?largely Republican?as to where the respon?

sibility for the debacle lies and what the United States

should do next.

Altogether the volume comprises almost 1,100 pages,

including several main sections: a fifteen-page letter

of transmittal from Secretary of State Acheson to the

President, 409 pages of textual analysis of Chinese-

American relations from 1844 to 1949, and 642 pages of documents, many previously unpublished. Since much

of the text consists of summaries of the salient points of documents not otherwise included, the documentary

portion is even larger than the above description would

suggest. The bulk of the White Paper is devoted to

developments of the last decade, especially the past five

years. The eight chapters of text cover the following

subjects: American policy in China, 1844-1943; Kuo-

1 United States Relations with China: With Special Refer? ence to the Period 1944-1949. Based on the files of the Depart? ment of State. Department of State Publication 3573, Far

Eastern Series 30, released August 1949. Washington: Govern?

ment Printing Office. xli, 1054 pp. $3.00.

mintang-Chinese Communist relations^ 1921-44; General Patrick J. Hurley's ambassadorship, 1944-45; Yalta and the Chinese-Soviet treaty of 1945; General George C. MarshalPs mission, 1945-47; Dr. J. Leighton Stuart's

ambassadorship, 1947-49; the military situation in

China, 1945-49; and the American economic aid pro? gram in China, 1947-49.

These pages offer the reader more of the raw material of history than is available for any other phase of recent American foreign policy. Here are quotations from

SEPTEMBER 7, 1949 VOL XVIII NO. 18

IN THIS ISSUE

WHITE PAPER ON CHINA

? The White Paper in Brief

by Lawrence K. Rosinger

? Toward a Dynamic Far Eastern

Policy

by John K. Fairbank

? The Failure of Secret Diplomacy in China

by Paul M. A. Lmebarger

? 205 ?



five letters?and the full text of a sixth?written by President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1944; a long series of dispatches on day-to-day devel-

opments, revealing the thinking of General Marshall, Ambassadors Gauss, Hurley, and Stuart, and many others; official notes on former Vice President Wallace's conversations with Chiang late in the war; the text of the China sections of the Wedemeyer Report of 1947; and a mass of additional material, including many statements by the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

The Main Thesis The White Paper's main thesis is that the United

States is not responsible for the fall of the Kuomintang, since this country gave the Nationalists extensive mili?

tary, economic, and political advice which was disre-

garded, did not abandon them until their cause became

hopeless, and could not have changed the outcome of the civil war through any further aid within "the reasonable limits" of American capabilities. Detailed in?

formation, statistical and explanatory, is given about American aid, which the book estimates at slightly more than $2 billion in military and economic grants since

V-J Day, plus military and civilian surplus property with a procurement cost of over $1 billion and a sales

price of $232 million. The sum of $2 billion is said to have been equivalent in value to more than half the Chinese governmenfs monetary expenditures in the

period. The analysis of the Marshall mission suggests that

it was, in effect, an effort to save Chiang from himself by persuading him to give up or modify his policy of force?which threatened catastrophe because it was

beyond his strength?and in the process to preserve and even increase his government's influence. This part of the White Paper is intended as an answer to pro-Kuo- mintang critics of the State Department, who have con- demned the effort to produce a Kuomintang-Commu- nist coalition and, in some cases, have suggested that the United States, late in 1945, stopped Chiang from driving ahead militarily when his forces were doing well. In this connection Wedemeyer, then Commanding Gen? eral in the China theater, is cited as reporting in Novem? ber 1945 that the Chinese government was entirely unprepared to occupy Manchuria against Communist

opposition and that it would be extremely difficult for

Chiang to stabilize his position in North China. The

point is also made that the concept of coalition was a

product of the Chinese scene, which had been accepted by Chiang in principle before the Marshall mission took place, and that previously, in the latter phase of the war, the danger of a collapse of the Chinese military effort had given the United States a vital interest in

strengthening the unity of the Chinese parties.

The characterization of the Nationalist government during the war and after is presented in devastating terms. President Truman is quoted as declaring to

Chiang, in a letter of August 10, 1946, "the hopes of the people of China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reactionaries." Again, in a report of July 1, 1947 to Washington, Ambassador Stuart declares that Nationalist forces and officials in Manchuria conduct themselves "as conquerors . . . and have imposed a 'carpetbag' regime of unbridled exploita- tion. . . . The evidence is growing daily that the people of Manchuria not only are prepared for but are keenly desirous of a change in the government." Later General David Barr, head of an American military advisory group in China, reports to the State Department on November 16, 1948 that the Kuomintang "military debacles in my opinion can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale des-

troying factors that lead to a complete loss of will to fight." And Secretary Acheson adds in his prefatory letter: "Our military observers on the spot have re?

ported that the Nationalist armies did not lose a single battle during the crucial year of 1948 through lack of arms or ammunition."

Yalta and the Wedemeyer Report In the course of the analysis presented by the State

Department attention is paid to two subjects which have aroused considerable discussion: the Yalta agreement on China and the Wedemeyer Report. On the former

question the book holds?in Secretary Acheson's words ?that: "Although dictated by military necessity, the

Agreement and the subsequent Sino-Soviet Treaty in fact imposed limitations on the action which Russia

would, in any case, have been in a position to take." The decision not to consult the Chungking government is defended by the Secretary in this statement: "It was felt that there was grave risk that secret information transmitted to the Nationalist capital at this time would become available to the Japanese almost immediately. Under no circumstances, therefore, would we have been

justified in incurring the security risks involved." The main conclusion advanced by General Wede?

meyer in his Report was that the United States should continue to aid the Chinese Nationalists militarily and

economically under agreements to be negotiated by the two governments, with the stipulation that China

(1) inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the United States for increased American material aid and advice, (2) request the United Nations to seek immediately a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and ask that Manchuria be placed under a "Five-Power

Guardianship" or, failing that, under a trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter, (3) use

206 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



her own resources effectively in an economic reconstruc- tion program and launch sound fiscal policies, reducing deficits, (4) give continuing implementation to urgently needed political and military reforms, and (5) accept American advisers in specific military and economic fields to aid in using assistance in the manner for which it was intended.

Although recommending further, expanded aid, Gen? eral Wedemeyer felt strongly that efforts to stop Com? munism without paying attention to "the continued existence of an unpopular repressive government" would be useless. Numerous shortcomings of the Kuomintang are discussed, as well as correspondingly desirable po? litical, economic, financial, and military reforms. Em-

phasis is placed on the importance of reducing the Chi? nese military establishment and increasing its efficiency, as well as on the fact that "Communist operations in Manchuria have practically rendered Nationalist forces in that area militarily impotent." In commenting on the decision not to make the Report public after it was

submitted, the White Paper declares that impediments were created by the recommendation on Manchuria, in view of the possible effects in arousing Chinese senti- ment and endangering the future of the United Na?

tions, already beset by grave problems. The belief is also

expressed that the Chinese government would have re-

jected the proposal. No reference is made to other factors as conceivably affecting publication.

The White Paper is a complex volume written on a number of levels and containing at least four types of material: outright documents (quoted in the text or

printed in the appendices), textual paraphrases of docu?

ments, textual analysis and interpretation, and the letter of transmittal. The parts which are of the greatest in- trinsic importance in studying past policy in China are the documentary ones, even though these sections must themselves be checked against, and supplemented by, other sources of information.

Sidelights on History The book contains many bits of history which east

light on the larger scene. One incident revolves about General Wedemeyer's reaction to Chinese conditions in the course of his 1947 mission. We read that he was in- vited by the Generalissimo to address the State Council and to express himself frankly. Subsequently Chiang called Ambassador Stuart and suggested that he might caution Wedemeyer against being too critical of the

government, in view of the heterogeneous nature of the

prospective audience. But Stuart declined on the ground that Wedemeyer was speaking at Chiang's invitation.

Wedemeyer's off-the-record address proved to be a critical one, and he also issued a sharp public state? ment on the day of his departure from China. The fol-

lowing day, according to the Ambassador, Chiang called Stuart's personal secretary, a Chinese, to his residence "and quizzed him at some length with regard to the

background of the Wedemeyer Mission." On another page the White Paper reports an un-

successful request from the Communist Commander-

in-Chief, General Chu Teh, in January 1945 that the United States Army lend the Chinese Communist forces

US$20 million for use in procuring the defection of Chinese puppet troops with their arms and in encourag- ing sabotage by puppet troops behind the Japanese lines. Ambassador Hurley commented that while such aid "might in the end prove to be more economical than importing a similar quantity of arms and ammunition from the United States for use against Japan," it would be contrary to the established American policy of sustaining Chiang Kai-shek's government.

In a reference to previous American aid, Acting Pres? ident Li Tsung-jen is quoted as writing to President Truman on May 5, 1949 that "owing to the failure of our then Government to make judicious use of this aid and to bring about appropriate political, economic and military reforms, your assistance has not produced the desired effect." A month before, on April 6, 1949, Ambassador Stuart had reported: "The Prime Minister

[Ho Ying-chin] is still hoping to secure a silver loan from the U.S. and suggested a lien on the island of

Taiwan, or on its products, as security."

Secretary Acheson's Conclusions

The basic overall conclusion is contained in this statement by Secretary Acheson: "The unfortunate but

inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its

capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision

by default." Here it should be noted that, while the White Paper is sharply critical of Soviet policy in Manchuria and refers to Soviet actions in 1945-46 as

having the effect of helping the Communists in that

area, the book does not contend that outside assistance was responsible for the success of the Communists.

Although it is only a small part of the volume, Sec?

retary Acheson's letter of transmittal, from which the above conclusion and some other statements have been

quoted, deserves attention as the policy-making section of the White Paper. After summarizing, reshaping, and

commenting on some of the main aspects of the subject, as brought out in the rest of the volume, the Secretary

SEPTEM BER 7, I 949 207



presents a current official view of the China situation

and hints at future policy. He declares that in the vic-

tory of the Chinese Communists "foreign domination

has been masked behind the facade of a vast crusading movement which apparently has seemed to many Chi?

nese to be wholly indigenous and national." There then

follows the paragraph already cited in which the Com?

munist victory is called "the product of internal Chin-

nese forces" beyond American control.

Advising the United States to "face the situation as

it exists in fact" and avoid "wishful thinking," the

Secretary expresses the belief that China will ultimately throw off "the foreign yoke." He adds: "I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end. In

the immediate future, however, the implementation of our historic policy of friendship for China must be

profoundly affected by current developments." Policy, he states, "will necessarily be influenced by the degree to which the Chinese people come to recognize that the Communist regime serves not their interests but those of Soviet Russia and the manner in which, having be? come aware of the facts, they react to this foreign dom? ination." He declares that if a Communist China should "lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's

neighbors," the United States and other United Na? tions members would face a situation violating the Charter and threatening world peace. Meanwhile, he

asserts, American policy will continue to be based on the

Charter, friendship for China, the Open Door, and

support of China's independence and administrative and territorial integrity.

Fourth Alternative Omitted Even in a volume of over 1,000 pages the full story

of China policy cannot be told, nor can an official ac? count be expected to do so. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the merits of the book's argu? ments. But it may be helpful to the reader to point out certain gaps in its coverage. The principal omission lies in the fact that the White Paper apparently was designed as an answer to those who say that the United States should have given more aid to the

Kuomintang, or that it should still do so. It is apparently not written as a reply to those who hold that the failure of American policy in China resulted from the decision to support the Nationalist government in the postwar period under circumstances of imminent or actual civil war. The letter of transmittal, for example, lists three alternatives confronting the United States in China when peace came: to pull out completely; to intervene on a major military scale (probably involving American

forces) to help the Nationalists destroy the Communists;

or to help the Nationalists establish their power as

widely as possible, but to seek to avoid civil war by work?

ing for a compromise between the parties. No reference is made here to a fourth alternative: to seek to avoid civil war by working for a compromise, but to keep the United States in a flexible position, basically un- committed to the extension of Nationalist, or any other,

power in China and ready to adjust itself to the further evolution of that country.

Other Points Not Covered

Beyond this omission, several other points may be noted: (1) Differences in outlook about China policy within the executive departments are played down, and nothing at all is said about the interplay of Con-

gressional and State Department opinion. Yet these differences of opinion have been of crucial importance in the evolution of American policy, especially in the transitional periods, such as the transition from General Stilwell to General Hurley and from Hurley to Gen? eral Marshall, as well as in the past two years. Linked with this is the fact that many questions of policy forma? tion are presented in a highly simplified way, which does not convey adequately the complexity of their

inception or handling. (2) Little light is shed on the role of China in American military planning in various

phases of World War II and in the postwar period. Related to this is the fact that, except for Yalta and the Sino-Soviet pact and its aftermath, there is virtual-

ly no discussion of China policy in its international

setting. (3) There is little beyond occasional mention of the Chinese Communists, except for their role in nego? tiations with the Kuomintang. As Secretary Acheson

explains, American official contacts with the Com? munists were limited. Nevertheless, material from the

reports of the American military observer group in

Yenan, 1944-46, might have been presented, as well as something about General MarshalPs visit to Yenan in the course of his mission. (4) Throughout the text

agrarian questions are seldom mentioned, and then only in passing or in a narrow context. While it is not sur-

prising that the White Paper does not undertake a

lengthy analysis of Chinese society, the absence of at least a clear-cut early statement of the various facets of the current land problem?ownership, taxation, usury, rents, technique, etc.?means that the reader is not

given the essential setting. In this respect, of course, the book reflects the very cursory consideration given to the land problem in the formulation of past American

policy toward China. Yet it should be clear that the

politics, economics, and welfare of agrarian countries such as China cannot be understood unless the ills that have long afflicted, and now increasingly arouse, the

peasantry are constantly borne in mind.

208 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



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