what the f**k: what the form
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This paper is a look at the mythologization and resistance to mythologization in the works of Eisenman, and the mythologization of Graves' works. This is a critique of Gandelsonas and Morton's article On Reading Architecture, and deconstructing their theoretic enframing of Eisenman and Graves' work.TRANSCRIPT
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What the F**k: What the Form
Patrick M. Dey
Architecture in Theory
ARCH 5140
Amir Ameri
University of
Colorado
College of Architecture and Planning
Midterm
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Gandelsonas and Morton frame the reading of Graves’ and Eisenman’s work through a lens of
comparison between meaning and form in architecture. Their means of contriving this reading of
architecture is achieved through how Graves uses opposition to create meaning via cultural vocabulary,
while Eisenman uses a vocabulary that is autonomous to architecture to convey a process, a
methodology of creating meaning through process of creating form. In this Graves is mythologizing his
architecture by using mythic and cultural vocabulary, while Eisenman is resisting the mythologization of
his architecture by using a morphology that neglects any vocabulary, except that of a strictly
architectural vocabulary. While there is a resistance to theory for Graves and Eisenman, the resistance
to myth is much more prevalent.1
Graves’ work is framed by the authors as generating meaning by using opposition. Essentially, using two
dichotomous elements of cultural vocabulary, Graves is able to generate some sort of meaning in his
work. Graves
is
“quoting”
the
vocabulary
(i.e.
forms)
and
grammar
(i.e.
architectonic
rules)
built
up
over
the generations to establish signification in architectural context, what is called the “double program.”
For instance, “the opposition between horizontal plane and vertical plane represents the opposition of
architect and user.”2 This is absolute fiction, and entirely arbitrary in the distinction between the
signified and signifier. In what way does the horizontal “represent” the architect? It is merely a frame to
read a horizontal plane, so when the orientations of surfaces are analyzed the oppositions are taken into
account. If the horizontal plane is read as the attributes of the architect, then naturally the user will be
read into the vertical planes.
Here, in the case of “this represents that,” the signified is, as always, arbitrarily attached to a signifier.3
There is no natural relationship between horizontal (images) and the architect (concept). As opposed to
the pyramid, which is an entirely meaningless geometric shape, but achieves a meaning that appears
obvious once the frame of theory is constructed: it looks like a mountain. From here the mind can go
wild with this frame of reference. The mountain is the place of the gods (why the gods are on
mountaintops is arbitrary), and the pyramid is a tomb for the Solar God Horus incarnated as the Pharaoh
1 I will here be synthesizing the arguments of De Man’s The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press). 1986. Pg. 3‐20) and Barthes’ Myth Today . In that the resistance to theory entails theory
attempting to end theory and make theory fact, but theory will never end, then resistance to mythologization
attempts to eradicate metalanguage in an autonomous language, which inevitably leads to a contextually
enframed metalanguage built upon the ashes of the preceding language. 2 Gandelsonas, Mario and David Morton. “On Reading Architecture,” Signs, Symbols, and Architecture. New York,
NY: John Wiley Inc. 1980. Pg. 248. 3 Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. New York, NY: Philosophical Library. 1959. Pg. 67.
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(why the Pharaoh is Horus incarnate is arbitrary as well). Thus, the tomb‐mountain is the gate for which
the dead solar king transcends to the gods and becomes Osiris. The link is, of course, arbitrary between
pyramid and mountain‐gate, which is constructed through the myths of the Egyptians. But it is
undeniable that the pyramid does resemble a mountain. In the case of the pyramid and mountain, the
relation between signified and signifier is seemingly less arbitrary than horizontal and architect. Each
must undergo a mountain of rhetoric and theoretical justification to link their respective signified and
signifier.
Apart from this arbitrary “representations” of one thing to another, there is always the quality of what
divides the opposites. At what point is a thing still its own ontological thing? And at what point does the
thing become its opposite? Take for instance the dichotomy in reading Graves’ work of the natural and
the artificial, the “in” and the “out.”4 At what point does architecture become natural? By logical
analysis, if
humans
are
a product
of
nature,
then
all
things
done
by
humans
are
natural,
and
built
into
the natural order (of course, this is an informal fallacy, but is a frame to interpret with). Is there an
actual delineation between inside and outside, the artificial and the natural? Or are the two extensions
of each other? As Levi‐Strauss defines with a traffic light, why does green mean “go” and red mean
“stop?” While “go” and “stop” are in opposition to each other, how is red and green opposed? How is
the signification of the stop and go duality created in the signifier red and green, which are without
opposition?5 There isn’t one. The two are only different.
6 Likewise, the opposition of inside and outside
as signifiers are arbitrarily attached to the weak opposition between artificial and natural as the
signified.
The authors further this frame of opposition by presenting Eisenman as the contrary to Graves’ theory
and work. This construct of Eisenman versus Graves is simply another arbitrary opposition, but gives a
reading of the two actually being opposites. Though the reading of the two appear to be opposites,
visually the relation between Graves’ Benacerraf House and Eisenman’s House II is slim. The two
residences look very similar with a very similar architectonic vocabulary. The two houses both utilize
autonomous and “artistic” uses of the wall, window, column, beam, door, and so forth. The different
reading of these two houses lies not in how they look (in which they are actually similar), but in how the
two are read through opposing theories.
4 Gandelsonas. On Reading Architecture. Pg. 249, 255. 5 Leach, Edmund. “Oysters, Smoked Salmon, and Stilton Cheese,” Claude Lévi ‐Strauss. New York, NY: Fontana‐
Collins Publishing. 1974. Pg. 16. 6 Saussure. Course in General Linguistics. Pg. 120.
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Eisenman is presented as rejecting mythic vocabulary of architectural form. In other words, if the use of
Corbusier’s garden window is ideal, then it has certain connotation with the form of the window, and
therefore, a certain mythologization of the window. Eisenman is trying to eliminate the mythologization
of any form by reducing the architectural language back to the signified and the signifier, and trying to
not let the two form a meta‐signified that can be attached to another signifier.7 This is how Barthes
establishes myth as a metalanguage. Eisenman strives for this demythologization in his work by using a
language that is autonomous to architecture, namely the line, plane, and volume, and their
representations in architecture, which is, respectively, the column, wall, and volume (or space).8
In House II the wall is given an ambiguous reading by doubling its reading. Essentially, the wall can be
read as an extension of the column (i.e. a bunch of columns placed side by side, or an extrusion of the
column), or it can be read as a “reside” of the volume (e.g. using the law of conservation of information,
if the
volume
is
destroyed,
then
the
wall
remains
as
the
information
referring
to
the
existence
of
the
volume).9 Eisenman calls this sort of structuring of architectural form “double‐deep structure,”
10 which
is its own form of mythologization, as it is a metalanguage.
The use of column, wall, and volume are forms that are meant to be strictly architectural, so the
architect can create an autonomous architecture, an architecture of “positive terms.”11
In this way the
architecture is not supposed to reference anything outside of itself, as opposed to Graves’ architecture,
which references existing cultural vocabulary and grammar of architecture. Where Graves
communicates architecture
as
a myth,
Eisenman
communicates
an
architecture
of
process,
of
methodology.12
To clarify, Graves uses language that exists outside of the creation of the work, while
Eisenman is trying to “invent” a language for translation through the methods of creating the work.
Through this construction of language via methodology, a metalanguage, the “double‐deep structure” is
formed. To Eisenman the purpose of the double‐deep structure is “to provide in the object two
conceptual readings, so that the object can never be held in the mind as a single entity, but rather as in a
state of tension or as a dialect between two conceptual notions.”13
7 Barthes, Roland. “Myth Today,” Mythologies. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 1972. Pg. 115. 8 Gandelsonas. Pg. 264‐265. 9 Ibid . Pg. 266 10
Ibid . Pg. 268. 11
Saussure. Pg. 120. 12
Gandelsonas. Pg. 268‐269, 270. 13
Eisenman, Peter. Taken from Gandelsonas. Pg. 269.
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Obviously there is a paradox here with an architecture of positive terms. Gandelsonas and Morton say
that Eisenman “…eliminate[s] all factors at the communication level except the message itself.”14
This
entails that nothing outside of the message is necessary for the communication of the concept.
Ultimately, this is a paradox. If communication is necessary – regardless of what is being communicated,
such as methodology for Eisenman – for one concept to be transmitted, then ultimately the “factors at
the communication level” cannot be eliminated. While this is a resistance to communication, that
resistance is really a subset of the resistance to mythologization, a resistance to metalanguage.
One cannot escape reading into what Eisenman says about the double‐deep structure as a form of
Newspeak for architecture, where the viewer (never the user or occupant, because these are contextual
to the architecture, and something that exists outside of an autonomous architect; to reference a user
makes the building incomplete without the user, so the user must be excluded)15 must “doublethink,”16
or process
one
interpretation
of
the
information,
while
consciously
being
aware
of,
but
ignoring,
another interpretation of the same information. In this sense, Eisenman is striving for an architecture
with a pared lexicon, which is to limit the readings of architecture; that is, to create architecture and to
read architecture under a limited vocabulary17
that is only meant to read the methodology of a building
design’s creation.
Can architecture have its own language in positive terms? Or is architecture simply stuck with the
vocabulary and grammar of its predecessors? Can architecture resist mythologization? Archi‐Newspeak
is a resistance
to
mythologization
of
architecture.
It
is
absolutely
paradoxical
that
architecture
can
be
autonomous, as it depends too much on context (i.e. site, users, client, construction methods, et
cetera). Tschumi prescribes an architecture of sensuality to correct, or, at the very least, to embrace the
paradox of autonomous architecture.18
But sensualizing architecture leaves it open to mythologization
as well. Certainly there is a problem to autonomous language in architecture, so the question must be
begged: can a language be autonomous? Or is it always subjected to arbitrary image‐concepts? Derrida
would claim that a “universal”, autonomous architecture is, indeed, arbitrary: “… a sort of ‘universal
tongue’. And once sounds no longer have any relation of natural representation with external sensible
things, they are more easily linked to the spontaneity of the understanding. Articulated, they furnish a
14 Gandelsonas. Pg. 258.
15 Ibid . Pg. 261.
16 Orwell, George. “The Principles of Newspeak,” 1984. New York, NY: Signet Classic. 1950. Pg. 309‐310.
17 Rowe, Colin and Fred Koetter. Collage City . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1978. Pg. 65.
18 Tschumi, Bernard. Architecture and Disjunction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1996. Pg. 27‐51.
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language in agreement with its laws. Here indeed we have the arbitrary nature of the vocal signifier.”19
This is precisely what Eisenman is striving for, but the arbitrary meaning of autonomous language in
demythologized architecture ultimately ends in paradox.
Take Hofstadter’s
analogy
of
a string
of
dominos,
for
instance,
in
thinking
about
a string
of
neurons
firing. If the dominos are knocked over, then a chain reaction of the other dominos ensues. But if one of
the dominos did not fall down, though all other ones succeeding it did fall, then it must be asked: why
did that one not fall down? The simple, and entirely myopic (“nearsighted”) answer would be, “Because
it didn’t fall down.” In thinking about neurons, some neurons won’t fire in a chain, while the rest do.20
Why? Avoiding a narrow‐minded response, then a signification must be attributed to the signifier. If the
domino doesn’t fall, then an external image‐concept would have to be attributed to it. In Eisenman’s
work, the same question of communication and meaning in the architecture is subject to being asked
“why?” for
its
usage.
Why
is
that
column
there?
The
myopic
answer
is,
“Because
the
column
is
there.”
But the communication of “why the column” is brought back into mythologization, due to the
metalanguage of the process. “The column is there because it is a residue of the wall, which has been
deconstructed…” If an addition language is necessary for reading the process of how the column got
there, then the building is not complete, and therefore not autonomous. Obviously the message
(signified) cannot be translated without communicating some sort of theory (signifier). It is as if
Eisenman was constructing an architectural word salad, which is syntactically correct, but the
nonsensical semantics can be read through the construction of the sentence itself.21 If this can be done,
then, once again, myth has stolen the language that was meant to evade mythologization.22
Point in fact, the struggle for Archi‐Newspeak is paradoxical unto itself. To subject an architectural
language to a language without context is, in itself, creating a language, a metalanguage, and, therefore,
a mythologization of architectural language. If the Modernist agenda for architecture is to pare down
the vocabulary of architecture, then it is being subjected to a metalanguage that is based on the flowery
and superfluous (i.e. unnecessary words) language of its predecessor. If the goal is to reduce the
vocabulary and achieve an autonomous language, then that language must derive itself from the
language that gave it the foundation for enframing the contextual aspect of autonomous language.
Essentially, the autonomous language is a copy of a language that is also a copy of its predecessor; a
19 Derrida, Jacques. “Economimesis”, Diacritics, Vol 11. Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press. 1981. Pg. 19.
20 Hofstadter, Douglas. I Am a Strange Loop. New York, NY: Basic Books. 2008. Pg. 37‐39.
21 Chomsky, Noam. Syntactic Structures. Boston, MA: Mouton & Co. 1957. Pg. 15.
22 Barthes. Mythologies. Pg. 131‐133.
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copy of a copy of copy of a… Or a better way to put, take the mathematical paradox of Cantor Sets, in
which a set of numbers can be inside another set of numbers– that is inside a set inside of a set, even its
own set. Likewise, this metalanguage of autonomous architecture is a language within a language within
a language within... Thus, Archi‐Newspeak is a resistance to mythologization, while, paradoxically, being
mythologized in the process.
Ultimately, Gandelsonas and Morton’s On Reading Architecture is a dichotomous comparison of
structuring form in architecture from established syntax and semantics, as was the case with Graves,
and from autonomous syntax to invent semantics of form, as it was for Eisenman. In comparing both
methods of structuring image and meaning, the authors are framing the reading of architecture as
either “standing on the shoulders of giants” (if I may use the words of Sir Newton), or being the lone
genius who seeks to invent a vision of what architecture is in the image of Rand’s Howard Roark. In the
former case,
that
of
Graves,
mythologization
of
architecture
is
embraced.
In
the
latter,
that
of
Eisenman,
mythologization is resisted, but ultimately the architecture succumbs to the metalanguage of myth.
Ultimately, the only way for realized architectural form to be perfect, as well as exist autonomously
without being subjected to mythologization is a paradox unto itself: it must not exist. “Then, liberated
from physical being, [architecture] will become nothing but an idea, and at last it will be perfect.”23 24
23 Hollis, Edward. The Secret Lives of Buildings. New York, NY: Henry Hold & Co. 2009. Pg. 40. The original quote
reads, “Then, liberated from physical being, The Parthenon will become nothing but an idea, and at last it will be perfect.” 24
It occurs to me at the end of this paper that I have not discussed Alberti, but it has occurred to me that Alberti is
still present here. Alberti defines beauty as that which “… nothing could be added, diminished or altered, but for
the worse.” (On the Art of Building Ten Books. Trans. Joseph Rykwert. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1988. Pg. 156).
To add Alberti would only be for the worse. In that sense, Alberti is present in this paper in principle, though never
referenced, except in this footnote.