what kind of theory for what kind of population geography?

What Kind of Theory for WhatKind of Population Geography?Elspeth Graham*

School of Geography and Geosciences, University of St Andrews, Fife KY16 9ST,Scotland, UK

ABSTRACT

This paper raises the issue of the role oftheory in population geography. In the lastdecade there have been calls for populationgeographers to become more involved in thewider debates of human geography andrelated social sciences, including a plea for(re)theorisation of the subdiscipline. Yet,there has been little response. Since theory isnot an optional extra, why this lack ofenthusiasm? One explanation, I suggest,relates to an uncertainty about the differentkinds of theory that inform empiricalpopulation research. Using the example ofdemographic transition theory, I identifydifferent `layers' of theory (populationtheory, theories of society, and philosophicaltheories) that underpin population research. Iargue that, in addition, populationgeographers must recognise the continuingimportance of disciplinary cultures andattend to theories of space and place.Understanding difference and diversity mustlie at the heart of population geography'scontribution to the multidisciplinary arena ofpopulation studies. It is the ideas ofpostmodernism that have `legitimised' suchunderstandings in the wider social sciences.At the same time, these ideas have introducedan ultimately nihilistic pluralism. Resolutionof the resulting tension is the greatestchallenge currently facing the discipline ofgeography. My entreaty is that populationgeographers recognise this challenge and, aspart of the (re)theorisation of the

subdiscipline, become more involved in thedebate. Copyright# 2000 JohnWiley& Sons,Ltd.

Received 18 March 2000; revised 14 June 2000; accepted 19June 2000

Keywords: theory; population geography;disciplinary culture; demographic transitiontheory; space and place

INTRODUCTION

The birth of a newmillennium encouragesre¯ection on both past and future. Thismay thus be an apposite moment to

re¯ect on the recent past and immediate futureof population geography, a moment to ques-tion `business as usual' and to recognise issuesthat remain unresolved. One such issue con-cerns the role of theory. During the 1990s, afew voices were raised suggesting that popu-lation geographywould dowell to take heed ofdevelopments in other parts of human geo-graphy and in related social sciences (Findlayand Graham, 1991; Fielding, 1992; Halfacreeand Boyle, 1993; Halfacree, 1995; Harper andLaws, 1995; White and Jackson, 1995).Amongst these was an explicit call for the(re)theorisation of population geography(White and Jackson, 1995) which seems largelyto have fallen on deaf ears. This is surprising,as a concern for theory development was alsobeing expressed in closely related areas ofhuman geography, such as health geography(Litva and Eyles, 1995; Philo, 1996), and evenin demography (McNicoll, 1992; Caldwell,1996; Greenhalgh, 1995, 1996). Despite thisclimate of concern for theory, there is no livelydebate in population geography to match thatin health geography, where the (re)formation

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POPULATION GEOGRAPHYInt. J. Popul. Geogr. 6, 257±272 (2000)

Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

* Correspondence to: E. Graham, School of Geographyand Geosciences, University of St. Andrews, Fife KY169ST, Scotland, UK.E-mail: [email protected]

of medical geography continues to be invigor-ating (Kearns, 1993; Mayer, 1996).

Apart from a general reluctance to abandona dominant empiricism, there may be twofurther reasons why so few population geo-graphers have taken up White and Jackson'sinvitation to join the debate. Firstly, debatesabout theory can often seem abstract andremoved from empirical research, with thegap between theory and practice appearingdif®cult to bridge. Those heavily involved inthe latter may suppose that it is incumbent onthe more theoretically minded to provide somekind of route map before they venture downwhat may, after all, turn out to be a cul-de-sac.Secondly, the nature and variety of theoreticalpositions that might underpin a (re)theorisedpopulation geography make the task of theorydevelopment particularly daunting. Whilst itis easy to agree with Caldwell (1996: 309) that`¼ some theory, perhaps barely articulated,must underlie all analysis', the explicit articu-lation of these theoretical underpinnings is amatter of considerable complexity and re-quires that we attend to several inter-related`layers' of theory. It is this second dif®culty forany project of (re)theorisation that providesthe focus for the following discussion.

Theory development in population geogra-phy, and in population studies more generally,is an important issue warranting wider debate.This is especially so at a time when a newgeneration of population researchers (and afew of the older generation) are activelyintroducing new ideas and methods in theirempirical work. Recent discussions of qualita-tive methods in demography (Obermeyer,1997) and multi-method research in popula-tion geography (McKendrick, 1999) open up arange of exciting new possibilities for futureresearch. Yet there is a danger that this `soft-ening' of population research does nothing tocounter the ®eld's reputation which, like thatof demography, remains one of `all methodand no theory' (Greenhalgh, 1996: 26). As Ihave argued elsewhere (Graham, 1999), thereis an urgent need to recognise the inter-relationships between methods and theory inorder to realise the full potential of these newapproaches. Theory, then, is not an optionalextra.

The most basic problem in any discussion of

theory is deciding what is to count as a theory,since the term is used in a variety of ways(Sayer, 1992). Moreover, confusion can arisewhere different protagonists in a debate makedifferent assumptions about what `theory' is.For the purposes of what follows, I intend to beas inclusive as possible. A theory, then, will betaken to be any set of ideas, or conceptualisa-tion, which goes beyond the particularities ofindividual cases and offers some more generalframework, or account of the nature of certaincircumstances, relationships or events. Inaddition, a theory must have explanatoryforce, which is to say that it must contributeto making these circumstances, relationshipsor events intelligible. No doubt the naturalscientist, and some social scientists, woulddemand a more rigorous de®nition whichspeci®es the kind of statements (e.g. law-likestatements) of which a theory is composed. Ideliberately avoid such precision here in orderto side-step the debate between science andnon-science, although it can be noted inpassing that Hauser and Duncan (1959) ap-peared to have adopted the natural sciencede®nition when they declared the ideas of thedemographic transition a `non-theory'.With these preliminaries in mind, we can

now begin to address the question in the title ofthis paper: what kind of theory for what kindof population geography? As a starting point, Iwill assume that population geographers seetheir work as both embracing demographyand contributing to a subdiscipline whoseparent discipline is geography. First, I willexamine the theoretical underpinnings ofpopulation studies more generally in order toelaborate the `layers' of theory that underlieour research. In doing so, I will identify threesorts of theory that must inform any study ofpopulation, and brie¯y consider the relation-ships between them. I will then examine thedistinctive nature of population geographyand the extent to which this might be re¯ectedin any theoretical development, before con-cluding on a note of caution which recognisesthe importance of adopting a critical attitude inany project of (re)theorisation. The discussionwill inevitably be incomplete, and not simplybecause of the brevity of this contribution.Contemporary population geography ad-dresses a considerable diversity of subject

Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Popul. Geogr., 6, 257±272 (2000)

258 E. Graham

matter and, in an effort to ground the discus-sion in familiar examples, there is much thatwill be ignored. In particular, little will be saidabout migration studies despite its pole posi-tion within population geography. As thepages of this journal amply illustrate, migra-tion research employs a wide variety ofapproaches and methods to reveal the diver-sity of migratory patterns and experiences.Yet, as Koser and Salt (1997) point out in theirresearch review on the geography of highlyskilled international migration, a strong ex-pirical standpoint has meant that analyses arestill theoretically limited. Thus, my inattentionto migration studies should not be seen as theglaring omission it might initially appear.Migration research may dominate populationgeography (Underhill-Sem, 1999) and be morein touch with its geographical roots, andmigration researchers may have shown agreater openness to new methodologies (Half-acree and Boyle, 1993; Gutting, 1996; Boyle andHalfacree, 1998), but even here a criticalengagement with many aspects of theorisingis lacking (Findlay and Li, 1999). Thus con-centration on a few examples should not beread as exclusionary, for many of the pointsraised have a more general relevance.

THEORIES UNDERLYING POPULATIONRESEARCH

A review of recent literature in the wider ®eldof population studies clearly reveals the con-tinuing dominance of quantitative, oftenhighly technical, empirical research, with thecontents of three leading English-languagedemography journals (Demography, Populationand Development Review and Population Studies)suggesting that fertility and related topics arecurrently the most studied within demogra-phy itself (Greenhalgh, 1996: 30). Populationgeography, of course, has tended to favourmigration studies and a greater range ofapproaches. There is good reason to think thatthis particular division of academic labour hasimportant disadvantages, as migration, ferti-lity and mortality are closely linked. Somemixing of interests between demographersand population geographers has certainlytaken place over the last couple of decades,but the composition of the two ®elds of study

remains rather different and is a reminder thatnot all criticisms of one can be taken to apply tothe other. Nevertheless, in so far as populationgeography and other areas of populationstudies look to demography for their researchagendas, the concerns and problems of demo-graphers are shared more widely.Currently, there is a slowly dawning recog-

nition that demography might be in troubleand that its predicament may, in part, be theresult of prioritising technical developmentover the accumulation of theory (McNicoll,1992). If Greenhalgh (1996) is right, then it isthe way in which twentieth-century popula-tion science has been constructed and, inparticular, its isolation from debates in thesocial sciences that has resulted in a lack oftheoretical vitality and created the currentcrisis. Her analysis is challenging and highlycritical, as is re¯ected in her conclusion:

`The discouraging conclusion one mightdraw is that, through decades of skewingtheir research activities, institutional ar-rangements, training programs, andscientizing practices to the needs of apolicy-oriented market, demographersmay have become institutionally incap-able of producing broad social theories offertility, especially historically and politi-cally informed ones, that are not tied tothe instrumental projects to reduce ferti-lity that the ®eld has helped to promoteand legitimize since the middle of thecentury.' (Greenhalgh, 1996: 59)

In her discussion, she claims both that theoryhas languished and that many of the assump-tions of one of the few enduring theories,demographic transition theory, had been re-cognised as problematic some time ago inother areas of the social sciences.A decade before, in 1986, Coleman and

Scho®eld edited a volume entitled The State ofPopulation Theory: Forward from Malthus. Thecollection is interesting for three reasons.Firstly, although the focus on Malthus isdeliberate, the inward-looking nature of mostof the discussion is notable. The vast majorityof references are to the works of otherpopulation researchers and, despite the topic,no attempt at all is made to examine possibleinputs frommore general social science theory.


Theory in Population Geography 259

Yet, secondly, the theoretical weakness ofdemography is explicitly, almost cheerfully,admitted. The editors open the discussion withthe following statement:

Àny subject which ®nds it necessary,or indeed possible, to consider its materi-al divorced from an appropriate body oftheory must be in trouble. This seems tobe the case with demography at pre-sent¼' (Scho®eld and Coleman, 1986: 1)

They then proceed to highlight the generalproblem of integrating ideas at the same scale(e.g. the ideas of Malthus and Marx at the levelof total population size and growth) and atdifferent scales (e.g. ideas about the family andabout institutions in relation to demographicresponses), leaving the reader to decipher theprecise relationship between this òutstandingproblem' and the state of population theory.Thirdly, the editors frame the introductorydiscussion in terms of science. This is evidentin their use of phrases such as `quasi-experi-mental designs' and `may not even be falsi®-able', although they recognise that large partsof demography may remain remote from thecanons of scienti®c inquiry. Their devotion torigour and quanti®cation is nicely captured bytheir claim that Ìn the end, demographywithout numbers is waf¯e, an amiable kindof social natural history' (Scho®eld and Cole-man, 1986: 4). This, then, is a continuation ofthe tradition of scientising to which Green-halgh (1996) draws attention and which, itseems to me, takes a rather narrow andinward-looking view of theory.

The published literature on demographictheory also tends to con®rm Greenhalgh's(1996) claim that theory has languished,although this requires some quali®cation.Leaving migration research to one side, thereseem to be only two main, and not unrelated,contenders for the accolade `populationtheory' and neither is a recent arrival. Thetheoretical hare set off by Malthus in theeighteenth century and predicted to be stillrunning in the twenty-®rst (McNicoll, 1998)is one. Demographic transition theory, atwentieth-century construction, is the other(Caldwell, 1997). Both provide a generalunderstanding of population relationshipswhich transcends the details of particular

circumstances and events, and both have beenremarkably enduring despite sometimes harshcriticism. Whatever our view of their strengthsand weaknesses, they represent a certain kindof theory in population studies. As theories,they operate near the empirical researchfrontier, suggesting research questions andframing research analyses. Their central con-cepts (population growth, fertility, mortality)are those that lie at the heart of demography,and their relevance to population research isobvious. Even if we suppose that both arefundamentally ¯awed, we can recognise thepotential of this kind of theory for makingdemographic changes intelligible.There are, however, other kinds of theory

that can and do inform population research.Indeed, it is my contention that, in order tofurther theory development in populationstudies, we need to understand the overlap-ping layers of theory that underpin and informany research. I will discuss three of these`layers', or kinds of theory, namely populationtheories, theories of society and philosophicaltheories. These are broad categories and I willtake examples in each in an effort to relate thefamiliar to the less familiar. My purpose indoing so is both to establish the relevance ofdifferent kinds of theory to population re-search, and to demonstrate the complexities ofwhat might be involved in a (re)theorisation ofpopulation geography.

Population Theories

I have already suggested that Malthusiantheory and transition theory are the twotheories that have been most in¯uential indemography. The latter, in particular, oftenframes empirical work in population geogra-phy even where studies deal with smallpopulations and limited geographical areas(see, for example, Hionidou, 1995; Ramiro-FarinÄ as and Sanz-Gimeno, 2000). I will taketransition theory as an example of populationtheory for the purposes of this discussion sinceit has attracted much comment recently, andthe controversy surrounding it opens up thepossibility of further theoretical debate. Thistheory sees long-term demographic change aslinear. In its basic formulation, populations aresaid to move from an initial phase charac-


260 E. Graham

terised by high mortality and fertility (and lowpopulation growth), through two intermediatephases where mortality, then later fertility,begins to fall (producing a population boom),before reaching a ®nal phase of low birth anddeath rates which re-establishes low popula-tion growth. The explanatory force of thetheory derives from linking these generalcharacteristics of demographic change to eco-nomic and social change often summarised as`modernisation'. Questioning of these ideashas begun to undermine their hegemony, butwhat is remarkable about the comments foundin the literature is the variety of views theyre¯ect. There are those, like Szreter (1993) andGreenhalgh (1996), who believe that the theorynot only fails empirical tests but also pre-judices empirical research and should beabandoned. Others, like Kirk (1996) andMason (1997), recognise that it may have somefailings but are prepared to build upon whatthey see as its strengths. Still others are ®ndingfurther transitions and constructing multicau-sal theories within the same general frame-work (Lesthaeghe, 1998; see also Jones et al.,1997). I do not want to rehearse these argu-ments here. Rather, my concern is with thenature of population theory and its relation-ship to both empirical research and other typesof theory.Demographic transition theory is a ®rst-

order theory, which is to say that it involves aninitial abstraction from the details of empiricaldata on the characteristics of populations. Itthus generalises the intricacies of particularinstances. At a minimum, it claims to provide ageneral framework within which long-termdemographic changes in Europe can be under-stood. In this, it relies upon the marshalling ofempirical evidence to support its claim. At onelevel, then, it is crucially dependent on thedetails of empirical research, for if they contra-dict its central propositions then the theorymust be abandoned. Some have read theresults of the European Fertility Project (Coaleand Watkins, 1986) as just such contradictoryevidence, while others see the same results asmisleading when used as a `test' of transitiontheory (Mason, 1997). This highlights oneaspect of the problematic relationship betweenempirical research and population theorywhere each is dependent on the other, and

judgements about the appropriateness of thetheory must, by their very nature, dependupon interpretations of the empirical evidence.Judgements of relevance are no more avoid-able and the scope for debate is considerable.Nevertheless, theories of this kind (i.e. ®rst-order population theories) must have a directempirical justi®cation, however dif®cult thatmight be to judge in practice.Both supporters and detractors of transition

theory recognise other weaknesses of classicaldemographic transition theory, which fails togive a clear account of the mechanisms orcauses of change. References to the impact ofmodernisation on mortality and fertility lackdetail, and thus limit the theory's usefulness asa tool for understanding long-term trends invital rates and confuse its accountability to theempirical evidence. It is unsurprising, then,that since Notestein's statement of the theoryin 1945, there have been numerous attempts toinvestigate the causalities that link economyand society to mortality and fertility. Some ofthese have been thought of as themselvesbeing theories. Thus, in her discussion offertility transitions, Mason (1997) identi®essix major theories, including classic demo-graphic transition theory, Caldwell's theory ofwealth ¯ows, neoclassical micro-economictheory of fertility, and what she refers to as`so-called ideational theory'. She criticisesthese theories for focusing on only one ortwo causes and thus for assuming that allfertility transitions have a common cause. Sheis less explicit about the relationships betweenthese theories, although her outline of a morefruitful approach to understanding fertilitytransitions uses important ideas from several.In the conceptual model she presents, East-erlin's proximate determinants play a centralrole, whilst she emphasises the ideational andinteractive nature of the model. Further, sheimplicitly retains the framework of classicdemographic transition theory by citing mor-tality decline as an important, if loosely linked,precondition to fertility decline. This can betaken as an example of how several ®rst-orderpopulation theories (i.e. generalisations de-pendent upon detailed empirical evidence onpopulation change) may overlap. However,whether we have here one theory or several isa moot point. If the theories of causal connec-



tion, whether competing or complementary,serve to add to or modify classic transitiontheory, then, arguably, they are themselvesparts of a grander theory which generalises toa greater degree.

It may be thought that debates about whatconstitutes a theory are tediously semantic andultimately unsettleable. However this may be,it seems to me that different conceptions of therelationships between these various general-isations I have called population theory help toexplain radically opposing claims in theliterature. While most population researcherswho re¯ect on thematter appear to bemoan thelack of theory in demography, Mason takes theopposite view, claiming that, since 1952 whenRupert Vance in his presidential address to thePopulation Association of America asked `IsTheory for Demographers?', `¼ one might saythat demographers have indulged in socialscience theorising with a vengeance' (Mason,1997: 443). Mason, I think, overstates her case,but it is another aspect of her claim that is ofparticular interest here. Demographers aresaid to have indulged in social science theoris-ing, not simply demographic or populationtheorising. I take this to be an implicitrecognition of the in¯uence of ideas, includingtheoretical ideas, from anthropology and eco-nomics on the population theories she dis-cusses. Thus, population theory shades intoother social science theory even in what mightbe called mainstream demography. Recognis-ing this connection draws attention to a hugetheoretical literature of potential relevance topopulation studies, and takes us to our secondkind of theory.

Theories of Society

It is in relation to theories of society (i.e. social,cultural and economic theories) that thecritiques of Greenhalgh (1996) and White andJackson (1995) take hold. Although there areimportant exceptions, such theories frequentlyattempt to distil the major characteristics ofsocieties, cultures and economies in the mostgeneral sense. The ambitions of populationtheory also go beyond a general understandingof demographic change in one area and onehistorical era. Thus Kirk (1996: 365) sees thegreatest strength of demographic transition

theory as being `¼ the prediction that thetransition will occur in every society which isexperiencing modernisation' (my emphasis).In contrast, for Greenhalgh (1996) this is itsgreatest weakness. Her critique includes thecontention that, because of the way in whichthe discipline of population science has his-torically been constructed, many demogra-phers continued to espouse a populationtheory based on the already discreditedassumptions of a theory of society (i.e. moder-nisation theory) formulated outside demogra-phy. Two points are of particular interest:®rstly, the recognition of the social construc-tion of a discipline in which social structuresand disciplinary culture direct and constrict itspractitioners; secondly, and not unrelated tothe nature of the dominant disciplinary cul-ture, the failure of demographers to acknowl-edge the relevance of theories of society and toengage in wider theoretical debates or learnfrom the theoretical work of other socialscientists. In development studies, for exam-ple, modernisation theory has been the subjectof numerous critiques and was effectivelycriticised by dependency theorists during the1970s, since when the theoretical discourses ofpostmodernism have provided a sweepingcondemnation of both (Peet, 1997). Althoughthe ideas of postmodernism may seem farremoved from empirical population research,it is not dif®cult to demonstrate their relevance(Graham, 1995). Methodological pluralism, inthe spirit of postmodernism as method, holdspotential for a shift towards more differen-tiated understandings of population processes,including reproductive behaviour (Sporton,1999).Demographic transition theory, at least in

terms of its ambitions, is a thoroughly moder-nist theory. Like both modernisation theoryand dependency theory, it provides a generalpicture of change over time which is pre-dicated on a linear view of history in which theWest sets the standard and is further along agiven path of progress than the Third World.Like modernisation theory, demographic tran-sition theory, in some of its versions, denies theThird World a history and assumes thatprogress consists of achieving the character-istic conditions of the West. A few populationresearchers have indeed recognised transition


262 E. Graham

theory's neglect of the structural and historicalforces implicated in change (Demeny, 1988;Szreter, 1993), but despite the evident ground-ing in modernist ideas of this major populationtheory, there seems to be an almost total lack ofenthusiasm amongst population researchersfor engaging with the challenges of post-modernism. What must be recognised is thatdemographic transition theory, or any otherpopulation theory, is not only accountable tothe empirical evidence on population change,but also to the coherence of the conceptions ofthe society that it embraces. If the latter can beshown to be fundamentally ¯awed, then thetheory may be mortally wounded, whateverthe empirical evidence on population changesuggests.Mason (1997) attempts to circumvent this

particular criticism of transition theory byemphasising the ideational and interactivenature of fertility change, where both percep-tions and pre-existing conditions in¯uence theimpact of particular forms of change onfertility. This takes transition theory into therealm of social norms and hence cultural andother differences both between and withinpopulations. If a better theory of fertilitychange requires attention to these aspects ofsocial life, and I think that it does, then it issurely incumbent upon population researchersnot to neglect social theory. White and Jackson(1995) provided a few pointers as to how anengagement with social theory might serve to(re)theorise population geography and, byimplication, population studies more gener-ally. For example, if we take seriously the ideathat events are ìnstantiations' of social struc-tures in the sense that they both re¯ect andreproduce these structures, then birth èvents'must not be seen in isolation but as part of asocial practice given meaning and value by thestructures in which they are embedded. Nolonger do we have a linear view of a fewproximate causes (e.g. a particular level ofwealth or availability of contraceptives) trig-gering an effect (i.e. the number of births), buta dialectical set of social relationships whichmust be seen as changing together. The role ofsocial structures (such as institutions of mar-riage or religious institutions) in conferringmeaning and value on demographic èvents' ishardly captured by Mason's insistence on the

importance of perception. Furthermore, de-bates about the nature of culture also assume arelevance here as culture can be seen asactively mediating between local circum-stances and structural conditions to createdistinctive meanings (Agnew, 1993). Since, onthis account, meanings are social construc-tions, then the meanings of demographicevents are likely to vary widely (White andJackson, 1995). Nor can we suppose that thisvariation will be conveniently con®ned toheterogeneity between national populations.Socially constructed meanings may be con-tested within populations, challenging theaggregations of national population `types'on which transition theories depend. Thusserious attention to social theory can impact onour own understandings of demographicchange in quite profound ways and, therefore,on the characteristics of the population theorywe might seek to construct.Both demographers and population geogra-

phers have been slow to recognise the importof ideas from social theory for their ownresearch, despite some very recent attemptsto stimulate debate. Astone et al. (1999), forexample, argue for the introduction of socio-logical theory to the ®eld of demography. Theysee mutual bene®ts to scholarship of anengagement between sociological theory andsocial demography, focusing particularly onthe development of a framework for analysingplace-speci®c processes of transformation infamily life. The concept of social capital, theycontend, should be reintegrated with socialexchange theory in order to illuminate whyindividuals manifest particular family-build-ing behaviour. Since scholarship that uses thisconcept currently suffers from `fuzziness andinconsistency', they are drawn into a widerdebate about the nature of social capital. Theirdiscussion thus underlines not only the dia-lectical relationship between informed empiri-cal understanding and theoretical debate, butalso the necessity of a critical engagement withtheoretical concepts.Culture is another concept increasingly

employed in contemporary demography, withexplanations of fertility decline emphasisingthe role of ideational change, notably change inideas about the acceptability of birth control.At the same time, demographers have come



under criticism from anthropologists for their`¼ lack of conceptual clarity about just what isbeing referred to when culture is invoked'(Kertzer, 1995: 44). They stand accused ofcon¯ating culture and social organisation, andof separating culture from agency (Carter,1995); in short, of using anthropologicallyoutdated notions of culture (Kertzer andFricke, 1997). Fricke (1997) argues that thissituation arises because of demography'shistorical inattention to debates in culturetheory, and is problematic because of therecognised need to incorporate culturallyshaped motivations into demographic ana-lyses. Much the same criticism could belevelled at population geography, includingsome part of migration research. However, inthis case the inattention to debates in culturetheory is even more perplexing given thecultural turn in other areas of human geogra-phy (Duncan and Ley, 1993), since it cannot beexplained simply by reference to disciplinaryboundaries. Perhaps, as Kertzer and Fricke(1997) argue in relation to demography, thefunding successes associated with the quanti-tative analysis of large data-sets have served tomaintain a pragmatic approach to researchwhich has impeded theoretical progress. Cer-tainly, incorporating `culture' in the main-stream of empirical population geographyrequires new thinking and a participation inthe wider debates.

Underhill-Sem (1999) conveys a similarmessage, although addressed more directlyto population geographers. She calls for arethinking of demographic events which rec-ognises their social construction along with theintimate relationships between power andknowledge. Again, she recognises the impor-tance of theoretical debate and, although shecommends (along with Skeldon, 1995) theintroduction of innovative methodologies bythose researching migration geographies in thePaci®c, she is also concerned by their lack oftheoretical justi®cation. The absence of explicitattention to questions of social theory (and ofepistemology) must be seen as a signi®cantlimitation in any attempt to transform researchpractice in population geography.

This brief discussion hardly touches thesurface of the ways in which social theorymight refashion population studies, but it does

ful®l the limited purpose of demonstrating itsrelevance. Being convinced by the ideas ofsocial constructivism or postmodernism is nota prerequisite for entering the debate aboutmodernist theorising, nor is disliking thedismissal of treasured ideas a good reasonfor staying out. Why there is no criticaltheoretical literature in population studiesequivalent to that in development studies isan interesting question which undoubtedlydemands an answer sensitive to the intellec-tual histories of those areas of study describedby Scho®eld and Coleman (1986) as the `softerouter rind'. It is further evidence, however, forthe contention that theoretical developmenthas failed to parallel technical and empiricaladvances in population studies. It also sup-ports the view that `¼ a little more philosophyin our work might enrich our scholarship'(Underhill-Sem, 1999: 24), a view furthercon®rmed by examining our third layer oftheory, philosophical theories.

Philosophical Theories

No academic research, however mundane, canavoid making philosophical assumptions.Since the broad purpose of academic researchis to acquire knowledge of the world, it mustassume some epistemological stance. This is tosay that it is, of necessity, based on somephilosophical theory about how knowledge isacquired (Graham, 1997). Disciplinary culturessocialise practitioners in particular ways ofacquiring knowledge, and like the structuresof language to the native language speaker,epistemological stances may remain hidden.Theoretical development in any empiricaldiscipline will thus be informed by theoriesof knowledge, however taken-for-grantedthese may be. The role of philosophy is, ofcourse, much wider, and since it is concerned,in the most general sense, with the conceptsthat structure our thinking, philosophicaltheories of causation, human nature, truthand falsity, as well as ethical theories, are alllikely to have relevance to population theory inone or more of its guises. Philosophy isprobably the most fundamental of all knowl-edge and it is hardly a revelation to claim thatthe theoretical structures of other disciplinesare built upon philosophical foundations.


264 E. Graham

Although philosophical assumptionspermeate population theory, they can bedif®cult to articulate. Rather than attempt todo so in a general way, I want to demonstratethe direct relevance of philosophical thinkingto population theory by examining anotheraspect of transition theory. Perhaps the centralidea in classical transition theory is one ofhistorical progress. As `modernisation' pro-gresses, so death rates, then birth rates, fall andthe population emerges from the transition asa low mortality and low fertility regime.Furthermore, these staged changes are deemedirreversible. According to the initiators of thetheory, European populations were the ®rst togo through the transition, but as modernisa-tion and westernisation spread to other coun-tries, other populations would experience thesame staged changes. Kirk (1996) believes thatthis is exactly what happened. Mortality, hesays, has fallen in every country and `¼ thefertility transition is becoming universal andevery country can be placed on a continuum ofprogress in the transition, as was predictedsome 50 years ago.' (Kirk, 1996: 382). I wantnow to use these claims about the demo-graphic transition to show that, although theempirical evidence of changes in vital ratesmentioned by Kirk is not immaterial to ourjudgement of the theory, it is not the only `test'we can impose.Three points are worth noting about the

claims of the transition theorists: ®rstly, thecentrality given to the notion of progress andits implication of improvement, i.e. change forthe good; secondly, the measurement of pro-gress against a European yardstick (i.e. fornon-European countries, change for the betteris change as Europe experienced it); thirdly,the causes of change in non-European popula-tions are thought to emanate from Europe,with non-European populations progressingby adopting the characteristics of Europeanpopulations. The last two of these points seemclosely associated with claims of culturalsuperiority and the theory has, quite rightly,been condemned for its Eurocentrism, at leastby Greenhalgh (1996). Conceptually, however,the notion of progress is not itself dependenton either a European yardstick or any otherassumption of European cultural superiority.To abandon the Eurocentric predilections of

the classic theory is not necessarily to dispensewith the notion of progress as a way ofrendering intelligible long-term historical de-mographic change, for the two are concep-tually distinct. If life expectancy doubles overtime in any population, in any part of theworld, whatever the causes, is this not evi-dence of progress of some kind, i.e. change forthe better? The empirically minded may wantto delay judgement until more detail is known.Perhaps if lower mortality was won at the costof individual freedom, or longer life expec-tancy failed to increase the number of dis-ability-free years lived, the answer wouldseem less obvious. What philosophical analy-sis can demonstrate, however, is preciselywhat is required to make such a judgement.Any theory of history that interprets the courseof events as `progress' needs not only to be ableto provide an accurate general description ofchange over time (the empirical evidence) butto relate the description to normative princi-ples by which that change may be judged. Thisin turn opens up a host of issues surroundingthe nature of normative principles and theirhistorical and cultural speci®city. Thus,although it is plausible to suppose that allsocieties at all times have believed thatincreases in life expectancy are a good thing,it is markedly implausible to make a similarclaim about low rates of fertility.The normative principles assumed by classic

demographic transition theory, even strippedof their more overt Eurocentrism, turn out tocreate other problems for the theory's notion ofprogress. However, it would be premature toabandon all efforts to identify and interpretlong-term demographic change as a basis fortheory development. This is a point of someimport, since the perceived failures of demo-graphic transition theory might be thought tohold this implication. Giving shape to the pastis both an empirical and a philosophicalenterprise and, to the extent that populationtheories depend upon an historical under-standing, theory development in populationstudies will be aided by an awareness of thephilosophical complexities of the concepts onwhich they might be based.So far, we have been concerned with the

layers of theory that demand attention fromanyone concerned with theory development in



population studies. By their very nature,population theories do not stand alone butoverlap in terms of both substantive concernsand underlying assumptions with other kindsof theory. Demographic transition theoryprovides a good example of this complexity,and the analysis above hints at the scope of theissues involved in any attempt to retheorisepopulation studies. There is, however, oneaspect of theorising about which I have so farbeen silent, namely the role of space and place.Not surprisingly, demographers, like manysocial scientists in the past, have shown littleinterest in questions of space. Certainly,demographic transition theory can be given acrude spatial expression in terms of thediffusion of `modernisation' from Europe.None of the recent discussions of the theoryhave paid more than passing attention to thisaspect, however, and even population geogra-phers tend to ignore the writings on space andsocial theory that have become so in¯uential inother parts of human geography. There is,thus, an additional layer of theory which I willargue is both relevant to theorising in popula-tion studies more generally and of particularrelevance to geographers. Using demographictransition theory as a starting point, I wantnow to consider such theories of space andplace, along with their role in a (re)theorisedpopulation geography.

POPULATION GEOGRAPHY ANDTHEORIES OF SPACE AND PLACE

With the bene®t of hindsight, it is evident thatinitial formulations of demographic transitiontheory included a very crude conceptualisa-tion of space. Space was seen as a container ofnational populations, and these populationswere divided into three basic types, each at adifferent stage in the transition (Thompson,1929; Notestein, 1945). This ignored the hetero-geneity within nations and encouraged aquestionable use of national averages tosummarise demographic characteristics. Dif-fusionist ideas are also evident in these earlyexpositions and have been further developedmore recently, although mainly in relation tothe highly restricted concern of the spatialspread of contraceptive ideas and technologyin developing countries. In the European

context, we ®nd the language of diffusionin¯uencing proposals for a new transitionproject which would seek to establish, amongother things, `leads and lags' (Van de Kaa,1999). Even Kirk (1996), whose recently ex-pressed views are generally favourable totransition theory, criticises discussions ofdiffusion dynamics in population studies fortheir lack of conceptual clarity, and McNicoll(1992: 406) declares diffusion a problematicterm, a `description in search of a theory'which hardly begins to illuminate the `cultureof networks'. It is Greenhalgh (1996), however,who widens the critique by expressing concernthat the very narrowly de®ned diffusionapproach to understanding fertility decline,which, she observes, is growing in popularityamongst demographers, not only perpetuatesthe Eurocentrism of modernisation theory butalso introduces a greatly impoverished view ofculture. At the same time, and with respectedexceptions in studies of disease diffusion (e.g.Cliff et al., 1981), once-popular diffusion theoryhas fallen out of favour in human geography.Despite developed critiques from other humangeographers (Blaut, 1993), however, a sus-tained theoretical critique of diffusionist ideasin fertility studies from population geogra-phers is still awaited. This suggests thatpopulation geographers are not playing towhat should be their strengths, at least in termsof a theoretical engagement with demography.Concerns with the nature and dynamics of

space and place are archetypically geographi-cal concerns and, arguably, fundamental to theidentity of human geography. Thus Gregory(1994), to take only one recent example, centreshis Geographical Imaginations around the con-cepts of place, space and landscape. Yet,beyond an empirical attention to spatial dis-tribution and the spatial movement of people(migration studies), there is surprisingly littleevidence that population geographers see thenature and dynamics of space and place as afocus of concern. I have remarked on thisnoticeable ®ssure between population geogra-phy and human geography elsewhere (Findlayand Graham, 1991) and will not repeat thatargument here, but rather develop it in aslightly different direction.Each area or subdiscipline within geography

and within population studies has an identity,


266 E. Graham

however implicit or hazy it may be. Thisidentity develops, at least in part, in responseto the institutional structures of academia asthey have evolved over time (Greenhalgh,1997). Disciplinary cultures, then, provide thegrounding for normative judgements aboutthe coherence and worth of individual re-search projects, in¯uence research agendasand mediate relationships with other disci-plines. Some disciplinary identities are stron-ger, or more sharply de®ned, than others.Demography, as Greenhalgh's (1996) analysisdemonstrates, has constructed its identitytightly enough to circumscribe the role ofother disciplines in demographic research.Both she and Caldwell (1996), although indifferent ways, reach the perhaps pessimisticconclusion that the disciplinary differencesbetween demography and anthropology arecurrently substantial enough to preclude afruitful abandonment of disciplinary demarca-tion. If they are right, then it is important torecognise the different disciplinary cultureswithin population studies (i.e. the varied,socially constructed disciplines or subdisci-plines of which population studies is com-posed). Greenhalgh's (1996) advice thathistorians and anthropologists should domes-ticate demographic issues rather than attempt-ing to invade demography may apply equallyto population geographers.Articulating the disciplinary culture of hu-

man geography is fraught with dif®culties, notleast because geography has come to be seen asa very fragmented area of study. As Benko andStrohmayer (1997: xiii) put it, `Human geogra-phy, after all, never was granted anything likethe straightforward delimitation of a subjectarea so common to other academic subjects'. Itis unsurprising, then, that the subdisciplinaryidentity of population geography is equallyunassured. This circumstance no doubt hassome advantages, such as an openness to newideas, but it also appears to hold disadvan-tages, especially in relation to the task ofdeveloping theory. What is surprising is thatmany population geographers seem to havebeen unwilling to apply their `geographicalimaginations' to this task and link their under-standings of population to the new under-standings of space and place burgeoning notonly in other areas of human geography but in

the social sciences more generally. Perhaps it istime to renegotiate our subdisciplinary iden-tity, not in the sense of erecting barriers toprotect our academic turf, but rather to ensurethat the research agenda of population studiesre¯ects a sound theoretical understanding ofspace and place.White and Jackson (1995) gesture at the

possibilities here but make no explicit mentionof spatiality. They draw attention to thesocially constructed nature of some of theways in which we (population geographers)categorise population groups (for example, bygender, `race' and age), and emphasise thenecessity of recognising that social categoriesare contested. We can take this further,however, by acknowledging that space too isa social concept and, what is more, a basiccategory of thought and perception (Shields,1997). Space is also implicated in the construc-tion of identities, both individual and group.Cultures are `situated' and places are createdby the habitual interactions over generationsbetween people and space. Thus the aggregatecategories used by population geographersneed to be sensitive not just to the socialconstruction of identities but also to theirspatiality. Even in the hard core of demogra-phy, understandings of fertility decline which,since the European Fertility Project (Coale andWatkins, 1986), have focused on culturalvalues rather than economic modernisationas the explanatory `variable', would bene®tfrom a more nuanced and theoreticallygrounded conception of culture and thus ofthe spatiality as well as the social constructionof identities. This is surely one area in whichpopulation geographers could reassert theirown `geographical' identities.It is not only the nature of the categories

used to conceptualise population groups thatrequires population geographers to attend tonotions of spatiality. As was noted earlier,Scho®eld and Coleman (1986) identify thedif®culties of relating ideas at different scalesas one of the outstanding problems of demo-graphy. The different levels of analyses theyhad in mind range from the macro to the microand assume, rather than state, a relationship tospatial scale. However, more recent ideas incultural geography challenge representationsof space embedded in, for example, the use of



national, regional and local populations asappropriate scales of analysis, since thistaxonomic device lacks theoretical grounding.As in classic demographic transition theory,such classi®cations treat space as empty, asmerely a convenient way of identifying groupsof people.

Yet geography matters more than thisconception allows. Culture is neither ®xed inhistorical time nor set in place. Rather, culture,time and space are dynamically and inextric-ably interwoven. Thus, not only must werecognise the contextuality of the culturalpractices associated with fertility or migration,for example, but we need theories of space andplace to inform our understandings of thesepractices. Agnew (1993) argues that places, intheir differentiation from other places, canbecome an `object' of identity for a `subject',reinforcing the social±spatial de®nition ofplace from inside. This sense of place neednot be restricted to small geographical areasand is part of a complex interchange betweencultural practices, economic processes and,thus, demographic change. Culture, therefore,is not a simple `variable' that might be causallyconnected to fertility decline or rates ofmigration. Nor is it a set of practices thatde®ne unplaced population groups. Thusrelating different scales of analysis in popula-tion studies may be more dif®cult than istypically assumed, and these dif®culties, Isuggest, arise more from the conceptual com-plexities of the substantive relations involvedthan from the technical dif®culties of ensuringcompatibility of data at different geographicalscales. Recognising that culture, like socialorganisation, is a human project requires morethan a pragmatic selection of variables or thecollection of additional survey information. Itdemands both an engagement with recentconcerns in demographic anthropology and acritical extension of culture theory to providean understanding of the spatiality of culture.These ideas may still seem opaque but theyillustrate the relevance and potential of astrategy of theory development in populationgeography which looks both to the widerliterature of the social sciences (includinghuman geography) and exercises our geogra-phical imaginations. Theoretical understand-ings of what Shields (1997) calls `social

spatialization' is still in its infancy, butprogress in population geography may ulti-mately depend on joining the debate.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A CRITICALPOPULATION GEOGRAPHY?

Recognising the complex role of these layers oftheory in empirical population research is a®rst step in any project to retheorise popula-tion geography. There are, however, attendantdangers in a less than full involvement intheoretical debates. Where disciplinary cul-tures become enslaved to particular modes oftheorising, as has arguably happened ineconomics, a myopic disregard for empiricalevidence may result in a world that seems tohave been made up for the bene®t of theorists(Clark, 1998). Geographers, including popula-tion geographers, have a long tradition ofattending to difference and diversity betweenpeople and places. Indeed, McDowell (1995)sees this as the raison d'eÃtre of the discipline.Contemporary social theory encourages atheoretical recognition of this diversity in itsquestioning of the privileged status of `grandnarratives', or metatheories. Demographictransition theory might be regarded as a grandnarrative of population research and, like thestylised facts of economic theory, its disregardof diversity seen as its major failing. Thiscriticism itself, however, demands theoreticaljusti®cation, embedded as it is in wider ideasof situated local knowledges and power rela-tions.Population geographers have, over the last

decade or so, become increasingly sensitive tothe diversity of individual experiences indifferent times and places. Furthermore, thissensitivity is re¯ected in a greater willingnessto employ a variety of methods in empiricalresearch and to accept the contribution tounderstanding of small-scale studies, some-times based on qualitative data. Much of thiswork, however, remains within an empiricaltradition in which theory is barely articulated(see, for example, Lockwood, 1997). Therehave been notable exceptions such as a recentdiscussion of ecopolitics which identi®es `anew frontier for geographical studies ofpopulation' and offers a political ecologicalframework that transcends both Malthus and


268 E. Graham

Marx (Shrestha and Conway, 1996). Using acase study from a remote area of the world inNepal, the authors provide an innovativerethinking of the role of peasant ecology whichchallenges the acceptance of Western valuesand modern notions of development. In this,they emphasise the complexities of the localecopolitical battle as well as its diverse rootsboth locally and in wider settings. Situatedcultural knowledge, in terms of environmentalpractices, is seen as part of a nexus of socialrelations, state policies, development interestsand demographic forces, with the local beingmediated through the national and the global.Their discussion exempli®es not only thedialectical relationship between theory andempirical understanding, but also the advan-tages of breaking out from a narrowly de®nedpopulation geography by attending to otherliteratures.The postmodern movement in social theory

also concerns itself with the idea of situatedknowledge and, it seems, has `legitimised'difference not only in terms of allowing thedisempowered a voice but also in its encour-agement of methodological diversity. Yet, toborrow fromKatz (1996), the avowed partialityof the resultant theoretical claims presents itsown problems. The epistemic advantages of asingle way of theorising appear to be lost to anultimately nihilistic pluralism (Bridge, 1997),to theory as `fashion' (Barnett, 1998). There is atension between recognising diversity andremoving the normative grounding whichprevents methodological choices from seem-ing utterly arbitrary (McDowell, 1995; Boh-man, 1999). This is the `®ne balance' that,Wynn (1999) argues, characterises geographyat the millennium. If a failure to resolve thetension promises an `interestingly cata-strophic' future for geography as a discipline,then population geographers may be asleep onthe Titanic.I have argued that the development of

theory in population studies is not merely amatter of matching detailed empirical evi-dence on population change to some generalpopulation theory which might render thatchange intelligible. Rather there are severaloverlapping layers of theory that requireconsideration. The events that populationresearchers typically study cannot be under-

stood when divorced from their wider con-texts. Thus theories of society also informdemographic understandings. Furthermore,population theories that attempt to give shapeto temporal change are at once both historicaland philosophical. Thus philosophical theoriesof history, along with epistemological theories,form part of the theoretical underpinnings ofpopulation theory and should not be ignored.In advancing this argument, I have paid closeattention to one particular example of popula-tion theory ± demographic transition theory ±and the controversy surrounding it. In therecent literature concerning this controversy,different authors have expressed remarkablydifferent views on the presence (or absence) oftheory in population studies. Their variedjudgements arise, to a degree, from differentconceptions of what constitutes a theory, butthe differences of assessment can also beexplained by the different attention thatauthors pay to different layers of theory.Recognising more explicitly the kinds oftheory implicated in attempts at theory devel-opment within population studies can thusclarify not only the nature of the task in hand,but also some apparent contradictions in thecurrent literature.Inward-looking tendencies in population

studies have militated against the properrecognition of these several layers of theory,and population geographers have hardly beenmore eclectic in their outlook. Demography, inparticular, has been criticised for circumscrib-ing the research agenda in such a way as tolimit the input of ideas from other disciplines.The limitations of policy orientation and data-led research are also evident in some areas ofpopulation geography and it is hardly acci-dental that studies of migration, the part ofpopulation geography historically least in¯u-enced by demography's research agenda, haveproved most open to new approaches. Dis-ciplinary cultures thus remain important evenwithin a multidisciplinary arena, with theattendant danger that dominant cultures mayexercise greater in¯uence over what is re-searched and how. I have suggested that, insuch circumstances, population geographywould do well to enhance its own identity asgeography by re-engaging with wider debatesin human geography and the social sciences



more generally. My concern has been not withwhere population geography is going (Noin,1991) but with where it might go in the future,with possibilities rather than probabilities.This is not an argument in favour of one setof theoretical ideas over another, but anentreaty to population geographers to becomemore theoretically aware, critically re¯ectiveand involved.

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what kind of theory for what kind of population geography?

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