what constitutes a scinetific interpretation of religion

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What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion?Author(s): Edgar Sheffield BrightmanSource: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 6, No. 3 (May, 1926), pp. 250-258Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1195318

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WHAT CONSTITUTESA SCIENTIFIC NTER-PRETATIONOF RELIGION?EDGAR SHEFFIELDBRIGHTMANBostonUniversity

In the case of religion he very datato be observedand classified reexperiencesof persons.Hencevaluationsareinextricablyntermingledwith facts. It is the prov-inceof science o describe,but not to evaluate. Any scienceneedsphilosophy o com-plete the interpretation.Science s inevitablyabstract;but it is unscientifico selectone particular eneralization s an all-inclusiveprincipleof explanation.The scienceof religion s in dangerof fallinginto methodologicaldogmatism hroughthe exclu-sive use of a psychologicalmethod which is uncriticallyextended nto metaphysics.Genuine cience houldbe catholic,andpave the way for fruitfulphilosophicalnter-pretation.

Therearethreephases f the attitude f thoughtowardreligion: i) theproductionf religiousxperience,2) thescientific escriptionf thatexperience,nd(3) thephilo-sophicalnterpretationothofexperiencendofscience.Theworkof philosophichought eturns ponexperience,edi-recting, nriching,r impoverishingt. There s an endlesscycle.Nosinglephase fthecyclehastheprerogativeo haltitsmovement. xperience,cience, ndphilosophy,achhasbeenright n assertingts importance,utwrongn holdingthat ts claimwas inal.The interrelationsf experience,cience, ndphilosophyarenevernegligible.Physics nablesus to control nden-largeourexperiencendto reinterpreturphilosophy,ndso do allthesciences.Ofnone s thismore ruethanof thescience f religion. ndeed,t is more ntimatelyelated oexperiencehanare hephysicalciences.Thedataofphysicsare iterally ata,objects ivenalike oall, nsofarasobjectscanbemerely iven o activeminds.Butthestudent f re-ligions notfacing worldhat smerely iven.Religionon-sists of facta and acta ratherthan of data-of deeds and actsrather than of things given. One may say that the past of250


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SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATIONOF RELIGION 251religionis a datum. But the very meaningof the past of re-ligion is often transformedby later events, as is evidencedby the constant reinterpretationsof the person and work ofBuddhaandof Jesus. Religionis always in the making,as thephysical world is not. Further,no matter how muchphysicsstudies or controlsnature, nature will remain. But the sameis not true of the relation between the science of religionandits subject matter, religious experience. If all human beingswere to devote themselves exclusively to a study of the sci-ence of religionthere would be only scientificexperience; nomorereligious experience. Physical energywill be conserved,come what may; religiousvalues must be increasedor theywill disappear.The interrelations, herefore,between experience,science,and philosophy, are unusually close in the case of religion.The facts accessible to the thinkerare moreobviously depen-dent on, and coloredby, his subjectiveexperienceand lead tomorealterations of experiencein the field of religionthan inany of the natural sciences. The difficultyof maintainingatruly scientificspiritis correspondinglygreater.

IIf we are to contributeanything towardan answerto thequestion, What constitutes a scientific study of religion?weshould try to come to some understandingof what we meanby science and its relations to philosophy and experience. Iproposethe followingbrief definition: science is the attemptto formulatethe characteristic aws of some selected domainof experience. By "formulate aws" is meant to describe,butnot to evaluate. Even when the subject matter of a scienceconsists of value experience,its task remainsclean-cut. It isto describe. If science renounces this task, as some wouldhave her do, then a new disciplinemust take it up. We mustknowwhat ourvalueexperiencesarebeforewe canundertaketo tellwhat they are"truly"worth. The word"characteristic"


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252 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGIONin the definition implies that the objects in the selected do-main are to be allowed to speak for themselves. Their lawsare to be soughtwithout bias derivedfromthe study of othertypes of experience. The consciousattitudes of religiousex-perience, for instance, are not to be studied merely from thestandpoint of the results of biology. The words "some se-lected domain of experience"serve to differentiate the sub-ject matter of science from that of philosophy. Any sciencedeals with a part of experience; philosophy tries to take allexperienceinto account and to interpret the relations of allspecial fields to experienceas a whole.Thephilosophyof religionshould,therefore,bemoreclear-ly differentiated from Religionswissenschaft than is some-times the case. The science of religion is phenomenologymerely. It consists of the history, the psychology, and thesociology of religion. But a complete and perfect phenome-nology is not a philosophy of religion. A philosophy of reli-gion will include the facts of phenomenology,but it will inter-pret the relationof these facts to ourpictureof the world as awhole. In particular it will evaluate the valuations whichsciencehas described. Indeed, how can one evaluate, i.e., as-sign "true" value to, any experience without philosophicalpresuppositions? How can one venture a hypothesis aboutwhat truly ought to be or what is truly valuablewithout tak-ing into account all that we know about the meaningof expe-rienceas a whole?

IIThe scientific study of the phenomena of the religious,as of any other domain,must be consciouslyand severely ab-

stract. Withoutabstractionno science and no thoughtof anykindis possible. If experiencebe left unanalyzed,as it comes,we have a mere chaos before us. The solid whole of experi-encehas to be brokenup into its elementsand the dumbmys-tery of the whole has to be made articulate in distinct andwell-defined problems. Only then does scientific thoughtarise. Scientific observation itself implies abstraction both


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SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION 253in the selectionof objects to be observedand in the exclusionof all that is irrelevant. Scientific thought moves from de-scriptionand classificationto higherstages of abstractionandculminates in the generalizations that we call laws. Thesegeneralizationsare abstractin the furthersense that they arehypothetical.' No generalizationcan be regardedas uncondi-tionally true. Nor could any generalization be completelyverifiedby any numberof experiments. What Jevons calledperfect induction, the enumerationof all instances, is impos-sible in mostcasesof any importance;andeven if it werepos-sible the knowledgethat the inductionwas perfect would re-main hypothetical unless the entire universe, including allpossible instances,wereknown.Hence not generalizationsonly, but also the very proc-esses of verification,are abstract. They move in a restricteduniverseof discourseand are subject to revisionand correc-tion in the light of fullerknowledge. The fulfilmentof a pre-diction is said to verify it. Yet nothing is more evident thanthe fact that predictionsbased on false principlesmay be ful-filled. The ultra-fundamentalistjargon of a fanatic may beverifiedby a "conversion,"yet the whole processbe abstractand invalid. C. D. Burnshas recently said that "abstractionis logical forgetfulnessor the art of forgetting; and it is notmisleadingunlessyou forgetthat you have forgotten."2 Noneneed this maxim more than those who are trying to under-stand religion. Science, with its tendency to a sometimessmug departmentalization,forgets too easily that it is ab-stract; philosophy too facilely remembersthat it is not. Asound scientificstudy of religionwill be an abstract descrip-tion of religiousexperience,without evaluationor philosophi-cal interpretation. Such a sciencewill have no right to intro-duce surreptitious evaluations of any sort whatever, eventhoughit be engagedin describingvalue experiences. On the

1 See the illuminating monograph by Esther Crane, The Place of the Hypothesisin Logic (University of Chicago Press, 1923).SC. D. Burns, The Contact between Minds (London: Macmillan, 1923), p. 3.


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254 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGIONother hand, a philosophyof religionwhich seeks to arriveata final synthesis without full considerationof the results ofscience is mere romantic imagination. It is not using, butabusing,the methodof hypothesis.

IIIIt is essential to sound scientific method that scienceshould use the widest possible rangeof fruitful abstractions.This principleappearsto violate the lex parsimoniaeand Oc-

cam'srazor. Scienceexhibitsa desire for the simplestpossibleexplanation. Theorieswhich"reduce"religionto behaviororto socialrelationshave theirlogicaljustification n this praise-worthy desire. It has been said that the outcome of the his-tory of religionis that "man as religiouswas found to be sim-ply man behaving in a certain social way."" Social behaviorindeedexhibitsreligioustraitswhichareworthyof most care-ful study. But when man as religiousis said to be "simply"man behaving socially, the scientist may be said to have cuthis fingerson Occam'srazor. The principleentia nonmultipli-candapraeternecessitatemis to be taken in connectionwiththe equally importantprinciple entia non temere minuenda.This latter principle,that entities must not be rashly dimin-ished, the science of religionis in dangerof violating.

The science of religion n the United States may be said tohave fallen prey to a methodologicaldogmatism. The diffi-culty is not so muchthat unscientificmethodsareused as thatsome particularscientificmethod is advocated in a partisan,and thereforeessentially unscientific,spirit. Some behavior-ists, for instance,flatly reject all use of introspection,ridiculeself-psychologyas "unscientific,"and regardbehaviorismasthe only genuine scientific method. Now there is no doubtthat a study of religiousbehavioris necessary to a completescience of religion. But when behaviorismis made the solemethod and behavior the sole subject matter of a science ofreligion, legitimate scientific method becomes scientific pro-"A. E. Haydon, Journal of Religion, VI (1926), p. 36


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SCIENTIFICINTERPRETATIONOF RELIGION 255vincialism. This procedurecloses the mindof the investigatorto a study of the innerlife of religion. Prayer,devotion,wor-ship, and mystical experienceare not behaviorin the biologi-cal sense,anda study of theireffectson behavior eaves unex-plainedtheir nature as consciousexperiences.Again, a purely introspective method would be equallyinadequate. Many workers n the psychologyof religionhavemade much of questionnaires(Hall, Starbuck,Coe, Pratt);others have largely confinedthemselves to descriptionof theinner life of mystics (James, Underhill, von Hiigel). Studyof such introspectivedata is necessaryto a complete scienceof religion. None but a methodologicaldogmatistwould be-lieve that the fact that these data are communicatedby or-gans of speech impairs their standing as genuine reports ofinner experiences. And none but a methodologicaldogmatistwouldrely entirely on such data.Similarly, the sociological method (Durkheim, King,Ames, etc.) is regardedby many as die Alleinseligmachende.Religion, advocates of this methodpoint out, is essentially asocial fact, born in a socialmilieu, changingwith environmen-tal changes,bound up with the interests and the fortunesofgroup life. It is unquestionably one of the most valuablemethods of the science of religion. But valuable as it is, itsvalue is largelylost when it is madethe sole method. Here, aseverywhere, partisanship is the foe of the truly scientificspirit. Religion, it is true, is "social." But so is every otherexperienceof man. Now, a factor commonto all experiencecannot be a distinctive explanationof any particularexperi-ence. If all experienceis social, there is little point in the re-markthat religionis social. Moreover,study of religionas asocial fact needs to be supplementedby a study of it as indi-vidual experience.Since we always start fromour own immediateself-expe-rience,no science of religionwould be complete that did notconsiderreligionas the experienceof persons. The attitudes


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256 THE JOURNALOF RELIGIONof individuals,psychologicaltypes, the contributionsmadebygreat religiouspersonalities,the relationsof individual to so-ciety-all these are data which a catholic science of religionmust take into account. Sociologicalmethod must be supple-mented by personalisticmethod (Pratt, Strickland,Hocking,etc.). This method has an inalienable right in the common-wealth of science. But if it regarditself as the only propermethod it turns into scientificdogmatism,which is no betterwhen "I" practiceit than when "you" do.A truly scientificspirit, then, will select the widest possi-ble range of fruitful abstractions and will welcome everylegitimatemethod. It will love all truthtoo muchto become amere partisan of any one approachto truth. The science ofreligion,in the eulogistic sense, is not behavioristic,or intro-spectionist,or sociological,orpersonalistic: it is the co-opera-tive outcome of all methods. The defect of a book like J. H.Leuba'sThe Psychology of ReligiousMysticism is not that itcontains erroneouspsychology, but rather that its methodo-logical dogmatismleads the author to restricthimself to theresultsof a single method. IV

To practicethe principlesjust outlined the scienceof reli-gion should be both structuraland functional,both analyticand synoptic. The structural-analyticmethod will seek forelementsand causalrelations;the functional-synopticmethodwill considerthe ends which religiousexperienceis realizing,the values and meaningsgiven in its processes. Each methodeasily goes to extremes. An atomistic history, psychology, orsociology is a splendid illustration of abstractionwhich hasforgottenthat it has forgotten. Yet to ignorethe necessity ofanalysis is to abandon clear thought for mere romanticism.But functional method is of at least equal importancewithanalytic. Religion is the movement of minds in interactionwith environment,and the entire rangeand directionof thatmovementneeds to be included in the purview of a genuine


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SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATIONOF RELIGION 257science of religion. The functionalist is, however, in dangerof exalting his method too highly. Like J. R. Angell, in hisarticle in the Decennial Publications of the University ofChicago, he may come to regard functionalism as identicalwith philosophy. But, even though functional method ob-serves ends, values, and meanings, its business as science isonly to describe. It tells what the value-claimsof religionare,but it does not ask whether these claims are justified. It de-scribes the social and individual meanings which religionasserts, but it does not inquire whether these meanings are"true." If it should assert its right to be normative it wouldmake metaphysicalpretensions. One of the regrettablephe-nomena of the present is the fact that so much unacknowl-edged metaphysicsappearsin the garbof science.

VIt may be said that the view of scientificmethodherepre-sented is mere eclecticism. But this would be a misunder-

standing. Not scientificeclecticism,but scientificcatholicity,is what we need. Each methodshouldbe true to itself and beworked as far as possible; but each method should heartilyacknowledgethe rights of all other legitimate methods. Therelationsbetween behavioristsand self-psychologists, for ex-ample, should not be the intolerant and even ignorant oneswhichhave sometimesexisted hitherto.But even scientific catholicity does not complete themind's task in understandingreligion. Nothing, it is true, cangive us absolutely complete knowledge. In the cycle experi-ence-science-philosophy here is a perpetualmotion, to whichphilosophy makes a unique contribution. Science to the endremainsabstract and descriptive.' Philosophy tries to relatethe abstractions of scienceto each other in a concreteview ofthe whole,and to evaluate the facts describedby the sciences.

4 The failure of science to solve problems of value is well stated in the instal-ment of "My Apprenticeship," by Mrs. Beatrice Webb, published in the SurveyGraphic for January, 1926.


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258 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGIONWhen the mind asks the question, What is the meaning

and value of life as a whole? it acquiresno pontifical powers.Philosophyis liable to error,as is science. Philosophicalerroris more difficultto detect, philosophicaltruth to verify, thanare scientific errorand truth. But nothingshortof the failureof curiosityabout the worth of life and a refusal to think cansilence philosophicquestionings. Every philosophic proposi-tion, like every scientific, is indeed a hypothesis. A perfectphilosophy of religion presupposesa perfect science; a per-fect sciencepresupposesa perfect experience;a perfect expe-rience presupposesa perfect philosophy; and so on. All hu-man endeavor is relative; none is final. But in the forwardmovementof life thephilosophicview of the wholeis as neces-sary to sane control of experienceas is the scientific view ofthe parts. Between the hypotheses of experience, science,andphilosophythereshouldbe a fruitful and conscious inter-action.

We may summarize he intent of this paperby saying thatscientificmethod in the study of religionis, like all scientificmethod, abstractand descriptive. It should aim, by as fruit-ful a variety of proceduresas possible, to discover the struc-tures and functions characteristic of religious experience. Itshould seek to abolish the methodologicaldogmatismwhichmars the work of many contemporary investigators, andshould cultivate scientific catholicity. Finally, it should ac-knowledgemorefranklythanit has done, the necessaryinter-relationsof the cycle experience-science-philosophy.A grow-ing philosophyis necessary to the interpretationand evalua-tion of the facts of experience and the results of scientificinvestigation.

what constitutes a scinetific interpretation of religion

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