webster, steven. dialogue and fiction in ethnography

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9

DI LO GUE ND FICTION IN ETHNOG R PHY

Steven Webster

My first aim in this essay is to try to close

the gap which still exists between ethnography

and hermeneutics. Anthropologists who have

heard out the occasionally pretentious claims

of herme neutic philosophers may suggest that

this all seems a needlessly elaborate extrapola-

tion of what ethnographers have always done

in the field. In response to this disciplinary

provincialism, I will try to clarify why an

epistemology of hermeneutics is nevertheless

needed in ethnography now. With the possible

exception o f history, no other form of social in-

quiry has really come to terms with this philo-

sophical tradition. It is doubly ironic that

theoretical natural science, after centuries of

setting a fatally misleading ideal for the under-

standing of society, may be discovering its

own hermeneutics before the social sciences

do. Sociology, in this herm eneutic matu ra-

tion , is far ahead of the o ther social sciences

but seems to have again been subtly co-opted

by the positivist tradition it seeks to transcend.

Social anthropology, on the ot her hand, ma y

be the natural home of this new epistemology.

Here, understanding has always - professional-

ly, so to speak - had to confront its own para-

doxes and prejudices, has had always to pro-

ceed with a certain irreducible hesitation. Let

me begin by epistemologically interpet ing

conventional ethnographic hesitancy, opening

up the way we think about what we do, and

the way we write about what we have done.

Steven Webster is Senior Lecturer in Social Anthrop ology

at the University of Auckland, New Zealand

I hope to trace a continui ty between two

situations of classical ethnography and their

recen t analogues which poses a dil emma of a

peculiar kind, perhaps an epistemological im-

passe whose time has come in anthropology.

As Ruby [ 1 ] has poin ted out, Malinowski

began his Argonauts with an invocation

which the much later revelations of his

Diary

imply he h imself was unable to live up

to

... every student o f the less exact sciences will do h is

best to bring home to the reader all the condition s in

which the exp eriment or the observations are made.

In Ethnogr aphy, where a candid account of such data

is perhaps even more necessary, it has unfor tunately in

the past not always been supplied with sufficient generos-

ity, and many writers do no t ply th e searchlight o

metho dic sincerity, as they move among their facts but

produce them before us out of complete obscurity [2].

Although refreshing, the ethnographic de-

scription of his observations stopped far short

of the candor he seemed to demand. Profound

personal struggles, disaffection and cynicism

about his hosts, guilty self-indulgence on the

margins of European society, are only a few

of the implications. The diary was meant to

keep his personal reflections separate from

his ethnography, and privately to discipline

himself to objectivity (cf. Firth's introducti on),

yet how can this aim be reconciled with his

demand for sincerity and an accounting of the

genesis of objective facts? Yet an integration

of such intimate reflections into ethnographic

work would still seem irrelevant to us as well

as to him. C ontempo rary ethnography can

0304- 4092/ 82/00 00-00 00/ 02.75 9 1982 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company



92

countenance neither the view that these are

a part of the field expe rime nt which

Malinowski recomme nded on the model of

the natural sciences, nor the naive positivist

assumption that they are simply inconsequen-

tial. This is the dilemma we have inherited

(most directly ) from Malinowski.

Geertz fixes on the irony of Malinowski's

diary to expose the futility of the romantic em-

pathic ideal of ethnography [3]. But he ne-

glects to pursue in this context another sort of

irony he himself had defined in 1968: despite

the bitterness and disappointment of one

case he recounts,

Such an end to a nthropologist -informant relationships is

hardly typical: usually the sense of being members, how-

ever temporarily, insecurely and incompletely, of a single

moral communi ty can be maintained even in the face of

the wider social realities which press in at almost every

mome nt to deny it. It is this fiction - fiction not false-

hood - that lies at the heart of successful anthropological

field research; and, because it is never completely convinc-

ing for any of the participants, it renders such research,

considered as a form of cond uct, continuous ly ironic. To

recognize the moral tension, the ethical ambiguity, im-

plicit in the encount er of anthropologist and informant ,

and to still be able to dissipate it through one s actions

and one s attitudes, is what encounter demands of both

parties ff it is to be authen tic, ff it is actually to happ en.

And to discover that is to discover also something very

complicated and not altogether clear about the nature of

sincerity and insincerity, genuineness and hy pocrisy,

honesty and self-deception [4].

In his earlier insight Geertz had focused upon

what he called the anthropological irony, a

peculiar species of good faith between ethno-

grapher and informant which verged on bad

faith, and thereby constituted, strangely

enough, what he suggested was the basis of

authenticity in et hnography. Geertz reasoned

that there was always some form of reciprocal

pretence between anthropologist and host re-

flecting their situational agreement to wel-

come one another into their respective cul-

tures regardless of the few realistic grounds for

such participation. At least in the new states,

this reciprocity of touching faith takes the

form of an honorary cultural membership for

the anthropologist and a sanguine hope of

Western advantages to be gained by his hosts,

objective, deterr ent condi tions aside. The

impossibility of such unspoken promises is

both the tragedy of cultural difference-

domination and the ground o f its understand-

ing. Malinowski's recur rent disaffection from

his hosts and longing to be elsewhere suggests

another form of the same inevitable anthro-

pological irony. The authenticity of his ethno-

graphy was sufficient unto the times, but

Geertz's halting int uition regarding his own

fieldwork some 45 years later suggests that

authentic ethno graphy can no longer in good

positivist faith efface the diary from the ac-

count.

Perhaps not unlike Malinowski in his ethno-

graphic amnesia, Geertz [5] spared us further

discomfort and changed the subject from the

epistemology of a profound , if uniquely dis-

trusting, intimacy be tween ethnographer and

informant, to the epistemology of how the

ethnographer understands. An epistemological

con tex t which mystifies the native and over-

looks the ethnographer himself seems to sup-

plant the earlier insight where bot h were all

too transparent to one another, and authen-

ticity somehow unproblematic. As the article

reveals, Geertz, l ike Malinowski, had slipped

back into a false consciousness of how one

does ethnographic research. On the other

hand, while Malinowski had invoked the reifi-

cation of func tion ali sm to assure the ob-

jectivity for which he strove, Geertz does at-

tempt to recover a sense of the arbitrary

variety of inte rpretive analogues which consti-

tute ethnographic reality, there by foreclosing

on any such simple objectifcation. Neverthe-

less, these analogues are now comfo rtab ly

experience-distant from himself and his

own presumably still experienc e-nea r con-

course with his hosts. In this excavation of

ethnographic epistemology he reveals the inter-

pretive strata of our understanding, but stops

short of the ground of au thenticit y he had

exposed several years earlier. He has not, so



93

far as I know, dug so deeply again.

Only a few years earlier, Kennet h Read had

made mirror-sharp the situations which Geertz

briefly reflects upon in less universal terms [6].

Makis and the Gahuku Gama were his hosts,

striving both for a share of Read's culture and

humane acceptance of his hesitant intrusion,

while Read struggled with the futility o f him-

self being a Gahuku Gama, the pa thos of a

future which he could see more clearly than

they, and the distractions of a private world of

nature and humanity whose graces seemed too

delicate to share except in the pages of his book.

The counterpoint is also between Malinowski

and Read, both of whom felt their radically

diffe rent forms of alienation and reverie must

be kept apart from their ethnographies. But

Geertz did suggest an epistemological basis

from which the conti nuity of all three ethno-

graphic introspections becomes apparent, and

perhaps no longer legitimately segregated from

the e thnography to which it gives rise.

Anoth er ethnographic and epistemological

situation which I will interpret as convergent

with the ironies of Malinowski and Geertz is

Evans-Pritchard's ambivalent attitude toward

Zande witchcraft, oracles, and magic [7].

Geertz's 1968 introspection broached the

relationship of ethnography and fiction, so I

will exploit the fortuitous appearance of the

same word in Evans-Pritchard's ethnography:

There is an established fiction that the

Avongara [the Zande nobility] are not

witches... [8]. The enduring brilliance of this

ethnogra phy is his demon stration t hat witches,

oracles, and magic do exist just as the Azande

think they do, while never for very long allow-

ing us to lose sight of the fact that they don't

really exist at all, or (to pu t it in terms of the

Azande's own response) at least they don't

exist in England. Writing when ethno graphy

still oft en had to convince its readers that

other cultures were human, Evans-Pritchard

walked a fine line between conscientious under-

standing of the way Azande themselves saw

these phen omena and a frank incredulity -

apparently not hidden from the Azande them-

selves - tha t the whole thing could be taken

so seriously. I am fascinated by a professional-

ism which seems to have left no stone un-

turned, an ethnographic candor which reveals

sufficient respect for his hosts to confr ont

them without patronising indulgence, and

sufficient respect fo r his readers to bare his

own innermos t epistemological prejudices and

ambivalences. Writing fully in the same posi-

tivist preconception as Malinowski, he never-

theless achieved the sincerity o f which

Malinowski was incapable because he could

not fully efface his diary from his ethnography.

The innocentl y paradoxical comme nt about

the Zande fict ion which I quoted above

leapt ou t at me from Evans-Pritchard's pages

as the quintessence of the epistemological

dilemma his candor had left bare: due to a

certain fiction the nobility are not witches,

but due to a radically different sort of fiction

many other Azande are witches (in daily,

ordinary, and t aken-for-granted fact).., and

due to yet again a radically different sort of

fiction Evans-Pritchard was unable to con-

vince himself, except for certain lapses in

his everyday practical experience of Zande

life and language, of the trut h of Zande fiction.

Toward the end of this essay I will suggest that

the fictions by which we constitute ethno-

graphy are not essentially different from

those by which the subject constitutes his

world; analysis of the two processes is neces-

sarily integral.

The subsequent ethnographic tradition of

explaining witches seems to have circumve nted

Evans-Pritchard's problem by means comparable

to what Malinowski, and later Geertz, adopted

to abstract themselves from the way things

had been in the field. Rather than struggle

with the shifting distinction between the trut h

and fiction of witches in an intercultural

epistemology , most of us have managed to cre-

ate the unintended illusion that this central

issue becomes irrelevant when witches can be

viewed as projections of anxieties, indicators o f



94

social strains, or symbolic expressions of evil.

While ethnographers, and social anthropologists

in general, conti nued to explain witchcraft as

though Evans-Pritchard (influenced by Levy-

Bruhl and Pareto) had unequivocally vanquished

the witches themselves, philosophers of social

science have taken the issue up where Evans-

Pritchard left it.

Perhaps because ethnography since then has

been little help in this regard, the philosophers

continue to veer, much like Evans-Pritchard

did himself, between enchahtment and denial.

Winch [9] concludes that Zande witches

exis t in whatever terms the Azande them-

selves use, and that if we wish to understand

them we can only accede to their terms of

reference ; Gellner [ 10] no more thought ful-

ly than Evans-Pritchard in his dogmatic mo-

ments, scoffs at the whole absurd illusion, in-

cluding Winch's. Lukes [ 11 ] wants to have i t

both ways by urging both relativistic and uni-

versalistic criteria of rationality, but the Zande

nevertheless fail on the latter grounds. Jarvie

[ 12] and Giddens [ 13] accept forms of rela-

tivistic understanding like Winch's but avoid

the solipsistic implications of Winch's argu-

ment by pointing out that different cultures

are either historically or logically mediated by

com mon meanings. Jarvie implies that differ-

ences in cultural conception of reality get

worked out historically in a survival of the

fittest (and t ruest) mode. Giddens lucidly sug-

gests, on the other hand, that different cultural

realities are frames of meaning which are

already in the process of mediation (insofar as

the y are aware of each other). He refrains from

drawing conclusions about whet her in particu-

lar cases this mediation reflects the triumph

of rationality or, for instance, coercion or

delusion. This hermene utic form of relativism,

in which the historical situation is the one suf-

ficient absolute, certainly helps us underst and

why both the Azande and Evans-Pritchard

were fight about witches, and that while

British indirect rule was making progress in

overcoming the Zande preconception, Zande

rationalism was making progress in overcoming

Evans-Pritchard's assumptions.

We can further understand the relativity of

truth and fiction in this instance by comparing

it with the more recent but equally significant

ethnographic dilemma posed by Castaneda's

account of don Juan, the Yaqui bru]o or

shaman. This compari son reveals the ironic

disparity between the relationship of Evans-

Pritchard and Castaneda to their respective

audiences almost two generations apart.

Evans-Pritchard had sought to convince a

sceptical readership of the practical rationality

of the Azande beliefs (while convincing him-

self that their beliefs were nevertheless a fic-

tion); Castaneda sought to convince an en-

thusiastic counter-cu lture devoted to perceiv-

ing oth er realities of the practical irrational-

ity o f his experiences with don Juan (while

convincing himself that these experiences

were nevertheless true). Some anthropologists

appreciated his epistemological effort, while

others pursued the issue of ethnographic

veracity with a seriousness that perhaps better

than any other cir cumstance reveals to us the

ephemeral nature of ethnographic commit-

ment. The ironic reversal between

Witchcraft

Oracles...

and its sequel for ty years later not

only demonstrates the shifting relationship

between the ethnographer, his subject, and his

audience: the tension between the former as

palpably true ethnography and don Juan as

convincing fiction also places the tenuous dis-

tinction inescapably before us.

I have traced a continuity between a perspec-

tive implicit in Malinowski's ethnography (and

in Geertz's and Read's), and again between

Evans-Pritchard's ethnography and Castaneda's,

suggesting that these continuities converge as

exemplars of an epistemological dilemma for

con tempora ry social anthropol ogy. I have also

suggested that anthropologists have avoided

confronting this recurrent dilemma, Malinowski

and Evans-Pfitchard in their particular ways -

and Geertz, Read, and Castaneda (or his de-

tractors) in their's. Now I must make the im-



95

plicit accusation clearer, and marshall behind

it more than a few tenuous ethnographic re-

interpretations.

To recapitulate: Malinowski experienced a

profound alienation in the midst of his hosts

that often betrays disdain for them, erotic

distractions, and doubts about himself that

would not be unfamiliar to m ost ethnographers.

He set many high standards fo r full field re-

porting, yet apparently assumed that the con-

ditions o f research were separable from his

scientific purpose. Geertz suggests that at least

in research in the communit ies of the new

states a tenuous trust must be built upon im-

possible ideals of reciprocal cultural mobili ty,

and concluded that this irony is nevertheless

integral to anthropological understanding.

Read's own lyrically ethnographic diary,

published as a supplement which ironically

may itself only be supplemented by his

conventional ethnography, suggests a media-

tion which extends to all ethnography. Al-

though Malinowski and Read may be obverse

sides of a personal predicament, I think they

also r epresent obverse sides of Geertz's episte-

mological predicament. Geertz's ambiguously

sincere reciprocation of touching faith

between et hnographer and hosts is implicit

in both Malinowski's and Read's accounts,

as is their disaffection from their hosts implicit

in Geertz's regression from a more penetrating

epistemology. Although the gap between cul-

tures may be theore tical ly bridgable, few field

researchers would presume to have overcome

it, and most would have to admit to an im-

penetrable alienation between themselves and

their hosts, ba lanced more or less by the ac-

complishment o f some degree of understanding.

I don't think my own efforts with recalcitrant

and suspicious Quechua has coloured my con-

clusions, because my personal experience among

Maori has been utterly to the contrary ye t can-

not rise be yond a similar sense of estranged in-

timacy. Whethe r this residual sense of mutua l

alienation arises from a wider context of politi-

cal, economic, or ideological domina tion by

the anthropologist's culture, or a narrower

cultural contex t of such domination of the

anthropologi st by his hosts, it seems likely

that the transcendance of such disparity is ne-

cessarily a fiction.

The convergence between this peculiarly ir-

reducible epistemological difficulty and that

which I have outlined through Evans-Pritchard

and Castaneda furth er extends Geertz's notion

of anthropological irony. Evans-Pritchard ex-

perienced a profound ambivalence between

the practical and discursive rationality of

Zande beliefs and his own conviction that they

constituted no more than an elaborately ratio-

nalized fiction, however real to the Azande.

The cultural basis o f his own conviction may

not have been so clear to Evans-Pritchard who,

after all, confronted a professional audience

no less dubious of primitive rationality than

the population at large. Castaneda's converse

labour decades later, to convince an enthusias-

tically credulous readership of the practical im-

possibility of believing in a sorcerer's world

for very long, however palpably true it might

be, puts this dilemma in fuller perspective.

However convinced Castaneda and his audience

may be of the t ruth of don Juan's world, its

fiction is apparent insofar as they must come

back to the straight world o f California; how-

ever convinced Evans-Pritchard and his

audience may remain of the fiction in the

Azande's world, its truth is apparent insofar

as they remain there, insistently reabsorbed

in Zande com mon sense. This version of the

anthropological irony seems to adumbrate a

more radical ontological polarity between an-

thropologist and hosts which underlies the

merely ethical tensions revealed by Malinowski,

Read, and Geertz. However, both forms of

polarity are existential in the sense that they

necessarily constitute the fieldwork experience,

not merely regulate its boundaries. That is to

say, the experience of such existenti al gaps is

itself the ground of the anthropological under-

standing which is indubitably accomplished,

and join tly built upon , by strangers living to-



96

gerber. The gap is the foundation of under-

standing, not its subversion. As Geertz dimly

saw in 1968, the ethn ograp hy which is to re-

flect this accomplishmen t must in some sense

both perpetrate a fiction and claim truth.

This peculiarly produc tive epistemological

dilemma must not be confused with those

generic to the positivist tradition o f social

science. Such spurious dilemmas arise from the

illusory assumption that the understanding

subject and the object understood are primor-

dial realities each c onde mned to ineffable sub-

jectivi ty in an objective world which stands

apart. Descartes' cogito ergo sum gave rise to

a positivism which split the unity of concrete

experience into subjectivity cogito, or the

isolated consciousness) and objectivity res,

or substance), two polar forms of alienation

which appeared to leave no option between

an arrant subjectivism and a scientistic objec-

tivism. The epistemological perspective I am

urging, here deduced from ethnographic im-

passes, instead suggests that both subjectifica-

tions and objectifications are extrapolations

from the ground of mutual understanding

upon which any enco unt er necessarily begins

insofar as human beings recognize one an-

other as such. This accompli shment, however

ephemera l its inception, is necessarily the

primordial reality and unequivocal basis of

an authent ic understanding, which is neither

a subjectified understanding on the one hand

nor an objectified understood on the other.

This latter subjective-objective split is the

mystif icat ion which now misleads us, obscur-

ing the middle ground from which understand-

ing dialectically arises.

But, the polarity o f subject and object is

now very real, as derived from Descartes and

now assumed in the standard Western European

worldview. Understanding must be a dialectic,

that is to say, a dialogue between subject and

object. Although the dilemma may only be

historical rathe r than ontological, it is no less

inescapable. Interpretation of this spontaneous

dialectic of understanding can only waiver be-

tween tru th which reflects the alienation of

subject and object and fic tio n which regains

their existential media tion. This is, in most

general terms, the dilemma which Geertz called

the anthropological irony. I hope to clarify

the philosophical bases and implications of

this epistemological problem, and head o ff

some of the ways it may be subverted by the

positivist perspective which takes subjectivity

and objectivity as given.

Geertz, again as though his explicit episte-

mological enquiry in 1974 were a regression

from the clarity of his merely moral enquiry

of 1968, in the later essay raised the mislead-

ing issue of the inaccessibility of the native's

point of view . With Malinowski's disaffection

as a demonstrat ion, he suggests that an anthro-

pologist's understanding is instead derived

from the native's own experience-near con-

cepts , mediated by experience-distant con-

cepts which the anthropologist brings to bear

on the problem from whatever sources are in-

tuitively comparable, including ideas from

othe r cultures as well as his own. I do no t take

issue with Geertz's herm eneutic met hod here,

but rather with its truncation. Although he

suspects that no clear line can be drawn be-

tween the native's innermost point of view

and his experience-near concepts, Geer tz never-

theless leaves the impression that the former

would be the ideal basis o f knowledge were it

not in principle as inaccessible as the romanti c

ideal of empathy is futile in anthropological

understanding. The frustrated understanding

can only hope to approximate this ideal know-

ledge with out recourse to pretensions of

more-than-normal capacities for ego-efface-

ment and fellow-feeling... ; furthermo re,

... whatever accurate o r half-accurate sense

one gets of what one's informants are really

like comes not from the experience of that ac-

ceptance as such, which is part of one's own

biography, not of theirs, but from the ability

to construe their modes of expression... [ 14].

In 1968 Geertz had concluded that a certain

moral tension or ethical ambiguity be-



9

tween anthropologis t and hi s informan ts l i es

at the heart of successful anthropological re-

search ; i ts recog ni t ion and dissipat ion is

w ha t enc oun t e r demands o f bo t h pa r ti e s if it

i s to be authen t ic [ 15] . But in 1974 he has

rever ted to ego-ef facement on the one hand,

and an ap proxim at ion to fe l low-fee ling on the

other ; he has abs t rac ted h i s b iography f rom

their s , and fur th ermo re my st i f ied the na t ive 's

b iography by ext rapola t ing an ephemera l sub-

jec t iv i ty tha t obscures the authent ic i ty once

t ransparent in d ia logue and com promise .

Simi lar ly , Geer tz ' s own exper ience-n ear con-

cepts , e th ica l and epi s temologica l, d i sappear

in thi s expl ic i t metho dolo gy o f unders tanding.

The na t ive 's point of v iew is objec t i f ied a t one

al ienated end of a t runcated symmetry be-

tween i t s own exper ience-near concepts and

Geer tz ' s ex per ience-di s tant analogues , the

nat ive speaking no w in to a void f rom which

Geer tz has absented h imsel f. A more re cent

vers ion o f Geer tz ' s v iew o f herme neut ics s ti ll

re f lec t s a s imi larly one-dimens ional a ccou nt

of anthropologica l und ers tanding [ 16] .

I t seems to me tha t the inef fabi l i ty of the

nat ive 's inn erm ost point of v iew i s a

chimera crea ted by th is rec iprocal a l i enation

f rom the prac t ica l d ia logue in which under -

standing necessari ly ar ises. T he dialect ic be-

tween subjec t and ob jec t has impl ic i t ly been

t ransformed by abs t rac t ion in to two a l ienated

subjec t iv i ti es, on e of which i s unapproach able

and the the o th er o f which is gone ent i re ly .

This backg round of subjec t i f i ca t ion impl ic i t ly

invokes an objec t i f i ed foreground which

Geer tz presents as a method olog y, i t se l f ab-

s t rac ted f rom any par t i cular s itua t ion . Th e

dialect ic of understanding is saved from Des-

car tes ' fa teful d ichotomizat ion of knowledge

only by Geer tz ' s proposal of an unres t ra inedly

arbi t rary and pancul tura l assor tment of ex-

per ience-di s tant concepts . Al though these

too are presented abs t rac t ly , they never the less

res tore authe nt ic i ty by sugges t ing a d ia logue

between Geer tz and some others , somewhere .

This is one way tha t the d ia logue in whic h

understanding necessari ly ar ises can be retained

in i ts subsequent ethnography, that is , i f a rei f i -

ca t ion of subjec t and objec t do no t obscu re it s

dialectic.

II

Having rejected D il they's fut i le ideal of em-

pathy, Geer tz accepts f rom him the model of

hermeneut ic unders tanding as t acking be tween

par t and whole or par t i cular and genera l [17] .

Dil they had dist inguished social science from

natura l s icence meth odo logy, emphas iz ing

that the former, by vir tue o f i tself being social ,

has direct access to i ts subject mat ter , whereas

the la t t e r can only impu te m eaning indi rec t ly

to i t s subjec t mat ter . He a l so emphas ized the

dia lec t ica l or re f lexive na ture of in te rpre ta t ion

which achieves unders tanding o f i ts ob jec t by

relat ing i t as part ial meaning within a whole

conte xt of meaning [ 18] . B ut as Gada mer has

argued [ 19] , Di l they 's incons i s tency was to

abs t rac t the herm eneu t ic c i rc le f rom the h i s tor-

ical and exi s tentia l con text of the in terpre ter ,

just as Geertz has d on e in re-segregating his

own f rom the na t ive 's b iography. Begui led by

the posi t ivist ideal of natura l scient i f ic kno w-

ledge , Di l they e levated empa thy to in tu i t ive

cer t i tude by t ranscending the h i s tor ical con-

text o f the in terpre te r and objec t i fy ing what

is interpreted; s imilar ly, Geertz pursues the

objec tiv i st chimera by abs t rac t ing not only

f rom any recogni t ion of h is own po int o f v iew,

but a l so: f rom any imm edia te unders tand ing of

the na t ive 's poin t o f view. This leaves us with

what Gadamer cal ls , in cr i t icism of Dil they,

a pu re l y fo rma l me t h odo l ogy unancho red

in real li fe conf r onta t io n be tween subjec t

and objec t , despi te the phenomenologica l

idea l of Di l they 's

Lebensphilosophie

G a d a m e r

furth er suggests that i t i s just this abstract con-

cept of unders tanding, der ived f rom Enl ighten-

ment Cartesianism and i ts posi t ivist apotheosis

in Comte and Mi ll, which rende red Di l they 's

me thod vulnerable to idea li sm and re la t iv i sm

[20] . I ronica l ly , then, wi th both the in ter-



98

pre t e r 's and t he na t i ve ' s po in t s o f v iew gone

from Geer tz ' s her me ne ut ic c i rc le, in a s t il l

more r i gou rous app rox ima t io n t o ob j ec t iv i s t

kno wled ge it too i s l i able to inher i t the wind,

the very subjec t iv ism i t ab jures. G adam er ,

fo l l owing He idegge r' s r e inco rpo ra t i on o f t he

in t e rp re t e r i n to t he h e rme neu t i c c i rc le o f

h is tor ica l unders tanding , a rgues tha t the

t ru th o f unde r s t an d ing is ne i t he r ob j ec ti ve

nor subjec t ive , but a r ises in an in tersubjec t ive

d i a logue be tween two d i f f e r en t po in t s o f

view:

T r u e h i s t o ri c a l t h i nk i n g m u s t t a k e a c c o u n t o f i t s o w n

h i s t or i c a li t y . O n l y t h e n w i l l it n o t c h a s e t h e p h a n t o m

o f a n h i s t o r i c a l o b j e c t w h i c h i s t h e o b j e c t o f p r o g r e ss i v e

r e s e ar c h , b u t l e a r n t o s e e i n t h e o b j e c t t h e c o u n t e r p a r t

o f i t s e l f a n d h e n c e u n d e r s t a n d b o t h . T h e t r u e h i s t or i c a l

o b j e c t i s n o t a n o b j e c t a t a ll , b u t t h e u n i t y o f t h e o n e

a n d t h e o t h e r , a r e l a t io n s h i p i n w h i c h e x i s t b o t h t h e

rea l i ty of h i s tory and the rea l i ty of h i s tor ica l unders ta nd-

ing 121].

Elsewhere he cha ract e ri s e s t h is cou n te rpa r t

o r d i a lec t ic o f unde r s t an d ing a s a f f i n i t y ,

a concep t d r awn f rom He idegge r:

E v e r y n e w p o s i t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h r e p l a ce s

a n o t h e r c o n t i n u e s t o n ee d t h e f o r m e r b e c a u s e i t c a n -

n o t i t s e l f b e e x p l a i n e d s o l o n g a s i t k n o w s n e i t h e r

in

w h a t

n o r

y

wha t i t i s oppos ed . . . We see tha t there a re d ia lec t ica l

r e l a t io n s b e t w e e n . . , o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e p r e j u d i ce

organica l ly a par t o f my par t icu la r sys tem of convic t ions

or opin ions , tha t i s the impl ic i t p re judice , and on the

o t h e r h a n d , a n e w e l e m e n t w h i c h d e n o u n c e s i t , t h a t i s ,

a f o r e ig n e l e m e n t w h i c h p r o v o k e s m y s y s t e m o r o n e o f

i t s e l e m e n t s [ 2 2 ] .

This i s t rue conve rsa t ion or d ia logue . How-

ever , f o r unde r s t and ing t o abs t r ac t i t s e l f f rom

i t s own h i s to ri ca l con t ex t , i n t he p r e t ense o f

ob j ec t ive und e r s t and ing , i n s t ead f a i ls t o pu t

i t s own im pl ic i t pre judices a t r i sk , and sub ver t s

in th i s evasive or pa t ronis in g indulge nce the

t ru th c l aim o f t ha t wh ich i t s eeks t o unde r -

s tand [ 23 ] . C onse que nt ly , a l l kno wle dge i s

necessar ily an ef fec t ive uni ty which can only

be ana lyzed a s a ne tw ork o f r ec ip roca l ac t i ons

[241.

Wha t appea r s , f rom the pe r spec t ive o f

pos i t iv i sm, to be a potent ia l conserva t ive or

e thno cen t r i c b i as r e t a ined i n t he sub j ec ti v i t y

o f t he i n t e rp re t e r , i s f rom the pe r spec t i ve o f

he rm eneu t i c s a neces sa ry pa r t i c ipa t i on i n t he

re fo rm ula t i on o f know ledge on i ts on ly ob -

jec t ive bas is , in te rsubjec t ive d ia logue . On ly

in th i s la t te r way can we d iscr iminate the

real ly c r it ic a l que s t i on o f he rm eneu t i c s ,

nam e ly o f d i s ti ngu i sh ing t he t rue p re jud i ces ,

by w h ich we unde r s t and , f rom the f al se ones

b y w h i c h we m i s u n d e r s t a n d [ 2 5 1. G a d a m e r

d i smi s se s t he im pu ta t i on t o h i s app roach o f

unc r i ti c a l a ccep t ance o f t r ad i t i on and socio -

po l i ti c a l conse rva ti sm, po in t i ng ou t t ha t t he

bourgeois h is tor ica l consc iousness ,which

th rou gh r e l a t iv i s a ti on o f t he o ld embraces

eve ry th ing new, a l so cou r t s t he hegem ony

of t he o ld t h roug h the r e l a ti v i sa t i on o f t he

new [261 . The roo t s o f Gadam er ' s d i al ec ti c

in Pla to a re c lear : S ocra tes fou ght the n ih i l is t ic

and hen ce po t en t i a l l y demagog ic s cept i c ism

of t he S oph i s t s w i th t he new a r t o f ph i l o sophy ,

whereby a pe rpe tua l d i a l ec ti c o f t he se s and

coun te r theses can on ly adumbra t e an ephem-

era l t ru th

( what

som e th ing i s ) bu t neve r

loses s ight of i t . Al th oug h he repres ented t rad i-

t ion agains t the new ideas of the day , the

d i a lec t ica l me tho d bo rne o f t h is a f f i n i t y

b e t w e e n p h il o s o p h y a n d i t s s h a d o w , s o p h i s m

insu red t ha t mer e ta lk , no th in g bu t t a lk, c an ,

howe ve r un t ru s tw or th y i t may be , st il l b r ing

o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n h u m a n b e in g s -

which i s to say tha t i t can s t i l l make human

b e in g s h u m a n [ 2 7 ] .

T h is c o m m e n t a b o u t n o t h i n g b u t t al k

br ings me to a f ina l cons idera t ion regarding

G a d a m e r ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f h e r m e n e u t i c s w h i c h

I hop e wi l l head o f f , or ra ther , co-o pt , a

Marxian cr i t ique . Gadamer has been charged

by h is c r it ical theo r i s t co l league Haberm as

wi th p ropo s ing a he rm eneu t i c s wh ich by r e -

ma in ing mere ly l i ngu i st i c i s im po ten t t o

pene t r a t e t he f al se consc iousnes s wh ich ob -

scu re s t he con t r ad i c t i ons o f cap i t a li s t soc i e ty

[28 ] . Bu t I cons ide r Gadam er ' s r e j ec t i on o f

t h e p u r e l y f o r m a l m e t h o d o l o g y o f D i l t he y i a n

hermeneut ics and i t s impl ic i t idea l i sm an ade-



101

fu l i n conc re t e con te x t r a the r t han nonesens i ca l

on some spur ious log i ca l g rounds . These

" m i n i a t u r e " s e m a n t i c s it u a t io n s a p p l y " m a c r o -

scop ica l ly" t o " th e u nde r s t an d ing o f a li en be -

l ie f s y s t e m s " [ 4 7 ] . G i d d e n s ' a p p r o a c h t o

unde r s t and ing n o t on ly em phas i se s i t s d ia log i -

cal na tu re bu t a lso , li ke Gadame r ' s emphas i s

on p rac t ica l r a the r t han abs t r ac t po in t s o f

v i ew, r eminds us o f t he ob j ec t ive con tex t o f

soci a l a c t i on and pow er i nequa l i t y i n wh ich

mean ing typ i ca l l y occu r s .

I t h i n k t h i s s y n o p t i c r e vi e w o f c o n t e m p o r a r y

he rmeneu t i c t heo ry sugges t s a p rob lema t i c

e p i st e m o l o g ic a l c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n " t e m p o r a l

d i s t ance" a s cons t i t u t ive o f h i s to r i cal unde r -

s t and ing , and " cu l tu r a l d i s t ance" a s cons t i t u -

t i ve o f an th ropo log ica l unde r s t and ing . I f

Gid den s ' ins ight is r ight , these fo rms o f soc ia l

s c ie n t if ic u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e h o m o l o g o u s t o

cer ta in semant ic processes in the i r prac t ica l

use . I wou ld fu r th e r sugges t t ha t an th ropo log i -

cal unde r s t a nd ing i s p ro t o typ i c , because i t s

soc ia l bas is i s ins is tent and immedia te and

leas t l iab le t o an un re f l ex ive a s sumpt ion o f

unde r s t and ing . W he the r o r no t t he se c la ims

a re accep ted , it is at l ea s t dea r t ha t t he mo de l

o f t he d i a logue is necessa r il y t he c om m on

den om ina to r o f soc i al s c ien t i fi c unde r s t and ing .

Con sis tenc y wi th th is epis temo logica l bas is re -

qu i r e s t ha t bo th an th ropo log ica l s e lf - awareness

and e thn ograp h ic accou n t r e f l ec t t he d i a l ec t ic

by w h ich th i s unde r s t and ing i s cons t i t u t ed .

At l ea st i n t he ca se o f an th ro po log ica l unde r -

s t and ing , r ai s ing the conc ep t o f " cu l tu r a l d is -

t ance " t o t he l evel o f a basi c ep i s t emolog ica l

pr inc ip le appears espec ia l ly paradoxica l . The

he rm eneu t i c i n s i s tence on the r e in t eg ra ti on o f

the i n t e rp re t e r i n t he ob j ec t o f knowled ge ap -

pears to col l ide wi th cul tura l re la t iv ism and

inv i te o r l eg i t imize e thno cen t r i sm , t he obve r se

a p o d i ct i c s o f t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a n t h r o p o lo g i -

ca l t heo ry . Howeve r , I t h ink th i s appa ren t

con t r ad i c t i on can be r e so lved in j u s t t he s ame

way a s Gad ame r has de fen ded h im se l f aga ins t

t he cha rge o f t r ad i t i ona l i sm o r conse rva t i sm.

Th i s r econs ide ra t i on o f bas ic t ene t s o f t he

disc ip l ine has the added advantage of in tegra t -

i ng t hem in t he r e f l ex ive c r i ti que w h ich mot i -

va tes the new approach. Gadamer ' s re la t iv isa-

t i on o f h i sto r i ca l unde r s t an d ing i s i n t en ded a s

a sword wh ich cu t s bo th ways : by r ea f f i rming

the logica l ly necessary pr ior i ty o f the in ter -

p re t e r ' s h i s to r ic i t y i n an apprehens io n o f

t ru th , he a l so g ives us the gro un d a lways to

suspect i t s mot ives , to d iscr im inate , as he says,

i t s fa l se f rom i t s t rue pre judices . The la t te r , in

turn , can only be provis ional ly to lera ted as

impl ic i t or invis ib le , subjec t to subsequent

con t rove r s ion by openness t o t he t ru t h c l a im

of ano th e r po in t o f vi ew. Whi le t he con v ic t i on

of " t rue p re jud i ce" i s the on ly bas i s up on

which unde r s t and ing can be bu i l t, t he m ove -

m e n t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g in t h e c h a n gi n g ci r cu m -

s t ances o f h i s to ry a l so conv ic t s t r ue p re jud i ce

of fa l se hood or i l lus ion . This d ia lec t ica l ap-

p r o a c h t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g p u t s t h e a n t h r o po l o g i -

ca l apodic t ic s on less dog ma t ic groun ds: i f

cul tura l re la t iv ism is t rea ted objec t iv is t ica l ly

i ts l og ica l conc lus ion i s j u s t ano th e r fo rm o f

e t h n o c e n t r i s m ; t hi s h a p p e n s i n m u c h t h e s a m e

w a y t h a t D i l t h ey ' s r o m a n t i c i s t h e r m e n e u t i c s

fo rge t s i t s e l f i n an apo theos i s o f em pa t hy a s

pos i ti v i st h i s to ry . On the o the r hand , e thno-

cen t r i sm mu s t unde r l i e t he p ro fe s s ion o f soc ia l

an th ro po log y in so fa r a s we can on ly t r ans l a te

o n e c u l t u re i n t o a n o t h e r . T o p u t i t a n o t h e r

way , e scape f rom e thn ocen t r i sm i s ou r busi -

ness , bu t a de f in i t i ve e scape pu t s u s o u t o f

bus ines s a l toge the r . M eanwhi l e , e thnocen t r i sm,

l ike t rue pre judice , i s the only bas is upon

which we und e r s t and a t a ll , and , whe n unavo id -

ab le , d i s c r imina t e good f ro m bad cu l tu r a l p r ac -

t i ce s (ou r own o r o the r s ) . S imi l a r t o G adam er ' s

f rag il e " t rue p re jud i ce" , R icoe ur sugges t s t ha t

t he d i a l ec t ic o f unde r s t an d ing seeks a " secon d

na ive t e " once c r it i c ism has pu rged the f i rs t

[ 4 8 ] . T h e s e p ar a d o x e s d o n o t e x p o s e a n t h r o -

po logy a s a cha rade any mo re t han G adame r ' s

he rm eneu t i c s is a r eac t iona ry sub te r fuge ; t hey

only reasser t the inescapably h is tor ica l and

d ia lec t ica l na tu re o f u nde r s t and in g , and r edi s-

cover cer t i tude as a d ia logue . From th is perspec-



102

tive, positivist objectivism or scientism becomes

the ultimate ethnocentrism, at least in the pre-

sent conjuncture of our historical self-under-

standing.

I have extende d the anthropological iron y

from Geer tz himself to several other examples

of ethnography

in ex tremis

arguing with

Gadamer that this apparent difficulty is really

the vindication of ethnographic truth. Geertz

also sensed this at one time, furthermore point-

ing out how un comfo rtabl y close this irony

is to hypocri sy, bad faith, self-deception, false-

consciousness. I think these are the othe r side

of the coin of understanding, namely, mis-

understand ing of varying degrees of culpability,

and not separable from its dialectic except

through a positivist sleight-of-hand. Karl

Popper, in his matu rity, similarly suggests that

all forms o f distinctively human knowledge

arose originally in lies or story-te lling [49].

Now, embedde d in the long history of know-

ledge, we are in no bett er position than we

ever were to discriminate between the story

which is built truthfully on the epistemological

foundatio n of anthropological irony from that

which is falsehood or false-consciousness. This

discrimination must be made, but cannot be

made in abstraction from particular instances

of interpretation. In any case, if the positivist

vision of an undialectical tr uth is now revealed

as chimerical, we can no longer draw the line

between truth and fiction so simplistically.

Geertz's comments on the anthropological

irony also broach the issue of fiction, and give

me the oppo rtunit y to take it up where he has

left off. For Geertz in 1968 the touc hing

faith between anthropologist and informan t

suggests a ... fiction - fiction not falsehood -

tha t lies at the heart of successful anthropolog-

ical field research [50]. A few years later he

goes further, extending this perception of

understanding to ethnography itself, and draw-

ing comparisons with Madame Bovary and

painting, making the point that all are neces-

sarily multi-layered interpre tations which can-

not easily be discriminated from their referen-

tial reality [ 51 ]. He nevertheless asserts a dis-

tinction b etween this

f i c t io -

something

made - and falsehood or unfactuality, and

suggests that the intention to depict reality,

and other conditions of this depiction, serve

to distinguish it more or less from the fiction

of a novel. Although not really verifiable ,

the fictions of ethnography are appraisable,

not merely aesthetically, but as better or

worse than other accounts; and although co-

herence or thickness of description is a crite-

rion of such appraisal, correspondence to

action and events is indispensible:

If anthropological interpr etatio n is constructing a reading

of what happens then to divorce it from what happens

- from what in this time or that place specific people

say what they do what is done to them from the whole

vast business of the wo rld - is to divorce it from its ap-

plications and render it vacant [52].

This is one of the crucial points at which

Geertz opts at the last minu te for a vestigial

positivism that threatens to reincorporate and

paralyze his hermeneutics. There is no doubt

that the basic difference between ethnogra phy

and fiction is that the former intends, and is

taken to intend, truth. Realistic fiction, on the

other hand, encourages a suspension of doubt,

or signals its status in some even more subtle

way. But this distinc tion, far f rom being ob-

vious, instead seems to be the focus of the

thickest description of all, a broad semantic

no-man's land. Corresp ondence or pure

factual reference to wha t happens.. . is cer-

tainly a necessary illusion for ethnography to

maintain, but at the same time it must not in-

vite us to hypostatize the facts and lose sight

of the irreducible ambiguity of circumstance

Geertz is elsewhere at pains to make clear.

Such covert factualisation o f the world is, in

social science, the correlative of the magical

abstraction of the scientist from the under-

standing presented. The tricks through which



103

e thn ogra phy c l a ims t ru th a r e no l es s com plex

than t hose t h rou gh wh ich t he nove l c l a ims

f i c t ion . Now, t h i s d i ff e r ence mus t be exam-

ined r a the r t han t aken fo r g r an t ed .

I f we a r e t o t ake up , pe rhaps mo re s e r iously

than Gee r t z does h imse l f , h i s sugges t i on t ha t

b o t h e t h n o g r a p h i c f i el d w o r k an d e t h n o g r a p h y

are sor ts o f f ic t ion , wh ere sha l l we go? My

ow n d i r ec t i on was i n it i al l y d i c t a t ed , I shou ld

confess , by a spu r ious hope t o mar ry e thno-

g raphy and t he a r t o f t he nove l . Bu t t h i s van i ty

was a l r eady be ing me t ha l fway by fo rm s o f

l i te r a ry c r i t i ci sm wh ich conce rn t hemse lves

wi th t he r e l a t ion be twee n f i c t i on , r ea l ism, and

rea l i t y . Th i s pa r t i cu l a r fo rm o f he rmeneu t i c s

has come to be ca l led nar ra t ive theory; I wi l l

su rvey t he pos i t i ons o f some o f it s con t r i bu to r s ,

fo l l owing these pa r t i cu l a r imp l i ca t i ons o f t he

g e n er a l r a p p r o a c h m e n t o f h e r m e n e u t i c s a n d

e t h n o g r a p h y . M y o w n c o n c l u s io n , w h i c h I

shou ld a t t h i s po i n t f o r ecas t, i s t ha t na r r a t ive

theo ry can mak e c l ea r e r to u s t he d i a logue im-

p l i c i t i n bo th f i e ldwork and e thnography , and

h e l p o v e r c o m e t h e d o g m a w h i c h o b s c u re s t h e

d i a lec t ic o f f i c t i on and t ru t h i n he ren t in bo th .

S o o n a f t e r G e e r tz e x t e n d e d R i c o e u r 's m o d e l

o f t ex tua l i n t e rp re t a t i on t o t he Ba linese cock -

f i gh t [ 5 3 ] , R i c o e u r e x t e n d e d i t e ve n m o r e

genera l ly to soc ia l ac t ion and h is tor iography

[54 ] . R i coeu r d r ew a t t en t i on t o na r r a t i ve as t he

co m m on ep i s t emolog i ca l ba si s o f t he t ex t ,

soc ia l ac t ion , and h is tory . Whereas ac t ion

f ixes d i s cou r se i n a way comp arab l e to t he

t ex t , h i s t o ry f i xe s ac t i on and i t s e l f becom es

a tex t . Al l a re s tor ie s in the sense of nar ra-

t ive , wh e the r t r u th o r f i c t ion , whose mean ing

has become f r ee f rom the o r ig ina l cond i t i ons

o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n a n d r e m a i n s o p e n t o n e w

socia l con tex ts an d an ind ef in i te ser ies of pos-

s ib l e r eade r s [ 55 ] . Th roug h th i s he rm eneu t i c

emphas i s on t he h i s to r i ca l r e l a ti v i ty o f m ean ing

in d iverse aspec ts o f soc ia l rea l ity , Ric oeu r a l so

sugges ts a d ia lec t ica l reuni f ica t ion o f na tura l

sc ience explanat ion and soc ia l sc ient i f ic under-

s t and ing i n a fo rm o f i n t e rp re t a t i on wh ich r e -

ma ins open t o h i s t o ry . F rom th i s pe r spec t ive ,

h is tor iography, l ike any tex t and l ike soc ia l

act ion i tself , is :

t h e o p e r a t i o n b y w h i c h t h e n a r r a t o r t e l ls a s to r y a n d h i s

l i s tener hears i t [561 . .. a rec iproca l re la t ion be twe en re -

c o u n t i n g a n d f o l l o w i n g a h i s t o r y w h i c h d e f i n e s a c o m -

ple te ly pr imi t ive language game. . . ; to fo l low a h i s tory i s

a c o m p l e t e l y s p e c i fi c a c t i vi t y b y w h i c h w e c o n t i n u o u s l y

a n t i c i p a t e a f i n a l c o u r s e a n d a n o u t c o m e a n d w e

succe s

s ive ly c o r r e c t o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s u n t i l t h e y c o i n c i d e w i t h

t h e a c t u a l o u t c o m e . T h e n w e s a y t h a t w e h a v e u n d e r -

s t o o d [ 5 7 1 .

In t h i s way R icoeu r sk ir t s t he p r e - empto ry

pos i t iv i s t v i s ion of a predic table wor ld , which

w o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e h e r m e n e u t i c s as a m o m e n -

tary i l lus ion , and ins tead re incorpora tes th i s

c lo su re i n t he i r r educ ib l e ope nnes s o f i n te r -

pre ta t ion . Geer tz s t ra ins for such a resolu t ion ,

bu t cann o t fo r l ong l e t go o f t he pos i ti v i st

v i s ion , a t le a s t in h i s mos t t heo re t i ca l m om en t s .

To m Wol fe, t he f i rs t o f t h r ee na r r a ti ve

theor i s t s I wi ll br ie f ly cons ider , s imi lar ly seems

c lose ly t o app roa ch bu t s t ops j u s t sho r t o f a

d i a lec t ica l unde r s t an d ing o f t he r ea li t y he

seeks to depic t [58] . Wolfe reve iws the r i se of

new jou rna l i sm in t he 1960s , a rgu ing t ha t

i t s r ecou r se t o t he dev ice s o f t he 19 th cen tu r y

t radi t io n of rea l i s tic f ic t ion (espec ia lly scene-

by - scene cons t ruc t i on , d i a logue , t h i rd -pe r son

poin t -of -v iew, and depic t ion of s ta tus l i fe )

h a v e en s u r e d a n i m m e d i a t e t o u c h w i t h t h e

rea l i t ies journa l i s t s must pa ins takingly docu-

me nt . I ronica l ly , l it e rary f ic t ion i t se l f has de-

ser ted rea l i sm, pursuing a ne w f orm of c lassi -

ca l s tory- te l l ing or neo -fab ul i sm which loses

a l l contac t wi th rea l i ty , i f only because i t can

n o l o n g e r c o m p e t e o n t h e s e g r o u n d s w i t h u p -

s t ar t j o u r n a li s m [ 5 9 ] . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e

ea rl i er be ige on s tud i ed ly neu t r a l j ou rna l i sm

r e a c te d w i t h c o m p l a i n t s o f p a r a j o u r n a l is m

or zoo t - su i t ed p rose , wh ich r eca ll s t he

ind ignan t cha rges o f pop u l i s t s ensa t i ona li sm

wi th wh ich t he o r ig ina l r ea l ism o f F i e ld ing ,

S t e rne , Smol l e t t , D ickens and Ba l zac were me t

[60 ] . Ye t t he se r eac t i ons o f t en be t r ay a mora l -

iz ing or pol i t ic iz ing e l it i sm w hich i s ve i led by a

p re t ence o f e i t he r ob j ec t i v i t y o r ae s the t i c ism



105

sured [70] ; fu r t he rm ore , fa lse , ins id ious, o r

tota li tarian fic t ion is in principle dis t inguish-

ab le f rom innocen t f ic t ion insofa r as the la t te r

e x p lo re s r a th e r th a n d ic t a t e s th e h u ma n w o r ld

and on ly cal ls fo r condi t iona l a s sen t [ 71] .

Tha t these d is t inc t ions themse lves assume a

d i s c r imin a tio n o f t ru th f ro m f i c t ion i s th e

ex is ten t ia l d i lemma which fasc ina tes Kermode ,

reca l l ing to me Gadamer ' s d is t inc t ion be tween

true and fa lse p re jud ices. L ike Sar t re , Kerm ode

ends by requ ir ing of g rea t f ic t ion the pa radox-

ica l fa i th in , and vers imi l i tude to , the con t in -

gen t w orld o f rea l i ty w hich is los t in the ob-

jec t iv is t i l lus ion main ta ined by non-f ic t ion .

Consequent ly , a l though he speaks on beha lf

of f ic t iona l l i te ra tu re , h is con c lus ion para l le ls

Wolfe ' s regard ing the journa l ism of rea l ex-

per ience . E thnog raph y , as the non-f ic t ion a l ac -

cou nt o f o ther cu l tu res , can leas t o f a ll the

sciences maintain the objectivis t i l lus ion.

In the enesis of Secrecy [7 2 ] Ke rmo d e

views th is d i lemma a t the boundar ies be tween

f i c t ion a n d re a l i ty in t e rms o f a c o n te mp o ra ry

ambiva lence be tw een c lass ica l o r medieva l

P la ton ic Rea l ism (which assumed the world

to be i t se l f meanin gfu l) and the nom ina l is t

scep t ic ism ( to which we as he i rs o f the En-

l ig h te n m e n t a re a l so c o m mi t t e d ) . S p ino z a ,

in 1670 , fa te fu l ly d is t ingu ished be tw een mean-

ing and t r u th , see ing the l ike l ihoo d of au thor i -

ta r ian misuse in the i r equ ivoca t ion [ 73] . S ince

the ad ven t o f th is nomin a l is t scep t ic ism, we

mu s t admit the bas ic p r inc ip le tha t no narra -

t ive can be t ransparen t on h is to r ica l fac t [74] ,

tha t i s to say , t ru th i s never impl ic i t in the

meaning of d iscourse about the world . Ye t

th is ax iom is exceed ing ly hard to hang on to ,

and we invar iab ly sl ip back in to the m ore an-

c ie nt , i n n o c e n t , a n d c o mfo r ta b le a s s u m p t io n

o f th e Re a li s ts wh o in tu i t e d a p o te n t i a l c o n -

t inu i ty be tween words and th ings tha t guaran-

t e e d a t r a n s p a re n c y o f th e wo r ld . Ke rmo d e

quot es Bar thes :

W e c a n n o t e s c a p e t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e f a c t c a n e x is t

o n l y l i n g u i s t ic a l l y , as a t e r m i n a d i s c o u r s e , a l t h o u g h w e

b e h a v e a s if i t w e re a s i m p l e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g

o r o t h e r o n a n o t h e r p l a n e o f e x i s t e n ce a l t o ge t h e r , s o m e

e x t r a - s t r u c t u r a l ' r e a l i t y ' [ 7 5 ] .

The m eaning of the world a rises in the in t r ica te

imp u ta t io n s o f o u r n a r ra t iv e a b o u t i t, b u t d e -

s p it e th e s c e pt i ci s m o f th e E n l ig h te n m e n t we

cann ot fo r long see i t th is way , and again take

the m eaning to be t rue o f the world . Th is i s,

i ron ica lly enough , the same ambiva lence which

Evans -Pr i tchard (and Cas taneda) fe l t about the

compel l ing bu t unb e l ievab le t ransparency be-

twe e n Z a n d e (o r d o n J u a n ' s ) m e a n in g a n d t ru th ;

b u t a s I t h in k mu s t b e th e f a te o f e th n o g ra p h y ,

th e p e n d u lu m o f a mb iv a le n c e swing s b e twe e n

two or mo re a l te rnat ive worlds o f na ive rea lism,

c lear ac ross the pecu l ia r chasm of scep t ic ism

c re a te d b y E n l ig h te n m e n t no min a l i s m.

In i l lus t ra t ion of th e d i lem ma as i t faces

h i s to r ia n s , Ke rmo d e q u o te s P y n c h o n :

L e t m e n o w q u o t e a h i s t o r i c a l , o r p s e u d o - h i s t o r i c a l , n a t -

r a t i v e o f a v e r y d i f f e r e n t k i n d . I t p u r p o r t s t o d e s c r i b e a n

e n g a g e m e n t b e t w e e n a n A m e r i c a n a n d a R u s s i a n w ar s h i p

o f f t h e c o a s t o f Ca l i fo r n i a: ' W h a t h a p p e n e d o n t h e 9 t h

M a r c h , 1 8 6 4 . . . i s n o t t o o c l e ar . P o p o v t h e R u s s i a n a d m i r a l

d i d s e n d o u t a s h i p , e i t h e r t h e c o r v e t t e ' B o g a t i r ' o r t h e

c l i pp e r ' G a i d a m e k ' , t o s e e w h a t i t c o u l d s e e . O f f t h e c o a s t

o f e i t h e r w h a t i s n o w C a r m e l - by - t h e -S e a , o r w h a t i s n o w

P i s m o B e a c h , a r o u n d n o o n o r p o s s ib l y t o w a r d d u s k , t h e

t w o s h i p s s i g h t ed e a c h o t h e r . O n e o f t h e m m a y h a v e f i re d ;

f f i t d id t h e n t h e o t h e r r e s p o n d e d ; b u t b o t h w e r e o u t o f

r a n g e s o n e i t h e r s h o w e d a s c a r a f t e r w a r d t o p r o v e a n y -

t h i n g . ' T h i s p a s s a g e d e s c r i b e s a n h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t w h i c h i s

h e l d t o h a v e o c c u r r e d , t o h a v e l ef t n o t r a c e , a n d t o b e

s u s c e p ti b l e o f h o n e s t r e p o r t o n l y i n t h e m o s t u n c e r t a i n

a n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e m a n n e r . I t a d m i r a b l y r e p r e s e n t s a

m o d e r n s k e p t i c i s m c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e f e r en c e o f t e x t s t o

e v e n t s . E v e n t s e x i s t o n l y a s t e x t s , a l r e a d y t o t h a t e x t e n t

i n t e r p r e t e d , a n d i f w e w e r e a b l e t o d i s c ar d t h e i n t e r p r e t a -

t i v e m a t e r i a l a n d b e a s h o n e s t a s h i s t o r i a n s , q u i t e h o n e s t l y ,

p r e t e n d t o b e , a ll w e s h o u l d h a v e l e f t w o u l d b e s o m e

s u c h n o n s i g n i f i c a n t d u b i e t y a s t h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e f i r s t

e n g a g e m e n t e v e r to t a k e p l a c e b e t w e e n A m e r i c a n a n d

R u s s i a n f o r ce s [ 7 6 ] .

Such a purged chron ic le app l ies too s t r ic t a

d i s t in c t io n b e twe e n me a n in g a n d t ru th a n d

would leave few his torical narratives capable

of in te res t ing us [ 77] . Al t houg h it is i l lusory ,

we shal l con t inu e to wri te h is to r ica l na rra tive

as i f it were an a l toge ther d i f fe ren t m at te r



106

from making fictions or, a fortiori, from telling

lies [78].

With my case already made for the episte-

mological equivalence of historical and cultural

distance, I can now claim that historians and

ethnographers, as well as journalists, are in an

epistemological predi cament similar to novelists.

Kermode's appreciation of the historical dialec-

tic between plerom atic certitude and

classical realism, the positivist certitude of the

Enlightenment, and the vertigo of a scepticism

which only gathers momentum since the

sophists and the nominalists (Gadamer' s

shadow of philosophy ), ending in the defi-

ant honest y of Sartre's fiction, all this leaves

little room for a facile epistemological re-

assurance which pictures itself as outside

history. The reorientation of journalism docu-

ment ed by Wolfe further fills in this herme-

neutic circle. The meaning which we hurry to

see as truth transparent to the world is not

only inevitably a narrative of our own making,

it is a dialogue in Gadamer 's and Ricoeur's

senses, a conversation with more than one

point of view, which is irrevocably part of its

historical moment and changing with history.

That this relativism does not relieve us of the

demands of truth and morality is ironic or

tragic, but nonetheless true.

Rabinowitz [79] has clarified a furthe r di-

mension in the narrative theory of fiction and

realism by examining the relationship between

author and audience. This more recen t reader-

orient ed approach, rather than the text-

ori ented approach still evident in Kermode

and Wolfe, reflects the convergence of literary

criticism and Gadamer's and Ricoeur's philos-

ophy of social science on the epistemological

model o f the dialogue. If one does not pre-

emptorily sever the te xt from its context, it

may be argued that all of the conventions of

realistic narrative point ed out by Wolfe and

Kermode are, phenomenologically, not nar-

rative at all but dialogue. I think that these

perspectives can help a reflexive ethn ograp hy

to better understand what it is doing.

Rabinowitz claims we must distinguish at

least four audiences implied in any narrative

literary text, correlative to as many different

modes of the author. The relationships between

these several audience-author levels o f narra-

tive meaning are the basis for contextual dis-

criminations between truth and fiction. Most

pivotal here is the aut hor and his assumed

or intended actual audience (authorial

audience), and the internal narrator, typical

of realistic fiction, and his intended audience

(narrative audience). For War and Peace the

authorial audience accepts the reality of the

War of 1812 while only the narrative audience

accepts the reality of Natasha, Pierre, and the

other characters. The tension between the

two is distinctive of fiction. For

Metamorphosis

the narrative audience is asked without apology

to accept what is incredible for the authorial

audience, although the entire context is per-

fectly realistic. When the distinction between

the two [authorial and narrative audiences]

disappears entirely, we have autobiography or

his tor y [80]. I would add that the device

whereby authorial and narrative audiences

are merged also includes ethnography, and

emphasize (as would Wolfe and Kermode) tha t

this is a device.

Rabinowitz furthe r points out that the

authorial and narrative audience each have

their f urth er levels. The former necessarily

implies a factually actual audience and

auth or (the social and historical facts); the

latte r fictional level often includes an ideal

narrative audience which is taken in or

duped by any fiction the fictional narrator

chooses to create. The two innermost fictional

levels readily become an infinite regress, as

Rabinowitz illustrates with Nabakov's Pale

Fire

[ 81 ]. Successful mana geme nt of the two

outer levels creates a sense of trut h against

which these levels of fiction are played off.

Just as the ambiguous levels of dialogue with-

in the fictional narration may exube rantly

explore the distinction between relative truth

and relative fiction, the central ambiguity



107

between narrative and authorial audience

(and between their authors) explores the

more inclusive and less simply fictional dis-

tinction between its own fiction and an ac-

count of reality. It seems to me that each of

the four levels of dialogue which Rabinowitz

invokes serves as a true frame o f reference or

tru th- fra me relative to which its lesser in-

clusive levels are appreciated as fiction. Pheno-

menologically, we approach the whole as fic-

tion, y et take each more inclusive level as

true relative to our discovery of an included

fiction, suggesting the mutual definition of

these levels is dialectical. Rabinowitz empha-

sizes the simultaneity of the percept ion of

both truth and fiction [82], precluding any

simplistic resolution of this dialectic. The

dialogical natur e o f the monological narrative

illusion itself is made clearer by the author's

apparent intent ion o f such a simultaneous

and multivocal display of'meaning, and the

reader's appreciation of the author's intentions.

Fiction is here a sliding function of tru th, al-

though ne ither is ever unambiguous.

What I want finally to suggest is that in

ethnograph y, truth is a sliding function of

fictional frames of reference, although neith er

is ever unambiguous. This merely puts a some-

what different perspective on Gadamer's dia-

lectic of true prejudice . Along with auto-

biography and history, ethnogra phy works

from an assumption of truth, rather than an

assumption of fiction. I think it can be shown

that the illusion of meanings transp arent to

truth is achieved through the implicit accep-

tance of a more inclusive level of fiction.

Through the ethnographic exemplars with

which I started my discussion, I will now only

suggest some of the ways in which this per-

spective may be developed. At the very least,

such considerations would reopen our under-

standing of et hnograph y as a dialogue, as well

as a narrative, and reintegrate it in its own

social and historical context.

Rhetorical devices which encourage the

impression of veracity or transparency are in

the first instance simply grammatical. These

are less obvious than, for instance, the scholar-

ly form of d ocume ntati on which invokes

authorit y through citation o f the wider con-

text of scientific literature. In most non-

fictional literature, like history or biography,

third-person narration is the mode which

best produces the illusion of pure reference

[83]. On the other hand, the grammatical

patt ern most typical of social science is no

point of view at all, effacing on behalf of

neutral abstraction even the implied objectiv-

ity of third-person narration. Where some

narra tor mus t be invoked, usually some pas-

sive voice avoids dispelling the aura o f objecti -

fication. The first person plural is occasionally

asserted in what is still sometimes a fictional

claim of authority ( ... we have concluded... ).

The first-person singular I or me is con-

sistently avoided in order not to compromise

the sense of objectivity achievable in a de-

tached narrative.

Such innocent but careful modulation o f

locutions which introduce or evade introduc-

tion of specific points of view is probably

general throughout social science literature.

Perhaps peculiar to ethnogra phy is the ethn o-

graphic present , the previously unquestioned

convention whereby history may tacitly be ig-

nored. This sentimenta lism seems no longer

legitimate, but is survived by other conventions

such as the segregation of cultural change from

culture, extraneous from intrinsic factors, or

dysfuncti on from function. Even if ethno-

graphy can no longer be accused of these in-

nocent forms of decontextualisation, it is diffi-

cult not to conclude that there are others of

which we are not aware, or simply by consen-

sus not inclined to recognize as fiction in any

ideological sense. Omission is, of course, selec-

tive, and thereby also constitutes narrative.

Rarely is there a candid accounting of basic

conditions of understand ing such as linguistic

fluency, duration of time in the field, form

and degree of acceptance, or theoret ical biases

and the ir modificat ion. This seems avoided for



108

much the same reason that the first-person

singular is judged inappropriate, and the speci-

ous plural fo rm occasionally invoked. Insofar

as auth ority is established through such con-

ventions, cultural strangeness, geographic re-

moteness or difficu lty of access, and the futil-

ity of replication, may be accepted implicitly

as credentials rather than deter rents to credibil-

ity.

It is by now apparent that in lieu of other

criteria of verifiability, clearly futile but never-

theless desired in th e social sciences, functional

explanation maintains the fiction of transpar-

ency in much the same way that Kerm ode's

teleological sense of an ending maintains

coherence of a narrative through followabil-

ity . Among the various structural, semiotic,

or he rmen eut ic alternatives which have suc-

ceeded functionalism, the implicit criteria of

coherence has increasingly come to rest in the

narrative form of ethnog raphy itself rather

than in some metaphysics which it invokes.

Geertz's thick descrip tion [84] may be seen

as an explicit recognition of ethnogr aphy as

narrative, even as implicitly recomme nding

such devices of social realism as championed

by Wolfe on behalf of the New Journalism.

More recen tly, Marcus has suggested approach-

ing ethnography as a genre in the interest of

appreciating the claim of authenticity implicit

in distinctive rhetorical devices [85]. Among

these he suggests that:

readers expect an ethno graphy to give a sense o f the con-

ditions o f fieldwork; of ev eryday life (Maiinowski's

impo ndera bilia ); of micro-process (an implicit valida-

tion of participant observation); of holism (a form of

portraiture integrated with the pursuit of particular claims);

and of translation across cultural and linguistic boundaries

(the broad, contextu al exegisis of indigenous terms and

concepts) [86].

He also points out tha t Rabinow [87] and

Dumont [88], like Bateson, appear conscious-

ly t o be experimenting (if only implicitly)

with an:

ethnographic genre which can accommodate reflexivity

while retaining the traditional author ity of its texts , that

is , the rhetorical usage of language and forma t by which

ethnographers have constructed their accounts as certain

and objective knowledge about other s [89] .

I only seek to press to its full epistemological

implications the insights which Geertz and

Marcus present as methodologies; unless these

implications are made explicit, such methodo-

logies are liable simply to be reincorporated in

the positivist precon ception of ethnography.

Having broached these considerations, I

suggest that the ethnographic dilemmas dis-

cussed in the beginning are problematic be-

cause the merger of authorial (that is, intended

or assumed) audience and narrative (tha t is,

internal or constructive) audience, necessary

to turn realistic fiction into non-fi ction, be-

comes uncomf ortab ly conscious. The tension

between the two audiences, which serves as

the focus of fictional narration, becomes super-

ficially the embarrassment, but more profound-

ly the authenticati on, of ethnography. The

grammatical and other conventions which I

have suggested above implicate a narrative

audience which is prepared to grant the ethno-

graphy many shortcuts to a transparent truth.

Behind this tacit narrator/narrative audience

agreement stand the author and his authorial

audience, ethnographe r and readers whose in-

nocence of a ny such conspiracy constitutes a

key factor in the truth of the narrative account.

Tacit fi ction serves as a frame o f reference for

the assertion of truth.

Furthermor e, the retrospective exposure of

ethnographic authorship through Malinowski's

diary, and its introspective exposure in Geertz's

and Read's reflections, suggest a background

of ot her audiences we have also overlooked.

At least two of these are the people we write

for and those we write about. Even in fictional

literature the subjects of the work are an

audience in some sense (e.g., an ideal narra-

tive audience ), so presumably even an ethno-



111

eve r, t he supe rf i c ia l r e semblance o f he rm e-

neu t i c ope nne s s o r t he d i a l ec t i c o f t r ue and

fa lse pre judica l to the po s i t iv i s t c r i te r ia o f

ver i f iab i li ty or fa l s i f iab i l i ty i s equal ly l iab le

to subve r t he rme neu t i c s . Opennes s o f in t e r-

p re t ab i l i t y and t he po t en t i a l exposu re o f t r ue

p re jud i ce s ar e mi s t aken a s hypo th eses , t he t e st -

i ng o f w h ich r e su l t s i n d i sp ro o f o r p rov i s iona l

con f i rm a t ion . B u t t he se cha rac t e ri s t ic s o f

knowledge a r e u l t ima te , no t i n t e rmed ia t e ,

cond i t i on s o f unde r s t and ing . Na ively t o mi s -

t ake t h em as hyp o thes es s imp ly c lose s t he

d i a logue , a s sumes t ranspa rency , o r t akes t r ue

pre jud ice as s imply t rue , uni la te ra l ly sever ing

the d i a logue f rom which t he y a r is e and p re -

t end ing t ha t t h i s ab roga t i on i s no t i t s e l f a

f ic t ion .

Both subjec t iv is t and objec t iv is t miscons t ru-

a ls o f con t em pora ry he rm eneu t i c s ar is e f rom

the same i l lusory Car tes ian dual i sm which sub-

v e r t ed D i l t h e y ' s o w n h e r m e n e u t i c s a n d m a y

con t in ue t o m i s l ead Gee r tz ' s . Th i s d i cho tomisa -

t i on o f know ledge i t s e lf j o ined t he d i a lec t ic o f

en l i gh t enm en t and a l i ena ti on , r e su lt i ng ( t h roug h

the r i se of 1 9th cen tury p os i t iv i sm) in the

mo nopo l i s a t i on o f knowled ge by pos it i v is t ob -

jec t iv i sm and the re lega t ion o f al l a l te rna t ives to

sub j ec t iv i sm. Whereas En l ig h t en men t nomina l -

i sm had fo reve r s epa ra ted t ru th f rom m ean ing ,

En l ig h t en me n t pos i ti v i sm again pu r sued t r ans -

pa rency a s t hou gh th i s had neve r happened .

The new rea l i sm, founded in i t ia l ly on a fa l se

d i c h o t o m y , r e if ie d i ts t e r m s a n d p r o m o t e d i ts

own fo rm o f sub j ec t i v i ty t o s c i en ti f ic s t a tu s :

T h e o b j e ct i v it y o f t r u t h , w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e

dia lec t ic is inconceivable , i s t ac i t ly re placed

by vulgar pos i t iv i sm and pragm at i sm - u l t i -

ma te ly , t h a t i s , by bou rgeo i s sub j ec t iv i sm

[ 9 5 ] . G e r m a n R o m a n t i c i s m f r o m H e r d e r an d

idea li sm f rom K an t and Hege l, by r eac t i ng t o

t h is m o n o p o l i s a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e , e a r n e d t h e

s t i gma o f t he i r name s [96 ] . The pa t ron i z ing

of subjec t iv is t in i t ia t ives by objec t iv is t soc ial

s c ience mere ly con t inue s t h i s t r ad i t i on o f sub -

o rd ina t i on , pe rhaps dese rved ly among those

who na ive ly i n t he roman t i c i s t t r ad i t i on accep t

the Ca r t e s ian d i cho tom y und ia l ec t icaUy .

Bu t t he d i l emm a o f ob j ec ti v i sm and sub jec -

t iv i sm l ike o ther d i lem mas i s m et by going be-

tween i t s horns . Subjec t and objec t a re an

i r r educib l e d i a l ec t ic , and know ledge mu s t

a ri se i n t he un fo rec losed d i a logue be twe en

the tw o , n o t t he c lo su re o f some i l l u so ry r e so -

lu t i on i n beha l f o f one o r t he o the r . Sub jec t iv -

i ty a nd o bjec t iv i ty a re equal ly re i fy ing abs t rac-

t i ons f rom the p rac t i ca l i ty and pa r t i cu l a r i ty o f

d ia logue . Each has a l ready assumed a meaning

t ransparent to the wor ld , and so has g iven

away th e d ia lec t ic on w hich i t is based and

f rom which i t mu s t de r ive it s au then t i c i t y .

Never the less , these f ic t ions a re the f ramework

in wh ich an e lu s ive t ru th mus t con t inuous ly

be rees tabl i shed . The d ia lec t ic of en l ighten-

men t f rom P lan ton i c r ea l i sm to nomina l i sm

and Car t e s i an i sm, t o pos i ti v i sm, con t em pora ry

he rme neu t i c s , and c r i t ic a l t heo ry , i s no t me re ly

i l lu so ry bu t t he heavy co n t ex t o f h i s t o ry i n

which we necessar i ly th ink . However , th i s

m o v e m e n t i ts e l f i m p li e s th a t t h o u g h t c a n n o t

take i t se l f undia lec t ica l ly for gran ted as g iven

(as Descar tes d id) . The chal lenge for e thn o-

g raphy i s t o b r idge t he gap be tween f i e ldwork

and p re sen t a t i on i n j u s t t he s ame mod e and

s ty le tha t i t b r idges the gap be tween one cul -

t u r e and an o the r , and i n j u s t t he s ame way

tha t eve ryon e can b ridge t he gap be twe en

h imse l f and ano the r , enco mpass ing t he c lo su re

of objec t iv is t or subjec t iv is t a l iena t ion w i th

t h e o p e n n e s s o f d ia lo g u e. E t h n o g r a p h y m u s t

hang on i n good f a i t h t o t he myr i ad con t ingen -

c ies and opaq ue perso nal i t ies of rea l i ty , and

den y i t se l f the i l lus ion of a t ransp arent descr ip-

t ion, a luxury reserved for less reflexive sciences.

I f in so do ing i t mus t g ive up bo th t he ques t

for general know ledge of soc ie ty an d a par -

t icu lar ly indulgent form of subjec t iv ism, th i s

wi l l only cons t i tu te the loss of pre judices

wh ich a r e no l onge r t rue .

I have sugges t ed t ha t d i l emmas i nhe re n t i n

an th rop o logy , and a lso verg ing upon the d i s ci -

p l i ne f rom the ph i lo sop hy o f soci a l s c i ence ,



3

20

Ibid.,

p. 124.

21 H.-G. Gadamer, Th e historicity of understanding, in

P. Connerton (ed.),

Critical Sociology: Selected Read ings

(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976a), p. 125.

22 Gadamer,

op. cit.,

1979, pp. 157-158, also p. 132.

23 Gadamer,

op. cit.,

1976a, p. 125.

24 Gadamer, op. cit., 1979, p. 134.

25 Gadamer,

op. cit.,

1976a, p. 124.

26 Gadamer, op. cit., 1979, pp. 108-109.

27 H.-G. Gadamer,

Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneuti-

cal Studies on Plato (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 1980), pp. 12 2-1 23.

28 H.-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermen eutics (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1976b), pp. 2 6- 36 ; J .

Habermas, Systema tically distorted comm unicatio ns,

in P. Connerton (ed.),

Critical Sociology: Selected

Readings

(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976); P. Ricoeur,

Ethics and culture: Habermas and Gadamer in dialogue,

Philosophy Today,

vol. 17, no. 5 (1972), pp. 153-165.

29 Dilthey, quoted in Gadamer,

op. cit.,

1979, pp. 124-125.

30

Ibid.,

pp . 125 -126 .

31

Ibid.,

p. 130.

32 T. Adorno,

Jargon o f Authenticity

(Evanston, Illinois:

Nor thw estern Un iversity Press, 1973).

33 F. Hearne,

Dom ination, Legitimation and Resistance;

The Incorporation of the Nineteenth Century English

Working Class

(London: Greenwood, 1978); J . Alt,

Revie w of domination, legitimation, and resistance by

F. Hearne,

Telos,

vol. 37 (1978), pp. 207-216.

34 Gadamer,

op. cit.,

1976a, p. 123.

35 Gadamer, op. cit., 1979, p. 108.

36 Gadamer,

op. cit.,

1976a, p. 123.

37 P. Ricoeur, The mo del of text: meaningful action con-

sidered as a te xt , in P. Rabin ow and W. Sullivan (eds.),

Interpretive Social Science: A Reade r

(Berkeley: Universi-

ty of California Press, 1979). See also the paradigm of

Geertz, Deep play: notes on the Balinese Cockf ight in

the same reader.

38 P. Ricoeur, Expla nation and understanding; on some

remarkable connect ions among the theory of the text ,

theory of ac t ion, and theory of h is tory , in

The Philosophy

of Paul Ricoeur

(Boston: Beacon, 1978), p. 153.

39 Ricoeur,

op. cit.,

1979, p. 100.

40 Ricoeur, op.

cit.,

1978, p. 166.

41 G.

Devereux,From A nxi ety to Method in the Behavioural

Sciences

(New York: Humanities Press, 1967).

42 Gadamer,

op. cit.,

1976a, p. 125.

43 G. Marcus, Th e Ethnograph ic Subject as Ethnograp her -

A Neglected Dimension in Fieldwork,

Rice University

Studies,

vol. 66, no. 1 (1980a), pp. 65-68.

44 Giddens,

op. cit.,

pp . 46 -47 .

45

Ibid.,

p. 58.

46 Ibid., p. 143.

47

Ibid.,

p. 147.

48 P. Ricoeur, Herme neutics: restoration of meaning or

reductio n of illusion? in P. Connorto n (ed.),

Critical So-

ciology: Selected Readings

(Harmondsworth: Penguin,

1976), p. 195.

49 K. Popper, Unended Quest; An Intellectual Autobiography

(Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), p. 190.

50 Geertz, op. cit., 1968, p. 154.

51 C. Geertz, Thi ck description: toward an interpretative

theory of culture, in C. Geertz, The

Interpretation of

Cultures

(London: Hutchinson, 1975), pp. 15-16.

52

Ibid.,

pp . 16 -18 .

53 Geertz,

op. cit.,

1979.

54 Ricoenr,

op. cit.,

1978, pp. 149 ff.

55

Ibid.,

pp. 152, 161.

56

Ibid.,

p. 154.

57 Ibid., pp. 154, 163-164.

58 T. Wolfe, The new journalism , in T. Wolfe and E.W.

Johnson (eds.), The New Journalism (Bongay, Suffolk:

Picador, 1973); T. Ludvigson, personal commun ication,

1979.

59 Wolfe,

op. cit.,

pp . 55 -56 .

60

Ibid.,

pp . 51 -52 .

61

Ibid.,

pp. 54, 58.

62

Ibid.,

pp. 11, 49, 57.

63 With Philips, mentioned

inlbid.,

p. 49.

64 F. Kermode, The

Genesis of Secrecy: O n the Interpreta-

tion o f Narrative

(Cambridge: MA: Harvard University

Press, 1979).

65 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 49.

66 F. Kermode, The

Sense o an Ending; Studies on The

Theory of Fiction

(New York: Oxfor d U niversity Press,

1968).

67

Ibid.,

p. 54.

68 IbM., pp. 150, 157.

69

Ibid.,

p. 59.

70

Ibid.,

pp . 43 -44 .

71

Ibid.,

pp . 37 -39 .

72 Kermode,

op. cir.,

1979.

73

Ibid.,

p. 119.

74

Ibid.,

p. 116.

75

Ibid.,

p. 117.

76 Ibid., pp. 107-108.

77

Ibid.,

p. 114.

78 Ibid., p. 109.

79 P.J . Rabinowitz, Tru th in fiction; a reexamin ation of

audiences,'

Critical lnqu iry,

vol. 4 (1977), pp. 121- 141 .

80

Ibid.,

p. 131.

81

Ibid.,

p. 140.

82

Ibid.,

pp. 125, 128 ff.

83 Kermode, op.

cit.,

1979, p. 117.

84 Geertz,

op. cit.,

1975.

85 G. Marcus, Rhet oric and the ethnographic genre in

anthropological research,

Current Anthropology,

vol. 21,

no. 4 (1980b), pp. 507-510.

86 Marcus,

op. cit.,

1980a, p. 509.

87 P. Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (Berke-

ley: University of California Press, 1977).

88 J .P. Dumont, The Headman and L Amb iguity and Ambi-

valence in t he Fieldwor king Experience

(Austin: University

of Texas Press, 1978).

89 Marcus,

op. cit.,

1980a, p. 508.

90 Rabinow,

op. cir.,

1977.



4

91 Dumont,

op. cit.

1978.

92 Marcus,

op. cit.

1980b, p. 508.

93 R. Jay, Personal and extrapersonal vision in anthrop ology,

in Dell Hymes (ed.),

Reinventing Anthropology

(New York:

Vintage, 1974).

94 J . Honigmann, The personal approach in cultural anthro-

pological research, Current Anthropology vol. 17, no. 2

(1976), pp. 243-250.

95 T. Ador no, Cultural criticism and society, in P. Conner-

ton (ed.),

Critical Sociology: Sele cted Readings

(Harmonds-

worth: Penguin, 1976), p. 270.

96 Cf. C. Taylor,

Hegel

(Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1975).

webster, steven. dialogue and fiction in ethnography

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