50

The Formal Structure: The Concept ofBureaucracy

U nder normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureau­cracy is always overtowering. The "political master" finds himself in the

position of the "dilettante" who stands opposite the "expert." ...

Max Weber

READING 2

IntroductionTo most Americans, "bureaucracy" is a fighting word. Few things are more dislikedthan bureaucracy, few occupations held in lower esteem than the bureaucrat. Both aresubjected to repeated criticism in the press and damned regularly by political soap boxorators and ordinary citizens. "Inefficiency," "red tape," "stupidity," "secrecy," "smug­ness," "aggressiveness," and "self-interest" are only a few of the emotionally chargedwords used to castigate bureaucrats.

There may be considerable truth to our dim view of bureaucrats. We also may bejustified in venting our spleens occasionally at the irritating aspects of bureaucracythat arise almost daily-we may even experience a healthy catharsis in the process.But this understandably testy outlook should not prevent us from grasping the cen­tral importance and meaning of this phenomenon of bureaucracy.

From the standpoint of public administration and social science literature in gen­eral, "bureaucracy" means much more than the various bothersome characteristics ofmodem organizations. The term in serious administrative literature denotes the gen­eral, formal structural elements of a type of human organization, particularly a gov­ernmental organization. In this sense bureaucracy has both good and bad qualities; itis a neutral term rather than one referring to only the negative traits of organizations.It is a lens through which we may dispassionately view what Carl Friedrich has ap­propriately tagged "the core of modem government."

The German social scientist, Max Weber (1864-1920), is generally acknowledgedto have developed the most comprehensive, classic formulation of the characteristicsof bureaucracy. Weber not only pioneered ideas about bureaucracy but ranged acrossa whole spectrum of historical, political, economic, and social thought. As Reinhard

Reading 2/ Introduction 51

Bendix observed, Weber was "like a man of the Renaissance who took in all human­ity for his province." In his study of Hindu religion, Old Testament theology, ancientRoman land surveying, Junker politics, medieval trading companies, and the Chinesecivil service, he sought to analyze objectively the nature of human institutions and toshow how ideas are linked with the evolution of political, economic, and social sys­tems. One of his best works, Th~ Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, es­tablished the critical intellectual ties between the rise of Protestantism and capitalismin the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He constantly pressed for answers to enor­mously complex problems. What is the interplay between ideas and institutions?What distinguishes the Western culture and its ideas? Why has a particular societyevolved the way it has?

We cannot summarize here the numerous ideas formulated by Max Weber's fer­tile mind, but we can examine a few aspects of his thought that bear directly on hisconception of bureaucracy. Weber believed that civilization evolved from the primi­tive and mystical to the rational and complex. He thought that human nature progressedslowly from primitive religions and mythologies to an increasing theoretical and tech­nical sophistication. World evolution was a one-way street in Weber's nineteenth­century view: he visualized a progressive "demystification" of humanity and hu­manity's ideas about the surrounding environment.

In keeping with his demystification view of progress, Weber describes three "ideal­types" of authority that explain why individuals throughout history have obeyed theirrulers. One of the earliest, the "traditional" authority of primitive societies, rested onthe established belief in the sanctity of tradition. Because a family of rulers has al­ways ruled, people judge them to be just and right and obey them. Time, precedent,and tradition gave rulers their legitimacy in the eyes of the ruled.

A second ideal-type of authority, according to Weber, is "charismatic" authority,which is based on the personal qualities and the attractiveness ofleaders. Charismaticfigures are self-appointed leaders who inspire belief because of their extraordinary,almost superhuman, qualifications. Military leaders, warrior chiefs, popular partyleaders, and founders of religions are examples of individuals whose heroic feats ormiracles attract followers.

Weber postulated a third ideal-type of authority that is the foundation of moderncivilizations, namely, "legal-rational" authority. It is based on "a belief in the legiti­macy of the pattern of nonnative rules and the rights of those elevated to authorityunder such rules to issue commands." Obedience is owed to a legally established, im­personal set of rules, rather than to a personal ruler. Legal-rational authority vestspower in the office rather than in the person who occupies the office; thus anyone canrule as long as he or she comes to office "according to the rules."

This third type of authority forms the basis for Weber's concept of bureaucracy.According to Weber, bureaucracy is the normal way that "legal-rational" authorityappears in institutional form; it holds a central role in ordering and controlling mod­ern societies. "It is," says Weber, "superior to any other form in precision, in stabil­ity, in stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible aparticularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of organizations andfor those acting in relation to it." It is finally superior in its operational efficiency and"is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks." For Weber.

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52 Chapter 2/ The Formal Structure; The Concept of Bureaucracy

bureaucracy is indispensable to maintaining civilization in modem society. In his view,"however much people may complain about the evils of bureaucracy it would be sheerillusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can be carried outin any field except by means of officials working in offices."

A great deal of Weber's analysis of bureaucracy dealt with its historical develop­ment. According to Weber, modem bureaucracy in the Western world arose duringthe Middle Ages when royal domains grew and required bodies of officials to over­see them. Out of necessity, princes devised rational administrative techniques to ex­tend their authority, frequently borrowing ideas from the church, whose territories atthat time encompassed most of Europe. "The proper soil for bureaucratization of ad­ministration," writes Weber, "has always been the development of administrativetasks." Bureaucracy grew because society needed to do things-to build roads, to ed­ucate students, to collect taxes, to fight battles, and to dispense justice. Work was di­vided and specialized to achieve the goals of a society.

Weber also identified a monied economy as an important ingredient for the de­velopment of bureaucracy. "Bureaucracy as a permanent structure is knit to the pre­supposition of a constant income for maintenancy.... A stable system of taxation isthe precondition for the permanent existence of bureaucratic administration." Othercultural factors contributing to the rise of highly structured bureaucracies were thegrowth of education, the development of higher religions, and the burgeoning of sci­ence and rationality.

Weber listed in a detailed fashion the major elements of the formal structure of bu­reaucracy. Three of the most important attributes in his concept of bureaucracy werethe division of labor, hierarchical order, and impersonal rules-keystones to anyfunctioning bureaucracy. The first, specialization of labor, meant that all work in abureaucracy is rationally divided into units that can be undertaken by an individualor group of individuals competent to perform those tasks. Unlike traditional rulers,workers do not own their offices in bureaucracy but enjoy tenure based on their abil­ities to perform the work assigned. Second, the hierarchical order of bureaucracy sep­arates superiors from subordinates; on the basis of this hierarchy, remuneration forwork is dispensed, authority recognized, privileges allotted, and promotions awarded.Finally, impersonal rules form the life-blood of the bureaucratic world. Bureaucrats,according to Weber, are not free to act in any way they please because their choicesare confined to prescribed patterns of conduct imposed by legal rules. In contrast to"traditional" or "charismatic" authority, bureaucratic rules provide for the systematiccontrol of subordinates by superiors, thus limiting the opportunities for arbitrarinessand personal favoritism.

Weber theorized that the only way for a modem society to operate effectively wasby organizing expertly trained, functional specialists in bureaucracies. Although MaxWeber saw bureaucracy as permanent and indispensable in the modem world, he washorrified by what he believed was an irreversible trend toward loss of human free­dom and dignity:

It is horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with nothing but thoselittle cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving towards bigger ones-a stateof affairs which is to be seen once more, as in the Egyptian records, playing an

Reading 2/lntroduction 53

ever-increasing part in the spirit of our present administrative system and especiallyof its offspring, the students. This passion for bureaucracy ... is enough to driveone to despair. I

And although he despaired over the increasing trend toward bureaucratization inthe modem world, Weber also observed the leveling or democratizing effect of bu­reaucracy on society. As Reinhard Bendix wrote of Weber's idea: "The developmentof bureaucracy does away with ... plutocratic privileges, replacing unpaid, avoca­tional administration by notables with paid, full-time administration by profession­als, regardless of their social and economic position.... Authority is exercised inaccordance with rules, and everyone subject to that authority is legally equal."2

Over the last fifty years, certain elements in Max Weber's conception of bureau­cracy have fueled repeated academic debate and scholarly criticism.3 There-are thosesocial scientists who criticize his "ideal-type" formulations as misleading. They con­tend that it offers neither a desirable state nor an empirical reality. Others suggest thathe overemphasizes the formal elements of bureaucracy-i.e., specialization, hierar­chy, rules, division oflabor, etc.-and does not appreciate the informal dimensions­such as human relationships, leadership, communication networks, etc.-as equally,if not more important, for influencing bureaucratic performance and efficiency. Stillothers say that Weber neglects the deficiencies of large-scale bureaucracies that canencourage alienation of workers and citizens alike, in contrast to the stimulating cre­ativity that small, fluid networks of specialists can enhance. Some scholars chargeWeber's concept as being both time-bound and culture-bound to the late nineteenthand early twentieth century German "scientific" heritage. They say he idealized theGerman bureaucratic state that dominated that era. This list of social science criticismscould go on, and they are all to some degree telling criticisms.

Nevertheless, the main outline of Weber's classic formulation is generally ac­cepted as true and significant. For students ofpublic administration, his concept formsone of the essential intellectual building blocks in our understanding of the formal in­stitutional structure of public administration.

As you read this selection, keep the following questions in mind:

Where can you see evidence of Weber's concept of bureaucracy within familiarorganizations?

In what respects does Weber's characterization of bureaucracy as a theoretical

IAs quoted in Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960),p.464.

%id., p. 429.

'For an excellent discussion of general academic criticism and revision of Weber's ideas, read either Al­fred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Ferrel Headyand Sybil L. Stokes, Papers in Comparative Public Administration (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of PublicAdministration, 1962), or Peter M. Blau and Marshall W. Meyer, Bureaucracy in Modem Society (NewYork: Random House, 1971). For a recent bold and different interpretation of Weber, see the essay on Weberby Robert Leivesley, Adrian Carr, and Alexander Kauzmin, in Ali Farazmand, ed., Handbook ofBureau­cracy (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1994).

54 Chapter 2/ The Formal Structure: The Concept of Bureaucracy

MAX WEBER

ements constitute "bureaucratic authority." In pri­vate economic domination, they constitute bu­reaucratic "management." Bureaucracy, thusunderstood, is fully developed in political and ec­clesiastical communities only in the modem state,and, in the private economy, only in the most ad­vanced institutions of capitalism. Permanent andpublic office authority, with fixed jurisdiction, isnot the historical rule but rather the exception. Thisis so even in large political structures such as thoseof the ancient Orient, the Germanic and Mongolianempires of conquest, or of many feudal structuresof state. In all these cases, the ruler executes themost important measures through personaltrustees, table-companions, or court-servants.Their commissions and authority are not preciselydelimited and are temporarily called into being foreach case.

II. The principles ofoffice hierarchy and of lev­els of graded authority mean a firmly ordered sys­tem of super- and subordination in which there isa supervision of the lower offices by the higherones. Such a system offers the governed the pos­sibility of appealing the decision of a lower officeto its higher authority, in a definitely regulatedmanner. With the full development of the bureau­cratic type, the office hierarchy is monocraticallyorganized. The principle of hierarchical office au­thority is found in all bureaucratic structures: instate and ecclesiastical structures as well as in largeparty organizations and private enterprises. It does

"ideal-type" miss the mark in describing the practical reality? In what respects isit on target?

How is Weber's bureaucratic model relevant to the previous case, "The Blast inCentralia No.5"? On the basis of that case as well as your own observations, canyou describe some positive and negative features of modem bureaucracy?

Bureaucracyl

1. The regular activities required for the pur­poses of the bureaucratically governed struc­ture are distributed in a fixed way as officialduties.

2. The authority to give the commands requiredfor the discharge of these duties is distrib­uted in a stable way and is strictly delimitedby rules concerning the coercive means,physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, whichmay be placed at the disposal of officials.

3. Methodical provision is made for the regu­lar and continuous fulfilment of these dutiesand for the execution of the correspondingrights; only persons who have the generallyregulated qualifications to serve are em­ployed.

) .In public and laWful government these three el-

1. Characteristics of Bureaucracy

Modem officialdom functions in the following spe­cific manner:

I. There is the principle of fixed and official ju­risdictional areas, which are generally ordered byrules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.

Bureaucracy, pp. 196-233, from Max Weber: Essays in Soci­ology by Max Weber, edited and translated by H. H. Gerth &C. Wright Mills. Translation copyright 1946, 1958 by H. H.Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Renewed copyright 1943 by HansH. Gerth. Used by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

I Wirtschaft und Gesel/schaft, part ill, chap. 6, pp. 650-78.

:BER

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oflev­:d sys­.1ere ishighere pos­officeulatedureau­ticallyice au­res: inn largeIt does

not matter for the character of bureaucracy whetherits authority is called "private" or "public."

When the principle of jurisdictional "compe­tency" is fully carried through, hierarchical subor­dination-at least in public office-does not meanthat the "higher" authority is simply authorized totake over the business of the "lower." Indeed, theopposite is the rule. Once established and havingfulfilled its task, an office tends to continue in ex­istence and be held by another incumbent.

III. The management of the modem office isbased upon written documents ("the files"), whichare preserved in their original or draught form.There is, therefore, a staff of subaltern officialsand scribes of all sorts. The body of officials ac­tively engaged in a "public" office, along with therespective apparatus of material implements andthe files, make up a "bureau." In private enterprise,"the bureau" is often called "the office."

In principle, the modem organization of theciviI service separates the bureau from the privatedomicile of the official, and, in general, bureauc­racy segregates official activity as something dis­tinct from the sphere of private life. Public moniesand equipment are divorced from the private prop­erty of the official. This condition is everywherethe product of a long development. Nowadays, itis found in public as well as in private enterprises;in the latter, the principle extends even to the lead­ing entrepreneur. In principle, the executive officeis separated from the household, business from pri­vate correspondence, and business assets from pri­vate fortunes. The more consistently the modemtype of business management has been carriedthrough the more are these separations the case.The beginnings of this process are to be found asearly as the Middle Ages.

It is the peculiarity of the modem entrepreneurthat he conducts himself as the "first official" of hisenterprise, in the very same way in which the rulerof a specifically modem bureaucratic state spokeof himself as "the first servant" of the state. Theidea that the bureau activities of the state are in­trinsically different in character from the manage­ment of private economic offices is a continental

Max Weber / Bureaucracy 55

European notion and, by way of contrast, is totallyforeign to the American way.

IV. Office management, at least all specializedoffice management-and such management is dis­tinctly modem-usually presupposes thorough andexpert training. This increasingly holds for themodem executive and employee of private enter­prises, in the same manner as it holds for the stateofficial.

V. When the office is fully developed, officialactivity demands the full working capacity of theofficial, irrespective of the fact that his obligatorytime in the bureau may be firmly delimited. In thenormal case, this is only the product of a long de­velopment, in the public as well as in the privateoffice. Formerly, in all cases, the normal state ofaffairs was reversed: official business was dis­charged as a secondary activity.

VI. The management of the office follows gen­eral rules, which are more or less stable, more or lessexhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledgeof these rules represents a special technical learningwhich the officials possess. It involves jurispru­dence, or administrative or business management.

The reduction of modem office management torules is deeply embedded in its very nature. Thetheory of modem public administration, for in­stance, assumes that the authority to order certainmatters by decree-which has been legally grantedto public authorities-does not entitle the bureauto regulate the matter by commands given for eachcase, but only to regulate the matter abstractly.This stands in extreme contrast to the regulation ofall relationships through individual privileges andbestowals of favor, which is absolutely dominantin patrimonialism, at least in so far as such rela­tionships are not fixed by sacred tradition.

2. The Position of the Official

All this results in the following for the internal andexternal position of the official:

56 Chapter 2/ The Formal Structure: The Concept of Bureaucracy

I. Office holding is a "vocation." This is shown,first, in the requirement of a firmly prescribedcourse of training, which demands the entire ca­pacity for work for a long period of time, and inthe generally prescribed and special examinationswhich are prerequisites of employment. Further­more, the position of the official is in the nature ofa duty. This determines the internal structure ofhisrelations, in the following manner: Legally and ac­tually, office holding is not considered a source tobe exploited for rents or emoluments, as was nor­mally the case during the Middle Ages and fre­quently up to the threshold of recent times. Nor isoffice holding considered a usual exchange of ser­vices for equivalents, as is the case with free laborcontracts. Entrance into an office, including one inthe private economy, is considered an acceptanceof a specific obligation of faithful management inreturn for a secure existence. It is decisive for thespecific nature of modem loyalty to an office that,in the pure type, it does not establish a relationshipto a person, like the vassal"s or disciple's faith infeudal or in patrimonial relations of authority.Modem loyalty is devoted to impersonal and func­tional pwposes. Behind the functional pwposes, ofcourse, "ideas of culture-values" usually stand.These are ersatz for the earthly or supra-mundanepersonal master: ideas such as "state," "church,""community," "party," or "enterprise" are thoughtof as being realized in a community; they providean ideological halo for the master.

The political official-at least in the fully de­veloped modem state-is not considered the per­sonal servant of a ruler. Today, the bishop, thepriest, and the preacher are in fact no longer, as inearly Christian times, holders of purely personalcharisma. The supra-mundane and sacred valueswhich they offer are given to everybody whoseems to be worthy of them and who asks for them.In form~r times, such leaders acted upon the per­sonal command of their master; in principle, theywere responsible only to him. Nowadays, in spiteof the partial survival of the old theory, such reli­gious leaders are officials in the service of a func­tional purpose, which in the present-day "church"has become routinized and, in tum, ideologicallyhallowed.

II. The personal position of the official is pat­terned in the following way:

1. Whether he is in a private office or a publicbureau, the modem official always strivesand usually enjoys a distinct social esteemas compared with the governed. His socialposition is guaranteed by the prescriptiverules of rank order and, for the political of­ficial, by special definitions of the criminalcode against "insults of officials" and "con­tempt" of state and church authorities.

The actual social position of the officialis normally highest where, as in old civilizedcountries, the following conditions prevail:a strong demand for administration bytrained experts; a strong and stable socialdifferentiation, where the official predomi­nantly derives from socially and economi­cally privileged strata because of the socialdistribution ofpower; or where the costlinessof the required training and status conven­tions are binding upon him. The possessionof educational certificates-to be discussedelsewhere-are usually linked with qualifi­cation for office. Naturally, such certificatesor patents enhance the "status element" inthe social position of the official. For the restthis status factor in individual cases is ex­plicitly and impassively acknowledged; forexample, in the prescription that the accep­tance or rejection ofan aspirant to an officialcareer depends upon the consent ("election")of the members of the official body. This isthe case in the German army with the offi­cer corps. Similar phenomena, which pro­mote this guild-like closure of officialdom,are typically found in patrimonial and, par­ticularly, in prebendal officialdoms of thepast. The desire to resurrect such phenomenain changed forms is by no means infrequentamong modem bureaucrats. For instance,they have played a role among the demandsof the quite proletarian and expert officials(the tretyj element) during the Russian rev­olution.

Usually the social esteem of the officials

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as such is especially low where the demandfor expert administration and the dominanceof status conventions are weak. This is es­pecially the case in the United States; it isoften the case in new settlements by virtueof their wide fields for profitmaking and thegreat instability of their social stratification.

2. The pure type of bureaucratic official is ap­pointed by a superior authority. An officialelected by the governed is not a purely bu­reaucratic figure. Of course, the formal ex­istence of an election does not by itself meanthat no appointment hides behind the elec­tion-in the state, especially, appointmentby party chiefs. Whether or not this is thecase does not depend upon legal statutes butupon the way in which the party mechanismfunctions. Once firmly organized, the partiescan tum a formally free election into themere acclamation of a candidate designatedby the party chief. As a rule, however, a for­mally free election is turned into a fight, con­ducted according to definite rules, for votesin favor of one of two designated candidates.

In all circumstances, the designation ofofficials by means of an election among thegoverned modifies the strictness of hier­archical subordination. In principle, an offi­cial who is so elected has an autonomousposition opposite the superordinate official.The elected official does not derive his po­sition "from above" but "from below," or atleast not from a superior authority of the of­ficial hierarchy but from powerful party men("bosses"), who also determine his furthercareer. The career of the elected official isnot, or at least not primarily, dependent uponhis chief in the administration. The officialwho is not elected but appointed by a chiefnormally functions more exactly, from atechnical point of view, because, all othercircumstances being equal, it is more likelythat purely functional points of considerationand qualities will determine his selection andcareer. As laymen, the governed can becomeacquainted with the extent to which a candi­date is expertly qualified for office only in

Max Weber / Bureaucracy 57

terms of experience, and hence only after hisservice. Moreover, in every sort of selectionof officials by election, parties quite natu­rally give decisive weight not to expert con­siderations but to the services a followerrenders to the party boss. This holds for allkinds of procurement of officials by elec­tions, for the designation of formally free,elected officials by party bosses when theydetermine the slate of candidates, or the freeappointment by a chief who has himself beenelected. The contrast, however, is relative:Substantially similar conditions hold wherelegitimate monarchs and their subordinatesappoint officials, except that the influence ofthe followings are then less controllable.

Where the demand for administration bytrained experts is considerable, and the partyfollowings have to recognize an intellectu­ally developed, educated, and freely moving"public opinion," the use of unqualified of­ficials falls back upon the party in power atthe next election. Naturally, this is morelikely to happen when the officials are ap­pointed by the chief. The demand for atrained administration now exists in theUnited States, but in the large cities, whereimmigrant votes are "corraled," there is, ofcourse, no educated public opinion. There­fore, popular elections of the administrativechief and also of his subordinate officialsusually endanger the expert qualification ofthe official as well as the precise functioningof the bureaucratic mechanism. It also weak­ens the dependence of the officials upon thehierarchy. This holds at least for the large ad­ministrative bodies that are difficult to su­pervise. The superior qualification andintegrity of federal judges, appointed by thePresident, as over against elected judges inthe United States is well known, althoughboth types of officials have been selectedprimarily in terms of party considerations.The great changes in American metropolitanadministrations demanded by reformers haveproceeded essentially from elected mayorsworking with an apparatus of officials who

58 Chapter 2/ The Formal Structure: The Concept of Bureaucracy

were appointed by them. These reforms havethus come about in a "Caesarist" fashion.Viewed technically, as an organized form ofauthority, the efficiency of "Caesarism,"which often grows out of democracy, rests ingeneral upon the position of the "Caesar" asa free trustee of the masses (of the army orof the citizenry), who is unfettered by tradi­tion. The "Caesar" is thus the unrestrainedmaster of a body of highly qualified militaryofficersand officials whom he selects freelyand personally without regard to tradition orto any other considerations. This "rule of thepersonal genius," however, stands in contra­diction to the formally "democratic" princi­ple of a universally elected officialdom.

3. Normally, the position of the official is heldfor life, at least in public bureaucracies; andthis is increasingly the case for all similarstructures. As a factual rule, tenure for lifeis presupposed, even where the giving of no­tice or periodic reappointment occurs. Incontrast to the worker in a private enterprise,the official normally holds tenure. Legal oractual life-tenure, however, is not recog­nized as the official"s right to the possessionof office, as was the case with many struc­tures of authority in the past. Where legalguarantees against arbitrary dismissal ortransfer are developed, they merely serve toguarantee a strictly objective discharge ofspecific office duties free from all personalconsiderations. In Germany, this is the casefor all juridical and, increasingly, for all ad­ministrative officials.

Within the bureaucracy, therefore, themeasure of "independence," legally guaran­teed by tenure, is not always a source of in­creased status for the official whose positionis thus secured. Indeed, often the reverseholds, especially in old cultures and com­munities that are highly differentiated. Insuch communities, the stricter the subordi­nation under the arbitrary rule of the master,the more it guarantees the maintenance of theconventional seigneurial style of living forthe official. Because of the very absence of

,

these legal guarantees of tenure, the con­ventional esteem for the official may rise inthe same way as, during the Middle Ages,the esteem of the nobility of office rose at theexpense of esteem for the freemen, and as theking's judge surpassed that of the people'sjudge. In Germany, the military officer or theadministrative official can be removed fromoffice at any time, or at least far more read­ily than the "independent judge," who neverpays with loss of his office for even thegrossest offense against the "code of honor"or against social conventions of the salon.For this very reason, if other things are equal,in the eyes of the master stratum the judge isconsidered less qualified for social inter­course than are officers and administrativeofficials, whose greater dependence on themaster is a greater guarantee of their con­formity with status conventions. Of course,the average official strives for a civil-servicelaw, which would materially secure his oldage and provide increased guarantees againsthis arbitrary removal from office. This striv­ing, however, has its limits. A very strongdevelopment of the "right to the office" nat­urally makes it more difficult to staff themwith regard to technical efficiency, for sucha development decreases the career-oppor­tunities of ambitious candidates for office.This makes for the fact that officials, on thewhole, do not feel their dependency uponthose at the top. This lack of a feeling of de­pendency, however, rests primarily upon theinclination to depend upon one's equalsrather than upon the socially inferior andgoverned strata. The present conservativemovement among the Badenia clergy, occa­sioned by the anxiety of a presumably threat­ening separation of church and state, hasbeen expressly determined by the desire notto be turned "from a master into a servant ofthe parish."

4. The official receives the regular pecuniarycompensation of a normally fixed salary andthe old age security provided by a pension.The salary is not measured like a wage in

: con­rise inAges,: at the-as theople's.or thejfrom~ read­lneveren theaonor"salon.

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terms of work done, but according to "sta­tus," that is, according to the kind of func­tion (the "rank") and, in addition, possibly,according to the length of service. The rela­tively great security of the official's income,as well as the rewards of social esteem, makethe office a sought-after position, especiallyin countries which no longer provide op­portunities for colonial profits. In such coun­tries, this situation permits relatively lowsalaries for officials.

5. The official is set for a "career" within thehierarchical order of the public service. Hemoves from the lower, less important, andlower paid to the higher positions. The av­erage official naturally desires a mechanicalfixing of the conditions of promotion: ifnotof the offices, at least of the salary levels. Hewants these conditions fixed in terms of "se­niority," or possibly according to gradesachieved in a developed system of expertexaminations. Here and there, such exami­nations actually form a character indelebilisof the official and have lifelong effectson his career. To this is joined the desireto qualify the right to office and the in­creasing tendency toward status group clo­sure and economic security. All of thismakes for a tendency to consider the officesas "prebends" of those who are qualified byeducational certificates. The necessity oftaking general personal and intellectualqualifications into consideration, irrespec­tive of the often subaltern character of theeducational certificate, has led to a conditionin which the highest political offices, espe­cially the positions of "ministers," are prin­cipally filled without reference to suchcertificates.... (pp. 202-204]

_~. Technical Advantages ofBureaucratic Organization

W'~e decisive reason for the advance of bureau­,r_,:~tic organization has always been its purely tech-

Max Weber / Bureaucracy 59

nical superiority over any other form of organiza­tion. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanismcompares with other organizations exactly as doesthe machine with the nonmechanical modes ofpro­duction.

Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge ofthe files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subor­dination, reduction of friction and of material andpersonal costs-these are raised to the optimumpoint in the strictly bureaucratic administration,and especially in its monocratic form. As com­pared with all collegiate, honorific, and avocationalformS of administration, trained bureaucracy is su­perior on all these points. And as far as complicatedtasks are concerned, paid bureaucratic work is notonly more precise but, in the last analysis, it isoften cheaper than even formally unremuneratedhonorific service.

Honorific arrangements make administrativework an avocation and, for this reason alone, hon­orific service normally functions more slowly; beingless bound to schemata and being more formless.Hence it is less precise and less unified than bu­reaucratic work because it is less dependent uponsuperiors and because the establishment and ex­ploitation of the apparatus of subordinate officialsand filing services are almost unavoidably less eco­nomical. Honorific service is less continuous thanbureaucratic and frequently quite expensive. This isespecially the case if one thinks not only of themoney costs to the public treasury--eosts whichbureaucratic administration, in comparison with ad­ministration by notables, usually substantially in­creases-but also of the frequent economic lossesof the governed caused by delays and lack ofpreci­sion. The possibility of administration by notablesnormally and permanently exists only where officialmanagement can be satisfactorily discharged as anavocation. With the qualitative increase of tasks theadministration has to face, administration by nota­bles reaches its limits-today, even in England.Work organized by collegiate bodies causes frictionand delay and requires compromises between col­liding interests and views. The administration, there­fore, runs less precisely and is more independent ofsuperiors; hence, it is less unified and slower. All ad~vances of the Prussian administrative organization

60 Chapter 2/ The Formal Structure: The Concept of Bureaucracy

.,,\

i

10. The Permanent Character ofthe Bureaucratic Machine

ences among possible principles by which politiesmay meet their demands.

The second element mentioned, "calculablerules," also is of paramount importance for mod­ern bureaucracy. The peculiarity of modern cul­ture, and specifically of its technical and economicbasis, demands this very "calculability" of results.When fully developed, bureaucracy also stands, ina specific sense, under the principle of sine ira acstudio. Its specific nature, which is welcomed bycapitalism, develops the more perfectly the morethe bureaucracy is "dehumanized," the more com­pletely it succeeds in eliminating from officialbusiness love, hatred, and all purely personal, ir­rational, and emotional elements which escape cal­culation. This is the specific nature ofbureaucracyand it is appraised as its special virtue.

The more complicated and specialized modernculture becomes, the more its external supportingapparatus demands the personally detached andstrictly "objective" expert, in lieu of the master ofolder social structures, who was moved by per­sonal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude.Bureaucracy offers the attitudes demanded by theexternal apparatus of modern culture in the mostfavorable combination. As a rule, only bureauc­racy has established the foundation for the admin­istration of a rational law conceptually system­atized on the basis of such enactments as the latterRoman imperial period first created with a high de­gree of technical perfection. During the MiddleAges, this law was received along with the bu­reaucratization of legal administration, that is tosay, with the displacement of the old trial proce­dure which was bound to tradition or to irrationalpresuppositions, by the rationally trained and spe­cialized expert.... [pp. 214-216]

Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is amongthose social structures which are the hardest todestroy. Bureaucracy is the means of carrying"community action" over into rationally ordered

2Here we cannot discuss in detail how the bureaucratic appara­tus may, and actually does, produce definite obstacles to the dis­charge of business in a manner suitable for the single case.

have been and will in the future be advances of thebureaucratic, and especially of the monocratic, prin­ciple.

Today, it is primarily the capitalist market econ­omy which demands that the official business ofthe administration be discharged precisely, unam­biguously, continuously, and with as much speedas possible. Normally, the very large, modern cap­italist enterprises are themselves unequalled mod­els of strict bureaucratic organization. Businessmanagement throughout rests on increasing preci­sion, steadiness, and, above all, the speed of oper­ations. This, in turn, is determined by the peculiarnature of the modern means of communication, in­cluding, among other things, the news service ofthe press. The extraordinary increase in the speedby which public announcements, as well as eco­nomic and political facts, are transmitted exerts asteady and sharp pressure in the direction of speed­ing up the tempo of administrative reaction to­wards various situations. The optimum of suchreaction time is normally attained only by a strictlybureaucratic organization.2

Bureaucratization offers above all the optimumpossibility for carrying through the principle ofspecializing administrative functions according topurely objective considerations. Individual perfor­mances are allocated to functionaries who havespecialized training and who by constant practicelearn more and more. The "objective" discharge ofbusiness primarily means a discharge of businessaccording to calculable rules and "without regardfor persons."

"Without regard for persons" is also the watch­word of the "market" and, in general, ofall pursuitsof naked economic interests. A consistent execu­tion of bureaucratic domination means the level­ing of status "honor." Hence, if the principle of thefree-market is not at the same time restricted, itmeans the universal domination of the "class situ­ation." That this consequence of bureaucratic dom­ination has not set in everywhere, parallel to theextent of bureaucratization, is due to the differ-

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"societal action." Therefore, as an instrument for"societalizing" relations of power, bureaucracy hasheen and is a power instrument of the first order­for the one who controls the bureaucratic appa­rutus.

Under otherwise equal conditions, a "societalnction," which is methodically ordered and led, issuperior to every resistance of "mass" or even of"communal action." And where the bureaucrati­lation of administration has been completely car­ried through, a form of power relation isestablished that is practically unshatterable.

The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out ofthe apparatus in which he is harnessed. In contrastto the honorific or avocational "notable," the pro­fessional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by hisentire material and ideal existence. In the great ma­Jority of cases, he is only a single cog in an ever­moving mechanism which prescribes to him anessentially fixed route of march. The official is en­trusted with specialized tasks and normally themechanism cannot be put into motion or arrestedby him, but only from the very top. The individualbureaucrat is thus forged to the community of allthe functionaries who are integrated into the mech­unism. They have a common interest in seeing thatthe mechanism continues its functions and that theKocietally exercised authority carries on.

The ruled, for their part, cannot dispense withor replace the bureaucratic apparatus of authorityonce it exists. For this bureaucracy rests upon ex­pert training, a functional specialization of work,lind an attitude set for habitual and virtuoso-likemastery of single yet methodically integrated func­tions. If the official stops working, or if his workIs forcefully interrupted, chaos results, and it isdifficult to improvise replacements from amongthe governed who are fit to master such chaos. Thisholds for public administration as well as for pri­vute economic management. More and more thematerial fate of the masses depends upon the steadyllnd correct functioning of the increasingly bu­reaucratic organizations of private capitalism. TheIdea of eliminating these organizations becomesmore and more utopian.

The discipline of officialdom refers to the atti­tude-set of the official for precise obedience

1

Max Weber / Bureaucracy 61

within his habitual activity, in public as well as inprivate organizations. This discipline increasinglybecomes the basis of all order, however great thepractical importance of administration on the basisofthe filed documents may be. The naive idea ofBakuninism of destroying the basis of "acquiredrights" and "domination" by destroying publicdocuments overlooks the settled orientation ofman for keeping to the habitual rules and regula­tions that continue to exist independently of thedocuments. Every reorganization of beaten or dis­solved troops, as well as the restoration of ad­ministrative orders destroyed by revolt, panic, orother catastrophes, is realized by appealing to thetrained orientation of obedient compliance to suchorders. Such compliance has been conditioned intothe officials, on the one hand, and, on the otherhand, into the governed. If such an appeal is suc­cessful it brings, as it were, the disturbed mecha­nism into gear again.

The objective indispensability of the once­existing apparatus, with its peculiar, "impersonal"character, means that the mechanism-in contrastto feudal orders based upon personal piety-is eas­ily made to work for anybody who knows how togain control over it. A rationally ordered system ofofficials continues to function smoothly after theenemy has occupied the area; he merely needs tochange the top officials. This body of officials con­tinues to operate because it is to the vital interest ofeveryone concerned, including above all the enemy.

During the course of his long years in power,Bismarck brought his ministerial colleagues intounconditional bureaucratic dependence by elimi­nating all independent statesmen. Upon his retire­ment, he saw to his surprise that they continued tomanage their offices unconcerned and undis­mayed, as if he had not been the master mind andcreator of these creatures, but rather as if some sin­gle figure had been exchanged for some other fig­ure in the bureaucratic machine. With all thechanges of masters in France since the time of theFirst Empire, the power machine has remained es­sentially the same. Such a machine makes "revo­lution," in the sense of the forceful creation ofentirely new formations of authority, technicallymore and more impossible, especially when the

62 Chapter 2/ The Formal Structure: The Concept of Bureaucracy

apparatus controls the modem means of commu­nication (telegraph, et cetera) and also by virtue ofits internal rationalized structure. In classic fash­ion, France has demonstrated how this process hassubstituted coups d'etat for "revolutions": all suc­cessful transformations in France have amountedto coups d'etat.

11. Economic and SocialConsequences of Bureaucracy

It is clear that the bureaucratic organization of a so­cial structure, and especially of a political one, canand regularly does have far-reaching economicconsequences. But what sort of consequences? Ofcourse in any individual case it depends upon thedistribution ofeconomic and social power, and es­pecially upon the sphere that is occupied by theemerging bureaucratic mechanism. The conse­quences of bureaucracy depend therefore upon thedirection which the powers using the apparatusgive to it. And very frequently a crypto-plutocraticdistribution of power has been the result.

In England, but especially in the United States,party donors regularly stand behind the bureau­cratic party organizations. They have financedthese parties and have been able to influence themto a large extent. The breweries in England, the so­called "heavy industry," and in Germany the HansaLeague with their voting funds are well enoughknown as political donors to parties. In moderntimes bureaucratization and social leveling withinpolitical, and particularly within state organiza­tions in connection with the destruction of feudaland local privileges, have very frequently benefitedthe interests of ~apitalism.Often bureaucratizationhas been carried out in direct alliance with capi­talist interests, for example, the great historical al­liance of the power of the absolute prince withcapitalist interests. In general, a legal leveling anddestruction of firmly established local structuresruled by notables has usually made for a widerrange of capitalist activity. Yet one may expect asan effect of bureaucratization, a policy that meets

the petty bourgeois interest in a secured traditional"subsistence," or even a state socialist policy thatstrangles opportunities for private profit. This hasoccurred in several cases of historical and far­reaching importance, specifically during antiquity;it is undoubtedly to be expected as a future devel­opment. Perhaps it will occur in Germany.

The very different effects of political organi­zations which were, at least in principle, quite sim­ilar-in Egypt under the Pharaohs and in Hellenicand Roman times-show the very different eco­nomic significances of bureaucratization whichare possible according to the direction of otherfactors. The mere fact of bureaucratic organizationdoes not unambiguously tell us about the concretedirection of its economic effects, which are al­ways in some manner present. At least it does nottell us as much as can be told about its relativelyleveling effect socially. In this respect, one has toremember that bureaucracy as such is a precisioninstrument which can put itself at the disposal ofquite varied-purely political as well as purelyeconomic, or any other sort-of interests in dom­ination. Therefore, the measure of its parallelismwith democratization must not be exaggerated,however typical it may be. Under certain condi­tions, strata of feudal lords have also put bu­reaucracy into their service. There is also the pos­sibility-and often it has become a fact, for in­stance, in the Roman principate and in some formsof absolutist state structures-that a bureaucrati­zation of administration is deliberately connectedwith the formation of estates, or is entangled withthem by the force of the existing groupings of so­cial power. The express reservation of offices forcertain status groups is very frequent, and actualreservations are even more frequent. The democ­ratization of society in its totality, and in the mod­ern sense of the term, whether actual or perhapsmerely formal, is an especially favorable basis ofbureaucratization, but by no means the only pos­sible one. After all, bureaucracy strives merely tolevel those powers that stand in its way and inthose areas that, in the individual case, it seeks tooccupy. We must remember this fact-which wehave encountered several times and which we

I I ,

At first glance, the following story may seem out of place-or odd-to follow such ahighly abstract and theoretical essay by Max Weber. It is a personal story told by a fa­ther, George Lardner, who recounts the details of the shooting death of his 21-year-olddaughter Kristin on May 30, 1992. She had been raised in Washington, D.C. and wasliving in Boston, studying in a fine arts program, jointly sponsored by the Museum of Fine

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shall have to discuss repeatedly: that "democracy"as such is opposed to the "rule" of bureaucracy, inspite and perhaps because of its unavoidable yetunintended promotion of bureaucratization. Undercertain conditions, democracy creates obviousruptures and blockages to bureaucratic organiza­tion. Hence, in every individual historical case,one must observe in what special direction bu­reaucratization has developed.

12. The Power Position ofBureaucracy

Everywhere the modem state is undergoing bu­reaucratization. But whether the power of bureauc­racy within the polity is universally increasingmust here remain an open question.

The fact that bureaucratic organization is tech­nically the most highly developed means of powerin the hands of the man who controls it does not de­termine the weight that bureaucracy as such is ca­pable of having in a particular social structure. Theever-increasing "indispensability" of the official­dom, swollen to millions, is no more decisive for thisquestion than is the view of some representatives ofthe proletarian movement that the economic indis­pensability of the proletarians is decisive for themeasure of their social and political power position.If"indispensability" were decisive, then where slavelabor prevailed and where freemen usually abhorwork as a dishonor, the "indispensable" slaves ought

I CASE STUDY 2

Introduction

Case Study 2/ Introduction 63

to have held the positions of power, for they wereat least as indispensable as officials and proletariansare today. Whether the power of bureaucracy assuch increases cannot be decided apriori from suchreasons. The drawing in ofeconomic interest groupsor other non-official experts, or the drawing in ofnon-expert lay representatives, the establishment oflocal, inter-local, or central parliamentary or otherrepresentative bodies, or of occupational associa­tions-these seem to run directly against the bu­reaucratic tendency. How far this appearance is thetruth must be discussed in another chapter ratherthan in this purely formal and typological discus­sion. In general, only the following can be said here:

Under normal conditions, the power position ofa fully developed bureaucracy is always overtow­ering. The "political master" finds himself in theposition of the "dilettante" who stands opposite the"expert," facing the trained official who standswithin the management of administration. Thisholds whether the "master" whom the bureaucracyserves is a "people," equipped with the weapons of"legislative initiative," the "referendum," and theright to remove officials, or a parliament, electedon a more aristocratic or more "democratic" basisand equipped with the right to vote a lack of con­fidence, or with the actual authority to vote it. Itholds whether the master is an aristocratic, colle­giate body, legally or actually based on self-re­cruitment, or whether he is a popularly electedpresident, a hereditary and "absolute" or a "con­stitutional" monarch.... [pp. 228-233]

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