We will discuss Revised Forestry Code until small scale mining act next meeting.

Revised Forestry Code - PD. No. 705

A) oriented to progress and development of the country, advancement of science and public welfare

B) Protection, management and rehabilitation for sustainable development

C) Land classification and survey shall be systematized and hastened

D) Wood-processing plants shall be encouraged

Public Forest vs Permanent Forest or forest reserves

-subject to the present system of classification

1. Protected Areas -  locations which receive protection because of their recognised natural, ecological and/or cultural values

a. RA 7586 National Integrated Protected Areas System = AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREAS SYSTEM, DEFINING ITS SCOPE AND COVERAGE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as “protected areas”.

• Picop Resources vs. Base Metals, 510 SCRA 400

ALvarez vs PICOP nov 29, 2006DOCTRINETimber licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind theGovernment regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.FACTS PICOP’s predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43.TLA No. 43, as amended, expired on 26 April 1977. It was renewed on 7 October 1977 for another 25 years to "terminate on April 25,2002.On 25 November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297,"EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF

PROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1931, ANDDECLARING THE SAME AS MINERAL RESERVATIONu AND AS ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA."The excluded area consists of 8,100 hectares, more or less, which formed part of PICOP’s expired TLA No. 43, subject of its applicationfor IFMA conversion.On 21 January 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the aforesaid presidential proclamation as well as its implementing DENR Administrative Order.In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondents therein from implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary and her co-respondents in said case filed on 6 February 2003 an Omnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order dated 3 February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss ISSUE

Whether or not the presidential warranty was a contractHELD: NO PICOP’s ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed contract entered into by the government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated 29 July 1969 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refutes this claim, and alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential Warranty a valid and subsisting contract under the Constitution’s Non-Impairment Clause.The SC disagrees. Such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare

b. PD 705 Revised Forestry Code as amended by EO 277 and RA 7161Policies

See top

Sec 3. Definitions - see page 95

• Sec of Environment and Natural Resources Vs Yap GR Nos. 167707 and173775 Oct 8, 2008 –

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued

Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,

caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and

marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine

Tourism Authority (PTA).  President Marcos later approved the

issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to

implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82

precluded them from filing an application for judicial

confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling

purposes, respondents-claimants  Mayor .  Yap, Jr.,  and others

filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,

Aklan

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No.

1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to

secure titles over their occupied lands.  They declared that

they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession

and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since

time immemorial.  They declared their lands for tax purposes

and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited

that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did

not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man.  Since the

Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of

private ownership.  Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,

they had the right to have the lots registered in their names

through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for

declaratory relief.  The OSG countered that Boracay Island was

an unclassified land of the public domain.  It formed part of

the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not

available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of  the

Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that

respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA

Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced.  Their right to judicial

confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and

Revised Forestry Code, as amended.  Since Boracay Island had

not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever

possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of

respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA

Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was

denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the

appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the

OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence,

the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial

court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation

No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land

(protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable

and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other

landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition

for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation

No. 1064. They allege  that the Proclamation infringed on their

“prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay.  They have been

in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay

since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of

the two petitions

ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a

right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

 

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles,

Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain

prior to Proclamation No. 1064.  Such unclassified lands

are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all

unclassified lands of  the public domain as public forest.

Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines apublic forest as “a mass

of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of

the present system of classification for the determination of

which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.”

Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in

Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests.  PD No.

705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its

effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into

agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by

the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the

1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national

parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior

to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island

had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified under

any of these grand divisions.  Boracay was an unclassified land

of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and

disposable is required.  In keeping with the presumption of

State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized

that there must be a positive act of the government, such

as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an

administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands

investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant

may also secure a certification from the government that the

land claimed to have been possessed for the required number

of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in

overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for

registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the

land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,

administrative action, report, statute, or certification was

presented to the Court.  The records are bereft

of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of

Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a

government proclamation that the land is alienable and

disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification

cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to

classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.  If

President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable

and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the

specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation

No. 1064.  This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

NOTES:

1. Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is

misplaced.   Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time

when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify

lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and

agricultural.  At that time, the courts were free to make

corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were

vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the

preponderance of the evidence.  Act No. 2874, promulgated in

1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the

Executive Department, through the President,

the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands

into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then,

courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied,

to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.

2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that

particular case, having regard for its present or future

value for one or the other purposes.  We believe, however,

considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that

a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural

lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence

of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are

agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.  Whatever the

land involved in a particular land registration case is

forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of

proof.  Its superior value for one purpose or the other is

a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each

particular case

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the

Constitutionclassifying lands of the public domain into

“agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national

parks,” do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land

or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and

underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.

Director of Forestryis particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain

does not lose such classification simply because loggers or

settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.  Parcels of land

classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or

planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.

“Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the

way places.  Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa

palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may

also be classified as forest land.  The classification is

descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not

have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks

like.  Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released

in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form

part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,

the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

There is a big difference between “forest” as defined in a

dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a classification of

lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes.  One is

descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a

legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the

Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay

Island, and not look into its physical layout.  Hence, even if its

forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants

and other commercial establishments, it has not been

automatically converted from public forest to alienable

agricultural land.

3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants.  While they

may not be eligible to  apply for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended,

this does not denote their automatic ouster from the

residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now

classified as agricultural.  Neither will this mean the loss of

their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands.

Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good

faith as builders of improvements.  They can take steps to

preserve or protect their possession.  For another, they may

look into other modes of applying for original registration of

title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the

conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private

claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt

them from certain requirements under the present land laws.

There is one such bill now pending in the House of

Representatives.

• Lalican Vs Vergara GR 108619, July 31, 1997 

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order

is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."

On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,[1] Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:

"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.[2]

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber"

should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.[3]

On September 24, 1991, the lower court, [4] guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:

"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber."

The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues.[5]

The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.

Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in

case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another.[6]

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.[7]

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.

On June 10, 1992, the lower court [8] issued the herein questioned Order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."

The petition is devoid of merit.

Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:

"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if

such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.)

Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:

"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,' which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timberwithout the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus."

Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for

enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x"

To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.[10] After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:

"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., x x x

Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.

If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful authority."

The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[11] Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.[12]

On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.[13] Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[14]As this Court said:

"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari."[15]

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.[16]

The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of

a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[17]

Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.[18] The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[19] An interlocutory order may be assailed bycertiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[20] However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts.[21]

Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan[22] for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, [23] this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.

With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case,[25] this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.[26]

The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare

and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Chapter I. Organization and Jurisdiction of the Bureau• DENR vs. Daraman, 377 SCRA 39 Gr 125797, 2002 

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision [1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.

The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.

The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[3]

The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.

The Facts

In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:

That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.

Thereafter trial was conducted.

The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:

That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a

vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would beP729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer,Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver GregorioDaraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house inBarangay Abrero, Calbayog City.

The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].

For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established:

That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as

cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, CalbayogCity. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened.[4]

After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.

Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan,Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents. [5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII,Tacloban City.[7]

Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof. [8] He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively

confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9]He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.

The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.

In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.

Substantively, the trial court ruled:

x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accusedNarciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final and executory.

Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case.

Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed.[10]

Hence, this Petition.[11]

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:

(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already owned by the government.

(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.

(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.[12]

Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle

Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.

We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law. [13] A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.[14]

Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.[15]

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.[16]

Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20]

Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]

To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or

license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.

Confiscation Without Due Process

Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false, falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.

Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.[23]

We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]

The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR

are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]

Second Issue:Construing PD 705, as Amended

Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.

In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.

We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.

Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]

We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the

implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]

Third Issue:Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Chapter II. Classification and Survey

Areas Needed for Forest Purposes - even if they are below eighteen percent in slope, are needed for forest purposes to wit: see page 109

Chapter III. Utilization and Management

• Antonio Vs Factoran GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993 – Sec 20, PD 705 = see internetA. Timber:Silvicultural and Harvesting System

Silviculture is the establishment, development reproduction and care of forest trees

Page 118

Limitations Page 118

Duration Page 118

B. Wood Processing - page 122C. ReforestationLands to be Reforested1. Public2. PrivatePD 953 REQUIRING THE PLANTING OF TREES IN CERTAIN PLACES AND PENALIZING UNAUTHORIZED CUTTING, DESTRUCTION, DAMAGING AND INJURING OF CERTAIN TREES, PLANTS AND VEGETATION PD 1153 REQUIRING THE PLANTING OF ONE TREE EVERY MONTH FOR FIVE CONSECUTIVE YEARS BY EVERY CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES n furtherance of said policy, every citizen of the Philippines at least ten (10) years of age, actually residing therein, unless physically disabled to do so, shall plant one tree every month for five (5) consecutive years. • Utleg Vs Arca GR No. L-25026, August 31, 1971 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/may1989/gr_l67195_1989.htmlKainginD. Special UsesE. Criminal Offenses:Who are liableWhat acts are punishableWho may arrest• Merida vs. People, 554 SCRA 366• Aquino vs. People, 594 SCRA 50• Taopa Vs People Gr 184098 Nov. 2008c. RA 9175 Chainsaw Act of 2002Persons authorized to use chainsawUnlawful acts

2. Minerals

a. RA 7076 People’s Small-Scale Mining Act• SR Metals Inc Vs Angelo T. Reyes GR 179669; June 04, 2014• League of provinces of the Philippines vs. DENR, Gr no. 175368, - • Leonora Calanza Vs Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines Gr 146662 April 24, 2009