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range of substituents restricted to the set of expressions referring to human beings (or other moral agents, if there are any), among them the individual constants a, b, . . . An expression like A a is interpreted as expressing the command “a, do (an action of type) A’. N is in- troduced, with the rule that (NA)a is materially equivalent to N(Aa) . NAa expresses the command “a, do not-A’. N A means “the opposite of A ’ in the sense, explained by Von Wright, that N A is done in just those circumstances in which an action is done which brings about a state-of-affairs whose description is the strong contradictory of that of the state-of-affairs brought about when A is done; while nA is done when the action required to bring about the latter state-of-affairs is not done - e.g. because it is impossible. Von Wright gives a set of axioms for monadic predicate calculus, and these could easily be given an imperative interpretation. Their peculiarity is that instead of the single equivalence Enx fnzxn f , which holds in classical predicate cal- culus, there are two, EnxfNZxnf and EZxfNnxnf . Implications hold when N is replaced by n. But there is no relation between either n x f and N z x N f or Xxf and N n x N f .

Von Wright makes the interesting suggestion that if 17x and 2 x are replaced by 0 and P respectively in his axioms (and individual variables dropped, it being a monadic predicate calculus) the result is a better formalisation of deontic logic than his original system. The reason is that, while prohibition is still rendered by On, this is now equivalent not to nP (mere absence of permission) but to NP (posi- tive refusal of permission); and permission is now equivalent to posi- tive refusal to prohibit the act, not to mere absence of this prohibition: not to nOn but to NOn. This suggestion is clearly an advance, and it can easily be adapted to a system of modal imperative logic which I have sketched elsewhere.‘ The question of which modal system ought to be the base of the combined alethic-deontic system, constructed as shown in that paper, when the second negation-symbol is added will not be discussed here.

W e know that norms cannot be true or false. Critical comments on Arne Ncess: Do we know that basic norms cannat be true or false? (Theoria, vol. XXV, I, 1959.1 By D a g 0 s t e r b e r g.

I In a recently published article professor Arne Ness sets out to show

that the widely accepted view - within Scandinavian philosophy - denying the objectivity of norms, cannot be defended.

He devotes the bulk of the paper to demonstrate the insuffiency of

‘ Ibid.

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wellknown a priori arguments to refute the doctrine that norms can be objectively valid. Next, the possibility of settling the matter by a posteriori argumentation is doubted, because every piece of empirical research must be framed within logical categories, and must conse- quently in turn depend upon logical rules, chosen a priori, for their va- lidity. And professor N ~ s s concludes: “Thus the above reasonings re- sult in both rejecting the decisive force of a priori and a posteriori argumentation in answering the question of truth-value of basic norms. I cannot see any way leading to a rational decision. A suspension of judgment, an epoch6, seems appropriate.”

The following attempts to show that the viewpoint of professor N ~ s s , as exposited in the mentioned article, has too many weak points to justify the above-quoted conclusion. At the end the present writer briefly states his own position.

I1 As my critique certainly will contain many “high-order’’ arguments

(I shall try to refute Nzss’ refutation of the refutation of value-ob- jectivism), it might be wise to establish before start what a pro-argu- ment is meant to be in favor of: A pro-argument - regardless of its order - is always in favor of value-nihilism, i.e. the doctrine that norms cannot be true or false. A con-argument, respectively, is always in favor of the reverse doctrine, value-objectivism.

The first pro-argument examined by Nzss is a semantical one: Norms are not propositions, and only propositions can be true or false. Now Nzss argues in the following way: Just as it may be fruitful to extend the application of a scientific concept, it may prove fruitful to let the terms “true” or “false” apply to norm-sentences.

Among many pertinent remarks to this way of reasoning, I make the following: I think the semantical pro-argument should be regarded, not as a case of the “cult of common usage”, but as a statement about the meaning of “truth”. Nzss seems to reason like this: Even if only propositions can have truth-value due to the more or less arbitrary rules for the correct application of the term “true”, it does not follow that norm-sentences cannot be true. But what, then, is meant by “true”? It is tempting to interpret N ~ s s like this: There is one “abso- lutely right” way of defining “truth’. If a sentence satisfies the (pos- sible) criteria of this “absolute truth”, it is absohtely tru‘e. The pre- vailing theories of truth, according to which value-objectivism must be deemed wrong or even meaningless, are but imperfect approxima- tions to this absolutely right conception of truth. So even if norms cannot fulfill the truth-criteria of contemporary philosophy, they may be true in the above-described absolute sense.

Now I think this conception of absolute truth is an extremely hazy

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one, and even if it can be defended, I regard the whole argument to be of a rather trivial kind: If we had a better philosophical understanding, that is, if we discarded our old truth-definitions, we might change our opinion as regards the logical status of norm-sentences.

Nobody would deny this, neither would anyone bother to do so. And it is highly probable that the position of professor Naess involves more than this utter common-place. I claim, however, that he has not stated his view clearly enough. He says: “In short, from premisses telling us how the terms “true”, “false”, “norms” and “proposition” have been used until now, we cannot conclude that norms can, or cannot, be true or false.” If this argument is to have philosophical value, I require as a necessary premiss a reasonably elaborated theory of truth, according to which the difference between “can be true or false” and “can be labelled “true” or “false”” can be rendered intelligible. Such a theory is not presented in the paper at scrutiny.

Let me then turn to professor Nzss’ treatment of the following onto- logical pro-argument: A proposition is true only if it corresponds to some state of affairs. A norm, however, docs not agree with reality, it announces, not that something is the case, but that something ought to be the case.

Nzss is unconvinced by this argument, which he interprets to mean that a sentence can be true or false if it only asserts that something is the case. But clearly norm-sentences can then be true cr false: The Golden Rule is true if it is the case that we should love our neighbour as ourselves. And, says Ncess, whe ther anything is the case or not is a question of fact which cannot be answered a priori.

I am, in my turn, unconvinced by this refutation. The definition of truth einployed here, is of a quite formal nature. In the manner of Tarski it is asserted that “ ‘p’ is true if and only if, p”. This definition - presumably of great heuristic value to the logicians - evades the very problem which concerns us as philosophers, namely, what should be our criteria of truth. The statement that it can be true that we ought to do X if it can be the case that we ought to do X, is undoubtedly true, but it is valueless to us until we know what is meant by “something being the case”. And this question cannot, of course, be answered by reference t o the concept of truth. Cri- teria must be given. Besides this sin of omission there is, however, a logical flaw in professor Naess’ exposition of his view: A norm can be true or false if it can be the case that we ought to do something. And whether something is the case or not is an empirical question. True, but the problem at stake is not whether something is the case, but whether a norm can be true or false, that is, whether it can be the case that something ought to be the case.

In short, I hold that this Tarski-inspired concept of truth has proved

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fruitful to the logicians, just for the reason that it is completely formal and thereby evades the philosophical head-aches connected to the meaning of “truth”. In the discussion of value-objectivism all this talk of “what is the case” hardly amounts to more than a play of words. Evading a problem is not a solution of it.

Professor Nzss now presents the viewpoint of several outstanding value-objectivists belonging to the idealistic tradition in philosophy. I shall not go in detail concerning the teachings of Simmel, Hartmann and Husserl, what would by far transcend my competence (whatever that may be). But I shall throw doubt on the relevance of his argument. It seems that value-objectivism can be intelligibly defended within idea- listic philosophy. But what is the significance of this fact to a philosopher belonging to an analytical, empirical trend? Obviously he cannot adopt the conclusion: “norms can be true or false” if the premises are in- compatible with the frame of reference within which he is thinking. Statements on this issue simply do not mean the same to a Simmel and a Carnap, even if they are given the same wording. So the whole argument of professor Nzss can be reduced to the following: If our view on life were different, so would our philosophical positions. If I had been Edm. Husserl, I would have been a phenomenologist. This is without doubt true, but unfortunately with necessity.

I11 Now I come to the very essence of the problem, as I conceive it. At

the end of his well-known paper “On the Logical Nature of Proposi- tions of Value”,’ professor Ross puts forward the following argument: Granted that some norms are true, why should our knowledge of them influence our behaviour? “I may, for instance, accept the theoretical assertion that lying has the quality of ‘odiousness’ and at the same time without any sort of inconsistence lie on a large scale”.

Against this professor N ~ s s rightly holds that the motivating force of a norm should be kept distinct from its being true or false. And he says: “Thus I do not think the argument of Ross hits the mark.”

And yet, I think the idea of Alf Ross was a crucial one. What he is actually saying is this : Even if value-objectivism were correct, value- nihilism would remain unshaken. I t is an analytical truth that norms cannot be true or false. For what does it mean that a norm is true? Nothing, except that it is true, and that is meaningless.

This opens for an analytical treatment of value-objectivism, as has become usual in the Oxford school. I am in these matters quite in ac- cord with this trend of philosophy, and will now present my own posi- tion to examplify their way of tackling the problem.

Theoria, vol. 11, 1945.

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IV I think that the notions of ‘ought’, ‘norm’, ‘expectation’, ‘responsi-

bility’ and ‘choice’ are not independent of each other, but that they form a structure of ‘action concepts’, the elucidation of which gives a clue to our problem.

Let me start with the word “ought”. The primary use’ of “ought” always involves that someone is telling another to take a certain at- titude towards the world. It may be God, the police-man or the public opinion who wants me to act in a certain way. I may even expect my- self to do something.

Now it may be true that 1 ought to do X if somebody actually wants me to. The answer to the question: “Ought I to do X?” is a matter of psychological or sociological fact. It is either true that some authority expects me to do something, or I am mistaken.

But such existing expectations can neither determine nor justify my actions: The recognition of a norm - true or not - cannot causally compel me to act, as opium makes us sleep, because that would con- tradict what we mean by ‘norm’ and ‘action’. An action does not hap- pen to us, an action is something we do, and the logic of action con- cepts is not that of ‘cause and effect’, but of ‘reasons and ends’.

But a norm cannot justify my actions either, because I must al- ways take an attitude toward it: I have to choose whether to obey or deviate from it, and this holds for even the most Absolute, Transcen- dental or Eternal Laws of Mankind. And my choice cannot have any ultimate foundation. It is - in the last analysis - utterly unjustified. In fact, this is what we mean by a ‘choice’. I am always responsible for my choice. If my choice did have an ultimate foundation in some ‘true’ norms or values, so that I could defend my choice by pointing back to those true values and thereby elude responsibility, we simply would not call it a ‘choice’. (Excuses, indeed, often consist in arguing that the agent “really had no choice”.) But I cannot conceive of such a foundation, because then we should never be allowed to speak of ‘choices’ and ‘actions’ anymore, and that is to me an absurd come- quence.

Not all human behavior is responsible action, but at least a part of it must be, (at any rate, this is a conditio sine qua non for the moral philosopher’s activity to make sense.) And ‘action’ implies ‘choice’, which by its nature is unjustifiable.

Hence I conclude: We know that norms cannot be true or false, be- cause it is true with logical necessity. The question: “Can norms be true or false?” cannot be answered in a synthetic manner. The answer lies in the very meaning of the word ‘norm-sentence’.

In the sense of P. H. Nowell-Smith.

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Argumentation No. 1 a Premiss 1: norms are not propositions. Premiss 2: all definitions of truth in philosophical literature until

now have included a stipulation that only propositions can be true or false .

Conclusion: only propositions can be true or false Even this conclusion seems to me unwarranted. One might say: ac-

cording to every definition in philosophical literature until now, only propositions can be true or false. But formulations of definitions in philosophy are implementations of certain tasks, f . inst. relation to explication or analysis of actual use of the terms “true” and “false” in certain texts. Definitions are considered more or less good and there are more or less generally accepted rules of when to discard a defini- tion and adopt a new one. In the case of definitions of truth and fal- sity, the core of the definitions are not a stipulation that only proposi- tions may be true or false, but expressions such as “agreement with reality”, “coherence” etc.

Osterberg would be right in maintaining that my criticism of the conclusions in argumentation No. 1 and No. 1 a is common-place or trivial. But considering the actual situation, namely that some norms are by some philosophers and many non-philosophers claimed to be true (or false), the insufficiency of arguments based on definitions or on denotata in philosophical literature should be pointed out. Those who maintain &at they know that norms cannot be true or false because of certain definitions, should state their reasons why they think those who do not deny the possibility of true norms, should adopt a defini- tion of truth such that norms cannot be true or false.

Osterberg agrees that it can be true that we ought to do X if it can be the case that we ought to do X, but adds that “it is valueless to us until we know what is meant by “something being the case”. “Criteria must be given, says Osterberg, and he thinks it a “sin of omission” that I do not offer criteria.

Now, formulations of general criteria of something being the case are scarcely helpful, perhaps because ‘to be the case’ is something very fundamental and very simple. Phenomenologists have offered masterly and vivid accounts of what is experienced when judging something to be the case. Especially the descriptions of self-evidence, of insight that so-and-so evidently must be the case, are impressive pieces of literature. There is, however, something unsatisfactory in the pheno- menological accounts if addressed to people who are uncertain about which criteria of ‘being the case’ are good criteria. Either ones intui- tions fit the descriptions or one has no reason to accept them. But even if it may be unfruitful to search for general criteria that something is

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the case, particular criteria might be useful. I consider it to be the case that 7 f 5 is 12, that only extended things can be green, that dynamite is explosive, and that one ought to act with due regard to consequences. I can state special reasons for considering each being the case.

As to norms, I have the suspicion - backed up by psychological and sociological theories - that corresponding special reasons are not so strong or so good as in certain cases of sensory experience, or of logic or mathematics. But I have not found and cannot formulate any con- vincing general and direct criticism a priori of norms being true or false. Sometimes what norms assert is to me and many others as compelling in their evidence and just as independent in their validity froin my likes and dislikes as mathematical or any other propositions.

Is it an empirical question whether something is the case or not? My answer has been yes. But it seems to me now that the answer rests on an unduly general concept of ‘empirical’, taking it roughly to be equivalent to ‘ontological’. One may ask whether it is the case that an absolute proof of consistency is not available for the whole of arith- metic. I would say it is - as formulated - an ontological question, but not empirical. May be “factual question” is a better term: if something is the case or not the case, it is either a fact or not a fact. It is a factual question in contrast to one (e.g.3 of terminological conveniency or convention.

As to whether something can be the case, I agree with Osterberg that it is a different question (from the point of view of connotation) from that of whether something is the case. But in so far definitions of ‘true’ and of ‘norm’ and related terms leave it open as to whether norms can be true, I do not see how it can be concluded that norms cannot be true. If definitions, or more general, conceptual structures, agreed upon by convention (among very distinguished authors), do not rule out a possibility, I cannot see that it remains other things to do than to show that something in fact do not exist, i.e., that there actually are not true (or false) norms.

Thus I am not convinced that there is a logical flaw where Oster- berg sees one.

Osterberg touches a very important point in the following words: “It seems that value-objectivism can be intelligibly defended within idea- listic philosophy. But what is the significance of this fact to a philo- sopher belonging to an analytical, empirical trend? Obviously he can- not adopt the conclusion: “norms can be true or false” if the premisses are incompatible with the frame of reference within which he is think- ing. Statements on this issue simply do not mean the same to a Simmel and a Carnap, even if they are given the same wording. So the whole argument of professor Naess can be reduced to the following: If our view on life were different, so would our philosophical positions. If I

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had been Edm. Husserl, I would have been a phenomenologist. This is without doubt true, but unfortunately with necessity.”

I doubt very much that Osterberg would find it adequate to say “Norms cannot be true or false because I think within a frame of re- ference such that norms cannot be true or false”. As soon as one can formulate a frame of reference one do not think completely inside it and one should be able to state whether they are considered to express postulates, self-evident truths, etc.

There are certain fundamental positions found among idealists or pla- tonists (G. Simmel, Nic. Hartmann, E. Husserl, A. Church) such that, if they are believed in, one is likely to believe not only in the possi- bility but even in the actuality of true norms. Just because they are fundamental it is hard to find a frame of reference that goes still deeper and from which the belief can be shown to be a false belief. A t least I have not found any empirical or analytical position satisfying this condition. My conclusion is therefore that I do not know that (basic) norms cannot be true or false. The position of Aristotle seems to me to be wise when he denies that principles represent knowledge. What is so fundamental that it cannot be shown to be the case by reference to more fundamental [true) principles is not known.

If by a ‘fundamental frame of reference’ or a ‘set of basic assump- tions’ is meant what I take it to mean, the ultimately ontological or factual question ‘what can be the case?’ has no answer which con- stitute a piece of knowledge. One may vehemently disagree that norms can be true or false, but this is no proof of the cognitive character of the disagreement.

In reply to Bsterberg I would say that if one sees analytical and em- pirical frames of reference as special frames of reference at the same level as idealist and Platonist frames, one is apt to consider explications of the frames as sets of postulates rather than insights. And in that case answers to ‘what can there be’ and ‘what can be the case’ will either be postulational or derivations from postulates.

Osterberg tries to show that by logical necessity norms cannot be true or false. According to him “ought” has a primary use, and this use is such that it involves necessarily someone telling another to do some- thing: It is true that I ought to do X if an authority expects me to do X. But why obey the authority?

In some instances of “ought”, the analysis by Osterberg may be cor- rect. But it is certainly not correct of those instances which are of interest in our present discussion. All authorities may be wrong: they may tell me that I ought to be an informer but I know I ought not. “Why should I obey?” is a pertinent question if I am told by some- body to do something. But in judging “I ought to do X’, there is

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not a question of obeying somebody else. There is a sense in saying “All authorities say I ought not to do X, but nevertheless I ought to do X.” Whether this is a primary use I consider irrelevant in the present context. I think empirical investigations of the use of “ought” would reveal that ought is often used in this impersonal way, and I do not see how one could argue validly against that use in support of 0ster- berg’s thesis.

Thus, hypotheses about the use of “ought” do not warrant us to conclude that norms by logical necessity cannot be true or false.

As regards the theory of responsibility and choice suggested by (asterberg, I am afraid I do not understand it. Whether I act according to a true norm or violate it, I am in both cases responsible for my ac- tion. Jaspers, who seems to hold opinions closely similar to 0sterberg’s concerning the ‘I’ and its ‘freedom’ does not see any incompatibility between objective validity of moral laws and the “inescapable” respon- sibility of the ‘1’. It adopts it and enable it to become itself. It seems to me strange that 0sterberg from his point of view can tell an other person that norms by logical necessity (common to both persons] can- not be true or false. I do not pretend, however, to understand his theory. My remarks are therefore purely parenthetical.

*

NOTE

In his paper A three-valued calculus for deontic logic Mark Fisher makes a reference to an unpublished work of Peter Geach. Mr. Geach has, in a letter, pointed out to me that this reference must be a mistake as the work referred to does not exist.

The Editor