wd aef bulletin 06 - bulletin for field officers number 6.pdf

7/25/2019 WD AEF Bulletin 06 - Bulletin for Field Officers Number 6.pdf

1/8


2/8

DEFENSE

AGAINST TANKS

225TII INF NTRYIVISION

IA No 5200

SEPTBMBER

1918.

Pursuant to the dispositions made by General Headquarters con-

cerning th e experiences in the last defensive engagements the follow-

main points for anti-tank operations are set fortl~. Regimental

talion and company and battery cornmanclers are enjoined to give

their respective troops thorough instruction on these points

A IN

GENERAL

The infantry must be insistently in str~ctecl hat enc ay tanks

in themselves have no figlrting powers whatever and tha t their

shooting is inaccurate; their effect is principally a moral cffoct.

Bxgerlencc has shown tliat infantry on its own initiative with the


3/8

cut off just the s mie as, lor csamplc, nlnclii~~c -gunrews that have

been stoppcel in our rcar b y tanks (as has often lmppened); they are

citl~rr1cr;tn)ycclbyour firc or put ou t cf action by 011.j. hrompt counter

:~ttaclr. l h t so much the inorc is i t absolutely esscntial that tlic

infantry isai~ltain he s1i;upcst observation totvi~r tl ho front , in orcler

io

rccogdih in tiine and to bring u~lclcrdcstrucWvc fire the enemy

ill at nlay be clangerous to us-thc cncmy ipfantry-which eithe r

follo? ,close behind th e tanlrs or else aft er a considerable interval.

R

TRRBXIIAVIOR F

TIT 5

X N ~ ~ N T R I I ND ,I\ ~ASUIIIW

O

BE TAKEN

OR

COMBATTINGNKMV~ A NK S

I

T h e

il fnlztry

conzhafs

t nks at closa rnqp son nletms at

rnost-with armor-piercing ammunition, and a t still closer rang(:

wit11 Iland grcnacle balls ( two hitnd grenadc heads bound with tvirp,

to another hand grenadc) by throwing thc lattcr on the citterpillar

chains or against the perpendicular surfaces

of

tltc tank.

Hand-

grcnade balls will be copi o~~ slyl:~Cccl along t he line of 1nail-i

resistance

Nauptruiecierstnltdslinie)

whicll is cspccially exposcd to ta nka tta cks ,

m d in the rcar weas (alcrng lines, in machhic-gun ~nc sts ). Single

hand grcnarics arc without elfect. When tanlrs arrivc at our lines in

spi te of precautions, in fm tr y will give way t o eithc P sirlc.

Expcricnce Lcachcs that idantry often opens fire too sou11, ancl

shoots wild. Hence the principle: Onl y by

well-ninced Blre

nt

close

m z g e

can t d i s bc put out of action. The nzen mnst bc instructed

with picturcs exactly a t what points t hc tanlrs arc vulncrnblc to ulcir

wcapcms.

2

Measures

o

n passive

matzwd.-Tank tr aps cIistriL~utcc1 n

rlopth Ior blocking tho Mosclle Valley roacl ih question, tlw lJcy-et\-

hay^.--Norroy road, swamping l hc L rcp VallQy, blowing up o roads

leading out of

villages,

briilgcs, laying out mine-fields wltliin the

scctor, arc Jr ea dy unclcr w:~y. Tho Commaaclcr of Pioacel-s is made

responsible for the clircction and speccly executicnl of the work. Maps

oI thc worlcs undcr construction (passive tank dcfcusc) iu conaectioil

with thc active ta nk tlelCnsct (Art.,M G s.,

L .

M s.) will br @yyn t o 111o

units.

C

CONCLUSIONS

In all cnenzy attaclts in which tanlrs are ngecl the cnemy infan try

rcmains our principal opponent,

Tanlrs will

be

attenrlccl to by our

scar cloienses, By rcason of tllcir smoll fighting powers thcy a re

unable to execute an encircling movement, o r to gain a ny tactical

advantage. Eve ry ntcitns must, tbcrclore, be used to raise tho con-

fidence of our infant ry in our woapons and moans of clofcnse. Divi-

sions th at have becn atlaclrctl many iirnes by tanlrs dcclare that t he

in fa nt ~y , cforc thc first tanlc attaclc, considers tllc tarlks

as

much

worse tha n they r edl y arc. The sple~lclicl ire effect ol our defensive

means, which has dcstroyecl one tan k af ter anothcr, has t aught thcm

better. Thcrcfore, thc men mtlst tmclcr no circunlstntlces losc thcir

LESSONS LEARNED

I N

A N T l T A N R

F G H T I N G

3

ncrvc upon the first appearance of tanlrs. Fur ther , whcn tanlts hava

broken through our positions, these positions must still be clefended

according t o arclers; in no case cloes the breaking thr ough of ta nks

offer a reason for withdrawal. This must be nmde thoroughly clear

to every infantryman.

(Signed) JUNG.

LESSONS LEARNED IN RECENT ANTI TANK

IGHTING

No

322

SWT.

18.

Not to be taken i d o he front l ine Ivenches

A

widc use is t o be made of th e megaphone and of the signal of

attention

by buglc.

Wireless: the post must bc occnpiecl day and

night. Visual signals: bengal flares used up t o now are too wcalr for

use in foggy weather.

Sta cks of fire wood, sprinlclccl with gasoline,

kerosene and other inflammable liquids will be lighted at particularl y

suita ble points. Strea ms of fire will be shot vertically ancl rcpcateclly

by tho flame projectors. Mobile observation syste ms motor-cyclists,

cyclists, cav alry patro ls and telephone shall be usccl. A large nnm-

bcr ol megnphoncs a nd bugles will be in rcadi nc~swithin the villages.

Tank

Trenches.

Tllcsc will

be

prepnrecl in thc laws through which tlzc tank is

obligcil t o pass, across tlic cntirc width of t he road (a t lcnst fivr

nmtcrs) and be well conccalcd by camoufiage; tlic boarding mnst bc

such that only light vehicles, ~vcighing our tans a t the most, can

cross thcm. If possible, the clitches ar e to be filled with watcr to a

tlcpth

of

two meters as t he water stops th e motor, or anti-tank mincs

placccl a t the bot tom with an a utoma tic clcvicc for clischarging.

She routcs available for hoavy artillery will be de arly ~n arkctl ut.

Awli 2nn.W

Bawiers .

l~ermancnt arriers which nligllt hinder our own traflic will not

bc constructecl unncccsserily.

The new Vrencll tanlrs, sniall moilcl,

ar c only 1.70 meters widc.

Obstacles

will conscqncntly l ~ c on-

structetl. Care will be ta ken th at the concrcte blocks arc firmly sct;

otherwise

Lhe ta nk will displace thc m. Thc tank cnnnot bc stoppctl by

bloclis lcss than two nietcrs high.

I t is ntlvisnhlc tlm1

n

ditch onc

lnclcr c1cc.p he (lag in h n t o llw slapping

l h r k

in

suvh

wag

t h a t


4/8

i t forms an acutc angle at t lic brtsc with t l ic concrct il lh c k :inti tll;lt

th e stopping block bc sturltlccl with rails o r T-irolis in th e ilircction fronl

whic l~ lic knlk is cspcctecl.

(Sce sltclrll.)

If harricrs arc constructetl out of a gricultura l nmchiaes i t is

necessary to join tli c~ u ogether with a qen nti ty of iron wire; tak e

advantage of tlic pointed nletal parts, snch as harrows, cic., which

w ill c ~ t c hn th c caterpillar tread. Tllcsu kin d of barric rs will fulfil1

their purpose only

if

cons tructed on narrow roads t o a depth o

10

t o 20 meters. Strctcliccl iron wirc is useloss ns tlie tuilr rolls over it ,

Trnprovisecl barricrs ar c ma de

of

barricades wi th vi~r ious andy

rnatcrial os of stopping blocks fornzcd out of trce-trunks inzhctltled

in

thc ground and coverctl with earth or slonc.

A

vehicle placcd across the ro ad can only

stop

tlic Lank if

of

large

size and loaded with stone.

Small orcl in~ry chiclcs arc not suifi-

cient.

All

barriers can s top thc prugcss of the a r~ kor

a

longer o r ~h or lc r

pcriod only; tlicy cannot stop it dcfiuitcly nor destroy it.

lJnr this

reason tlic system of passiva dcfensos

will ho

complcmcntetl by

pwticularly uctivc clcfcnsivc mctl\ods.

3.

A c n v e

Dr .E hNS

The effcct

of S

aznnwmition is nil; that

of

i : i~laa~unit lonarmor-

piercing)

against tank s of ncw n ~otl cl s doubL[ul.

l'lir bulltlt o thi?

anti-tank riflc passcs Illrough the present arurror p h t r ; t maxirnum

&tance of goo motors;

it

is nccrssary, tlicrcforc, to lot tllo el~tlks

approa ch. Groups of anti-tan k siflcls

will

b Eolmctl; tlicsc .rvoapnns

will be cntrustad only to experioncccl

:md

cud-hcitclotl riflemen.

Bomb-tlvowcss will br couritetl on only Ins clu~ ncr* its in vosy

vulncmablc pa rt s of th a tnnlr.

I g M r cn c li r no rt ar s p ie rc e t l ~ c r n ~ o r - p l d c ; pcchl soft-nosotl

projectiles

have jus t bceu i~~tr ocl i~c cd.i ortlor

to

dinii~lisll lispcr-

sion , tlic firing is to bo cltrtie Srarn

Lhc plxlfami

as much ns yoasiblo.

Guns t m h e ~ r c a t c s tnemics of tm l i s . C ootZ r c a ~ ~ l l src ol,Cairzed

with tho field gun nm lel

196

using brass ccirtrlclgc c;isr.

ITp LO rgoo

mctcrs every artillcry projcclilc is cll'ct'livr; for tlistanccs over 1500

lnetcrs soft-nosed proicclilcs will he uscrl, On ~c co nn t its Io\v r i lt ~

of

fire the field m o d d 1x6 is lcss sui lalh .

SZrcl

r w t r i r l p ~- ;~s t~sn.c

not s i~i is factory s thcy

jn

ni l o o frcqucully.

GERM N ESTIM TE

O F

T N K S 6

Ilxccllcnt results are obtained with flamc projectors by directing

tho firc on the loop-holes. This weapon is particularly suitablc for

the defcnse of villages. The crcw awaits thc tank under covcr bchind

tlie honsos, ctc. One arm y proposes, when the terrain is provided

with good points for observation, to group all the means for active

tlcfense in such a way as to form ant i-tan k redoubts. All thc means

for acti ve defonso arc collected there under t hc sole commancl of an

energotic officer, all men being rcsolvcd to hold out to .the last and to

destroy all thc tanlrs coming witliin range. Th e composition of such

rctloubts would be one or

t wo

guns, one or two light trench nzortars,

two macliinc guns, three or four anti-tank riflcs, one or two flame

projectors; obstacles will be constructccl around the group.

The ta nk s arc always follo\vccl by hostile infan try ancl oftcn by

cavalry.

Tllc main point to be observed in ilefcnsc is that nobody lose his

hcad :wtl that cv ery nnit bc held firmly in hi~ntl y an encrgctic lcadcr.

GERMAN ESTIlVTATE OF T NKS

C:otnnzeqbt by G c r r n m

1flicrr.s o

the pth I rzfnutvv l?~g irncw t,

28th

IJiuisiow.

'Lhc Germim Arm y untlercstimatecl thc valu e o f tanlcs, r~nd here

fore when we hav e necrlrtl them tlicrc havc bccn none available.

Thc

iirst tanlrs intmclucecl by tllc British c arlier in tlic wa r worc so licavily

constructccl an d so slow in movemcnt th at from our p oint of view

thc y were practica lly valuclcss. 170s these reasons, the German

Govcmment consi i lered the

employment

and construction of tanlcs

of no aclvantage, bu t in thc course of time the Briti sh sleadily irnprovetl

on their or iginal ~nncl~inesntil th ey now a rc in possession of an

rxtreu~zclyeikctivc wcapon against which wc havc an inacleqnatc

ckfcnse consisting mercly of li ght field gnns wllicli a t best arc

impracticable.

I t has talccn us a long tinle to realize what; powerful

weapons tanks really arc, so tha t now, wlicn i t is probably

t oo

Into.

we are attempting

to

bring up, to tlic line machines tha t measure u p

to tlic British stanrlartl but which in actual practice arc far below it.

'I.lm

failure of our ow n original tanlts was cxcnscil by the phasc Only

t11c)sc troo ps w llo l iav c los t th cir 17GrVC ncerl t ho s upp ort of lanlrs ,

nurl having pcrsuarlctl oarselvcs tlmt this was I r n c wc ni;~rlc o fnr l l in

IMP

1

our r l ~ ~ n ~ s y~ ~ n s t ~ ~ i c i i o n s .


5/8

ORGAMXZATXON OF REGIMENTAL PI NE NW ER FE R COM-

PANIES-TH EIR US E TO COMBAT TANKS

It is apparent from various signs that the Gcrnu~n ommand

found th at divisional

hf

W. conipanics do not meet t he nccds of t he

1wescnt warfarc, and with a view t o releasing n ~ c nor inhnt ry scrvicr

has ilccidctl to abolish divisionttl

M. W

companies and form rcgi..

nicntal companies.

From a captured German c.locumont of August ~ 7 t ht is cviclcut

h a t his reorganization is basccl on the following

principles

1st.

Assignment of t he personnel f rom tll c i1ivision;~l onqmnies

;tn~ong he reginwntal companics.

zrl,

Using tllc esistiug rcsonlccs of tllc inl nntr y

R4

I\ ,dctacll-

ments for the formation of rcgimcntnl coiiipanics.

I t seems th at bcsiclcs lllc itlca

of

amel iora ting t11t~ lolicicncy in

lllc inlan try pcrsonncl, tllc Ccsnxm high co n~mant l n fonning tllcwb

rcgimcntal M.W. companies has had in nsintl forming spucinl units

co~1ntcr a illcans of combat tha t is giving il: Inure and nztrrr

anxiety.

An orclcr

of

I,uciontlorff clatecl August 7,

I Q I N

is quotctl

"In order to eI~cctiv cly ombat tanks t21c grcntcst ilqwr tiz nc~

must be attachcd to the iustrl~ctiollof the persor~ncl n t hc us^ of

ligl~t

.

W, with flat trajcctorics mcl itnti-hnlr rifles.

More than one soldicr

of

tllc gJlant U.

\V.

forces will rcgrcl

seeing tho divisional companies tlissolvccl; howcvur, :mi suro tlli tt

ovary om fainilar will1 the tactical conditions which maltc this c l i i ~ n g ~

imperative

will rcjoicc in seeing tho beginning

of n

morc iutiintitc

ini ion

with the infan try. Tllc fight agsinst tanlcs, wllicll is assaxniug

nu extraorclinary iiuportancc, bccomos th e first cnus i(1w~t ion

N W.

~lnits.''

'lhc Sollowing armament is given to rCgini cnta l

M. W

cslnpanios

2 111cdiumM. .

t) light M. W

anti-tank riflcs.

'l'hc n~ccliumM.

W.

arc cxclnsivoly iutcnclctl lor position 'ivnrIt2rc

nncl dcfcnsive war far e. All illc light M. W , must Iw ~~rrwitlctlit11

flat trajectory carriages.

Ih

cn should have pmctic-r in firing ligllt

M

against wondcu

C

USES OF DEFE T O THE X d

GERM N RMY

7

tml rs a t clistanccs of from 200 to 300 meters. Practice firing should

also hc conducted with medium and heavy M.

W.

upon the lanes

tl~ro11g11 hich tanlcs must follow.

THE CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT

OF

THE

IId

GERMAN ARMY

According

to

the reports of tllc oIGcers sen t by the High Commancl

into the zono of ba ttle o tho I Id Army, t he dcfetlt of this army is due

to t he following Eacts:

I . 'rho troops dlowcd thc~u sclvcs o be talrcn by surprisc by

c~tts~clrsf t;ullcs in large nunzbcis, ant1 above al l, lost all cliscipli~lc

when ttmks, which llad succccdccl in brealring th rough owing lo a

~r nt wa l r artificial log, appeared suclclenly bchincl tl~ eni.

2 '111~ nclvanccd zonc of combat as well as t he positions a nd

scctors n~orcn tlic scar had neither positions nor supplcnzcntary

tlcfcnscs sufic ien t to offer a metllodical resislance.

3

l3atLalir)ns n reserve and the reserves of larger units ilicl not

11i~vcuou~11~rtilloryrnmctliatclv ava ilable to e nable tlleni

to

oppose

atltlil ional arli llcry rosist:tncc against the cncmy nncl t:~nlrs vllic11 lad

1)roltcn through.

'l'l~c following is I-horcfore ticccssary

I As

I

lmvc alrcncly prcscribcil in my onlcr In Nn. 9.7~8,ecret,

op. Angust 8 i t is nccessnry to t ake niorc care t han I)c.forc to fiml

out tllc tlisposition LIE tllc cnclny by taking prisancrs, by matching tlw

terrain lr o n~ pecial observatories of the ccntew

of

information, by

norid rcconnaissancc,

y

listening posts, etc. In t he prcscnt situation

we must oxpect surprise nttaclts in other scctors or the front.

?'he grcat cst vigilance is necessary n t d ;~ y rcalr. and cluring tho

ct~ rly ours ol tlw inoming, as surprisc attaclcs arc gcrren~lly lartctl

LC

t l d s t he ,

Inr

the tcnsion of the night pxl uc es a certain rclasn-

tion

of

th r nerves and slrengtb of thc

men.

Ilcct nC csporicncc llns

p u ) v ~ d1111t an ii lq~ccti on S tll(> rot)11s ixt this tinw is p:~r licularly

nccvss:lry.


6/8

be attac hcd to t he defense agajnst tanlcs and. the tmops' dislilrc of

digging should be overcome in every way

possible.

II

in certain places in the advanced zoae, in an activc scctor and

bcfore a vigilant enemy, the organization

of

trenches am1 the siting

of supplementaly defensive positions is of neccssity

a

slow opcrnt ion,

commanding oficers must, nevertheless, sec to it that the infantry

digs itself in quiclcly, and prote cts itself b y

supplementary

clefenscs,

so small works conceded from view will change littlc by little into

continuons clemants and finally into lines.

But i t is absolutely necessary t ha t work shoulcl go ahcntl more

rapidly on the terrain

further

back, which is not altogetlicr under fire

of the enemy artillery. Above d l attention must bc paid lo Lhc

construction of points of support n ~ ~ t u a l l ylalllcing caclr other,

in

organizing with networlrs of wire cntan glencnts for a detcrminctl

clcfense, of villages, farms, woocls, and roads, a ~ l d stnblishing anti -

tank clefenscs. Even in rear positions continuit y must bc sought fo r

(fire support, visual comlmmication ctc.).

I t

is beyond all rcason

to assnmc that ttanlcs, having pcnetratccl aclvauccd positiotzs witlrout

lneeting either obstacles or resistance, shoulcl bc ablc t o continuc

several lrilometers on the roads o r alongside of them , right n p to

divisional

headquarters.

3

The idea that troops even though surronnclecl slroulcl, in

clofault or othcr orders, clcfcnd their battlc scctor to the vcry last

n1an and t o the very last cartriclgc, sccrns to havo been cntirc ly 6)s-

gotten.

The cnemy who executes an e~lci rcliug zoveaicnt is hinrrclr

turncd , and a11 parl s of a break through must be closecl,

Our Inen are not justified in falling back w l~ cn i~lglc nnks urld

cnvalry cletachn~ents reak tl lr ou gl ~ 'Lhey will be put

ou t

o f action

by skilful1 tacti cs of tho rcservcs.

:

A largc numnber of our troops fight badly a gainst tanks.

Tn-

structlon on this subjcct should be pushed.

a. tank: falls an casy prey to artillery

of

all mlibms.

Tlic

first thing ncccssary is that part of th e Ficld Artillcry s l d l not be

in fortified c~nplaccments,which lattcr makcs t hc use of each

gun

in

any clirection impossilAe,

t slzould be placccl in such a position tlzi~L

it can assist in repulsing a, tanlc attack as well as a cavalry atta ck,

th at is to say , in t hc open or on t he cclge of woods with aground obser-

vation station near by, The rcmnining artiller y clemcnts should also

be clisposcd in suc h a lrlanncr that their guns may tlcfeutl thcmsclvcs

against th c tanlrs.

I n

addition single guns shonltl be lalrcn several

kilometers

belzii~il

the principal line of rcsistance, t o sc~cllpoints as are particularly

imp ort mt, the entrance to villages, etc. Thc duty of tllesc

RUIIS IS

to put out of action rluicltly and at short rmge such tanlcs as ~ n ~ y

11avr 1)rolron through. Op cn in ~ ire prcrnilt~~rrly arns t h e tank.

1 .

' I ' r t ~ d ~ort;vs

giv

the sitlllr rcsi~lts.

'I'llcir lack of prc-

c ) ~ r

( I ~ W ; L I ~ ~ Hiri* a t short rangrt.

111

:ltltlition, i nlnutry will gct out of t11v way to permit tlle firc

O the arlillcry a r i t l of

th ix

lrclnrli mork~rs, nrl will take up tlie fight

against t he rllcnty illfiullry, \.irllich gci l~ ~r dl yollows quite

:L

disklncc

bcliintl tllc

tarilzs.

'l'lic use o nv~chitir uns against tsnlrs ; ~ tollg

ruugt is Ear1)irldcn; it is uwlcss

i l~ l i l

W[LS~CS ~n~nl~x~itioll .

11 .

I:iti:~lly

r o

110t fo rg ~t

~ I S S ~ Y ~ C

O ~ O I ~ S C S

arricildes, tro11chcs,

clrstruction

o f

lwidgl ntltl of mads, placing of fougasscs and contact

mines. Ilvcn iE

L ~ I S

cltlfenscs:m bmlrcn clown, or crossed by the

tanks , t1ic.y will ~it ~vc ~.L lio li~ sselay tliem

oncl

n~ ak e ur work of dcfcnse

easier. 'l'hc greatvst rr~ ~c~ ura ge~ ~zc tlthould be given to the active

:LI~(It ~ v w t i v ~ ~~ li il ts f ~ ~ l l > i ~ l t ~ r l l ~n tlic construction of thesc works.


7/8

ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE

In our last account of opcrntions on th e Wcstern Fron t (paxiqdilct

No. 3 Lessons 'Taught by th e Attack of March ~1 s t ) e clcnlt with

tllc beginning of the grcat offensive which the Rritisll Army has suc-

ceeded in maintain ing from tlie beginning of August down l o the

present date. I t is already clear tha t this operation will mnlr as onc

of th e outstanding features of the war. 30s sustainecl vigor, for thcx

great material a d mechanical nleans emnployecl, for its clccisivr

influence on the Gcrinan arm y hi France, its iaiportancc can hardly

be exaggerated. And Anlcrican clivisions [lave shown u p to great

adv t~n tagc n fighting among tlic I3ritish. I3ut for tlie nioment v

have not tlic space at our disposal tu give :~tlequatc ccount ol tlwsc

cvcnts and must come rapidly to what concerns inorc iinm~diatrly

the American Army viewed. as

n

whole.

For bcl~inil he working out of the strilring opemiions o f thr last

three months on the front,

w

mus t not losc sight of Ilic fact th at

behincl Lhe line of ba tt le a nlil itary eve nt was occuring

of

quite as

much significance as the combats tl~cn~sclvrs.Llis was the fonna-

tion of the American Arniy. I-Iowcver grcat a par1 our troops ancl

our cnininancl may have playccl during tllc critical moment whru thr

title tunle d in July, wc were then still playing an undeveloped pa rt

in the war,-mcrcly llelpiilg our allics with a division llorc i ~ ~ t l1

division there. Since then, wcclc by wcclc, througll th e height

of

t11c

struggle, deteriniilecl policy and hard work were mpitlly aggrcg:~ling

our divisions into wha t became abon he miclclle or thc closc

o

AugusL

tlic First American Arnzy.

Witho ut discussing the reasons for this, it h ad long bee11 r ~ r r a n g r t l

t1i:~I:when forinccl our armies slioulrl operate on t ha t par t

of

Lhc Front

which may roughly be describccl as lyin g to thc east of the Ar gonnr.

In that

direction

wcre some outslanrling features: th e ancient lortrcss

of Vercl~m, he scene of the terrific Ggliting of

1 9 ~ 6 ;

11c remarlmblr

salient

of

St . Mihicl, one of t he str ong points of the (;ernznn line

in

li'rance; and just back of the Gcrman linc the Bricy lirlils which 1i:~vc

been one of the grcat f actors in Lhc conilu rt ol operations and just by

tl~einMetz, the grc at aclvancc concentration po int which (Ecrnmny for

a gm~eration ast h t ~ l elcl like the point of a sword towartls I'nris.

It was natural that it shoulcl hxvo bcon in this direction that thosr

rcsponsiblc for the hnuclling ol our

First Arniy shoul ~l ~a vc nolwl.

Thc Chrm;~n osilion at St. Milliol prcscutrd a rrii ~:~rlcnl~lcin-

bination of natural and military features.

The Cotes de Meusc.,

bordering

iliat rivrr on Llic cast, lomi

I

strilring chain of hills rising al ~u ut 50 feet w r y sharply Irom lli r

hilcuse valley

lo thr

wrsl and thr 1Vocvrc.s 11 ll1r casl.

S ~ Pills arc

licavily wuorlctl and ikcply cut by ravines in all tlirectiuns; i n otlicr

words what will1 good clr.~inagc nd dense u ~iclcrbrush hey arc admir-

d>ly ~cla~pLetlor tlefelise in truuclz warfare. The Gcnnan positions

strctclicd froirt

n

conical Id11 just suutli

o

St. Mihiel, the Camp iles

lioinnus, right along th e Cotes for about 2 lalis. nortliwarcl a t which

p h t the y desccnclctl ~zort heast crly nto the lowlanils. St. Millie1

itself lay a t the b ot to n~ f a natural cup and sul'ferecl throug 1~)ui om-

pnr:ttively littl e damage save from aerial boir~bart lment. The JVocvrcs

is the

n

turol counterpart

o

th e cllain of hills,-an ill drained lowlantl

full

o

niarslics ant1 pontls, ill atlaptccl to clefensivc works, and indcccl

to any

Eom of

n~i lit ary perations. Immediately cast o l St. BiIihiel,

lio~vevcr,

L

prc)j~cti ng p r of hills reduced the widtli

t r I

this tlistrict

to onl y few lrilonietcrs of bad ground beyond mliicli, still moving

abo ut tluq east , onc renclieil the next rise of hills, Lortlcring on tho

Moselle., I k m i St . hIiliic1 to th e Moselle is about 30 lrnis.; ratlicr more

tha n olne-half of thi s t1ist;~ncc s clifticult ground, but roughly r~b out

midway a fairly gootl front could be found where troops could be

hantllcc~ n the att ack and where clcfensive positions wcre not too

strong.. This pi ~r t f th e southorn lace of th e salient was therefore

clearly id$icated a s a poinl: of attaclc.

Coming. now to th e lines of com~nunicntionwithin the salient,

tlie m ap intlicatecl in th e clearest possible way tha t a n attac k from

lllc soutll face should be ~i ln cd t reaching %hiancourt extending as

far to t hc west as possible in th e direction of Vigneulles. 'I'hcse two

point s were tho kno ts of roads controlling the apex of th e salient some

I

or 5 Icilonzc~tcrs

outheasterly

towar ds St. Mihiel. Assunling

a

reasonable clcgpc

o

success it was apparent, lzowcver, that Thiau-

curt multl be q 6 x c asily rdnchcd than Vigneulles, while tlie imi n

road St . Mihicl-Vigneulles woulrl give thc Gerninns a sufficient incans

lor witli ilrawiug thei r troopb if leEt uninter ruplecl long enough. 'Vhc

clucs tian tluxefor~ rose wliclhcr it might not bc possible to force the

~mt .hcrnntl

oI

tl lc Gcrn~a.nrl osition across tlic Cotes do Meuse ant1 to

1)rcak tlimugh along th e~ hi ll s outlleasterly some 13,000 yards from

new Lcs Kparges t o Vigneulles. 111this way the cl~anc cs

f

cutting tlic

main Gcrnx~nine

r l

co~smunicatiori

would

bc ilclublcd.

It could not, of course, havc heen Inrscc~z t the tiinc when the

opcmtion was plantzed wllcther or not the C~crn\i~nommand would

decide to mdce

a

fig111 lor the salicnt. Tllc general situ ation gave

some i~lclication s to what was probnblc; and tlic claily work of tlic

Zntelligcnce Section cnablerl our IIigll Command to lcccp the closcst

sort of check on tho eize~ay's utcntions in this regard. Still it tvns

necessary to plan the

operation

011 the basis tllat

a

consiclcrablc

aniou nt of rcsistnncc would have Lo be overcome. I t

WLS

also o the

utiuost inzporta~nci~l~ nl lic linc

T l l i a ~~ c on r t - V i g~~ c ~~ l l e s

hoalil bc

rfnched wi th gre:bt r,~p irlil y,1)ccnusc cvery llonr th at tlw rontlu rc-

inzinctl o p u i i~cauthnL just so many Inore (:rrnz;~n troolrs could lic


8/8

1 ULLETIN FOR

FIELD

O F F I J i R S

brought ou t of t he salient.

Tllercforc it was important to use the

fullest number of tro ops th at could be usefully enlployecl under a ny

conclitions; and t was equally important to surprise the enemy.

The surprise element was most succcsslully murkeil, nncl in rnorc

tlmn one way. Sufiice it to say th at t he at tack came off about q

hours before it had been anticipated by th e enemy and th at ou r move-

ment on the western face towards Vigiieulles was appare ntly not Sore-

seen at all.

Our Staff functioned rcmarltably well,

The attack

been

along familiar lines on thc rzth.

At r o'cloclr: in the morning an

intense artillery preparation was opened, followed soon after dawn by

the adv ance of th e infantry. Meanwhile, however, th e Gcr111aus hail

becoine aware of t he imillinence of t he dangcr an d having clcternzinccl

upon withdrawal rath er tllan deleasc, orders wcrc issued for th e move

went t o take place on the very night selected for our attack; and our

artillery preparalion came a t the worst possible mo~lzcnt or th c

Germans, upsetting t heir aclj usti~lcnts for retr eat.

'The encnly at

this moment had in position the following divisions 77th R, roth,

5th Lw., rgzcl and par t of thc 35th AX

Undcr th e conclitions already noted, and in view oE t llc k~ ct ha t

with one exception the German divisions ~vcrc hird class, a strcmg

rcsistniice was hardly t o be expected. The aclvancc of our troops

procectlecl with great success, The at tac k on the suuth facc

o

111~

salie nt with seven clivisions in linc between Ricllccourt nntl Vcy en

I-layo, 14 Irilomcters, reachecl Thiaucourt and n consitlcwblc tlistaucr

west by the 1;1tc afternoon.

On

the wcstcrn facc the (;cr~unu s lfcrctl

vary littlc rrsistance, but on the otlicr hantl t h ~rtm~clwas so

naturally strong ancl the woolls so

C ~ C I ~ S G

hat the

I L ~ V ~ L I ~ O C

ils w

rapicl. TIM1 evening the progress n~ni lr rft the divisions cup~ gotl

only abou t llalfwa y to Vignculles.

On

th e 13tl1, the opcrtttion oil tho su uthern face coi~sistctl n Iit llr

more than mopping up and closing in on the scconcl Gcrinnn linc of

clcicnse, n linc which ra n roughly nortl~wcstwnrcls rom I'agny

on

t1w

Moselle

n t

an average clistancc of from 5 to

xo

Bms, back of the

first

line.

On

tllc othe r side, the i~clvnllcoowards Vigncullrs was resuil-rcd.

Our infantry rcncllcd tlic edge of th e l~il lsust north

oI

Vigncullcs nl

about hdlpast ten in tho morning and Vigacullos itself

L

few li(wr ;

Inter.

This marlred the find rwliing oTC oC thc St . Mihirl siilitwl.

The rcsnlt of th e opcratio;l :IS a wliolc was t o str:~ighLcn11111Allicrl

line betwccn the Nloselle and tho Argonnc in such

:L

wily IS

o

give ;I

fr on t facing Bricy mlrl Metz. It gave our st Anuy :LII i u v i ~ l ~~ ; t l ~ l ( ~

cxpcrioucc in large troop movcnients ant1 corn1)ii~atl ~ t t ~ l i .1

netted a total o i~ bo nt 5,ooo pris011ers ~vi1.h v w I W O li~i~~clr(\(llins,

machine gnns and. n-rortars, rolling stock ant1 wr 111~Icricl.

wd aef bulletin 06 - bulletin for field officers number 6.pdf

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