water allocation, climate change, and sustainable peace the israeli proposal

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Water Allocation, Climate Change, and SustainablePeace The Israeli ProposalJonathan Lautze a , Meredith Reeves a , Rosaura Vega a & Paul Kirshen aa IWRA Tufts University , Massachusetts, USAPublished online: 22 Jan 2009.

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International Water Resources AssociationWater International, Volume 30, Number 2, Pages 197–209, June 2005

© 2005 International Water Resources Association

197

Water Allocation, Climate Change, and Sustainable PeaceThe Israeli Proposal

Jonathan Lautze, Meredith Reeves, Rosaura Vega, and Paul Kirshen, Member IWRA,Tufts University, Massachusetts, USA

Abstract: Israeli-Palestinian joint water management strategies fail to account for increased waterdemand caused by increasing populations and potential decreases in water availability due to climatechange. This study examines the impacts of population growth and climate change on the water suppliesof Israelis and Palestinians under “business-as-usual” conditions as well as under the Israeli-proposedwater resources division discussed in meetings parallel to those at Camp David in 2000. The analysisestablishes renewable water resources by source in Israel/Palestine and presents the current sectoraltrends in water consumption. From this baseline, eight scenarios are developed that describe conditionsin 2000 and 2025. Several indicators are used to measure the positive and negative effects of theseconditions. The indicators show that population growth and climate change will negate many of thebenefits of the water resources division proposed in 2000. Furthermore, the indicators reveal extremewater resources stress among Palestinians as well as potential environmental degradation as climatechange depletes natural water supplies.

Keywords: Israel, Palestine, climate change, transboundary water issues, peace accord, sectoralwater use

IntroductionIn recent peace negotiations between Israelis and Pal-

estinians, the division of water resources has been a con-tentious issue. Although it does not receive the same levelof attention as more high-profile issues such as boundariesor right-of-return, an acceptable solution is proving simi-larly elusive. Since the 1993 Joint Declaration of Prin-ciples, Israel and the Palestinian Authority have taken smallbut important steps toward the creation of a managementplan for their shared water resources, including an agree-ment to prevent deterioration of water quality and estab-lishment of a Joint Water Committee. These advances havenevertheless fallen short in two key areas. Managementstrategies fail to account for: 1) increased water demanddue to rapidly increasing populations, and 2) potential de-creases in water availability due to climate change.

Israel, which controls most of the water resourcesshared between Israelis and Palestinians, has been quitesuccessful at maximizing the potential of its water resources.However, it has nearly exhausted the efficiency methodsthat are available to fully exploit its freshwater supplies.Furthermore, such efficiency has come at a price. Unsus-

tainable withdrawal of groundwater and surface waterhas resulted in severe environmental stress – stress thatincludes saltwater intrusion into wells and aquifers, con-centrated pollutant loads in surface water, and a nearlycomplete loss of Israel’s wetlands (Lonergan and Brooks,1994). The combined water withdrawal by Israel and Pales-tinian Territories (or Palestine) reached approximately 2,375million cubic meters per year (MCM/year) in 2000, whichcan be compared against a total renewable yield of 2,060MCM/year from the same sources of water (described later).

While the current situation in Israel and PalestinianTerritories is one of substantial environmental stress, theregion may find itself in a much worse predicament by2025. Projections indicate that population pressure on do-mestic water supplies and increased agricultural activitycould significantly increase regional water stress. Climatechange, caused by greenhouse gas emissions, may fur-ther exacerbate the water crisis through seasonal droughts,an overall decrease in precipitation, and an increase intemperature leading to an increase in evapotranspiration(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2000).

In an effort to develop an accurate picture of possiblefuture water conditions in the region, eight scenarios havebeen developed that take into account different political

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198 J. Lautze, M. Reeves, R. Vega, and P. Kirshen

IWRA, Water International, Volume 30, Number 2, June 2005

and climatic realities. These scenarios evaluate the im-pact of climate change on the water supplies of Israel andPalestinian Territories under both “business-as-usual” con-ditions as well as under the proposed division put forth duringthe Camp David-Emmitsburg peace discussions in July 2000.

Naturally, understanding the Israeli water proposal ofJuly 2000 requires some level of interpretation. Further,evaluating the repercussions of climate change entails acertain degree of speculation about the future. The au-thors sought to minimize such uncertainty by thoroughlyanalyzing trends in sectoral water use among Israelis andPalestinians by engaging in discussions with parties in-volved in the most recent water negotiations, and by re-viewing the literature on the impact of climate change onthe water resources in the region. The result of our work,we hope, will help to illuminate the necessity of incorpo-rating climate change as well as population change intofuture peace discussions.

Background InformationHistorical Background

While Israeli and Palestinian claims to the land massalternatively called Israel or Palestine date back to an-cient times, the early 20th century saw Palestinians in theoverwhelming demographic majority in the region thenreferred to as Palestine. With the creation of the state ofIsrael in 1948, mandate Palestine was divided in two (Fig-ure 1). Israel received (or captured) all of mandate Pales-tine except the West Bank (of the Lower Jordan River)and the Gaza Strip, while most Palestinians were expelledor fled to areas not controlled by Israel. Conditions re-mained more or less the same until 1967, when Israel oc-cupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip (in addition to otherareas). The West Bank and Gaza Strip have remainedunder Israeli control since that time, and recent Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions have revolved around ced-ing most of these two regions in return for an end tohostilities (Lonergan and Brooks, 1994; Wolf, 1995).

Study AreaApproximately three-fourths of the water supply of

Israel and Palestine comes from the Mountain Aquifer,the Jordan Basin, and the Coastal Aquifer. The MountainAquifer consists of the Western, Northeastern, and East-ern Aquifers. The Jordan Basin, which lies north of theMountain Aquifer, provides water from the Sea of Galilee(also referred to as Lake Kinneret and Lake Tiberias) andrivers to its north. The Coastal Aquifer lies west of theMountain Aquifer, stretching along the coast from the northof Haifa south through the Gaza Strip (Figure 2). Addi-tionally, the Israeli national water carrier (a series of ca-nals and pipelines) transports approximately 400 MCM/year of water from the Sea of Galilee in the Jordan Basinto regions as far south as Beersheba. While this serves tosupplement the amount of water available to Israelis south

of the Jordan Basin, it also significantly diminishes flow inthe Lower Jordan River.

Baseline DataAn in-depth analysis of issues requires accurate data

about renewable water resources under current conditionsin Israel and Palestinian Territories (Table 1). From theJordan Basin, which consists primarily of the Upper Jor-

Figure 1. Israel and Palestinian Territories 2002: Political Boundaries(Source: CIA, 2002)

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Water Allocation, Climate Change, and Sustainable Peace: The Israeli Proposal 199


dan River (above Galilee) and the Sea of Galilee, 570 MCM/year are available for use in Israel and Palestine. TheMountain Aquifer, which consists of three sub-aquifers,provides approximately 640 MCM/year of water. TheWestern Aquifer provides approximately 360 MCM/year,the Northeast Aquifer supplies roughly 140 MCM/year,and annual recharge in the Eastern Aquifer is approxi-mately 140 MCM/year. The third major source of waterin the region is the Coastal Aquifer, which supplies ap-proximately 330 MCM/year. This aquifer is generally di-vided into two sub-aquifers: the Israeli Coastal Aquifer(270 MCM/year) and the Gaza Coastal Aquifer (60 MCM/year). Additionally, other minor water resources of cis-terns, runoff, and a small amount of desalination accountfor roughly 300 MCM/year, and reused wastewater com-prises about 220 MCM/year. This gives 2,060 MCM/yearof renewable water resources (reused wastewater anddesalinated saltwater are included among the renewablewater resources).

The division of the Coastal Aquifer along political linespoints to a key issue superimposed upon decisions to makethe most efficient use of water resources: the Israeli-Pal-estinian conflict. Virtually all water resources of the Moun-tain and Coastal Gaza Aquifers lie beneath the West Bankand Gaza Strip, regions that are slated to become an inde-pendent Palestinian state if peace discussions succeed. Itis therefore necessary to analyze current water withdrawalalong national lines; this is given in Table 2. Note that Table2 also serves to indicate the quantity by which withdrawalexceeds renewable resources.

It should be noted that, in many cases, it is difficult toseparate politics and science: this appears to be one suchcase. Many estimates exist for the quantity of water with-drawn by Israelis and Palestinians each year (Brooks andMehmet, 2000; Kartin, 2000; Rouyer, 2000; Weinthal andMarei, 2002; NSU, 2003; Shamir, 2003). Although theredoes seem to be more agreement on Palestinian withdrawal,estimates of Israeli water withdrawal – particularly from theoccupied territories – are inconsistent. In response to theseambiguities, we used mid-range values in Table 2.

Figure 2. Mountain Aquifer Water Resources (Source: Brooks andMehmet, 2000)

Table 1. Renewable Water Resources in Israel and Palestine (Rouyer, 2000)

Source MCM/yearJordan Basin 570 Upper Jordan River (Hasbani, Bantes, Dan) 500 Runoff above Sea of Galilee 140 Galilee (rainfall, springs, runoff) 200 Yarmuk River 70 Evaporation from Galilee -300 Saline Discharge into Lower Jordan -40Mountain Aquifer 640 Western 360 Northern 140 Eastern 140Coastal Aquifer 330 Israeli 270 Gaza 60Minor aquifers, runoff, cisterns, desalination 300Reused wastewater 220Total 2,060

Table 2. Water Withdrawal in Israel and Palestine (MCM/year)Total Total

Water Source Israel Palestine Withdrawn RenewableJordan Basin 700 0 700 570Mountain Aquifer 485 115 600 640 Western Aquifer 340 62 402 360 Northern Aquifer 105 30 135 140 Eastern Aquifer 40* 23 63 140Coastal Aquifer 430 125 555 330 Israeli 420 5 425 270 Gaza 10 120 130 60Minor runoff, cisterns, desalination 300 0 300 300Reused Wastewater 220 0 220 220Total 2,135 240 2,375 2,060* in settlements

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Israel: Sectoral Water Use and TrendsIn Israel, approximately 60 to 64 percent of all wa-

ter withdrawn is used for agriculture, which equals ap-proximately 1,250 to 1,300 MCM/year (Lonergan andBrooks, 1994). The amount of water devoted to agri-culture has been stabilizing over the last decade as in-creasing agricultural demand has been largely satisfiedby installation of water-conservation technologies ratherthan increased water use. Industrial water demand ap-pears to have stabilized as well (Brooks and Mehmet,2000). Use for this sector remained in the 130 to 150MCM/year range throughout the 1990s, which consti-tutes 6 to 7 percent of Israeli water withdrawal.

The remaining sector, domestic water withdrawal,accounts for 600 to 700 MCM/year, or approximately30 percent of total Israeli water withdrawal. Water usein this sector continues to demonstrate sharp increases,from 200 MCM/year in the mid-1960s, to 400 MCM/year in the mid 1980s, to 550 MCM/year in the mid1990s, to more than 600 MCM/year in 2000. Increasesin domestic withdrawal can be directly correlated withincreases in population; indeed, the average Israeli hasconsistently used 275 to 350 liters per capita per day (l/c/d) of water. Analysis of future levels of water with-drawal must therefore account for Israeli demographictrends (Wolf, 1995; Rouyer, 2000).

While an increase in the Israeli population (Figure3) will likely produce an increase in domestic waterdemand, proliferation of conservation measures suchas low flow toilets and low-flow showers should never-theless help to mitigate projected increases in domesticwater withdrawal. Potential increases in reused waste-water will also help meet future water demands. TheIsrael Ministry of the Environment (1999) estimates thatby 2020, 565 MCM of treated effluent will be availablefor use for agriculture, which will meet 42 percent ofthe projected total agricultural demand of 1,350 MCM.(The World Bank, 2000).

Palestine: Sectoral Water Use and TrendsWhile analysis of future water withdrawal in Israel is

relatively predictable, the future of Palestine holds morevariables: a rapidly increasing population (Figure 4), a po-tential peace accord which may double water suppliesavailable to Palestinians, rapid economic development un-der which an industrial sector may arise, and the potentialintroduction of new water conservation technologies. Asconditions now stand, Palestinian populations of the WestBank and Gaza Strip use 155 MCM/year in agriculture,which is 65 percent of their total withdrawn water. Ap-proximately 78 MCM/year, or 33 percent of withdrawal, isused for domestic purposes. Finally, about 7 MCM/year, or 2percent of withdrawal, is used for industry (Rouyer, 2000).

What does all this mean? Most importantly, despitethe fact that a relatively high 33 percent of water is usedfor domestic purposes, the average Palestinian has ac-cess to just over half of the World Health Organization’s(WHO) recommended daily amount of 100 l/c/d for do-mestic water needs. In 2000, Palestinian per capita do-mestic withdrawal stood at about 63 liters/day (USAID,2003). In contrast to the per capita Israeli water with-drawal which has steadily increased, it appears that eventhis inadequate Palestinian per capita withdrawal is actu-ally declining (Berland, 2000; Brooks and Mehmet, 2000).

Indeed, when Israel captured the West Bank and GazaStrip in 1967, Palestinians were prohibited from furtherdeveloping their water resources. Although Palestinianswithdrawal has increased modestly from approximately200 MCM/year to 240 MCM/year, the population nearlytripled in the same time interval (Berland, 2000; Brooks andMehmet, 2000). In other words, while Palestinian water with-drawal in 2000 stood at 107 to 120 percent of its 1967 level,the Palestinian population in 2000 was nearly 300 percent its1967 level: hence a substantial decrease in gross per capitawithdrawal. Assuming no final status peace agreement isreached, per capita water availability will decrease further.

Should there be a peace accord, on the other hand,one can expect many changes. Among other things, Pal-

Population Trends in Israel(1950-2050)

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Figure 3. Israeli population trends from 1950-2050. Includes bothnatural population increase and medium variant immigration at presentconditions (Source: UN, 2002)

Palestine Population Trends (1950-2050)

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Figure 4. Palestinian population trends from 1950-2050. Includesboth natural population increase and medium variant immigration atpresent conditions (Source: UN, 2002)

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estinians would begin to receive more water – roughlydouble their current allotment if they accept the Israeliproposal described in the following section. Additionally, itis widely accepted that much foreign aid would be deliv-ered into the country: estimates range from $0.5 to 1 bil-lion annually (The World Bank, 2002). Aid such as this,combined with a country at peace, could lead to rapid eco-nomic growth and increased per capita domestic wateruse. Such economic development, in turn, could serve toattenuate natural population growth rates. However, withpeace, immigration to Palestine could significantly increaseabove the UN medium variant amount as shown in Figure 4.

Among the positive impacts resulting from a peaceaccord would be the construction of wastewater treat-ment facilities. Palestinian engineers currently aim to con-nect 75 percent of the urban population and 25 percent ofthe rural population to wastewater treatment facilities by2020 (Al-Sa’ed, 2000). This would provide approximately73 MCM/yr of reclaimed wastewater, which would benearly 15 percent of the amount projected for agriculture in2020 (Nashashibi and van Duijl, 1995). In sum, a peace agree-ment will seriously impact future water conditions.

Camp David/Emmitsburg Re-allocation of WaterResources and Other Future Developments

The most recent final status water negotiations be-tween the Israeli and Palestinian governing bodies occurredin July 2000, in a conference that paralleled that at CampDavid. Camp David played host to discussion of politicalissues – boundaries, refugees, Jerusalem, and others –while more technical issues were dealt with in Emmitsburg,Maryland (NSU, 2003). After formalities such as callsfor mutual recognition of water rights and future coopera-tion, the Israelis offered 50 MCM/year from the Westernaquifer, 10 MCM/year from the Northern aquifer, 80 MCM/year from the Eastern aquifer, and the right to withdrawand desalinate 40 MCM/year from the Lower Jordan River(see Table 3). Additionally, the Palestinians would co-man-

age an American-financed desalination plant at Hadera,which could supply the Palestinians with another 50 MCM/year.

In addition to shifts in water allocation under the termsof the Israeli proposal, the potential water resources gen-erated from two desalination plants currently under con-struction – in Ashkelon and Gaza – are shown in Table 3(Israeli Ministry of National Infrastructures Water Com-mission, 2002). Also, although withdrawal in the CoastalAquifer is listed as the same as in Table 2, withdrawal amountsare subjecting the aquifer to serious environmental stress.Construction of coastal desalination plants may therefore leadto a reduction in withdrawal from the Coastal Aquifer.

A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 reveals that the Pal-estinians would receive approximately 230 MCM/year ofadditional water and the Israelis gain about 10 MCM/yearof water. For the Israelis, this change constitutes a mini-mal increase in water supplies (less than 1 percent) whilewater available to Palestinians would virtually double.Nevertheless, total Palestinian withdrawal would still onlyamount to approximately 19 percent of total water with-drawal in the region while Palestinians would compriseabout 37 percent of the 2000 population (assuming no re-turn of refugees). Further, it should be noted that the pro-posal does little to account for yearly fluctuations inprecipitation or an evolving nature of water resources im-pacted by climate change.

Climate Change in the RegionClimate change is expected to produce several nega-

tive consequences on water supplies in Israel and Pales-tine: 1) a reduction in precipitation, 2) an increase inevapotranspiration, and 3) an increase in extreme weatherevents (Blaustein, 2000). Bou-Zeid and El-Fadel (2002)estimate that annual water supplies will decrease as a re-sult of climate change between 5 and 15 percent by 2025in neighboring Lebanon. Blaustein (2000) estimates thatIsrael’s replenishable water supplies will stand at 60 per-cent of their current level by 2100. Vorosmarty et al. (2000)find that the Israel-Palestine region will experience a 3percent decrease in renewable water supply by 2025. In-formation from these sources was used to develop two cli-mate change scenarios (A and B), which are described below.

Climate Change Scenario A is based on the results ofVorosmarty et al.’s study entitled Global Water Resources:Vulnerability from Climate Change and Population Growth,which used a water balance model to compute runoff at a30 minute (0.5 degree) grid resolution for the entire globe(Vorosmarty et al., 2000). Vorosmarty et al. (2000) usedclimate change predictions developed using the HadleyCenter General Circulation Model (HadCM2Gsa1), whichrepresents a one percent per year increase in CO2 equiva-lent forcing and sulfate aerosol dampening. This data setcontained current (year 2000) and future (year 2025) glo-bal discharge values in square kilometers per year (km2/year). These present and future water discharge values

Table 3. Summary of Israeli-Proposed Water Division by Source atCamp David 2000 (MCM/yr) (Source: NSU, 2003)Water Source Israel Palestine TotalJordan Basin 660 40 700Mountain Aquifer 385 255 640 Western Aquifer 290 113 403 Northern Aquifer 95 40 135 Eastern Aquifer 0* 102 102Coastal Aquifer 430 125 555 Israeli 420 5 425 Gaza 10 120 130Minor runoff, cisterns, desalination 450 70 520 Existing 300 0 300 New Desalination Plant at Hadera 50 50 100 New Desalination Plant at Ashkelon 100 0 100 New Desalination Plant in Gaza 0 20 20Reused Wastewater 220 0 220Total 2,145 490 2,635* in settlements

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were recorded for Israel and Palestine and used to calcu-late a 3 percent decrease in water resource availabilityfor the area by 2025.

Climate Change Scenario B was generated using in-formation from the Israel National Report (Blaustein, 2000)and Bou-Zeid and El-Fadel (2002). The Israel NationalReport estimates a 40 percent decrease in water supplylevels by 2100. Assuming that climate change affects waterresources at a linear rate, water supplies will decrease by10 percent in 2025. Bou-Zeid and El-Fadel (2002) usedseveral generalized circulation models, including HadCM2,GFDL, ECHAM4, and CGCM1, and applied the IS92aassumptions, which account for greenhouse gas and sul-fur aerosols. They conclude that water supply levels inLebanon will experience a 5 to 15 percent decrease by2025. Combining the two estimates, a second climatechange scenario was developed that assumed a 10 per-cent decrease in water supplies.

Definition of Eight ScenariosScenario development is an established method for

creatively describing possible alternatives for the future.By applying a set of variables to a current condition ordecision point and describing how an event may turn out,scenarios allow users to consider its potential outcome.Hammond (1998) describes scenarios as “powerful be-cause they help those who read them to visualize in moreconcrete and human terms - to emotionally connect with[…] potential consequences of current trends or proposedactions.” Visualizing the future for Israel and Palestinerequires developing creative scenarios to illustrate howwater management decisions may play out over time inrelation to population, development, and climate trends.

In this paper, the decision point is the formulation of awater allocation strategy between Israel and Palestine in2000. The driving forces are: 1) political agreements, 2)climate change, 3) population, and 4) development. Thispaper describes influence of the driving forces on waterallocation strategies in eight scenarios: 1) Business as Usual2000 (BAU 2000); 2) Business as Usual 2025 (BAU2025); 3) Business as Usual 2025 under Climate Change

Scenario A (BAU 2025(A)); 4) Business as Usual 2025under Climate Change Scenario B (BAU 2025(B)) ; 5)Camp David 2000 (CD 2000); 6) Camp David 2025 (CD2025); 7) Camp David 2025 under Climate Change Sce-nario A (CD 2025(A)); and 8) Camp David 2025 underClimate Change Scenario B (CD 2025(B))

Scenario results are summarized in Table 4 and ex-plained in the sections that follow. The eight scenarios arelisted vertically. Listed horizontally are the indicators.

Scenario ResultsScenario 1: Business as Usual (BAU) 2000

The first scenario examines the water allocation situ-ation in 2000. Data from Table 2 and water use by sectorby the two nations were used to determine water demandby sector in 2000 in both MCM/year and l/c/d; note that2000 demand is equal to actual withdrawal (see Table A1ain the Appendix) The ratio of water use by sector wasthen applied to data on withdrawal by source in Israel/Palestine, producing a matrix of withdrawn water bysource and sector by the two groups. Recognizing, how-ever, that desalinated saltwater is used domestically, andreused wastewater is used for agriculture and industry,adjustments in the allocation were made (Table A1b).

In order to determine the amount of withdrawn waterconsumed by Israel and Palestine, approximate consump-tion percentages were applied based on country and sec-tor. Shiklomanov (1999) reports that Israel consumes 83percent of water withdrawn for agriculture, 36 percent ofwater withdrawn for domestic use, and 21 percent of waterwithdrawn for industrial purposes. It was assumed that Pal-estinian consumption was typical of that of a water stresseddeveloping country; a 50 percent consumption figure wastherefore assumed in all sectors. Reused wastewater wasalso added to the domestic consumption of Israel becausethat water is not part of return flow from domestic users. Theresults of this process are to be found in Table A1c.

The annual water remaining in the environment afterwater withdrawal and consumption was estimated in TableA1d in the Appendix to measure the water-related envi-ronmental stress in the region due to water use. It was

Table 4. Overview of Results—Details in the Appendix

Israeli Israeli Palestinian Palestinian Israeli Palestinian Environmental Actual % of Actual % of Actual Actual Environmental Surplus: %

Withdrawl Target Withdrawl Target Withdrawl Withdrawl Surplus Change fromScenario (MCM/yr) Withdrawl (MCM/yr) Withdrawl (l/c/day) (l/c/day) (MCM/yr) from BAU 2000BAU 2000 2,135 100 240 100 971 171 344 0BAU 2025 2,390 100 270 58 772 104 343 0BAU 2025(A) 2,390 100 270 58 772 104 296 -14BAU 2025(B) 2,390 100 270 58 772 104 189 -45CD 2000 2,144 100 402 100 975 318 452 +31CD 2025 2,299 96 540 65 742 207 397 +15CD 2025(A) 2,299 96 540 65 742 207 350 +2CD 2025(B) 2,299 96 540 65 742 207 243 -29

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calculated by subtracting consumption from each renew-able water resource by source and referred to as environ-mental surplus. The total environmental surplus of 344MCM/year found in 2000 was used as a benchmark againstwhich to measure future environmental conditions.

Finally, unsatisfied demand was determined in TableA1e in the Appendix. Demand equals withdrawal in 2000,resulting in zero unsatisfied demand in each of the twogroups and the region as a whole. All scenario results aresummarized in Table 4.

Scenario 2: Business as Usual (BAU) 2025Percent increases in population in Palestine from Fig-

ure 4 were used in order to determine demand increasesfrom 2000 to 2025. Because a return of refugees is un-likely without a peace agreement, no consideration is givento immigration-induced population increases. Per capitaPalestinian demand therefore remained constant in all sec-tors, producing an increase from 240 to 497 MCM/year intotal Palestinian demand from 2000 to 2025. For Israelidemand, it was assumed that irrigation and industrial with-drawal have stabilized, and these quantities remained attheir 2000 levels. Domestic demand for Israel is assumedto increase proportionate to population increase in Figure3. Israeli per capita domestic demand, therefore, remainedthe same, producing an increase from 2,135 to 2,398 MCM/year in total Israeli demand from 2000 to 2025.

Table A2 in the Appendix shows how Israel and Pal-estine meet their increased demand. Israel is able to meetits larger demand through an augmentation in desalinationcapacities as well as installation of more wastewater re-use facilities. While the Palestinians are able to modestlyincrease their supplies by 30 MCM/year by reusing waste-water, this meets little of their demand increase. Becauseof the extreme water stress Palestinians will face, it isassumed that they seek to satisfy all domestic demandand 90 percent of their industrial demand before irriga-tion. This results in Palestine being able to meet only one-third of its irrigation demand.

To determine consumption, the same methods de-scribed in the previous scenario were used. It should benoted, however, that renewable water resources increasedin this scenario due to increased desalination and waste-water reuse. This produced a total environmental surplusof 343 MCM/year in Table 4, which is virtually the sameas our benchmark figure of 344 MCM/year. Israeli, Pales-tinian, and total unsatisfied demand were calculated in thesame manner as in the previous scenario and are in Table 4.

Scenarios 3 and 4: Business as Usual (BAU) 2025under Climate Change Scenarios A and B

To apply the impact of climate change to our Businessas Usual 2025 scenario, only the renewable resources werechanged. BAU 2025 (A) applies more conservative pro-jections for climate change’s impacts: a 3 percent decreasein water supplies. BAU 2025 (B) assumes a larger cli-

mate change-induced impact on water resources. Theamounts of satisfied demands are the same as BAU 2025,but these scenarios’ reductions in water resources are quiteevident as the environmental surpluses significantly increase.

Scenario 5: Camp David (CD) 2000To develop the Camp David (CD) 2000 scenario, data

from Table 3 were used. The slight increase in the Israeliwater allocation was distributed throughout the sectors,and it is assumed Palestinian demand increased in light ofincreased water availability. As Palestinian domestic with-drawal stood at about 60 percent of the minimum standardset by WHO, Palestinian demand was increased by a ra-tio of 100/60 in each water use sector and this resulted inthe total withdrawal of 400 MCM/year. The allocationsare in Table A3 in the Appendix. Although the Palestinianwater allocation was 490 MCM/year, it was assumed thatthey would not necessarily use all of it in 2000. It shouldbe noted that much of the increased water supply comesfrom greatly increased quantities of desalinated water forboth Israel and Palestine, which also serves to bring waterfrom users into the environment; hence an increase in en-vironmental surplus.

Additionally, it should be acknowledged that the com-plex issue of refugee return was avoided in the scenarios.In the event of a peace agreement between Israelis andPalestinians, it is likely a certain number of Palestinianrefugees will return to the newly independent state ofPalestine. Such will produce a larger Palestinian popula-tion, leading in turn to a larger Palestinian demand for water.Our results may therefore be viewed as conservative es-timates: Palestinian demand for water will increase witheach refugee that returns.

Scenarios 6, 7, and 8: Camp David (CD) 2025,Camp David (CD) 2025, and Camp David (CD)under Climate Change Scenarios A and B

In the Camp David 2025 scenario, the same methodsin projecting forward from BAU 2000 to BAU 2025 wereused. That is, Palestinian demand increased in all sectorsproportionate to population growth from CD 2000 to CD2025. Israeli irrigation and industrial demands were keptconstant, as total Israeli demand increased only becauseof an increase in domestic demand. The allocations are inTable A4 in the Appendix. For scenarios CD 2025(A) andCD 2025(B), the same methods used in BAU climatechange scenarios were employed.

DiscussionIn what follows, the results in Table 4 are summarized

using the indicators of Unsatisfied Israeli Demand, Un-satisfied Palestinian demand, Total Unsatisfied Demand,and Environmental Surplus.

The first scenario under evaluation is the situation in2000. Although quantifying demand for water is a some-

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what subjective endeavor, it was assumed that Israeli andPalestinian water demands were met. While this is prob-ably much more likely in the Israeli case (as per capitaIsraeli withdrawal stood at four to five times that of Pal-estine), Palestinian demand is assumed to equal prevailingwithdrawal mainly to create a benchmark with which fu-ture conditions can be compared. Similarly, the environ-mental surplus figure of 344 MCM/year serves as areasonable benchmark.

Despite the seemingly neutral benchmark figures,however, the situation in 2000 left much to be desired.Per capita Palestinian withdrawal averaged well belowWHO’s minimum standards for health and sanitation(World Bank, 2002; USAID, 2003). Further, as previ-ously explained, the environment felt much stress. As-suming a stable population and supply of water,conditions were clearly grim. Unfortunately, the Pales-tinian population is rapidly increasing, and it appearswater supplies are decreasing: such trends will greatlyexacerbate existing water stresses.

Looking to the future under a no reallocation situa-tion, three scenarios are examined: one stable watersupply scenario, and two climate change scenarios.Looking first at the case in which climate change wieldsno impact on regional water resources (BAU 2025), itseems unsatisfied Israeli demand as well as environ-mental surplus change only minimally. It is presumedthat the Israelis will be able to placate their growingwater demands created by population increases throughimproved wastewater reuse and desalination capaci-ties. Larger amounts of desalinated water will createmore water for the environment, while proliferation ofwastewater reuse will decrease return flows from do-mestic water.

While conditions in 2025 look quite similar to their2000 states from both an Israeli and environmental per-spective, the water situation among Palestinians in 2025looks worse (BAU 2025). Assuming per capita and persector Palestinian demand remains constant, the 2025withdrawals will be approximately 227 MCM/year (42percent) below demand – this is almost equal to theentire Palestinian withdrawal in 2000. Most likely, wa-ter available will be shifted increasingly to domestic uses,creating a situation in which Palestinians will be heavilydependent on foreign countries and aid agencies for theirfood supply.

As grim as the last scenario looks, the actual situa-tion could be worse. Climate change is affecting globalwater resources, and the water supplies in Israel andPalestine are no exception. Climate change scenarios– BAU 2025(A) and BAU 2025(B) – indicate environ-mental deficits ranging from 48 to 155 MCM/year, whichis 14 to 45 percent less than the benchmark of 344 MCM/year. Decreases in renewable water resources will ne-cessitate reductions in water use among Israelis andPalestinians. Such reductions will only further stress

Palestinian water supplies. Moreover, projections indi-cate that the Palestinian population will continue to in-crease and renewable water resources will continue todecrease after 2025.

If trends continue unabated, then the future looksquite dismal. While it appears suffering will be particu-larly acute among Palestinians, the mounting environ-mental deficits will damage the water supplies of thewhole region. Further, it seems that a correlation existsbetween declining Palestinian conditions and undesir-able repercussions felt by Israelis. In sum, it appears inthe best interests of all parties to create a frameworkto alter current trends.

Most recently, participants at the Camp David Fi-nal Status discussions in July 2000 discussed a newframework for water management. While the discus-sions failed primarily due to reasons other than disagree-ments over water division, there was nevertheless muchdisagreement on this issue as well. The following sce-narios examine the Israeli proposal under conditions in2000 and 2025. While it is clear the immediate impactof the offer is positive, analysis of the plan a quartercentury into the future begins to illuminate serious prob-lems. Further, as with the business-as-usual scenarios,it can be assumed that problems initially exposed in 2025will only increase in size in subsequent years.

As shown in Table 4, all sectors in both countriesimprove from initial acceptance of the Israeli proposalat Camp David in 2000. Although it will take a fewyears to build the desalination plants that supply the in-creased quantities of water to Israelis and Palestinians,soon enough the water resources of all parties – Pales-tinians, Israelis, and the environment – will increase.While Israeli supplies increase only slightly, the Pales-tinians would seem to benefit substantially from the Is-raeli proposal at Camp David. The amount of waterallocated to Palestinians will be augmented from 240MCM/year to 490 MCM/year. It is assumed Palestin-ian demand increases to approximately 400 MCM/year,creating a situation in which Palestinians demand andwithdraw an additional 160 MCM/year. Further, theenvironment benefits from the accord as well, as anadditional 108 MCM/year of water (31 percent) willenter the environment. The improved conditions will re-sult largely from increases in desalinated saltwater,unconsumed portions of which will enter the environment.

Therefore, it seems clear that the Israeli proposalwould create improvements for both Palestinians andthe environment if conditions in 2000 remained constant.Realistically, however, several variables must be takeninto account to fully evaluate the offer. First, the percapita Palestinian withdrawal will remain at less thanhalf of the per capita Israeli withdrawal. Second, thePalestinian population is rapidly increasing (even as-suming no Palestinian refugees return), meaning thatany water proposal must be analyzed relative to future

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population projections. Third, regional water resourcesare far from stable. Annual fluctuations in supplies areextreme, and it seems virtually certain there will be yearswhen drought conditions preclude attainment of statedallocations. Finally, the impacts of climate change willlikely reduce water supplies.

Even in the first scenario from 2025 (CD 2025), inwhich climate change has no impact on the water re-sources of Israel/Palestine, it seems improvements en-gendered by the Camp David proposal will becomeobsolete. While the Israelis will face only 99 MCM/year of unsatisfied demand (4 percent), the Palestin-ians will be coping with 288 MCM/year in unsatisfieddemand (35 percent). Most likely, Palestinian demand,which was assumed to expand in light of new realitiesin 2000, would revert to the bleak conditions before theCamp David accord was signed. Under a best-casescenario of no change in renewable water resources,then the improved Palestinian water conditions gener-ated by acceptance of Israeli’s proposal would hardlysustain Palestinians for two decades.

The environmental situation looks equally unsustain-able. While an estimated extra 108 MCM/year of wa-ter was presumed to enter the environment in 2000 as aresult of implementation of the Israeli proposal, that fig-ure reduces to an extra 53 MCM/year under a best-case scenario in 2025 (CD 2025). Realistically,renewable water resources will decline due to climatechange. Estimates in the two climate change scenarios– CD 2025(A) and CD 2025(B) – put environmentalsurplus anywhere from a modest 6 MCM/year (2 per-cent) increase over BAU 2000 conditions to a largedeficit of 101 MCM/year (29 percent). What seemsclear is that renewable water resources are declining,and minor indications of this in 2025 will intensify insubsequent years.

The Bigger Picture: Policy ImplicationsFor better or worse, the Palestinian delegation never

accepted the Israeli offer in 2000 (nor did the Israelisaccept the Palestinian counter-offer). Palestinian de-mands were tempered by the fact that a peace accordwould produce substantial economic development andimprovements in living standards (Khatib, 2002). It isexpected that acceptance of a peace proposal wouldhave led directly to increased quantities of water andforeign aid and investment in the form of much neededinfrastructure projects (Riedel, 2002; World Bank, 2002).Such would have served as a valuable incentive to signthe accord for the Palestinian delegation; thus Palestin-ians may have reduced some of their demands in orderto achieve benefits accompanying a peace accord.

From an Israeli perspective, an offer was put forthto approximately double prevailing Palestinian water sup-plies. The government is hesitant to relinquish controlover water resources given the relationship between

water and security in the region (Lonergan and Brooks,1994; Wolf, 1995; Amery and Wolf, 2000). The pro-posal made in 2000 went in the direction of satisfyingPalestinian demands, requiring little sacrifice from Is-rael. In short, it seems Israel was (and is) in a positionof advantage and was therefore willing to make fewerconcessions (Alpher, “Israel,” 2002).

Israel nevertheless has some incentive to makepeace. While some argue that Israel’s main motivationfor signing a peace accord lies in increased security,others point out that Israel must act quickly to codifyand preserve its position of advantage while Jewish Is-raelis comprise the demographic majority in Israel/Pal-estine (Alpher, “The Clock,” 2002; Susser, 2002). Shouldcurrent trends continue, by 2012 Palestinians and Pal-estinian Israelis will outnumber Jewish Israelis. As re-spected New York Times columnist Thomas Friedmanstates, “The Palestinians are no longer going to call fortwo states; they’re going to call for one man-one vote”(Friedman, 2003; PBS, 2003). From this perspective, itappears entirely in the Israeli interest to improve theiroffer in order to convince the Palestinians to sign.

As concerns this paper, we hope to highlight theingredients for an equitable and sustainable water agree-ment. First, in a region so steeped in history, it seemsfoolish to disregard past precedents in water use andthe legal issues associated with them. As much of theregion’s water comes from territories under occupa-tion, international law in occupied territories, as statedin the 1907 Hague regulations and the Fourth GenevaConvention of 1949, should be taken into account(Shehadeh, 2002). Second, there is one factor severelystressing water resources that can be controlled locally:population growth. As such, consideration should begiven to managing demographic trends.

Most significantly, if a peace accord is to be sus-tainable, it must account for the fluctuating and evolv-ing nature of water supplies. One way to do this isthrough water resources divisions along the lines ofpercentages rather than quantities. Another method isto allot certain sources of water to certain parties, e.g.the Palestinians get access to water beneath the WestBank and Gaza Strip. If there is a future shortage, then,there is no dispute as to who gets what: the Palestin-ians will be forced to adapt to the decreased supplies intheir areas. Finally, if parties are really intent on quan-tity-based division of water resources, provisions canbe made for conditions of reduced water supplies usinga pre-established drought management plan.

Looking beyond 2025, it appears trends in reduc-tion of renewable water resources will continue if notaccelerate. While attempts at mitigation may be madeglobally through such initiatives as the Kyoto Protocol,adaptations to climate change-induced decreases in re-newable water resources must be made locally. De-salination and wastewater re-use seem to be necessary

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so that renewable water resources meet demand in asustainable manner. Israelis and Palestinians may alsoconsider shifts in water use from more to less intensivesectors, such as, away from agriculture and toward in-dustry. It is our estimate that these three goals – man-aging population growth, increasing desalination andwastewater reuse capacities, and shifting water awayfrom irrigation – will serve as an effective start to cli-mate change adaptation under a peace agreement.

ConclusionIn conclusion, the Israeli/Palestinian region that has

endured so much change and conflict throughout thecenturies may be facing its ultimate challenge. Whilealways an arid landscape, population increases are plac-ing extreme pressure on water supplies. Add to this theexpected climate change-induced reduction in water re-sources and the seemingly ubiquitous political strife, andthe recipe for disaster appears complete. The only thingneeded will be a spark, which seem to be in abundantsupply these days.

It is growing increasingly evident that little can beaccomplished without a comprehensive final status peaceagreement to resolve current political disputes. However,political decisions will become obsolete if environmentalissues are not addressed promptly and effectively. It isimperative that the parties formulate a bi-national (andregional) plan that considers future water resource pro-jections. Current reactionary, business-as-usual practicesfor water allocation and continued lack of conservationwill lead to a grossly deficient future supply of water.

By highlighting the inadequacies of the Israeli proposalin the summer of 2000, we hope to have contributed to abetter comprehension of sustainable peace. As far as thewater component of the 2000 peace discussions is con-cerned, it appears augmentations in per capita water with-drawal would have been temporary rather than sustainable.Further, it appears climate change was hardly mentioned inthe 2000 talks. We expect that our study will stimulatesome constructive dialogue on the subject. Let us hopethis stands as a point for agreement on which to worktoward a sustainable peace.

Appendix

Table A1a. Demand under Business-as-Usual 2000 Scenario(MCM/year except where noted)

Sector Israel Israel (l/c/d) Palestine Palestine (l/c/d)Industrial 149 68 5 4Domestic 641 291 79 63Irrigation 1,345 612 156 124Total 2,135 971 240 191Note: Population of Israel in 2000: 6,023,000. Population ofPalestine in 2000: 3,451,900

Table A1b. Withdrawal/Allocation, BAU 2000 Scenario (MCM/year)Actual Actual Allocation

Sources Allocation w/d Irrigation Domestic Indust.IsraelJordan Basin 700 700 508 160 32Mountain Aq. 485 485 337 111 37Coastal Aq. 430 430 297 100 33Israeli Coastal Aq. 420 420 290 98 32Gaza Coastal Aq. 10 10 7 2 1Minor runoff, cisterns, desal. 300 300 0 270 30Reused wastewater 220 220 203 0 17Total 2,135 2,135 1,345 641 149PalestineJordan Basin 0 0 0 0 0Mountain Aq. 115 115 75 38 2Coastal Aq. 125 125 81 41 3Israeli Coastal Aq. 5 5 3 2 0Gaza Coastal Aq. 120 120 78 40 2Minor runoff, cisterns, desal. 0 0 0 0 0Reused wastewater 0 0 0 0 0Total 240 240 156 79 5

Table A1c. Consumption, BAU 2000 Scenario (MCM/year)Sources Irrigation Domestic Industrial TotalIsraelJordan Basin 422 112 7 540Mountain Aquifer 280 77 8 365Coastal Aquifer 247 70 7 323Israeli Coastal Aquifer 241 68 7 316Gaza Coastal Aquifer 6 1 0 7Minor runoff, cisterns, desalination 0 188 6 195Reused Wastewater 168 0 4 172Total 1,116 447 32 1,596PalestineJordan Basin 0 0 0 0Mountain Aquifer 38 19 1 58Coastal Aquifer 41 21 2 63Israeli Coastal Aquifer 2 1 0 3Gaza Coastal Aquifer 39 20 1 60Minor runoff, cisterns, desalination 0 0 0 0Reused Wastewater 0 0 0 0Total 78 40 3 120

Table A1d. Consumption vs. Renewable Resources, BAU 2000Scenario (MCM/year)

Consumption Environ.Israeli Palestinian Total Renewable surplus

Jordan Basin 540 0 540 570 30Mountain Aq. 365 58 423 640 217Coastal Aq. 323 63 386 330 -56Israeli Coastal Aq. 316 3 318 270 -48Gaza Coastal Aq. 7 60 67 60 -7Minor runoff, cisterns, desal. 195 0 195 300 105Reused Wastewater 172 0 172 220 48Total 1596 120 1716 2060 344

Table A1e. Unsatisfied Demand under under Business-as-Usual2000 Scenario (MCM/year)

Demand Actual Withdrawal Unsatisfied Total Unsat.Israel 2,135 2,135 0 0Palestine 240 240 0

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Table A2. Withdrawal/Allocation under Business-as-Usual 2025Actual Allocation

Sources Allocation Actual withdrawal Irrigation Domestic IndustrialIsraelJordan Basin 700 700 442 225 32Mountain Aquifer 485 485 281 167 37Coastal Aquifer 430 430 256 141 33Israeli Coastal Aquifer 420 420 250 138 32Gaza Coastal Aquifer 10 10 6 3 1Minor runoff, cisterns, desalination 400 400 0 370 30Reused Wastewater 375 375 358 0 17Total 2,390 2,390 1,337 903 149PalestineJordan Basin 0 0 0 0 0Mountain Aquifer 115 115 33 79 4Coastal Aquifer 125 125 32 87 6Israeli Coastal Aquifer 5 5 1 4 0Gaza Coastal Aquifer 120 120 32 83 6Minor runoff, cisterns, desalination 0 0 0 0 0Reused Wastewater 30 30 30 0 0Total 270 270 95 166 9

Table A3. Withdrawal/Allocation under Camp David 2000Actual Allocation

Sources Allocation Actual withdrawal Irrigation Domestic IndustrialIsraelJordan Basin 660 659 502 129 28Mountain Aquifer 385 385 368 0 17Coastal Aquifer 430 430 271 129 30Israeli Coastal Aquifer 420 420 265 126 29Gaza Coastal Aquifer 10 10 6 3 1Minor runoff, cisterns, desal 450 450 0 394 56Reused Wastewater 220 220 205 0 15Total 2,145 2,144 1,346 652 146PalestineJordan Basin 40 40 0 40 0Mountain Aquifer 255 191 162 23 6Coastal Aquifer 125 125 95 26 8Israeli Coastal Aquifer 5 5 2 6 0Gaza Coastal Aquifer 120 120 93 20 8Minor runoff, cisterns, desal 70 44 0 44 0Reused Wastewater 0 0 0 0 0Total 490 400 257 133 14

Table A4. Withdrawal/Allocation under Camp David 2025Actual Allocation

Sources Allocation Actual withdrawal Irrigation Domestic IndustrialIsraelJordan Basin 660 659 442 185 32Mountain Aquifer 385 385 191 157 37Coastal Aquifer 430 430 256 141 33Israeli Coastal Aquifer 420 420 250 138 32Gaza Coastal Aquifer 10 10 6 3 1Minor runoff, cisterns, desal 450 450 0 420 30Reused Wastewater 375 375 358 0 17Total 2300 2299 1247 903 149PalestineJordan Basin 40 40 0 40 0Mountain Aquifer 255 255 170 79 6Coastal Aquifer 125 125 31 87 8Israeli Coastal Aquifer 5 5 1 4 0Gaza Coastal Aquifer 120 120 30 83 8Minor runoff, cisterns, desal 70 70 0 70 0Reused Wastewater 50 50 50 0 0Total 540 540 251 276 14

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AcknowledgementsThe authors wish to thank the following people who

provided helpful comments on initial drafts of this paper:Hussein Amery, Allison Berland, Elie Bou-Zeid, EllenMarie Douglas, Dixie Goswami, Charles Lawson, andAaron Wolf. In particular, Rami Shehadeh provided in-valuable insights. We also appreciate the comments of twoanonymous reviewers.

About the AuthorsJonathan Lautze is a graduate student at Tufts Uni-

versity. He will receive a Master of Arts in Law and Di-plomacy and a Master of Science in Water ResourcesEngineering in 2005. He holds undergraduate degrees inMath and History from Santa Clara University, and servedas a math teacher in the Peace Corps in West Africa. Heis interested in IWRM and International Development, withparticular emphasis on transboundary waters.

Meredith Reeves graduated from the Food, Agri-culture, and Environment Program at Tufts UniversitySchool of Nutrition Science and Policy in 2004. She worksas a Research Analyst at Earthpace, LLC, focusing onenvironmental indicators, nonpoint source pollution issues,and the role of digital technologies in environmental deci-sion-making.

Rosaura Vega graduated from the Urban and Envi-ronmental Policy and Planning department at Tufts Uni-versity in 2004 with a Masters of Arts. Her work is focusedon international environmental policy and integrated wa-ter resource management.

Dr. Paul Kirshen is Research Professor in the Civiland Environmental Engineering Department and the In-ternational Environment and Resource Policy Program ofthe Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Univer-sity, Massachusetts, USA. He conducts research on cli-mate change impacts and adaptation, integrated waterresources and watershed planning, management, and policy,water resources operations, decision support systems, andhydrology.

Discussions open until November 1, 2005.

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water allocation, climate change, and sustainable peace the israeli proposal

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