was the vela incident a clandestine nuclear test?

8/13/2019 Was the Vela Incident a Clandestine Nuclear Test?

1/3

Was the double flash event a clandestine nuclear test?CHARLIE KENZIE

Department of Earth Sciences, University of Durham 2013

1. Introduction

1.1 Double flash

During the first few milliseconds of a nuclear

explosion, extremely high temperatures and

radiation cause gas to rapidly expand outward

from the hypocenter, ionising the surrounding

air and creating a spherical shockwave. Theexpanding shockwave is opaque and therefore

shields the bright fireball from view. The

process results in an initial intense flash

followed by a dip in intensity, associated with

the shockwave fireball interaction, and then aprolonged flash that steadily increases in

intensity.

1.2 The Vela Incident

On September 22, 1979, a double-flash

event was detected by a pair of solid-statebhangmeter sensors onboard the American

Vela satellite 6911. The measured event was

equivalent to that of a 2-3 kT atmospheric

nuclear explosion. The bhangmeter light

patterns are shown in Fig.1a. Intelligence

suggests that if the signal was caused by a

nuclear test, it was most likely carried out by

the governments of Israel, South Africa, or

both collectively. The observations of the

Vela Satellite remain ambiguous and there

continues to be doubt over whether theyoriginated from a nuclear explosion.

2. Evidence at the time of incident

2.1 Double flash observation

The double flash observation provides the

most convincing evidence that a surface

nuclear burst (SNB) took place. There is no

known single natural phenomenon that can

imitate a double flash signature (Sublette,

2001). Additionally, 41 double flashes

previously recorded by Vela satellites were allconfirmed to be nuclear explosions through

other means (Fig.1), (Sublette, 2001).

However, in a report by a government

appointed scientific comitee, headed by Jack

Ruina, some elements of the observation

proved problematic. Firstly, the nominal

lifespan of the Vela satellites had long been

surpassed by the time the flash was detected

in September 1979. It was already known that

this had caused a malfunction in the electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) detector on the Vela

6911 (Weiss 2011). Additionally, both

bhangmeters should have recorded exactly thesame source signal, only differing in either

amplitude or phase. However, the Ruina panel

argued that the intensities measured by the

two bhangometers on September 22nd were

different (Fig.1a).

It was concluded, that the signal was probably

not caused by a nuclear explosion, although itcould not be ruled out (Ruina et al1980). One

possibility was that the double-flashobservation was caused by sunlight reflecting

off debris from a micro-meteroid that hadstruck the Vela satellite. Such anomalous

events, were termed zoo-events (Ruina et al1980), of which there had been a number

recorded before the vela incident (Fig.2).

Additionally, theoretical studies show that theVela signal could be replicated by a series of

meteroid collisions, if they possesed the right

trajectory (Oetzel & Johnson 1980).

However, further analysis showed that thechance of just one of the collisional models

occuring was of the order of 1 in 100 billion(Oetzel & Johnson 1980). From just eyballing

the observations taken by the Vela satellites,it is clear that the zoo-events (Fig.2) have

markedly different signal characteristics to

that of the September 22ndevent and previous

double flash observations (Fig.1).

Additionally, the September 22nd

double flash

event (Fig.1a) has a very similar signal to that

of a double flash event recorded from an

earlier confirmed nuclear explosion (Fig.1b).

2.2 Nuclear Fallout

United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft were

soon dispatched to recover any nuclear debris

in the calculated area of testing. No

radioactive debris was found. However, lowlevels of iodine-131, a short half life isotope

produced by nuclear fission, were found in

sheep in southeastern Australia, which appear

to fit with wind patterns at the time (Barnaby

1989). A third bhangometer, usually in

operation to locate the geographic origin of an

event, was not operating on the Vela 6911,thus the location of any likely nuclear

explosion could only be estimated within a3,000 mile area (Richelson, 2006). It is

possible that USAF flight sorites missed thenuclear debris due to the large error in pin-

pointing the actual test site.


2/3

CHARLIE KENZIE

2.3 Hydro-acoustic Data

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)

collected and analysed hydro-acoustic and

ocean wave data. According to one account

the data showed that Navy sensors had

recorded a strong acoustic signal reflected off

the Antartic shelf, allowing a calculatedestimate of the events location, which wasmatched with the vela satellite location for the

hypothetical test.

3. Further evidecne

3.1 TIROS-N plasma

A plasma analyser, on the TIROS-N satellite,

observed an anomalously high precipitation of

magnetospheric electrons into the auroral

ionsosphere around the time of the Vela

Incident. It was proposed that the anomalywas linked to the effects of an atmospheric

nuclear explosion, however analysis indicatesthat the electron intensifaction occurred 3

minutes before the Vela light flash, and wascaused by a naturally occurring auroral arc

(Hones et al1979).

All-sky camera pictures taken from Syowa

Base, Antartica, show a patch of auroral lightthat suddenly appeared a few seconds after

the Vela event (Fig.3). Anomalous auroral

patches are associated with whistler ducts,

kilometer wide magnetic flux tubes at theionosphere, which are produced by electro-

magnetic pulses (Hones et al 1979). A similar

auroral patch was observed after an EMP was

released from a US nuclear test, Operation

Lea (Hones et al 1979). The auroral patch

observed at Syowa base could be interpreted,

though not uniquely, as a consequence of the

electromagnetic pulse caused by the Vela

nuclear test (Hones et al 1979).4. Conclusions and implications of future

monitoring systems

Efforts during and after the Vela Incident to

collect an unambiguous dataset have beenunsuccesful. Firstly, the auroral data could,

with indeterminate probability, be either

caused by natural phenomenon or the

consequence of an SNB (Hones et al 1979).

The vela-satellite data appears to provide

evidence of a nuclear test, but the

observations can not be verified against anyother data. This is with the exception of the

NRL hydro-acoustic data, which was

apparently ignored by the White House.

Certainly, one has to consider the political

implications of an Israeli nuclear test on the

Carter adminstration, and thus question the

reliability of the findings of the Ruina report.

However, this cross-over between science and

politics is a dangerous course, and can raise

more ambiguity. Perhaps, an inherent problem

of a government !"##$%&'(panel, such as the

Ruina panel, is that a political agenda is

immediately associated with it, regardless of

the reliability of the panels conclusions.

Indeed, the Ruina panel were specifically

briefed to ignore all political questions

concerning the event, however it does seem

strange that the Carter adminstration choose

to ignore the hydro-acoustic data, to allow therelease of the Ruina report before the NRLreport had been completed, and that at the

time of writing, the 300 page NRL report wasstill classified. Perhaps the US government

benefited from a conundrum apparent in

society and science, that once a status quo

has been reached with reguard to an

observation (in this case the Ruina report) it isdifficult, regardless of evicence shown to the

contrary, to challenge the initial hypothesis.

Nevertheless, even considering the NRL

findings, it is still clear that more variables areneeded to substantiate whether a nuclear test

took place. An important consideration forfuture monitoring systems is that

nondedicated scientific systems are likely tolack sensitivity or to be turned off at an event

time. Even dedicated systems are not free of

substantial background noise (Hones et al

1979). For example, vlf receivers can detect

EMP signals from even small nuclearexplosioins, but the signal is entirely similar

in character to those produced by natural

lightening strikes. Equally, Ionosondes have

the ability to sense large SNBs but are

insensitive to smaller explosions (Hones et al

1979). The use of seismometers is similarly

restricted, since only the largest magnitude

atmospheric explosions will generate a

seismic signal. The best method would be toemploy a number of specifically designed and

maintained bhangmeter light sensors on anumber of satellites, which would improve

reliability and allow cross verification of

observations on a global scale.


3/3

CHARLIE KENZIE

Fig.1(a) Bhangmeter light patterns detected by the Vela satellite on 9/22/79 (Ruina 1980). The Ruina Panel explained the signal asa zoo event, caused by natural phenomena, not associated with a nuclear explosion.

(b)Light pattern detected by a pair of bhangmeters from a Vela satellite for a known nuclear test (Ruina 1980). Notice the overall

similarity of the signal to (a).

Fig.2 So called zoo-event from previous vela satellite

observations (Ruina et al1980). Notice the difference in

signal characteristics in Fig.1.

Fig.3 Pictures of the sky taken with the all-sky camera at

Syowa Base. The frame exposed fourth from left, top row,

shows the time 00:52:50 to 00:52:57 UT, and displays a

roughly trapezoidal patch of light that did not occur in the

frame before. It appears unchanged in the next frame and

then is gone. Possibly evidence of a whistler event caused by

a nuclear explosion generated EMP.

a b

REFERENCES

BARNABY, F. (1989). The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East.I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

HERSH, S. (1991). The Samson Option.United States Government. Random House.

HONES, E. W., Baker, D. N., & Feldman, W. C. (1981). Evaluation of Some Geophysical Events on 22 September 1979.

United States Government, US Departments of Energy and Defense. Los Almos: United States Department of Energy.

OETZEL, G., & Johnson, S. (1980). Vela Meteroid Evaluation.SRI International. SRI International.

RICHELSON, J. T. (2006). Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea.Washington DC: W. W. Norton.

RUINA, J., Alvarez, L., Donn, W., Garwin, R., Giacconi, R., Muller, R., et al. (1980).Ad Hoc Panel on the September 22

Event.United States Government, National Security Council. Washington, DC: Clifford Stone Document Archive.

SUBLETTE, C. (2001, September 1).Report on the 1979 Vela Incident.Retrieved November 23, 2013, from Nuclear Weapon

Archive: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Safrica/Vela.html

WEISS, L. (2011). The 1979 South Atlantic Flash: The Case for an Israeli Nuclear Test.Stanford University. Washington, DC:

Stanford University.

was the vela incident a clandestine nuclear test?

Documents