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WARS OF IDEAS AND THE WAR OF IDEAS

Antulio J. Echevarria II

June 2008

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FOREWORD

Many references to the war of ideas have appearedin defense literature recently. However, few of themactually shed any light on what wars of ideas are. Thismonograph, by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, begins byclassifying several types of wars of ideas. It is importantto note, as the author points out, that physical events,whether intended or incidental, can play determiningroles in the ways these kinds of con icts unfold, andhow (or whether) they are resolved. In other words,because ideas are interpreted subjectively, it is not likelythat opposing parties will win each other over bymeans of an ideational campaign alone. Moreover, thirdparties may consider the actions of the belligerents asmuch more important than the collective merits of theirideas. Thus, while strategic communications remain

essential, we may need to manage our expectations asfar as what we wish them to accomplish, particularlyin the current war of ideas.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph as a contribution to the debate on thistimely issue.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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SUMMARY

Despite widespread emphasis on the importance ofwinning the war of ideas in recent strategic literature,we nd few analytical studies of wars of ideas assuch. With that in mind, this monograph offers a briefexamination of four common types of wars of ideas, anduses that as a basis for analyzing how the United Statesand its allies and strategic partners might proceed inthe current war of ideas.

Scoping the Problem. Simply put, a war of ideasis a clash of visions, concepts, and images, andespeciallythe interpretation of them. They are,indeed, genuine wars, even though the physicalviolence might be minimal, because they serve apolitical, socio-cultural, or economic purpose, andthey involve hostile intentions or hostile acts. Wars

of ideas can assume many forms, but they tend tofall into four general categories (though these are notnecessarily exhaustive): (a) intellectual debates, (b)ideological wars, (c) wars over religious dogma, and(d) advertising campaigns. All of them are essentiallyabout power and in uence, just as with wars overterritory and material resources, and their stakes, canrun very high indeed.

Common Wars of Ideas .

Intellectual Debates are disputes in which opposingsides advance their arguments, support them withevidence, and endeavor to refute the reasoning andconclusions of the other. Examples include the ongoing

debate between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life advocates, andthe recent dispute between the theories of intelligentdesign and evolution.


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Ideological Wars are a clash of broad visions usuallyorganized around a doctrine, whether secular or

nonsecular. The most popular example of an ideologicalcon ict is the Cold War, which involved political,economic, and military competition between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.

Disputes over Religious Dogma are a form of intel-lectual debate, but they center on con icting interpreta-tions of sacred tenets or texts, the access to which canbe, and often is, deliberately restricted or otherwiselimited. Examples include the Sunni-Shiite split withinIslam and Catholicisms East-West schism.

Advertising Campaigns are contests betweencompeting producers or vendors for market share.The objective of such campaigns is to persuadeaudiences to take desired actions, such as voting for aparticular candidate, visiting a certain place, or buying

a speci c product. A classic example is the Cola Warsbetween Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola.

Wars of Ideas: Some Conclusions.

Inconclusive outcomes are not unusual in wars ofideas. Opposing sides seldom change their positionsbased on the introduction of new evidence, or newways of evaluating existing evidence. Thus, warsof ideas are rarely settled on the merits of the ideasthemselves. Instead, they tend to drag on, unless anevent occurs that causes the belligerents to focus theirattention elsewhere.

When conclusive outcomes do occur, they tendto follow the physical elimination or marginalization

of one sides key proponents. In other cases, a majorevent, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, mightoccur that renders one side incapable of continuing thecon ict or campaign.


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Thus, physical events, whether designed orincidental, are in some respects more important to the

course and outcome of a war of ideas than the ideasthemselves.

The War of Ideas.

Diverging Approaches? Two diverging schools ofthought exist on how the United States and its partnersshould approach the current war of ideas with al - Qaeda and similar groups. The rst treats the con ictas a matter for public diplomacy, de ned as theconveyance of information across a broad spectrumto include cultural affairs and political action.Accordingly, this view calls for revitalizing the U.S.Department of State, and reestablishing many of thetraditional tools of statecraft.

The second advocates waging the war of ideas asa real war, wherein the objective is to destroy thein uence and credibility of the opposing ideology, andneutralize its chief proponents. It calls for continuingthe transformation of the U.S. Department of Defense sothat it can better leverage information-age weapons.

Although each approach has merits, neither isinformed by an understanding of wars of ideas assuch. U.S. strategy for the war of ideas requires a moreprecise goal than just improving Americas image.Winning a popularity contest is far less important thanundermining al -Q aedas ability to recruit. The twoaims are certainly related, but eminently separable.Success in the former does not necessarily equateto success in the latter; con ating the two aims only

creates confusion.


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Recommendations.

U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must bemore alert to the opportunities and pitfallsintroduced by physical events. For instance, thesuccessful stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraqwould have an extremely positive effect on thewar of ideas, undercutting al - Qaedas generalinformation campaign.

Neither the Department of States approach northat of the Department of Defense should besubordinated to the other. Rather, the UnitedStates should pursue both approaches inparallel.

Both Departments should sponsor studies andconferences that will explore wars of ideasin more depth, thereby promoting greater

understanding. The Joint community should revise itsdoctrine concerning information operations, toinclude psychological operations and militarydeception. The basic assumption underpinningcurrent doctrine is that information operationsare a subset of support to military operations.Yet, in some cases, military operations mightneed to support information operations.

U.S. doctrine on information operationsmust also acknowledge that the informationenvironment is neither neutral nor static.Disparate cultural and social in uences almostalways ensure that diverse audiences willinterpret the same information differently.

The U.S. Armys new Human Terrain System,which helps enhance cultural awareness, is animportant step in the right direction and shouldbe supported.


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By developing an understanding of wars of ideas

as a mode of con ict, we can ght the current battle ofideas more effectively, while at the same time betterprepare ourselves to wage future ones.


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WARS OF IDEAS AND THE WAR OF IDEAS

INTRODUCTION

Of cials and analysts alike continue to underscorethe importance of the war of ideas as an integralpart of the larger war on terror. 1 The U.S. NationalSecurity Strategy (March 2006) declares that From thebeginning, the war on terror has been both a battle ofarms and a battle of ideasa ght against the terroristsand their murderous ideology. 2 Likewise, the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September2006) states that In the long run, winning the War onTerror means winning the battle of ideas. 3 Similarly,the newly released U.S. National Strategy for HomelandSecurity (October 2007) af rms that the War on Terroris a dif ferent kind of warnot only a battle of arms but

also a battle of ideas.4

In addition, Stephen Hadley,President Bushs National Security Advisor, recentlyexplained:

. . . what we need to do as a nation is come together andput in place the tools we need both to wage the opera-tional war and also to wage the war of ideas. . . . Weneed to ght this enemy operationally, we need to ght

it ideologically, in terms of our values and principlesand alternative vision. 5

Although the importance of the war of ideas isbroadly recognized, many analysts warn that theUnited States is losing that war. 6 As we shall see, theseconcerns are partly the result of con ating the warof ideas with the popularity (or, more accurately, the

unpopularity) of some U.S. policies, and of Americasimage abroad. Interestingly, the United States does notappear to be losing the war of ideas on the home front.


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Polls taken by the Pew Research Center show thatthe overwhelming majority of American Muslims

reject terrorism and religious extremism, and holda positive view of American society, despite thefact that more than half say it is more dif cult tobe Muslim since September 11, 2001 (9/11). 7 Thetendency to roll general attitudes of anti-Americanismunder the rubric of the war of ideas is justi ed only toa limited extent, and only because our adversaries willtry to exploit those attitudes. 8 It is not helpful to linkgeneral negative opinions about the United States to afailure in the war of ideas. The stated policy aim in thisbattle of ideas is, after all, to prevent the emergenceof vio lent Islamic radicalization in order to denyterrorists future recruits and [to] defeat homegrownextremism. 9 Dissatisfaction with certain U.S. policiesdoes not necessarily equate to support for a global

jihad. Some anti-American sentiments existed wellbefore, and quite independently, of the war on terror;and many of them will undoubtedly persist for sometime in the future, regardless of how the con ict ends.

Despite this widespread emphasis on winning the war of ideas, we nd almost no analyses of such warsin todays voluminous strategic literature. At present,we have a wealth of studies addressing all forms ofconventional and unconventional wars, particularlyinsurgencies. Yet, we nd precious few addressingwars of ideas. This dearth is particularly unfortunategiven that more than 6 years have elapsed since 9/11. 10 Indeed, various battles of ideas are taking place at anygiven time.

Hence, an analytical study of wars of ideas, to the

extent they are wars, would enhance our understandingof such con icts and how we might approach them.With that in mind, this monograph, which is necessarily


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limited in scope, does two things. First, it offers a briefexamination of what appear to be the four basic types

of wars of ideas found in history. Second, it uses thatexamination as a start point for analyzing the principalapproaches in the current war of ideas. Just as wewould do well to understand the nature of any armedcon ict we intend to ght before embarking upon it,so, too, we ought to appreciate the nature of any warof ideas we might attempt to wage. 11

Scoping the Problem.

Simply put, a war of ideas is a clash of visions, con-cepts, and images, andespeciallythe interpretationof them; for the images themselves matter much lessthan the way they are perceived. They are, indeed,genuine wars because they serve a purpose, usually

political, social, or economic in nature, and they involvehostile intentions or hostile acts, though they are notalways physically violent. 12 History suggests wars ofideas fall into four general categories: (a) intellectualdebates, (b) ideological wars, (c) wars over religiousdogma, and (d) advertising campaigns. All of themare essentially about power and in uence, just as withwars over territory and material resources, and theirstakes can run quite high. In fact, many wars of ideasoccur as part of larger physical con icts. One of theprincipal motives for a war of ideas is fear that otherswill gain access to, or control of, some form of physicalpower or material wealth. In some cases, ideas are themost effective weapons for countering such threats.

Nearly every war has an ideational component, but

in some con icts that component plays secondary role.As history shows, propaganda and patriotic rhetoricoften escalate into a war of words and images, a battle


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of ideas of sorts. Such battles help boost morale andgenerate material contributions and other support for

the physical ghting. Yet, it is not necessary to winsuch battles to win a physical clash of arms. In theSecond World War, for instance, the rhetoric used bythe Allies and the Axis powers portrayed the con ictas an all-out struggle between good and evil. 13 However, the ideational struggle was settled on thebattle eld, with the physical defeat of Axis forces inEurope and the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan.This physical success helped discredit Nazism and Japanese imperialism, except of course in the eyes offanatics. The physical presence of military forces duringreconstruction enabled the Allies to control people andplaces, and thereby remove, rehabilitate, or reeducatesubject populations. 14

It is important to note the difference between wars

in which ideas are used mainly to support a physicalclash of arms, and others where ideas are either the casusbelli or the principal weapons. Both types of con ictsare, strictly speaking, wars of ideas. In the former,however, military power initially plays a leading roleby defeating an opponents armed might, then shiftsto a secondary, yet still important role by providingsecurity during reconstruction. In the latter, militarypower may play only a limited role or perhaps none atall. As noted earlier, U.S. of cials see the current war onterror as a combined effort, involving both physical andideational elements, with the latter more important, ifnot decisive, than the former. This emphasis suggeststhat the United States sees itself as engaged in thesecond type of wars of ideas, where physical force plays

a supporting role. However, that is not to say that theuse of military force is not important in this con ict, orthat there is not a relationship between it and success


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and failure in the war of ideas. On the contrary, as thefollowing survey reveals, physical events, to include

those brought about by the use of (kinetic) force,often play a critical role in resolving wars of ideas ormarginalizing the opposition.

PRINCIPAL WARS OF IDEAS

Intellectual Debates.

An intellectual debate is a relatively common andlong-standing form of a war of ideas. We will de ne ithere as any dispute in which opposing sides advancearguments, support them with evidence of some kind,and endeavor to refute the reasoning and conclusionsof the other. Not surprisingly, such debates range fromthe trivial to the consequential. An example of the

former might be the various interpretations of literaryworks by scholars and other critics, particularly thosewho adhere to some of the tenets of post-structuralism,such as the assertion that we can never know for certainwhat an author intended to say so we should excludeauthorial intent altogether. 15 In contrast, the ongoingdebate between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life advocateshas raised momentous legal, ethical, and moral issues;a number of doctors and medical personnel lost theirlives in the process. 16 The debate was well under wayeven before the case of Roe v. Wade, the 1973 SupremeCourt decision that upheld abortion as a constitutionalright. 17 An example of an intellectual debate that fallssomewhere between trivial and consequential is thecontroversy over whether the military revolution that

purportedly took place in early modern Europe wasmore of an evolution than a revolution, or whetherit was actually a series of punctuated equilibria. 18


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Regardless of how we choose to answer this question,the consequential part of the military revolution is how

it transformed power relationships both within Europe,and beyond it, at the time (of course, this effect, too, isdebatable).

Ostensibly, intellectual debates hinge on thenature and quantity of evidence available, and theinterpretations or conclusions we can reasonablydraw from that evidence. In theory, debates involvean objective evaluation of available facts, such asthey are, and the participants purportedly revisetheir positions as new information becomes available.However, as Thomas Kuhn has shown, intellectualdebates turn as much on the power structures involvedin the controversy and what they stand to lose bysupporting a particular point of view as much asorperhaps even morethan they do on the available

evidence.19

Similarly, Sir Karl Poppers seminal workon objective knowledge reveals that what we know,even if developed via the scienti c method, is neverwholly certain; knowledge is uid, and the processof knowing is dynamic, affected as much by ourunderlying assumptions as our imperfect ability toidentify and examine those assumptions. 20 In short,people from different cultures and backgrounds donot necessarily give an equal amount of credence tothe same kinds of evidence.

The recent dispute between the theories ofintelligent design and evolution is a case in point. 21 Proponents of the former maintain that Darwinstheory of natural selection, which is the intellectualfoundation for the modern theory of evolution, does

not explain the origin of complex forms of life; hence,it is quite likely that some higher intelligence designedthem. Opponents of intelligent design counter that this


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theory is merely creationism in another guise. U.S.District Judge John E. Jones III ultimately ruled that

the insertion of the theory of intelligent design into thescience curriculum of the Dover Area School District(in Pennsylvania) violated the separation of churchand state. 22

Other examples include controversies caused rstby Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) and later by GalileoGalilei (1564-1642) when they advanced heliocentric, orsun-centered, models of the universe. 23 These modelschallenged the Ptolemaic, or geocentric model, whichplaced the earth at the center of the universe, and hadobvious implications beyond the narrow interestsof mathematical astronomy. If the earth was not, infact, the center of the universe, as sacred texts werepurported to have stated, what then was to be madeof scriptural authority? In essence, these controversies

had as much to do with interpretive authority as withthe inadequacies of the geo-centric model, which werealready known to many scholars and clerics. In truth,the heliocentric model only undermined literalistinterpretations of Christian scripture, an understandingmany religious authoritiesto include Augustine ofHippo (354-430)had long cautioned against.

Actually, Copernicus work was preceded by that ofother students of the stars, to include several Catholicclergymen and Muslim scholars, who had developedcomputational models which, by implication at least,suggested that the sun was the center of the universe.Nonetheless, Copernicus astronomical tables weremuch more extensive than those of his predecessors,enabling the computation of past as well as future

positions of the stars and planets. This predictivequality moved helio-centrism from the category ofsimple speculation, or hypothesis, to a defensible


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theory. The theory was subsequently defended byseveral astronomers, to include Johannes Kepler

(1571-1630) and more famously, Galileo.This debate was only one of many for Galileo,however. He was also engaged in arguments with otherastronomers, including a number of Jesuit scholars,about the nature of sunspots, comets, and scienceitself. 24 Unfortunately, none of the participants in thesedebates were above inserting a gratuitous ad hominem or two in their works to belittle their opponents; suchactions quickly and predictably drove the disputebeyond the dialectical quest for knowledge into thebaser realm of personal score-settling. Even moreunfortunately, the timing of Copernicus and Galileosscienti c endeavors coincided with the gatheringmomentum of the Inquisition and the Thirty YearsWar (1618-48), which had made the Catholic Church

sensitive to scriptural challenges, direct or implied.Many Church of cials, to include Pope Urban III,originally an admirer of Galileo, acknowledged thedata supporting the heliocentric model, but cautionedagainst advocating it as a replacement for the geocentricmodel, which was also the conventional wisdom evenamong secular scholars. Evidently, when Galileopublished his famous work, Dialogue Concerning theTwo Chief World Systems, he thought he had compliedwith Urbans wishes to avoid advocacy. However, theChurch saw the work differently. In 1638, Galileo wasbrought before the Inquisition on the charge of heresy.The tribunal ordered him to recant, which he refusedto do. He was subsequently found guilty and placedunder comfortable house arrest where he remained

until his death in 1642. According to most historians,he was condemned more for defying papal authoritythan for the scienti c, if awed, model he advanced.


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Such muddled outcomes are typical of intellectualdisputes. Proponents on each side are rarely persuaded

to change their positions by the introduction of newevidence, or new ways of evaluating the evidence.Instead, they tend to remain entrenched in theirpositions, convinced of the correctness of their owninterpretations, and resolved to carry on the ght inanother form, or in another setting, or with differenttactics, rather than conceding. Arbitration may have tocome from an outside authority, but that decisionas inthe example of the debate over Intelligent Designmayonly limit the formal jurisdiction of the theory or idea,not its appeal or its informal in uence. In some cases,intransigence might have little to do with the evidence,which might be persuasive, and more to do with thepolitical repercussions of conceding. It was not untilcenturies later that the Catholic Church apologized

for condemning Galileo. However, it insists, probablyrightly, that its rejection of the heliocentric model wascorrect based on the scienti c standards of proof at thetime; Galileo, for instance, could not account for the lackof parallax shifts in the stars positions, a phenomenonwhich must occur if the earth moved about the sun. 25 So, while Galileo showed that the Ptolemaic modelwas inadequate, which many already believed, he wasnot entirely persuasive with regard to his own model.

At rst glance, the stakes involved in intellectualdebates might not seem particularly high. A scholaradvancing a controversial interpretation of thesigni cance of one of Shakespeares works, for instance,may be denied tenure at an intellectual institution onthe basis of his or her views (among other factors).

Yet, should that concern the general population? Tobe sure, such consequences might not impress thoseoutside academia. However, a lack of intellectualdiversity in institutions of higher learning can lead


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to rigid orthodoxies concerning what is taught atthat level, as well as other levels of education. Many

scholars promoted racist, Social Darwinist doctrines inWestern educational curricula during the 19th century,with disastrous consequences for later generations. 26 Thus, the outcomes of intellectual debates can be quitemomentous. Likewise, a judges stand on Roe v. Wadecould affect whether he or she is con rmed for a seat onthe Supreme Court, the rulings of which can obviouslyprove widely and profoundly in uential.

In several of the cases mentioned above, an externaleventthe decision of a judge or a courtdecided theissue. While some assume that such authorities areunbiased and impartial, that is not necessarily true, andit was clearly not true in the case of Galileo. Nonetheless,the decisions above had only limited in uence.The debate over the heliocentric system resurfaced

later; similarly, the disputes involving evolution andcreationism, and those regarding abortion tend toresurface periodically. Other intellectual debates, suchas the causes of the French Revolution or of World WarI, continue, sometimes with new schools of thoughtemerging, or old ones trying new perspectives oruncovering new evidence. It would also be inaccurateto say that such debates have no strategic aims, asmany of them, such as those pertaining to the causes ofthe French Revolution, are part of a larger ideologicalstruggle.

Disputes over Religious Dogma.

Disputes over religious dogma are similar to

intellectual debates in the sense that the proponentstend to adhere doggedly to their own points of view.The key difference, however, is that the evidentiary


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support for battles over religious dogma generallycenters on the interpretation of sacred texts, the access

to which can be, and often is, deliberately restricted orotherwise limited. Complicating the issue, of course,is that many sacred texts have been forged or falsi ed,while many others have been lost or may never, in fact,have existed. 27 Logic and rigorous analysis, then, cancarry the debate only so far. Beyond that, one mustmake the proverbial leap of faith.

A case in point is the dispute between Augustineof Hippo, the renowned bishop whom the CatholicChurch later canonized, and the ascetic monkPelagius (354-420). At root, the controversy centeredon two different views of human nature, which inturn had momentous implications for the traditionalunderstanding of the nature of original sin and themeans of salvation. Pelagius believed human beings

had the ability to choose, and therefore could chooseright over wrong. Because of this capacity for self-determination, humans and their societies wereperfectible: progress was possible through rightchoices. Although Augustine laid down similar viewsin his early writings regarding the human ability tochoose (particularly in his Confessions), he later cameto reject the Pelagian idea of self-determination. ForAugustine, human beings had unconscious urges orfeelings which they could not simply choose to not have(a matter with which he had considerable experience).Since these feelings could not be eliminated by choicealone, they required the healing powers of baptism,to absolve one rst of original sin, and divine grace,to cleanse one of subsequent sin. Humans could only

realize free will and self-determination at the end ofa long spiritual healing process by which feelingsand the intellect were brought together in union. 28 To


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summarize the contrast, Pelagius held that humannature was essentially good, though far from perfect,

and that God had already given it the intellectual andspiritual tools necessary for its salvation. Humans hadbut to choose to apply those tools correctly. Augustine,on the other hand, maintained that humans could not choose not to be humans, and that they are, by theirnature, weak and sinful; ergo, humans could not becounted on to choose well, absent the intervention ofdivine grace. 29

Signi cantly, Augustines refutation of Pelagius,and its subsequent acceptance by the Catholic Churchsengaged but rather deferential clergy, contributed topreserving the Churchs assumed role as humanitysspiritual leader and healer. Although Pelagius andhis followers appear to have been more interested inreforming human social behavior, which they saw

as morally lax, than in setting forth a new religiousdogma, Augustine saw their ideas as a threat to theChurchs authority and in uence, and repeatedlyportrayed them as such.

Notably, each side of the controversy had extensivenetworks of followers and supporters: Pelagius werelocated primarily in Britain and Sicily, while Augustineswere found predominantly in Rome and Africa. Severalcouncils met (two in 415 and one each in 416 and 418)to determine whether Pelagius beliefs were in accordwith Church dogma. Augustines voluminous anddetailed arguments had exposed other heresies, andhad duly established him as an authority on matters ofdogma. In 418, he held a council in Hippo that issueda condemnation of Pelagius teachings based on nine

points which, Augustine correctly demonstrated,directly contradicted Church dogma. Augustine sentthe condemnation to Pope Zosimus, strongly urging the


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Pope to agree. 30 Zosimus consented, and Pelagius wasexiled from Rome. He is believed to have died shortly

thereafter, in 420, though that remains uncon rmed.Moreover, the circumstances of his death are not clear:some accounts claim he was killed by members ofthe Catholic Church who feared he might continuepreaching; again, none of that has been substantiated.Indeed, Pelagius ideas, which appear to have been ablend of Celtic individualism and Greek stoicism, havepersisted in Christian literature, though in diffusedform. Even today, we nd the idea of self-determinationat the root of any number of modern ideologies anddoctrines.

Not surprisingly, the stakes in this dispute ranhigh. After all, a dominant interpretation of dogma canshape what the members of a particular faith believefor many ages to come. The tenets or principles which

comprise religious dogma de ne not only this life,what it means and how to behave in it, but also theafterlife, what it is, and who shall have it. Augustineobviously understood the stakes, even if some of hisfellow bishops did not. Other, perhaps better knownand certainly more consequential examples of disputesover religious dogma include the Sunni-Shiite splitwithin Islam and Catholicisms East-West schism. Eachof these disputes involved different interpretations ofdogma, as well as overlapping political, economic, andcultural issues.

In this example, a physical eventthe Popesdecision to exile Pelagius and his resultant departurefrom the sceneplayed a key role in resolving thedebate. Except for Augustines and Pelagius followers,

other members of the clergy appear to have beenambivalent. Perhaps not as well-steeped in churchdogma as Augustine, they failed to perceive Pelagius


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teachings as a threat. It took Augustines persistentorchestrations and his detailed comparison between

Pelagius writings and church dogma to move Zosimusto action. That action proved decisive. Again, we cansay that this resolution was only a temporary one inthe larger picture, however. The debate over humannature has been taken up by many philosophers andtheologians since, and remains essentially unresolved.

Ideological Wars.

For purposes of this monograph, an ideology isany organized set of political or philosophical ideas,whether secular or nonsecular. An ideological wardiffers from a dispute over religious dogma in that thelatter involves a disagreement over the interpretationof sacred texts, with the opposing views emerging

from within the same religion. Ideological contests, incontrast, often cross secular and nonsecular lines.Some scholars argue that religious beliefs and

ideologies are qualitatively different because theformer are more powerful motivators than thelatter. 31 However, making such a distinction seemsunnecessary. Religions and ideologies each have theirarticles of faith; both rely on underlying assumptionsthat seldom hold up well to rigorous scrutiny. Just aswith religion, the principal proponents of an ideologyare likely to remain faithful despite an absence ofpositive proof for their views, and in the face ofcontrary evidence. Indeed, ideologues, by de nition,claim access to a higher source of knowledge which, forthem, requires no proof. To be sure, religious beliefs,

especially those associated with achieving a place in,or de ning, the afterlife, have prompted people totake extreme measures. Such religious concerns were


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among the many motives for the Thirty Years Warthat ravaged Europe. However, those concerns were

also inextricably bound up with some very secularpolitical and material motives. Moreover, it is dif cultto conceive of any measures more extreme than thoseassociated with Adolph Hitlers Holocaust. JosephStalin and Mao Zedong also purportedly killed tens ofmillions of people in the furtherance of their ideologicalgoals. We have little reason, then, for maintaining thatnonsecular ideologies are necessarily different fromsecular ones on the grounds that the former are moredestructive than the latter. 32

The most familiar example of an ideological war is,of course, the Cold War, where the political, economic,and military competition between the United Statesand the Soviet Union and their allies played out inan ideational realm as well. 33 While the Cold War is

considered to have begun at the end of World War II,its roots surely trace back to the Russian Revolution of1917, which strained relations between the United Statesand the emerging Soviet Union (which, incidentally,the United States did not recognize until 1933). Theantipathy between the two competing ideologiesMarxism-Leninism and Western-style capitalismbegan in the mid-19th century, and grew in intensitythrough the 20th century.

The post-World War II era saw massive propagandaefforts deployed by both sides in an attempt to winthe battle of ideas between competing political andeconomic philosophies. 34This ideational war was foughtin classrooms and on college campuses, in journals andbooks, and in radio broadcasts, television programs,

and the silver screen, and, of course, in the courts, andit involved the use of a plethora of catchwords andimages. Both sides also exploited international sporting


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and other competitive events, such as the Olympicsor the World Chess Championships, for propaganda

purposes. Far from a contest between the merits anddemerits of the theories propounded by Adam Smithor Karl Marx, this ideational struggle often took on apowerful emotional dimension: the pluck and grit ofamateur athletes, such as the U.S. Hockey team whichaccomplished the famous Miracle on Ice againstthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) state-groomed powerhouse of semi-professionals in 1980;or the eccentric and troubled genius of Bobby Fischerdefeating the methodical brilliance of Boris Spassky atthe World Chess Championship of 1972. 35

For the United States and its allies, much Cold Warpropaganda emphasized success stories, especiallythose well-suited to a David-versus-Goliath theme.However, there was also a dark, and patently self-

destructive, side to the ideological war againstcommunism that both succumbed to, and fostered, aninsidious civic paranoia. The McCarthyism of thelate 1940s and 1950s, for instance, ruined the lives ofmany loyal Americans, and often did so on little morethan unfounded suspicions, or for the sake of politicalopportunism. 36 The use of loyalty review boards andother interrogational institutions that went hand-in-hand with McCarthyism may seem like extreme meas-ures, but they are by no means unique as weapons inwars of ideas. Christendoms religious inquisitions,which ran from the 12th through the 19th centuries,were, in essence, loyalty review boards, but on a grand-er scale.

History recognizes four major inquisitions. Scholars

generally refer to the rst as the medieval inquisition,which was a combination of the largely ineffectiveepiscopal inquisition, begun in 1184, and the much more


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ef cient papal inquisition, initiated by Pope GregoryIX in the 1230s, and carried out with the support of

the Dominican order. The second is referred to as theSpanish Inquisition, which began in 1478 at the behestof monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, and was notof cially ended until 1834, though in practice it hadfaded much earlier. The third inquisition began in 1536at the direction of King Joao III of Portugal, and is thusreferred to as the Portuguese Inquisition. The fourth orRoman inquisition, which was designed to combat thespread of Protestantism in Italy, commenced in 1542 atthe order of Pope Paul III, and lasted until the middleof the 18th century. 37 Collectively, the inquisitions wereas much political instruments as they were religious,and the motives for them were as materiel as theywere ideational. Their explicit purpose was to ensurethat recent converts to Christianity were earnest:

many converts apparently did so primarily to avoidpersecution and expulsion. However, there were cleareconomic and political motives behind the Inquisitionas well, since many of those accused were wealthy orhad political enemies. While much has been made ofthe inquisitions use of torture and executions, recentscholarship has challenged those views. 38 In fact, theinquisitors gained more by showing mercy and byobtaining confessions than by burning people at thestake. Victory was de ned in terms of the numberof souls saved through confessions; in contrast, anexecution meant a defeat, for it was a failure to save asoul.

Many analysts today advocate using the ColdWar model for the war of ideas in the current war on

terror. 39 The model has much to recommend it. TheCold War lasted several generations and involvedmultiple dimensions (political, economic, military,


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and cultural). However, in other respects, the modelis not useful. The Soviet Union was an explicitly

de ned political-geographic entity, which could betargeted militarily and physically contained, though,to be sure, its ideology of revolution was not limitedby physical boundaries. Al - Qaeda and other terroristgroups naturally need to occupy physical space andare clearly political entities in their own right, albeitwith a religiously zealous, anti-Western core; however,they are not geographically identi able in the samesense, though al - Qaedas largest base appears to bein the mountains of Pakistan. 40 More signi cantly,the decisive event in the war against communistideology was the economic collapse of the SovietUnion. 41 To be sure, part of that collapse was due tothe Wests strategy of containment and the fact that itwas carried out against fundamentally awed Soviet

economic practices during the post-World War II armsrace. However, neither of these causes can be directlyattributed to the war of ideas, the propaganda battlebetween Moscow and the West.

Moreover, a fundamental problem with the ColdWar model is that it is essentially impossible to wagean economic war against al - Qaeda and its af liates,or to pursue a strategy of containment, without at thesame time harming Muslim states and populationswhom we do not want to harm. In addition, it is notclear that the propaganda war that raged betweenthe Western allies and the USSR actually convincedpeople to believe anything they did not already wishto believe, or had been conditioned to believe. Thoseindoctrinated in a particular system do not appear

especially receptive to propaganda from the otherside, unless they have ulterior motives. If they turnagainst their own side, as in the case of the ex-Federal


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Bureau of Investigation (FBI) spy Robert Hanssen, theyoften appear to do so for reasons which have little to

do with ideology.42

Without reliable data, it is dif cultto draw defensible conclusions about the effectivenessof propaganda efforts on target populations which arealready intellectually and emotionally committed toanother cause. Undecided minds are another matter.Hence, if one party is waging a concerted informationcampaign, the other can hardly avoid doing likewise.Silence suggests weakness, guilt, or both.

The ideological wars referred to above wereresolved either by a major physical event, such as thecollapse of the Soviet Union, or by other kinds of force.The inquisitions detained individuals by force, andextracted confessions, again usually by physical oremotional force. This was also true of McCarthys moresecular brand of inquisition. That Hitler, Stalin, and

Mao used force in their ideological struggles is patentlyobvious, though one would expect that when ideas areused to support military action. This is not to say thatpropaganda in the form of lea ets, radio broadcasts,and the like, are not effective in getting opponents tosurrender or that they have no value. Rather, it is easyto overlook the amount and type of psychological oremotional force they can bring to bear.

Advertising Campaigns.

Advertising campaigns are arguably the mostpervasive, and thus the most common, wars of ideas.An advertising campaign is a series of messages, oftenpackaged as sound-bites or slogans, carrying a central

idea about a person, place, or a thing. The objective ofthe campaign, of course, is to get the audience to take adesired action, to vote for a particular candidate, to visit


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a certain place, or to buy a speci c product. Accordingto one source, some of the most successful advertising

campaigns in the United States include: Nike, JustDo It (1988); Miller Lite, Tastes great, less lling(1974); Avis, We try harder (1963); Maxwell House,Good to the last drop (1959); U.S. Army, Be all thatyou can be (1981); and Burger King, Have it yourway (1973). 43 With but few exceptions, many of theseslogans are still in use, which is obviously evidence oftheir effectiveness.

Stakes in this sort of war of ideas are relatively high,from the political success of a candidate to an increasein market share for a manufacturer or a vendor. Aclassic example is the ongoing war of slogans andimages between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. Each usesa combination of slogans, images, and celebrities in anattempt to convince consumers that its product tastes

better and is more refreshing. These Cola Warshave raged for several decades, with each producerdeveloping new avors and marketing strategies.The most important of these was Coca-Colas effortto provide a cheap and steady supply of bottled Coketo men and women serving in the military duringWorld War II. This strategy resulted in millions ofservicemen and women returning to the United Stateswith an acquired taste for Coca-Cola, and in a globalbottling and distribution network. Another notablemarketing move was Coca-Colas use of the song, Idlike to teach the world to sing . . . in the early 1970s;the song, connected with images of people of all racesand nationalities joining hand-in-hand, proved aninstant success, offering hope in politically uncertain

times. Another success, the Pepsi Challenge, wasinitiated by Pepsi-Cola in 1975, in which individualstook blind taste-tests and selected the product they


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preferred. Pepsi was purportedly chosen a majorityof the time. Yet, while Pepsis sales increased through

this and other clever strategies, it has never been ableto overtake Coke in terms of market share. The Coca-Cola logo has become associated internationally withall things American, good and bad. In 2006, Coca-Cola products still held 43 percent of the market sharefor carbonated soft drinks in the United States, whilePepsi-Cola products held 31 percent. 44

Advertising campaigns must continue as longas a product can be expected to be sold for a pro t,or a candidate is running for of ce. To be sure, thecampaigns themselves evolve (or devolve) over time,responding to changing situations and to actions takenby the competition. However, they retain their basiccharacteristic, which is the intrinsic drive for largermarket share, whether that consists of consumers

or voters. Signi cantly, Coca-Colas relative edgeover Pepsi-Cola has as much to do with the formersaggressive exploitation of physical events unrelated tothe taste of its products, such as military deploymentsoverseas, world sporting events such as the Olympics,and providing a message of hope in troubled times.

WARS OF IDEAS: SOME CONCLUSIONS

This brief discussion of wars of ideas reveals, rstof all, that they do not occur in isolation from physicalevents, but rather turn on them. Physically eliminating,driving away, or otherwise neutralizing a partys keyproponents is only one, albeit the most obvious, way toresolve such a con ict. Augustine leveraged the power

of the pope to achieve such an outcome in the battlewith Pelagius. As the example of the collapse of theSoviet Union shows, a major eventsuch as an internal


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coup, economic collapse, or natural disastercan alsobring about the demise of one party, or its credibility,

and thus resolve or at least marginalize a war of ideas.Deliberately connecting a negative event to a failedset of ideas is thus another way to gain an importantadvantage in a con ict. It might not matter that theconnection does not hold up to close scrutiny; theaudience might not require a high standard of proofif the outcome is desirable. The West was eager tobelieve, albeit with some justi cation, the explanationthat the Soviet Union collapsed because the strategy ofcontainment worked. To be sure, socialism has hardlybeen extinguished as a school of thought. Still, thefailure of the Soviet experiment seriously compromisedthe ideologys basic tenets, and it is now much lesspowerful.

It is unlikely that the inquisitions of the Catholic

church or the loyalty review boards of McCarthy wouldhave been taken seriously without some legal, moral,or physical force to back them. At the same time, it isnot clear that any confessions extracted by the threatof force have ever been truly reliable. While force canplay an important role in any battle of ideas, it can alsolead to results that are super cial or counterproductive.Of course, that raises the question as to whether theconfession was the ultimate purpose, or whether thewar of ideas was only intended to support the use offorce in the rst place.

The survey also suggests that wars of ideas canfade into irrelevance for at least some period of time.Participants might have their interests taken up byother matters, perhaps another debate or a catastrophic

physical event. Or, the next generation might havedifferent tastes and concerns, and thus might notconsider a particular battle of ideas worth its time. It is,


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to be sure, to avoid such outcomes that advertising andrecruiting campaigns transform themselves to ensure

that they retain their appeal in ever changing markets.Yet, such efforts must run continuously, and shouldinvolve extensive market research.

Many wars of ideas will continue inde nitely,evolving into different forms with varying intensities,to be fought out by later generations. The debatesbetween Pro-Life and Pro-Choice constituencies haveraged for decades, and will likely continue for decadesmore. 45 New evidence may be presented, or new tacticstried, but at root, this debate will involve many of thesame issues for years. Similarly, we could make acase that the battle between Augustine and Pelagiusrepresents but a single episode in a longer disputeover contrasting views of human nature. None of this,of course, mattered to either Augustine or Pelagius at

the time. In short, the old adage is true that ideaslikediseasesnever really die, only the vectors do.

The War of Ideas.

The battle of ideas in the war on terror is a complexmixture of two types of con icts, one external and theother internal. Externally, this war is an ideologicalstruggle between the West, and in particular the UnitedStates, and terrorist groups, especially al - Qaeda andits spin-offs. The aim of the United States is to renderal- Qaeda a negligible threat. For al -Q aeda, it is aneffort to undermine the Wests support for moderateIslamic regimes, and to prevent its secular ways fromcorrupting Islam. To be sure, the ideas at odds here

vary among those participating in, or describing, thecon ict. 46 That is to be expected in a battle of ideas, sincecompeting parties will often use otherwise unrelatedimages, concepts, and slogans to support their causes.


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Internally, this war is a battle over religious dogmawithin Islam. It is a struggle to establish a particularly

militant interpretation of the Koran and of sharia law,which would mobilize Muslims against the West, andthus lead to the puri cation of Islamic society andresurrect the greatness of the Caliphate.

As Akbar Ahmed, a Muslim scholar who holdsthe Chair of Islamic Studies at American University,explains :

Properly understood, this is a war of ideas within Islamsome of them faithful to authentic Islam, but some ofthem clearly un-Islamic and even blasphemous towardthe peaceful and compassionate Allah of the Quran .47

Other Islamic scholars and Muslim organizationshave agreed, some explicitly condemning bin Ladenas an apostate. 48 In addition, some Muslim leadershave openly denounced the threat Tak ri and Sala jihadism poses:

[Saudi youth have become] a tool in the hands of for-eign forces that manipulate them in the name of jihad,whilst ful lling their shameful goals and objectives infoul operations that are far removed from religion sothat our youth have become a commodity to be bought

and sold.49

Either we will have in the next 10 years 80 million pro-ductive young people . . . or we will have 80 million radi-cal extremists in the Middle East. 50

In addition, other Muslim authorities havechallenged key al - Qaeda leaders, such as Ayman al-

Zawahiri, to debate religious issues.51

The internalstruggle is one that only Muslims can wage; non-Muslims may assist in some ways, when asked, but


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they surely have no authorityand, thus, no righttoopine on matters of dogma. The quotes above suggest

that Islam is in the midst of a revivalist or reformation-counter-reformation dynamic that will have to run itscourse.

In contrast, the external struggle involves bothMuslims and non-Muslims; the tactics of these self-styled Tak ri or Sala st jihadis virtually ensure that.So, the central question for American policymakersbecomes how the United States and its strategicpartners might wage the external ideological battlewithout unnecessarily complicating Islams internalstruggle. Revivalist movements have come and gonethroughout history, with most lasting but a fewdecades, and the more violent ones less than that.It is possible, then, that the so-called Sala jihadimovement will also eventually burn itself out, even

if a small core of zealots manages to survive.52

Justas some wars of ideas end when people lose interestin them, so Muslim youths might also lose interest inthis movement, seeing it as the dead-end it literally is,and turn their minds and bodies toward more fruitfulendeavors. Indeed, as some scholars have pointed out,the future of the region belongs to young Muslims,and, thus, the United States would do well to considerhow its policies and actions will affect them. 53

Of course, the motives in each of these con ictsare more than ideological. One former terroristconfessed that he found the idea of a quick and surepath to paradise via martyrdom attractive: The ideaof dying as a martyr provided a perfect escape fromthe frightening anguish of eternal punishment. 54

Signi cantly, this individual emphasized the ideaof dying as a martyr over other potential motives.Similarly, other testimonies place less stress on the


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image of Islam under assault, the presumed rallying cryof many Sala st jihadis, than they do on a certain lust

for violenceas evidenced by the popularity of videocamera recordings of car bombings and other attacks. 55 This emphasis suggests that an adolescent desiring toact out violent fantasies may in part account for therecent popularity of some forms of jihadism, with therallying cry merely providing social justi cation forother destructive impulses. 56 Still other scholars pointout that the motives for some terrorists are rooted insmall-group dynamics rather than lofty ideologicalaims, while admitting that a vague vision of creating aSala state does seem to hold al -Qaeda and some of itsemergent offshoots together. 57 Yet other scholars warnthat economic, social, political, and cultural conditionscannot be ruled out. 58 In any case, the point is that themotives of leaders may well differ signi cantly from

those of the foot soldiers. Oversimplifying the problemis, thus, likely to lead to a awed strategy.

Diverging Approaches?

There are two principal schools of thought onhow to approach the war of ideas. The rst approachadvocates treating the con ict as a matter best addressedthrough public diplomacyde ned as the conveyanceof information across a broad spectrum to includecultural affairs and political action. Accordingly,this view calls for revitalizing or transforming theU.S. Department of State and many of the traditionaltools of statecraft. 59 This school of thought contends,and justly, that American public diplomacy declined

after the Cold War, as evidenced by the demise of theU.S. Information Agency in 1999, and the reductionor elimination of strategic communications programs


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such as Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The remedy, then, according to this view,

is to re-engage the world, especially the Arab-Muslimworld, by revitalizing both the form and content of U.S.public diplomacy and strategic communications, andby reinforcing those communications with concreteprograms that invest in people, create opportunitiesfor positive exchanges, and help build friendships. Infact, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and its Iraqicomponent, Radio Free Iraq, and Al-Hurra TV are nowactively participating in U.S. strategic communicationefforts, though with debatable effectiveness; all thishas occurred, in part, by taking resources from Voiceof America. 60

Some experts characterize this approach asattempting to win the hearts and minds of Muslimsworldwide. 61 However, this characterization is

counterproductive, implying that the United Statesis trying to convert Muslims. That apprehension, inturn, plays into the hands of violent extremists whoclaim their religion and way of life are under attack.Simply put, this approach is an advertising campaign,though it strives to be more than that by promotingreal investments in people and in genuine culturalexchanges, such as the revival of the FulbrightScholarship Program and the creation of the GlobalCultural Initiative. 62 The objective of this advertisingcampaign is to sell America rather than to convertothers, though there is a ne line between convincingpeople to buy into an idea, and converting them. Thisapproach is also an important attempt to employ morethan military tools in the war on terror. As of cials and

analysts have repeatedly noted, soft power matters. 63 Yet, it seems the means for employing soft power areinadequate.


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In direct contrast, the second school of thoughtadvocates treating the war of ideas as a real war,

wherein the objective is to destroy the in uenceand credibility of the opposing ideology, to includeneutralizing its chief proponents. 64 This approach seespublic diplomacy as an essential, but insuf cient toolbecause it requires too much time to achieve desiredresults, and does little to aid the immediate efforts ofcombat forces in the eld. For this school of thought,the principal focus of the war of ideas ought to be howto use the ways and means of information warfare toeliminate terrorist groups. In the words of one advocateof this view:

We seek an unashamedly offensive strategy to take andhold the initiative in the war of ideas. This informationoffensive is fought not as one would conduct diplomacy,but as one would wage true warfare: a political and psy-chological strategy not just to undermine the enemy butto help our diplomats and combat forces destroy it. 65

It is worth reiterating that this view does not considerthe former schools emphasis on public diplomacyto be wrong, only too limited in terms of the tools itemploys and too passive in nature. Instead, this viewmaintains that what is needed is an acknowledgmentthat the war of ideas is a genuine and serious war withconsiderable stakes, and that winning it requires muchmore than the restoration of public diplomacy, howeverrobust that restoration turns out to be. Second, it urgesthat the United States and its friends and allies adoptinformation strategies that are more aggressive. Suchstrategies would use words as weapons, rede ne

concepts in ways the enemy cannot exploit, brandand ridicule the views of the foe, and overwhelmhim with images and narratives too numerous to


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counter. 66 It especially stresses more extensive use ofinformation-age technologies, such as the internet, to

block or disrupt jihadist recruiting and propagandaefforts. 67 In short, this approach treats the war of ideasas a classic ideological struggle, but wants to wage itwith newer information warfare tools and techniques,combined with kinetic force where appropriate.

Indeed, substantial evidence supports this view.As one American who has worked in informationoperations in both Iraq and Afghanistan recentlyreported:

The [U.S.-led] coalition [in Iraq] has failed to counterenemy propaganda either by responding rapidly witheffective counter messages or by proactively challengingthe messages, methods, and ideology that the insurgentsand extremists promote and exploit. . . . while the coali-tion fumbles its information operations, the insurgents

and militia groups are adept at releasing timely messag-es to undermine support for the Iraqi government andbolster their own perceived potency. They are quick toexploit coalition failures and excesses; they respond rap-idly to defend their own actions, often by shifting blameto the authorities; and they hijack coalition successes toargue that change only occurs as a result of their vio-lence. The slow speed of the U.S. militarys clearanceprocesstypically it takes 3 to 5 days to approve even a

simple information operations product such as a lea etor billboardcreates an information vacuum that Iraqisll with conspiracy theories and gossip often re ecting

the exaggerations or outright lies of insurgents and ex-tremists. 68

Extremists have also purportedly identi edin uential columnists and academics with email

addresses, such as Thomas Friedman, FrancisFukyama, and Samuel Huntington, as targets for theirpublic relations campaigns. 69 The value of the internet


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has already been well-documented: websites and chatrooms provide violent extremists with the necessary

grist to concoct moral and theological justi cationsfor their crimes, as well as the training and instructionneeded to execute them. 70 Its use continues to expand,fostered in part by young Muslims who appear to beacting independently, as the result of inspiration ratherthan direction. 71

Their differences notwithstanding, these twoapproaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.Much of the language in the new U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC)supports both, though it is explicitly weighted towardthe former. 72 The NSPDSC establishes three strategicobjectives for public diplomacy: (1) to offer a positivevision of hope and opportunity rooted in our mostbasic values; (2) to isolate and marginalize violent

extremists; and (3) to nurture common interests andvalues between Americans and peoples of differentcountries, cultures, and faiths across the world. 73 Notably, the document offers two ways to accomplishthe second objective: (1) isolating and discreditingterrorist leaders, facilitators, and organizations; and (2)delegitimizing terror as an acceptable tactic to achievepolitical ends. Clearly, these ways, or methods, are inalignment with the second approach.

Still, while these two approaches are not mutuallyexclusive, they are not entirely compatible either.They represent two different perspectives: the formeraccords with the views of the U.S. Department of State,which sees the main effort as the reshaping of theimage of the United States through outreach. The

second approach is in line with the U.S. Departmentof Defense (DoD), which sees the objective as theactual elimination of a threatening ideology. This task,according to one expert, cannot be run out of the State


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Department, since diplomats by their purpose andtraining are not warriors and should not be expected

to become warriors.74

By the same logic, however,it would seem that warriors, by their purpose andtraining, are not well-suited to engage in outreachwith foreign cultures, aside from military-to-militarycontacts. Yet, this is precisely the role in which theyoften nd themselves. So, the logic above does notnecessarily hold, even if the recommendation might.

Nor is it desirable to subordinate one departmentto another in this case. Either the restoration of publicdiplomacy will proceed too slowly, or the isolationand neutralization of terrorist leaders will not occurquickly enough. The solution recently recommendedby the Defense Science Board (2008), namely, creating apermanent strategic communication structure withinthe White House, has potential. 75 However, some

caution is warranted as the U.S. strategic effort cannotafford to add yet another layer of bureaucratic oversightto a structure and a process that are already painfullyslow and reticent to act. The speed of informationin todays strategic environment underscores theneed not only for rapid, decentralized responses, butalso for preemptive or anticipatory measures. TheState Department and DoD are organized more withaccountability than ef ciency in mind. U.S. leadershipat all levels is answerable for its actions in ways thatits opponents are not; but, the need for accountabilityfuels a tendency to exercise tighter control, especiallyin uid environments. That, in turn, works againstrapid responsiveness or preemption. Thus, the goalof creating a permanent strategic communication

structure must be to facilitate White House leadershipand direction, rather than to add further impedimentsto the ow of information.


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Moreover, neither department has sponsored aconcerted effort to understand wars of ideas as such.

While, as we have said, the State Department endeavorsto change the U.S. image from malevolent to benevolent,such efforts ought to occur whether or not the UnitedStates is involved in a war. They should, in fact, neverend. Opinions are eeting things requiring constantcultivation. 76 As one expert testi ed: U.S. earthquakerelief efforts doubled the percentage of Pakistaniswith favorable views of the U.S. from 23 percent to 46percent from May 2005 to November 2005. This gurehad dropped to 27 percent by 2006, however. 77 Also,as the Cola Wars illustrate, advertising campaignsshould expect to run inde nitely. The goal is not justthat consumers should drink Coke instead of Pepsi oranother brand, but that they should drink it regularly.Campaign efforts must persist because when they fail

to do so, they give rise to uncomfortable questionsabout a products long-term viability.While proponents of the second approach see the

war of ideas as an ideological struggle, they do notaddress how to avoid in icting collateral damage onIslam as a religion and a way of life. By comparison,the possibility of in icting collateral damage on theideology of socialism was hardly a concern duringthe Cold War. An aggressive campaign to debase anddelegitimize al - Qaeda leaders and their ideas mustavoid inadvertently striking core religious or culturalvalues, which might in turn lend credence to the claimthat the West is attacking Islam. The violent reaction tothe cartoons that appeared in the Danish newspaper,

Jyllands-Posten, in September 2005, shows that extrem-

ists will move quickly and ruthlessly to exploit certainmessages and images, regardless of their content orthe authors intent. The problem is that information


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warfare is not as precise as conventional wisdomwould have us believe. The many and various tools of

the information age almost guarantee that words andimages are, at best, only blunt instruments. The waysin which information can be spun have multipliedconsiderably, thereby increasing the damage radiusof words and ideas.

The second approach rightly sees the war of ideasas a clash of opposing wills. However, this clash isnot simply binary in nature. During the Cold War, itwas reasonable to expect that third parties would bereceptive to the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations(NATO) strategic communications. That is not nec-essarily the case today. As mentioned previously, anoverwhelming majority of Muslims might not want to join a Sala st global jihad; but they might nd someU.S. policies openly hostile, and might actively resist

U.S. communication efforts as a result. Accordingly,U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must have a moreprecise goal than improving Americas image: it mustcontinue to discourage young Muslims from joiningal-Qaeda or one of its af liates. Winning a popularitycontest is far less important than undermining al - Qaedas ability to recruit. The two aims are eminentlyseparable, and con ating them only creates confusion.

Fortunately, the brutal methods of al -Qaeda and itsaf liates are helping Coalition efforts in the battle ofideas. As recent polls have shown, support of suicidebombing and other violent tactics is declining amongsome Muslim populations; this drop off is partly dueto the extreme methods employed by al -Qaeda. 78 SomeSunni militias have distanced themselves from al -Qaeda

in Iraq, and groups of Concerned Local Citizens(CLCs) have emerged not only to compete for resourceslocally, but also to help combat al -Qaedas in uence. 79


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The hotel bombings in Amman motivated the Jordaniangovernment to take more aggressive action in its own

war against terror.80

Again, these developments haveoccurred partly because of al - Qaedas ruthless use ofterror tactics against other Muslims. While al -Qaedaspropaganda paints the war on terror as a crusadeagainst Islam, and publishes images of coalition troopsbeing attacked, the reality is that far more Muslimsthan non-Muslims have been killed and injured by itsviolent tactics. 81 That knowledge is becoming morewidespread; U.S. strategy should help spread it evenfarther, and it should encourage peaceful politicalactivism as an alternative to violent extremism.

RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must be

more sensitive to the opportunities and pitfallsintroduced by physical events. The incidents atAbu Ghraib, which were extremely harmful tocoalition efforts, would pale in comparison to apremature withdrawal from Afghanistan or Iraq.Indeed, bin Laden and other al - Qaeda leadershave already purportedly declared victory inIraq based on their skewed interpretations ofU.S. opinion polls and of election campaignrhetoric regarding troop withdrawals. 82 Con-versely, the successful stabilization of thosestates would have an extremely positive effecton the war of ideas, undercutting al - Qaedasgeneral information campaign. This is not tosay that U.S. forces must remain committed in

large numbers in both countries irrespectiveof progress, or despite the emergence of otherstrategic challenges. However, it does mean


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that winning the war of ideas will become muchmore dif cult, and the damage to Americas

image much more severe, if the withdrawalof Coalition forces is perceived as premature.To be sure, terrorists will attempt to spin anyCoalition withdrawal as a strategic failure,regardless of the circumstances under whichit occurs. However, that spin will have greaterpotential of back ring if indigenous forces cancontinue to provide effective security in thewake of any departure of coalition troops.

Neither the Department of States approach northat of DoD should be subordinated to the other.Rather, the United States should pursue bothapproaches in parallel. Public diplomacy effortsshould be expanded with the aim of restoringAmericas image, and that endeavor should

continue inde nitely, whether or not the UnitedStates is at war. The State Department should alsoexpand and enhance its current communicationefforts with new methods and technologies. Someanalysts suggest that any tendency to controlthe message too tightly is counterproductiveto U.S. communication efforts; they suggest anevolutionary approach, modifying messagesand techniques as the situation dictates. 83 This isonly one possible innovation; whether or not itsucceeds, the point is that the United States canexplore different messages and techniques withminimal risk in most cases.

Concurrently, DoD should concentrate its effortson defeating al -Qaeda and its af liates militarily.

Admittedly, terrorist organizations can changetheir names, but that, too, is a victory of sorts.Moreover, even with altered names, many ofthe key network nodes and links will remain


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true in many types of con icts. However, inother cases, particularly the current war of ideas,

this relationship is reversed: military operationsneed to support information operations. Al - Qaeda and other jihadi organizations are not

ghting a new kind of war, but instead aresubordinating their military operations to awell-crafted information campaign designedto exploit certain cultural and religious values.All Joint and service publications pertainingto information operations should be revisedto incorporate those wars where militaryoperations are conducted in support of a largerinformation campaign. Put differently, U.S.military doctrine must broaden its view of therelationship between kinetic and informationoperations.

Furthermore, doctrine concerning informationoperations must be revised to re ect the realitythat the information environment is neitherneutral nor static. Disparate cultural and socialin uences almost ensure that diverse audienceswill interpret the same information differently.Even within that variegated landscape, themeanings of images, concepts, and visions areoften bitterly contested. It is almost impossibleto interpret information objectively because thevery tools needed for interpretation in the rstplace are derived from subjective experiencesand structures of meaning. In many cases,enough commonalities exist to allow at least abaseline of communication to take place. Yet,

an important assumption underpinning U.S.doctrine on information operations is that allaudiences will essentially draw the desirable


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conclusion, if given enough of the rightinformation. This assumption overlooks how

various cultures assess information dependingon the sources. Simply put, right appearsdifferently to diverse audiences. While wewould expect our opponents to spin informationto their advantage, even so-called neutralpopulations are not necessarily impartial whenit comes to interpreting information offered byeither side.

The U.S. military already understands, atleast in theory, that successful informationoperations require a working understandingof target cultures. It needs more resources toput theory into practice, however. For thatreason, the U.S. Armys new Human TerrainSystem (HTS) is an important step in the right

direction.85

The mission of the HTS is to providecommanders information on local social groupsand their interests, beliefs, leaders, and on thebasic drivers of individual and group behaviors.Clearly, this kind of information is invaluablein stability operations and counterinsurgencyoperations where interaction with theindigenous population is both frequent andvital. The most critical part of the system is theHuman Terrain Team (HTT), which consistsof ve personnel: a team leader, two socialscientists, a research manager, and an analyst.A preliminary assessment of the contributionsof an HTT in Afghanistan was positive. 86 But,more HTTs appear to be needed.

Assuming subsequent assessments of HTTs arealso positive, the Army should seriously considerexpanding the HTS and making it more robust.


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The HTS is one concrete way of putting usefulcultural and social information in the hands

of those at the sharp end. It also provides theArmy with a vehicle for optimizing the use ofpersonnel with valuable cultural knowledge andlanguage skills. Thus, the Army should considerincreasing the number of HTTs to perhaps asmany as one per battalion, and placing a generalof cer in charge of the overall system to give itmore heft. Consideration should also be givento placing them at combatant command level toassist in the development of security cooperationplans. Personnel assignment and assessmentpolicies will also have to be aligned to rewardleaders appropriately, and to help grow of cersand noncommissioned of cers with relevantcultural knowledge and other expertise. To be

sure, supplying enough quali ed personnel tomeet the demand will remain a major challenge.Nonetheless, recent successes in Afghanistanand Iraq suggest that taking such measures willpay important dividends in future con icts.

As we have seen, wars of ideas, regardless of type,are often serious matters. The stakes can run quitehigh, and the consequences of failure can be severe,regardless of how little shooting is involved. Just asideas require carriers or vectors, so wars of ideas turnon physical events. Our approach to such wars mustalways take that into account. By understanding warsof ideas as a mode of con ict, we can ght the currentbattle of ideas more effectively, while at the same time

better preparing ourselves to wage future ones. Wehave much more to learn about such con icts than thisbrief survey can capture. One point is clear: our efforts


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to understand wars of ideas must rival our endeavors tograsp other forms of con ict; otherwise our knowledge

of warfare will remain regrettably incomplete.

ENDNOTES

1. Tom Regan, Experts: US Must Win War of Ideas,Christian Science Monitor , June 16, 2006, www.csmonitor/2006/0616/ dailyupdate.html ; see Terrorism Index, Foreign Policy Review, July/August 2006, web1.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julyaug_2006/TI-index/index.html.

2. The White House, United States National Security Strategy ,Washington, DC, March 2006, p. 9.

3. The White House, United States National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC, September 2006, p. 7.

4. The White House, United States National Strategy for Homeland Security, Washington, DC, October 5, 2007, p. 15.

5. National Public Radio, Interview of the National SecurityAdvisor, Stephen Hadley, July 13, 2007; www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2007/07/20070713-6.html .

6. See Daniel L. Davis, The Battle of Ideas: U.S. Losing in RecentYears, Washington Times , January 1, 2008; William Matthews,Rumsfeld: U.S. Needs Online Strategic-Communications

Agency, DefenseNews.com, January 23, 2008; and anonymous,Rumsfeld: U.S. Losing War of Ideas, which captures formerSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelds statement in March 2006:If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a D or aD-plus as a country as to how well were doing in the battle ofideas thats taking place in the world today. See www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/27/terror/main1442811.shtml .

7. Haya El Nasser, American Muslims Reject Extremes:

Survey Notes Contrasts on Iraq War, Role of Faith, USA Today,May 23, 2007, p. 1; Alexandra Marks, Radical Islam Finds USSterile Ground, Christian Science Monitor , October 23, 2006,reports similar ndings from a 2004 Zogby survey.


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8. Declassi ed Key Judgments of the National IntelligenceEstimate, Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for theUnited States, April 2006, lists pervasive anti-U.S. sentimentamong most Muslims as one of four underlying factors the so-called jihadists exploit; yet, the same document states that theultra-conservative interpretation of sharia-based governanceis unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Thus, it ispossible to harbor anti-American sentiments without wanting tobecome a jihadist.

9. National Strategy for Homeland Security , p. 15.

10. In fact, numerous wars of ideas have been underway.George Packer, ed., The Fight is for Democracy: Winning the War of Ideas in America and the World, New York: Harper Collins, 2003, p.14.

11. Histories have their problems, but they offer a place tostart; see Antulio J. Echevarria II, The Trouble with History,Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 78-90.

12. I have borrowed here from Clausewitzs construct whichdescribes the nature of war in terms of three dynamic tendencies:hostility, chance, and purpose.

13. Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, and Paul Paret, PersuasiveImages: Posters of War and Revolution from the Hoover Institution Archives, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, exploresthe use of propaganda posters in Russia, Central and WesternEurope, and the United States from the turn of the century to theaftermath of World War II; the posters form a bridge between theclaims of ideology and the state on the one hand and the supportor submission of millions of men and women on the other.

14. This military presence undoubtedly helped preventhardcore believers from regaining political in uence. In Germany,for instance, committed Nazis continued to resist well into 1946.Stephen G. Fritz, Endkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of theThird Reich, Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

15. For an introduction to post-structuralism, see PaulHarrison, Post-structuralist Theories, in S. Aitken and G.


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Valentine, eds., Approaches to Human Geography, London: Sage,2006, pp. 122-135.

16. The following website chronicles the violence in icted onphysicians and medical staff: www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/ violence/murders.asp.

17. Donald T. Chrichtlow, The Politics of Abortion and BirthControl in Historical Perspective, University Park: PennsylvaniaState University, 1996; James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: TheOrigins and Evolution of National Policy, 18001900 , New York:Oxford University, 1978.

18. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovationand the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, New York: CambridgeUniversity, 1996; Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? MilitaryChange and European Society, 1550-1800, Atlantic Highlands, NJ:Humanities, 1991; Clifford Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate:Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe ,Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.

19. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scienti c Revolutions, 3rdEd., Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1996.

20. Brian Magee, Popper , London: Collins, 1973; Karl R.Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1972; and The Logic of Scienti c Discovery, London:Routledge, 2006, published in 1935 as Logik der Forschung. KarlPopper also advanced the view that even objective knowledgeis tentative, and thus any theory purporting to embody it is alsoof necessity tentative, that is, contingent on the discovery ofnew objective knowledge, which might expand or transform theoriginal objective knowledge.

21. Mike Weiss, War of Ideas Fought in a Small-townCourtroom: Intelligent Design Theory vs. the Science of Evolutionat Center of Pennsylvania Trial, San Francisco Chronicle, November6, 2005, p. A-1.

22. Judge Rules Against Intelligent Design: ReligiousAlternative to Evolution Barred from Public-School ScienceClasses, Associated Press, December 20, 2005.


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23. Nicholas Copernicus, On the Revolutions of the HeavenlySpheres, Edmund Rosen, trans., Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity, 1992; Edward Rosen, Copernicus and the Scienti cRevolution, Malabar: Robert E. Krieger, 1984; Thomas S. Kuhn, TheCopernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought , Cambridge: Harvard University, 1957; MauriceA. Finocchiaro, ed., The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History,Berkeley: University of California, 1989; Annibale Fantoli,GalileoFor Copernicanism and the Church, 3rd English ed., NotreDame, IN: Vatican, 2003.

24. Michael Sharratt, Galileo: Decisive Innovator, Cambridge:Cambridge University, 1996.

25. The Galileo Controversy, www.catholic.com/library/ Galileo_controversy.asp.

26. Mike Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and AmericanThought, 1860-1945: Nature as Model and Nature as Threat , NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

27. Bart D. Ehrman, Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scriptureand the Faiths We Never Knew, Oxford: Oxford University, 2003,examines several forged or falsi ed Christian texts.

28. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo, Berkley: University ofCalifornia, 1969, pp. 365-374, provides an excellent summary andanalysis of the ideas of and political struggle between Augustineand Pelagius; Gareth B. Matthews, Augustine , Oxford: Blackwell,2005; James J. ODonnell, Augustine: A New Biography, New York:HarperCollins, 2005.

29. In fact, Augustines views on free will are much morecomplex than can be covered here. In On Free Choice of the Will,for instance, he stated: For sin is that which you gave us whenyou granted us free choice of will. Augustine: On Free Choice of the Will, Thomas Williams, ed. and trans., Indianapolis: Hackett,1993.

30. Brown, Augustine , p. 374.


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31. Compare: Anna Simmons, Making Enemies, Part Two,The American Interest, Vol. 11, No. 1, Autumn 2006, pp. 35-45.For a view that treats religion as an ideology, see JohnathanFine, Contrasting Secular and Religious Terrorism, Middle EastQuarterly , Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 59-69.

32. Michael Burleigh, Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religionand Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror , New York:HarperCollins, 2006, adds an interesting twist, equating 20th-century ideologies, such as fascism and socialism, to secularreligions.

33. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, NewYork: Penguin, 2005.

34. Scholars credit the papacy with the rst modern use ofthe term propaganda when, in the midst of the Thirty YearsWar, it created the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (SacredCongregation for the Propagation of the Faith) in 1622. This of cewas charged with the systematic dissemination of ideas designedto in uence public opinion. Lynette Finch, PsychologicalPropaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Halfof the Twentieth Century, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 26, No.3, S

wars of ideas and the war of ideas pub866

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