walking on eggshells: balancing the spratly islands between the people's republic of china, the...

7/30/2019 Walking on Eggshells: Balancing the Spratly Islands between the People's Republic of China, the Philippines and the United States

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S u n H o o K i m a n d

A n d r e w D o u s e t t e M a r s h

G o v t - 4 5 1 C o n f l i c t i n A s i a

D r . P h i l i p K a r b e r

D u e 2 0 N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2

Walking on Eggshells:

Balancing the Spratly

Islands between the

Peoples Republic of China,

the Philippines and the

United States


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Kim and Marsh 1

I. IntroductionThe end of the Cold War changed international relations irrevocably or at least

that is what international relations scholars and military strategists thought in 1991

when they were redrawing their world maps to reflect the new world order. More

accurately, the end of the Cold War represented a shift in the world paradigm, away

from a bipolar system where the fate of the world depended on the stability of Soviet

Union and the United States, to a multipolar region with strong regional powers and

the United States haphazardly refocusing and redefining what would be important

as the world marched headlong into a new millennia.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and Russian communism signaled the end of thepredominance of Russia as the central communist world power and refocused it to

The Peoples Republic of China, who, as of the early 1990s, was experiencing a

period of economic growth and international expansion so much so that both

countries in the region and the United States were taken by surprise. But no

significant power vacuum is complete without the existence of conflict. Among the

many problems the end of the Soviet Union caused, none were more potentially

dangerous and unstable than the situation that existed in the South China Sea.

Overnight, the power of balance shifted in the South China Sea when the Cold

War came to an end. The United State withdrew from Subic Bay in the Philippines

and the former Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Carman Bay in Vietnam.1

Suddenly, the Peoples Republic of China stood in the best position to take advantage

of the resulting power vacuum and assert its dominance to take control of some of

the most strategic and economically significant islands in the entire South China Sea,

the Spratly Islands. But The PRC was not the only power to lay claims on the Spratly

Islands.

Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei and the Philippines all have separate

1 Hindley, Michael, and James Bridge. "South China Sea: The Spratly and Paracel Islands Dispute." The

Word Today50.6 (June 1994): 109-12. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Web. 6 Nov. 2012.

. p. 110


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Kim and Marsh 2

claims to parts or all of the South China Sea and its islands. However, addressing the

claims of each and every country is a long and complex process. For the purposes of

this paper, only the relationship between the PRC and the Philippines will be

addressed, taking into consideration their historical claims to the Spratly Islands, the

strategically economic reasons both claim to poses in holding the islands and why

international law has failed to resolve this over 50 year old conflict. The role of the

United States will also have to be taken into consideration in this analysis as the US

has had a significant geopolitical, economic and military presence in the region.

Finally this paper will describe the military balance in the region and analyze if

or when The PRC and the Philippines will engage in a hot conflict in light of their

claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. Overall, this paper seeks to

determine the causes of the conflict in the South China Sea and address the power

balance between The PRC and the Philippines in the event that either nation decides

to engage in military action against the other.


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Kim and Marsh 3

II. Claims to the Spratly Islands and Historical Background1. The PRCs Historical Claim in Context

Simply stated, the PRCs basis for its claim to the Spratly Islands comes on the

principle of the right of prior discovery.2 The PRC claims to have first settled and

staked its claim to the Spratly Islands in 1282 during the Yuan Dynasty and since

then, every dynasty and political regime has technically held the islands. In fact, it

was not until 1931 that the Chinese claims to the Spratly islands were seriously

challenged when the French Quai DOrsay sent a note to the Republic of China

legation in Paris claiming that the Vietnamese had historical sovereignty in the area.

They sighted the examples of the 1816 Emperor Gia Long formally governing the

islands and the 1835 Emperor Minh-Mang who had sent some of his subjects to

build structures, including a pagoda and a stone tablet on one of the islands.3 Later,

in 1935, the French claimed both the Paracels and the Spratly Islands in the South

China Sea, declaring to both Europe and the Chinese government they no longer

could claim dominion on the island chains.4 However, the French did acknowledge

that the only people living on the islands at the time of occupation were in fact

Chinese and not Vietnamese. At the time, the Chinese government lodged a formal

complaint, claiming that the French had invaded Chinese territory, citing the fact

that there were only Chinese people living on the islands.5

Moving into the late 1930s the PRC continued to exchange notes with France

over the ownership of the Spratly Islands until it became unnecessary in 1939 when

Japan would change the course of history in the region. In 1939, Japan, seeking to

2Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace."

Asian Survey 17.12 (Dec., 1977): 1167-181. University of California Press. Web. 6 Nov. 2012.

. p 11763

Ibid. pp 11784

See People's Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "China's Indisputable Sovereignty Over the

Xisha and Nansha Islands," Beijing Review 37, 18 February 1980, pp. 14-15.5Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace."


. p. 1178


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Kim and Marsh 4

enlarge its imperial holdings, expanded their control to cover Hainan, the Paracel

Islands, and the Spratly Islands.6 Backing up their claim with military power, the

PRC had no choice but to allow the Japanese to claim the islands and the South China

Sea as part of Imperial Japans bourgeoning empire.

It was Japans conquest and subsequent surrender that has caused much of the

uncertainty as to whom the Spratly Islands belong. This uncertainty, as will be

discussed later on, still lingers on today and it the matter of political, economic and

military balancing in the region.

On 26 August 1945, the Japanese formally surrendered to the United States,

withdrawing their forces from the Spratly Islands after a lapse of one year and three

months as was specified in their surrender agreement.7 Following the Japanese

withdrawal, the Republic of China, before the ROC was exiled to Taiwan, sent a naval

contingent with representatives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and officials

from the Kwangtung Provincial government to take over the Islands.8 It would

appear that the PRC had retaken the islands and was now in control of them as they

always had been. This however proved not to be that case as two major

developments took place starting in 1950.

The first of these two developments came after the ROC government was forcedinto exile in 1949. By 1950, the PRC government landed troops on the Hainan Island,

forcing the ROC government on Taiwan to withdraw their forces from the Paracel

and Spratly Islands back to Taiwan.9 Before the PRC could reoccupy the Spratly

6Jie, Chen. "China's Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia." Asian Survey

34.10 (Oct., 1994): 893-903. University of California Press. Web. 6 Nov. 2012.

. p. 8967 USS MissouriInstrument of Surrender, WWII , Pearl Harbor, Historical Marker Database, www.hmdb.org,

[accessed 2 November 2012].8Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace."

Asian Survey17.12 (Dec., 1977): 1167-181. University of California Press. Web. [6 November 2012]

. p. 11799

Marlay, Ross. "China, the Philippines and the Spratly Islands."Asian Affairs 23.4 (Winter, 1997): 195-210.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. [accessed 6 November ] 2012.

. p. 197
http://www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=49677http://www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=49677http://www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=49677http://www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=49677


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Kim and Marsh 5

Islands, the second major development of the period took place.

In order to legally conclude the Second World War, the Japanese Peace

Conference was held in San Francisco in August of 1951. The then foreign minister of

the PRC who attended the conference, Chou En-Lai, declared that Whether or not

the U.S.-British Draft Treaty contains provision on this subject, and no matter how

these provisions are worded, the inviolable sovereignty of the PRC over Nanwei

Island (the Spratly Islands) and Sisha Islands (the Paracel Islands) will not be in any

way affected10 While the Chinese government believed their declaration would be

considered as legal reality based on their historical occupation and administration of

the Islands, such was not the case.

The Treaty of San Francisco, while stipulating that Japan would renounce its

claim to the Spratly Islands, did not specific to whom they were to be assigned.11

This vagueness in the language laid the ground for the Philippines to eventually

make their claim to the Spratly islands later in the 1950s.

2. The Philippines Historical Claim in ContextUnlike Chinas claim to the Spratly Islands and the entire South China Sea, the

Philippines claim to the island chain are found in more contemporary history and in

the ambiguities of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. Legally, the 1951 treaty left

the territory that comprises the Spratly Islands open to be claimed according to the

principle of Res or terra nullius. Res nullius is the legal principle whereby res, or an

object that can be anything, is not yet the object or rights of any specific subject.

These types of objects are in principle ownerless and can freely to be claimed or

owned.12 As the 1951 treaty left the Spratly Islands ownerless they became the

10Hung Dah Chiu and Park Choon Ho, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands," Ocean

Development and International Law, 3:1, pp. 9-12.11

Treaty of Peace with Japan (including transcript with signatories: Source attributed : United Nations

Treaty Series 1952 (reg. no. 1832), vol. 136, pp. 45164.)". Taiwan Documents Project. [accessed 13

November 2012]12

http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htmhttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htmhttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htmhttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htmhttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htmhttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htmhttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htmhttp://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm


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Kim and Marsh 6

object of Res nullius and therefore open to be claimed by anyone. Though the PRC

foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, said the islands belonged to China again, the PRC

never properly reclaimed the islands after 1950. Under the legal qualifications of

international law as it was understood then, the Spratly islands did not legally

belong to the PRC.

This fact was not lost on one enterprising citizen of the Philippines in 1956. A

private Filipino citizen named Tomas Cloma traveled to the Spratly Islands in 1956

and unilaterally declared a new state on 53 of the islands in the South China Sea,

calling it Freedomland.13 In respond, the Republic of China sent a navel contingent

to patrol the Spratly Islands but Cloma had already left. Before he had left however,

Cloma had asked the Philippines to buy the territory from him and make the islands

he had claimed as Freedomland into a protectorate of the Philippines. In 1978, the

Philippines annexed the islands on this basis and called them the Kalayaan. Further,

the then President, Ferdinand Marcos, issued Presidential decree No. 1596,

declaring the Spratly Islands as Philippine territory.14

The primary problem with this decree is that it was anachronistic as the

Philippines did not register these claims until the 1970s and Cloma made his

original claim to statehood followed by protectorate status in 1956. In the timebetween these years, both the PRC and ROC has revisited the islands and at

numerous times, claimed them.15 It is worth mentioning briefly that among the

reasons the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea represents is the fact that there

is no owner spelled out in international law. At various times to the present, the PRC,

ROC, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, and Malaysia have all registered claims to the

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. [accessed 6 November 2012] .

p. 19713

"PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596 - DECLARING CERTAIN AREA PART OF THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY

AND PROVIDING FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION".Chan Robles Law Library. June 11,

1978.14

Ibid.15

Furtado, Xavier (December 1999). "International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither

UNCLOS?".Contemporary Southeast Asia: 386404. pp, 397
http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecrees/presidentialdecreeno1596.htmlhttp://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecrees/presidentialdecreeno1596.htmlhttp://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6479/is_3_21/ai_n28748621/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6479/is_3_21/ai_n28748621/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6479/is_3_21/ai_n28748621/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6479/is_3_21/ai_n28748621/http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecrees/presidentialdecreeno1596.htmlhttp://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecrees/presidentialdecreeno1596.html


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Kim and Marsh 7

South China Sea or parts of it with no clear way to discern to whom it belongs. The

next section will consider the ambiguities and failures of international law to settle

the conflict over the Spratly Island while creating the grounds for potential conflict

in their international relations and power balancing.


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Kim and Marsh 8

III. Why the Spratly Islands? Economics and International Law:The Grounds for Conflict

The Spratly Islands consist of over a hundred, small rather unimportant islets,coral reefs, atolls, cats, rocks, sand banks, and sea mounts spread over three

hundred and forty thousand square miles in the South China Sea between the

Philippines and Vietnam, almost 1000 miles to the South of the PRC.16 Seen from

the air, they have relatively little value, are mostly barren, have no natural harbors

and are regularly submerged during high tide or when a typhoon hits.17 So why

have these relatively useless islands become the flashpoint for a potential conflict

between the Philippines and the PRC?

There are two primary reasons why these islands have become so important in

modern international relations. The first finds its base in the economic abundance of

the South China Sea, particularly in the natural resources to be found in the Spratly

Island chain beneath the seabed. The second is a strategic argument that finds its

beginning in international law and has evolved to become one of strategic balance

and fragile international relations. The next two sections will explore these themes.

1. Economic Value and Strategic InterestsAbove almost any other reason, economic incentives in the South China Sea have

provided a reason for the PRC and the Philippines to claim sovereignty over the

Spratly Islands as well as giving the United States a reason to stay involved in the

region to the present.

In 1968 oil was discovered in the region. Currently, the Mineral Resources

Ministry of the Peoples Republic of China estimates that the Spratly area holds oil

and natural gas reserves of 17.7 billion tons, bigger than the estimated 13 billion

16Marlay, Ross. "China, the Philippines and the Spratly Islands."Asian Affairs 23.4 (Winter, 1997): 195-210.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. . pp 20017

See D.M. Johnston and M.J. Valencia Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems: Status and Solutions

(Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 12834. p. 129


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Kim and Marsh 9

tons held by Kuwait, placing it as the fourth largest reserve bed in the world.18

Internationally, the claims from both the PRC and the Philippines have intensified

the situation and propelled territorial claims on the region from a number of

countries in the region. Adding tension to the situation, on 11 March 1976, the

Philippines discovered oil off the coast of an island called Palawan, in close

proximity to the Spratly Islands. As of 2010, these oil fields account for about 15%

percent of all petroleum consumed in the Philippines.19 Confusingly, as will be seen

later, the PRC in 1992 signed a cooperation contract between the China National

Offshore Cooperation and Crestone Energy, as US Company based in Denver,

Colorado. Their purpose was to mutually explore an area of the South China Sea that

includes the Spratly Islands.20 This contract and the vagueness of who owns the

territory only adds more fuel to a fire that is barely contained between the PRC and

the Philippines.

Additional economic sources of conflict can be found in the form of commercial

fishing. Since the early 1980s, the South China Sea has been become one of the most

lucrative fishing grounds in the world, accounting for almost 8% of the world catch

and this number has most certainly risen.21 PRC analysts have estimated that the

South China Sea holds combined fishing and oil and gas reserved worth in the areaof one trillion dollars. This estimate has caused numerous clashes between the PRC

and the Philippines as they claim their territory has been trespassed under the

auspices of each countrys Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as established by the

Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).22

18 Baker et al., Cooperative Monitoring for South China Sea Disputes; and Lin, Taiwans South China Sea

Policy, 324. Cf. Central Daily News Taiwan, 2 December 1992, p. 4.19 Ibid. p. 520


Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. . p. 20121

R. Haller-Trost, Clive Schofield, and Martin Pratt. "The Brunei-Malaysia Dispute over Territorial and

Maritime Claims in International Law" International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, UK.

199722

"The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective)". United Nations
http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htmhttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htmhttp://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/


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Strategically, the region is also one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. At

the moment, more than half the worlds supertanker traffic passes through the

regions water every year. Tanker traffic through the South China Sea is over three

times greater than through the Suez Canal and five times more than the Panama

Canal. These high numbers mean that over 25% of the worlds crude oil passes

through the South China Sea.23 These numbers present two distinct problems.

Controlling the Spratly Islands and therefore the shipping lanes in the South China

Sea would give its possessor vast economic powers and control over the economy of

the region. This has served as a flashpoint for conflict between the PRC and the

Philippines over the last couple decades. What is also means is the United States has

chosen to stay actively involved in the region. As recently as July of 2012, Secretary

of State Hilary Clinton is quoted as saying that Washington is focused on ensuring

free navigation, unimpeded commerce and stability in the West Philippines Sea.24 It

is estimated that each year, approximately $5.3 trillion of trade goes through the

South China Sea with nearly $1.2 trillion of this total accounting for US trade

accounts.25 In light of these numbers, it is not difficult to discern why the United

States has such a distinct interest in making sure a conflict does not escalate

between the PRC and the Philippines.While these economic reasons provide greater detail as to why both the PRC

and the Philippines both claim the region, it does not provide any details as to why

this situation exists in the first place nor does it tell what how the conflict has

Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Retrieved November 11, 2012.23

R. Haller-Trost, Clive Schofield, and Martin Pratt ."The Brunei-Malaysia Dispute over Territorial and

Maritime Claims in International Law". International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, UK,

199724

Will the US defend Philippines if China Attacks. Jojo Malig, ABS-CBNnew.com. Posted at 07/25/2012

10:58 PM | Updated as of 7/25/2012 11:15 PM, Retrieved on 11/4/2012. http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attacks25

Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations,

April 2012), [accessed 1 October

2012]
http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attackshttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attackshttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attackshttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attackshttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attackshttp://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/


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Kim and Marsh 11

manifested itself in their international relations. The next section will address these

problems.

2. International Law and Relations: the Peoples Republic of China, thePhilippines and the United States Balancing.

The history and carefully balancing act between the Peoples Republic of China,

the Philippines and the United States is a long a nuanced one, too long for the scope

of this paper. For the purpose of giving as succinct analysis of this relationship, this

section will be confined to discussing the Third United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 3) of 1973 as this where the groundwork for the modern

day causes of conflict come from. In regards to international relations and prior

conflicts between the PRC and the Philippines, this paper will be limited in scope to

only consider events that have occurred since the election of President Ramos of the

Philippines and the appointment of Jiang Zemin as General Secretary of the

Communist Party of China in 1989.

A. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaThe Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 3) was

convened in 1973 and did not end until 1982, entering into force on 16 November

1994. In 1968, the Soviet Union took the initiative of convening a new conference

with the express purpose of seeking acceptance for a twelve-mile territorial water

principle for fishing zones, freedom of transit across international waters, and

machinery to accommodate costal states special interests.26 Unsatisfied with the

Soviet requests and being left out of the conference initially, Latin American

countries held two conferences that ultimately came up with the idea of the

Patrimonial Sea. Under this idea, costal states have the right to the renewable and

non-renewable resources found in the waters in the seabed and in the sub-soil of an

26L. D. M. Nelson, "The Patrimonial Sea," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 22, 1973, pp.

673 and 674.


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Kim and Marsh 12

area adjacent to the territorial seas, and this territory would not exceed a 200

nautical miles circumference. Under the law, freedom of navigation would be

ensured.27 Concurrently and with the aid of this compromise in international law,

countries like Indonesia and the Philippines were further defining what a 200 mile

economic zone would mean for their countries as they were technically

archipelagos.28 By the time the UNCLOS 3 concluded and was ratified by 1982 and

entered into force, it was understood that archipelagos could maintain an exclusive

economic zone (EEZ) for 200 nautical miles around their islands as long as rite of

passage was given to any ship sailing through territorial waters. This right was

called the Doctrine ofInnocent Passage. 29 Though UNCLOS 3 entered into force in

1994, it created a problem that has plagued relations in the South China Sea since

the early 1990s. The PRC did not ratify or approve UNCLOS 3 immediately, the

Philippines did.

The PRCs main objection is that it did not want to restrict its actions in regards

to the South China Sea nor did it want to be tied down to the strictures of

international law as it was spelled out by the First World. Instead, the PRC sent out a

letter that affirmed its rejection of innocent passage in a nations territorial waters.

Further, the PRC substituted the terms 200-mile maritime right for 200-mileterritorial sea, describing this zone not as a territory but as an exclusive economic

zone.30 This statement left much ambiguity as to what the PRC was eventually going

to do in regards to the 200-mile zone. Ultimately, the PRC did ratify UNCLOS 3, using

this assumption as their basis for ratification.

27L. D. M. Nelson, "The Patrimonial Sea," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 22, 1973 p.

67728 H. P. Rajan, "Toward a Codification of Archipelagos in International Law," Indian Journal of International

Law., July, September, 1973. 13:3, p. 468.29

Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace."


. pp 117530

Jerome Alan Cohen and Hung Dah Chiu, People's China and International Law, Vol. 1, p. 548. Letter

between delegation of China Fishery Association and the delegate of Japan. China Fishery Council, 1963.


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Kim and Marsh 13

It is at this point the vagueness of international law comes through clearly. If

UNCLOS 3 holds as customary international law as it has since entering into force in

1994, then both the PRC and the Philippines can legally lay claims to the Spratly

Islands as a part of their economic or territorial zones. Ergo, the question of to

whom the territory legally belongs has become the basis for conflict between the

two regional powers in the modern era.

B. International Relations, Balancing and the Grounds for ConflictIt is prudent to state at the beginning of this section that relations of any sort

between the Philippines and the PRC are not a new development. Although the PRC

and the Philippines only reestablished diplomatic relations in 1975, there has been

ongoing trade and migration between the two countries for centuries and this has

only increased in the past decade due to the expanding Chinese economy. However,

the last two decades of RPC-Philippines relations have left the question of potential

conflict today very open as the last 20 years have shown there to be only an forced

stability between the two countries. An analysis of their diplomatic affairs since

1992 should demonstrate this fact.

As of 1993, the Philippines had a military presence in the Spratly Islands. At thetime, President Ramos of the Philippines was informed by the Chairman of the

Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, Qiao Shi that the PRC was

determined to contribute and help maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific

region and had no intention of attacking the Philippines military installation in the

Spratly Islands.31 Going forward, the PRC supported the idea that the ASEAN

Regional Forum could serve as a meeting and dialogue venue for both nations to

communicate with one another and facilitate negotiations the state reached with

one another during the Presidents state visit to the PRC in 1993.32

31A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post Cold War Era' , by Amitav Akhara (Adelphi

Paper 279, August 1993). p. 6432

Ibid. p. 65


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Kim and Marsh 14

Moving forward to 1995, the PRC and the Philippines were able to broker a

dispute within the ASEAN Regional Forum, agreeing that each nation would inform

the other of any and all military movement within the Spratly Islands and that there

would be no further construction on any of the islands. This agreement was

immediately violated by the PRC when they sent in naval vessels to repair fishing

shelters they claimed where damage in a storm. In response, the Philippines lodged

a formal protest with both ASEAN and the United Nations, insisting that the PRC

remove its structures on the Spratly Islands. The Philippines also increased naval

patrols in Kalayaan and invited American politicians to come and inspect PRC bases

by plane.33 This was a low point in Sino-Filipino relations during the 1990s that

almost saw military escalation and conflict.

Despite these early indications of potential conflict in the 1990s, the first 12

years of the 21stcentury has arguably seen tensions at its worst and diplomatic

relations at its best between the Philippines and the PRC. In 2001, Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo became President of the Philippines and she propelled the PRC to become

one of the Philippines largest trading and business partners, signing over 100 so-

called cooperation agreements during her term that ended in 2010. 34 Concurrently,

the Philippines also pulled troops out of Iraq in 2004, leading to a temporary butmemorable chill in relations with the United States during which time Arroyo and

Hu Jintao in Beijing saw a warming of relations.35 Throughout this early period,

almost all questions of maritime disputes between the Philippines and the PRC were

subdued in preference to amicable relations.

But this amicable period did not last forever. Since the Philippines gained its

freedom from the United States, the US and Philippines have always enjoyed cordial

relations; both countries do military exercises with the other on an annual basis

33Landler, Mark. "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands". The New York Times.

(2010-07-23)34

D.J. Yap, China Admits Close PH-US Relations, Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 12, 2010.35

Ibid.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html


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Kim and Marsh 15

while the Philippines and the PRC are always cautious not to upset the tenuous

bonds they have with one another. The Chinese have acknowledged the fact that the

relationship the US shares with the Philippines is fundamentally different from PRC-

Filipino relations.36

The elections of President Obama in 2008 and the election of President Aquino

of the Philippines in 2010 marked a shift in the power balance in the region. At the

beginning of the Obama administration, President Obama promised that America

would refocus or pivot its attention back on Asia after eight years of a Bush

Presidency that largely ignored Asia as it waged war in the Middle East and reaffirm

Americas commitment to its allies in South East Asia.37 In April of 2012 this

commitment was put to the test.

On 10 April 2012, the PRC and the Philippines became embroiled in a navel

standoff in disputed territorial waters in the South China Sea.38 The conflict

occurred when the Philippine Navy Frigate, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, was sent to

investigate the reported sighting of eight Chinese fishing boats at Scarborough Shoal

in the Spratly Island chain and discovered that one of them was carrying coral, giant

clams and live sharks, all things that are protected under Philippine law. Both sides

claimed the other had violated the others sovereignty and lodged diplomaticcomplaints with the other.

In the subsequent months, the Chinese government advised its nationals against

traveling to the Philippines and raised trade barriers on goods from the

Philippines.3940 Later, on 16 May 2012, both nations implemented a fishing ban in

36 Steven Rood, U.S. Military and the Philippines: What do Philippine Citizens Really Think? The Asia

Foundation, February 1, 2012.37

Carlyle Thayer, Standoff at Scarborough Shoal: Implications for USChina Relations, China US Focus,May 9, 2012, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/standoff-at-scarborough-shoal-implications-

for-us-china-relations/ (accessed November 4, 2012).38

Thayer, Carlyle A. "Standoff at Scarborough Shoal: Implications for Us-China Relations. "China-US Focus:.

2011 China-United States Exchange Foundation, 9 May 2012. Web. 19 Nov. 2012.

.39

Damian Grammaticas. "China bangs the war drum over South China Sea".BBC. (May 9, 2012) Retrieved
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18016901http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BBChttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BBChttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BBChttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BBChttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18016901


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Kim and Marsh 16

the Scarborough Shoal and by June, both nations had withdrawn their vessels from

around the shoal. As of September, the PRC still maintains ships near the Shoal and

turn away Filipino vessels that try to enter the area around the Shoal.41 In essence,

there is a basic strategic calculation that is taking place here: the first nation to leave

the Shoal will be perceived internationally and domestically as ceding sovereignty.

This current situation puts the United States in a difficult place. The United

States has long been neutral on the sovereignty issues involving the South China Sea.

The question is, should it be? In 1951 the United States and the Philippines signed a

Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) that among other things recognizes that an armed

attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own

peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in

accordance with its constitutional process.42

What this basically means is that there are three contingencies that could result

from this guarantee. The first envisions a direct attack on the territory of the

Philippines or the United States. Second, a direct attack on the island territories

under the Philippines or the United States jurisdiction in the Pacific. Finally, an

attack on either partys armed forced, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.43

The text of the MDT leaves it very much open as to whether the US commitmentto the Philippines in this situation is credible. Under the second envisioned scenario,

the Philippines sees the Spratly Islands and therefore Scarborough Shoal as their

sovereign territory. However, thanks to the ambiguity of the UNCLOS 3 and the

inability of international law to determine to whom the Spratly Islands in the South

China Sea belong, the US has chosen to remain inactive and neutral throughout the

Novemeber 11, 2012.40

Barbara Demick "China cancels tours to Philippines over South China Sea dispute". Los Angeles Times.(May 10, 2012).41

"China to enforce fishing ban in disputed waters".The Jakarta Post. May 14, 2012. Retrieved November

17, 2012.42

See, "Republic of the Philippines".U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 11/18/2012.43

Lohman, Walter. "Scarborough Shoal and Safeguarding American Interests." Issue Brief3603 (May,

2012): 1-4. The Heritage Foundation. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. . p. 2
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/14/china-enforce-fishing-ban-disputed-waters.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jakarta_Posthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jakarta_Posthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jakarta_Posthttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm#historyhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm#historyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jakarta_Posthttp://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/14/china-enforce-fishing-ban-disputed-waters.html


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Kim and Marsh 18

the Philippines on its own to defend against a potential armed conflict with the PRC.

However, the fact of the matter is if the Scarborough Shoal conflict escalates into a

real international crisis between the Philippines and the PRC, under the conditions

of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will be forced to fulfill its role

as an ally to the Philippines and seek to intervene in the crisis. Given what has been

said from Washington in recent months, such an attack would have to be a direct

assault initiated by the PLA against either a Filipino vessel on the seas, or a direct

assault against the mainland Philippines. Which side is likely to win in a conflict?

How would this conflict play out? The next section of this paper will address these

questions and more in an in-depth military analysis and balance.


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Kim and Marsh 19

IV. Military Balance

1. Premises

The Peoples Republic of China and the United States are powerful countries with

both nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities. As a result, military balance

can mean different things in different contexts. It is therefore necessary to discuss

the circumstance under which they may get involved in military conflicts, which

would limit the weapons they may use and scope of the battle.

First, each side will engage in and continue military conflict only if the benefit

exceeds cost. The PRCs interests include natural resources, control of trade and

navigation, prestige, and so on. The US, on the other hand, would want to continue

free navigation through South China Sea, maintain its prestige in the region, and

prove its loyalty to its allies. Moreover, both countries have interest in not losing

their men and equipment, possibly the US more than the PRC. Thus when military

conflicts are expected to result in more losses than gains of these interests, one side

will avoid the conflict and give into the other sides demand.

Second, mutual nuclear deterrence is assumed to hold. Nuclear warfare may

increases the cost of warfare dramatically, and a rational country, which we assume

U.S and PRC to be, is unlikely to engage in a nuclear warfare. Moreover, they have

interests in maintaining the stigma attached to the use of nuclear weapons, which

would be eliminated the moment a country actually uses a nuclear weapon. Neither

country would threaten to use nuclear weapon, either, for this would increase

pressure for the other side to preemptively launch a nuclear weapon. Indeed

throughout the history, most countries did not use their weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) even when faced with the prospect of imminent defeat. German

did not employ its chemical weapon during World War II, and neither did Iraq

during the First Gulf War.46 This is not to say that nuclear warfare is impossible. The

46 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure

Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010),


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Kim and Marsh 20

US may decide to carry out a preemptive nuclear strike if it believes that it can

successfully eliminate all Chinese nuclear weapons through it47 and that such

victory brings more benefit than cost to the US. In such case, the analysis presented

in this paper would not be applicable.

Related to the first and second assumption, a conflict that may take place in

South China Sea would be quick and limited. While the PRC and the US both have

important interests in South China Sea, they would not risk an escalation into a

prolonged major warfare. For example, while the US would defend the Philippines in

order to honor their alliance, the US would try to reach peace after the initial

exchange. Thus, the only forces included in this balance analysis are the entire

Philippine force, the forces of Guangzhou Military Region for the PRC, the forces in

the West Pacific for the US. Again, a military conflict can escalate into a larger

warfare, in which case our analysis would be inapplicable.

Fourth, amphibious and land operations, if they are carried out, would follow the

initial naval and aerial victory rather than happening simultaneously. Air and surface

support is crucial in carrying out an amphibious mission, 48 and this means air and

surface combatants may have to fight inefficiently to maximize the protection of the

amphibious forces. Thus it is irrational for a country to carry out an amphibious

operation against islands that are nearly 800 miles away while fighting enemy air

force and navy. For this reason, land or marine forces are not included in this

analysis of balance in South China Sea. In this paper, we are interested in which side

can win the first decisive victory, and it would be this victory that would determine

[accessed 1 October 2012], p.

50.47Scholars such as Lieber and Press argued that the U.S. is now capable of eliminating all the Russian or

Chinese nuclear weapons with through initial strike. See there article The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,

Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, (2006): pp. 42-54.48

Amphibious Operations in the 21stCentury, (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Base Quantico,

18 March 2009),

[accessed 1 October 2012], p. 28.


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Kim and Marsh 22

detection.50 On the other hand, the United States has almost no submarines that can

be deployed to South China Sea when China initiates a military conflict. Only three

nuclear powered Los Angeles-class submarines (SSNs) under Submarine Group 751

cover entire areas of responsibility of the 5th and 7th fleet or as their website

proudly states, nearly half the world.52 While they are technological superior to

their Chinese counterparts and are armed with guided cruise missiles, they cannot

be counted upon to be of great help in case a conflict occurs in South China Sea. The

speed of these submarines are approximately 25 knots,53 and thus unless one of the

three submarines happens to be near South China Sea at the moment a conflict

occurs, they would cannot come back in time to tilt the balance towards the US-

Philippine force.

Lack of submarines in West Pacific is especially a serious problem for the United

States because the submarines play a major role in anti-submarine warfare,54 which

is the biggest weakness of the United States. In late 2006, a Chinese submarine

stalked a US carrier battle group led by USS Kitty Hawk without detection until it

was less than five miles away from the group, which is well within the firing range of

its missiles and torpedoes.55 ASW capable weapons in the battle group included sox

S-3B Viking ASW aircrafts and four SH-60F SeahawkASW helicopters, attached to

50 The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, (Suitland, MD:

Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), [accessed 1

October 2012], p. 23.51

Ships, Submarines, & Units, Commander Submarine Group 7,

[accessed 1 October 2012].52

Home, Commander Submarine Group 7, [accessed 1 October

2012].53

U.S. Navy Fact Sheet: Attack Submarines - SSN, Ameircas Navy,

[accessed 1 October

2012].54 Eleni Ekmektsioglou and Matthew Hallex, Chinese Submarines and U.S. Anti-Submarine Warfare

Capabilities, e-International Relations, (27 August 2011), [accessed 1 October 2012]55

China Sub Stalked U.S. Fleet, Washington Times, (13 November 2006),

[accessed 1

October 2012].


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Kim and Marsh 23

USS Kitty Hawk, and one attack submarine that was part of the battle group. This

case suggests that in an actual conflict, the 21 Chinese submarines would be able to

inflict major damage to U.S surface combatants.

Dong-feng 21D (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) is another major

factor that may potentially give the PRC advantage in a naval conflict. As seen in

figure 1, this ballistic missile is capable of mid-course ballistic correction as well as

terminal guidance after re-entering the atmosphere.56 This makes the missile highly

capable of hitting moving targets such as US aircraft carriers, against which it is

designed.57 The terminal guidance can also extend the missiles range by hundreds

of nautical miles compared to other medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), as

shown in Figure 2. Therefore, in the event of a military conflict with the United

States in South China Sea, DF-21D can target any of the US ships involved. Combined

with the undersea superiority, this ASBM serves as a great to any US ships engaging

in a battle with PLA Navy within the keep out zone.58



October 2012], p. 26.57

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic ofChina 2012, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washington,

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2012),

[accessed 1 October 2012], p. 2258

Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure


[accessed 1 October 2012], pp.

21-22


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Kim and Marsh 24

Figure 1 ASBM Concept of Operations

Source: The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, (Suitland,MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 27.


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Kim and Marsh 25

Figure 2 The Range of DF-21 ASBM, Comparison with That of Other Chinese Ballistic Missiles and

Combat Radius of Strike Aircraft

Source: Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,18 May 2010),



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Kim and Marsh 26

Figure 3 PRC's "Keep Out" Zone

Source: Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,18 May 2010), [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 22.

There are three ways that the United States can neutralize DF-21. First, it can

preemptively destroy the missiles before it is launched. This option is not practical

because DF-21D missiles are mounted on highly mobile transporter erector

launcher (TEL).59 As a result, not only are they difficult to locate in the first place,

but they may have moved by the time pre-emptive strikes are launched against them.

Second, the US can intercept the missile is launched. If the US intercepts it using a

nuclear missile, the US risks escalation into a nuclear war by giving the PRC a

justification to use nuclear weapons. If the US uses conventional weapons, the

missile is extremely hard to shoot down. Hitting a normal ballistic missile alreadyrequires extreme precision; hitting a ballistic missile that adjusts its course twice is



October 2012], p. 27.


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Kim and Marsh 27

near impossibility.60 The last option, and the most practical one, is to disable the

radars and ISR nodes, on which an ASBM relies for targeting.61 This will be further

discussed inthe section about operation.

One major issue with DF-21D ASBM is that its full operational capability has not

been confirm. Thus it is known whether it can actually track the aircraft carrier after

re-entering the atmosphere and successfully hit its target. Details regarding the

development of DF-21D are shown in Table 2.

Table 2 Development of DF-21D

Date Event

2002.12.19 successful test flight of the terminally guided DF21C MRBM.104

2003 First mention of the CSS5 MRBM in DoD annual report.

2004The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns book details potential operational uses foran ASBM.

2006 The Office of Naval Intelligence references Chinas interest in developing an ASBM.

2008 The Defense Intelligence Agency acknowledges Chinas development of an ASBM.

2008 First mention of the ASBM in DoD annual report.

2009 DF21D variant constructed, initial operational capability estimated at 2012.

2010.8.3Private sector analysts estimate the initial operational capability (IOC) of an ASBM tobe a ways off.

2010. 12Admiral Willard (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command) announces that Chinas ASBMhas reached IOC.

2011.2.18 Chinese media reports that the ASBM is already deployed in the army.

2011General Chen Bingde (Director, PLA General Staff Dept.) publicly confirms that theASBM is in development.

Source: Amy Chang and John Dotson, Indigenous Weapons Development in Chinas MilitaryModernization, (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5 April2012), , [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 21.



October 2012], pp. 26-27.61

Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure


[accessed 1 October 2012], pp.

59-61


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Kim and Marsh 28

In sum, while the US-Philippine force has overwhelming advantage in terms of

surface combatants, overall naval balance is tilted toward the PRC because of its

undersea superiority. Once the capacity of the PRCs new ASBM is confirmed, the

balance would further shift toward the PRC.

3. Air/Air Defense Balance

Figure 4 Military Regions and Major Formations of PLA

Source: The Military Balance 2011: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and DefenceEconomics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), p. 197.

Analyzing aerial balance is complicated because the number of deployable

aircrafts depends on the countrys proximity to the area in which conflict occurs and

its capacity to refuel aircraft in air. In the case of the fighters of Peoples Republic of

China, only the fighter regiments in Chengdu Military Region, Guangzhou Military


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Kim and Marsh 29

Region, and Nanjing Military Region that consist of F-8 (J-8)62 or F-10 (J-10) fighters

were counted. This decision was made based on 2010 report by National Air and

Space Intelligence Center that PLA Air Force has limited aerial refueling capability

and thus is able to refuel only F-8 and F-10 aircraft.63 No Chinese fighters can be

expected to fight around Spratly Islands, which is at least 800 miles away from most

Chinese air bases, without aerial refueling. Thus the only fighter regiments included

for the PRC side were a regiment of F-8H aircraft under 9th Naval Aviation Division of

South Sea Fleet, a regiment of F-10 aircraft under 2nd Fighter Division of Guangzhou

Military Region, a regiment of F-10 aircraft under 9th Fighter Division of Guangzhou

Military Region, and a regiment of F-10 aircraft under 44th Fighter Division in

Chengdu Military Region. 3rd Fighter Division in Nanjing Military Region also had a

regiment of F-10 aircraft, but it was excluded because it was too far in the north. The

numbers of aircraft are given in a range because only approximate number of

aircraft per regiment could was available, which was between 16 and 30. 64

Four bomber and ground attack regiments were included regardless whether

they can be refueled in air. The 2011 annual report of US Department of Defense

writes that the engage enemy surface combatants located up to 1,850km away from

Chinese coast with long-range cruise missiles.65 Therefore, a regiment of B-6G (H-

6G) bombers under 8th Naval Aviation Division of South Sea Fleet, a regiment of FB-

7A (JH-7A) ground attack fighters under 9th Naval Aviation Division of South Sea

Fleet, two regiments of B-6H (H-6H) and B-6K (H-6K) bombers under 8th Bomber

62I use the names used by the Annual Report of the Department of Defense, which are used for export

versions of the aircraft. Names in parentheses are the ones used within the PRC.63

People's Liberation Army Air Force 2010, (Wright-Patterson, OH: National Air & Space Intelligence

Center, 1 August 2010), [accessed 1

October 2012], p. 764 People's Liberation Army Air Force 2010, (Wright-Patterson, OH: National Air & Space Intelligence

Center, 1 August 2010), [accessed 1

October 2012], p. 71.65

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of

China 2011, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washington,


[accessed 1 October 2012], p. 29, 33.


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Kim and Marsh 30

Division in Guangzhou Military Region are included in the analysis.66

The United States have much better refueling capacity, so all the US aerial forces

in West Pacific were included in the balance analysis. There are twelve KC-130J

Super Hercules tankers in under US Marine Corps in Okinawa, each of which can

carry over 12,000 gallons of fuels and refuel two aircraft simultaneously.67

Moreover, as long as the US planes can make it to Philippines and carry out initial

battle, it can land on Philippine airfields and refuel there.68 Lastly, the USS George

Washington can also provide some refueling to aircraft engaging in battle. Those are

Fifth Air Force in Osan, South Korea, which is about 2000 miles away from Spratly

Islands; Seventh Air Force in Okinawa, Japan, which is about 1300 miles away from

Spratly Islands; and Carrier Air Wing 5, which belongs to Carrier Strike Group 5.

While the exact number aircraft of Fifth and Seventh Air Forces were available, the

number of aircraft under Carrier Air Wing was approximated based on The Military

Balance 2012, which said a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier consists of 55 F/A-18 Hornet

FGA aircraft.69

Because of its proximity to Spratly Islands, the Philippines can deploy all its

aircraft even without aerial refueling capability. However, the Philippines had no

aircraft that can engage in an actual military conflict.

66Although B-6H and B-6K are not mentioned in the report, they are included here because they are

upgraded versions of B-6G.67 KC-130J SUPER HERCULES, US Marine Corps, [accessed 1 October 2012].68



2012] p. 2.69

The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence Economics,

(London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), p. 57.


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Kim and Marsh 31

Figure 5 Locations of the Land-Based Fighters of the PRC and the US that Can Be Deployed to Spratly

Islands

Table 3 Aerial Forces of the PRC, the Philippines, and the US

Aircraft Type PRC Philippines U.S. Philippines + U.S.

FTR/FGA 64-120 0 203 203

Bombers/Ground Attack 64-120 0 0 0

Bombers Average Training Hours 100-150 0 260 260

FTR/FGA Average Training Hours 100-150 N/A 189 189

Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and DefenceEconomics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 54-68, 233-42, 276-7.,People's Liberation Army Air Force 2010 , (Wright-Patterson, OH: National Air & Space IntelligenceCenter, 1 August 2010), [accessed 1October 2012], p. 72

Even if all PLA fighter regiments consist of 30 aircraft, the PRC is largely

outnumbered by the US fighters. Considering that the US has better technology in

general and that the US pilots are much better trained, the United States has a clear

advantage over the PRC in air.

The PRC has a significant number of bombers which can launch long-range


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Kim and Marsh 32

ASCMs. They can contribute to anti-access/area denial (A2AD) in combination with

PRCs superior the ASBMs and submarines.70 However, because the US has much

stronger and numerous fighter forces, PLA bombers activities against surface

combatants can be effectively thwarted. Thus USs superiority in fighters limits the

PRCs A2AD capability.

In order to offset the huge disadvantage it has in carrying out air combats in a

distant sea, the PRC has improved air defense capability of its navy.71 All five

destroyers and nine of 24 frigates under South Sea Fleet are armed with surface-to-

air missiles, and both the number and quality of surface combatants with anti-air

capability continues to increase over time.

4. Space/Counterspace Balance

Table 4 Satellites of the PRC, the Philippines, and the US

Satell ite Type PRC Philippines U.S. Philippines + U.S.

Communication 4 0 31 31

Positioning/Navigation/Timing 10 0 31 31

Meteorology/Oceanography 0 0 6 6

ISR 15 0 10 10

Electronic/Signals Intelligence 11 0 20 20

Space Surveilance 0 0 1 1

Early Warning 0 0 5 5

Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence

Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 54-68, 233-42, 276-7.

Balance in the space is significant because it determines how much intelligence a

country has and how well it can target enemies ships, launchers, etc. In terms of the

number of satellites, the United States is clearly superior; it has more satellites than

the PRC in all but one types. The Philippines has no satellite that can be used for

70 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of



[accessed 1 October 2012], p. 29.71

Ibid., p. 4.


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Kim and Marsh 33

military purpose. In terms of anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, exact data is not

available. However, from the fact that the PRC tested its first ASAT missile against its

weather satellite in January 2007,72 22 years after US did its first test,73 it can be

assumed that the US has superior ASAT capability as well. However, neither side has

actually used an ASAT weapon against an enemy satellite, and whether they would

be able to in a real combat is still in doubt.74

However, it seems that the PRC is not necessarily trying to win the space balance.

US Air Force officers Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France have pointed out,

Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential US-Chinese

ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race. Rather, the purpose of the PRCs

space program is to counter the space-enabled advantage of US conventional

forces.75 In other words, all that the PRC is aiming at is to overcome the advantage

the US has in conventional warfare by developing some space and counterspace

capability. According to the 2011 Annual Report of the Department of Defense, the

PRC seems to be largely successful in achieving this goal; it reports that the PRCs

space activities have significant impact on its A2AD effort.76 Not only has the PRC

become mostly independent in positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) and

communication functions, the it is even supplying those satellites to other countries.

Also, the PRC has enhanced its ability to track satellites and attack them using both

72 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of



[accessed 1 October 2012], p. 37.73

AFSPC Milestone: First US ASAT Intercept,Air Force Space Command Public Affairs, (15 September

2012), [accessed 1 October 2012].74

Baohui Zhang, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,Asian Survey, vol.51, (2011): p. 317.75

Baohui Zhang, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,Asian Survey, vol.

51, (2011): p. 312.76

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic o f





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Kim and Marsh 34

kinetic and non-kinetic means.77 Lastly, The PRCs C4ISR based on satellites and

over-the-horizon (OTH) radars is increasing its capacity to identify, track, and target

enemy combatants,78 and this would play a crucial role in the use of its ASBM.

5. Operations and Overall Balance

The course of actual military conflict among the PRC, the Philippines, and the US

can be predicted based on three factors: first, our premise that neither the PRC nor

the US would start a nuclear war or cause an escalation into one; second, historical

precedents of Chinese actions in South China Sea; and third, military balance

analyzed above.

The conflict will begin when the PLA Navy attacks the Philippine ships or

occupations in Spratly Islands. The Philippines would not start a war since it has an

extremely weak military, and since it expects the US support only when it is attacked

by an adversary. The US has little justification for initiating a fight in South China Sea,

and the US attack of Chinese territory or ships in South China Sea is likely to escalate

into a total war, which the US would not risk. Besides, as long as the PRC does not cut

off the US navigation in South China Sea, the US would not have an incentive to start

a conflict. On the other hand, the PRC has interests that can be achieved onlythrough the use of military. The PRC have to fight the Philippines in order to

establish its hegemony in the region or capture the natural resources. If the PRC

does start a battle, it would do so by attacking the Philippine ships or occupations in

Spratly Islands, not by attacking the US ships directly. Attacking the US ships first,

even if strategically desirable in order to achieve a quick decisive victory, risks

starting a total war, as the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor exemplifies. It is also

possible that the PRC may unintentionally initiate a military conflict while simply

trying to scare the Philippine forces away. The uncertainty regarding exactly what

action will trigger the US intervention reinforces the possibility of the PRC starting

77Ibid., p. 37.

78Ibid., p. 38.


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Kim and Marsh 35

an unintended battle.

Once a major conflict begins between the PRC and the Philippines, the US would

intervene in order to fulfill its ally obligation. It is in the best interest of the US to

take out the PRCs ISR satellites using ASAT weapons; this would not only show that

the US is willing to use force but also cripple the Chinese ASBMs and ASCMs. If the

PRC is unable to use its ASBMs, the PRC may back down because it of its huge

disadvantage in fighter aircraft and surface combatants. However, if the PRC is still

able to successfully launch its ASBMs, whether it is because the US ASAT missiles fail

or because the OTH radars provide sufficient information regarding the locations of

the US surface combatants, the submarines would be able penetrate the US ASW

defenses.79 The huge advantage that the US enjoys in fighters and surface

combatants would become meaningless since its ASW capability is so lacking. This

means that the US would have to back down, virtually acknowledging the Chinese

hegemony in South China Sea.

79 Eleni Ekmektsioglou and Matthew Hallex, Chinese Submarines and U.S. Anti-Submarine Warfare

Capabilities, e-International Relations, (27 August 2011), [accessed 1 October 2012] pp. 3-4.


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Kim and Marsh 36

V. Conclusion

1. Where is it headed?

The Spratly Islands reflects the volatile nature of the existing conflict betweenthe PRC and the Philippines. The end of the Cold War signaled a shift in the regional

paradigm and it has become clear through the course of this paper that China has

become the regional balancer against which all other play. In the South China Sea,

China has tried to assert this power but for the past 20 years, stopped short of

waging an all-out conflict.

The United States is still a player in the region and this is nowhere more clear

that in its longtime ally and mutual defense partner, the Republic of the Philippines.However, reality does not always reflect a nice balancing act of powers were things

remain status quo and stable. Since the 1990s, China and the Philippines have

engaged in heated conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and to

whom they belong. Theoretically, the issue of sovereignty should have been

addressed and resolved through the United Nation and the Third United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea but as history and international customary law

shows, this was not the case. The combined factors of no clear owner of the Spratly

Islands from the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco under the principle of Res nullius and

the ability of states to claim sovereignty in their 200 nautical mile Exclusive

Economic Zones have created an inherently unstable situation between China and

the Philippines.

While Arroyo and Hu Jintao were able to keep maritime disputes at bay in favor

of economic cooperation and mutual investment, the last two years have seen this

legacy erode as the most recent conflict over the Scarborough Shoal begins a new

chapter in the dispute between the new nations. At the present moment, the

Scarborough Shoal crisis has not concluded, neither side willing to withdraw focus

or momentum from the area as any conciliatory action would be interpreted as

ceding sovereignty to the other. Neither is willing to do this. While it is the hope of


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Kim and Marsh 37

the international community that this crisis does not turn hot, there is always the

possibility of an armed conflict between the China and the Philippines unfolding if

the situation there is not soon resolved. Presuming that the conflict might turn hot

and the Philippines calls on the United States to fulfill its obligations under the MDT,

what can be expected to happen and how will this affect the balance of power in the

South China Sea?

2. Options for the US

Assuming that the DF-21D is or soon will be fully operational, the balance in

South China Sea is in favor of the PRC at the moment. This can be problematic for the

US, especially since a military conflict seems to be likely. The US has three options itcan take in order to prevent a military conflict and protect its interest in the region.

First is to enhance its military forces in Asia to match that of the PRC. Currently, the

major weakness of the US is its ASW capability. With limited ability to locate and

destroy enemy submarines, its advantage in surface combatants and fighters would

be meaningless. The best way for the US to bolster its ASW capability by

concentrating more of its submarines in the region and narrowing the area they

have to cover. However, the major flaw of this option is that this would encourage

the PRC to further enhance its military capability in the region. The PRC protested

when the US decided to install an early-warning radar, which is a purely defensive

equipment.80 If the US places more submarines, which have both defensive and

offensive capabilities, in the region, the PRC would react by strengthening its forces

further. This resulting arms race would threaten the stability and security in the

region.

The second option for the US is to strengthen the Armed Forces of the

Philippines. The Philippines has extremely weak military and relies completely on

80 Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Plans New Asia Missile Defenses, The Wall Street Journal, (23

August 2012),

[accessed 19

November 2012].


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Kim and Marsh 38

the United States for the defense of its islands.81 This may be more justifiable than

the US deploying more of its forces in the region. That said, the PRC may still protest

against the US providing military aid to those to a country that is so close to the PRC.

Moreover, since the PRC already worries about the US using the Philippines as a

basis to carry out its offensive against the PRC,82 the arming of the Philippines may

also result in arms race and instability.

Given that first two options may worsen the security in the region, the last option

seems to be the best: stop trying to balance the PRC militarily, establish means

through which disputes in the region can be settled peacefully, and acknowledge the

Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia as long as it does not invade other countries or

threaten the core US interests. However, this is much easier said than done. First of

all, it is extremely difficult to settle territorial disputes conclusively without violence.

Glaser proposes applying the Svalbard example; in the dispute over Svalbard, the

sovereignty over the island was given to Norway, while the resources were split

among disputants.83 The problem in the case of South China Sea is that the PRC has

no incentive to share the resources with other countries, especially since it enjoys

superiority in military or economic power compared to its neighbors. It is also

extremely challenging to acknowledge the hegemony of the PRC while protecting the

US interests. This may simply whet the PRCs appetite; after all, giving the

Sudetenland to Nazi Germany encouraged them to be more assertive rather than

stopping them. Thus the US has to find a way to convince the PRC that US will punish

the PRC if it harms the US interests without making the PRC feel threatened.

81A former Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, said to Robert Willard, then Commander of U.S.

Pacific Command that Philippines would not be part of a shooting war because in the first place, we have

nothing to shoot with. Dona Pazzibugan, Peace RPs only option in Spratlys, Philippine Daily Inquirer, (19

August 2012), [accessed 1 October 2012].82

Thammy Evans, The PRCs Relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum: Realpolitik, Regime Theory, or

a Continuation of the Sinic Zone of Influence System? Modern Asian Studies 37:3 (July 2003), p. 73883



2012] p. 5.


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Kim and Marsh 39

The case of the PRC, the Philippines and the United States, any balance will be

difficult to achieve. It has been shown the politically, the situation is already unstable.

If the situation deteriorates into an armed conflict, the results could be worse as two

of the options explored above lead to an arms race and this will only serve to

destabilize the region even further. This paper sought to show the inherent

instability of the current situation in the South China Sea through the lens of the

Spratly Islands as a flashpoint for political and military balancing between the

Peoples Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines and the United States.

Balance is difficult to achieve and peace is even more elusive. Until the day a

peaceful solution can be found to stabilize the South China Sea, each country will

have to walk on eggshells so as not to upset the already fragile and breaking balance.


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Kim and Marsh 40

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