volume xi, issue no. 44 october-december 2009

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWS 1October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009

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SUPREME COURT

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PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWS2

Seminar-Workshop for Executive Judges andVice Executive Judges of Regions IX to XII

Development Partners: USAID; ABA-ROLIDate: September 29 to October 1, 2009Venue: Pryce Hotel, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 30 executive and vice executive judges

Orientation Seminar-Workshop onComparative Analysis between the FamilyCode and the Code of Muslim Personal Laws

Date: September 29 to October 1, 2009Venue: Amigo Terrace Hotel, Iloilo CityParticipants: 54 comprising judges, PAO lawyers,representatives from IBP, NBI, CHR, DILG, PNPand Philippine Army

Date: December 1 to 3, 2009Venue: Casablanca Hotel, Legazpi CityParticipants: 50 comprising judges, PAO lawyers,representatives from NBI, CHR, DILG, and PNPof the Bicol Region

Competency Enhancement Training for Judgesand Court Personnel Handling Child Abuseand Trafficking Cases

Development Partners: CPU-Net; PLAN International,Inc.Date: October 6 to 8, 2009Venue: Leyte Park Resort Hotel, Tacloban CityParticipants: 56 comprising selected judges and courtpersonnel, prosecutors, PAO lawyers, and PNPofficers of Region VIII

Development Partners: CPU-Net; UNICEFDate: November 24 to 26, 2009Venue: Manila Pavillion Hotel, UN Avenue, ManilaParticipants: 86 selected judges and court personnel,Court of Appeals lawyers, prosecutors, PAOlawyers, representatives from PGH-CPU and PNPof NCJR

Convention and Seminar of the PhilippineJudges Association (PJA)

Date: October 14 to 16, 2009Venue: Century Park Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 538 judges

Planning Dialogue with the Executive Judges

Date: October 15, 2009Venue: Badjao Ballroom, Century Park Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 150 executive judges

Sixth Metrobank Foundation ProfessorialChair Lecture by Dean Marivic M.V.F. Leonen

Topic: Law at Its Margins: Questions of Identity,Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Ancestral Domainsand the Diffusion of LawDate: October 21, 2009Venue: Malcolm Theater, University of thePhilippines College of Law, Diliman, Quezon CityParticipants: 249 comprising SC, CA and CTAjustices, selected judges and clerks of courts ofNCJR, SC officials and lawyers, members of thediplomatic corps and the academe, andrepresentatives from the Metrobank, NCIP,development partners, NGOs and media


Eighth Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshopon Agrarian Justice

17th Orientation Seminar-Workshopfor Newly Appointed Clerks of Court

Date: November 10-13, 2009Venue: Bayview Park Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 63 newly appointed clerks of courtnamely:

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION IAtty. Arthur C. Agullana, Jr.RTC, OCC, Batac, Ilocos NorteAtty. Relen L. CaldeRTC, OCC, Urdaneta, PangasinanAtty. Elizabeth Cerezo-TugadeRTC, Br. 69, Lingayen, PangasinanAtty. Raquel D. Estigoy-AndresRTC, OCC, San Fernando, La UnionAtty. Jerico G. Gay-yaRTC, Br. 61, Baguio City, BenguetAtty. Alejandro Epifanio D. GuerreroRTC, Br. 5, Baguio City, BenguetAtty. Jocelyn P. HumiwatRTC, Br. 35, Bontoc, Mountain ProvinceAtty. Jurgens SJ MilanRTC, OCC, La Trinidad, BenguetAtty. Roger L. NafianogRTC, Br. 60, Baguio City, BenguetAtty. Raymond G. PanhonRTC, Br. 8, La Trinidad, BenguetAtty. Purissa M. ReyesRTC, Br. 57, San Carlos City, PangasinanAtty. Jocelyn V. RosarioRTC, Br. 38, Lingayen, PangasinanAtty. Zulieca L. Tamayo-De VeraRTC, Br. 50, Villasis, PangasinanAtty. Rodrigo C. Valdez, Jr.RTC, Br. 66, San Fernando, La Union

REGION IIAtty. Freniza Joy D. Cacatian-BaranganRTC, Br. 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino

(Continued on next page)

Development Partners: AJFI;DAR; DOJ; PAO; IDEALSDate: November 10 to 12, 2009Venue: South Sea Resort Hotel,Dumaguete CityParticipants: 47 comprisingselected judges, prosecutors,PAO lawyers, representativesfrom DAR, PNP, CHR, NGOs,POs and DAR facilitators of theProvince of Negros Oriental

Atty. Sheila C. GacutanRTC, Br. 5, Tuguegarao City, CagayanAtty. Arvil Philipp A. NicolasRTC, Br. 18, Ilagan, IsabelaAtty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-QuerubinRTC, Br. 4, Tuguegarao City, CagayanAtty. Shirley M. Tagao-GumiranRTC, Br. 22, Cabagan, Isabela

REGION IIIAtty. Alexander DG. AdrianoRTC, OCC, Cabanatuan City, Nueva EcijaAtty. Bienvenido B. Almonte, Jr.RTC, Br. 78, Malolos, BulacanAtty. Rosario R. BaluyotRTC, Br. 5, Dinalupihan, BataanAtty. Irma Gay G. Idago-BelinoRTC, Br. 86, Cabanatuan CityAtty. Rowena S. CunananRTC, Br. 42, San Fernando, PampangaAtty. Gay T. Escalada-ClavelRTC, Br. 3, Balanga, BataanAtty. Lenie T. GarciaRTC, Br. 44, San Fernando, PampangaAtty. Enrico S. InteriorRTC, Br. 27, Cabanatuan City, Nueva EcijaAtty. Jean P. LilaganRTC, Br. 9, Malolos, BulacanAtty. Roberyn Joy C. Mariñas-NavarroRTC, Br. 60, Angeles City, PampangaAtty. Bernadeth N. Sta. Ana-LazaroRTC, Br. 8, Malolos, BulacanAtty. Maria Helen D. SurlaRTC, Br. 47, San Fernando, PampangaAtty. Apollo J. UmadhayRTC, Br. 48, San Fernando, Pampanga

REGION IVAtty. Catherin B. Beran-BaraoidanRTC, OCC, San Pedro, Laguna


Atty. Nadia S. DiumanoRTC, OCC, Antipolo City, RizalAtty. Rizalina A. EndozoRTC, Br. 10, Balayan, BatangasAtty. Robert Ryan H. EsmendaRTC, OCC, Lipa City, BatangasAtty. Ruby P. FerrerRTC, Br. 72, Antipolo City, RizalAtty. Grandis Rem T. ManalabeRTC, OCC, Sta. Cruz, LagunaAtty. Ferdinand M. MingaoRTC, Br. 74, Antipolo City, RizalAtty. Alexander A. RiveraRTC, Br. 49, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan

REGION VAtty. Rebecca O. BagasalaRTC, OCC, Libmanan, Camarines SurAtty. Marjorie E. Benosa-GadorRTC, Br. 64, Labo, Camarines NorteAtty. Antonette C. Beriña-BanceRTC, Br. 36, Iriga City, Camarines SurAtty. Michelle A. Faurillo-JovenRTC, Br. 56, Libmanan, Camarines SurAtty. Maria Kristina C. MalanyaonRTC, Br. 33, Pili, Camarines SurAtty. Arminda T. PintorRTC, Br. 13, Ligao City, AlbayAtty. Edwin L. RanaRTC, OCC, Masbate, Masbate

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES

REGION IIIMs. Margie M. Dela RosaMTCC, Br. 2, Tarlac CityMs. Rosemarie B. FernandezMTCC, Br. 3, Olongapo CityMs. Victorina R. JacintoMTCC, Palayan City, Nueva EcijaMr. Teofilo L. Liwanag, Jr.MTCC, OCC, Olongapo CityMs. Emma M. ManglicmotMTCC, OCC, Tarlac CityMs. Anna Marin F. SisonMTCC, Br. 73, Olongapo City

REGION IVMr. Francisco J. CalibusoMTCC, Br. 1, Cavite CityMs. Rochelle D. De Leon-RedondoMTCC, OCC, Antipolo CityMr. Marvin Ignacius L. LlamasMTCC, OCC, Lucena City, QuezonMs. Ruth Kristine R. MapayeMTCC, Br. 2, Lucena City, Quezon

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION IMs. Leonardo P. Abbugao, Jr.MTC, Bontoc, Mountain Province

REGION IIIMs. Joni Isabel M. AntonioMTC, Paniqui, TarlacMs. Vilma B. De GuzmanMTC, Baliuag, BulacanMs. Rosemarie R. PalomoMTC, Caranglan, Nueva Ecija

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

REGION IMs. Dina G. Chio6th MCTC: La Paz-Lagayan-Dangla, Abra

REGION IIIMs. Leila D. Rendon5th MCTC: Apalit-San Simon, Pampanga

18th Orientation Seminar-Workshopfor Newly Appointed Clerks of Court

Date: December 8-11, 2009Venue: Montebello Villa Hotel, Cebu CityParticipants: 30 newly appointed clerks of courtnamely:


REGION VIAtty. Ross R. CamanayRTC, Br. 68, Dumangas, IloiloAtty. Felix G. Guarnes, Jr.RTC, Br. 60, Cadiz City, Negros OccidentalAtty. Valerie V. ParreñoRTC, Br. 53, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental

REGION VIIAtty. Cheryl F. BuenoRTC, Br. 56, Mandaue City, CebuAtty. Maria Corazon C. GadugdugRTC, Br. 33, Dumaguete City, Negros OrientalAtty. Consolacion T. LapeRTC, Br. 16, Cebu City, Cebu

REGION VIIIAtty. Milreysa S. DayandayanRTC, Br. 35, Ormoc City, LeyteAtty. Maria Sheila F. Deloso-BaquilodRTC, Br. 3, Guiuan, Eastern SamarAtty. Paul E. PlazaRTC, OCC, Tacloban CityAtty. Rino E. SabarreRTC, Br. 21, Laoang, Northern SamarAtty. Elegia B. SingzonRTC, Br. 38, Gamay, Northern Samar


REGION XAtty. Maribeth L. De Juan-HermosoRTC, Br. 5, Butuan City, Agusan Del NorteAtty. Julieme B. GelbolingoRTC, Br. 15, OzamisCity, Misamis OccidentalAtty. Alfredo Z. GomezRTC, Br. 27, Gingoog City, Misamis OrientalAtty. Dendo G. UdarbeRTC, Br. 2, Butuan City, Agusan Del Norte

REGION XIAtty. Sherry Joy O. BurdeosRTC, OCC, Tagum City, Davao Del NorteAtty. Francisco M. CampanerRTC, OCC, Davao City, Davao Del SurAtty. Marion Gay C. MirabuenoRTC, OCC, General Santos City, South Cotabato

REGION XIIAtty. Kristine M. CamanderoRTC, Br. 24, Midsayap, North Cotabato


REGION VIMs. Marite E. PenieroMTCC, OCC, Iloilo City, IloiloMs. Cheline T. SorreñoMTCC, Victorias City, Negros Occidental

REGION VIIMs. Angelina B. PeraltaMTCC, Br. 2, Mandaue City, CebuMs. Josephine R. TevesMTCC, OCC, Cebu City

REGION IXMs. Rosemarie R. SalvacionMTCC, Br. 2, Dipolog City, Zamboanga Del Norte

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

REGION XIMs. Eugenia G. UyMTC, Tupi, South Cotabato


REGION VIIMs. Eufemia S. Garcia18thMCTC: Dagohoy-Danao, Bohol

REGION VIIIMs. Rowena C. Resulta8th MCTC: Victoria-San Antonio, Northern Samar

REGION XMr. Manutuis Aldo G. Hijos7th MCTC: Loreto-Libjo-Tubajon, Surigao Del NorteMs. Rosita F. Ramos6th MCTC: Tagoloan-Villanueva, Misamis Oriental


SHARI’A CIRCUIT COURT

REGION XIIMr. Esmael A. Karon10th SCC: Lebak, Sultan Kudarat

Seminar-Workshop on CEDAW and GenderSensitivity for Selected Judges, Clerks ofCourt and Legal Researchers of ZamboangaDel Norte

Development Partners: CGRJ; Subcommittee onTraining and Capacity Building; AHRCDate: November 18 to 19, 2009Venue: Camila 2 Hotel, Dipolog CityParticipants: 45 selected judges, clerks of courts andlegal researchers of Zamboanga Del Norte

Pagsasanay ng mga Hukom ukol sa Paggamitng Wikang Filipino sa Hukuman

Date: November 21, 2009Venue: Hiyas ng Bulakan Convention Center, BulakanProvincial Capitol Ground, City of MalolosParticipants: 26 selected judges and IBPrepresentatives

Seminar-Workshop on Deposit Insurance,Banking Practices, and Bank Conservatorship,Receivership, and Liquidation

Development Partner: PDICDate: November 24 to 25, 2009Venue: Crown Regency Hotel and Towers, Cebu CityParticipants: 70 comprising CA justices and lawyers,commercial court and selected RTC judges

16th National Convention-Seminar of thePhilippine Trial Judges League, Inc. (PTJLI)

Theme: “Frontlining Judicial Independence andMoral Uprighteousness in the First Level Courts”Date: November 26 to 28, 2009Venue: Century Park Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 329 judges

Seminar on Speedy Trial and Disposition ofCases

Development Partners: OCA; USAID; ABA-ROLIDate: November 26, 2009Venue: Manila Room, Marco Polo Plaza CebuParticipants: 53 selected RTC and MTCC judges fromthe Visayas Region

Date: December 3, 2009Venue: Mandarin Oriental Manila, Makati CityParticipants: 45 selected RTC judges of the NCJR


56th Orientation Seminar-Workshopfor Newly Appointed Judges

Date: December 1 to 10, 2009Venue: A.Venue Hotel Suites, Makati CityParticipants: 44 newly appointed judges namely:

A. NEW APPOINTMENTS


NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Hon. Danilo B. SuarezRTC, Br. 259, Parañaque City

REGION IHon. Mia Joy O. CawedRTC, Br. 4, Baguio CityHon. A. Florentino R. Dumlao, Jr.RTC, Br. 42, Dagupan City, PangasinanHon. Reynaldo A. LacasandileRTC, Br. 20, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur

REGION IVHon. Angelo R. ArizalaRTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princesa City, PalawanHon. Lily V. BitonRTC, Br. 77, San Mateo, Rizal

REGION VHon. Frank E. LobrigoRTC, Br. 3, Legazpi City, AlbayHon. Maria Theresa G. San Juan-LoquillanoRTC, Br. 10, Legaspi City, Albay

REGION VIHon. Florian Gregory D. AbalajonRTC, Br. 38, Iloilo City

REGION VIIIHon. James Clinton Richard C. NuevoRTC, Br. 12, Ormoc City, Leyte

REGION XIHon. Lope L. CalioRTC, Br. 33, Davao City

Hon. Emilio G. Dayanghirang IIIRTC, Br. 32, Lupon, Davao OrientalHon. Jordan H. ReyesRTC, Br. 5, Mati, Davao Oriental

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS


Hon. Barbara Aleli Hernandez-BrionesMeTC, Br. 61, Makati CityHon. Job M. MangenteMeTC, Br. 54, Navotas CityHon. J. Ermin Ernest Louie R. MiguelMeTC, Br. 11, Manila


REGION IHon. Imelda P. CosalanMTCC, Br. 1, San Fernando, La UnionHon. Zarah R. Sanchez-FernandezMTCC, Br. 2, Dagupan City, Pangasinan

REGION IIHon. Maita Grace D. IsraelMTCC, Br. 3, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan

REGION IIIHon. Evelyn M. Pascua-LeeMTCC, Br. 3, City of San Fernando, Pampanga

REGION XIHon. Jill Rose S. Jaugan-LoMTCC, Br. 4, Davao CityHon. Leo T. MadrazoMTCC, Br. 1, Davao City

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION IIIHon. Roel G. SamonteMTC, Subic, Zambales

REGION IVHon. Adeliza H. Magno-GingoyonMTC, Bacoor, Cavite


Hon. Gwyn P. CalinaMTC, Cainta, Rizal


REGION IHon. Homer Jay D. Ragonjan4th MCTC: Narvacan-Nagbukel-Santa Cruz, Ilocos SurHon. Richard T. Domingo11th MCTC: Sta. Cruz-Sta. Lucia, Ilocos Sur

REGION IIIHon. Rene E. Reyes3rd MCTC: Sto. Tomas-Minalin, Pampanga

REGION XHon. Dymphna G. Labindao1st MCTC: San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario, Agusan Del Sur

B. PROMOTIONS



Hon. Lorenzo R. Bordios-PaculdoRTC, Br. 126, Caloocan CityHon. Danilo A. BuemioRTC, Br. 265, Pasig CityHon. Antonio M. OliveteRTC, Br. 267, Taguig CityHon. Cecilyn B. VillavertRTC, Br. 89, Quezon City

REGION I

Hon. Benjamin N. AbellaRTC, Br. 54, Alaminos PangasinanHon. Manuel R. AquinoRTC, Br. 34, Balaoan, La UnionHon. Carlito A. CorpuzRTC, Br. 27, San Fernando, La UnionHon. Robert P. FangayenRTC, Br. 39, Lingayen, PangasinanHon. Caridad V. GalvezRTC, Br. 43, Dagupan City, PangasinanHon. Juvencio S. GasconRTC, Br. 26, San Fernando, La UnionHon. Cleto R. Villacorta IIIRTC, Br. 6, Baguio City

REGION IIIHon. Mary Anne P. Padron-RiveraRTC, Br. 46, City of San Fernando, Pampanga

REGION VHon. Marvel C. ClavecillaRTC, Br. 33, Pili, Camarines Sur

REGION VIHon. Victorino O. Maniba, Jr.RTC, Br. 39, Iloilo City

REGION VIIHon. Ananson E. JaymeRTC, Br. 63, Bayawan City, Negros Oriental

Forum on Children in Conflict with the Law(CICL): Creative Partnership among thePillars of Justice and NGOs

Development Partners: ACAY; Virlanie Foundation;ERDA; The Embassy of France in the Philippines;Rotary Club of San Francisco Del MonteDate: December 3, 2009Venue: Court of Appeals Auditorium, ManilaParticipants: 203 selected family court judges, clerksof court and social workers, PAO lawyers,prosecutors, Court of Appeals lawyers,representatives from DSWD, PNP, and NGOs.

Personal Security Training for Judges

Development Partners: OCA; NBIDate: December 8-10, 2009Venue: Taal Vista Hotel, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 32 selected first and second level judges

PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURNEW RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURTTTTT8

ELECTION LAW

Election offenses; a candidate is liable forelection offenses only upon the start of thecampaign period.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidateis liable for election offenses only upon the start ofthe campaign period. This Court has no power toignore the clear and express mandate of the lawthat “any person who files his certificate ofcandidacy within [the filing] period shall only beconsidered a candidate at the start of the campaignperiod for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.”Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to theexpress and clear language of the law that “anyunlawful act or omission applicable to a candidateshall take effect only upon the start of the campaignperiod.”

The forum for examining the wisdom of thelaw, and enacting remedial measures, is not thisCourt but the Legislature. This Court has norecourse but to apply a law that is as clear, conciseand express as the second sentence, and itsimmediately succeeding proviso, as written in thethird paragraph of Section 15 of RA No. 8436, asamended by RA No. 9369.

(Carpio, J., Rosalinda A. Penera v. Commission onElections and Edgar T. Andanar, G.R. No. 181613,November 25, 2009.)

COMELEC cannot alter dates set by law forvoters to register.

Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrageensures that the State derives its power from theconsent of the governed. The paramountimportance of this right is also a function of theState policy of people empowerment articulated inthe constitutional declaration that sovereigntyresides in the people and all government authorityemanates from them, bolstered by the recognitionof the vital role of the youth in nation-buildingand directive to the State to encourage theirinvolvement in public and civic affairs.

It is against this backdrop that Congressmandated a system of continuing voter registrationin Section 8 of RA No. 8189 which provides:

SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registrationof Voters. – The personal filing ofapplication of registration of voters shallbe conducted daily in the office of the

Election Officer during regular office hours.No registration shall, however, beconducted during the period starting 120days before a regular election and 90 daysbefore a special election. (emphasis and italicssupplied)

The clear text of the law thus decrees that votersbe allowed to register daily during regular officehours, except during the period starting 120 daysbefore a regular election and 90 days before a specialelection.

By the above provision, Congress itself hasdetermined that the period of 120 days before aregular election and 90 days before a special electionis enough time for the COMELEC to make ALLthe necessary preparations with respect to thecoming elections including: (1) completion ofproject precincts, which is necessary for the properallocation of official ballots, election returns andother election forms and paraphernalia; (2)constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors,including the determination of the precincts towhich they shall be assigned; (3) finalizing theComputerized Voters List; (4) supervision of thecampaign period; and (5) preparation, bidding,printing and distribution of Voter’s InformationSheet. Such determination of Congress is wellwithin the ambit of its legislative power, whichthis Court is bound to respect. And theCOMELEC’s rule-making power should beexercised in accordance with the prevailing law.

(Carpio-Morales, J. Kabataan Party-ListRepresentative Raymond V. Palatino, Alvin A.Peters, President of the National Union of Studentsof the Philippines (NUSP), Ma. Cristina AngelaGuevarra, Chairperson of the Student ChristianMovement of the Philippines (SCMP), Vencer MariE. Crisostomo, Secretary General of KabataanParty-List, Vijae O. Alquisola, President of theCollege of Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP),Dianne Kristel M. Asuelo, Secretary General of theKabataang Artista para sa Tunay na Kalayaan(KARATULA), Kenneth Carlisle Earl Eugenio, AnaKatrina V. Tejero, Victor Louis E. Crisostomo,Jacqueline Alexis S. Merced, and Jade CharmaneRose J. Valenzuela v. Commission on Elections, G.R.No.189868, December 15, 2009.)

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSOctober-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009 9

CIVIL LAW

Guidelines in resolving petition fordeclaration of nullity of marriage based on theFamily Code

The Supreme Court laid down the guidelinesin resolving petitions for declaration of nullity ofmarriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,in Republic v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullityof the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.Any doubt should be resolved in favorof the existence and continuation of themarriage and against its dissolution andnullity. This is rooted in the fact thatboth our Constitution and our lawscherish the validity of marriage andunity of the family. Thus, ourConstitution devotes an entire Article onthe Family, recognizing it “as thefoundation of the nation.” It decreesmarriage as legally “inviolable,” therebyprotecting it from dissolution at thewhim of the parties. Both the family andmarriage are to be “protected” by thestate.

The Family Code echoes thisconstitutional edict on marriage and thefamily and emphasizes their permanence,inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychologicalincapacity must be (a) medically orclinically identified, (b) alleged in thecomplaint, (c) sufficiently proven byexperts and (d) clearly explained in thedecision. Article 36 of the Family Coderequires that the incapacity must bepsychological – not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms maybe physical. The evidence must convincethe court that the parties, or one of them,was mentally or psychically ill to suchan extent that the person could not haveknown the obligations he was assuming,or knowing them, could not have givenvalid assumption thereof. Although noexample of such incapacity need be givenhere so as not to limit the application ofthe provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such rootcause must be identified as a

psychological illness and itsincapacitating nature fully explained.Expert evidence may be given byqualified psychiatrists and clinicalpsychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to beexisting at the “time of the celebration”of the marriage. The evidence must showthat the illness was existing when theparties exchanged their “I do’s.” Themanifestation of the illness need not beperceivable at such time, but the illnessitself must have attached at such moment,or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown tobe medically or clinically permanent orincurable. Such incurability may beabsolute or even relative only in regardto the other spouse, not necessarilyabsolutely against everyone of the samesex. Furthermore, such incapacity mustbe relevant to the assumption ofmarriage obligations, not necessarily tothose not related to marriage, like theexercise of a profession or employmentin a job. Hence, a pediatrician may beeffective in diagnosing illnesses ofchildren and prescribing medicine to curethem but may not be psychologicallycapacitated to procreate, bear and raisehis/her own children as an essentialobligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough tobring about the disability of the party toassume the essential obligations ofmarriage. Thus, “mild characteriologicalpeculiarities, mood changes, occasionalemotional outbursts” cannot be acceptedas root causes. The illness must beshown as downright incapacity orinability, not a refusal, neglect ordifficulty, much less ill will. In otherwords, there is a natal or superveningdisabling factor in the person, an adverseintegral element in the personalitystructure that effectively incapacitates theperson from really accepting and therebycomplying with the obligations essentialto marriage.


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(6) The essential marital obligations must bethose embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 ofthe Family Code as regards the husbandand wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and225 of the same Code in regard to parentsand their children. Such non-compliedmarital obligation(s) must also be statedin the petition, proven by evidence andincluded in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the NationalAppellate Matrimonial Tribunal of theCatholic Church in the Philippines, whilenot controlling or decisive, should begiven great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequotedpronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, theSupreme Court scrutinized the totality of evidencepresented by petitioner and found that the samewas not enough to sustain a finding thatrespondent was psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and hermother ’s testimonies, merely established thatrespondent left petitioner soon after their weddingto work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondentreturned to the Philippines a year and a half later,he directly went to live with his parents in SanJose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitionerin Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did notcontact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad.These testimonies though do not give us muchinsight into respondent’s psychological state.

Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to bedesired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It mustbe noted that Tayag was not able to personallyexamine respondent. Respondent did not appearfor examination despite Tayag’s invitation. Tayag,in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, hadto rely on information provided by petitioner.Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudentand thorough in her evaluation of respondent’spsychological condition, since her source ofinformation, namely, petitioner, was hardlyimpartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondentwas suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,traceable to the latter’s experiences during hischildhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of thebasis for the said conclusion. Tayag did notparticularly describe the “pattern of behavior” thatshowed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic

Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed toexplain how such a personality disorder maderespondent psychologically incapacitated toperform his obligations as a husband. Weemphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner,not just to prove that respondent suffers from apsychological disorder, but also that suchpsychological disorder renders him “trulyincognitive of the basic marital covenants thatconcomitantly must be assumed and discharged bythe parties to the marriage.” Psychologicalincapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a“refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of somemarital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed,through the evidence adduced, to peek intopetitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceivea simple case of a married couple being apart toolong, becoming strangers to each other, with thehusband falling out of love and distancing ordetaching himself as much as possible from hiswife.

To be tired and give up on one’s situation andon one’s spouse are not necessarily signs ofpsychological illness; neither can falling out of lovebe so labeled. When these happen, the remedy forsome is to cut the marital knot to allow the partiesto go their separate ways. This simple remedy,however, is not available to us under our laws.Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a veryspecific situation – a relationship where no marriagecould have validly been concluded because theparties; or where one of them, by reason of a graveand incurable psychological illness existing whenthe marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate theobligations of marital life and, thus, could not havevalidly entered into a marriage.

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null andvoid marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, isnot to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causestherefor manifest themselves. It refers to aserious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of themarriage. It is a malady so grave and sopermanent as to deprive one of awarenessof the duties and responsibilities of thematrimonial bond one is about to assume.x x x.

CIVIL LAW (continued)

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSDOCTRINAL REMINDERSOctober-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009 11

The Supreme Court have held in the past that mere“irreconcilable differences” and “conflictingpersonalities” in no wise constitute psychologicalincapacity.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Veronica Cabacungan Alcazarv. Rey C. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13,2009.)

Alienation or encumbrance of conjugalproperty without the consent of the wife notvoid under the New Civil Code but onlyvoidable; void under the Family Code.

In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras, the Supreme Courtheld that:

The Family Code, which took effect onAugust 3, 1988, provides that any alienationor encumbrance made by the husband of theconjugal partnership property without theconsent of the wife is void. However, whenthe sale is made before the effectivity of theFamily Code, the applicable law is the CivilCode.

Article 173 of the Civil Code provides thatthe disposition of conjugal property withoutthe wife’s consent is not void but merelyvoidable.

The Court likewise made the same holding inPelayo v. Perez :

x x x [Under] Article 173, in relation to Article166, both of the New Civil Code, which wasstill in effect on January 11, 1988 when thedeed in question was executed, the lack ofmarital consent to the disposition ofconjugal property does not make thecontract void ab initio but merely voidable.

In Vera-Cruz v. Calderon, the Court noted thestate of jurisprudence and elucidated on the matter,thus:

In the recent case of Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, we reiterated the rulethat the husband cannot alienate orencumber any conjugal real propertywithout the consent, express or implied, ofthe wife, otherwise, the contract is voidable.To wit:

Indeed, in several cases the Court hasruled that such alienation or

encumbrance by the husband is void.The better view, however, is toconsider the transaction as merelyvoidable and not void. This isconsistent with Article 173 of theCivil Code pursuant to which thewife could, during the marriage andwithin 10 years from the questionedtransaction, seek its annulment.

x x x

Likewise, in the case of Heirs of Christina Ayustev. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that:

There is no ambiguity in the wordingof the law. A sale of real property ofthe conjugal partnership made by thehusband without the consent of hiswife is voidable. The action forannulment must be brought duringthe marriage and within ten yearsfrom the questioned transaction bythe wife. Where the law speaks inclear and categorical language, thereis no room for interpretation – thereis room only for application.x x x (Emphasis ours.)

(Leonardo-De Castro, J., Heirs of DomingoHernandez, Sr., namely: Sergia V. Hernandez(Surviving Spouse), Domingo V. Hernandez, Jr.,and Maria Leonora Wilma Hernandez v. PlaridelMingoa, Sr., Dolores Camisura, Melanie Mingoaand Quezon City Register of Deeds, G.R. No.146548, December 18, 2009.)

Contracts; Distinction between Contract ofSale and Contract to Sell.

A distinction between a contract to sell and acontract of sale is helpful in order to determine thetrue intention of the parties. In a contract of sale,the title to the property passes to the vendee uponthe delivery of the thing sold; while in a contractto sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved forthe vendor and is not to pass to the vendee untilfull payment of the purchase price. In a contract ofsale, non-payment of the price is a negativeresolutory condition. In a contract to sell, fullpayment is a positive suspensive condition. In acontract of sale, the vendor loses and cannot recoverownership of the thing sold until and unless the



REMEDIAL LAW

Taking of judicial notice; when mandatory andwhen discretionary

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Courtdeclare when the taking of judicial notice ismandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.– A court shall take judicial notice, withoutthe introduction of evidence, of the existenceand territorial extent of states, their politicalhistory, forms of government and symbols

contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. In acontract to sell, the title remains with the vendor ifthe vendee does not comply with the conditionprecedent of making payment at the time specifiedin the contract. In a contract to sell, the paymentof the purchase price is a positive suspensivecondition, the failure of which is not a breach,casual or serious, but a situation which preventsthe obligation of the vendor to convey title fromacquiring an obligatory force.

In the instant case, ownership of the generalpurpose polystyrene products was retained by SMP,Incorporated (SMP) until after the checks given aspayment by Clothespak Manufacturing Philippines(Clothespak) cleared. This was evidenced by aprovisional receipt issued by SMP to Clothespak.The agreement between SMP and Clothespakinvolved a contract to sell defined under Article 1478of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, the stipulation that the lossor destruction of the products during transit is onthe account of Clothespak, as buyer of the products,is of no moment. This does not alter the nature ofthe contract as a contract to sell. The free on boardstipulation on the contract can coexist with thecontract to sell. Otherwise stated, the provisionsor stipulations in the contract — for the reservationof the ownership of a thing until full payment ofthe purchase price and for the loss or destructionof the thing would be on account of the buyer —are valid and can exist in conjunction with theother.

(Nachura, J., Bank of the Philippine Islands assuccessor-in-interest of Far East Bank and TrustCompany v. SMP, Inc., G.R. No. 175466, December23, 2009.)

of nationality, the law of nations, theadmiralty and maritime courts of the worldand their seals, the political constitution andhistory of the Philippines, the official acts ofthe legislative, executive and judicialdepartments of the Philippines, the laws ofnature, the measure of time, and thegeographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. –A court may take judicial notice of matterswhich are of public knowledge, or arecapable of unquestionable demonstration orought to be known to judges because of theirjudicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro isinstructive:

1. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on thewisdom and discretion of the courts. Thepower to take judicial notice is to beexercised by courts with caution; caremust be taken that the requisitenotoriety exists; and every reasonabledoubt on the subject should be promptlyresolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicialnotice have three material requisites: (1)the matter must be one of common andgeneral knowledge; (2) it must be well andauthoritatively settled and not doubtfulor uncertain; and (3) it must be knownto be within the limits of the jurisdictionof the court. The principal guide indetermining what facts may be assumedto be judicially known is that ofnotoriety. Hence, it can be said thatjudicial notice is limited to factsevidenced by public records and facts ofgeneral notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial noticeof a fact is merely another way of sayingthat the usual form of evidence will bedispensed with if knowledge of the factcan be otherwise acquired. This is becausethe court assumes that the matter is sonotorious that it will not be disputed. Butjudicial notice is not judicial knowledge.The mere personal knowledge of thejudge is not the judicial knowledge ofthe court, and he is not authorized tomake his individual knowledge of a fact,

CIVIL LAW (continued)


are capable of ready and unquestioneddemonstration. Thus, facts which areuniversally known, and which may befound in encyclopedias, dictionaries or otherpublications, are judicially noticed,provided, they are such of universalnotoriety and so generally understood thatthey may be regarded as forming part of thecommon knowledge of every person. As thecommon knowledge of man ranges far andwide, a wide variety of particular facts havebeen judicially noticed as being matters ofcommon knowledge. But a court cannot takejudicial notice of any fact which, in part, isdependent on the existence or non-existence of afact of which the court has no constructiveknowledge.

From the foregoing provisions of law and theSupreme Court holdings thereon, it is apparentthat the matter which the appellate court tookjudicial notice of does not meet the requisite ofnotoriety.

(Nachura, J., Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip v.Rosalie Palaña Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16,2009.)

Writ of Preliminary Injunction; Its Natureand Object.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an ordergranted at any stage of an action or proceedingprior to the judgment or final order, requiring aparty or a court, agency or a person to refrain froma particular act or acts. It is merely a provisionalremedy, adjunct to the main case subject to thelatter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself.Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is availableduring the pendency of the action which may beresorted to by a litigant to preserve and protectcertain rights and interests therein pendingrendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects,of a final judgment in the case.

The writ is provisional because it constitutes atemporary measure availed of during the pendencyof the action and it is ancillary because it is a mereincident in and is dependent upon the result of themain action.

It is well-settled that the sole object of apreliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or


not generally or professionally known,the basis of his action. Judicial cognizanceis taken only of those matters which are“commonly” known.

Things of “common knowledge,” ofwhich courts take judicial notice, may bematters coming to the knowledge of mengenerally in the course of the ordinaryexperiences of life, or they may be matterswhich are generally accepted by mankindas true and are capable of ready andunquestioned demonstration. Thus, factswhich are universally known, and whichmay be found in encyclopedias,dictionaries or other publications, arejudicially noticed, provided they are ofsuch universal notoriety and so generallyunderstood that they may be regarded asforming part of the common knowledgeof every person.

The Supreme Court reiterated the requisite ofnotoriety for the taking of judicial notice in therecent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court ofAppeals, which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial noticehave three material requisites: (1) the mattermust be one of common and generalknowledge; (2) it must be well andauthoritatively settled and not doubtful oruncertain; and (3) it must be known to bewithin the limits of the jurisdiction of thecourt. The principal guide in determiningwhat facts may be assumed to be judiciallyknown is that of notoriety. Hence, it can besaid that judicial notice is limited to factsevidenced by public records and facts ofgeneral notoriety. Moreover, a judiciallynoticed fact must be one not subject to areasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)generally known within the territorialjurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capableof accurate and ready determination byresorting to sources whose accuracy cannotreasonably be questionable.

Things of “common knowledge,” of whichcourts take judicial notice, may be matterscoming to the knowledge of men generallyin the course of the ordinary experiences oflife, or they may be matters which aregenerally accepted by mankind as true and

REMEDIAL LAW (continued)


REMEDIAL LAW (continued)

mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until themerits of the case can be heard. It is usuallygranted when it is made to appear that there is asubstantial controversy between the parties and oneof them is committing an act or threatening theimmediate commission of an act that will causeirreparable injury or destroy the status quo of thecontroversy before a full hearing can be had onthe merits of the case.

Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ ofpreliminary injunction was granted by the lowercourt upon respondent’s showing that he and hispoultry business would be injured by the closureof the subject road. After trial, however, the lowercourt found that respondent was not entitled tothe easement of right of way prayed for, havingfailed to prove the essential requisites for suchentitlement, hence, the writ was lifted.

The present case having been heard and founddismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ ofpreliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purposeas a provisional remedy having been served, theappeal therefrom notwithstanding.

Unionbank v. Court of Appeals enlightens:

x x x a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining orderor temporary injunction has been grantedoperates as a dissolution of the restrainingorder or temporary injunction,” regardless ofwhether the period for filing a motion forreconsideration of the order dismissing thecase or appeal therefrom has expired. Therationale therefor is that even in cases wherean appeal is taken from a judgmentdismissing an action on the merits, theappeal does not suspend the judgment, hencethe general rule applies that a temporaryinjunction terminates automatically on thedismissal of the action. (italics and emphasissupplied)

The lower court’s citation of Lee v. Court ofAppeals is misplaced. In Lee, unlike in the presentcase, the original complaint for specific performanceand cancellation of real estate mortgage was notyet decided on the merits by the lower court.Thus, the preliminary injunction therein issuedsubsisted pending appeal of an incident.

There being no indication that the appellatecourt issued an injunction in respondent’s favor,the writ of preliminary injunction issued onDecember 1, 1999 by the trial court wasautomatically dissolved upon the dismissal of CivilCase No. 26015.

(Carpio Morales, J., Purisimo Buyco v. NelsonBaraquia, G.R. No. 177486, December 21, 2009.)

Writ of execution. Writ of execution mustconform to the dispositive portion of decision.

It is a fundamental legal axiom that a writ ofexecution must conform strictly to the dispositiveportion of the decision sought to be executed. Awrit of execution may not vary from, or gobeyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks toenforce. When a writ of execution does not conformstrictly to a decision’s dispositive portion, it is nulland void.

Admittedly, the tenor of the dispositive portionof the August 7, 1996 RTC decision, as modified bythe CA and affirmed by this Court, did not orderthe transfer of ownership upon payment of theadjudged compensation. Neither did suchcondition appear in the text of the RTC decision,and of this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 168732.

As aptly pointed out by the CA in its assailedDecision:

[NPC], by its selective quotations from theDecision in G.R. No. 168732, would have ussuppose that the High Court, in decreeingthat [NPC] pay the full value of the propertyas just compensation, implied that [NPC]was entitled to the entire land, including thesurface area and not just the subterraneanportion. No such inference can be drawnfrom [the] reading of the entirety of the HighCourt’s Decision. On the contrary, a perusalof the subject Decision yields to this Courtthe unmistakable sense that the High Courtintended [NPC] to pay the full value of thesubject property as just compensationwithout ordering the transfer o[f ]respondents’ title to the land. This is patentfrom the following language of the HighCourt as quoted by [NPC] itself:


In disregarding this procedure andfailing to recognize respondents’ownership of the subterrain portion,petitioner took a risk and exposed itselfto greater liability with the passage oftime. It must be emphasized that theacquisition of the easement is notwithout expense. The undergroundtunnels impose limitations onrespondents’ use of the property for anindefinite period and deprive them ofits ordinary use. Based upon theforegoing, respondents are clearlyentitled to the payment of justcompensation. Notwithstanding the factthat [NPC] only occupies the subterrainportion, it is liable to pay not merely aneasement but rather the full compensationfor land. This is so because in this case, thenature of the easement practically deprivesthe owners of its normal beneficial use.Respondents, as the owners of theproperty thus expropriated, are entitledto a just compensation which shouldbe neither more nor less, whenever itis possible to make the assessment,than the money equivalent of saidproperty.

Clearly, the writ of execution issued by the RTCand affirmed by the CA does not vary, but is, infact, consistent with the final decision in this case.The assailed writ is, therefore, valid.

(Nachura, J., National Power Corporation v. OmarG. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom. Bucay G.Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G.Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G.Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G.Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G.Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M.Ibrahim, Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim, and LucmanIbrahim, represented by his heirs Adora B. Ibrahim,Nasser B. Ibrahim, Jamalodin B. Ibrahim, RajidNabbel B. Ibrahim, Ameer B. Ibrahim and SarahAizah B. Ibrahim, G.R. No. 183297, December 23,2009.)

Continued from page 1

FFFFFrom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’s Desks Desks Desks Desks Desk

Convention-Seminars were also held forthe Philippine Judges Association and thePhilippine Trial Judges League.

Similarly, our Philippine MediationCenter Office and its field units continued toprovide the parties-litigants the neededassistance in settling their cases throughalternative dispute resolution methods andto train and accredit mediators in differentparts of the country.

In all these activities, the Academy sawthe remarkable performance of its teams andpersonnel, doing their tasks with dedicationand loyalty. Thank you all.

I also wish to thank all our developmentpartners who unfailingly extended to usfunding, expertise, sharing of best practicesand the bond of friendship – The UnitedStates Agency for International Development(USAID), American Bar Association-Rule ofLaw Initiative (ABA-ROLI), Child ProtectionUnit Network (CPU-NET), United NationsChildren’s Fund (UNICEF), PlanInternational, Inc., Association CompassionAsian Youth (ACAY), Virlanie Foundation,Education Research and DevelopmentAssistance (ERDA), The Embassy of Francein the Philippines, The Rotary Club of SanFrancisco del Monte, and The AsiaFoundation.

Thank you, too, to the Honorable ChiefJustice Reynato S. Puno, and the SupremeCourt, for the unstinting support andinspiration given to PHILJA and all itsundertakings. The success of a JudicialAcademy hinges on its support from the ChiefJustice and the Highest Court and PHILJA istruly fortunate in enjoying this crucialingredient.

Finally, thanks to the Almighty for theblessings and graces needed to serve ourpeople effectively.

Again, congratulations and thank you!

Adolfo S. Azcuna Chancellor

PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS16

SUPREME COURT

RESOLUTION of the COURT En Banc datedNovember 17, 2009, on A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC

AMENDED RULES ON WHO SHALL RESOLVEMOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OFDECISIONS OR SIGNED RESOLUTIONS INCASES ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISIONS OFTHE COURT

This Resolution supersedes the Resolutionpromulgated on February 15, 2000. The new ruleson who shall resolve motions for reconsiderationof Decisions or signed Resolutions in casesassigned to the Divisions of the Court are asfollows:

1. Motions for reconsideration/clarificationof a Decision or of a signed Resolutionshall be acted upon by the Ponente andthe other Members of the Division,whether special or regular, whoparticipated in the rendition of theDecision or signed Resolution sought tobe reconsidered, irrespective of whetheror not such Members are already in otherDivisions at the time the motion forreconsideration/clarification is filed oracted upon; for this purpose, they shallbe deemed constituted as a SpecialDivision of the Division to which thePonente belonged at the time ofpromulgation of the Decision or SignedResolution.

2. If the Ponente is disqualified or hasinhibited himself/herself from acting onthe motion for reconsideration/clarification, he/she shall be replaced byanother Justice who shall be chosen byraffle from among the remainingMembers of the Division whoparticipated in the rendition of theDecision or signed Resolution and whoconcurred therein. If only one Memberof the Court who participated andconcurred in the rendition of theDecision or signed Resolution remains,he/she shall be designated as the Ponente.

3. If the Ponente retires or is otherwise nolonger a Member of the Court, a newPonente for all his/her Decisions or signed

Resolutions that may be subject ofmotions for reconsideration/clarificationshall be designated by raffle from amongthe remaining Members of the Divisionwho participated and concurred in theDecision or signed Resolution. InDecisions or signed Resolutions of theretired Ponente that the new Ponente didnot participate and concur in, anotherPonente shall be chosen by raffle fromamong those who participated andconcurred in the Decisions or signedResolutions.

4. If a Member (not the Ponente) retires or isotherwise no longer a Member of theCourt, a Justice shall be designated byraffle from the other Divisions to replacehim/her in all Decisions or signedResolutions to which he/she participatedin and where such Decisions or signedResolutions are the subject of furthermotions, until a new Justice is appointedas replacement for the retired Justice.Upon the appointment of a new Justice,he/she shall replace the designated Justicein such Decisions or signed Resolutions.

5. Any vacancy or vacancies in the SpecialDivision shall be tilled by raffle fromamong the other Members of the Courtto constitute a Special Division of fiveMembers.

6. If the Ponente and all the Members of theDivision that rendered the Decision orsigned Resolution are no longer Membersof the Court, the case shall be raffled toany Member of the Court and the motionshall be acted upon by him/her with theparticipation of the other Members of theDivision to which he/she belongs.Should the membership of this Divisionbe less than the number required for aSpecial Division, the vacancy orvacancies shall be filled by raffle fromamong other Members of the Court.

7. Motions for reconsideration shall beresolved by the Division with theconcurrence of at least three of itsMembers.

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSOctober-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009October-December 2009 17


If there are pleadings, motions or incidentssubsequent to the denial with finality of the motionfor reconsideration, the case shall be acted uponby the Division which rendered the Decision orsigned Resolution.

This Resolution shall take effect upon itspublication in two newspapers of generalcirculation in the Philippines.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines, which is herebydirected to disseminate copies thereof to its Members.

Promulgated this 17th day of November 2009.

(Sgd.) PUNO, CJ, CARPIO, CORONA (on officialleave), CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR. (on official leave), NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA (onofficial leave), BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 135-2009

ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIONAL COURTADMINISTRATION OFFICE (RCAO) IN THETHIRD JUDICIAL REGION (CENTRAL LUZON)AND IN THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL REGION(SOUTHERN MINDANAO), DIRECTING THEEXECUTION OF ACTIONS TO OPERATIONALIZETHE SAME, AND FOR OTHER RELATEDPURPOSES

Pursuant to the En Banc Resolution of theSupreme Court in A.M. No. 09-3-22-SC dated April14, 2009 approving the replication of the RCAO inat least two selected regions other than the SeventhJudicial Region, the establishment of the RCAO inAngeles City, Pampanga and in the City of Davao,to provide administrative and financialmanagement and support services to the first andsecond level courts in the Third Judicial Region(Central Luzon) and in the 11th Judicial Region(Southern Mindanao), respectively, is herebydirected.

1. Overall Implementation Management.The Office of the Court Administrator shallbe responsible for the overall managementand supervision of the implementationprocess and shall ensure a smooth, efficientand effective decentralization process thatis consistent with the vision of creating theenabling organizational environment forefficiency, effectiveness and integrity.

2. Implementation Actions. The CourtAdministrator shall submit for the approvalof the undersigned an action plan andimplementation schedule that will ensurethat the two new RCAOs are open forbusiness at the soonest time possible. Suchplan and schedule shall include amongothers the following:

a) Measures to bring downdecentralization of certain operationalfunctions to executive judges, such asprocurement and the correspondingredesign of the decentralization offunctions, authority and workflows.

b) Proposed administrative structure,internal functional configuration andstaffing pattern of RCAO consideringthe scope and level of functions andauthority assigned to it.

c) Personnel recruitment and deploymentplan which will ensure that the lowercourts would not be disadvantagedwith loss of personnel to the RCAOoffices.

d) Proposed budget for the RCAOs for theappropriate period to cover the cost ofpre-operation and preparation.

e) An implementation schedule thatpresents preparatory activities, decisiontimelines and operationalizationactivities.

3. Creation of the Pilot Oversight Unit.Consistent with the Court-approveddecentralization framework, an oversight

RESOLUTION on A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC (continued)


unit in the Supreme Court is necessary tosupervise regional operations and exerciseauthority of central level functions withinthe decentralized framework. Therefore, thepilot Oversight Unit is hereby establishedwith the Court Administrator as head andthe chiefs of the OCA-FinancialManagement Office (OCA-FMO), OCA-Office of Administrative Services (OCA-OAS), the Supreme Court’s FiscalManagement and Budget Office (SC-FMBO)and Office of Administrative Services (SC-OAS) as members. The CourtAdministrator is hereby directed to submitto the undersigned a list of all members andstaff that will comprise the oversight unit.

4. Expense Allowance and Honoraria. Allpersonnel who may be detailed to the pilotRCAO shall be entitled to a monthlyexpense allowance not exceeding 20 percentof their current basic monthly salaries. Allpersonnel who may be detailed to the pilotOversight Unit shall be entitled toexpense allowance not exceeding 20 percentof their current basic monthly salaries. Allallowances and honoraria authorizedunder this Order shall be charged to theJRP-GOP (ADB) counterpart or such otherfunds as may be available for the purpose.

5. Optimization of the Use of ADB TechnicalAssistance. The Court Administrator shallprovide regular guidance to and optimizethe use of the Technical Assistance (TA)provided by the Asian Development Bank(ADB) and engage in more intensiveworking relationship among his office, theabovenamed OCA and SC chiefs of officesand the ADB-TA team to ensure that suchassistance will be congruent with andmeaningfully support the vision andobjectives of the decentralization program.

This Order shall take effect upon its approval.

October 8, 2009.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO Acting Chief Justice

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 169-2009

TO: ALL PRESIDING JUSTICES AND CLERKS OFCOURT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,SANDIGANBAYAN, AND COURT OF TAXAPPEALS AND ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS COURTOF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI’ADISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIALCOURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPALCIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS AND SHARI’A CIRCUITCOURTS

SUBJECT: ATTACHMENTS AND AMENDMENTS ONSECTIONS 2, 3, 4 AND 8 OF ADMINISTRATIVEORDER NO. 170-2008

The National Archives of the Philippines (NAP)has invited the attention of this Honorable Courton the usage and issuance of the revised NAPForms, wherein it specifically informed the Courtthat ONLY the revised NAP Form No. 3, insteadof the previous NAP Forms Nos. 3-5, will beattached to every request of the lower court underthe present OCA Form No. 1 of our newguidelines on the disposal and/or destruction ofcourt records, papers and exhibits. The basicrequirements are crucial before NAP shall finallyprocess the request for the disposal and/ordestruction of court records, papers and exhibitsof the lower court and issue the correspondingauthority for its approval in compliance withSection 18 of Article III and Article 46 of Rule 30 ofthe Republic Act No. 9470 and its ImplementingRules and Regulations, respectively. Thus,Administrative Order No. 170-2008 datedNovember 11, 2008 should be amended by replacingthe OCA Form No. 1 and NAP Forms No. 3-5 withthe revised OCA Form No. 1 and NAP Form No. 3only, as well as the required amendments onSections 2, 3, 4 and 8 of said Administrative OrderNo. 170-2008, which are now stated as follows:

SEC. 2. After the last day of the retentionperiod, a request for the disposal and/or destruction of court records,papers, and exhibits shall be filedwith the Office of the, CourtAdministrator (OCA), using theprescribed form (OCA Form No. 1).The request shall be acted upon by theCourt Administrator within 30 daysfrom receipt hereof;

SEC. 3. The Court Administrator should seekan authority from the ExecutiveDirector, National Archives of thePhilippines (NAP) using the

A.O. No. 135- 2009 (continued)


prescribed NAP Form No. 3 togetherwith the preceding completed OCAForm No. 1 in accordance with Section18 of Article III and Article 46 of Rule30 of the Republic Act No. 9470 andits Implementing Rules andRegulations, respectively;

SEC. 4. The Court Administrator shallinform the requesting lower courtabout the approved authority and itsattachments obtained from NAP 10days from notice;

x x x x

SEC. 8. The sale or burning shall be conductedin the presence of the Presiding Justice/Executive Judge/Presiding Judge, theClerk of Court and the Representativesfrom the National Archives of thePhilippines (NAP) and Commission onAudit (COA). Thereafter the concernedrepresentatives must be furnishedwith the approved Certificate ofDisposal of Records (NAP Form No 6)and its accompanying Request forAuthority to Dispose of Records (NAPForm No. 3), NAP Authority for theDisposal of Records (NAP Form No. 5)and Records Management AnalysisReport (NAP Form No. 4);

x x x x

Conformably to the foregoing, all concerned arehereby DIRECTED to ADOPT the new OCA FormNo. 1 and NAP Form No. 3, appended herein asAnnexes “A” and “B” respectively, and USE thesame as ATTACHMENTS, for every request filedto this Court through the Office of the CourtAdministrator on the disposal and/or destructionof court records, papers and exhibits startingJanuary 2010.

This Administrative Order, therefore, amendsor otherwise supersedes Administrative No. 170-2008 dated November 11, 2008 ONLY insofar as tothe latter’s OCA Form No. 1 and NAP Form Nos.3-5 and Sections 2, 3, 4 and 8 thereof as mentionedabove.

Strict compliance herewith is hereby enjoined.

December 8, 2009.

(Sgd.) REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice


(a) NOTE and GRANT the letter requestof the Commission on Audit forexemption from payment of fees forcopies of transcript of stenographic;(underscoring ours) and

(b) AUTHORIZE the Office of the CourtAdministrator to issue a circularreminding all courts of the exemptionprovided under Section 22, Rule 141,Revised Rules of Court, as amended, andclarifying that exemption from paymentof stenographer’s fee under Section 11of the same rule should be granted bycourts without the need for each andevery agencies and instrumentalities ofthe national government to request thisCourt for authority to avail of suchexemption.

NOW, THEREFORE, all Judges and Clerks ofCourt are reminded that the exemption frompayment of legal fees of those mentioned in theabove quoted Section 22 of Rule 141 as amended,specifically stenographers fees should be recognizedand granted by courts without the need for eachand every agency and instrumentality of thenational government to request the Supreme Courtfor authority to avail of such exemption.

September 24, 2009

(Sgd.) JOSE P. PEREZ Court Administrator

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 135-2009

TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT/ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS OF THE FIRST ANDSECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION ON THEEXEMPTION OF COOPERATIVES FROMPAYMENT OF COURT AND SHERIFF’S FEESPAYABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN ACTIONSBROUGHT UNDER RA No. 6938

Quoted hereunder are portions of theResolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR


TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OFTHE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OFTRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES(TSN) OF ALL AGENCIES ANDINSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE NATIONALGOVERNMENT

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Rule 141 of theRevised Rules of Court requires payment ofstenographer’s fees as follows:

SEC. 11. Stenographers. – Stenographers shallgive certified transcript of notes taken by themto every person requesting the same uponpayment to the Clerk of Court of (a) TENPESOS (P10) for each page of not less 250words before the appeal is taken and (b) FIVEPESOS (P5) for the same page after the filing ofthe appeal, provided, however that one-thirdof the total charges shall accrue to theJudiciary Development Fund (JDF) and theremaining two-thirds to the stenographers

concerned.

WHEREAS, Section 22 of Rule 141, as amended,clearly exempts the Commission on Audit (COA)from payment of legal fees, to wit:

SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic ofthe Philippines, its agencies andinstrumentalities are exempt from paying thelegal fees provided in the rule. Localgovernments and government-owned orcontrolled corporations with or withoutindependent charters are exempt from payingsuch fees.

However, all court actions, criminal orcivil, instituted at the instance of theProvincial, City or Municipal Treasurer orAssessor under Section 280 of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 shall be exemptfrom payment of Court and Sheriff’s fees. (Page

211 of the Manual for Clerks of Court).

WHEREAS, in the resolution of the Court EnBanc dated June 30, 2009 in A.M. No. 08-4-9-SC(Re: Request for Transcript of Stenographic Notes[TSN] Free of Charge from Drug Courts). – theCourt Resolved, upon the recommendation of theOffice of the Court Administrator, to:


estimated travel expenses for service ofsummons and court processes. Onceapproved, the Clerk of Court shall release themoney to said sheriff or process server. Afterservice, a statement of liquidation shall besubmitted to the court for approval. Afterrendition of judgment by the court, any excessfrom the deposit shall be returned to the partywho made the deposit. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

In this case, Article 62, paragraph 6 of RA No.6938; Section 6, Article 61 of RA No. 9520; andOCA Circular 44-2007 explicitly state thatcooperatives shall only be exempted frompayment of all court sheriff’s fees payable tothe Philippine Government for and inconnection with all actions brought under theCooperative Code, or where such action isbrought by the Cooperative DevelopmentAuthority before the court, to enforce thepayment of obligations contracted in favor ofthe cooperative. The amount required todefray the sheriff ’s expenses is clearly notcovered by the exemption; they are notconsidered as court and sheriffs fees and norare they amounts payable to the PhilippineGovernment. Accordingly REMPCO is notexempted from the deposit/payment of sheriffsexpenses assessed by small claims court in

collection actions filed before these courts.

For strict compliance of all concerned is thedispositive portion of the resolution of the SupremeCourt En Banc dated September 1, 2009 in the A.M.No. 03-4-01-0 which states that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we rulethat the REMPCO Multi-Purpose Cooperativeis NOT EXEMPT from the deposit/paymentof sheriff’s expenses under Section 10, Rule 141of the Rules of Court in collection actions filed

with the Small Claims Court of Makati City.

October 1, 2009


September 1, 2009 in A.M. No. 03-4-01-0 (Re:Exemption of Cooperatives from Payment of Courtsand Sheriff’s fees payable to the government inactions brought under RA No. 6938), to wit:

x x x x

Our reading of the express wordings of Article62, paragraph 6 of RA No. 6938 and Article 61of RA No. 9520 proceeds from the statutoryconstruction rule that words used in statutesare to be given their usual and commonlyunderstood meanings unless differentmeanings are plainly intended. In the provisionunder consideration, the term “all court fees”refers to the totality of “legal fees” imposedunder Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as anincident of instituting an action in court. Thesefees include filing or docket fees, appeal fees,fees for issuance of provisional remedies,mediation fees, sheriff ’s fees, stenographer ’sfees and commissioner’s fees. These legal feesare payable to the Philippine Government, not tosheriffs or process servers for their travelexpenses. As correctly pointed out by the Officeof the Court Administrator (OCA), the OneThousand Pesos (P1,000) service fee beingassessed against the petitioners is not in thenature of court and sheriff ’s fees within thecontemplation of the exemption granted tocooperatives under the law and OCA CircularNo. 44-2007.

Section 10, Rule 141 of the 1997 Revised Rulesof Procedure (Rules) distinguishes between theterms sheriff’s fees (as enumerated in items (a) to 1and sheriff’s expenses (as found in the secondparagraph of Section 10). Section 10, Rule 141 of

the Rule relating to sheriffs expenses provides:

SEC. 10 Sheriffs, PROCESS SERVERS andother persons serving processes.

x x x x

In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, theamount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS(P1,000) shall be deposited with the Clerk ofCourt upon filing of the complaint to defraythe actual travel expenses of the sheriff,process server or other court-authorizedpersons in the service of summons, subpoenaand other court processes that would be issuedrelative to the trial of the case. In case theinitial deposit of ONE THOUSAND PESOS(P1,000) is not sufficient, then the plaintiff orpetitioner shall be required to make anadditional deposit. The sheriff, process serveror other court authorized person shall submitto the court for its approval a statement of



TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS,SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI’A DISTRICTCOURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPALTRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIALCOURTS AND SHARI’A CIRCUIT COURTS

SUBJECT: EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENTOF LEGAL FEES OF THE CLIENTS OF THENATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID (NCLA)AND OF THE LEGAL AID OFFICES IN THE LOCALCHAPTERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES (IBP)

For the information and guidance of allconcerned, the Supreme Court En Banc, in aResolution dated August 28, 2009, in A.M. No.08-11-7-SC (Re: Request of National Committeeon Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients FromPaying Filing, Docket and Other Fees),APPROVED the Rule on the Exemption from thePayment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the NationalCommittee on Legal Aid and of the Legal Aid Officesin the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines [A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR)], thepertinent provisions thereof are quoted asfollows:

ARTICLE IPURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose. – The Rule is issued forthe purpose of enforcing the right of free accessto courts by the poor guaranteed underSection 11, Article III of the Constitution. It isintended to increase the access to justice bythe poor by exempting from the payment oflegal fees incidental to instituting an action incourt, as an original proceeding or on appeal,qualified indigent clients of the NCLA and ofthe legal aid offices in local IBP chaptersnationwide.

ARTICLE IIDEFINITION OF TERMS

SECTION 1. Definition of Important Terms. – Forpurposes of this Rule and as used/ therein, thefollowing terms shall be understood to be howthey are defined under this Section:

x x x x

(d) “Legal fees” refers to the legal feesimposed under Rule 141 of theRules of Court as a necessary

incident of instituting an actionin court either as an originalproceeding or on appeal. Inparticular, it includes filing ordocket fees, appeal fees, fees forissuance of provisional remedies,mediation fees, sheriff ’s fees,stenographer’s fees (that is fees fortranscript of stenographic notes)and commissioner’s fees;

x x x x

ARTICLE IIICOVERAGE

SECTION 1. Persons Qualified for Exemptionfrom Payment of Legal Fees. – Persons whoshall enjoy the benefit of exemption from thepayment of legal fees incidental to institutingan action in court as an original proceedingor on appeal, granted under this Rule shall belimited only to clients of the NCLA and thechapter legal aid offices.

The said clients shall refer to thoseindigents qualified to receive free legal aidservice from the NCLA and the chapter legalaid offices. Their qualifications shall bedetermined based on the tests provided inthis Rule.

SEC. 2. Persons Not Covered by the Rule. – Thefollowing shall be disqualified from thecoverage of this Rule. Nor may they beaccepted as clients by the NCLA and thechapter legal aid offices.

(a) Juridical persons; except in casescovered by developmental legal aid orpublic interest causes involvingjuridical entities which are non-stock, non-profit organizations,non-governmental organizationsand people’s organization whoseindividual members will pass themeans test provided in this Rule;

(b) Persons who do not pass themeans and merit tests;

(c) Parties already represented by acounsel de parte;

(d) Owners or lessors of residentiallands or buildings with respect tothe filing of collection or unlawfuldetainer suits against theirtenants; and


(e) Persons who have been clients ofthe NCLA or chapter legal aid officepreviously in a case where theNCLA or chapter legal aid officewithdrew its representationbecause of a falsity in theapplication or in any of theaffidavits supporting the saidapplication.

x x x x

ARTICLE IVTESTS OF INDIGENCY

SECTION 1. Tests for Determining Who may beClients of the NCLA and the Legal Aid Officesin Local IBP Chapters. – The NCLA or thechapter legal aid committee, as the case maybe, shall pass upon requests for legal aid bythe combined application of the means andmerit tests and the consideration of otherrelevant factors provided for in the followingsections.

SEC. 2. Means Test; Exception.

(a) This test shall be based on the followingcriteria: (i) the applicant and that of hisimmediate family must have a grossmonthly income that does not exceed anamount double the monthly minimumwage of an employee in the place wherethe applicant resides and (ii) the does notown real property with a fair marketvalue as stated in the current taxdeclaration of more than Three HundredThousand Pesos (P300,000).

In this connection, the applicant shallexecute an affidavit of indigency (printedat the back of the application form) statingthat he and his immediate family do notearn a gross income abovementioned norown any real property with the fair valueaforementioned, supported by an affidavitof a disinterested person attesting to thetruth of the applicant’s affidavit. The latestincome tax return and/or current taxdeclaration, if any, shall be attached to theapplicant’s affidavit.

(b) The means test shall not be applicable toapplicants who fall under thedevelopmental legal aid program such asoverseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers,laborers, indigenous culturalcommunities, women, children and otherdisadvantaged groups.

SEC. 3. Merit Test. – A case shall be consideredmeritorious if an assessment of the law andevidence at hand discloses that the legalservice will be in aid of justice or in thefurtherance thereof, taking into considerationthe interests of the party and those of society.A case fails this test if, after consideration ofthe law and evidence presented by theapplicant, it appears that it is intended merelyto harass or injure the opposite party or towork oppression or wrong.

x x x x

ARTICLE VIIIEFFECTIVITY

SECTION 1. Effectivity. – The Rule shall becomeeffective after 15 days following itspublication in a newspaper of general

circulation.

The Rule was published in the September 12,2009 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

October 7, 2009.


PHILJA BULLETIN

JUSTICE ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy

PROFESSOR SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA

Editor in Chief

ARMIDA M. SALAZAR

Assistant Editor

ATTY. ORLANDO B. CARIÑO

JOCELYN D. BONDOC

JENIFFER P. SISON

CHRISTINE A. FERRER

Editorial Staff

SARAH JANE S. SALAZAR

Production and Circulation

EDMUNDO M. MOREDO

LETICIA G. JAVIER

Printing Services


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volume xi, issue no. 44 october-december 2009

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