volume 35, number 4 2011 vol 35 no … · fortitudine,vol. 35, no.4, 2011 3 from the director dr....

FORTITUDINEVOLUME 35, NUMBER 4 2011

BULLETIN OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAM

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution isunlimited.

PCN 10401220100

HISTORYDIVISIONPRESIDENT

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITYBGen Thomas M. Murray

DIRECTORDr. Charles P. Neimeyer

DEPUTY DIRECTORPaul J. Weber

CHIEF HISTORIAN Charles D. Melson

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANTCynthia M. Meyer

HISTORIES BRANCHCharles D. Melson (Branch Head); Dr.Fred H. Allison; Dr. Thomas M.Baughn; Maj David W. Kummer; Dr.Nicholas J. Schlosser; Charles R. Smith;A. Rob Taglianetti; Paul W.Westermeyer

HISTORICAL REFERENCE BRANCHRobert V. Aquilina (Branch Head);Annette D. Amerman; Beth L. Crumley;Kara R. Newcomer; Shelia Phillips;

FIELD HISTORY BRANCHCol Stephen E. Motsco; LtCol David A.Benhoff; LtCol Gregory S. McCarthy;Maj Robert F. Williams; CWO-4Timothy S. McWilliams; GySgtBradford A. Wineman

EDITING AND DESIGN BRANCHKenneth H. Williams (Branch Head);James M. Caiella; Andrea L. Connell;Dr. Stephen E. Evans; W. Stephen Hill;Robert A. Kocher; Gregory A.Macheak; Vincent J. Martinez; Wanda J.Renfrow; Jeanette L. Riffe; Shawn H.Vreeland

Marine Corps History Division3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, Virginia 22134Telephone (703) 432-4877http://[email protected]

Motto of the United States Marine Corps in the 1812 era

Historical Bulletin Vol. 35, No. 4 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

About the Cover: The cover depicts the battle inLake Erie between the British naval force underCommander Robert H. Barclay and the UnitedStates naval force under the command of MasterCommandant Oliver Hazard Perry. Sketch byThomas Birch. Courtesy of Library of Congress.

From the Director: A New Year Upon UsDr. Charles P. Neimeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Core of the Corps: James Bird and the Battle of Lake ErieCharles R. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Joe Foss’ First Days with the Cactus Air Force2dLt Kyle J. Bare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

National Museum of the Marine Corps: Battle of the PotomacJohn H. Haynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Marine Navy Cross Recipients in Operation Desert StormBorislav V. Chernev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

First to Write: Destination Wolmi-do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Book Review: The Final Years of the Vietnam War

Charles D. Melson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21Book Review: Iraq and Counterinsurgency

Nicholas J. Schlosser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

This bulletin of the Marine Corps historical program is published for Marines, at the rate of onecopy for every nine on active duty, to provide education and training in the uses of military andMarine Corps history. Other interested readers may purchase single copies or four-issue sub-scriptions from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. The appro-priate order form appears in this issue.

“We can only know who we are by being certain ofwho we have been.” Gen Leonard F. Chapman Jr.

24th Commandant of the Marine Corps

2 Fortitudine, Vol. 35, No.4, 2011

FORTITUDINEVOLUME 35, NUMBER 4 2010

BULLETIN OF THE MARINE C ORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAM

Fortitudine, Vol. 35, No.4, 2011 3

From the Director

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

A New Year Upon Us

It is another new year and theHistory Division continues to makegreat strides in the publication of his-torical material related to the opera-tional performance of Marines in bothcombat and peacetime environments.This year bodes well for the publish-ing of publications and for our futurelocation at Quantico, Virginia. First, the year 2011 signifies the

beginning of the centennial anniver-sary of naval aviation. Festivities andscheduled events commemorating thissignificant landmark will begin withthe Navy kicking things off in May atthe home of naval aviation inPensacola, Florida. After about sixmonths of celebrating Navy aviation, itwill be time to remember the uniquecontributions of Marine Corps aviatorsto the history of naval aviation. Thecelebration of the naval aviation cen-tennial is scheduled to conclude byMay 2012. Prior to January 2012, the Division

plans to produce a number of publi-cations that will be distributedthroughout the Marine Corps and thepublic. First, the History Division willpublish an Illustrated History ofMarine Corps Aviation, 1912–2012.Through the extensive use of many“never seen before” photographs andother pertinent illustrations, Ms.Roxanne Ibinson of the KratosCorporation has produced a book thatwill impact the naval aviation commu-nity. The book will be accompaniedby a compact disc that contains theoral history of key Marine Corps avia-tors gleaned from the HistoryDivision’s extensive oral history col-lection. The compact disc alsoincludes a battle study on the use ofMarine Corps aviation in Nicaragua,1927–1933. Nicaragua has long beenconsidered a watershed event for thedevelopment of what we know todayas the Marine Air Ground Task Force

concept, and I anticipate this particu-lar study will be highly sought after. However, an illustrated history is

not, by definition, one that is designedto be a fully developed, scholarly his-tory. For that mission, I assigned twoof History Division’s most qualifiedaviation historians, Dr. Fred Allisonand Dr. Thomas Baughn. Drs. Allisonand Baughn have woven together avery thorough, scholarly history of thedevelopment of Marine Corps aviationfrom its inception in 1912 up to thepresent day. Starting with the father ofMarine Corps aviation, Major Alfred A.Cunningham and continuing up to thepresent day Commandant of theMarine Corps, General James F. Amos,Drs. Allison and Baughn have writtenan engaging, institutional history ofthe aircraft developed, and of the menand women who flew the aircraft. Theaviation history shows how technolo-gy, innovation, and even key person-alities were able to take aviation froman “interesting experiment” to one thatbecame an integral part of the MarineCorps—so fundamental that it is hardto imagine a Marine Corps without itsaviation component today.

While the publishing of publica-tions continues to be an impor-

tant task of the Division, an equallyimportant component is where thatpublishing takes place. During 2011,the Marine Corps University hopes tobegin breaking ground on the longanticipated project, known as theBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmonshistory wing. This wing will be addedonto the Gray Research Center here atQuantico, Virginia, and HistoryDivision will be collocated with theArchives and Special CollectionsBranch. As plans now stand, theHistory Division will be located on thethird floor of the new wing and theArchives and Special Collections

Branch and other elements of theUniversity will be located on the firstand second floors. Once built,researchers will have a one-stop loca-tion for all their research needs,regarding any aspect of Marine Corpshistory. We also hope to use the col-location as an opportunity to achievesome economies of scale regardingour research collections.

In conclusion, we look forward toanother bright and productive yearin Marine Corps history. We plan topublish several extensive monographsthat focus upon Operation IraqiFreedom; Operation Enduring Free-dom; a battle study of the first year ofMarine Corps engagement in Afghan-istan; a definitive history of MarineCorps activities during OperationDesert Shield/Desert Storm; a historyof the Marines in the frigate navy; andeven a short monograph on the histo-ry of the Mountain Warfare TrainingCenter, authored by retired LieutenantGeneral O.K. Steele. This year we willalso begin our commemorative histor-ical series on the Vietnam War, startingwith Colonel George Hofmann’s (Ret)excellent study about Marine CorpsOperations in Southeast Asia,1961–1965. These Vietnam War com-memorative books will be similar innature as were the books that theHistory Division published for the50th anniversaries of World War II andthe Korea War. We plan, after ColonelHofmann’s book, to publish morebooks about the Vietnam War; ulti-mately, the History Division plans onpublishing a complete set of Vietnamcommemorative books, dedicated tothose Marines who fought in one ofAmerica’s longest and most divisiveconflicts. Again, it is an exciting timeto be part of all these important initia-tives.

q1775q


Core of the Corps

James Bird and the Battle of Lake Erieby Charles R. Smith

Historian

across the Susquehanna River fromWilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. FollowingGeneral William Hull’s abortive attackinto Canada and his subsequent sur-render of Fort Detroit during the sum-mer of 1812, large numbers of rein-forcements were wanted to defendAmerica’s northwestern frontier.Among the troops that “unanimouslyresolved to tender their services to theGovernor of Pennsylvania, as part ofthe quota of the Pennsylvania militia,”were the Kingston Volunteers, a com-pany of artillery under the commandof Captain Samuel Thomas. Numberedwith the volunteers was James Bird.With the American Army under

Major General William Henry Harrisoncontemplating an invasion of Canadain 1813, naval control of Lake Erie was

essential to Harrison’s ability to secure-ly move troops and supplies north. Atthe outbreak of the War of 1812, GreatBritain maintained one 17-gun shipand several small gunboats on thelake, while the United States had onlyone armed brig which subsequentlywas captured when Detroit fell. Toachieve the all-important naval advan-tage, America had to start from scratch.Initial oversight of the construction ofthe Lake Erie fleet fell to Captain IsaacChauncey, based at Sackett’s Harbor,New York, and Presque Isle Bay atErie, Pennsylvania, was selected as thesite where the new fleet would bebuilt. By early January 1813 construc-tion of several brigs, schooners, andgunboats was well underway, andCaptain Chauncey felt it was time to

On 11 November 1814, MarinesJames Bird and James Rankin,

and Seaman Henry Davidson, mettheir deaths on board the brig Niagaralying at anchor outside the harbor atErie, Pennsylvania. They did not die inbattle. They were executed—the twoMarines shot and the seaman hanged.This is the story of James Bird, the

victim who received the most sympa-thy—for within a short time of hisdeath a ballad was written about himthat is sung or recited at folk gather-ings throughout the country to the pre-sent day. Born in Morris County, New Jersey,

about 1785, Bird was the eldest of 10children of John and Rebecca Bird,who later resided in Exeter (nowknown as Kingston or Forty Forts)

Viewed from behind the disabled and abandoned American brig Lawrence on which James Bird served, the entire battlefor Lake Erie is portrayed by English-born American painter Thomas Birch. Not one to commemorate the role of individ-ual naval officers, Birch depicts the American victory from afar rather than concentrating on the triumphant brig Niagaraled by Oliver Hazard Perry.

Courtesy of Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, Philadelphia. Gift of Mrs. C.H.A. Esling


appoint an experienced officer tosupervise the completion of the vesselsand to command the Erie fleet. Hischoice was 27-year-old MasterCommandant Oliver Hazard Perry.

Perry would not only be responsiblefor the numerous details in com-

pleting the fleet’s construction, butalso for the infant fleet’s protection.Although several of the gunboats hadbeen launched which provided somesecurity, no more than 100 men couldbe called upon to guard the fleet andman the defenses at Presque Isle,which was vulnerable to both a navaland land attack. Perry needed infantryand Captain Chauncey asked the WarOffice for a regiment of PennsylvaniaMilitia.Pennsylvania Governor Simon

Snyder, as a result of a requisition fromthe Secretary of War, issued a generalorder in late March 1813 calling for a1,000-man militia detachment for the“protection of our naval armament atthe town of Erie.” Among the unitsdrafted was Captain Thomas’ KingstonVolunteer artillery company, whichwas incorporated into Colonel ReesHill’s 147th Regiment of the Pennsyl-vania Militia and ordered to ren-dezvous at Erie on or before 20 April.Although the raw militiamen couldhardly be considered an effective fight-ing force, by early May their presencealone would discourage any Britishforce from launching an assault. Whennot manning the defenses the militia-men were employed in building sever-al of the smaller gunboats.A detachment of Marines arrived in

mid-May to reinforce the militiamen.Under Lieutenant John Brooks, theseven-man party left Washington inApril, and after recruiting stops atHagerstown, Maryland, where JamesRankin enlisted, and Pittsburgh andWaterford, Pennsylvania, arrived atErie with a total of 14 Marines.Canvassing the Pennsylvania Militiaunits at Erie over the next two months,Brooks managed to enlist 20 moremen for his detachment. Among themwere William McGinnis and James Birdfrom Thomas’ artillery company.It was reported that prior to his

enlistment in Brooks’ detachment, Birdhad charge of one of the fleet’s store-

houses near the mouth of CascadeCreek, where Perry was building thelarger vessels of the fleet. Some of themen, with Bird’s knowledge, it wasalleged, pilfered some of the stores,and when confronted he and his menresisted arrest and had to be subduedby force. Bird was told that his offens-es would be overlooked if he joinedthe Marines. On 8 June, the 26-year-old, five-foot, eleven-inch, sandy-haired, former weaver and his compa-triot William McGinnis, after passinginspection by the fleet’s surgeon,receiving a bounty, and being read thenaval regulations against mutiny anddesertion, were enlisted for five yearsin the Marine Corps. Bird subsequent-ly would join Lieutenant Brooks onboard the 20-gun brig Lawrence. Ofthe six artillerymen of Thomas’ com-pany who enlisted for service with thefleet, only Bird and McGinnis signedup for five years, the remainderincurred a three- or four-month oblig-ation. By mid-July, Perry’s Erie fleet was

almost complete, although not yet fullymanned. The British squadron, whichhad maintained a blockade of PresqueIsle and at times skirmished with thedefending batteries, withdrew in lateJuly because of a shortage of suppliesand bad weather. Perry immediatelybegan to move his 11-vessel fleetacross the sandbar at the mouth ofPresque Isle Bay, where he awaitedadditional sailors and Marines. Duringthe move Private McGinnis was takenill, “occasioned by cold and exposure,”and taken to the hospital at Erie wherehe remained for several months untilbeing discharged. When the Britishsquadron returned in early August,Perry’s gunboats and smaller schoon-ers were arrayed in such a confidentline that the out-gunned British with-drew to await the completion of their19-gun ship Detroit.After receiving 130 extra sailors, 50

of whom had been drafted from theConstitution, then undergoing a refit inBoston, Perry proceeded to Sandusky,Ohio, where he received further con-tingents of volunteers from MajorGeneral William Henry Harrison’sArmy of the Northwest. Perry thenappeared off the naval yard atAmherstburg, Ontario, in an attempt to

coax the British out, finally establish-ing an anchorage at Put-in-Bay, Ohio.From this position, he was able to pre-vent supplies from reachingAmherstburg, effectively blockadingthe British squadron for the next fiveweeks. Running out of supplies inearly September, the British comman-der, Robert H. Barclay, had no choicebut to put out again and seek battlewith Perry.Sailing from his base, Barclay flew

his flag from the recently completedDetroit and was joined by the QueenCharlotte (13 guns), Lady Prevost (13),Hunter (10), Little Belt (3), andChippawa (1). Perry countered withthe Lawrence (20), Niagara (20), Ariel(4), Caledonia (3), Scorpion (2),Somers (2), Porcupine (1), Tigress (1),and Trippe (1). Commanding fromLawrence, Perry’s ships sailed under ablue battle flag emblazoned withCaptain James Lawrence’s immortalcommand, “Don’t Give Up the Ship.”On the morning of 10 September, theAmericans saw Barclay’s vessels head-ing for them and got underway fromtheir anchorage at Put-in-Bay. Perryplaced Ariel and Scorpion at the headof his battle line, followed by theLawrence, Caledonia, and Niagara.The remaining gunboats trailed to therear.

Both squadrons were in line of bat-tle with their heaviest vessels near

the center of the line. Perry hoped toget his two brigs, the Lawrence andNiagara, into carronade range quickly,but in light winds his ships made littleheadway, and the Lawrence was bat-tered by the Detroit’s assortment oflong guns for at least 30 minutesbefore being able to reply effectively.As his guns began pummeling theBritish ships, he was surprised to seethe Niagara slowing rather than mov-ing to engage the Queen Charlotte.The delay in bringing the Niagara intobattle allowed the British to focus theirfire on the Lawrence. Although Perry’sgun crews inflicted heavy damage onthe British, the Lawrence’s gun crewswere soon overwhelmed, and theLawrence was reduced by the twoBritish ships to a wreck. More thanthree quarters of the Lawrence’s crewwere killed or wounded, among them


Michigan, which had fallen to theBritish in 1812, was short of provisionsand ill-defended. Elliott was ordered tofit out the squadron and retake thegarrison. At about the same time, theNavy Department decided to make aseparate command of the upper lakes;Captain Elliott therefore was relievedand ordered to report to Sackett’sHarbor, and Captain Arthur Sinclairwas appointed in his place.

James Bird had spent the winter atErie, Pennsylvania, recuperatingfrom his wounds and in the spring asthe squadron prepared for theMackinac expedition, Bird again wascharged with securing the squadron’sstorehouse. On 4 June, “his waywardnature reasserted itself,” as one authorput it, and with fellow Marine JamesRankin, who had been granted a fewhours shore leave, Bird deserted.Reasons offered for his desertion havebeen many: some have suggested thatdue to his admiration for Perry hewished to join his former commander;others proposed that he was attempt-ing to make his way south to joinAndrew Jackson’s forces in repellingthe British below New Orleans. Whilethe latter lacks credibility since theBritish plan to capture New Orleanswas unknown in early June, there maybe some merit to former. Both Bird and Rankin were appre-

hended and arrested six days laternear Butler, Pennsylvania, by Sailing-Master William Caldwell, who was onhis way to Erie with a draft of seamenfor the fleet. On 22 June, the eve of thefleet’s departure for Mackinac, CaptainSinclair reported the capture of Birdand Rankin and requested theSecretary of the Navy grant a courtmartial for their trial on the charge ofdesertion, recommended by their com-manding officer, Marine LieutenantBenjamin Hyde, who had replacedLieutenant Brooks. The court martialwas held on board the Lawrence, offof Buffalo, New York, on 12September 1814. On the charge ofdesertion, both Bird and Rankin, mak-ing no defense, pleaded guilty andthrew themselves “upon the mercy ofthe Court.” After the court was clearedand the complete proceedings read bythe judge advocate, the following sen-

Lieutenant John Brooks, killed, andMarine James Bird, severely wounded.When the last gun on the Lawrencebecame unusable, Perry decided totransfer his flag. He was rowedthrough heavy gunfire to the Niagarawhile the Lawrence was surrendered.“When her flag was struck,” wrote anobserver, “she had but nine men fit forduty remaining on deck. Her sideswere completely riddled by the shotfrom the long guns of the British ships.Her deck, the morning after the con-flict, when I first went on board,exhibited a scene that defies descrip-tion—for it was literally covered withblood which still adhered to the plankin clots—brains, hair and fragments ofbones were still sticking to the riggingand sides . . . Enough! horror appalledmy senses.”

During the brief lull in firing fol-lowing the surrender, the Detroit

and Queen Charlotte, being almostunmanageable due to damaged riggingand severe losses among the crews,collided and became entangled.Helped by a strengthening wind, Perrysteered the Niagara at Barclay’s dam-aged ships instead of leading theAmerican vessels away in retreat. Hisflagship broke through the British lineahead of the Detroit and QueenCharlotte, raking both with devastatingbroadsides while the American gun-boats fired from astern. Although thecrews of the two Britishs ships man-aged to untangle the Detroit andQueen Charlotte, they could no longeroffer any effective resistance. Bothships surrendered in mid-afternoon.When the smoke of battle had cleared,Perry had captured the entire Britishsquadron and secured American con-trol of Lake Erie. Writing to GeneralHarrison, he reported: “We have metthe enemy and they are ours.”Following the victory, Perry ferriedHarrison’s Army of the Northwest toDetroit where it began its advance intoCanada. This campaign culminated inthe October 1813 American victory atthe Battle of the Thames.In November, the greater part of

Captain Thomas’ artillery companyreturned to the Wilkes-Barre area.With Perry’s triumph still fresh in theminds of his countrymen, the compa-

ny’s quartermaster sergeant, JohnCarkhuff, gave an account of conductof a former member of the companyduring the engagement:

James Bird, son of Mr. J. Bird,of Exeter, was on board theLawrence with the gallant Perry,on the glorious tenth ofSeptember. The battle raged—many a poor fellow fell aroundhim—Bird did his duty like ahero. Towards the close of theengagement, a canister shotstruck him on the shoulder as hewas stooping to his gun. He wasinstantly covered with blood,and his officer ordered himbelow. He ventured to disobey,preferring to do duty while hehad life, to abandoning his post.But the blood flowed so fast thatanother order was issued to gobelow. He ran down, got a hastybandage on the wound, cameagain on deck, and although hisleft arm was useless—yet hehanded cartridges and per-formed the utmost service in hispower with his right, until thestars and stripes waved glorious-ly victorious over his foe.

Bird not only became a hometownhero, but also shared in Perry’s adula-tion as accounts of Bird’s conductwere widely circulated throughout theUnited States.Following the second American vic-

tory at the Thames, Perry asked to berelieved and returned to the East Coastwhere he eventually was given com-mand of the frigate Java, then underconstruction at Baltimore, Maryland.Master Commandant Jesse Elliott, hissecond in command on the lakes, wasgiven command of the Lake Eriesquadron. With cold weatherapproaching the fleet was ordered dis-mantled, except for its armament, andmoored at Erie, Put-in-Bay, and BlackRock (Buffalo), New York, in suitabledefensive positions. Here they spent aquiet winter. Spring found the vesselsof the squadron safe except for threegunboats which were destroyed whenthe British took possession and burnedBuffalo in December 1813.

Information was received in Marchthat the garrison at Mackinac,

tences were pronounced: “the prison-er, Corporal James Bird having pleadguilty the court after mature consider-ation, [by unanimous vote] do sen-tence him to suffer Death.” PrivateJames Rankin, likewise, was sentencedto death, although there was one votefor corporal punishment. The proceed-ings were forwarded to Washingtonand returned approved by PresidentJames Madison on 22 October. Relyingon the papers of his father, CaptainDaniel Dobbins, who was in charge ofthe building of the ships at Erie andlater commanded the Ohio, CaptainWilliam W. Dobbins later asserted thatexecutive clemency was recommend-ed but President Madison claimed that“desertion from off post in time of warcould not be overlooked, therefore, anexample must be made.” With the sen-tences approved by the President, theSecretary of the Navy ordered that“Corporal James Bird and PrivateJames Rankin be forthwith shot todeath upon the deck of the U.S. BrigNiagara with all the solemnity due tothe occasion.” Of the 19 known menwho deserted from the Marine detach-ment stationed at Erie, Pennsylvania,between June 1813 and November1814, seven were returned and ofthose seven, only two were punishedby being sentenced to death. While awaiting his execution, Bird

wrote a last letter to his parents, fami-ly and friends in Exeter:

Dear Parents, I take my pen inhand to write a few words to youwhich will bring bad news; butdo not lament, nor make sadmoans for the loss of your firstbeloved and dearest son James.Dear Parents, brothers and sis-

ter, relations and friends, I dowrite to you a most sad and dis-mal letter, such as never beforecame from any [of] your belovedchildren. I have often sat downand wrote a few lines to you withpleasure; but I am sorry at pre-sent to let you know my sad anddeplorable situation. I am themost miserable and desolate childof the family,—Dear Parents, letmy brothers and sisters read thisletter, for it is the last they canever receive from my hand, for bythe laws of our country I am

[According to one authority, the tune towhich the ballad was sung is “The DourBlack Watch,” an old Scottish dirge.]

Sons of freedom, listen to me,And ye daughters, too, give ear;You a sad and mournful storyAs was ever told, shall hear.

Hull, you know, his troops surrendered,And defenseless left the West,

Then our forces quick assembled,The invaders to resist.

Among the troops that marched to war,Were the Kingston volunteers;

Captain Thomas them commanded,To protect our west frontiers.

Tender were the scenes of parting,Mothers wrung their hands and cried;Maidens wept their swains in secret,Fathers strove their tears to hide.

There is one among the number,Tall and graceful is his mien,

Firm his step, his look undaunted,Scarce a nobler youth was seen.

One sweet kiss he snatched from Mary,Craved his mother’s prayer, and more,Pressed his father’s hand, and left them

For Lake Erie’s distant shore.

Mary tried to say “Farewell, James,”Waved her hand, but nothing spoke,

“Good-bye, Bird, may Heaven preserve you,”From the rest at parting broke.

Soon they came where noble PerryHad assembled all his fleet;

Then the gallant Bird enlisted,Hoping soon the foe to meet.

Where is Bird? The battle rages;Is he in the strife or no?

Now the cannon roars tremendous;Dare he meet the hostile foe?

Aye! Behold him! See him, Perry!In the selfsame ship they fight;

Though his messmates fall around himNothing can his soul affright.

But behold! A ball has struck him;See the crimson current flow;

“Leave the deck!” exclaimed brave Perry; “No!” cried Bird, “I will not go.”

“Here on deck I took my station,Here will Bird his cutlass ply;

I’ll stand by you, gallant captain,Till we conquer or we die.”

Still he fought, though faint and bleeding,Till our stars and stripes waved o’er us,Victory having crowned our efforts,

All triumphant o’er our foes.

And did Bird receive a pension?Was he to his friends restored?No; nor never to his bosom

Clasped the main his heart adored.

But there came most dismal tidingsFrom Lake Erie’s distant shore;Better far if Bird had perishedMidst the battle’s awful roar.

“Dearest parents,” said the letter,This will bring sad news to you;Do not mourn your first beloved,Though this brings his last adieu.

“I Must suffer for desertingFrom the brig Niagara;

Read this letter, brother, sisters,“Tis the last you’ll hear from me.”

Sad and gloomy was the morningBird was ordered out to die;

Where’s the breast not dead to pityBut for him would heave a sigh?

Lo! He fought so brave at Erie,Freely bled and nobly dared;

Let his courage plead for mercy,Let his precious life be spared.

See him march and bear his fetters;Hark! They clank upon the ear;But his step his firm and manly,For his heart ne’er harbored fear.

See him kneel upon his coffin,Sure his death can do no good;

Spare him! spare! O God, they shoot him!Oh! His bosom streams with blood.

Farewell, Bird; farewell forever;Friends and home he’ll see no more;But his mangled corpse lies buried

On Lake Erie’s distant shore.


The Ballad of James Bird


doomed and sentenced to death,for deserting from the marines atLake Erie, and am now confinedon board the United States brigNiagara.And O! loving Parents, my time

is but short here on earth. I havebut a few moments to make mypeace with my maker,—I leaveyou only for a short time here onearth, I leave you only for a shorttime here in this most trouble-some world; but I hope that byconstant prayer, we shall meet inthe world above, to part no more.

On the rainy morning of 11November, Marines Bird and Rankin,and seaman Henry Davidson, whosecrimes were multiple desertions,including to the enemy, were broughtupon deck. The two Marines wereplaced in front of one of the gun ports,where they were required to kneelupon their coffins. Marine LieutenantHyde, who had been appointed to exe-cute them, asked to be relieved of theduty, but Captain Sinclair refused. Birdand Rankin were then shot by a file ofMarines from the opposite side of thequarter deck. (So haunted by having toexecute two of his men, LieutenantHyde took his own life early the fol-

lowing year.) Seaman Davidson washung from the yardarm. Their bodieswere then lowered into a small boat,rowed ashore, and buried on the sandybeach of Presque Isle.

Three months after the execution,the attorney of James Bird’s father

drew his son’s share of prize moneythat fell to the victors of the Battle ofLake Erie; Bird and Rankin were enti-tled to $214.89 of the more than$240,000 appropriated. Many people were saddened by

Bird’s execution, mainly because of hisservice on board the Lawrence on 10September 1813, and his perseverancein remaining at his post when severelywounded. Many also thought that whilehe was guilty of the offenses he wascharged with, the severity of his pun-ishment was undeserved. Others wereguilty of equal or graver offensives,they said, yet they received lesser or nopunishment at all. Charles Miner, news-paper editor, publisher, and WyomingValley, Pennsylvania, historian, wasamong the latter. Shortly after theMarine’s death, Miner composed andpublished the Ballad of James Bird inhis Wilkes-Barre newspaper, TheGleaner. The following year, he gave

the reasons behind his composition: “Ido not mean to complain of any officer,or of any man, but I could not helpthinking that the bravery and good con-duct of Bird in the battle, might haveplead for his pardon. [General William]Hull gave up a whole army, yet he waspardoned. [Army Sergeant] Brack mur-dered poor [Robert] Dixon, but Brackwas not sentenced to die. Bird had per-formed more services than either, andhis crime was much less injurious ormalignant, but there was no pardon forhim. It was the fortune of war. Indeedwar is a cruel monster, at least I thoughtso when I reflected on the death of thebrave Bird.”

Editor’s Comment: After talkingwith the author about this story, Idid some research to see if I couldfind the ballad of James Bird beingsung. I eventually tracked downone version, residing at TheLibrary of Congress. Use the fol-lowing link to hear the ballad.<http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/que ry/ r ? ammem/a fcnyeb ib:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28afcnye000005%29%29>

Marine air power on Guadalcanalwas a critical component of the

first American offensive in the Pacific.Based on the code name for the island,the American aviators operating fromGuadalcanal were nicknamed the“Cactus Air Force.” In the fall of 1942,superior Japanese numbers and equip-ment nearly defeated the Cactus AirForce as the number of operationalAmerican planes on the island dwin-dled to near zero. Additional aviatorsand aircraft were rushed toGuadalcanal. They immediately facedoverwhelming odds and a steep learn-ing curve against the Japanese. Joseph J. Foss flew to Guadalcanal

on 9 October 1942 with MarineFighting Squadron 121 as the execu-tive officer. He flew his first combatflight the next day when he led eight

Grumman F4F, Wildcat aircraft on abomber escort mission. His first killcame three days later on 13 October.Focused on an approaching formationof enemy bombers, he did not noticea group of Mitsubishi A6M2, Zero air-craft above and behind him. One ofthe Zeros dove for his plane andscored several hits. Fortunately, theZero overshot him and flew right intohis sights. Foss pulled the trigger andthe Zero tumbled out of the sky. Hehad little time to celebrate as threemore Zeros were shooting at him frombehind. Rounds hit his oil pump andthe engine soon died, forcing Foss todive for Henderson Field. Slowingdown would allow the Zeros to catchhim and finish him off so he came inextremely fast. Foss stated that “theyrolled out an ambulance to pick up

the pieces, but I was lucky enough tostop before I hit the stumps at the endof the runway.” Foss was back in the air on the

14th. His plane had engine trouble,but he could not land because the air-field was under attack so he took hisplane into a cloud to wait it out. As hepopped out of the cloud, a Wildcatflashed past with a Zero on its tail.Foss kicked the rudder pedal andaligned his F4F on the Zero’s tail. Oneshort burst from his .50-calibermachine guns sawed the enemy’swing off, sending it plummeting into amountain. Foss had a close call the next day.

Flying a patrol 25,000 feet overGuadalcanal, he passed out becausehis oxygen mask was too loose. Whenhe woke up, he was less than 1,000

Joe Foss’ First Days with the Cactus Air Forceby 2dLt Kyle J. Bare


feet from hitting the ground and bare-ly managed to pull up in time.

On the 18th, Foss was assigned tolead an eight plane strafing mis-

sion against Japanese supply areaswest of Henderson Field. Foss took offand waited for the others to get air-borne, but the sixth plane crashed ontakeoff, killing the pilot. This delayedthe last two planes from taking off so

Foss circled the field. As the twoplanes finally became airborne, Fossnoticed three Zeros closing in on thetwo planes from behind. He led hiswingmen down on the Zeros anddestroyed one while the rest of hispilots quickly dispatched the othertwo. Before the Marines could formup, more Zeros attacked. Foss hit oneof them but before he could finish itoff he saw another Zero bearing inhead-on. Closing with each otherrapidly, the Zero pulled up first toavoid colliding. Foss fired a shortburst that ripped into the Zero’s belly,and it burst into flames. Then Fossspotted a formation of MitsubishiG4M, Betty twin-engine bombers. Hemaneuvered to get above them andthen dove straight down. Foss had aBetty in his sights when it suddenlyexploded. Another American pilotshot it from below before Foss had itin range. Foss had just enough time toput a short burst into a differentbomber before he passed below theformation. Putting his Wildcat into asteep climb, he brought anotherbomber into his sights. With his planenear vertical and almost stalled, Fossfired into the Betty’s underside and hitthe left engine. The Japanese plane

went into a rapid 45-degree dive andcrashed, bringing Foss’ kill count tofive, making him an ace.

Two days later, on 20 October, Fossand eight other Marine fighters

intercepted 18 Zeros. One Zero closedon Foss head-on, firing a long burstjust below Foss’ plane. As they closedthe distance, the enemy turned hisplane with Foss hard on his tail. Fossfired a long burst into the enemy’swing, and the plane exploded. Fossengaged another Zero, firing .50-cal-iber bullets into the cockpit, killing thepilot. The Zero plunged into the sea,but another Zero had Foss in its sights.Enemy machine gun rounds and can-non fire ripped through Foss’ engine,which sputtered and died. Foss glidedback to Henderson Field and made hissecond deadstick landing in little overa week.For his actions between 13 and 20

October 1942, Admiral William F.Halsey awarded Foss with theDistinguished Flying Cross. Fosswould remain in the Solomon Islandsuntil early 1943, leaving with 26 con-firmed kills. He was awarded theMedal of Honor when he returned tothe United States. q1775q

Major Joseph J. Foss in a Corsair over San Diego.Dept. of Defense Photo

Dept. of Defense Photo

Foss, admiring a Wildcat, visited theGrumman factory in Bethpage, NewYork, in April 1943.


Marine Corps Base Quantico hasalways been considered the

‘cross roads of the Marine Corps,’ buta little known fact is that it has alsoserved as a cross road of Civil War his-tory under its former name ofEvansport, Virginia. While the estab-lishment of the Marine Barracks atQuantico in 1917 had nothing to dowith the prior military use of the loca-tion, the terrain did. Proximity of theshipping channel to the shore andaccess to seagoing transportation ledto the establishment of the MarineBarracks at Quantico, and 56 yearsearlier, this same feature held a similaradvantage for Confederate forces.Although the Confederate guns atEvansport inflicted relatively minordamage to U.S. ships traveling thePotomac, the potential threat to anypassing ship gave the Confederatestactical advantage over this section ofthe lower Potomac and created a suc-cessful blockade of Washington DC forseveral months in the winter of1861–1862.Upon Virginia’s secession from the

Union in April 1861, President Lincoln

ordered a naval blockade of allVirginia ports. This included thePotomac river, which served as a kindof ‘Main Street’ in the region. TheUnion Navy established the PotomacFlotilla to enforce the blockade againstVirginia, and the secessionists sooncountered by erecting batteries justsouth of Evansport at Aquia Creek todefend a railroad depot and a steamerthat had been seized from the U.S.Army. The steamer, CSS George Page,had strategic importance for the warbecause she was capable of quicklymoving hundreds of troops across theriver.Union naval commanders recog-

nized the threat of this combination ofa railhead and steamer, and gathered aforce of gunboats to attack the posi-tions at Aquia Creek. Two days ofthunderous artillery exchange be-tween the Union ships and the batter-ies began on 1 June 1861 and resultedin damages to the Union ships andConfederate batteries but no seriouscasualties. Anticipating a third day offighting, the Virginians prepared newgun positions for an enfilade against

the gunboats, but the flotilla withdrewto the Washington Navy Yard forrepairs.

Encouraged by their success, theConfederates began to consider

more powerful batteries at a locationwhere they would be effective enoughto blockade shipping to and fromWashington DC. Their first choice wasat Mathias Point where the river makesa broad bend, and a battery couldkeep ships under fire for the longestduration. Construction began on earth-works there, but the activity did notescape the notice of CommanderJames Ward, commodore of thePotomac Flotilla. Ward gathered alanding force of sailors from theFlotilla and attacked on 27 June 1861.The sailors were repulsed in a hail ofmusket fire, wounding several andkilling Commander Ward as he stoodat the deck gun of his flagship, the USSThomas Freeborn. Although theyfailed to establish a beachhead, theattack produced the Civil War’s firstrecipient of the Medal of Honor to aU.S. naval officer, Captain of the

National Museum of the Marine Corps

Battle of the Potomacby John H. Haynes

Base Archaeologist, Marine Corps Base Quantico

Shipping Point batteriesHarper’s Weekly 1861


Maintop of the USS Pawnee, JohnWilliams. Unknown to the U.S. com-manders at the time, this attack dis-suaded the Confederates from contin-uing to erect a battery at Mathias Point.

Even before Ward’s raid proved thevulnerability of Mathias Point,

Confederate planners had been look-ing for other locations where moreeffective fields of fire could be real-ized. Soon after, Captain C. H.Kennedy of the Confederate StatesNavy surveyed likely sites for offensivebatteries along the Potomac and set-tled on Evansport. He identifiedShipping Point at the mouth ofQuantico Creek (modern day HospitalPoint) as the best site for effective fireon enemy ships as they traversed thePotomac. He reported to GeneralRobert E. Lee that he would use “. . .9-inch guns to command the channelwith the aid of one rifled 12-pounderclose to the river in the day time.”General Lee had already made plansto send 9-inch guns for a battery onthe Potomac, and the effort to arm

Shipping Point would soon benefitfrom the spoils of war. ConfederateInspector General Samuel Coopermade five cannons captured atManassas available for the Evansportbatteries. Two of these cannons stillreside in Quantico, including the onethat sits near the location of a rear bat-tery on Rising Hill (now known asWaller Hill) and one in storage withthe National Museum of the MarineCorps. Other heavy cannon wereobtained from the vast inventory ofguns seized at Gosport Navy Yard inPortsmouth, new rifled models in pro-duction at the Tredegar Iron Works inRichmond, and an advanced English-made rifled cannon. The latter, a 7.5-inch Blakely gun, remains at theWashington Navy Yard where it wastaken after its capture for testing.By September of 1861 the

Confederates secret construction ofbatteries at Evansport was in fullswing. Shipping Point, jutting like aspear up the Potomac River channelfrom the mouth of Quantico Creek,would be the site of the two largest in

a string of 15 batteries betweenFreestone Point and Mathias Point.The Confederates tried their best toconceal this work and divert attentionto other locations.

The Confederate batteries at AquiaCreek, Potomac Creek, and

Freestone Point engaged Union shipsduring the summer of 1861, but theseskirmishes did little damage to Unionships or the Confederate batteries. Itwas not until 11 October 1861 thatsailors from the gunboats USS Union,USS Rescue, and USS Resolute staged adaring raid up Quantico Creek and setfire to a schooner anchored there.Though this raid had been risky, theUnion unknowingly took a greater riskjust four days later as the USSPocahontas steamed by the area onher way to South Carolina.Not knowing about the newly con-

structed battery at Shipping Point, butacting on the rumor that theConfederates might be at work onsomething there, the USS Pocahontaslobbed shells at Shipping Point on its

Harper’s Weekly 1861

Confederate batteries defending Aquia Creek, where the captured steamer CSS George Page lay at anchor near a railroaddepot, exchanged fire over two days with the USS Pawnee, USS Thomas Freeborn, USS Anacostia, and USS Yankee.


way down the Potomac River. Thedefenders rapidly chopped down treesthat had hidden the earthworks, butthe Confederates were not fast enoughto return fire on the USS Pocahontas,which continued on her way down theriver. However, by the time the USSSeminole, the sister ship of the USSPocahontas, sailed by Shipping Point,the Confederate batteries were readyto fire. The USS Seminole and theConfederate batteries exchangedabout 20 shots each with the slooptaking the most damage; the USSSeminole sustained five hits that toreaway most of her auxiliary sail riggingand splintered sections of her hull.

News of the engagement reachedthe Washington Navy Yard where

two more warships were preparing toembark on the campaign to take PortRoyal, South Carolina. The USSPawnee and USS Mount Vernon,crowded with Marines bound foraction in South Carolina, steamed pastthe batteries at Evansport. Althoughthe USS Mount Vernon was successfulin slipping past, the USS Pawnee wasstruck six times or more, including ahit on her Number 2 gun, whichwould have killed several of her crewhad they been manning it. The deci-sion not to engage the batteries sparedthe USS Pawnee’s passengers and crewof any injury, and the ship continuedon its voyage to South Carolina afterrepairs down river.Throughout the months that the

Confederates maintained their batter-

ies on the Potomac, the CSS GeorgePage conducted many sorties fromAquia Creek alarming the Unionforces. One report warned that shehad 500 troops on board, and Unionforces in Maryland withdrew inlandthrowing up earthworks on the roadsleading to Washington. On 18 October1861, Confederate forces made use ofthis advantage by capturing twoschooners laden with hay, which wasa critical supply for maintaining themany thousands of horses serving theUnion Army in the Washington area.This seizure of hay and the continuedpresence of the Confederate batterieson the Potomac created concernsabout obtaining sufficient supplies for

the Union Army to get through thewinter months. By the end of October,the Potomac Flotilla was effectivelybottled up between Evansport’s batter-ies and even stronger batteriesbelieved to be at Mathias Point.Because the Potomac Flotilla had beenrendered useless by the presence ofthe Confederate shore batteries, it wassuggested to Secretary of the NavyGideon Wells that the guns from theships be put ashore and mounted incounterbatteries opposite Evansport.By the end of November 1861, a coun-terbattery was in place at Budd’s Ferryacross the river from Quantico Creek.

Soon after the building of the Budd’sFerry battery by the Union, offen-sive actions were taken against the bat-teries at Mathias Point. The 47th NewYork infantry regiment was ferriedacross the Potomac from the Marylandside. Upon landing the Union soldiersfound only a small mounted patrol,and some abandoned and uncomplet-ed earthworks instead of the 18-gunbattery reported to Flotilla officers by“a reliable source.” Due to the natureof the bogus information, GeneralJoseph Hooker requested the servicesof Professor Lowe’s observation bal-loon. Lowe used a specially designedbarge with all the equipment neededfor a launch. In the first deployment ofthe world’s first aircraft carrier, the USSCoeur de Lion towed the barge to

The USS Pawnee had been the most powerful warship on the Potomac, but whenordered south from Washington DC in October 1861, she steamed past theShipping Point batteries without engaging. Although she was hit over six times,she was repaired downriver in time to participate in the capture of Port Royal,South Carolina.

Naval Historical Center


On 15 October 1861, the USS Pocahontas fired at Shipping Point on the rumor thatthe Confederates were preparing batteries there. Although her fire was unan-swered, the Confederates cut down the trees that were concealing the batteries intime to inflict damage on the USS Seminole, trailing behind the USS Pocahontas.


Mattawoman Creek across the riverfrom Evansport in Maryland. ThereProfessor Lowe ascended to look atthe Confederate camps and batteriesaround Evansport and Cockpit Point;while airborne, Lowe made his famoussketch of the Confederate positions.

The sight of this balloon promptedConfederate commanders to rein-

force their defenses. General PierreGustave Toutant de Beauregard fumedat General Isaac Trimble’s lack of landdefense at Evansport and in Decemberreplaced him with General SamuelFrench. Several regiments settled intowinter camps behind the batteries asthe winter wore on and a Unionassault failed to materialize. Besidesdull and chilly picket duty along theriver, the troops suffered from commu-nicable diseases common in camps ofboth sides. Those units from thinlypopulated areas, such as the deepsouth and the west, had the worst ratesof attrition. Though producing farfewer casualties than disease, Uniongunners had some of the camps inrange and shelled them frequently,adding to the troubles of theConfederate soldiers. The Confederate soldiers manned,

besides the two large batteries atShipping Point, four between ShippingPoint and the mouth of ChopawamsicCreek, two at Cockpit Point, two atPossum Point, two at the mouths of

both the Potomac Creek and AquiaCreek, and one at Boyd’s Hole acrossthe river from Maryland Point. The bat-tery at Freestone Point was abandonedafter it had served its diversionary rolewhile the other positions were secret-ly prepared. The chain of batteries inthe Evansport area could fire on shipsfor up to seven miles along the ship-ping lane. Caught behind this formidable

gauntlet was the formidable 17-gunUSS Pensacola; she ran the gauntlet of

batteries on the moonless night of 12January 1862, holding her fire andsteaming at top speed. If the USSPensacola had fallen into Confederatehands, they would have had the mostpowerful warship in those waters. Asthe USS Pensacola made her waysouth in that dark winter night a fewsignal lanterns flashed along theVirginia shore but not the muzzles ofthe many cannons. Confederate guncrews came to quarters when shedrew past Evansport but were too late


Budd’s Ferry battery

Confederate steamer, CSS George PageHarper’s Weekly 1861


to muster an effective fire. The USSPensacola steamed south without ascratch and on to the Gulf of Mexicowhere she would play a leading role inthe capture of New Orleans.

Union forces gained strengtharound Washington as did the

public pressure for an offensive cam-paign. The North would strike and thequestion was where and when.McClellan outlined three alternatives toLincoln: (1) Attack in northern Virginiawhere the Confederates had delivereda crushing defeat at Manassas the pre-vious summer; (2) Land at theRappahannock River port of Urbanna,which offered the shortest land dis-

tance to Richmond or (3) Campaign upVirginia’s lower peninsula from estab-lished positions around FortressMonroe. McClellan favored an attackthrough Urbana, while Lincoln favoredattacking in Northern Virginia. Lincolnshrewdly left the decision up to hiscommanding general, but with stipula-tions—that 50,000 troops be retainedfor the defense of Washington and thatthe Confederate batteries at Evansportbe eliminated. However, before McClellan could

act on the President’s stipulation toeliminate the threat of the Evansportgun batteries, Confederate GeneralJohnston acted first. Because of theperceived threat from General Joseph

Hooker’s 8,000 troops and 18 guns onthe Maryland side of the Potomac,across from Evansport, and the uncer-tainty of where and when GeneralMcClellan would attack, GeneralJohnston ordered all Confederatetroops to evacuate the gun batterypositions along the Potomac. Since ithad rained for days in February 1862,making the roads a quagmire, theConfederate soldiers were unable totake much of anything with them. Assuch, they left the guns, supplies,ammunitions, and even personal itemsbehind. It was not until the early partof March that Union sailors of thePotomac Flotilla realized that some-thing was amiss with the gun batteries;the Union ships had received no replyfrom the gun batteries after shellingShipping Point for an hour. Landingparties from the Potomac Flotilla dis-covered that the Confederate troopshad abandoned Shipping Point andleft large guns behind, one of whichweighed five tons. The construction ofthe gun emplacements was substantialand complex. Colonel CharlesWainwright, Hooker’s Chief of Ar-tillery, stated the following about thegun emplacements:

“They were at least half sunkin the bank and from 15 to 50feet thick making it impossiblefor the gunboats to injure them.The magazines were cut into thesolid bank. The gunners werescreened by bombproofs, andtheir sleeping compartmentssunk several feet in the ground.There was a good supply of can-nonballs, canister and grapeshot,and shells. Rifle pits and breast-works covered the areas adjacentto the batteries.”

Though the gun batteries were nolonger a threat to the Union’s supplylifeline, for five months in late 1861 toearly 1862, they had served to harassand blockade river traffic. The fate ofthe Potomac gun batteries finallyresided in the hands of a Confederategeneral and the uncertainties of war,eliminating any chance the Confed-eracy might have had of stopping rivertraffic on the Potomac and constrictingthe ability of the Union to wage waron the South. q1775q

Map by W. Stephen Hill

Vicinity map showing the locations of the Confederate and U.S. batteries on thePotomac River (Confederate batteries are in red)


After the massive buildup of coali-tion forces in Saudi Arabia during

November–December 1990, January1991 saw the transition from defensiveplanning and operations to offensiveplanning and operations for the 1stMarine Division as it cooperated close-ly with the 2d Marine Division. Thesepreparations intensified during themonth of February as Ground-Day, 24February, drew near with the divisioncommand putting the final touches to aplan for a two-division breach of thetwo main Iraqi obstacle belts in Kuwait.The division also conducted a series ofartillery/combined arms raids againstIraqi forces in the area in preparationfor the major offensive. The Iraqi IIICorps, 5th Mechanized Division, waslocated near the al-Burqan Oil Fields.The III Corps, 3d Armored Division,was stationed approximately 20 kilome-ters north of al-Jaber airfield.After participating in the battle of al-

Khafji at the end of January, LieutenantColonel Kurth’s Marine Light AttackHelicopter Squadron 369 was preparingfor the impending ground offensive inFebruary. The squadron was composedof 5 Huey and 17 Cobra helicopters. On1 February the squadron relocated toTanjib. Over the following three weeks,different sections of the squadron con-ducted various missions including butnot limited to support flights for the 1st

and 2d Light Armored InfantryBattalions.Initially, it seemed as if Company B

of the 1st Light Armored InfantryBattalion would miss out on much ofthe action. In the weeks prior to theground offensive, Company B was busyrehearsing its attack plans. However,two days prior to the attack, BrigadierGeneral Thomas V. Draude, AssistantDivision Commander of the 1st MarineDivision, and Major General James M.Myatt, 1st Marine Division Commander,decided to designate Company B asreserve. Captain Ray, who consideredhis company to be the most capableand best trained due to rigorous drills,was “a little disappointed” by the deci-sion.General Draude also decided to set

up a forward command post for the 1stMarine Division in a wooded regionnear the al-Burqan Oil Fields known asthe Emir’s Forest. Based on his earlierexperience at Fort Leavenworth and onhis extensive reading of the works ofGeneral Erwin Rommel, the GeneralDraude believed that a small, mobile,forward command post situated closeto the actual battleground would servethe purposes of the 1st Marine Divisionbetter than one located further away.Retreating Iraqi forces had set the al-Burqan Oil Fields on fire on 24February, making them appear all butimpassable. This seemed to make theEmir’s Forest, the only wooded area inthis part of southeastern Kuwait, theperfect location for the division’s for-ward command post. General Draudethen assigned Company B of the 1stLight Armored Battalion to serve ascover for the command post, rejectingCaptain Ray’s request that his companybe reassigned to a more active position.During the late hours of 24 February,

an intelligence officer reported toGeneral Draude; the intelligence officerbelieved that two unaccounted for Iraqitank brigades could only be located inthe burning al-Burqan Oil Fields.Though the division command had pre-

viously considered the burning oilfields utterly inhospitable and althoughhe was skeptical of the possibility ofenemy troops surviving for long inwhat he termed “Dante’s inferno,”General Draude stated to the intelli-gence officer, “OK, I’ll endorse it. Ithink you’re wrong, but OK.”Meanwhile, a thorough examination ofcaptured Iraqi maps and prisoner inter-view reports convinced General Myattthat an Iraqi counterattack in the areawas imminent.

Now aware of the impending Iraqicounterattack and the threat this

attack posed for the exposed forwardcommand post, General Draude decid-ed to prepare the available units,Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,for time on target procedure.Developed by the U.S. Army duringWorld War II, this artillery techniqueinvolves the calculation of the time offlight from each firing unit to the targetarea. In this way, all units coordinatetheir firing rounds in order to hit thedesignated target at the same time, with

Marine Navy Cross Recipients inOperation Desert Storm

by Borislav V. ChernevHistory Division Intern

Marines had to wear goggles to protecttheir eyes from the oily smoke, causedby the burning oil wells.

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton

Captain Eddie S. Ray, CommandingOfficer of Company B, 1st LightArmored Infantry Battalion, 1stMarine Division, and LieutenantColonel Michael M. Kurth, Com-manding Officer of Marine LightAttack Helicopter Squadron 369, 3dMarine Aircraft Wing, earned NavyCrosses for their actions on 25 and26 February 1991 that “reflectedgreat credit upon [themselves] andupheld the highest traditions of theMarine Corps and the United StatesNaval Service.”


devastating effect on both enemymateriel and morale. General Draudewas initially frustrated by the slow paceof preparations, recalling later that “itseemed to take forever to get all of theartillery units in position so that theycould do this [time on target].” Thedelay was caused in part by the adverseconditions generated by the burning oilfields.

25 February 1991

Captain Ray described the environ-ment in the early hours of 25 Februaryas “absolutely pitch black” with blackoily smoke emanating from the wellsand reducing visibility to the minimum.Encountering the already deployedhumvees of Company C upon hisarrival at Emir’s Forest, Captain Rayconferred with the commander ofCompany C. He then decided to alignhis 10 light armored vehicles in an arc,which pointed in a different directionfrom the arc covered by Company C atthe edge of Emir’s Forest. After settingup his defenses, Captain Ray inspected

the area and briefed his Marines. By0645, everything was ready to meet theenemy attack.Around 0700 one of Captain Ray’s

light armored vehicles fired into thefog. Captain Ray immediately went tothe command and control vehicle, andcontacted fire support control with arequest to investigate the incident. Justminutes later, he heard 50-caliber shotsand moved his vehicle, and the com-mand and control vehicle in the direc-tion of the shots. He soon encountereda Marine humvee moving toward himfrom the apparent direction of theenemy forces. The Marines were shout-ing, “They’re coming, they’re coming!”In the meantime, the shots had prompt-ed about 100 demoralized Iraqi troopsto surrender.The first of three Iraqi attacks against

the 1st Division forward command postcame promptly at 0930; the Iraqi forceconsisted of 5 T-55 tanks, 33 armoredpersonnel carriers, and dismountedinfantry that emerged from the blackfog enveloping Emir’s Forest. CaptainRay’s vehicle immediately found itselfin the midst of a full-scale battle, engag-ing several Iraqi armored personnelcarriers. Maneuvering his vehicle skill-

fully between the trees, used as partialcover, Captain Ray continued to engagethe enemy armor, signaling for the restof his platoon to reinforce his position.As the other vehicles arrived, theyaligned themselves on either side ofCaptain Ray’s vehicle. Captain Ray andCompany B counterattacked the Iraqiforce, a mechanized brigade from the3d Corps, with 25mm fire. The battle-field was soon covered with burningIraqi armored personnel carriers.Unable to withstand the intensity andprecision of Marine fire, Iraqi troopsbegan dismounting and fleeing towarda nearby ditch in panic. The remainingvehicles retreated into the safety of theblack smoke, thereby bringing the firstIraqi attack to an end.

During the temporary lull in the timebetween the first and the second

Iraqi attacks, the Division inquiredthrough the command and controlvehicle whether Company B was inneed of any reinforcement. Withouthesitation, Captain Ray replied,“Cobras. Get us some Cobras.” Thisrequest brought in Cobra helicoptersfrom Lieutenant Colonel Kurth’s MarineLight Attack Helicopter Squadron 369

Photo by Col Jeffrey A. Powers

Capt Eddie S. Ray, CommandingOfficer of Company B, 1st LightArmored Infantry Battalion, inManifa Bay after the return to SaudiArabia


into the battle just in time for the sec-ond Iraqi attack at 1015.Much like Captain Ray’s Company B

of the 1st Light Armored InfantryBattalion, Lieutenant Colonel Kurth’sMarine Light Attack HelicopterSquadron 369 struggled with theadverse conditions created by the oilyblack smoke emanating from the burn-ing oil fields. On 23 February, the daybefore the beginning of the groundoffensive, the squadron estimated itsdesignation efforts as difficult toimpossible. On 24 February, thesquadron provided close air supportfor the 1st Marine Division withLieutenant Colonel Kurth’s commandand control helicopter monitoring theprogress of the ground units.

Upon receiving the Division’srequest for air support on the

morning of 25 February, LieutenantColonel Kurth dispatched his heli-copter squadron, led by theAdministrative Officer, Major Michael L.Steele, northeast toward the edge ofEmir’s Forest. Arriving for the secondIraqi assault, the helicopters fired 3antitank-guided missiles, 20 2.75-inchrockets, and 20mm cannon, destroyingthree Iraqi armored personnel carriersand four other Iraqi vehicles. The sud-den appearance of the Cobras alsocaused the surrender of about 35 Iraqisoldiers stationed in a nearby bunkerin the trees.Captain Ray helped orient the

Cobras upon arrival, which greatlyenhanced their effectiveness. It was

only after Major Steele’s helicoptershad flown back to refuel and rearmthat Captain Ray began to realize thatthe Iraqi forces opposing him outnum-bered the Marines. At first, he hadthought that his company was facingfewer than a dozen Iraqi armored per-sonnel carriers. “I just didn’t think theycould get close without us knowing,”he recalled later. Now more fully awareof the Iraqi forces in the area, CaptainRay decided to wait for the return ofthe Cobras before taking the offensive.The company’s forward air controllerhelped direct the movement of MajorSteele’s helicopters, which were nowreinforced by a section of helicopters

led by Operations Officer, MajorSidney E. Mills.The Iraqis launched their third and

final assault on the forward commandpost at 1100. Iraqi vehicles got within200 yards of the forward commandpost. At this point, General Draudedecided to raise the sides of the tent inorder for the headquarters personnel toget a panoramic view of the battlefield.His decision was spurred by the beliefthat the Marines would be less distract-ed if they were able to hear and see thefight rather than just hear the noise ofthe battle. Whether or not this unortho-dox move had any effect on theMarines remains unclear, but they con-tinued to perform their duties as com-mand post personnel. The generalrecalled later that “the Marines all camethrough in great shape . . . I never sawanybody who hesitated . . . [T]he focus,the concentration was just amazing.”

With the headquarters personnelclosely following their actions

and the Cobras positioned on theirshoulder, Company B counterattackedthe enemy. The Marines pierced theIraqi formation just as the Iraqis weretrying to deploy, engaging and destroy-ing several Iraqi vehicles. Unable towithstand the Marine pressure, theIraqi line fell in disarray and collapsed.Acting under the directions of the com-pany’s forward air controller, the

A Huey from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 is secured on theflight line prior to a mission during Operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia.

SDAN: DD-ST-91-06378, VIRIN: D0301

Marine Corps History Division

Two light armored vehicles from 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion driveacross the Saudi desert. These vehicles provided the heavy fire power of the bat-talion with antitank missiles.


Cobras fired 4 air-to-ground missiles, 2antitank-guided missiles, and 14 2.75-inch rockets, destroying five armoredpersonnel carriers, one multiple rocketlaunch system, one truck, and oneinfantry fighting position. After refuel-ing and rearming, the Cobras recon-noitered the area and continued sup-porting B Company’s pursuit of theretreating Iraqi forces through thesouthern portion of the oil fields beforereturning to their base at 1755.

Defending the division’s headquar-ters with the aid of Cobra heli-

copters over a 10 hour period, CaptainRay’s company defeated a superiorIraqi force, destroying over 30 armoredpersonnel carriers and two tanks. TheMarines captured more than 300 Iraqiprisoners of war and killed 100 Iraqis.Asked about the reasons behind theMarines’ victory, General Draudeopined the following about theemployment of time on target.

When you’re attacking enemythat can bring that kind of preci-sion, not only by location, but bytime, and we’re all at the sametime on target. I mean, we’re allon the same instant, same sec-ond, all this hitting, it has got tobe mind numbing. So I think ittook a lot of out of it. And thenwhatever they had left wasexpended and was turned back.

Textbook use of time on target couldnot have been possible without thesuperb training of the Marines, which

General Draude was quick to highlight. Besides the excellent training that

his Marines received, Captain Ray con-tributed to the success of Company B’sengagement with the Iraqis due to hisleadership abilities; his fortitude andcommand presence led his Marines toconquer a numerically superior force ofmechanized components of the Iraqiarmy. Captain Ray’s Navy Cross citationread in part: “[o]perating perilouslyclose to the attacking enemy, CaptainRay’s courage, composure under fire,and aggressive warfighting spirit wereinstrumental in the defeat of a majorenemy effort and the successfuldefense of the division forward com-mand post.”

26 February 1991

On the morning of 26 February1991, Lieutenant Colonel Michael M.Kurth described the conditions of theburning oil fields as “absolutely unbe-lievable” and “[t]he visibility that dayand the weather was really gross.” Thedense smoke extended as far as thenearby al-Jaber airfield, reducing visi-bility to between 100 and 300 feet. Thismade the task of Marine Light AttackHelicopter Squadron 369, providingclose air support to the 1st MarineDivision in its advance into Kuwait notonly difficult but hazardous as well. At 0600 on the 26th, Colonel Kurth

took off from the squadron’s base andproceeded north through the thicksmoke in the direction of al-Jaber air-field in search of Task Force Ripper.After being initially frustrated by the

adverse environment, he successfullylocated the task force several kilome-ters northeast of al-Jaber airfield, man-aging to surprise and capture severalIraqi soldiers and direct them to friend-ly ground units en route. LieutenantColonel Kurth then planned and ledseveral sections of his squadron in sup-port of various Marine ground units.Earlier in February, his helicopter hadbeen fitted with the prototype of anexperimental forward looking infraredradar and laser designator, whichproved invaluable under the conditionsof reduced visibility and Iraqi smallarms fire.

For the next few hours, he acted asairborne tactical air coordinator for

Task Force Ripper, providing close airsupport. An emergency occurred whenground units reported an Iraqi gasattack at 1345, and the chemical detec-tion tape on his helicopter also indicat-ed a possible chemical presence aswell. Although this turned out to be afalse alarm (oily smoke from the burn-ing wells was later found to havecaused the alert), all helicopters tem-porarily withdrew to the south.Lieutenant Colonel Kurth’s helicopter,however, remained operational in thearea, the crew wearing chemical pro-tective masks until the area wasdeclared clear. Following the chemicalattack scare, Lieutenant Colonel Kurthflew to the 1st Marine Division head-quarters, collected the plan for attackfrom General Myatt, and delivered it tothe Division’s forward troops. For therest of the day, Lieutenant ColonelKurth coordinated air support for the1st Marine Division during its assault onKuwait International Airport.For a period of over 10 hours on 26

February, Lieutenant Colonel Kurthovercame the adverse weather condi-tions and the resistance of the enemy,directing and leading various sectionsof his squadron through thick smokeand intermittent Iraqi fire and in dan-gerous proximity to high voltage powerlines in support of Marines on theground. As acknowledged in the NavyCross citation, his “courage and fearlessdedication rallied fellow Marines andresulted in the destruction of as manyas 70 Iraqi armored vehicles destroyedthat day.” q1775q

Marine Corps History Division Field History

During exercises prior to the beginning of the war, Marines rushed to load anti-tank missiles onto a Cobra helicopter. The Cobras provided extensive close airsupport for Company B, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion during the battleof the al-Burqan Oil Fields.


N orth Korea invaded South Korea on25 June 1950, sparking one of the

bloodiest ‘hot’ conflicts of the Cold War.On 2 August 1950 the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade landed at Pusan, quick-ly becoming the ‘fire brigade’ of thePusan perimeter. But the Marines hadnot been requested merely to shore-upthe defense of the tip of the Koreanpeninsula. Instead, they were required toagain demonstrate the value of amphibi-ous warfare by forcing their way ashoreagainst determined defenses.

On 15 September 1950 the 1st MarineDivision landed at Inchon in one of themost heralded amphibious assaults inhistory. Inchon was a notoriously diffi-cult landing site; success required thatthe island of Wolmi-do be secured first,in the early morning hours of d-day.This important job was given to 3dBattalion, 5th Marines.

This excerpt is from Charles R. Smith,ed., U.S. Marines in the Korean War(History Division, Quantico, VA, 2007pp. 98–101). This work contains all ofHistory Division’s 50th AnniversaryCommemoratives on the Korean War,including Brigadier General Edwin H.Simmons’ Over the Sea Wall: U.S.Marines at Inchon from which this selec-tion is taken. U.S. Marines in the KoreanWar can be downloaded in a pdf version

Robert D. “Dewey” Bohn (then a firstlieutenant; he would retire a major gen-eral). His company was embarked inthe fast destroyer transport Diachenko(APD 123). She stopped her engines atabout 0300, the troop compartmentlights came on, and reveille soundedover the public address system.Most of the Marines were already

awake. They hoped for the traditional“steak and eggs” prelanding breakfast ofWorld War II; instead they got scram-bled powdered eggs, dry toast, andcanned apricots. At about first light,Company G went over the side anddown the cargo nets into the bobbingLCVPs, which then cleared the ship andbegan to circle.

Three LSMRs—medium landing shipsconverted to rocket ships—sent

their loads of thousands of 5-inch rock-ets screeching shoreward towardWolmi-do. The island seemed toexplode under the impact. Then thelanding craft began the run to GreenBeach. MacArthur, Shepherd, Almond,Smith, Whitney, and Doyle all watchedfrom the flag bridge of the MountMcKinley.Seven LCVPs brought in the first

wave, one platoon of Company G onthe right and three platoons ofCompany H on the left. The landingcraft converged on the narrow beach—scarcely 50 yards wide—and groundedat 0633, three minutes behind schedule.

from the History Division website(http://www.history.usmc.mil) underPublications.

Destination Wolmi-doL-hour was to be 0630. At 0545, the

pre-landing shore bombardment began.Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. “Tap”Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, wasboated by 0600. The carrier-basedMarine Corsairs completed their lastsweep of the beach 15 minutes later.“G Company was to land to the right

of Green Beach in the assault, wheelright, and seize the dominant hill masson the island, Radio Hill,” remembered

First to Write

Destination Wolmi-do

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

The M-26 Pershing tanks, new to the Marines, began to land in the third wave atWolmi-do and were soon put to use against North Korean fortified positions. Atank-infantry patrol assaulted and took So Wolmi-do, an islet dangling at theend of a causeway from the main island.

Some North Korean defenders of Wolmi-do stubbornly remained in their cave-like positions and had to be burned out by flamethrowers. Marines were readilydistinguishable at this stage of the war by their camouflage helmet covers andleggings.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2798


The remainder of the two assault com-panies came in as the second wave twominutes later. Resistance was limited toa few scattered shots.

Captain Patrick E. Wildman, com-manding Company H, left a small

detachment to clear North Point andthen plunged across the island towardhis objectives—the northern nose ofRadio Hill and the shoreline of theburning industrial area facing Inchon.After a short pause to reorganize, Bohntook Company G towards the southernhalf of Radio Hill, 105 meters high.Resistance was halfhearted. At 0655,Sergeant Alvin E. Smith, guide of the 3dPlatoon, secured an American flag tothe trunk of a shattered tree. MacArthur,watching the action ashore from hisswivel chair on the bridge of the MountMcKinley, saw the flag go up and said,“That’s it. Let’s get a cup of coffee.”Ten tanks—six M-26 Pershings and

four modified M-4A3 Shermans, allunder Second Lieutenant Granville G.Sweet—landed in the third wave at0646 from three utility landing ships(LSUs). They crunched their way inland,poised to help the infantry.Lieutenant Colonel Taplett landed

from his free boat a few minutes later.At almost the same time, Captain RobertA. McMullen brought in the fourth wavebearingCompany I, the battalion reserve. His

company, following behind CompanyH, encountered an angry nest of abouta platoon of bypassed North Koreans. Aflurry of hand grenades was exchanged.

McMullen signaled Sweet’s tanks tocome forward. A Sherman with a dozerblade sealed the die-hard NorthKoreans in their holes.Moving on to the near end of the

causeway that stretched to Inchon itself,McMullen found more North Koreandefenders hiding in a cave. One ofSweet’s tanks fired a 90mm round intothe mouth of the cave. There was a muf-fled explosion and 30 dazed and deaf-ened North Koreans came staggeringout with their hands above their heads.“Captured forty-five prisoners. . . meet-ing light resistance,” radioed Taplett at0745 to the Mount McKinley.Wildman’s Marines were finding it

slow going in the ruins of the industrialarea. Taplett ordered Bohn to take therest of Radio Hill and by 0800 the highground was Marine Corps property.

‘Wolmi-do Secured’

Once again Taplett radioed theMount McKinley, this time: “Wolmi-dosecured.”With the success of the Marine land-

ing blaring over the loudspeakers,MacArthur left the bridge to pen a mes-sage to Admiral Struble in his flagshipRochester: “The Navy and Marines havenever shone more brightly than thismorning.”Ashore, Taplett consolidated his

gains. His three rifle companies, by pre-arranged plan, took up defensive posi-tions facing Inchon. The empty swim-ming pool at the tip of North Pointbecame a stockade for prisoners.At about 10 o’clock Taplett ordered

Bohn to take Sowolmi-do, an islet dan-gling to the south of Wolmi-do with alighthouse at the end of the causeway.Bohn sentSecond Lieutenant John D.

Counselman, leader of his 3d Platoon,with a rifle squad and a section of tanks.As a prelude to the assault, a flight ofCorsairs drenched Sowolmi-do withnapalm. Covered by the two tanks anda curtain of 81mm mortar fire,Counselman’s riflemen crossed the nar-row causeway, taking fire from a hillhoney-combed with emplacements.Flamethrowers and 3.5-inch rocketlaunchers burned and blasted the dug-in enemy. Seventeen were killed, 19surrendered, and eight or more man-aged to hide out. The lighthouse wastaken and the job completed in lessthan two hours. Three Marines werewounded, bringing Taplett’s casualtiesfor the day to none killed, 17 wounded.

Word was passed that some of theNorth Koreans who had escaped

were trying to swim for Inchon. A num-ber of Bohn’s Marines lined up rifle-range fashion and shot at what they sawas heads bobbing in the water. Othersdismissed the targets as imaginary.Mopping up of the island was complet-ed by noon.Taplett, growing restless and seeing

no sign of enemy activity, proposed todivision that he make an assault on thecity from his present position or at leasta reconnaissance in force. Smithresponded to his proposal with a firmnegative. q1775q

Marines from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, escorted a steady stream of prison-ers back to Green Beach on the seaward side of Wolmi-do. Landing ships andcraft could beach as long as the tide was high, but once the tide receded theywould be left high and dry on the mud flats.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2723


Willard J. Webb and Walter S. Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War inVietnam, 1971–1973 (Washington,DC: Office of Joint History, 2007)

Stephen P. Randolph, Powerful andBrutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger,and the Easter Offensive (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2007)

Robert E. Stoffey, Fighting to Leave:The Final Years of America’s War inVietnam, 1972–1973 (Minneapolis:Zenith Press, 2008)

As to be expected, once a historynarrative is completed new infor-

mation will come forward to comple-ment or contradict the earlier work. Infact, this is the historical process of acontinued dialogue by various histori-ans or groups of historians. In theMarine Corps case in regards to theVietnam War, the History and MuseumDivision published its history of the1971 to 1973 period in 1991, some 18years ago. I know, as I was one of thewriters involved. Now there are threerecent books about the Vietnam Warduring the last years of the conflictthat deserve consideration. Theyrange from official history at the high-

est level, through academic accounts,to a personal narrative.The Joint Chiefs of Staff work cov-

ers the period from 1971 and the inva-sion of Laos by South Vietnam withOperation Lam Son 719. It ends withthe mine-clearing of Operation EndSweep and the release of Americanprisoners of war in 1973. This is some521 pages of material including notesand an index. For those who need tobe reminded, this included AdmiralThomas H. Moorer, USN, Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs; Admiral Elmo R.Zumwalt Jr., USN, Chief of NavalOperations; General William C.Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of theArmy; General John D. Ryan, Chief ofStaff of the Air Force, and GeneralLeonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandantof the Marine Corps. The authorsdepict an orderly and inevitable with-drawal from the war as a matter ofplanned policy and strategy. Directorof Joint History, David A. Armstrong,notes that this is the final volume of aseries that documents America’s rolein Vietnam from 1945 through 1973.Both authors were respected careergovernment historians of the Vietnamconflict. Written as a classified study in the

1970s, new material was added,including a chapter on “Why Vietnam-ization Failed” written some 34 yearsafter the event. While it has beenargued that the 1968–1969 Americanstrategy reached a successful conclu-sion in 1972 by showing SouthVietnam could stand on its own, thesubsequent documentation in theJoint Chiefs of Staff records does notsupport this argument. The May 1972loss of Quang Tri City showed that,without American support, the Saigongovernment could not survive. Withthat, the U.S. government sought a“decent interval” in order to withdrawfrom the conflict. This is a detailedand well documented “official” historythat is required for any narrative of thesubject and would have helped U.S.

Marine Corps efforts with the story ofthis period some time ago.Next is a detailed narrative, during

the same period, about the use of tac-tical airpower during the 1972 so-called Spring or Easter Offensive. Itcovers the subject from theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam’sdecision to invade the Republic ofVietnam through the Paris PeaceAccords that saw the American with-drawal from the conflict. The author, aretired U.S. Air Force colonel at theNational Defense University, dealswith the topic of the use of militarypower (in this case, tactical air power)by the national command authority (atthe time, President Richard M. Nixonand National Security Advisor HenryA. Kissinger). Working against thedeadline of a presidential electionyear, both Nixon and Kissinger hopedgains on the battlefield wouldstrengthen their position at the negoti-ating table. In retaliation for a majorNorth Vietnamese offensive breakingover the Easter holidays, the presidentlaunched the all-out air campaignknow as Operation Linebacker—over-riding his Secretary of Defense Melvin

Book Review

The Final Years of the Vietnam Warby Charles D. Melson

Chief Historian


R. Laird and clashing with the theatercommander General CreightonAbrams in whom he had lost confi-dence. The use of strategic bombing by

B52s in North and South Vietnam isnot discussed, as the narrative focuseson the use of tactical air attacks by theU.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy as ameans to make the Vietnamese com-munists go to the table and work outan agreed upon withdrawal plan. Theconflicting approaches depicted showthat there is no single service responseto the demands on the battlefield. Inthe end, both Air Force and Navy airdoes not win the war but only facili-tates a political decision desired byWashington DC. Combat power reallycame from a mix of air, naval gunfire,and ground-based supporting armswith American advisors and the South

Vietnamese armed forces holding theirpositions and then carrying out a suc-cessful counteroffensive.For Marine and Navy veterans, the

story was best told by one of theirown, retired Colonel Robert E. Stoffey.Based upon research after the event,this is a personal narrative of his timewith Admiral James L. Holloway’sSeventh Fleet as the Fleet Marine AirOfficer in 1971–1972. Stoffey hadflown helicopters and observation air-craft in two previous tours in Vietnam.He wrote about his experiences inCleared Hot. By the time of the EasterOffensive in 1972, he was the seniorMarine with Seventh Fleet on the flag-ship USS Oklahoma City. With theongoing American withdrawal fromVietnam, the naval forces offshoreassumed a more significant role in pro-tecting this effort. Never before in the

conflict had naval power been asimportant. When combat power wasrequired from the Gulf of Tonkin,Seventh Fleet and its integrated FleetMarine Forces were there. This sup-port ranged from direct combat by air,naval gunfire, mine laying, andamphibious and special warfare forces.For Marines this included amphibiousbrigades and air-ground task units aswell as two groups of fighter andattack aircraft. His personal perspec-tive made this a compelling narrative.All in all, these three books show

that at least in terms of research andwriting something new can happen inhistory. They are recommended forthose interested in the ignored story ofmilitary operations in the latter part ofthe Vietnam War from the strategic,operational, and tactical levels.

q1775q

Book Review

Iraq and Counterinsurgencyby Nicholas J. Schlosser

Historian

Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency andCounterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2006)

Official and scholarly descriptions ofthe insurgency that erupted in Iraq

in 2003 have often been vague andimprecise. Terms used to characterize ithave ranged from the bureaucratic(“Anti-Iraqi Forces”) to the inexact (“for-mer regime elements”) to the excessive-ly broad (“the enemy”). Much of this isdue to the nature of the insurgency’stactics. Improvised explosives and otherbooby traps were the insurgents’weapons of choice, and consequently, itwas difficult to link the “enemy” with aparticular ideology or organization.Ahmed S. Hashim’s book,

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency inIraq, presents a welcome remedy tomany commentators’ aversion tospecifics when it comes to examiningthe Iraq insurgency. In this detailedexamination of the insurgency, Hashimexplores the movement by asking anumber of fundamental questions: Whoare the insurgents, why are they fight-ing, and how have they gained support?As he demonstrates, the answers to

these questions are neither simple norclear cut. Far from being a monolithicorganization, the insurgency was a vast,complex, multifaceted movement ofdiverse, often antagonistic organizationsdriven by a common goal: the removalof the United States from Iraq. This sin-gular purpose, Hashim notes, broughttogether a loose, tenuous partnership

between competing organizations thatincluded secular nationalists and reli-gious fundamentalists.

Their motivation, Hashim contends,lay in the common belief that Iraq’s

Sunni population was the primary targetof the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As theauthor notes, such a perception was notentirely unfounded: of all of Iraq’s eth-nic and religious groups, the Sunnis hadthe most to lose from the overthrow ofthe Ba’ath regime. Iraq’s Sunnis hadbeen the dominant ethnic and religiousgroup in the country since its creationby the British in 1921. Consequently,many Sunnis felt a sense of ownershipover the state itself and believed thatthe Coalition’s principle goal was tomarginalize their status and place themunder Shi’a control. The open favoritismgiven to Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurdish popu-lations by U.S. authorities and policy-makers only reinforced this impressionand exacerbated Sunni anxieties.

Thus, Hashim argues, the insurgencywas driven by a fundamental crisis ofnational identity on the part of Iraq’sSunnis. Weakened and divided by


National Museum of the Marine Corps

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decades of authoritarian government,and consequently, lacking the organiza-tion and means for expressing theirgrievances and anxieties in the newIraq, many Sunnis turned to militancy.Policies of the Bush administration andoccupation officials, most notably thedisbanding of the Iraqi Army and de-Ba’athification, further fanned resent-ments and motivated Sunnis to embracearmed resistance. Former soldiers,Ba’athists, Salafists, and other radicalgroups were thus drawn together by ageneral anxiety about the new Iraq andopposition to the occupation.

This opposition was intensified andexacerbated by three major factors:

the assumption by Coalition authoritiesthat the Sunnis would accept their lossof status, the Sunni’s unwillingness toaccept this loss, and the frequently“muscular” and heavy handed responseof U.S. forces against insurgent activity.Furthermore, the open favoritism on thepart of American neoconservative poli-cymakers toward Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’apopulations, linked with a generaldesire of neoconservatives to weakenthe Arab character of Iraq, only rein-forced the Sunni’s belief that the warwas launched against them.Of particular interest is Hashim’s

careful analysis and description of spe-cific insurgent organizations. Hashimlays out three broad types of groups:secular nationalists, radical religiousorganizations, and groups shaped by amixture of the two. As he stresses, manyof these organizations’ goals and mem-berships were fluid. Group names fre-quently changed and larger groupsoften absorbed smaller ones. The insur-gency was comprised of a mixture ofold-regime supporters such as theGeneral Command of the ArmedForces, Resistance, and Liberation ofIraq; radical nationalist groups such asIraq’s Revolutionaries–Al-Anbar ArmedBrigades; fundamentalist Islamist orga-nizations such as the Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah; and cells mixing nationalist andreligious elements such as the HigherCommand of the Mujahideen in Iraq.What becomes clear from Hashim’sanalysis is that the insurgency was nei-ther a motley collection of “regimedead-enders” nor a collection of “anti-Iraqi” foreign fighters. Instead, while

Ba’athists and foreign groups were cer-tainly amongst its ranks, the insurgencywas larger, enjoyed more local support,and included far more native Iraqis thanthe Bush administration and Coalitionofficials often realized. The insurgency,in short, was primarily an Iraqi Sunnimovement motivated by Sunni aspira-tions and Sunni fears.If the book has a weakness, it is one

that is beyond the author’s control.Published in 2006, most of the workfocuses on the period between 2003and 2005. As a result, the book cannotconsider the critical events of 2006–07,a period that saw both a further intensi-fication and ultimately a reduction inviolence. Most importantly, the workdoes not consider the critical period fol-lowing the 2006 destruction of the al-Askari mosque in Samara, an event thatsparked violent sectarian strife betweenSunni and Shi’a militias. By 2006, thewar in Iraq had evolved and trans-formed to such an extent that in manyplaces the United States was just one ofseveral participants in a conflict thatwas escalating in both intensity andcomplexity. In some cases, notably inal-Anbar Province, one time insurgentgroups, affiliated with the region’s tribalconfederations, aligned themselves withthe United States against more radical,fundamentalist insurgent forces. Itwould have been interesting to seeHashim examine such events. Relatedto this, the author is limited in thesources he can use. Most of the study isbased on newspaper reports from the

western and Arab press, web sites ofinsurgent groups, and interviewsbetween the author and Iraqis. As aresult, many of Hashim’s conclusionsare provisional and conditional, thoughthe author himself is ready to admitwhen evidence and information areinadequate and definite conclusionscannot be made.

Overall however, this is a valuablebook that will be of use to Marines,

soldiers, and analysts alike. It providesan excellent analysis of the motivationsthat drove the Iraq insurgency and ofthe myriad of groups and individualsthat chose to engage in insurgent oper-ations. Even though the violence in Iraqhas recently subsided from the levels itwas at when Hashim wrote the work,his argument that the U.S. military andgovernment must be aware of how itsactions are understood is critical to theimplementation of counterinsurgencyoperations in countries such as Iraq andAfghanistan. The invasion of Iraq andtoppling of Saddam Hussein’s regimemay have made a Sunni backlashinevitable. The collapse of the Ba’athregime also meant the collapse of Sunnidominance in Iraq. But U.S. and occu-pation administration decisions andactions during the spring of 2003 playeda large role in militarizing, radicalizing,and inflaming that backlash. An under-standing of how this happened is criti-cal to anyone responsible for planningand implementing counterinsurgencyoperations today. q1775q


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