vol.12 no.2 oct. 2012 - skkusjeas.skku.edu/upload/201210/chan lee.pdf · ontological relationship...

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J ournal ofE a s tA s i a nS t u d i e sVol.12 No.2 OCT. 2012

S ungkyun

ISSN 1598-2661

Academy of East Asian StudiesSungkyunkwan University

SUNGKYUNKWAN UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

email of the author: [email protected] 123

Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies Vol.12 No.2© 2012 Academy of East Asian Studies. 123-140

IntroductionAsked the basic question “where is your mind?” one’s answer might differ according to one’s language. If the question were posed in English, the reply would most likely be ‘in the head,’ whereas if the question were posed in Chinese (ni de xin zai nali?), the reply would likely indicate some part of the chest. In short, the contemporary English word, mind, cannot be semantically identical with xin even though both of them can be pragmatically used to predicate the same thing as signified in a certain similar context. Therefore, most sinologists and Chinese philosophers have translated xin as ‘heart-mind,’ in order to differentiate the implications of xin from ‘mind’ as basically indicating the realm of consciousness. However, I propose that heart-mind as a translation of xin may in itself give rise to much conceptual confusion, something which should make us seriously consider the incommensurability between them, in particular, when comparatively discussing the neo-Confucian notion of xin in relation to contemporary philosophy of mind.1 In fact, the translation of ‘heart-mind’ is a kind of equivocal combination to resolve problems raised by the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. Since Descartes, dualism is one of the main frameworks used to understand the relationship between mind and body, although there are some varieties. Much

It is widely accepted that the Neo-Confucian idea of xin is translated as the English term,

‘heart-mind.’ However, the English translation recalls to us the Cartesian framework of mind-

body dualism. By using the comparative way of thinking via a conceptual difference, we are

able not only to grasp a proper usage of the terms, but also to deepen our understanding

of different philosophical traditions. Therefore, rather than investigating alternative terms

to the English translation, I will examine whether or not the translation is appropriate by

examining some key concepts related to xin in the neo-Confucian philosophical context.

Through my argument, we can see that Zhu Xi’s philosophical concerns do not explain the

ontological relationship between the mental and the physical, but elucidate how to unify the

distinction between the moral disposition and life per se. Furthermore, we will understand that the

neo-Confucian philosophy of mind truly focuses on philosophical-anthropological questions like

“how should humans live?” and “why should humans be moral?”

Keywords: Zhu Xi, heart-mind, xin, dualism, the mental, the physical, the axiological disposition

Chan LEE Hallym University

Can We Call Zhu Xi’s Notion of Xin Mind? The Neo-Confucian Way of Understanding the

Philosophy of Mind

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of the contemporary debate concerning dualism focuses on how to explain the relationship between mental and physical events and how to define the mental and the physical in terms of their ontological dimensions. However, the dualistic way of understanding mind and body fails to draw an entire picture of human beings.

In this paper, I will examine whether Zhu Xi’s idea of xin can give us an alternative answer to the mind-body problem by addressing the features of xin constituted by the Chinese ontological terms of li and qi, which themselves also cannot be rendered as a single English word. Through the comparison between the understandings of mind in the East and the West, we can see that Zhu Xi’s philosophical concerns do not so much explain the ontological relationship between the mental and the physical, as elucidate how to unify the distinction between the axiological intentionality and the activity of life. In order to investigate this, I will first examine how the materiality of qi should be construed in understanding the ontological features of xin. Through my argument, we will see that the philosophy of mind in the neo-Confucian world does not focus on the ontological dilemma between the mental and the physical, which is derived from Cartesian dualism, but on philosophical-anthropological questions like “how should humans live?” and “why should humans be moral?”

Zhu Xi’s Idea of Xin as Ontological Unity of qi When translating xin as ‘heart-mind’ for readers in the English speaking world, we can mislead ourselves into thinking that Chinese xin is also ontologically composed of two parts, namely, the mental and the physical. In other words, the translation neatly reflects the Cartesian dualism that mind is essentially nonphysical. In his last work, The Passions of the Soul, Descartes is explicit in saying that “the soul is of such a nature that it has no relation to extension, or to the dimensions or other properties of the matter of which the body is composed.”2 Moreover, he claims in the Meditations that “there is a real distinction between the mind and body; in other words, the mind is a distinct and independent thing.”3 The key point Descartes wanted to make is that the mind as consciousness is ontologically distinct from the material body although they causally interact with each other.

As we know quite well, the pictograph for the word xin etymologically imitates the form of the physical organ of the heart. Rather than the brain, it is the heart that was believed to think as well as feel in ancient China. For instance, we may see in the Mencius that xin often indicates not only mind as a cognitive faculty, but also heart as an emotive organ. Xin is considered to be an embodiment of qi the character for which pictographically depicts rising mists. It is also defined as ‘cloud vapors’ in the oldest Chinese lexicon of the Exposition of Words and Characters

1 Like the character xin, such key terms of Neo-Confucianism as li, qi, xing, and qing do not have a single equivalent English word, but rather correspond to various English conceptions with their own context. In this paper, I will leave the key terminologies of Neo-Confucianism untranslated in order to open them to their hermeneutic possibilities.

2 René Descartes, “The Passion of the Soul,” in the Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 339. 3 René Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy,” in the Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 54.

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(shuowenjiezi). In a word, qi is ontologically considered to be a vital flow of energy. Since the Han dynasty, as Roger Ames points out, “the idea that the world and its phenomena emerge out of and fold back into a vital energizing field”4 has become a common way of thinking in understanding qi.

In relation to human beings, qi is considered as a sort of vital energy. The understanding of qi as vital energy entails at once both the physical and the vital/biological states, which can develop into mental phenomena. In other words, it is a position not yet demarcating the material from the vital. Rather, it can be said to be an attitude towards understanding the world and its phenomena as a holistic activity of organic things. Zhu Xi’s basic ideas of qi also do not deviate from these features. Needless to say, xin is ontologically composed of qi in Zhu’s philosophy, as he explicitly states:

It is just ‘life,’ if we try to express xin in a single word. Just as [the Book of Changes says that]

“the great virtue of the heaven-earth is life,” so all humans are born by receiving the qi of the

heaven-earth…”5 (ZZYL: 85)

In a word, xin implies a sort of an integrated circuit of qi indicating not only everything related to materiality, which includes both living things and inanimate objects, but also all kinds of vital energy and their activities.6 When defining xin as ‘the quintessential lucidness of qi,’7 it can be seen as an interpretation that all kinds of mental phenomena are the material activities of qi. Lucidity does not imply something non-material. In other words, thinking and feeling are considered as a part of the vital activities of qi. For example, Angus Graham explains that “qi is adapted to cosmology as the universal fluid, active as yang and passive as yin, out of which all things condense and into which they dissolve… it is like such words in other cultures as Greek pneuma ‘wind, air, breath.’ It is the energetic fluid which vitalizes the body, in particular as the breath, and which circulates outside us as the air.”8

Let’s examine one of Zhu Xi’s statements below:

When humans are born, there first exists qi (biological energy). After shape, the lower soul (po)

first comes into existence there. [Zhou Dunyi said] ‘After a shape comes into being, cognitive

faculty (zhi) emerges from the spirits (shen).’ After a shape exists, spirits and consciousness

4 Roger Ames, Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong, 72.

5 Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Yulei, 85 (Hereafter referred to as ZZYL). “一言以蔽之, 曰 ‘生’ 而已. ‘天地之大德曰生’人受天地之氣而生,….”

6 I believe that such a hylozoic explanation of qi provides not so much a scientific as a symbolic framework for capturing the organic universe of life. A contemporary scientific achievement explains that a primitive form of life originates from an accidental encounter among the material elements, like protein, nucleic acid, and ATP. In other words, the vital is created from a specific and unique combination of the material.

7 Zhu, ZZYL, 85. “Xin is the quintessential lucidness of qi (心者, 氣之精爽)”.8 Angus Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 101.

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dwell within it….9 (ZZYL: 41)

According to senior Confucians, “inhaling and exhaling via mouth and nose become

hun; brightness of ears and eyes becomes po” this is common opinion…. Hun is what one

comprehends and calculates. Po is what one memorizes and stores up.10 (ZZYL: 41)

According to Zhu, qi functions as all cognitive, emotive and even spiritual activities of human beings. Zhu Xi does not see the problem of whether or not the spirit as the mental substantively differs from qi as the material. In short, he never considered there to be any discontinuity within qi-materiality. The difference between the mental and the material hinges on the various degrees of density and clarity of qi. Qi can represent diverse shapes, qualities, functions, and relations in accordance with the degree of its quality and density. The more transparent qi is, the more it is akin to lucid mental activity. The thicker it is, the closer it is to the material or physical. Therefore, the mental and the physical are just different modes of the same qi, which differ in accordance with density and quality. Furthermore, density and quality are derived from the spontaneous movement of qi itself. To borrow Western philosophical terms, xin can be ontologically considered a monistic entity having continuity of qi from the mental to the physical.

In order to describe xin, Zhu uses two adjectives: empty (xu) and numinous (ling). These adjectives as metaphors for xin symbolize the inscrutable capacity of the mental (ling) as well as a reservoir of mental activity (xu) respectively. For example, Zhu claims that “the organ of xin is extremely inscrutable; it preserves the past [memory] and knows what comes (might we say, the future) [inference].”11 In fact, these descriptions are originated from the functional faculties of qi. The cognitive functions of xin as memory and inference are work by movements of lucid and numinous qi. In a word, the idea that mental activity of xin is an ontological analogy of the marvelous activities of qi enables us to infer that the mental phenomena of xin shares ontological properties with qi, having certain continuity between the mental and the physical. Thus, in Zhu’s philosophy xin does not mean certain conjunction between two different substances, which are ontologically irreducible to one another. Rather, xin is a sort of mode of qi, which can be considered as a unitary extended substance, having its various properties in accordance with its conditions. Such an ontological feature of xin leads us to rethink the propriety of the translation of ‘heart-mind’.

Zhu Xi’s Idea of Xin as the Dualistic Framework of Xing-Qing As we have seen so far, Descartes ontologically considers mind as non-material

9 Zhu, ZZYL, 41. 人生初間是先有氣. 旣成形, 是魄在先. “形旣生矣, 神發知矣.” 旣有形後, 方有精神知覺.

10 Zhu, ZZYL, 41. 先儒言:“口鼻之噓吸爲魂, 耳目之聰明爲魄.”也只說得大槪…人之能思慮計畫者, 魂之爲也; 能記憶辯別者, 魄之爲也.”

11 Zhu, ZZYL, 85. “心官至靈, 藏往知來.” Xin is often expressed by a spatial metaphor. For example, “the mind is the outer castle of human nature” (ZZYL: 3, 64).


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while Zhu understands xin as the physical event of qi. In terms of the mind-body problem, in fact, Cartesian dualism is an attempt to connect two things that are ontologically exclusive to each other. In other words, the mind-body problem starts with a hypothetical presumption that humans are a conjunction between mutually exclusive things. In the case of xin in Zhu’s philosophy, however, there is no such problem because xin, as the organ of thinking and feeling, has ontological continuity with the body. Then, is the notion of xin free from the problem of mind-body dualism?

In the insightful definition Zhu Xi fully embraces, “xin unifies xing with qing,”12 we can find a conjunction between two things that are ontologically heterogeneous. Xing is ontologically attributed to li while qing is attributed to qi in the Neo-Confucian way of thinking. In other words, when claiming that xin unifies xing with qing, there appears to be a kind of dualistic combination in which ontologically different entities are tied up together. According to Zhu, li and qi as the ontological entities have a sort of paradoxical relationship in that they are neither mixed nor separated. In so saying, Zhu Xi might also have been expressing certain puzzlement in his attempt to explain the relationship between them. That is, the relationship between li and qi implies inevitable interactions within human beings although they are ontologically different from each other. Of course, they do not signify the mind and body respectively. As I mentioned above, this is because in Zhu’s philosophy thought and matter are ontologically derived from the same thing, qi X. We may realize that Zhu’s understanding of xin can have a dualistic character even though it differs from the Cartesian dualism of mind and body.

The Nature of Duality of XinDescartes may have had his own philosophical projects for building up the dualistic framework.13 According to Cottingham, theological, metaphysical, and scientific considerations motivated Descartes’ dualism, although it would be difficult to single out any one as having the primacy in structuring his own personal convictions.14 Irrespective of whether his metaphysical demonstrations could be supported, such a perplexed dualism Descartes ventured to explain the incorporeality of the mind has provided with the mind-body problem by approaching them in the light of the substantialist perspective. For example, such properties as the immortal, the incorporeal, and the intellectual are remarkably distinguished from certain features the physical body has. This is the Cartesian approach to human beings in the light of the ontological framework for capturing all kinds of phenomena in the world.

The Chinese believed that in the living person dwelt the hun, or spiritual soul, and the po, or bodily soul. This dualism existed as early as the second century

12 Zhu, ZZYL, 67. 心統性情. This is argued by Zhang Zai, one of Zhu’s most reliable predecessors. Here, xing and qing indicate certain tendencies or dispositions that humans have. I will explain them in detail later.

13 Descartes himself admits that he in part failed to vindicate the dualistic framework metaphysically. See John Cottingham, “Cartesian Dualism: theology, metaphysics, and science,” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, 236-53.

14 John Cottingham, 236-53.

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BC, by which time it was already linked to the cosmological dualism of yin and yang, which, by joining, brought the world (including the human person) into existence. The hun-soul corresponds to the yang (associated with maleness, light, and activity) and the po-soul to the yin (femaleness, heaviness, and passivity). Like yin and yang, the hun and po-souls are a kind of binary way of understanding two different aspects or properties, which humans may possess at the same time, although they govern the mental faculties and the physical functions respectively. In contrast, Descartes is reluctant to envisage thought as the part of soul because “the word soul is ambiguous and is often applied to something corporeal.”15 It can therefore be said that Zhu and Descartes have different perspectives in understanding humans ontologically. To Zhu, all kinds of vital phenomena that humans represent are attributed to unitary activities of qi while Descartes tries to distinguish the mental from the physical. In terms of the mind-body problem in relation to the ontological framework, the Chinese way of thinking would be close to a sort of ‘property dualism’ when trying to find the characteristics of the mind, like the immortal and the intellectual.

Why then does Zhu fully embrace such a dualistic definition that xin unifies xing (li) with qing (qi)? What we must keep in mind here is the fact that he never has addressed the idea that xin is the unity between li and qi regardless of the question whether xing and qing are ontologically conceived of as li and qi respectively. Why does he pay attention to the xing-qing duality instead of the li-qi duality in understanding xin? What is the difference between the two dualities? What kinds of human features does Zhu Xi focus on when distinguishing xing from qing?

In the neo-Confucian terminology, qing is conceived as an entity implying all kinds of physical realities, which can be classified as emotive and temperamental stuff, while xing is considered as an entity entailing the original disposition only humans possess. Here, we need to illuminate the idea of xing more clearly. In a dialogue with a student, Zhu Xi figuratively states that xing is a sort of a disposition, which makes specific species like beans, chestnuts, or blackberries what they are.16 This means that each living thing has its own dispositions making it itself. Because of the dispositions, all kinds of creatures have their own peculiarities in correspondence with their species. Then, what makes us human? Are there any dispositions that differentiate human beings from other animals? Just as Aristotle defines the human being as a political animal, so Mencius defines humans as a moral animal. Mencius is explicit in saying that “you would not be human if you did lack the feeling of compassion” (Mencius 2A6). Since his claim, the moral is the most significant and only disposition of the species making humans humane in the Confucian tradition.17

15 René Descartes, “Objections and Replies,” in the Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 114.16 Zhu, ZZYL, 91.17 In a broad sense, the moral implies not just the ethical behavior of an individual, but also the

value-oriented tendency of human beings.


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Li: The Ontological Pattern of Xin Zhu Xi is convinced that such a moral disposition can be considered to be the ultimate principle of the world. To him, myriad things have “their own principles by which each thing is as it is (suoyiran zhi gu)” and “the ways according to which a thing ought to be (suodangran zhi ze).”18 Zhu Xi calls it li in the ontological dimension. Like qi, there is no single word for translating li in Western languages that covers all its facets. He ventured to define it as a sort of ‘pattern,’ ‘order,’ ‘principle,’ or ‘coherence,’ which inhere in all kinds of things in the world. Ontologically, in Zhu’s philosophy li is not an invariant substance, nor something transcendent. It means a sort of potentiality that all things innately have. When describing li as ‘no form (wuxing)’ in its ontological sense, for example, Zhu intends to say that it literally implies things yet to form. Through the debate on wuji-taiji in Lu Jiuyuan, one of the significant scholars contributing toward the idealistic tradition of neo-Confucianism in the Southern Song China,19 what Zhu wants to claim is that li should be understood, not as an invariant substance like ‘one thing,’ but as infinite openness as the ‘dynamic process’ of things. If it is considered as ‘one thing,’ according to him, taiji (li) cannot be the axis of all changes in the world.

Moreover, Zhu tries to reject the possibility that li is interpreted as something transcendent or a priori. When asking Zhu Xi whether or not taiji was the general name of the coherent order (li) of the myriad things and the Heaven-Earth, his most astute student, Chen Shun, was trying to comprehend the nature of taiji by clarifying the meaning of “something undifferentiated and yet formed ahead of the Heaven-Earth (tiandi).”20 More specifically, Chen Chun wanted Zhu Xi to clarify the implications of taiji because, ever since Zhou Dunyi, many neo-Confucians had continued to understand it in a Daoist context that can lead one to imagine the existence of something transcendent, independent of time and space (like the Western notion of God).21

Being aware of chapter twenty-five of the Daodejing, Chen Chun seemed to be asking whether taiji should be conceived as the nominal, rather than as the Daoist substantial. Chen thought that the understanding of taiji should be differentiated from the Daoist notion of something undifferentiated (hun cheng zhi wu), which can be interpreted as the transcendent. To sum up, he could not

18 Zhu Xi, the Questions on the Great Learning (Daxue Huowen) 1.11a-12b. “…至於天下之物, 則必各有所以然之故, 與其所當然之則, 所謂理也,…”

19 Their debates proceeded to elucidate the following points: (1) whether Zhou Dunyi was an authentic writer of the Diagram and Explanation of the Great Ridgepole. (2) How to understand the notion of wuji? (3) What is the meaning of ji (Ridgepole)? (4) What is the origin of the Diagram and Explanation of the Great Ridgepole? For my argument, I focus on (2). I try to translate taiji as the Great Ridgepole in order to communicate the literal meaning of the term. Wing-tsit Chan’s translation, ‘the Great Ultimate,’ leans heavily upon Zhu Xi’s interpretation. For this debate, see also Tillman 1992.

20 Zhu, ZZYL, 1.21 Another issue is whether or not the phrase appearing in chapter twenty five of the Daodejing,

“something undifferentiated and yet formed ahead of the Heaven-Earth” is originally understood as something transcendent. In order to overcome the interpretation influenced by the Western theology of God, Roger Ames and Hall philosophically re-translate it as follows: “There was some process that formed spontaneously, emerging before the heavens and the earth…” See Ames and Hall, 115.

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dare to think that taiji would be something transcendent like the Daoist concept. Instead Chen tentatively suggests the nominal as his answer in order to understand the notion of what is above the Heaven-Earth. Zhu Xi decisively rejects Chen’s answer. Nevertheless, he does not affirm that taiji is the transcendent, which would be independently substantial. Explicitly identifying it with li in answer to Chen’s suggestion, Zhu Xi wants to emphasize its immanence and reality rather than the transcendent and the nominal. Here, the idea of immanence seems not so much to highlight the opposite of transcendence as to involve the spontaneous integration of taiji with things. For example, aesthetic values of literature can be realized regardless of literature’s various styles. For all that, the values cannot break away from literature itself. In fact, such a way of understanding the nature of myriad things in Zhu’s account is derived from the Confucian intellectual reservoir of the Yi.

The Yi was fully modeled on the Heaven-Earth, and it can embrace, therefore, the Way of the

Heaven-Earth. Looking up, it contemplates the configurations of the Heavens (tianwen), and

looking down, observes the patterns of the Earth (dili)… (The Commentary of Yi A: 4)

Here, the author of the Commentary of Yi is explicit in stating that li is a certain constant pattern or order of things, including the Way of the heaven and earth. In terms of the idea that human experiences or humans per se are identified with the cosmic order of the Heaven-Earth, inherently, fully and isomorphically, we can say that li is a coherent integrative pattern, continuously unfolding through the world, including the myriad things (li yi fen shu). As Willard Peterson suggests ‘coherence’ might most optimally capture the whole meaning of li,22 as it means a coherent pattern making humans humane. When we say, for example, “he is coherent,” in everyday English, it implies that his way of speaking is very logical or reasonable. To have a coherent pattern or orderly coherence means his ways of life, ways of thinking, or ways of constructing a relationship with the world have a certain consistent pattern. When applied to personhood, it should be seen as a stable tendency a person possesses. So, the disposition can be termed the rational in terms of a logical coherence. As I mentioned above, the term li entails not only the descriptive, but also the prescriptive, which can be broadly interpreted as a value-oriented disposition in Zhu’s philosophy. The claim that “xing is no other than li” is to declare that what is called the original disposition of human beings is a consistent pattern to make humans humane.

Therefore, xing is the reason why humans are as they are as well as the way humans ought to be, while xin, as an aspect of qi, implies a vivid dynamics of life (elan vital). Moreover, “what humans ought to be” is not something heteronomous, nor coercive, but spontaneously becoming so itself. It can be called the natural disposition that humans innately have in the Neo-Confucian context. According to Zhu, fully manifesting the nature of xin (jinxin) is considered to be the realization of all kinds of potential principles that the myriad things innately have.

22 Willard Peterson, “Another Look at Li,” The Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies, 19.


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Furthermore, the entire understanding of one’s natural disposition (zhixing) is perfectly to follow a consistent pattern to make humans humane. Finally, this boils down to discerning the universe by grasping that the principles are so by their own virtue.23 In a word, such a series of sequences describes the Confucian view of the world that a human being is a sort of micro-universe, isomorphically identical with the Heaven-Earth.24

The Matter of Xin as Philosophical AnthropologyThe Translation of ‘Heart-Mind’ RevisitedBased upon my argument above, we can realize that it is difficult to translate the term of xin into ‘heart-mind’ unless we fully agree with Cartesian dualism.25 Although the duality of xing and qing can be ontologically reduced to the li-qi framework, such a duality never implies the ontological problem, which is concerned with the question of how to situate the mental within the physical world. If one holds to ‘the heart-mind’ as the translation of xin, there would exist the risk of leading readers of the English-speaking world to believe that the Chinese notion of xin would be a plausible answer to the mind-body problem because of the continuity between the mind and body.

In the Mencius we can of course find a conjunction between thinking and a bodily organ. Moreover, Mencius aims xin to signify two aspects, the emotive and the cognitive. To him, the organ of xin is in charge of not only the mental (Mencius, 6A15), but also the emotional in addressing the idea that the “xin of compassion is a sprout of humanity (Mencius, 2A6).” This view implies that there are psychological attitudes or dispositions in talking about a certain persistent attitude toward maintaining what one firmly believes (heng xin) or being used as ‘fully manifesting the nature of xin (jin xin),’ namely, ‘devoting oneself.’ To sum up, we can at least see that the Chinese xin has been developed into a conceptual bundle of meanings related not so much to bodily movements but to cognitive/emotive operations. In this context, ‘heart,’ as a part of the translation, can be considered as the organ in charge of emotional disposition or feelings in relation to the bodily mechanism.26

What then could serve as an alternative to this translation? In terms of the neo-Confucian idea of xin, it would be close in accordance with the ontological perspective to pneuma, which is an ancient Greek word for ‘breath’ and has developed philosophically into ‘spirit’ or ‘soul.’ However, I do not think that we can find one single proper English word for xin which accords with it philosophically,

23 Zhu, ZZYL, 1426. “盡心, 謂事物之理皆知之而無不盡; 知性, 謂知君臣∙父子∙兄弟∙夫婦∙朋友各循其理; 知天, 則知此理之自然.”

24 Zhu, ZZYL, 1426. “天便脫模是一箇大底人, 人便是一箇小底天.”25 Unlike his Scholastic predecessors, according to Marleen Rozemond, Descartes newly

reconceptualized the mental. For this, see Marleen Rozemond, “Descartes’s Dualism,” in A Companion to Descartes, ed. Janet Broughton and John Carriero, 372-89.

26 We may see that the pragmatic usages of heart are metaphorically derived from its physiological conditions if we consider the perspective of Chinese medicine. I will leave this aside in this article because it is not directly relevant to the topic at hand.

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and neither is it my goal in this paper to try and do so.27 Of course, I can add some adjectives for helping us understand the neo-Confucian idea of xin. Focusing on the implication of xing, which is based upon what I explained above, xin can be rendered as “humane-oriented mind.” Considering the unity between xing and qing, it can be translated as “intentional soul.”

These expressions are closer to a sort of interpretation than translation. In fact, translation is a kind of effective method to show us a certain specific philosophical interpretation that someone would like to argue. In this vein, what I want to say here is that the ‘heart-mind’ would not be a proper translation for xin unless the Cartesian dualistic understanding of the mind is consistent in the Chinese intellectual milieu. Probably, the ‘heart-mind’ can make up for a lack of the Cartesian mind by highlighting its physical aspect. Furthermore, the translation of ‘heart-mind’ starkly differentiates the Cartesian conception of the mind from Zhu Xi’s by showing that the translation of xin essentially entails a unity between the mental and the physical. Then, it can be called the embodied mind. But it is difficult to say that the term ‘heart-mind’ properly captures what Zhu Xi wants to represent via his understanding of the term xin. The uniqueness of xin in the neo-Confucian philosophy is not in the ontological feature of the physical embodiment, but in the philosophical anthropology of a desirable human character. In other words, the concept of xin should entail something humanistic or axiological goals for answering the question of what humans really are.

Xin: The Mind-Body Problem, the Li-Qi Framework, and the Unity of Xing-Qing Whatever it is, there are many ways to read the nature of xin in terms of various frameworks. For example, the mind-body problem starts with the question of how to explain the mental within the physical world. This question has nothing to do with the li-qi framework although both of them are deeply concerned with an ontological understanding of the world. In other words, the matter of the li-qi framework is not concerned with how to situate li (something non-physical) into qi (the physical). It implies that Zhu Xi does not regard the matter of xin as a problem of whether the mental is incommensurable with the physical. If we try to reconstruct Zhu’s philosophy in accordance with the mind-body problem, it would be closer to physicalism than Cartesian dualism. Just as mind and body can be understood as the physical continuity in physicalism, for instance, so they can also be conceived as the continuity of qi. The mind-body problem in Zhu’s theory can be interpreted as variant modes within the ontological oneness: qi. According to Zhu, the problem can be explained in terms of the spontaneous activities of qi, which are referred to as conglomeration and dispersion. Through the activity of conglomeration and dispersion, qi can have various degrees of quality and density. Hence, mental phenomena are specific states of qi-activity via conglomeration. Depending on how qi conglomerates, it can be a simple material like a stone or tree, or more complex, such as a living animal. In short, all life phenomena are a lucid

27 I think that the matter of translation will give rise to other philosophical problems like hermeneutic issues in relation to the philosophy of language. So, I will leave it aside in this paper.


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state of qi-activity. Moreover, Zhu took it for granted that life phenomena naturally have mental phenomena, like the activity of consciousness. The idea that a certain specific state of qi, namely, its extreme lucidness, can constitute mental phenomena is to imply that the phenomena emerge from the harmonious interaction of lucid qi.

As I explained above, li as xing can be read as a certain humanistic compass, showing us how humans ought to live. Furthermore, it is a sort of a natural pattern, which is innately given to us and thereby leads us to bring peace to this world. What I want to point out here is that the li-qi framework should not be understood as the relationship between the mental and the physical, although it is a sort of framework for understanding the ontological aspect of things, because the concept of li plays a teleological role in the Neo-Confucian way of ontological thinking.28 For example, Zhang Zai’s definition of xin on which Zhu Xi relies entails total unity between the axiological and the temperamental. The axiological signifies how humans ought to live, and already implies a teleological criterion or judgment of what kind of persons are morally decent in the Confucian world. On the other hand, the temperamental indicates all kinds of dispositions, including both the physical and the mental. As the ontological union of li and qi, xin does not give rise to the Cartesian question of how to link mind as thought with body as extension. Moreover, qi-activity implies not only a factual statement but also evaluative events. Therefore, the distinction between li and qi does not necessarily signify the distinction between value and fact. More precisely speaking, li and qi have their own respective descriptive and prescriptive aspects.

Why then does Zhu Xi try to connect li with qi, which would already entail both the factual and the axiological, in understanding xin? In order to differentiate humans from others, it seems that Zhu Xi paid special attention to the trait of li as axiological intentionality. Here, we need to sharply distinguish the axiological intentionality of li from the evaluative events of qi. When qi is understood as the total activity of things and events in the world, the events and things per se can be evaluated under certain conditions. When considering the feats of the legendary kings Yao and Shun as the transformation of qi, Zhu Xi seemed to imply not only that human civilization has been constituted by qi-material resources, but also that transformation is eventually placed into the terrain of value. Such qi-activity as conglomeration and dispersion carries such evaluative terms as ‘coherent,’ ‘optimal,’ ‘efficient,’ etc. Nonetheless, I do not think that the activity alone embodies right direction of what one ought to do. Although such evaluative terms as ‘optimal,’ ‘coherent,’ and ‘efficient’ capture certain specific phases of qi-movement, they would not necessarily allow the myriad things to become ‘themselves.’ To play the role of making one to become oneself is to lead one to manifest one’s own nature or possibilities. In the Confucian discourse, to manifest one’s own nature is to

28 This may give the impression that the li-qi framework is close to the relationship between form and matter in Aristotle’s philosophy although they are exactly identified with one another. I will here leave aside the Aristotelian issue of form and matter in relation to the mind-body problem, because it will give rise to other comparative philosophical problems.

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fully realize the natural tendencies of others and things in the world.29 Hence, the order implicitly entails axiological intentionality, which impels one to do what one believes one ought to do. In relation to xin, therefore, the notion of li in Zhu’s philosophy is considered as xing, which can be rendered as ‘nature’ or ‘natural disposition.’ In this case, the li-qi framework has nothing to do with the mind-body problem in the Western philosophical context. Rather, the li-qi framework in relation to the concept of xin reveals a philosophical anthropology of how humans ought to live by questioning what it means to live humanly, while the mind-body problem concerns the matter of the ontological relationship.

Xin as the Unity between the Moral and the MentalA unity between xing and consciousness (zhijue), which is also advocated by Zhu Xi, is another interesting definition of xin, formulated by Zhang Zai. We can see in the definition that the ontological difference Zhu wanted to clarify is a contrast between moral intention and consciousness in general. In differentiating human beings from other species,30 xing has two layers: the biological (qi zhi zhi xing) and the axiological dispositions (ben ran zhi xing). For instance, DNA or the audible frequency band of human beings are examples of the unique features that differentiate human beings from other species and that are derived from biological conditions, forming the temperamental. Moreover, human beings display sophisticated religious behavior, aesthetic tastes, or self-reflective attitudes, etc. In Zhu’s philosophy, the word ‘disposition (xing)’ does not imply the cognitive faculty or activities of thinking, but the principle of that faculty. A disposition is a sort of pattern innately engraved on qi-stuff, which can compose both the mental and the physical. Figuratively speaking, it is a sort of the built-in compass giving us a direction for living out humanistic values, which make humans different from other creatures. What are these humanistic values? For instance, we may recall such words as honesty, integrity, care and compassion, etc. These words let us know that values emerge from relationships between humans. The relationships are nothing but the matter of attitude toward others. Values start with the matter of choice when considering how humans should live. It develops into deliberation on living a better life, i.e., how human beings ought to live, which can form an intentional attitude toward axiological judgments of human action, and play the role of questioning the meaning of life. Thus, the axiological disposition (xing) as a part of xin is not only about the biological characteristics displaying unique human behaviors, but also the non-genetic tendencies that have been culturally transmitted to the next generation.

29 Zhongyong, Ch. 22.30 Interestingly, Zhu Xi emphasized in his commentary on Zhongyong that humans and animals

are equal to each other in terms of li (we might say, the cosmic order) while claiming that they are different from each other in terms of the same word, li, in his commentary on Mencius. This need not be taken as paradoxical, but as an unintended mistake. In fact, Zhu Xi often used the same word, li, without providing any clear description of it. As a result, even his students seemed at times confused (Zhu: 59). In the Commentary of Zhongyong (chap. 1), I think that the implication of li may be taken as the ontological common order in itself that all kinds of creatures equally possess. In the Commentary of Mencius (6A3), the cosmic order indicates humanity’s own order, which makes humans ‘human’.


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What does Zhu Xi mean by zhijue, which is rendered as ‘perception’ or ‘cognitive activity’ via sense data in English? It basically means the faculty of perception which both humans and animals share, and therefore has nothing to do with the moral. As we have seen so far, morality is derived from li as the universal principle of the world. In fact, such a distinction aims to criticize Buddhism by insisting that cognitive faculty per se is human nature, which entails the moral disposition. Zhu wants to maintain a firm foundation for moral cognition without relying on any sensual perception. Thus, he accounts for it by focusing on the marvelous faculty of xin per se. It is described as being ‘not-benighted,’ which means a state of always being aware of all kinds of moral events without any sensual stimuli at all. In this context, zhijue does not only imply the cognitive activity of humans, but also the entire faculty of moral understanding. In other words, zhijue also involves two phases, li and qi, at the same time—if it plays its role perfectly. When referring to zhijue as being conscious of things and events, it is the power of realizing the axiological disposition (xing) in the world. Hence, I believe that it can be considered as an intentional tendency toward what makes humans humane31 by consummating moral values like humanity and rightness.

These moral values have a firm certainty by constituting xin as a ground for embodying humaneness, which can be seen as a sort of ‘biological genetics’ in Zhu’s philosophical anthropology.32 Hence, the term xin, as the mental, extends itself for understanding the moral events in terms of cognitive dimension. If the mental is coextensively identified with the nature of xin, then it cannot be a reliable barometer for distinguishing humans from other creatures. Even so, the cognitive faculty alone should not be equal to human nature, including the moral disposition. To him, there are two components to the concept of xin: (1) the faculty of moral understanding and (2) the natural disposition of leading humans to carry out right judgments, choices, or actions. That is why Zhu truly advocates and develops Zhang’s idea that the concept of xin is the unity of the cognitive faculty with the axiological disposition.

The Locus of the Moral in Understanding XinAs I have argued so far, one of the key features of xin that Zhu tries to illuminate is a certain disposition, which leads humans to moral judgments, choices, or actions. In referring to the unity of xing with qing, Zhu is in fact interested in a distinction between the ethical (the axiological) and the temperamental (the physiological), rather than the ontological crevice between the mental and the physical to which Descartes paid special attention. I don’t think that Zhu wanted to claim ontological

31 In terms of ‘the principle (li)’ that makes each thing itself, of course, the disposition would be in a sense considered as a universal condition. For this, see Zhu: 59.

32 Ames and Bloom had a very absorbing disputation on the nature of xing, namely, whether it is nature or nurture. For this, refer to Roger Ames, “The Mencian Conception of Ren Xing: Does it Mean ‘Human Nature’?” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, 143-75. Irene Bloom, “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature ( Jen-hsing),” Philosophy East & West, 19-53. In the case of Zhu Xi, however, we need to read xing in a different context from that of Mencius. For this, see Zhu’s Commentary of Mencius 2A6, with special focus on the interpretation of duan.

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apriority of the moral in understanding human beings. For some reason, nevertheless, Zhu was aware of an ontological difference between the normative and the cognitive. One of the reasons for this seems to be that the normative is a sort of uniqueness that can be used to label humans as humane. Unlike the Cartesian ontological context, in short, Zhu explicitly clarifies that the axiological is totally different not only from the physical, but also from the mental by itself. According to Zhu, xin does not only preside over xing, which can be considered as a disposition making humans humane, but also directs qing, which can be seen as the temperamental disposition leading to human desire. Thus, the unity of xin does not just imply certain biological states of human creature, but also prescriptive conditions for transforming the human mind.

Zhu considers xin as the ground for engaging in cultivation.33 Although such a moral disposition is innately given to us, we should fully commit ourselves to the fulfillment of xin in order to become aware it. Even so, fulfilling xin is not necessarily the precondition to being aware of the moral disposition in his philosophy. Zhu Xi is clearly stating that “the reason why one can fulfill one’s xin is that one already understands what one’s disposition is and if one can do this, one knows the order of Heaven.” He added that “one is unable to fulfill one’s xin when one cannot understand one’s disposition.”34 Of course, the moral dispositions indicate such normative virtues as humanity, rightness, and ritual propriety in the real Confucian world. We should keep in mind that such virtues are not so much the ethical virtues per se, but the principle of the virtues in his philosophy. For example, the principle of humanity always manifests itself with qi-activities of love, just as medication does not work at all unless one takes it, although it has its own principle of efficacy. This entire process is carried out through xin. In other words, xin plays an optimal role by harmonizing the moral principle with each specific situation. It can be called ethical contextualization, which is presided over by xin. This is the reason why I claim that the concern of xin is not the mind-body problem, but the issue of philosophical anthropology, which seeks after what kind of human one should be and how one ought to live.

The question of how one should live is to establish a certain way of life.35 The way of life is not a priori given to us, but consummated through an ongoing process of interacting with the empirical world. If being a human entails an axiological intention or the value of species that humankind should pursue, as I said before, to become human means more than just being born as a human infant. Rather, it is to be accomplished through the achievements of the humanistic values. All of these processes are integrated into, manifested through, and finally universalized by xin as a dynamic place for creating the myriad things.

Although we need not fully agree with the claim that ‘being moral’ is a

33 Zhu, ZZYL, 94. 心者, 主乎性而行乎情.34 Zhu, ZZYL, 1422. “盡其心者, 知其性也.” 所以能盡其心者, 由先能知其性, 知性則知天矣. 知性知

天, 則能盡其心矣. 不知性, 不能以盡其心.35 Here we need to understand the way of life in a broad sense, which includes an axiological

intention to pursuing a better life.


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sufficient condition for living better, we may accept that we humans want to create meaning in our lives whatever it is. The process of creating meaning in one’s lives or to contextualize our lives is a sort of value-oriented disposition. A trajectory drawn by the value-oriented attitude makes us ‘humans.’ To borrow Zhu’s words, the trajectory can be neither classified with nor identified with one’s life itself. Xin that Neo-Confucians sketched in their minds is an intentional force to complete a consummate trajectory by combining the moral with the temperamental. Furthermore, they believed that the activity of xin has to do with the active participation of transforming and nourishing the world.36 The value xin embodies is to lead the myriad things to fulfill their own potentialities. That is what the morality of xin means.

ConclusionLet us return to the question that launched this paper: can we call xin mind? The answer would be “yes” and “no.” What can be said is that the Neo-Confucian idea of mind has totally different implications from the one with which contemporary philosophy of mind is deeply concerned. In understanding the mind, Neo-Confucian scholars have paid attention to its own uniqueness which only humans can innately have. They assume that the human mind has something special, which differs from what chimpanzees or elephants have in their minds. Based on my argument so far, I believe we have come to recognize some disparities between xin and mind.

In terms of the mind-body problem, the term of xin seems to be entirely monistic, unlike Cartesian dualism. Nevertheless, it has in a sense a dualistic tension between the normative and the cognitive. When making such an ontological difference between them, it is essentially a strategic framework for manifesting the possibility of making humans humane. This being so, it is hard to say that ‘the heart-mind’ is the proper term for xin, although it can show us the comprehensive aspect of xin as the conjunction between the physical and the mental.37 For example, a translation of the dictum, “xin unifies xing with qing” into conventional English, “mind (or the heart-mind) unifies human nature with emotions,” would make it difficult for English speakers to spell out what is implied in capturing the notion of mind.

In Zhu’s philosophy xin is an entire unity between the axiological intentionality of how one should live and actual occasions of human experiences, including the mental and the physical. The Neo-Confucian idea of xin shows us the ontological panorama of humans by answering the question of why and how we should live in this world. If the mind, like the Cartesian one, only signifies the mental alone, it is hard to describe the unique fabric of humankind that should be consummated via its whole life. We can see in Zhu’s criticism of Zhang Shi and Buddhism that the functional aspect of xin, namely, the mental phenomena, cannot

36 Zhongyong, Chap. 22.37 I would use “the spiritual mind” if forced to suggest an English translation of xin.

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be directly identified with what leads one to what one should do.38 Zhu Xi thought that Zhang and Buddhism may lead us into misidentifying the functional aspects of xin, like perception, thinking, and feeling, with xing as the original nature of human beings.

Why then does Zhu put the moral into the marrow of the human mind? Why does he consider the moral as something different from the mental in terms of ontological perspective? I assume that Zhu tried to elucidate the boundless dynamics of human transformation toward a well-rounded and noble character—like that of the sages. Since the northern Song era, when neo-Confucian scholars revived Mencius, they started to have confidence that we can become sages by making moral efforts through self-cultivation. Their beliefs have focused on philosophical investigations of xin. That is to say, they theorize an idea that humans possess an innate inner compass indicating how one ought to live and of what one ought to do in the world. This nature of xin they argued reveals what they consider as the foundation of true humankind.

On the other hand, we can still ask an ontological question of how to make an appropriate connection of moral intentionality with all the actual occasions of human experiences, namely, the real world. Zhu’s answer seems to come down eventually to practical fulfillment of all the ideas. In this vein, he truly emphasizes the persistent efforts to cultivate equanimity of xin via attentiveness (jing).39 To him, the world of xin belongs not to the kingdom of theories and ideas, but that of the realities that we vividly experience. By interacting with vivid experiences, xin becomes a more sensitive barometer for measuring values and giving us moral guidelines. Thus, the matter of xin is the matter of practice through concrete actions. That is why I claim that the notion of xin Zhu Xi attempted to establish is concerned with the philosophical-anthropological question, that is, how one ought to live in this world.

As we know well, translation is a sort of never-ending problem that gives rise to the matter of philosophical interpretation. Of course, I do not mean to imply that the attempt to discern philosophical implications between two target languages should necessarily create certain neologisms. Rather, we need to combine paying special attention to ordinary language and its semantic and pragmatic context with being aware of the subtle distinction between philosophical nuances. By using the comparative way of thinking, we are able not only to grasp the proper usage of the terms, but also to deepen our understanding of different philosophical traditions. One of the fruits of this methodology, I believe, is a greater understanding of the conceptual tension between mind and xin.

Acknowledgements: I deeply appreciate the insightful comments and helpful

38 Zhu, ZZYL, 104, 220 and 658.39 In order to see the unity Zhu Xi wanted to illuminate, we should examine the theoretical

transformation he underwent between his “Old Discourse of Equilibrium and Harmony” and “New Discourse of Equilibrium and Harmony.” For the sake of brevity, I will not here describe the character of this transformation. For further details, see Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, especially 118-20 and Chen Lai, Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu.


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suggestions made by anonymous reviewers of this paper. I also wish to thank Jieun Han and Franklin Rausch, for their precise editing and generous supports as manuscript editors. Their efforts were invaluable in revising my manuscript.

GLOSSARY

ben ran zhi xing 本然之性 taiji 太極Chen Chun 陳淳 tiandi 天地Daodejing 道德經 tianwen 天文Daxue Huowen 大學或問 wu 無dili 地理 wuji 無極duan 端 wuji-taiji 無極-太極heng xin 恒心 wuxing 無形hun 魂 xin 心hun cheng zhi wu 混成之物 xin zai nali 心在哪里jin xin 盡心 xing 性jing 敬 xing ji li 性卽理li 理 xu 虛li yi fen shu 理一分殊 yang 陽Li 禮 Yao 堯ling 靈 Yi 易Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 yi 義po 魄 yin 陰qi 氣 yin yang 陰陽 qi zhi zhi xing 氣質之性 Zhang Zai 張載qing 情 zhi 知ren 仁 zhi 智shen 神 zhijue 知覺shen 身 Zhongyong 中庸Shun 舜 Zhou Dunyi 周惇頤Shuowenjiezi 說文解字 Zhu Xi 朱熹suodangran zhi ze 所當然之則 Zhuang Zi 莊子suoyiran zhi gu 所以然之故

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