virtue theory and abortion

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Virtue Theory and AbortionAuthor(s): Rosalind HursthouseSource: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 223-246Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265432.

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ROSALIND URSTHOUSE VirtueTheoryand Abortion

The sort of ethical theoryderived fromAristotle,variously described asvirtue ethics, virtue-basedethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, s becomingbetter known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possiblerival to deontologicaland utilitarian heories. Withrecognitionhas comecriticism,of varying quality.In this articleI shall discuss nine separatecriticismsthat I have frequentlyencountered,most of which seem to meto betrayan inadequate graspeither of the structureof virtue theory orof what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in itsterms. In the first half I aimparticularlyo secure an understandingthatwill reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and toarticulate what I take to be the majorcriticism of virtue theory. I rejectthis criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In thesecond half I aim to deepen thatunderstandingand highlight the issuesraisedby the criticismsby illustratingwhat the theory ooks like when itis appliedto a particular ssue, in this case, abortion.VIRTUE THEORYVirtuetheorycan be laid out in a framework hatrevealsclearly some ofthe essential similaritiesanddifferences between it and some versions ofdeontologicaland utilitarian heories. I begin with a rough sketch of fa-

Versions of this article have been read to philosophy societies at University College, Lon-don, Rutgers University, and the Universities of Dundee, Edinburgh, Oxford, Swansea,and California-San Diego; at a conference of the Polish and British Academies in Cracowin I988 on "Life, Death and the Law,"and as a symposium paper at the Pacific Division ofthe American Philosophical Association in I989. I am grateful to the many people whocontributed to the discussions of it on these occasions, and particularly to Philippa Foot andAnne Jaap Jacobson for private discussion.

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miliarversions of the latter two sorts of theory,not, of course, with theintention of suggesting that they exhaust the field, but on the assump-tion that their very familiaritywill providea helpful contrast with virtuetheory.Supposea deontological heoryhas basicallythe following frame-work.We begin with a premiseprovidinga specificationof right action:P. . An action is rightiff it is in accordancewith a moral rule or prin-ciple.

This is a purelyformalspecification, orginga link between the conceptsof right action and moral rule, and gives one no guidance until oneknowswhat a moralruleis. So the next thing the theoryneeds is a prem-ise about that:P.2. A moralrule is one that ...

Historically,an acceptablecompletionof P.2 would have been(i) is laid on us by God

or(ii) is requiredby natural aw.

In secular versions (not, of course, unconnected to God'sbeing purerea-son, and the universalityof naturallaw) we get such completionsas(iii) is laid on us byreason

or(iv) is requiredby rationalityor

(v) would commanduniversalrationalacceptanceor

(vi) would be the objectof choice of all rationalbeingsand so on. Such a specification orgesa second conceptuallink, betweenthe concepts of moralrule and rationality.We have here the skeleton of a familiarversionof a deontological he-ory, a skeleton that reveals that what is essential to any such version isthe links between right action, moralrule, and rationality. That these



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formthe basic structure can be seen particularly ividly f we lay out thefamiliaract-utilitarianismn such a way as to bring out the contrasts.Act-utilitarianismbegins with a premise that provides a specificationof right action:P. . An actionis right iff it promotesthe best consequences.

It therebyforges the link between the concepts of right action and con-sequences. It goes on to specify what the best consequences are in itssecond premise:P.2. The best consequences are those in which happiness is maxi-mized.

It therebyforges the link between consequencesand happiness.Now let us consider what a skeletalvirtue theorylooks like. It beginswith a specificationof right action:P. . An action is right iff it is what a virtuousagent would do in thecircumstances.'

This, like the first premises of the other two sorts of theory, is a purelyformalprinciple,givingone no guidanceas to what todo, that forges theconceptual link between right action and virtuous agent. Like the othertheories, it must, of course, go on to specify what the latteris. The firststep toward this may appearquite trivial,but is needed to correct a pre-vailing tendency amongmany criticsto define the virtuousagent as onewho is disposedto act in accordancewith a deontologist'smoralrules.P. a. A virtuousagent is one who acts virtuously,that is, one who hasand exercises the virtues.

This subsidiarypremiselays bare the fact that virtuetheoryaims to pro-vide a nontrivialspecificationof the virtuousagent via a nontrivialspec-ification of the virtues,which is given in its second premise:i. It should be noted that this premise intentionally allows for the possibility that twovirtuous agents, faced with the same choice in the same circumstances, may act differ-ently. For example, one might opt for taking her father off the life-support machine and

the other for leaving her father on it. The theory requires that neither agent thinks thatwhat the other does is wrong (see note 4 below), but it explicitly allows that no action isuniquely right in such a case-both are right. It also intentionally allows for the possibilitythat in some circumstances-those into which no virtuous agent could have got herself-no action is right. I explore this premise at greater length in "Applying Virtue Ethics,"forthcoming in afestschrift for Philippa Foot.



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P. 2. A virtue is a character raita humanbeing needs to flourishor livewell.This premiseforgesa conceptuallink betweenvirtue andflourishing (orliving well oreudaimonia).And, just as deontology, n theory,then goeson to argue that each favored rule meets its specification, so virtueethics, in theory, goes on to arguethat each favoredcharacter raitmeetsits.These are the bare bones of virtuetheory.Followingarefive briefcom-ments directedto some misconceivedcriticisms that should be clearedout of the way.First, the theorydoes not have a peculiarweakness or problem n vir-tue of the fact that it involves the concept of eudaimonia (a standardcriticism being that this concept is hopelessly obscure). Now no virtuetheorist will pretend that the concept of human flourishingis an easyone to grasp.I will not even claimhere (though I wouldelsewhere) thatit is no more obscure than the concepts of rationality and happiness,since, if our vocabularywere more limited, we might, faute de mieux,call it (human) rational happiness,and therebyrevealthat it has at leastsome of the difficultiesof both. But virtue theoryhas never, so far as Iknow, been dismissed on the grounds of the comparativeobscurityofthis central concept; rather, the popularview is that it has a problemwith this which deontologyand utilitarianism n no way share. This, Ithink, is clearlyfalse. Both rationality and happiness, as they figure intheir respective theories, are rich and difficult concepts-hence all thedisputes about the various tests for a rule's being an object of rationalchoice, and the disputes, datingback to Mill's ntroductionof the higherand lowerpleasures,about what constituteshappiness.Second, the theory s not triviallycircular; t does not specifyright ac-tion in termsof the virtuousagent and then immediatelyspecify the vir-tuous agent in terms of right action. Rather, t specifies her in terms ofthe virtues, and then specifies these, not merely as dispositionsto rightaction,but as the character raits(which aredispositions o feel andreactas well as act in certainways) required or eudaimonia.2

2. There is, of course, the further question of whether the theory eventually describes alarger circle and winds up relying on the concept of right action in its interpretation ofeudaimonia. In denying that the theory is trivially circular, I do not pretend to answer thisintricate question. It is certainly true that virtue theory does not claim that the correctconception of eudaimonia can be got from "an independent 'value-free' investigation of



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Third,it does answer the question "Whatshould I do?"as well as thequestion "Whatsortof person should I be?"(That is, it is not, as one ofthe catchphrases has it, concernedonlywith Being and not with Doing.)Fourth, the theory does, to a certainextent, answer this question bycoming up with rules orprinciples (contrary o the common claim that itdoes not come up with any rules orprinciples).Everyvirtue generates apositive instruction (act justly, kindly,courageously, honestly, etc.) andevery vice a prohibition do not act unjustly, cruelly, like a coward, dis-honestly, etc.). So trying to decide what to do within the frameworkofvirtuetheory s not, as some peopleseem toimagine, necessarilya matterof taking one's favored candidate for a virtuousperson and asking one-self, "Whatwould they do in these circumstances?" as if the rapedfif-teen-year-oldgirl might be supposedto say to herself, "Nowwould Soc-rates have an abortion if he were in my circumstances?" and as ifsomeone who had never known or heard of anyone very virtuous weregoing to be left, accordingto the theory,with no way to decide what todo at all). The agent may instead ask herself, "If I were to do such andsuch now, would I be acting justly or unjustly (or neither), kindly orunkindly [and so on]?" I shall consider below the problemcreated bycases in which such a question apparentlydoes not yield an answer to"Whatshould I do?"(because, say, the alternativesare being unkind orbeing unjust); here my claim is only that it sometimes does-the agentmay employ her concepts of the virtues and vices directly,rather thanimagining what some hypotheticalexemplarwoulddo.

Fifth (a point that is implicitbut should be made explicit), virtue the-oryis not committedto any sort of reductionism nvolving defining all ofour moral concepts in terms of the virtuous agent. On the contrary,itrelies on a lot of very significantmoralconcepts. Charityorbenevolence,for instance, is the virtue whose concern is the good of others; that con-cept of good is relatedto the concept of evil or harm, and they are bothrelated to the concepts of the worthwhile, the advantageous, and thepleasant. If I have the wrong conceptionof what is worthwhile and ad-human nature" (John McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics," in Essayson Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Rorty IBerkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, I980]). The sort of training that is required for acquiring the correct conception nodoubt involves being taught from early on such things as "Decent people do this sort ofthing, not that" and "To do such and such is the mark of a depraved character" (cf. Nico-machean Ethics i i oa22). But whether this counts as relying on the concept of right (orwrong) action seems to me very unclear and requiring much discussion.



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vantageousand pleasant,then I shallhave the wrongconceptionof whatis good for, and harnful to, myself and others, and, even with the bestwill in the world,will lack the virtue of charity, which involves gettingall this right. (This point will be illustratedat some length in the secondhalf of this article;I mention it here only in supportof the fact that novirtue theorst who takes her inspiration rom Aristotlewould even con-templateaiming at reductionism.)3Let me now, with equal brevity,run throughtwo more standardcriti-cisms of virtue theory(the sixth and seventh of my nine) to show that,though not entirelymisplaced, they do not highlight problemspeculiarto that theory but, rather, problemsthat are sharedby familiarversionsof deontology.One common criticismis that we do not know which charactertraitsare the virtues, or that this is open to much dispute, or particularly ub-ject to the threatof moralskepticismor "pluralism"4r cultural relativ-ism. But the parallelroles playedby the second premises of both deon-tologicaland virtuetheories revealthe wayin which both sorts of theoryshare this problem.It is at the stage at which one tries to get the rightconclusions to dropout of the bottomof one's theory that, theoretically,all the work has to be done. Rule deontologistsknow that they want toget "don'tkill," "keeppromises,""cherishyour children,"and so on asthe rules that meet their specification,whatever it may be. They alsoknow that any of these can be disputed, that some philosophermayclaim, of any one of them, that it is reasonableto reject it, and that atleast people claim that there has been, for each rule, some culture that

3. Cf. Bernard Williams' point in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: WilliamCollins, I985) that we need an enriched ethical vocabulary, not a cut-down one.

4. I put pluralism in scare quotes to serve as a warning that virtue theory is not incom-patible with all forms of it. It allows for "competing conceptions" of eudaimonia and theworthwhile, for instance, in the sense that it allows for a plurality of flourishing lives-thetheory need not follow Aristotle in specifying the life of contemplation as the only one thattruly constitutes eudaimonia (if he does). But the conceptions "compete" only in the sensethat, within a single flourishing life, not everything worthwhile can be fitted in; the theorydoes not allow that two people with a correct conception of eudaimonia can disagree overwhether the way the other is living constitutes flourishing. Moreover, the theory is com-mitted to the strong thesis that the same set of character traits is needed for any flourishinglife; it will not allow that, for instance, soldiers need courage but wives and mothers do not,or that judges need justice but can live well despite lacking kindness. (This obviously isrelated to the point made in note i above.) For an interesting discussion of pluralism (dif-ferent interpretations thereof) and virtue theory, see Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Liberalismand Natural End Ethics," American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990): 153-6I.



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rejectedit. Similarly, he virtue theoristsknow that they want to get jus-tice, charity, fidelity, courage, and so on as the charactertraitsneededfor eudaimonia; and they also know that any of these can be disputed,that some philosopherwill say of any one of them that it is reasonabletoreject it as a virtue, and that there is said to be, for each charactertrait,some culture that has thus rejectedit.This is a problemfor both theories, and the virtue theorist certainlydoes not find it any harder to argue against moral skepticism, "plural-ism," or cultural relativismthan the deontologist. Each theory has tostick out its neck andsay, in some cases, "Thisperson/thesepeople/othercultures are (or would be) in error," nd find some groundsfor sayingthis.Anothercriticism (the seventh) often made is that virtue ethics hasunresolvableconflict built into it. "It is common knowledge," t is said,"thatthe requirementsof the virtues can conflict; charitymay prompt

me to end the frightfulsufferingof the personin my care by killing him,but justice bids me to stay my hand. To tell my brotherthat his wife isbeing unfaithfulto him wouldbe honest andloyal,but it would be kinderto keep quiet aboutit. So which shouldI do?In such cases, virtue ethicshas nothing helpful to say."(This is one version of the problem,men-tioned above, that consideringwhether a proposedaction falls under avirtue or vice term does not always yield an answer to "What should Ido?")The obviousreply to this criticismis that rule deontologynotoriouslysuffers from the same problem,arising not only from the fact that itsrules can apparentlyconflict,but alsofrom the fact that, at firstblush, itappearsthatone and the same rule (e.g., preserve ife) can yieldcontraryinstructionsin a particular ase.5As before,I agree that this is a problemforvirtue theory,but deny that it is a problempeculiarto it.Finally, I want to articulate,and reject, what I take to be the majorcriticismof virtue theory.Perhapsbecause it is the majorcriticism, thereflectionof a very generalsortof disquietabout the theory,it is hardtostate clearly-especially for someone who does not accept it-but it goessomething like this.6Myinterlocutorsays:

5. E.g., in Williams' Jim and Pedro case in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitar-ianism: For and Against (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973).6. Intimations of this criticism constantly come up in discussion; the clearest statementof it I have found is by Onora O'Neill, in her review of Stephen Clark's The Moral Status



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Virtue theory can't get us anywherein real moralissues because it'sbound to be all assertionand no argument.You admitthat the best itcan come up with in the way of action-guidingrules are the ones thatrely on the virtue and vice concepts, such as "actcharitably,""don'tact cruelly,"and so on; and, as if that weren't bad enough, you admitthat these virtueconcepts, such as charity, presupposeconcepts suchas the good, and the worthwhile,and so on. But that means that anyvirtue theorist who writes about real moral issues must rely on heraudience's agreeing with her applicationof all these concepts, andhence accepting all the premises in which those applicationsare en-shrined. But some other virtue theoristmight take differentpremisesabout these matters, and come up with very different conclusions,and, within the terms of the theory,there is no way to distinguish be-tween the two.Whilethereis agreement,virtuetheorycan repeatcon-ventional wisdom, preserve the status quo, but it can't get us any-where in the way that a normative ethical theory is supposed to,namely, by providingrationalgroundsfor acceptance of its practicalconclusions.

My strategywill be to split this criticisminto two: one (the eighth) ad-dressed to the virtue theorist'semploymentof the virtue and vice con-cepts enshrined in her rules-act charitably,honestly, and so on-andthe other (the ninth) addressedto her employmentof concepts such asthat of the worthwhile.Each objection, I shall maintain, implicitlyap-peals to a certainconditionof adequacyon a normativemoraltheory, andin each case, I shallclaim,the conditionof adequacy,once made explicit,is utterlyimplausible.It is true that when she discusses realmoral ssues, the virtuetheoristhas to assert that certain actionsare honest, dishonest, orneither; char-itable, uncharitable,or neither. And it is true that this is often a verydifficultmatter to decide;her rules arenot alwayseasy to apply.But thiscounts as a criticismof the theoryonly if we assume, as a conditionofadequacy,that any adequateaction-guiding heorymust make the diffi-cult business of knowingwhat to do if one is to act well easy, that it mustprovideclearguidanceabout whatought andoughtnot to be done whichof Animals, in Journal of Philosophy 77 (I980): 440-46. For a response I am much insympathy with, see Cora Diamond, "Anything But Argument?" Philosophical Investiga-tions 5 (I982): 23-41.



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any reasonably clever adolescent could follow if she chose. But such aconditionof adequacy s implausible.Acting rightlyis difficult,and doescall for much moral wisdom, and the relevant condition of adequacy,which virtue theory meets, is that it should have built into it an expla-nation of a truth expressed by Aristotle,7namely, that moral knowl-edge-unlike mathematicalknowledge-cannot be acquired merely byattendinglectures and is not characteristicallyo be found in people tooyoung to have had much experience of life. There are youthful mathe-matical geniuses, but rarely,if ever, youthful moral geniuses, and thistells us something significant about the sort of knowledge that moralknowledgeis. Virtue ethics builds this in straightoff precisely by couch-ing its rules in terms whose applicationmay indeed call for the mostdelicate and sensitivejudgment.Here we may discern a slightly differentversion of the problemthatthere are cases in which applyingthe virtue and vice termsdoes not yieldan answer to "Whatshould I do?"Suppose someone "youthful n char-acter,"as Aristotleputs it, having appliedthe relevant terms, finds her-self landed with what is, unbeknownst to her, a case not of real but ofapparentconflict, arisingfroma misapplicationof those terms. Then shewill not be able to decidewhat todo unless she knowsof a virtuousagentto look to for guidance. But her quandary s (ex hypothesi) the result ofher lack of wisdom, andjust what virtuetheory expects. Someone hesi-tating over whether to reveal a hurtful truth, for example, thinking itwould be kind but dishonest or unjust to lie, may need to realize, withrespect to these particularcircumstances,not that kindness is more (orless) importantthan honesty orjustice, and not that honesty or justicesometimesrequiresone to act unkindlyorcruelly,but that one does peo-ple no kindness by concealing this sort of truth from them, hurtful as itmay be. This is the typeof thing (I use it onlyas an example) thatpeoplewith moralwisdomknowabout, nvolvingthe correctapplicationof kind,and that peoplewithoutsuch wisdom find difficult.What about the virtue theorist'sreliance on concepts such as that ofthe worthwhile?If such reliance is to count as a fault in the theory,whatconditionof adequacy s implicitly n play?It must be that any goodnor-mative theory should provideanswers to questions about real moral is-sues whose truth is in no way determinedby truthsabout what is worth-

7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I142ai2-i6.



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while, or what really matters in human life. Now although people areinitially nclined to reject out of hand the claimthat the practicalconclu-sions of a normativemoral theoryhave to be based on premises aboutwhat is truly worthwhile,the alternative,once it is made explicit, maylook even more unacceptable.Considerwhat the conditionof adequacyentails. If truths aboutwhat is worthwhile (or truly good, or serious, oraboutwhat mattersin human life) do not have to be appealedto in orderto answer questions aboutreal moralissues, then I might sensibly seekguidance about what I ought to do from someone who had declaredinadvance that she knew nothing about such matters, or from someonewho said that, although she had opinionsabout them, these were quitelikely to be wrong but that this did not matter,because they would playno determiningrolein the adviceshe gaveme.I shouldemphasizethatwe aretalkingaboutreal moral ssues andrealguidance; I want to know whether I should have an abortion,take mymother off the life-supportmachine, leave academic life and become adoctor in the ThirdWorld,give up my job with the firm that is usinganimals in its experiments, tell my fatherhe has cancer. WouldI go tosomeone who says she has no views about what is worthwhile n life? Orto someone who says that,as a matter of fact, she tends to think that theonly thing that matters is havinga goodtime, but has a normativetheorythat is consistent both with this view and with my own rathermorepu-ritanicalone, which will yield the guidanceI need?I take it as a premise that this is absurd. The relevant condition ofadequacy should be that the practicalconclusions of a good normativetheory must be in part determined by premises about what is worth-while, important,and so on. Thus I reject this "major riticism"of virtuetheory,thatit cannot get us anywhere n the way that a normativemoraltheory s supposedto. According o my response,a normative heorythatany clever adolescent can apply, or that reaches practicalconclusionsthat are in no way determinedby premises about what is truly worth-while, serious, and so on, is guaranteed o be an inadequatetheory.AlthoughI reject this criticism,I have not arguedthat it is misplacedand that it necessarilymanifests a failureto understandwhat virtuethe-ory is. My rejection is based on premises about what an adequate nor-mative theorymust be like-what sortsof concepts it must contain, andwhat sort of account it must give of moral knowledge-and therebyclaims, implicitly,that the "major riticism"manifestsa failureto under-



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stand what an adequatenormative theoryis. But, as a matterof fact, Ithink the criticism is often made by people who have no idea of whatvirtue theorylooks like when appliedto a real moral issue; they drasti-cally underestimatethe varietyof ways in which the virtue andvice con-cepts, and the others, such as that of the worthwhile,figure in such dis-cussion.

As promised,I now turn to an illustrationof such discussion, applyingvirtue theoryto abortion.BeforeI embarkon this tendentious business,I shouldremindthe readerof the aim of this discussion. I am not, in thisarticle, tryingto solve the problemof abortion; am illustratinghow vir-tue theory directs one to think about it. It might indeed be said thatthinkingaboutthe problem n this way"solves"t by dissolving it, insofaras it leads one to the conclusion that thereis no single right answer,buta varietyof particularanswers, and in what followsI am certainlytryingto make that conclusion seem plausible.But, that granted, t should stillbe said that I am not tryingto "solvethe problems"n the practicalsenseof telling people that they should, or should not, do this or that if theyare pregnantand contemplatingabortion n these or those particularcir-cumstances.I do not assume, or expect, that all of my readerswill agree with ev-erythingI am aboutto say. On the contrary,given the plausibleassump-tion that some aremorallywiser than I am, and some less so, the theoryhas built into it that we are bound to disagree on some points. For in-stance, we may well disagreeabout the particularapplicationof some ofthe virtue andvice terms;andwe maydisagreeabout what is worthwhileor serious, worthless or trivial. But my aim is to make clear how theseconcepts figure in a discussion conducted in terms of virtue theory.What is at issue is whether these concepts are indeed the ones thatshould come in, that is, whether virtue theory should be criticized foremployingthem. The problemof abortionhighlights this issue dramati-cally since virtuetheory quite transforms he discussion of it.ABORTIONAs everyone knows, the moralityof abortion s commonlydiscussed inrelationtojust two considerations: irst,andpredominantly, he status ofthe fetus and whether or not it is the sort of thing that may or may notbe innocuously orjustifiablykilled;and second, and less predominantly



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(when, that is, the discussion concerns the morality of abortionratherthan the question of permissiblelegislationin a just society), women'srights. If one thinks within this familiarframework,one may well bepuzzled about what virtue theory,as such, could contribute.Some peo-ple assume the discussion will be conducted solely in terms of what thevirtuousagent wouldorwouldnot do (cf. the third,fourth,and fifth crit-icisms above). Others assume that only justice, or at most justice andcharity,8will be appliedto the issue, generatinga discussionverysimilarto JudithJarvisThomson's.9Now if this is the way the virtue theorist'sdiscussion of abortionisimagined to be, no wonderpeople think little of it. It seems obvious inadvance that in any such discussion there must be either a greatdeal ofextremely tendentious applicationof the virtue termsjust, charitable,and so on or a lot of rhetoricalappealto "thisis what only the virtuousagent knows."But these are caricatures; hey fail to appreciatethe wayin which virtuetheoryquite transforms he discussionof abortionby dis-missing the two familiardominatingconsiderationsas, in a way, funda-mentallyirrelevant.In what way or ways, I hope to make both clear andplausible.Let us first considerwomen'srights. Let me emphasize again that wearediscussing the moralityof abortion,not the rightsandwrongsof lawsprohibitingor pernitting it. If we suppose that women do have a moralright to do as they choose with their own bodies,or,more particularly, oterminatetheirpregnancies,then it maywell followthata law forbiddingabortionwould be unjust. Indeed, even if they have no such right, sucha law might be, as things standat the moment,unjust, orimpractical,orinhumane:on this issue I havenothingto sayin this article.But, puttingall questions about the justice or injustice of laws to one side, and sup-

8. It seems likely that some people have been misled by Foot's discussion of euthanasia(through no fault of hers) into thinking that a virtue theorist's discussion of terminatinghuman life will be conducted exclusively in terms of justice and charity (and the corre-sponding vice terms) (Philippa Foot, "Euthanasia," Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 2[Winter 1977]: 85-I I 2). But the act-category euthanasia is a very special one, at least asdefined in her article, since such an act must be done "for the sake of the one who is todie." Building a virtuous motivation into the specification of the act in this way immediatelyrules out the application of many other vice terms.

9. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion,"Philosophy & Public Affairs I, no. i(Fall 1971): 47-66. One could indeed regard this article as proto-virtue theory (no doubtto the surprise of the author) if the concepts of callousness and kindness were allowedmore weight.



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posing only that women have such a moralright, nothing follows fromthis suppositionabout the moralityof abortion,accordingto virtue the-ory, once it is noted (quite generally,not with particularreference toabortion)that in exercising a moralright I can do something cruel, orcallous, or selfish, light-minded, self-righteous, stupid, inconsiderate,disloyal,dishonest-that is, act viciously.IoLove and friendshipdo notsurvive their parties'constantly insisting on their rights, nor do peoplelive well when they think that getting what they have a right to is ofpreeminent importance;they harm others, and they harm themselves.So whether women have a moralright to tenninate theirpregnancies isirrelevantwithin virtuetheory,forit is irrelevant o the question"Inhav-ing an abortion n these circumstances,would the agent be acting vir-tuously orviciouslyorneither?"Whataboutthe considerationof the status of the fetus-what can vir-tue theory say about that? One might say that this issue is not in theprovinceof any moraltheory;it is a metaphysicalquestion, and an ex-tremely difficult one at that. Must virtue theory then wait upon meta-physics to come up with the answer?At first sight it might seem so. Forvirtue is said to involveknowledge,andpartof this knowledgeconsists in havingthe right attitude to things."Right"here does not just mean "morally ight"or "proper" r "nice" nthe modem sense; it means "accurate, rue."One cannot have the rightor correct attitude to something if the attitude is based on or involvesfalse beliefs. And this suggests that if the status of the fetus is relevantto the rightness orwrongness of abortion, ts status must be known, as atruth, to the fully wise and virtuousperson.But the sort of wisdom that the fully virtuousperson has is not sup-posed to be recondite;it does not call forfancy philosophicalsophistica-tion, and it does not depend upon, let alonewait upon, the discoveriesofacademicphilosophers.",And this entails the following,ratherstartling,

io. One possible qualification: if one ties the concept of justice very closely to rights,then if women do have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies it may follow that indoing so they do not act unjustly. (Cf. Thomson, "ADefense of Abortion.") But it is debat-able whether even that much follows.i i. This is an assumption of virtue theory, and I do not attempt to defend it here. Anadequate discussion of it would require a separate article, since, although most moral phi-losophers would be chary of claiming that intellectual sophistication is a necessary condi-tion of moral wisdom or virtue, most of us, from Plato onward, tend to write as if this wereso. Sorting out which claims about moral knowledge are committed to this kind of elitism



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conclusion: that the status of the fetus-that issue overwhich so muchink has been spilt-is, accordingto virtue theory,simplynot relevant tothe rightness or wrongness of abortion within, that is, a secular moral-ity).

Orrather,since that is clearlytooradicala conclusion, it is in a senserelevant,but only in the sense that the familiarbiologicalfacts are rele-vant. By "the familiarbiological acts"I mean the facts thatmost humansocieties are and have been familiarwith-that, standardly but not in-variably),pregnancy occurs as the result of sexual intercourse, that itlasts aboutnine months, duringwhich time the fetus grows and devel-ops, that standardly t terminatesin the birthof a living baby, and thatthis is how we all come to be.

It might be thought that this distinction-between the familiarbiolog-ical facts and the status of the fetus-is a distinctionwithout a differ-ence. But this is not so. To attachrelevanceto the status of the fetus, inthe sense in which virtuetheoryclaimsit is not relevant, s to be grippedby the conviction that we must go beyond the familiarbiologicalfacts,derivingsome sort of conclusion from them, such as that the fetus hasrights, or is not a person, or something similar.It is also to believe thatthis exhausts the relevance of the familiarbiologicalfacts, that all theyare relevantto is the status of the fetus and whether or not it is the sortof thing thatmay ormay not be killed.These convictions,I suspect, are rooted n the desire to solve the prob-lem of abortionby gettingit to fallundersome generalrule such as "Youought not to kill anything with the right to life but may kill anythingelse."But they have resultedin what shouldsurelystrikeany nonphilos-opheras a most bizarreaspect of nearlyall the currentphilosophical it-eratureon abortion,namely, that, farfromtreatingabortionas a uniquemoralproblem,markedlyunlike any other,nearlyeverythingwrittenonthe status of the fetus and its bearing on the abortion ssue would beconsistent with the human reproductive acts' (to say nothing of familylife) being totallydifferentfromwhat they are. Imagine that you are analien extraterrestrial nthropologistwho does not know that the humanrace is roughly50 percent female and 50 percentmale, or that our only(natural)form of reproductionnvolves heterosexualintercourse,vivipa-and which can, albeit with difficulty, be reconciled with the idea that moral knowledge canbe acquired by anyone who really wants it would be a major task.



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237 VirtueTheory and Abortion

rous birth, and the female's (and only the female's) being pregnant fornine months, or that females arecapableof childbearing rom late child-hood to late middle age, or that childbearing s painful, dangerous, andemotionally charged-do you think you would pick up these facts fromthe hundreds of articles written on the status of the fetus? I am quitesure you would not. Andthat, I think, shows that the currentphilosoph-ical literatureon abortionhas got badlyout of touch with reality.Now if we are using virtue theory,our first question is not "Whatdothe familiarbiological acts show-what can be derivedfromthem aboutthe status of the fetus?" but "How do these facts figure in the practicalreasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and reactions,of the virtuousand the nonvirtuous?What is the mark of having the right attitude tothese facts and what manifestshavingthe wrongattitude to them?"Thisimmediatelymakes essentially relevant not only all the facts about hu-man reproductionI mentioned above,but a whole range of facts aboutour emotions in relation to them as well. I mean such facts as that hu-man parents,both male andfemale, tend to carepassionatelyabouttheiroffspring, and that family relationships are among the deepest andstrongestin our lives-and, significantly,among the longest-lasting.These facts make it obvious that pregnancy is not just one amongmany other physical conditions;and hence that anyone who genuinelybelieves that an abortion s comparable o a haircut or an appendectomyis mistaken. 2 The fact that the premature erminationof a pregnancy is,in some sense, the cutting off of a new human life, and thereby,like theprocreationof a new human life, connects with all our thoughts abouthuman life and death, parenthood,and familyrelationships,must makeit a serious matter.To disregard his fact aboutit, to think of abortionas

12. Mary Anne Warren, in "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," Monist 57(1973), sec. i, says of the opponents of restrictive laws governing abortion that "their con-viction (for the most part) is that abortion is not a morally serious and extremely unfortu-nate, even though sometimes justified, act, comparable to killing in self-defense or to let-ting the violinist die, but rather is closer to being a morally neutral act, like cutting one'shair" (italics mine). I would like to think that no one genuinely believes this. But certainlyin discussion, particularly when arguing against restrictive laws or the suggestion that re-morse over abortion might be appropriate, I have found that some people say they believeit (and often cite Warren's article, albeit inaccurately, despite its age). Those who allowthat it is morally serious, and far from morally neutral, have to argue against restrictivelaws, or the appropriateness of remorse, on a very different ground from that laid down bythe premise "The fetus is just part of the woman's body (and she has a right to determinewhat happens to her body and should not feel guilt about anything she does to it)."



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nothing but the killingof something that does not matter, or as nothingbut the exercise of some right or rights one has, or as the incidentalmeans to some desirablestate of affairs, s to do something callous andlight-minded, the sort of thing that no virtuous and wise person woulddo. It is tohave the wrongattitudenot onlytofetuses, but moregenerallyto human life and death, parenthood,and family relationships.AlthoughI say that the facts make this obvious,I know that this is oneof my tendentiouspoints.In partialsupportof it I note that even the mostdedicatedproponentsof the view that deliberateabortion s just like anappendectomyor haircutrarelyholdthe same view of spontaneousabor-tion, that is, miscarriage.It is not so tendentious of me to claim that toreact to people's grief over miscarriage by saying, or even thinking,"What a fuss about nothing " would be callous and light-minded,whereas to tryto laugh someone out of griefover an appendectomyscaror a botchedhaircut wouldnot be. It is hard to give this pointdue prom-inence within act-centeredtheories,for the inconsistencyis an inconsis-tency in attitudeabout the seriousnessof loss of life, not in beliefs aboutwhich acts are right or wrong. Moreover,an act-centeredtheorist maysay, "Well, there is nothing wrong with thinking 'What a fuss aboutnothing 'as long as youdo not sayit and hurt the personwho is grieving.Andbesides,we cannot be heldresponsible or ourthoughts,onlyfortheintentionalactions they give rise to."But the charactertraits that virtuetheory emphasizes are not simply dispositionsto intentionalactions, buta seamless dispositionto certain actions and passions, thoughts and re-actions.To say that the cutting off of a human life is alwaysa matter of someseriousness, at any stage, is not to deny the relevance of gradualfetaldevelopment.Notwithstandingthe well-wornpoint that clear boundarylines cannot be drawn,our emotionsandattitudesregardingthe fetus dochange as it develops,and again when it is born,and indeed furtherasthe baby grows.Abortion or shallow reasonsin the laterstages is muchmore shocking than abortion or the same reasonsin the early stages ina way that matches the fact that deep griefovermiscarriage n the laterstages is moreappropriatehan it is overmiscarriage n the earlierstages(when, that is, the grief is solely about the loss of this child, not about,as might be the case, the loss of one's only hope of having a child or ofhaving one's husband'schild). Imagine (or recall)a womanwho alreadyhas children; she had not intended to have more, but finds herself un-



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expectedly pregnant. Though contrary o her plans, the pregnancy, onceestablished as a fact, is welcomed-and then she loses the embryo al-most immediately.If this were bemoanedas a tragedy, t would, I think,be a misapplicationof the concept of what is tragic.But it may still prop-erlybe mournedas a loss. The griefis expressedin such termsas "Ishallalways wonder how she or he would have turned out" or "WhenI lookat the others, I shall think, 'Howdifferenttheirlives would have been ifthis other one had been partof them.'"It would, I take it, be callous andlight-minded to say, or think, "Well,she has alreadygot four children;what's the problem?";t would be neither,norarrogantlyntrusive in thecase of a close friend, to tryto correctprolongedmourning by saying, "Iknow it's sad, but it's not a tragedy;rejoice in the ones you have." Theapplicationof tragic becomes more appropriateas the fetus grows, forthe mere fact that one has lived with it for longer, conscious of its exis-tence, makes a difference.To shrug off an earlyabortion s understand-able just because it is very hard to be fully conscious of the fetus's exis-tence in the early stages and hence hard to appreciate that an earlyabortion s the destructionof life. It is particularly ardfor the young andinexperienced to appreciate this, because appreciation of it usuallycomes only with experience.I do not mean "withthe experience of having an abortion" thoughthat may be partof it) but, quite generally,"with the experience of life."Manywomen who have borne childrencontrasttheir later pregnancieswith their first successful one, saying that in the later ones they wereconscious of a new life growingin them fromvery earlyon. And, moregenerally,as one reaches the age at which the next generation s comingup close behind one, the counterfactuals"IfI, or she, had had an abor-tion, Alice, or Bob, would not have been born"acquirea significant ap-plication,which casts a new light on the conditionals"If I or Alice havean abortion hen some Carolineor Billwill not be born."The fact that pregnancyis not just one among many physical condi-tions does not mean that one can never regardit in that light withoutmanifesting a vice. When women are in very poor physical health, orworn out from childbearing,or forced to do very physically demandingjobs, then they cannot be described as self-indulgent, callous, irrespon-sible, or light-minded f they seek abortionsmainlywith a view to avoid-ing pregnancy as the physical conditionthat it is. To go through with apregnancywhen one is utterlyexhausted, or when one's job consists of



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crawling along tunnels hauling coal, as many women in the nineteenthcentury were obliged to do, is perhaps heroic, but people who do notachieve heroism arenot necessarilyvicious.Thatthey can view the preg-nancy only as eight months of misery, followedby hours if not days ofagony and exhaustion, and abortiononlyas the blessed escape fromthisprospect, is entirely understandableand does not manifest any lack ofseriousrespect for human life ora shallowattitude tomotherhood.Whatit does show is that somethingis terriblyamiss in the conditions of theirlives, which make it so hard to recognize pregnancyand childbearingasthe goodthat they can be.In relation to this last point I should draw attention to the way inwhich virtue theory has a sort of built-inindexicality. Philosophersar-guing against anything remotely resembling a belief in the sanctity oflife (which the above claims clearly embody) frequently appeal to theexistence of other communities in which abortion and infanticide arepracticed.We should not automaticallyassume that it is impossiblethatsome other communities could be morallyinferiorto our own; maybesome are, orhave been, preciselyinsofaras their membersare, typically,callous or light-mindedor unjust. But in communities in which life is agreat deal tougher for everyonethan it is in ours, having the right atti-tude to human life and death, parenthood, and family relationshipsmight well manifest itself in ways that are unlike ours. When it is essen-tial to survivalthat most membersof the communityfend forthemselvesat a very young age or workduringmost of theirwaking hours, selectiveabortion or infanticide might be practicedeither as a form of genuineeuthanasiaor for the sake of the communityandnot, I think, be thoughtcallous or light-minded.But this does not make everythingall right; asbefore, it shows that there is something amiss with the conditions oftheirlives, which aremakingit impossiblefor them to live reaUly ell.13The foregoing discussion, insofar as it emphasizes the rightattitude tohuman life anddeath, parallelsto a certain extent those standarddiscus-sions of abortionthat concentrate on it solely as an issue of killing. Butit does not, as those discussions do, gloss over the fact, emphasized bythose who discuss the moralityof abortion n terms of women's rights,that abortion,wildlyunlike any other formof killing,is the termination

13. For anotherexampleof the wayin which "toughconditions" an make a differenceto whatis involved n havingthe rightattitude o humanlife anddeath andfamilyrelation-ships, see the concludingsentences of Foot's"Euthanasia."



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241 Virtue Theoryand Abortion

of a pregnancy, which is a condition of a woman's body and results inher having a child if it is not aborted.This fact is given due recognitionnot by appealto women'srightsbut by emphasizingthe relevance of thefamiliarbiologicaland psychological acts and theirconnection with hav-ing the right attitudeto parenthoodand familyrelationships.But it maywell be thought that failing to bringin women's rights still leaves someimportantaspects of the problemof abortionuntouched.Speaking in terms of women's rights, people sometimes say thingslike, "Well,it's her life you're talking about too, you know; she's got aright to her own life, her own happiness."Andthe discussion stops there.But in the context of virtue theory, given that we are particularlycon-cerned with what constitutes a goodhuman life, with what true happi-ness or eudaimoniais, this is no place to stop. We go on to ask, "And sthis life of hers a goodone? Is she livingwell?"If we are to go on to talk about good human lives, in the context ofabortion,we have to bring in our thoughts about the value of love andfamily life, and ourproperemotionaldevelopmentthrougha naturallifecycle. The familiar facts supportthe view that parenthoodin general,and motherhoodand childbearing n particular,are intrinsicallyworth-while, are among the things that can be correctlythought to be partiallyconstitutiveof a flourishinghuman life. 4 If this is right, then a womanwho opts for not being a mother (at all, or again, or now) by opting forabortionmay thereby be manifesting a flawed grasp of what her lifeshouldbe, and be about-a graspthat is childish,orgrosslymaterialistic,or shortsighted,or shallow.I said "may thereby":this need not be so. Consider,for instance, awoman who has alreadyhad severalchildrenand fears that to have an-other will seriouslyaffect her capacityto be a good mother to the onesshe has-she does not show a lack of appreciationof the intrinsic valueof being a parentby optingfor abortion.Nordoes a woman who has beena good mother and is approaching he age at which she may be lookingforwardto being a good grandmother.Nor does a woman who discoversthat her pregnancymay well kill her, and opts for abortionand adoption.Nor, necessarily, does a woman who has decided to lead a life centered

14. I take this as a premise here, but argue for it in some detail in my Beginning Lives(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, I987). In this connection I also discuss adoption and the sensein which it may be regarded as "second best," and the difficult question of whether thegood of parenthood may properly be sought, or indeed bought, by surrogacy.



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aroundsome other worthwhileactivityor activitieswith which mother-hoodwould compete.People who are childless by choice are sometimes described as "irre-sponsible,"or "selfish,"or "refusingto growup,"or "notknowing whatlife is about."But one can hold that having children is intrinsicallyworthwhilewithoutendorsingthis, for we are,afterall, in the happypo-sitionof therebeing more worthwhilethings to do than can be fittedintoone lifetime. Parenthood,and motherhood n particular,even if grantedto be intrinsicallyworthwhile,undoubtedlytake up a lot of one's adultlife, leaving no room for some other worthwhile pursuits. But somewomen who choose abortionratherthan have their firstchild, and somemen who encourage their partnersto choose abortion,are not avoidingparenthood or the sake of otherworthwhilepursuits, but for the worth-less one of "havinga good time,"or for the pursuitof some false visionof the ideals of freedomor self-realization.And some others who say "Iam not readyforparenthoodyet"aremakingsome sort of mistake aboutthe extent to which one can manipulatethe circumstancesof one's lifeso as to make it fulfill some dreamthatone has. Perhapsone's dreamisto have two perfectchildren,a girland a boy,within a perfectmarriage,in financiallysecure circumstances,with an interestingjob of one's own.But to care too much about that dream,to demand of life that it give itto one and act accordingly,may be bothgreedyandfoolish,and is to runthe risk of missing out on happiness entirely. Not only may fate makethe dreamimpossible,or destroyit, but one's own attachmentto it maymake it impossible. Goodmarriages,and the most promising children,can be destroyedby just one adult'sexcessive demandforperfection.Once again, this is not to deny that girlsmay quite properlysay "Iamnot ready for motherhoodyet," especially in our society, and, far frommanifesting irresponsibilityor light-mindedness, show an appropriatemodestyorhumility,ora fearfulnessthat does not amount to cowardice.However,even when the decision to have an abortion s the right deci-sion-one that does not itself fall undera vice-relatedterm and therebyone that the perfectlyvirtuouscouldrecommend-it does not follow thatthere is no sense in which havingthe abortions wrong,or guiltinappro-priate. For, by virtue of the fact that a human life has been cut short,some evil has probablybeen brought about,15and that circumstances

15. I say "some evil has probably been brought about" on the ground that (human) life



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make the decision to bring about some evil the right decision will be agroundforguiltif gettinginto those circumstances in the first place itselfmanifesteda flaw in character.What "gets one into those circumstances" n the case of abortion s,except in the case of rape,one's sexual activityand one's choices, or thelack of them, about one's sexual partnerand about contraception.Thevirtuous woman (which here of course does not mean simply "chastewoman" but "womanwith the virtues") has such character traits asstrength, independence, resoluteness, decisiveness, self-confidence, re-sponsibility, serious-mindedness,and self-determination-and no one, Ithink, could deny thatmany women become pregnantin circumstancesin which they cannot welcome or cannot face the thought of having thischild precisely because they lack one or some of these character traits.So even in the cases where the decision to have an abortion s the rightone, it can still be the reflectionof a moralfailing-not because the de-cision itself is weak or cowardlyor irresoluteor irresponsibleor light-minded, but because lack of the requisite opposite of these failingslanded one in the circumstances in the first place. Hence the commonuniversalizedclaim that guilt and remorse are never appropriateemo-tions about an abortion s denied. They may be appropriate,and appro-priately nculcated, even when the decision was the right one.Another motivationfor bringing women's rights into the discussionmay be to attemptto correctthe implication,carriedby the killing-cen-tered approach,that insofar as abortion s wrong, it is a wrong that onlywomen do, or at least (given the preponderanceof male doctors) thatonly women instigate. I do not myself believe that we can thus escapethe fact that nature bears harder on women than it does on men,i6 butvirtue theory can certainlycorrectmany of the injustices that the em-phasis on women's rights is rightly concerned about. With very littleamendment, everything that has been said above applies to boys andmen too. Althoughthe abortiondecisionis, in a naturalsense, the wom-an's decision, properto her, boys and men are often partyto it, for wellis (usually) a good and hence (human) death usually an evil. The exceptions would be (a)where death is actually a good or a benefit, because the baby that would come to be if thelife were not cut short would be better off dead than alive, and (b) where death, though nota good, is not an evil either, because the life that would be led (e.g., in a state of permanentcoma) would not be a good. (See Foot, "Euthanasia.")

i6. I discuss this point at greater length in Beginning Lives.



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or ill, and even when they are not, they are bound to have been partytothe circumstances that brought it up. No less than girls and women,boys and men can, in their actions, manifest self-centeredness, callous-ness, and light-mindednessabout life andparenthood n relationto abor-tion. They can be self-centeredorcourageousaboutthe possibilityof dis-ability n theiroffspring;they need to reflecton their sexual activityandtheirchoices, or the lack of them, abouttheir sexual partnerand contra-ception; they need to grow up and take responsibility or their own ac-tions and life in relationto fatherhood.If it is true, as I maintain, thatinsofar as motherhood s intrinsicallyworthwhile,being a mother is animportantpurposein women's lives, being a father (ratherthan a meregenerator) s an importantpurposein men's lives as well, and it is ado-lescent of men to turn a blind eye to this and pretend that they havemany moreimportant hings to do.

CONCLUSIONMuch more might be said, but I shall end the actual discussion of theproblemof abortionhere, and conclude by highlightingwhat I take to beits significantfeatures.These harkback to many of the criticismsof vir-tue theorydiscussed earlier.The discussion does not proceed simply by our trying to answer thequestion "Woulda perfectlyvirtuousagent ever have an abortionand, ifso, when?";virtue theoryis not limited to considering"WouldSocrateshave had an abortion f he were a raped, pregnantfifteen-year-old?" orautomatically stumped when we are considering circumstances intowhich no virtuous agent would have got herself. Instead, much of thediscussion proceedsin the virtue- and vice-relatedterms whose applica-tion, in several cases, yields practical conclusions (cf. the third andfourthcriticismsabove).These terms aredifficultto applycorrectly,andanyone might challenge my applicationof any one of them. So, for ex-ample, I have claimed that some abortions, done for certain reasons,would be callous or light-minded;that others might indicate an appro-priatemodestyorhumility;that others wouldreflect a greedyand foolishattitudeto what one could expect out of life. Anyof these examples maybe disputed,but what is at issue is, should these difficultterms be there,or should the discussion be couched in terms that all clever adolescentscan applycorrectly? Cf. the firsthalf of the "majorobjection"above.)



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Proceedingas it does in the virtue- and vice-relatedterms, the discus-sion thereby,inevitably,also contains claims about what is worthwhile,serious and important, good and evil, in our lives. So, for example, Iclaimed that parenthoodis intrinsicallyworthwhile, and that having agoodtime was a worthlessend (in life, not on individualoccasions); thatlosing a fetus is alwaysa serious matter(albeitnot a tragedy n itself inthe first trimester)whereas acquiringan appendectomyscar is a trivialone; that (human) death is an evil. Once again, these are difficult mat-ters, and anyone might challenge any one of my claims. But what is atissue is, as before,should those difficultclaims be there or can one reachpracticalconclusions about real moral issues that are in no way deter-mined by premises about such matters?(Cf. the fifth criticism,and thesecond half of the "majorcriticism.")The discussion also thereby, nevitably,containsclaims aboutwhat lifeis like (e.g., my claim that love and friendshipdo not survive their par-ties' constantly nsisting on theirrights;or the claimthat to demandper-fection of life is to run the risk of missing out on happiness entirely).What is at issue is, should those disputableclaims be there, or is ourknowledge (or are our false opinions)aboutwhat life is like irrelevanttoour understandingof real moralissues? (Cf. both halves of the "majorcriticism.")Naturally, my own view is that all these concepts should be there inany discussion of realmoral ssues and thatvirtuetheory,which uses allof them, is the right theory to applyto them. I do not pretend to haveshown this. I realize that proponentsof rivaltheoriesmay say that, nowthat they have understoodhow virtue theoryuses the range of conceptsit draws on, they are more convinced than ever that such conceptsshouldnot figurein an adequatenormative heory,because they aresec-tarian,orvague, or tooparticular,orimproperlyanthropocentric,and re-instate what I called the "majorcriticism."Or,finding many of the de-tails of the discussion appropriate, hey may agree that many, perhapseven all, of the concepts shouldfigure,but argue thatvirtuetheory givesan inaccurate account of the way the concepts fit together (and indeedof the concepts themselves) and that another theory provides a betteraccount; that wouldbe interestingto see. Moreover, admittedthat therewere at least two problemsfor virtuetheory:that it has to argue againstmoralskepticism, "pluralism,"nd culturalrelativism,and that it has tofind something to say aboutconflicting requirementsof differentvirtues.



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Proponentsof rival theories might argue that their favoredtheory pro-vides better solutionsto these problemsthan virtue theorycan. Indeed,they might criticize virtuetheoryforfinding problemshere at all.Anyonewho arguedfor at least one of moralskepticism, "pluralism," r culturalrelativismcouldpresumablydo so (provided heir favored heorydoes notfind a similarproblem);and a utilitarianmight say that benevolence isthe only virtue and hence thatvirtue theory errs when it discusses evenapparent conflicts between the requirementsof benevolence and someother charactertrait such as honesty.Defending virtue theory against all possible, or even likely, criticismsof it wouldbe a lifelongtask.As I saidat the outset, in this articleI aimedto defend the theory against some criticisms which I thought arose froman inadequate understandingof it, and to improvethat understanding.If I have succeeded, we may hope for morecomprehendingcriticisms ofvirtue theorythan have appearedhitherto.

virtue theory and abortion

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