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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review, Umatilla National Forest, U.S.

Forest Service

National Oversight Review

National Incident Management Organization

5/8/2014

Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest RegionUmatilla National Forest, March 2014

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.............................................................................................................................1Purpose............................................................................................................................................2Background......................................................................................................................................3Objectives of the Review.................................................................................................................6Fire Chronology...............................................................................................................................9Observations..................................................................................................................................11Discussion by review objective.....................................................................................................12Attachments...................................................................................................................................23Key Fire Events.............................................................................................................................24WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Validation and Rationale)........26Vinegar Fire Infrared Map.............................................................................................................35Vinegar IMT (Phone) Interview Schedule....................................................................................36

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Objective of this Review

The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document risk management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect effect on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management for incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive analysis of incident documentation.

This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the effectiveness of implementation in the field.

The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning environment and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.


Purpose

In December 2012, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation Management requested that the National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) assign Team Leaders for the ten selected fires within Forest Service Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. The NIMO Executive Committee assigned James “Tom” Johnston to be the National Programmatic/Cost Fire Review Team Leader for the Whiskey Complex (OR-UPF-130132) on the Umpqua National Forest and the Vinegar Fire (OR-UMF-000845) on the Umatilla National Forest, both in the Pacific Northwest Region. The review team (team) consisted of: Tom Johnston (Safety Officer-NIMO); Carla Schamber (IBA-PNW Region); Gabe Dumm (Fire Planner-Umpqua National Forest); Tim Sampson (Fire Staff-Colville National Forest); Joe Krish (Fire Specialist-PNW Region); Kris Eriksen (Public Information Officer-NIMO); Dana Reid (Finance Section Chief-NIMO); and Terri Knauth (Safety Officer-NIMO).

The team reviewed numerous documents located on the Forest, from the Incident Management Teams (IMTs), within the Vinegar Fire ftp site and on InciWeb. Documentation that was reviewed included: Incident Action Plans (IAPs); Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS); Incident Status Summaries (209’s); fire maps; and the Blue Mountain Interagency Dispatch Center (BMIDC) 2013 Year-end Summary. Eleven (11) on-site interviews were held in Pendleton, Baker City and La Grande, Oregon on March 5-6, 2014. Those interviewed included the: Forest Supervisors of the Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman National Forests (NFs); the Deputy Forest Supervisor on the Wallowa-Whitman NF; Forest Fire Staffs on the Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs; District FMO; Public Affairs Officer; the Tri-Forest Aviation Officer, Center Manager and Assistant Center Manager of Blue Mountain Interagency Dispatch Center (BMIDC); and the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) District Forester. Phone interviews were held with the two Incident Commanders (ICs) of the Type 3 Incident Management Organizations (IMO) and the ICs and Deputy IC of the Type 2 IMTs from February 3-18, 2014. The team focused on the objectives of the review and was

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Review Objectives:

Objectively look at actions taken by the Incident Management Team and the local Agency Administrator to meet the direction provided by the Forest Service Chief

Asses the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome

Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

Review Team Members:

Tom Johnston, SOF-NIMO

Tim Sampson, Fire Staff, Colville National Forest

Joe Krish, Fire Operations Specialist, Regional Office

Carla Schamber, IBA-Regional Office

Gabe Dumm, Fire Planner, Umpqua National Forest


cognizant of the need to avoid hindsight bias when reviewing documents or interviewing people. The team had open discussions with personnel regarding the incident, their interactions, and what they thought was important to share as lessons learned.

The team found that there were many factors that influenced the complexity of the Vinegar Fire: difficult terrain, adjacent to two NFs (Wallowa-Whitman and Malheur NF’s), involving two counties (Grant and Baker), with mixed conifer fuel type; the fires close proximity to two rural communities, scattered residences with very poor access, and active mining claims; and the fires location within the North Fork of the John Day Wilderness (NFJDW). Severe weather and fuel

conditions, as well as other wildfires burning in the immediate area, within the Region and on the adjoining Region, also contributed to the complexity.

Background

The 2013 Programmatic/Cost Fire Review(s) are grounded in the objectives of the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season. The reviews provide an opportunity to evaluate how clearly Leader’s Intent was communicated and the effectiveness of implementation in the field. The results of the reviews provide information critical to the well-established learning environment and continual improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service (FS).

The Chief’s stated vision for success continues to be defined as safely achieving reasonable objectives with the least firefighter exposure necessary, while enhancing stakeholder support for our management.

Building on lessons learned in 2012, utilization of all aspects of risk management continues to provide the best framework to successfully achieve this vision. Sound decision-making relies on identifying reasonable objectives for protection of critical values at risk (VAR), while considering the amount and quality of firefighter exposure and probability of success. The format/protocol is broken down into three sections: Pre-Season (engaging the fire before it starts); During Incident (managing incident uncertainty and inherent risk); and After Incident (learning and improving).Pre-Season preparedness is critical to success when a fire starts. In addition to pre-season preparedness (annual fire refresher, work capacity test) we need to build decision-maker

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Review Team Members Continued:

Kris Ericksen, PIO-NIMO

Dana Reid, FSC-NIMO

Terri Knauth, SOF-NIMO

Mike Ferris, PIO, NIMO


and key stakeholder capacity to manage the uncertainties and inherent risks associated with fires. Specifically, we need to increase understanding of risk management with key stakeholders and partners, cooperators and collaborators. We have to increase Line Officer Agency Administrators (AAs) capacity as risk managers and improve Incident Management Team (IMT) skills in operational risk management. In addition, the Agency units need to establish landscape level risk assessments, compare them to the goals and objectives in the Land Resource Management Plan (LRMP) and identify a common understanding of values to be protected by answering four questions:

What is important? Why is it important? How important is it? and How much risk are you willing to take to protect it?

Lastly, complete a risk analysis with partners to identify VAR and pre-determine strategies for protecting them, while balancing risks across all categories and in time and space.

The During Incident phase tests our pre-season work and our ability to apply risk management principles. As acknowledged by the National Cohesive Strategy for Wildland Fire Management: “Safe aggressive initial attack is often the best suppression strategy to keep unwanted wildfires small and costs down.”

This strategy will be applied to initial attack (IA) where the pre-identified values to be protected are at the greatest risk. Decisions will be based on firefighter/aviator/public safety, VAR and the probability of success. We will implement sound financial management and believe costs are an output of the best risk informed decisions. To be successful in this phase, we (IMTs and units) should follow the objectives listed below in the Standards for Managing Incident Risk:

Seven Standards for Managing Incident Risk

1. Complete an Incident Risk Assessment What is at risk, probabilities of harm, and possible mitigations?

2. Complete a Risk Analysis Consider alternatives (objectives, strategies and tactics) against desired

outcomes, respondent exposure, probability of success and values to be protected.

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3. Complete Two-way Risk Communication Engage community leaders, local government officials, partners and other key

stakeholders associated with the incident to share the risk picture and solicit input.

4. Conduct Risk Sharing Dialogue (“Red Book”, Chapter 05.11, framework 10 questions)

Engage senior line officers (AAs) and political appointee (as appropriate) in dialogue aimed at understanding, acceptance, and support for the alternatives and likely decision(s).

5. Make the Risk Informed Decision Develop a time frame to revisit the decision.

6. Document the Risk Document the assessment, analysis, communication(s) sharing, and decision in

WFDSS.

7. Continue Monitoring and Adjusting Monitor and adjust as necessary or as conditions change. Monitor incident;

revise the risk process as conditions change and re-engage stakeholders and senior officials as appropriate. Significant changes will likely require updates to the WFDSS (published decision and risk support work).

In areas identified pre-season as having low threats to values to be protected, an engagement strategy designed to minimize firefighter exposure and/or meet restoration objectives may be considered. Line Officers using fire for multiple objectives must follow the Seven Standards for Managing Incident Risk to the highest level of performance and accountability.

To be clear, Standards 1-4 need to be completed pre-season; all standards apply during the incident.

Lastly, the effective interaction between AAs and Incident Commanders (ICs) is essential for safe, efficient, and effective management of incidents, utilizing the Five Rights (the Right Plan, in the Right Place, at the Right Time, with the Right Assets [(personnel and equipment) for the Right Duration]. Careful attention to these five “Rights” will limit unnecessary exposure to firefighters and expenditure.

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The third phase, After Incident, is the time when we as a learning organization should strive to improve how we do business and seek to learn from each incident. It is important to engage key stakeholders in an After Action Review (AAR), noting what was planned, what worked and how we can improve. It may also be useful to engage in a peer review process with other units that have experienced similar incidents to learn strategies for improvement and identify personnel that will ensure improvement plans and lessons learned are implemented. Objectives of the Review

1. Identify Best Business Practices used on fires this past season.2. Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making.3. Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded.4. Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations.5. Identify actions taken by the IMT and Forest to meet the intent/direction of the

Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol.6. Identify practical application of risk management concepts that generate positive

outcomes (Public Safety, Firefighter and Cost).

Fire Environment

Blue Mountain Interagency Dispatch Center (BMIDC) was relatively busy during the week previous to the Vinegar Fire with thirty (30) initial attacks (IAs). The BMIDC set up an expanded dispatch for the Vinegar Fire. The Vinegar Fire was started by lightning on August 12, 2013 from a passing weather system that moved through Oregon, southern Washington and Idaho. The District at the time of the Vinegar Fire’s start had an additional six IA fires that they were managing at the same time. It had been a busy summer and many of the fires had gone into extended attack before being suppressed.

At the time of the Vinegar Fire, the Pacific Northwest (PNW) Region and State of Oregon had several large project fires (Big Windy, Whiskey Complex, Douglas Complex, etc.) and critical resources (Type1 (T1)/Type 2 (T2) air tankers, T1 helicopters, Interagency Hotshot Crews) were becoming scarce. At the time the fire started, the PNW Region was at Preparedness Level (PL) 4 and the national PL was 3.

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The Vinegar Fire was detected on Vinegar Hill (Appendix- Area Closure map) in the southeast part of the NFJDW. There were numerous hazards and conditions (inaccessible, steep terrain, active fire behavior and mine adits (mine entrances) that Dispatch and the duty officer had to consider in managing the fire. The decision was made to order the Redmond Smokejumpers and requested that one of the jumpers be qualified as a T3 IC. The intent, at that time was to place resources within the NFJDW and use a direct strategy (containment lines with one foot in the black). After careful consideration by fire managers and line officers of the values at risk and the firefighter’s exposure to uncommon hazards (i.e. mine adits, potential for unexploded ordinance), difficult and inaccessible terrain, and expected fire behavior, a decision was made to employ an indirect strategy focused on point protection and containment of some portions of the fire, while putting other portions of the fire in monitor status. This strategy balanced the need to protect critical values at risk, such as the nearby communities, with firefighter exposure.

Fire behavior on the Vinegar Fire from the day of IA on August 12-22, 2013 was influenced by heavy fuel loadings, remote access, warm temperatures in the 80-88 degree range, low relative humidity, gusty winds from the northeast up to about 25 m.p.h. and unstable atmospheric conditions as reflected in a Haines Index of 1-4 and multiple Red Flag days (lightning). These conditions produced a high intensity fire with torching, crowning, and spotting from ¼ to ½ mile. Initially the fire grew toward the north, which is normal for this time of year. The fire spread 50-100 acres quickly during the first day, established on a ridge and started backing downhill, though spotting. This was a fire with the potential of being large and complex. From August 16-21, 2013 the fire experienced changes in wind direction and grew to the south and southeast threatening the communities of Greenhorn (adjacent to the NFJDW Boundary) and Granite, and burning toward adjacent jurisdictions including the Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman National Forests, two counties and two ODF Districts (Appendix –Operational Map). Local firefighters and AAs with past fire experience in this area reported that they expected the fire to continue spreading to the north and not swing to the south, southeast.

The alignment of the terrain, fuel conditions (low dead and live fuel moisture), in addition to the change in wind direction caused the fire to grow approximately 1,000 acres. From August 19-22, 2013 the fire received some sporadic, light precipitation. After August 26, 2013 the fire experienced little growth due to more seasonal weather conditions with

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cooler temperatures and higher relative humidity. It was contained and turned back to the District on September 5, 2013.

Fire ChronologyDate % Command Acres + Comments Person Cost8/12 0 Initial Attack 100

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8/14 0 T3 B. Coville 150 50 Fire will spread on all perimeters, sustained crown runs. IMT 2 Watts will shadow tomorrow, take fire 8/15.VAR-Greenhorn, Historical structures (cabins) and affects the Natural Resources in North Fork John Day Wilderness.

50 20,000

8/16 0 T2 B. Watts 310 160 Remote location, access, limited resource availability (IHC, Aviation), continued dry and windy, hazards associated with historic and active mines.

283 300,000

8/17 0 T2 B. Watts 858 548 IHC and engines needed for Greenhorn Community burn-out and protection. Level 2 evacuation recommended Alamo- an area north of Greenhorn.

339 873,000

8/18 0 T2 B. Watts 858 0 Level 1 evacuation for Greenhorn, primary and secondary lines construction (N & E).

419 1.1 mil

8/19 0 T2 B. Watts 913 55 Road closures, active fire behavior, Level II recommended for Alamo, line completed on E.

517 1.5 mil

8/20 0 T2 B. Watts 964 51 Alamo reduced to Level I, weather dry and windy.

561 2.1 mil

8/21 0 T2 B. Watts 1,059 95 Active fire behavior-torching and spotting, Alamo and Level I., continue point protection.

547 2.8 mil

8/22 0 T2 B. Watts 1,161 102 Oregon Team 2 (Fillis) shadows today, area and road closures in affect.

534 3.4 mil

8/23 5 T2 B. Fillis 1,161 0 Level I in place, continue line construction, assist IA with WWF and UMF. Mop-up SE/E and NE Divisions.

535 4.2 mil

8/24 10 T2 B. Fillis 1,161 0 Level I in place, continue line construction, assist IA with WWF and UMF. Mop-up SE/E and NE Divisions.

537 4.7 mil

8/25 20 T2 B. Fillis 1,220 59 SAT visit yesterday, continue contingency line

489 5.5 mil

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preparation.8/26 45 T2 B. Fillis 1,220 0 Point Protection and mop

up. TOC planned 8/27.330 5.8 mil

8/27 45 T3 S. Severs 1,220 0 Concerns- remote location, weather (dry, windy), creeping and smoldering. Point protection and mop-up on E.

115 6.1 mil

8/28 45 T3 S. Severs 1,233 13 Interior- creeping and smoldering, increase due to more accurate mapping. Mop-up in all divisions.

115 6.4 mil

8/29 45 T3 S. Severs 1,291 58 Interior creeping isolated torching and short range spotting, SW corner perimeter. Mop-up Divs.

115 6.5 mil

8/30 45 T3 S. Severs 1,316 55 Growth in Salmon Creek and East Fork Clear Creek drainages. Mop-up in Divs.

99 6.7 mil

8/31 45 T3 S. Severs 1,323 7 Growth in SW isolated torching and short range spotting.

91 6.8 mil

9/1 45 T3 S. Severs 1,333 10 Mop-up all divisions, interior still active.

89 7.1 mil

9/2 45 T3 S. Severs 1,350 17 Growth in SW corner, Mop-up continues in all Divisions.

80 7.2 mil

9/3 45 T3 S. Severs 1,350 0 Continue mop-up. 32 7.3 mil9/4 53 T3 S. Severs 1,351 1 Continue mop-up,

transition to T4 tomorrow.28 7.3 mil

9/5 53 T4 District 1,351 Patrol and Mop-up.

25 days

53 4 IMT’s 1,351 Total Ac. No reportable accidents, 86,850 personnel hours

5,790Persons

$7,380,000

Critical Values at Risk (VAR)

VAR in the fire area as identified by the FS, cooperators/partners, and key stakeholders included: firefighters, public and responders; the communities of Greenhorn and Granite; scattered structures within and outside the NFJDW; the social/political relationship of private citizens and the ODF. Resource and wilderness values, such as wildlife habitat, watershed values, aesthetics, etc. were identified by agency personnel. No homes or businesses were destroyed or damaged, but the community of Greenhorn was threatened and required the construction of a shaded fuel break.

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Observations

The following are observations the team made in the report:

On the first day of the Vinegar Fire, a key decision was made by local fire managers. The decision was to disengage from direct attack and initiate actions to protect VAR (point protection). The early recognition of the need to change strategy increased the probability of success and decreased firefighter (smokejumpers) exposure to hazards.

The lend-lease (aviation) agreement between the Pacific Northwest and the Intermountain Region (specifically the Payette, Nez-Perce and Wallowa-Whitman, Umatilla and Malheur NFs) provided for outstanding cooperation, efficiencies, and working relationships for the Forests that border these two Regions.

The agreement(s) (formal and informal) between the Pacific Northwest Region and the ODF provides many types of organizational strengths. The sharing, training, collaboration and cooperation of resources (personnel and equipment) pre-season, during and post season provides for support during critical times. This is an exceptional example of a strong partnership/relationship that needs to be considered as an example to other regions.

The Umatilla NF maintains an active relationship with the local publics and the ODF. Numerous meetings and scenario based workshops are attended regularly by FS (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) and State of Oregon personnel. The relationship(s) developed in the course of pre-season planning/training was consistently brought up as a critical element in the success of the incident.

Throughout the duration of the fire, a number of Forest Managers were assigned as “shadows”1 to the Umatilla Forest Supervisor. The Forest and Region are actively trying to increase the “capacity” and “capability” of qualified Fire Managers.

1 Shadowing; having visiting Line Officers mentored by an experienced and qualified Fire Manager; learning about fire; increasing their skill, knowledge and experience on large complex fires.

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The team made other observations and developed lessons learned based on personal and phone interviews and written documentation. The team is available for future discussions as needed regarding the materials included in this review.

Discussion by review objective

The following observations, recommendations and Lessons Learned (positive and negative) are organized by the six objectives of the review. There are subjects, topics and situations that can be shared locally, geographically (Pacific Northwest Region), nationally, within all three areas and with all Incident Management Teams (Type 1 and Type 2) and Incident Management Organizations (Type 3 IMO).

Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires this Past Season

The Vinegar Fire burned a relatively small (1,351 acres) geographical area all within the NFJDW.

One of the lessons learned was the value of involving stakeholders (especially the ODF) early to establish dialogue on VAR, firefighter exposure, risk verses gain to inform and support decisions about fire strategies.

Even with the burning conditions and rapid large fire growth, Incident Management Team (IMT) were able to keep up with local contacts and notifications through aggressive outreach and communications plans. Communicating with the public and partners and gathering local input was essential to success. Utilizing the landowners, Oregon District Forester (John Buckman) and especially the knowledge and expertise of local FS personnel knowledge aided in the development of strategies, tactics, VAR, and community interactions that were both effective and well supported.

Pre-season planning and implementation is an important practice. Annually, the Forest conducted workshops, simulations and training, tests and exercises, cooperator/partner response, defined the roles and responsibilities of fire managers and line officers. Workshops also ensured that firefighters understood fire behavior (intensity and spotting), fuel characteristics, predicted weather patterns and rates of spread so they could be prepared for the fire season.

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Open communication between the three NFs (Umatilla, Wallowa-Whitman and Malheur) as well as the ODF was displayed on the Vinegar Fire. The Forest Supervisor and fire staff from the Umatilla NF made contact with their neighboring forests well before the Vinegar Fire even started. They had a fairly busy season to date and requested additional resources for fire management activities and leadership. Effective pre-season communication about risk, VAR, and firefighter exposure with communities, stakeholders, partners and adjacent units (Nez Perce-Clearwater and Payette NFs, and Region 4) was critical to success during the incident. The public, communities, cooperators and partners basically understood fire suppression activities and a have a good relationship with the FS.

Due to appropriate pre-season planning, Region 4 typically loans aircraft to their neighbors to the west whenever possible.

Dutch Creek protocols and procedures, [approved by National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)] have been in place for several years. Information such as point of contact, patient assessment, stabilization and transportation (ground and/or air) within the proper time frame (situation dependent) is vital. Assigning ground ambulances, EMTs and paramedics to specific locations of high risk operations is common place within the Forest’s fire organization. Remote locations and smoky conditions with poor visibility often cause fire personnel to rely on ground support rather than air-ambulances or designated team aviation assets.

The development of the Strategic Risk Assessment for the incoming IMT assisted in VAR identification, identifying responder exposure and defining long-term strategy (tactical, resource needs, etc.). Utilizing technical specialists, such as a Fire Behavior Analyst at public meetings to explain topography and fuel characteristics, influence of fire behavior, etc. helped to demonstrate professionalism and encourage cooperation between the public and Umatilla NF.

Clarity of the mission is paramount to a successful outcome. Every firefighter must understand the purpose and importance of their actions to provide an understanding of expectations and risk vs. gain.

Brian Watts’ Type 2 IMT has developed a Liaison Officer guidebook (guide) for helping personnel work with the public, cooperators and partners. The guide is an excellent example of who to talk to, why and what to say to interested persons about the fire.

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The forests (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) are excellent examples of a willingness to take the extra step to build AA fire management capacity. They had numerous line officers and other staff come to the Forest to shadow, train and be mentored in a highly complex fire unit.

The forest Public Affairs Officer updates and prepares a communication briefing package prior to the fire season. The package consists of current contact information (phone and email) of community leaders, political appointees, land owners, cooperators and partners that can be given to incoming IMTs during the fire season.

Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored into Our Decision Making

The social and political issues on the fire could have been controversial for the Forest and the IMTs if the fire had come out of the NFJDW and impacted the community of Greenhorn and/or the ODF Districts. The Forest was well aware of this risk and took proactive steps to minimize the sociopolitical impacts by communicating early and frequently with partners and cooperators, initiating aggressive public relations and communicating the plan and including key stakeholders in the decision making process and rationale.

Protection of private property and structures were clearly identified as a priority in the objectives for the incident. Most of the employees expressed an understanding of the VAR for the different stakeholders. Values such as communities, structures and infrastructure were easily identified and those stakeholders were included in the process.

The direction of the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the fire season was a catalyst for additional risk management discussions with the public, partners and local communities. They are extremely familiar with historic strategies and tactics within this remote, wilderness rich area. Fire personnel knowing that direct attack in this type of fuel and terrain can be difficult at best, spent days visiting with people in the potentially threatened community of Greenhorn managing expectations about best fire management practices and keeping them informed of current strategies and expected fire behavior.

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The ODF utilized full suppression, with numerous resources (personnel, equipment and aviation) to keep fires small and protect the public and private property. Their preferred method of fire suppression is single command with strong agency representation. They do not manage wildfires for multiple objectives and avoid managing long duration incidents. These suppression philosophies are not well aligned with current Federal management policies. The Forests (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) are working hard with the ODF (workshops, meetings and training) on developing a mutual understanding of risk management and risk analysis principles. Because of these efforts, partner relationships with the Forest Service are excellent.

There was a considerable amount of time and energy spent between the Forest, ODF and IMTs concerning the indirect line – shaded fuel break placed between the fire and the community of Greenhorn. Although it remained untested by the fire, the shaded fuel break (250’ wide, 1 mile long) gave the community of Greenhorn a measure of protection from not only the Vinegar Fire but future fires as well. The project was stopped when the weather and fire behavior moderated and the threat to the community of Greenhorn diminished. In addition, IMTs had over 80 portable pumps, porta-tanks and miles of hose laid out for the protection of VAR. What type of tactics and strategy can or should be used for the protection (shaded fuel break, sprinklers, gel, wrapping, retardant, etc.) of VAR? At what point are efforts such as this beyond the scope of responding to the immediate threat of the current and expected wildfire (no longer an emergency action) and would therefore require NEPA documentation? This is not a local or even a regional issue, but national in scope and should be discussed before the next fire season.

In the initial stages of the fire, extreme fire behavior, inaccessible terrain caused the Duty Officer and IA resources to rely on Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATS) to slow down the fire growth. It is fairly common for the public to think that if fire managers are not utilizing aviation “they are not fighting the fire.” The decision to stop flying was ultimately tied to excessive risk to the pilots and the low probability of success. Some aviation cost could have been reduced with less SEAT use.

Identify Which Current Procedures can be Enhanced or Expanded The WFDSS process was considered cumbersome with questionable value for the

firefighting or decision making effort. Some felt it was a valuable tool in the 15 | P a g e


beginning, but lost value as the incident increased in size, intensity and complexity. In some instances, IMTs and units find themselves behind and playing catch-up on highly complex fires documenting strategy in WFDSS. Password expiration dates can be untimely. Some personnel felt WFDSS was eventually used for documentation and not for making informed decisions and alternative development. Another perspective gleaned from interviews was that WFDSS is simply a web site that houses fire behavior and analysis tools and the major output of any consequence or timeliness is the strategic risk analysis. It would be useful for additional clarity at a national level to define what WFDSS should be. If the intent is that WFDSS is a documentation tool, then being a day or two behind on publishing a decision may not matter. If it is intended to serve as a decision aid- in that a decision is only made after the WFDSS is largely complete- then it may be necessary to streamline the process so that decisions may be published in real time.

The Forest did present Brian Watts’ T2 IMT with the Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA) and a set of broad strategies and asked them to develop specific strategy/tactics and bring them back the next day to the Forest for review. An IMT doesn’t often have the time to be able to develop specific strategies over a 24 hour period. However, the low intensity fire behavior allowed this transition to occur. The development of strategy, tactics and objectives over a longer than normal time period assured both the Forest Supervisor and the Incident Commander that they were on the same end-state page for the fire.

Programmatic fire reviews in the present context of “Lessons Learned” for AAs, IMTs and Fire Managers was viewed as a good tool. This effort is aimed at providing an atmosphere of learning in a very dynamic environment.

Communication between the incoming IMT and Expanded Dispatch has to be developed as soon as possible by phone. If the area doesn’t have hard line capability and/or cell phone coverage, it is strongly recommended that the IMT order a cell-on-wheels (COW) immediately. The facilitation of orders (supplies, equipment and personnel) is vital to successful fire management.

It is also important that IMTs assess their resource needs with the host unit before ordering equipment that is not initially needed (for example Engine Strike Teams in a Wilderness). A “standard” pre-order of equipment, personnel and supplies are not

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needed on every fire and/or situation. The time and expense for expanded dispatch to un-order/cancel the resource order(s) is unnecessary.

There were minimal accident/injuries on the fire line; and no reportable illnesses or injuries on the fire. The IMTs used the standard ICS-206 Medical Plan with an attached 9 line. None of the Teams are accurately following the NWCG Dutch Creek protocols on the ICS-206. All of the ICs asked for the protocol information and they agreed to apply it to their medical plans for the next fire/fire season.

All of the IMTs involved with the Vinegar Fire appropriately utilized the Hazard/Risk Modified 215A which identifies hazards, probability of exposure, consequences, risk level and mitigations.

The Redmond Smokejumpers/T3 IMO was assigned to reconnaissance of the fire (after the transition with Watts T2 IMT) but more importantly were delegated to go to the communities of Granite and Greenhorn to visit with the local residents to make the fire efforts and resources visible to the public. The relationship between the forest fire management organization and public was enhanced greatly by their interaction.

Transitions between like teams (i.e. T2 IMT to T2 IMT) were identified as normally being a smooth transition. Transitions from a T2 IMT to a T3 IMO is usually more challenging and requires additional time, focused efforts, and often requires some members of the outgoing team to remain with the new IMO for a period of time. The transition between Brett Fillis’ T2 IMT and the incoming Shane Severs’ T3 IMO presented challenges and it would have been beneficial to have an extra day built into the transition plan. The information exchanged was too little and the time too short and it took the T3 personnel two days longer to get a handle on porta-pump locations, understand shaded fuel break direction and get a full accounting of personnel allocation (numbers and positions). It is vital for incoming IMT/IMO to completely understand and agree with conditions, personnel numbers and expectations regarding successful incident management.

Type 3 IMOs are configured two different ways: a standing established Command and General (C&G) Staff and/or picking personnel from a pool (ad-hoc) and making up the team. Established teams have team cohesion and know each other’s skills, knowledge and abilities. While pick-up teams have to develop that information

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about each other in a very short period of time while still managing the incident. There are times, when just identifying and selecting personnel is a challenge. In addition, T3 ad-hoc organizations do not have a Liaison Officer (vitally needed on the Vinegar Fire), and at times have minimal logistics and finance skills and experience. As mentioned in earlier fire reviews, T3 position identification and training is wanted and needed for T3 organizations. The only two positions that have Incident Qualification and Certification System (IQCS) identifiers are the T3 IC and the Line Safety Officer. Other C&G staff positions on the ad-hoc team (logistics, public information, planning) have no formal training requirements.

Logistical challenges can cost a lot of time and effort and can be a distraction to an IMT/IMO. The Vinegar Fire presented such a challenge with an issue regarding the caterer. Initially, a local caterer was ordered for the Vinegar Fire because a national caterer was not available. As soon as a national caterer became available, the IMT was ordered to replace the local caterer with the available national caterer. This process was very time consuming and frustrating to the IMO. The IMO felt it made little sense to replace what was working as well as incur in and out set-up and demobilization costs to make this swap. National/Regional Contracting Officers should be able to evaluate the situation and make a decision dependent on cost, suitability, and customer service.

Identify Improvements that can be made in Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

It is the expectation of the Deputy Chief of State and Private (S&PF) and the Washington Office Director of Fire and Aviation Management (FAM) that we emphasize the importance of communicating our intent to all of our partners, including AAs and ICs. They expect each region and forest to become actively engaged with their stakeholders and prepare them to participate in risk-informed decision making meetings to prepare them for the upcoming fire season. The Leader’s Intent from the Forest Supervisor was stressed very often on the Vinegar Fire. Firefighter, aviation and public safety was the primary objective.

The forests (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) conducted pre-season planning to ensure that cooperators understood their roles and responsibilities for

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evacuations and fire management activities. The unit provided clear direction and understanding of their expectations for the fire season. Early on, they communicated and worked with local law enforcement, landowners, permittees, partners and cooperators with developing an understanding of the “what ifs” of wildland fire.

The continued partnership development with the local volunteer fire departments and cooperators included sand table scenarios, simulations and joint exercises. Strong relationships have been built with an understanding of capabilities and establishing priorities relating to VAR.

Communication of leader’s intent, expectations, management and resource objectives and definition(s) e.g. point protection, at the forest level is essential. Leader’s intent was transferred from the AA through the IMTs and IMOs to every firefighter, cooperator and partner on the incident.

Identify Actions Taken by the IMT and Forest to Meet the Intent/Direction of the Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol.

The Forests (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) met regularly pre-season and during the season to discuss fire management activities. They hosted pre-season workshops and scenarios with personnel from the ODF, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and other cooperators/partners (rural fire departments). Forest personnel also attend the Regional Aviation and Fire Management, Fire and Leadership Team (FALT) and the Oregon Eastside pre-season meeting prior to the fire season. The meetings and workshops ensured that equipment and cost-share agreements are in place and that risk analysis; firefighter exposure and VAR principles are understood. The Umatilla NF had the National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) come to the forest and facilitate risk based scenarios and sand-table exercises. It is apparent that these meetings have contributed to an excellent working relationship and understanding between fire managers from the different entities.

Fire personnel as well as forest personnel have After Action Reviews (AAR) after each incident and at the end of the fire season. The intent is to discuss what happened on the incident and how they can improve the next time. In most cases,

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cooperators (rural fire departments) and partners (BLM and ODF) are invited to participate.

IMT/IMOs habitually conduct AAR within their functional area sections (Logistics, Operations, Command, etc.) and with the C&G Team Leaders to discuss lessons learned and how to improve.

The Region, Forest and District(s) have been cooperative, open and frank in their discussions with the Programmatic/Cost Review team, to discuss ways to improve fire management activities and review lessons learned on the Vinegar Fire. Their commitment to a learning culture is commendable. Identify Practical Application of Risk Management Concepts that Generate Positive Outcomes (Public Safety, Firefighter and Cost).

The Umatilla NF, in conjunction with the Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman NFs prepared for the fire season all year long. During pre-season, they historically have an eastside Oregon meeting with key stakeholders, partners and cooperators.

On the Vinegar Fire, the Umatilla NF demonstrated several applications of risk management including:

o Worked with the Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman NFs to prepare Leader’s Intent and fire objectives: firefighter exposure and public safety were the number one priority; private structures; property and Forest infrastructure/resources were second; and natural landscape values were third. The Five Rights were discussed and reiterated daily: Right Plan; Right Place; Right Time; and Right Assets for the Right Duration.

o The Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs personnel prepared a Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA) during the IA phase of the Vinegar Fire. The VAR, (What is important? Why is it Important? and How Important is it?); firefighter exposure; probability of success; and the fire’s objectives were an integral part of the SRA.

o Changing the strategy from direct attack to indirect attack, (point protection) as soon as they discovered that direct attack was unsafe for firefighters. They shared the risk discussion with the ODF, the public, Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman NFs and cooperators.

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o Initiated and stayed in two way risk communication with the IMTs, the communities of Greenhorn and Granite, landowners, two County Sheriffs (Grant and Baker Counties), Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman NFs, Cooperators (rural fire departments), and partners (BLM and ODF).

The AA of the Umatilla NF had five “shadow” Line Officers (mentees) with him during the month of the Vinegar Fire. He truly believes in increasing the capacity and capability of fire management decision makers locally and nationally.

The IMTs and T3 organizations utilized the modified Risk/Hazard 215A that identifies hazards, exposure frequency, consequences, initial risk level, mitigations and the residual risk level. The risks from the hazards and mitigations were discussed daily with responders and the Umatilla NF. The results were: 25+ fire days, 1,351 acres burned, four (4) IMTs and IMOs assigned, 5,790 persons were on the fire with 86,850 personnel hours worked with no reportable accidents. This is a commendable safety record that can be directly attributed to the leadership and personnel on the Vinegar Fire.

The Dutch Creek Protocols: mission locations; medical support and assessment; and distance and time for medical extraction (ground and aerial) were discussed, and the Region 6 Nine Line was attached to the ICS-206 Medical Plan. Though especially not bulleted within Block 8 (Special Instructions) of the Medical Plan for this fire, all fire personnel understood the process in case of serious accident/injury. The IMTs will modify their Medical Plans prior to the 2014 Fire Season.

Attachments

Vinegar Fire History – Key Fire Events (see page 23). WFDSS Information - August 18, 2013 (see page 25). Medical 9 Line Information (see page 30) Transportation Map - August 27, 2013 (see page 31). Public Information Map - August 27, 2013 (See page 32). Vinegar Fire Area Closure Map (see page 33). Infrared Map - August 19, 2013 (see page 34). Personnel Interview List (Phone and Forest) (see page 35).

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Key Fire Events

The Vinegar Fire (OR-UMF-000845) was ignited by lightning on Sunday, August 11, 2013, and was declared 100% contained on September 5, 2013, after burning 1,351 acres in Oregon within the North Fork John Day Wilderness on the Umatilla National Forest.

The fire was detected and put under an initial attack strategy on August 12, 2013 along with seven other lightning caused fires within the area. The rapid growth of the Vinegar Fire in acres, situation and complexity led to multiple transitions of Incident Management Teams (IMT). The fire strategy was initially to go direct (fighting the fire close to the fires edge) and then changed to an indirect strategy/point protection strategy (backing off from the fires edge) because of the hazards and risk exposure to firefighters. The fire was initial attacked by a Type 3 Incident Management Organization (IMO) (Brandon Coville T3 IC and Jason Barber T3 IC trainee) but rapidly progressed in complexity to a Type 2 IMT (Brian Watts IC-Oregon Team 4). An opportunity that provided a quick transition was that Brian

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Watts Type 2 team was closing out a fire (GC Complex) in John Day, Oregon, just an hour away from the Vinegar Fire, and had 7 days left on their fourteen day tour.

The Management Objectives on the Vinegar Fire were: Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter,

other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, principles of the 10 Standards Fire Orders, LCES and the 18 Watch-Out situations as the foundation for risk decisions at all levels.

Use aggressive outreach to ensure timely and accurate dissemination of information regarding fire related activities is provided to the public, landowners, cooperators, elected officials and other stakeholders.

Utilize efficient and effective business practices to manage the fire cost, which should be in alignment with the identified values to be protected.

Ensure that relationships are maintained or enhanced with local cooperators, landowners, the general public and other key stakeholders. Seek input from landowners and cooperators in development of strategies.

The understood values at risk (VAR) were firefighters, aviators, the public, the communities of Greenhorn and Granite, mining claims, miscellaneous structures in and outside the North Fork John Day Wilderness, the Olive Lake wooden pipeline, and other values spread across two National Forests (Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman), two counties (Grant and Baker) and two Oregon Department of Forestry Districts.

The strategy chosen was to manage the Vinegar Fire as a full suppression incident (although in-direct), basing priorities on the VAR. Firefighters, the public and other incident responders were identified as the highest value. Protection of structures, community assets and private property were the second highest priority and natural resource values were the last priority. The message was clear: keep the fire within the North Fork John Day Wilderness if possible.

Oregon Team 4 timed out and Bret Fillis (Oregon T2 Team 2) who had been staged at La Grande, OR for a fire that did not materialize (District caught it) was reassigned to the Vinegar Fire from August 23-26, 2013. The Vinegar Fire had gotten some precipitation and fire growth was mainly interior with little perimeter growth.

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Oregon Team 2 timed out and was replaced by Shane Severs local T3 Incident Management Organization from August 27, 2013 until it was turned back to the District/Forest on September 5, 2013.

WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Validation and Rationale)

August 18, 2013 - Day 7 of Fire, Watts’ T2 IMT in place

Weather Dry, Rh 19-27%, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (47-52, 81-88)

degrees.

Objectives Base all actions on sound risk management principles with the highest priority on

firefighter and public safety (following standard firefighter safety protocols and provision for firefighter and public safety is the highest priority).

Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk. Ensure positive communications with affected partners, agencies and communities. Protect private inholdings, structures and improvements.

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Keep fire east of Olive Lake, south of the 10 road, west of 1310 road, north of Malheur National Forest boundary.

Course of Action Confine and contain fire while protecting the highest values at risk as described in

the strategic Risk Assessment (SRA).

Validation Relative Risk Notes - There is a high hazard to firefighter safety and a low

probability of success with a direct attack. Currently there is an imminent threat to the high value private structures and communities.

Hazards Notes - The fuel type is timber with significant amounts of standing dead trees and down fuels, most closely represented by fire behavior fuel model 10. The upper elevations are lodge pole pine with a mixture of sub-alpine fir. The fuels in the Vinegar Hill Scenic Area tend to a fuel model 2 with lighter fuels. Limited existing safety zones are available for a direct attack.

Value Notes - The most significant values at risk are adjacent private structures related to mining claims and the communities of Greenhorn and Granite. Secondarily, the Olive Lake Campground and the Fremont Powerhouse (and associated wooden pipeline) are recreational assets that should be protected where possible.

Probability Notes - Due to heavy fuel and fire on mid slopes there is a low probability of success with direct attack and due to the overhead hazards and lack of safety zones high exposure to fire fighters.

Risk Assessment

Intent This assessment was prepared on behalf of the Agency Administrators of the

Umatilla National Forest involved in Vinegar Fire and is intended to serve as Agency Administrator fundamental Incident Guidance with respect to strategic direction. The assessment provides a relative comparison of alternative strategic directions based on the values at risk, protection objectives and exposure of incident responders to the risks of wildland fire. The assessment reflects Agency Administrators’ careful consideration of management strategies and was completed with their full engagement and direction.

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Current Incident Summary

The Vinegar Fire is currently 300 acres and is located in the Greenhorn Unit of the North Fork John Day Wilderness, Umatilla National Forest, near the community of Greenhorn. The fire initiated in the Vinegar Hill Scenic Area, but was pushed by winds from the southwest downhill to the northeast and ended up above Dry Creek within one mile of the Wilderness and Wallowa-Whitman National Forest boundaries. The fuel type is timber with significant amounts of standing dead-trees and down fuels, most closely represented by fuel model 10. The upper elevations are lodge pole pine with a mixture of sub-alpine fir. There are numerous interspersed areas of rock scree and alpine meadows that break up the fuel continuity. The fuels in the Vinegar Hill Scenic Area tend to a fuel model 2 with lighter fuels.

Key Incident Objectives

Provide for firefighter and public safety Utilize risk management to provide for the safety of incident personnel and the

public while implementing reasonable objectives commensurate with the values at risk and probability of success.

Protect private inholdings, structures and improvements. Protect the structures and assets related to the Olive Lake Campground and

Fremont Powerhouse. Protect Wilderness values and natural and cultural resources by utilizing MIST

tactics and existing trails and natural barriers. Maintain suppression costs commensurate with values at risk. Maintain and enhance relationships with agency partners, cooperators, and

community leaders by providing timely and accurate information. Utilize resources from local communities wherever possible.

What are the critical values at risk?The most significant values at risk are adjacent private structures related to mining claims and the communities of Greenhorn and Granite. Secondarily, the Olive Lake Campground and the Fremont Powerhouse (and associated wooden pipeline) are recreational assets that should be protected where possible.

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Risk Analysis:

By implementing a confine and contain strategy in the wilderness, firefighter safety and costs should be minimized.

Options Considered:

Option 1 - Perimeter Control, Contingency Checking and Monitoring. Option 1 uses a combination of perimeter control, contingency lines, and monitoring to provide protection of critical values at risk. Fireline is used to provide protection of identified values (described in table above).

Option 2 - Full Perimeter Control. Option 2 uses a full perimeter control strategy to fully contain the fire as small as possible.

Option Comparison:

This assessment develops the person-hours of exposure of incident personnel for the total option and estimates the cost of the option. The assessment assumes that each person is exposed for 14-hours per option-day for hand crews and equipment crew (e.g., engines, water tenders). For aviation resources, exposure is based on 6-hours per option-day.

Option #1Perimeter Control, Contingency Checking and MonitoringEstimated Incident Responder Exposure (person hours)1300 Firefighter-days (70% probability of success)Estimated Cost: $1,300,000Option #2Full Perimeter Control2100 Firefighter-days (30% probability of success) Estimated Cost $2,100,000

Risk Communication:

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The Umatilla NF, Wallowa-Whitman NF, Oregon Department of Forestry (NE Oregon and Central Oregon Districts), and Grant County and Baker County Commissioners and Sheriff’s Offices will continue to be involved in management of this incident to its conclusion. Press releases are being sent to concerned members of the public, interest groups, neighboring agencies, partners, and media. These groups will continue to receive relevant information and public comment will be considered in the management of the incident.

Risk Sharing:

The District Ranger is working closely with the Forest Supervisor in the management of this incident. The Forest Supervisor has been in contact with regional staff and has briefed the Regional Forester and Regional Fire Director. The importance of working together is to provide clarity to the IMT for the course of action selection and leader’s intent direction was stressed.

Risk Decision:

Based on the findings outlined below, my decision is to implement Option # 1- Perimeter Control, Contingency Checking and Monitoring.

Findings:

The selected course of action is the least exposure prospect that meets the incident objectives, is worth exposing incident responders to the inherent hazards of the wildland fire environment, and has a reasonable probability of success. The selected option is reasonably safe for firefighters to implement.

Risk Monitoring:

As this incident develops, I will monitor the effectiveness of the course of action with the IMT. If conditions warrant, the risk assessment, analysis and risk decision will be revised as needed.

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Transportation Map

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Vinegar Fire Public Information Map

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Vinegar Fire Infrared Map

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Vinegar IMT (Phone) Interview ScheduleOR- UMF-000845

Assigned Type Name Position Date and Time

8/14 T3 Brandon Coville IC –T3 Tuesday Feb 18 @ 0900 PT

8/16 T2 Brian Watts IC (Team 4) Tuesday Feb 4 @ 0800 PTNick Lunde (AD) DIC Tuesday Feb 4 @ 0800 PT

8/23 T2 Bret Fillis IC (Team 2) Tuesday Feb 4 @ 1300 PT Eric Knerr DIC Tuesday Feb 4 @ 1300

PT

8/27 T3 Shane Severs IC Monday Feb 3 @ 0900 PT

Umatilla National Forest Interview Schedule2517 SW Hailey Ave, Pendleton, OR 97801

March 5, 20141000 Kevin Martin Forest Supervisor 541-278-3752 Tamarack 1100 Brian Goff Forest Fire Staff 541-278-3748 Tamarack 1100 Kelly Hedgepeth District FMO 541-427-5357 Potamus1200 Joani Bosworth Public Affairs 541-278-3722 Potamus 1200 John Buckman ODF District Forester 541-963-3168 Tamarack

Wallowa-Whitman National Forest Interview Schedule1550 Dewey Ave, Baker City OR

1500 John Laurence Forest Supervisor 541-523-1202 For. Sup. Office1530 Tom Montoya Deputy Forest Supervisor 541-523-1203 Grande Ronde1600 Bret Ruby Fire Staff 541-523-1207 Phone

541-519-8280

Zone Position/Blue Mtn. Dispatch Center (BMIDC) Interview Schedule59973 Downs Rd, La Grande OR

March 6, 2014 @ 0900

0900 Renae Crippen BMIDC Center Manager 541-975-5402 BMIDC1000 Billie Hopkins Exp. Dispatch Coordinator 541-975-5403 BMIDC1100 Miles Hancock Unit Aviation Officer 541-975-5418 BMIDC

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