vincent - ideology and the university

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Ideology and the University

AN DREW VI N CEN T

Introduction

For those who have lived through thelast few decades in British education,particularly higher education, thechanges have been both extensive andprofound. In fact for some of those whohave taught in universities in Britain

between the 1960s and the 1980s, thepresent system in 2011 is barely recogni-sable in many of its practices. I haveneither any wish in this essay to delveinto the minutiae of these changes nor theovert pros and cons of what has takenplace. However, what is not oftenthought about amidst the cacophony ofpolicies and reforms is what we preciselyhave in fact lost over the last thirty yearsthrough these changes. Further, we havenot really thought critically enough about

what has been really driving thesechanges, to the present day, in the basiceveryday habitus of university life. Thecrucial problem, in my reading, is thatideas will often submerge below the sur-face of actions, policies and events and

become an underlying vernacular whichis frequently taken for granted. Theembryonic ideas can then become diffi-cult to tease out. The present essay is anattempt to address some these issues and

the underlying ideas in a brief and com-prehensible format. My primary argu-ment is that it is the subtle movementsof ideology which are at the centre ofthese social transformations in education,although it is an ideology that permeatesour ordinary consciousness and is notalways articulated. It rather forms anunquestioned backdrop to policy.

Ideology and politics

When we address questions focused on abetter society or better education sys-tem, we are frequently invokingwhether we are aware of it or nottheconcept and practice of ideology. Ideol-ogy characteristically embodies ways ofnavigating the political world as well asvisions of a better (or worse) society.

There are though ever present dangerswithin ideology. One very familiar dan-ger is seeing a particular ideologicalvision as all-encompassing. This might

be described as the more zealous senseof ideology. It usually invokes the con-cept of truth and realityas exemplifyingthat particular ideological vision. In thissense, for example, liberalism, conserva-tism, national socialism or radical Isla-

mism are each literally the truthformany of their votaries. The world isthen seen wholly through the exclusivevision. The key point to emphasise here isthat this is a self-consciously deployedconception of ideology. The ideologicalagent is fully committed and conscious oftheir beliefs.

However there is a second danger inideology which is often linked paradoxi-cally to ideas such as common sense. Pre-

dictably, what is called common sense(particularly in social practices) is usuallythe preface to the triumph and domi-nance of another ideologyalthough itwould never be formulated in this man-ner by its proponents, mainly becausethey are always not self-consciouslyaware of what is taking place. Such ideo-logically driven common sense usuallyinvokes obfuscatory binaries such as Iam a practical person you are an ideolo-

# The Author 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA332

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gist, or I deal in the real world whereasyou are an impractical ideologist. In thislatter context, for some, ideology can

become a term of derision seen as distinctfrom the world of hard economic or social

realities. The hard reality though is stillideology, but submerged into an unques-tioned vernacular.

Ideology, in this common sense ver-sion, dwells in a double bind. In onemode it poses as common sense and thereal, and in another mode it condemns asfalse other patterns of thought becausethey are ideological. This might be calledanother more pervasive view of theideology of the end of ideology. It is close

to what Antonio Gramsci called hege-monythat is, where ideology literallybecomes the ordinary common sense of asociety. This can, in some contexts, be aprofoundly menacing form of ideologysince it masquerades as the only accept-able reality and pervades deeply intohuman lives, being largely unquestioned.

The ideology of socialdemocracy

In the period 194570, Britain exhibited aself-conscious ideological sense of a bet-ter society. It was an ideology that wasoften flaky at the edges and contested indetail, but, nonetheless, it held sway. Theagenda was focused on the desirability offull employment; the full extension of thesocial rights of citizenship, in the form ofa wide-ranging welfare state; the exten-sion of state-funded public education; theneed for secure social minimums as part

of any civilised society; the desirability ofa mixed economy, embodying a mutually

beneficial mixture of public and privateeconomic enterprises. State interventionand collective planning were seen as anexpected concomitant of this agenda. Onecommentator has summed up this ideo-logical consensus as Keynesian socialdemocracy.1

One central motif of social democracywas a critique ofunregulated free markets

as inefficient and wasteful, sociallydestructive, creating deep inequalitiesand profound social injustices. This wasa widely accepted orthodoxy for half acentury, particularly after 1945. It should

not be forgotten that, historically, socialdemocratic thinking had struggledagainst a largely classical liberal market-

based orthodoxy throughout the laternineteenth and early twentieth centuries.The achievements of social democracywere very hard won over almost a cen-tury of ideological and practical struggle.

In praise of social democracy

In the eighteenth and early nineteenthcenturies the state was viewed largely asan impersonal apparatus with a veryminimal range of functions. Much ofwhat we now think of as state responsi-

bilityparticularly in the domesticspherewas done in the early eighteenthcenturyoften with significant corrup-tion and inefficiencyby a plethora ofprivate agencies. Gradually such privateagencies were replaced by the state orlocal government in, for example, tax

collection, policing, the mail, sewerage,water supply, transport and education. Inthe twentieth century, by the 1950s and1960s, social democracy embodied thehigh point of this public development ofresponsibility. Indeed social democracyhad achieved many of its key initial ob-

jectives by 1970, after a profound strug-gle. As Ralph Dahrendorf remarked: [I]nmany respects the social democratic con-sensus signifies the greatest progress

which history has seen so far. Never before have so many people had somany life chances.2 This constituted aconcrete vision of a better society for allcitizens rich or poor.

The distinctive attribute of socialdemocracy was its subtle combinationand blending of elements from otherideologies. In many ways it was a mon-grel ideology. This was its virtue. Whatwas most attractive about it was that it

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embodied the integuments of a civil andcivilised society, which was focused onmaximising the life chances for as manycitizens as possible. Social democracyproposed that a better society was

neither just about wealth creation normonetary dividends. It was not aboutcivil security and obedience for its ownsake. It was not about achieving somehigher moral goal. It embodied aspectsof these, but if it had a core commitment,it was about enabling all citizens to flour-ish and to live a moderately good lifethat is, maximising human life chancesin a civil society. This maximising pro-cess was not dependent on wealth as

such. The economy existed for humanbeings, and not vice versa. Social demo-cracy was about providing opportunitiesto citizens, as well as protecting themfrom the pitfalls of ill-health and socialand economic distress.

The crisis of social democracy

Two things happened to social demo-cracy in the later 1970s: first it became,

in the main, the normative background ofeveryday life. The often heart-rendingand deep struggles that took place tocreate the social democratic state becamesubmerged gradually within institutionalnormalcy and common sense. It became,in a way, the background expectation,rather than the explicit ideology of ageneration. No one could even imagine,in the 1970s, the idea of a privatisedhealth service, private prisons, paying

for public schooling, severely constrainedsocial security, or hefty fees to study atuniversities. These would have been con-sidered as part of the hare-brained fringeof ideological thought. Many, however,did slowly forget the complex history,normative language and rationale of so-cial democracy. It was gradually replaced

by, if anything, a dull resentment againstthe tax burdens involved in achievinggreater social justice.

The second issue (which facilitated thistax resentment) was the arrival of a newproselytising ideology in the 1980sdeveloped continuously under theThatcherMajorBlairBrown years. Its

general ideological ethos was neoliberal,although ironically appearing first underthe umbrellas of purported conservatismand then socialism. The ideology rapidlypermeated policy debates on a globalscale, way beyond Europe, although itsimpact has been patchy. Its basic tenetidentified the unregulated classical lib-eral free market capitalist order as themost efficient allocator of resources. Itwas obsessively concerned with wealth

creation, privatisation and deregulation;it was highly individualistic; deeply sus-picious of state or public action in theeconomic or social spheres; and dedic-ated to the idea of incessant economicgrowth.

Neoliberal hegemony

The days of enthused proselytism for theideology of the neoliberal market order

have now passed. The ideology has nowsubmerged, in the 2000s, into our moderninstitutional vernaculars. It has become,in other words, hegemonic. The moves tocarry on marketising our public servicesand setting economic targets all reveal thesame basic underlying ideological mind-set. The Thatcher-to-Brown years wereunderpinned by an unquestioned ideo-logical assumption concerning the intrin-sic value of the unregulated market.

Despite the unprecedented financial irre-sponsibility of banking, hedge funds andprivate finance revealed in 2008, some-how, ideologically it was still the publicsector which must be penalised. The

banking sector has only been lightly chas-tised, largely for the sake of public per-ception, and the public sector must paythe full price over the next decade for theinefficiency, waste and irresponsibilityfostered by neoliberal ideology. One can

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see here the full power of ideologicalhegemony.

Thus the oddity is that this marketisingideology has become so embedded incommon sense and institutions that we

cannot seem even to have a criticalsearching conversation about it. It is theelephant in the room. When British peo-ple are told that privatising familiar ser-vices, such as the local authorities, busservices, nursing services, libraries oreducation, saves public money andimproves efficiency, they become verb-ally mute. Nothing is proved here, ratherthe ideology basically conditions think-ing and questioning. It becomes analo-

gous to an article of religious faith.

Education and ideology

Social democratic ideology reminds usthat a state is not a business. A state existsfor other purposes, the most important

being to facilitate the security, flourishingand well-being of its citizens. Facets of thestates social purpose have includedtransport, postal services, health and edu-cation. These facets of the state cannot be

fully marketised businesses. What hashappened under the hegemony of neolib-eral market ideology is that the economicand social powers of the state have beengradually removed into the private sectormanagement. However, because suchthings, by their nature, cannot be fullymarketised, we now have in Britain theworst of all worlds, the marketisation of

public services and a public sector monopolyof certain markets. Private finance initia-

tives to fund public structures are typicalof this hybrid product.

In this context let me focus on some-thing close to home: British universities.In universities the neoliberal marketisedideology (with its private sector manage-ment accoutrements) now dominates thevernaculars of vice chancellors, deans,heads of department and universityadministrators en masse. Such ideologicaldiscourse is presented as common sense,

a grasp of hard realities, or some form ofneutral rational truth about the social andeconomic world. Words such as com-petition, choice, enterprise and soforth take on a magical conjuring status.

When deployed in institutional academicdiscourse they trump all comers anddemand verbal obeisance. I am remindedhere of Keyness famous remark from hisGeneral Theory:

The ideas of economists and political philoso-phers, both when they are right and whenthey are wrong, are more powerful than iscommonly understood. Indeed the world isruled by little else. Practical men, who believethemselves to be exempt from any intellectualinfluences, are usually the slaves of somedefunct economist. Madmen in authority,who hear voices in the air, are distilling theirfrenzy from some academic scribbler of a fewyears back. I am sure that the power of vestedinterests is vastly exaggerated compared withthe gradual encroachment of ideas.3

University administrations speak con-fidently about new income streams, stu-dents as consumers, universities as

businesses and education as a globalmarketing product. Market impacts are

seen as valid forms of assessment ofacademic research. There is a belief thatacademic quality can be meaningfullymeasured and judged by this processthus the eponymous esteem indicator, aterm which reeks of market ideology. Agood academic now is one who gainsmore income than others. A good depart-ment is one which maximises externalgrant income. Students are implicitly en-couraged into a life of self-interest and

self-advancement. The idea that a lifecould be dedicated to public service isnow virtually meaningless.

Universities are not alone here. Healthservices, transport and policing are alldominated by the same ideological ethos.None of these can really be either doneaway with or completely privatised. Theyare, by their intrinsic nature, publicgoods. Only states can actually do suchthings effectivelyas the ideology of




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social democracy grasped. A private sec-tor business, usuallyunless they areironically so important for the stabilityof the general economy such as bankscannot rely on any guaranteed income

from the state or taxpayers. They haveto react to shareholders. Most privatecompaniesapart from bankshave tomake profits in order to continue to exist.Shareholders show their displeasure byselling shares. None of these factors applyto universities. Universities do not makeprofits. There are no shareholders tocheck management. They have no com-petitors in any real market sense. Andthere is no scope for shareholder rebellion

to impose a change, if management oradministration proves inadequate.What we have here, as emphasised, is

the worst of markets coupled with the worstof public control. The problem withimporting private sector managerial tech-niques into universitiesand into thepublic sector generallyis that it hascentralised authority along businesslines, but has not at the same timeinitiated the counter balances to monitorsuch managerial power. The ideology of

free markets (and private sector manage-rialism) does not entail pure deregulationin universities; it is rather a strange andperverse hybrid. It is neither fish norfowl. In consequence we have a largelyunaccountable university administrationtrying to redesign academic life to fit anideologically driven strategic vision andusing private-sector management tech-niques to nudge and coerce their staff inan authoritarian manner.

At the root of this is not a universityenabling academics to teach and research,

but rather to fulfil a deeply ideologicalmarket agenda, using purportedly neu-tral procedures of performance relatedpay, staff development review systems,appraisal and promotion procedures, andmonetary sticks and carrots to depart-ments and academics who follow thecentrally designed strategic businessplans. This entails the classic discipline

and control of academic thought. We aredealing here with the integument ofsmart power through managerialism. Pri-vate-sector management techniques (andtheir accompanying free market ideo-

logical beliefs) in their present perversehybrid form, are now in the process ofdriving a coach and horses through thecivilising processes of academic freedom.Any one who studies universities intwentieth-century authoritarian or mili-tant societieswhere the ideologicalagendas forced on universities are thatmuch more severewill know that sucha process ultimately undermines free cri-tical thought.

Education in the marketplace

What of the future of high education overthe next decade? One might havethought, as indicated earlier, that somedoubts might have been sown by therecent banking crisis (2008) over the roleof neoliberal market ideology. However,there is often an unexpected inertia builtinto ideas and the way they penetrateinstitutions. Once ideas have become

embedded there is an ideational timelag, which refuses to be falsified by anycounter evidence, no matter how power-ful. Thus, this neoliberal ideology findsits most recent expression in the BrowneReport: Securing a Sustainable Future for

Higher Education: An Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and StudentFinance (2010). This report should beunderstood as a symptom or pathologyof an ideological hegemony. It initiates

nothing, but rather reinforces pre-exist-ing ideological assumptionsassump-tions which have gradually permeatedinstitutional discourse over the last thirtyyears. It claims to be an independentadministrative report on higher educa-tion funding, but it is, in reality, tediouslyideological to its core.

The ideological themes which cementthe whole document are overly familiar.First, the competitive market is the most




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efficiently allocator of resources; second,governments should intervene onlyminimally in what should be the domainof markets, since under the same basicreasoning governments tend to act inef-

ficiently by not identifying market sig-nals. Publics goods are necessarilylimited, private goods are multiple andidentified with the wants and prefer-ences of self-interested individuals.Third, all societies are constituted byindividuals who are largely self-inter-ested utility-maximisers. Society is thusmerely an aggregation of these selfishindividual atoms. Fourth, individualchoice is fetishised; however, the choice

is constrained. It is only the choice of aconsumer in a market. Choice, in effect,means not being unreasonably con-strained in realising ones desires.

If we apply the above ideologicalvaluesas the Browne Report does inan acutely unimaginative mannertohigher education, then we derive thefollowing conclusions. It is atomised indi-viduals (students and, indeed, aca-demics) who constitute education, allseeking to maximise their own interests

in an educational marketplace. If suchindividual atoms benefit others, it will

be only indirectly and unintentionally.Thus, in higher education the individualstudent is primarily seeking to maximisehis or her own interests. The key reasonthey seek higher education is to reapindividual rewards in term of say futureprivileged financial benefits. The relationof higher education institutions to theindividual students is simply a rational

cost-benefit calculation for both parties.Similarly, academics (like all human

beings) are all moderately selfish indivi-dualists who, despite their social or moralrhetoric, are simply out to maximise theirown personal interests and indeed sal-aries. Like any other human being, theyneed market competition to stimulatetheir research and teaching quality. Any-thing that is of human value arises out ofcompetition and market choice.

The business community, per se, shouldmake no direct contribution to develophigher education in any up-front manner.This would be penalising business enter-prise for the sake of the private selfish

desires of others. In addition, businesswill employ graduates with high-demand skills and will reward themwith elevated salaries. Again, such sal-aries are not allotted for any altruisticreason, but rather, once again, becauseskills enhance the self-interest of businessin a world of competitive enterprises.Skilled workers will mean more effectiveinnovative productivity, more competi-tiveness and thus more profits for the

business. All this process can be encapsu-lated in Adam Smiths well-known ideo-logical terminology of the invisiblehandthat is, the belief that public bene-fits arise via private vices (although thislatter phrase is Bernard de Mandevilles).The driver here is an ideological accountof human nature, rooted in basic selfish-ness and acquisitiveness. It follows that ifthe state intervenes or subsidises highereducation (as it had done, to a greater orlesser degree, from 1960s up to the 1990s),

it will undermine the positive effects ofmarket competition, thus in effect drivingdown educational quality. Quality, in thisneoliberal ideological scenario, onlyarises from intensifying market competi-tion. Education is therefore understood asa good, invested in by the individual forpurely private gain. It follows that itwould be wrong for the hard-pressedBritish taxpayer to fund such whollyprivate goods. Higher education is a

private, not a public, goodIt follows from this ideological premise

that competition between students forplaces, competition between universityinstitutions for student cash, and com-petition between departments and aca-demics will weed out the inefficient,wasteful, low-quality students, teachersand institutions, and improve the overallquality of education. All this will there-fore ultimately redound to the benefit of




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all individuals in society, not from anyaltruistic motif, but simply via the invi-sible hand effect. As the Browne Reportnotes, university institutions in this set-ting will either have to raise their game

to compete or they will fail, or be takenover by more market-efficient institu-tions.4

The above state of affairs will haveunintended but specific effects on aca-demic subjects. If students have to paysignificant amounts for a universitycourse, they will want recoup incomevia relevant employability skillsthatis, skills which will enhance employmentand monetary prospects. However, the

Browne Report, oddly, at this point unex-pectedly breaks ranks with its core ideol-ogy and in part undermines its own logic,although it is still highly predictable in sodoing. The Report tries, in effect, to skewthe market- via state-led demands. Inother words, it does not really trust indi-vidual students to make the right rationalchoices. If a mass of consumer-studentstherefore aimed to study, say, law ormedia studies, they must be deterredthrough artificially constructed market

signals.Thus, the Browne Report, without any

argument or justification, states dogmati-cally that certain subjects (engineering,the sciences and medicine) are apparentlythe only ones which are important to thewell being of our society and to oureconomy and should be subsidised insome way by the taxpayer.5 A minimalpublic goods thesis thus sneaks surrepti-tiously in the back door. This argument is

not unexpected since the idea of an unre-gulated market is and always has been apure mythalthough we should notunderrate the immense power of suchmyths. What we have here, once again,is the trademark of current neoliberalmarket ideologynamely, the worst ofmarkets coupled with the worst of publiccontrol. Thus, market disciplines mustprevail until the market neoliberal arbit-rarily decides otherwise.

One crucial consequence of the aboveskewed market effect on stem universitysubjects is that the argument implies,quite directly, that all other academicsubjects, by definition, are not important

to the well-being of society. Thus, forexample, all the arts, languages, literat-ure, philosophy and social sciences aresimply seen as unimportant fripperieshaving no bearing on human well-beingor society and consequently should bepaid for fully by the consumer-student,without any subsidy. We have seen theforlorn half-conscious response to thisargument in, for example, the arts wherethe use value of the arts industries are

given priority in public pronouncements.Thus, the arts establishment desperatelywant to reassure their neoliberal mastersthat it has products which can be mar-keted and sold.

Another anomalous contradiction inthe Browne Report is to see higher educa-tion as isolated from education in gen-eralthat is, separate from primary andsecondary education. If it is the case thatmarkets are the most efficient resourceallocators, that competition is a positive

virtue, that all individuals are self-inter-ested utility-maximises, that societies areconstituted by such individuals and thatpublic goods must be minimal, then thereis no reason not to see a market ideologyapplying universally. It is thus surely afundamental error to see primary andsecondary education as exempt. Brownesuggests criteria to differentiate primaryand secondary from higher educationnamely, that the former are legally com-

pulsory, whereas the latter is a matter ofchoice and further that higher educationis dependent upon aptitude.6

At this point the Browne Reportneglects an obvious question: why areprimary and secondary education com-pulsory? The answer is equally obvious. Itis the state in comparatively recent historythat has chosen to make them legallycompulsory, bound up with the idea ofenabling opportunities for citizens. The




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state has created the boundaries to mar-kets. Prior to this, primary and secondaryeducation were not legally compulsory. Infact, exactly the same argument that theBrowne Report applies to higher educa-

tion was used by market liberals to denythe states role in primary and secondaryeducation, even well into the twentiethcentury. Many liberal market ideologueswould still argue, quite consistently, thatthe state should not be involved in educa-tion, since it is, in toto, a private good. Theargument would be as follows: who actu-ally benefits from primary education? Theanswer is the selfish individual (parent orchild). It follows, therefore, why should

the hard-pressed taxpayer have to subsi-dise the selfish demands of parents andchildren in primary education? Further,why is the selfish individual child in pri-mary education? The answer, for the lib-eral market exponents, is that unless theindividual is numerate and literate theywill not gain financially beneficialemployment. The individual will onlyget a higher salary when they increasetheir skills in education. We have there-fore exactly the same market logic at work

as for higher education. Education, in anyform, is a private good for the committedneoliberal.

Aptitude is certainly a issue, althoughthe fact that universities during the nine-teenth and early twentieth centuries drewthe majority of their students from afinancially wealthy eliteparticularly inthe case of Oxford and Cambridge via thefee-paying private school systemdoesnot square with aptitude criteria. In the

post-1950s era, aptitude did unquestion-ably come to the fore. However, if it isaptitude that determines higher educa-tional opportunities, what is the rele-vance of cash? If cash is irrelevant forprimary and secondary education, it fol-lows that it must be irrelevant for highereducation, unless one is prepared for apreposterous self-contradiction in theargument. This still allows one to choosenot to attend higher education, but if one

decides to go then it is still a public goodlike primary or secondary education.

Conclusion

One cannot even formulate clearlyenough here what an errant distortion ofacademic and educational life is impliedin the present ideological hegemony. Theideology of market neoliberalism andprivate sector managerialism effectivelyeviscerates what was a genuine publicgood. What was originally a dignifiedpublic responsibility has now become anillegitimate, huckstering, market mechan-ism, knowing the price of everything and

the value of nothing. The people whonow advocate this hegemonic ideologythink that it is realism and common sense.In fact, it is a highly politicised neoliberalideology masquerading as a managerialreality.

Universities are not businesses, how-ever much some administrators andindustrial executives would like them to

be. For the most part, academics are notmotivated by the pursuit of wealth. Theyare driven by the fulfilment of teaching,

the freedom to follow ideas and thecollegiality that universities once pro-vided, although no longer. Whatdegrades modern British universities isthe ideology of free marketsthe hege-mony of this ideology has become anunquestioned common sense of oureveryday working life and the profoundshame is that we do not even query this.Every committee meeting and universitydocument which apes this ideological

language is an affront to our criticalfaculties.

What social democracy did was actu-ally give us the basic components of acivilised society. Its ideology was mon-grel, but it had a sense of proportion and

judgement in the way it thought aboutthe delicate blending required for a

balanced, just and fair civil society. Publicservices were public. The private sectorand free markets were valuable in their




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place. Free markets (even now) cannotfunction without the state. This simplelogic seems to evade most votaries ofneoliberalism. Social democracy believes,however, that the market should serve

the state, unlike the free market ideologyand managerialists who believe the pub-lic sector and state should serve themarket. Humans are surely more thanthis eviscerated neoliberal image.

When we focus on our presentespe-cially in universitieswe have to graspthat what is at play here is ideology. It isnot a neutral rational administration setagainst ideology. It is just power andideological domination (with all the mys-

tifications implied in this process). Weneed to see it for what it is: a quitemenacing neoliberal ideology. We alsoconsequently need now, more than any-thing, critical thinking. We are too mod-est and too willing to give way toideological authority in everyday univer-sity life. No one should be exempt fromcriticism; university administrators are

now, more than anything, quite unapolo-getic ideological functionaries and weneed to relearn how to rigorously criticisethose who manage or govern usin allwalks of life. Ultimately no ideology lasts,

this present one will be supplanted; thequestion one has to ask here is what levelof damage to civil and intellectual life willit inflict and what might replace it?

Notes

1 D. Marquand, The Unprincipled Society, Lon-don, Collins, Fontans, 1988, see Chapter 1.

2 Quoted in T. Judt, Ill Fares the Land, London,Penguin, 2010, p. 78.

3 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employ-

ment, Interests and Money, London, Macmil-lan 1957, p. 383.

4 Securing a Sustainable Future for HigherEducation: An Independent Review of HigherEducation Funding and Student Finance (theBrowne Report), London, The StationeryOffice, 2010, p. 25.

5 Browne Report, p. 25.6 Ibid. p. 21.



vincent - ideology and the university

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