MRAP Utilization and Safety in the Iraq and Afghanistan Theaters:

The Warfighters Perspective

Adrian W. Vigneault

BIS Military Conflict Analysis

(Military History & Conflict Analysis and Resolution)

George Mason University

BIS 490 – Joe Killiany M.A.

Mentor – Dr. Christopher Hamner

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 3

Acronym Glossary 4

List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………….4

Introduction 5

Interdisciplinary Rationale 6

Interdisciplinary Diagram …………………..…………………………………………………..9

Audience ………………………………………….……..………………………………………10

Literature Review ...…………………………………………………………………………..10

Methods……………………………………………………………………………………….…16

Analysis……………………………………………………………………………….…………17

Implementation and Utilization…………………………………………………….….18

Operations and Mission Tactics……………………………...………………………..20

Safety and Risk……………………………………………………...…………………..22

Recommendations, Limitations and Conclusion……………………..………….……………25

Appendix………………………………………………………………...………………………28

Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………………..29

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Military and Defense personnel who made this research possible, with telling their stories and experiences, and making this project a truly awesome endeavor to work on. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to The BIS department, but especially my teacher for BIS 390 and 490 Joe Killiany, and my mentor Dr. Christopher Hamner for helping me stay focused, on track, and providing support when I needed guidance. I would also like to thank last, but not least, my parents and Melissa Fitter; for encouraging me and not giving up on me—even when I didn’t think I had anymore drive, and believing in me to the fullest extent.

Thank you.

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Acronyms▪ 155 (one five five) - 155mm artillery rounds

▪ Clicks – Kilometer

▪ COIN – Counterinsurgency Operations

▪ IED – Improvised Explosive Device

▪ EFP – Explosively Formed Penetrator

▪ MRAP – Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (Vehicle)

▪ MATV – MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle

▪ HMMVW (Humvee) - High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

▪ TC – Truck Commander

▪ SA – Situational Awareness

List of FiguresNumber Page

1. MRAP IMPLEMENTATION……………………………………………18

2. MRAP FIREFIGHT……………………………………………………...20

3. MRAP STUCK IN MUD………………………………………………...21

4. MRAP ROLLOVER SIMULATOR……………………………………..23

5. MRAP ROLLOVER IN WATER………………………………………..24

6. EXPLOSIVELY FORMED PENETRATOR (EFP)……………………..24

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IntroductionA deadly threat in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters was increasing and ripping through

the undercarriage of military vehicles, killing their occupants inside—the Improvised Explosive

Device (IED). By July 2008, the Government Accountability Office estimated that 75% of the

casualties in the theaters was due to the devices, which took a devastating toll on the

inadequately armored Humvees that constituted most of the vehicular fleet. In response to the

threat, the Department of Defense fast-tracked a program to develop vehicles that could

withstand the threats from IEDs. The result: the MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected

vehicle), which was equipped with a heavily armored V-shaped hull to deflect explosive blasts,

and higher ground clearance in order to increase safety and blast survivability of its occupants

during an IED event. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that the MRAP was "the

first major defense procurement program to go from concept to full-scale industrial production in

less than a year since World War II."

The MRAP was designed to mitigate the danger of IEDs. However, the same vehicle

characteristics that helped increase blast survivability for its occupants, including a higher

undercarriage and heavier armor, also increased the signature and weight of the MRAP. Those

changes, in turn, created other vulnerabilities for the defense and military personnel using them,

increasing their risk of injury from other dangers to the slow-moving, highly visible, rollover-

prone vehicles. The in-theater transition from fielding the Humvee to the multiple MRAP

variants was a response to the need of U.S. military forces. The transition and implementation of

the MRAP created new issues and challenges which will need to be addressed to identify its

proper role and service into the future with the armed forces, which leads to the research

questions. The primary question asks: from a first-hand, personal experience of military and

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defense personnel, was the warfighters’ mission, engagement, and disengagement strategies

improved or hindered by the MRAP vehicle? Moreover, was the implementation, and utilization

of the MRAP a success, or added risk in theater, and how? Secondary research questions include

how the MRAP compared to the Humvee platform in utilization and mobility. The research

process includes interviewing military and defense personnel from the Afghanistan and Iraq

theaters, in order to record their experience with fielding and utilizing the MRAP. This research

will include how it affected their strategies, tactics, mobility, and safety on missions and daily

operations. The large acquisition and implementation of the MRAP vehicles into the military’s

motor pool translates to an extended time of service they will provide for future missions.

Identifying the capabilities and limitations of their use, instead of utilizing the MRAP with a

blanket mission approach, will increase the safety and reduce the risk of military and defense

personnel injury or death.

Interdisciplinary Rationale

My BIS concentration is Military Conflict Analysis, which combines the disciplines of

Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and Military/Conflict History. Within conflict analysis and

resolution, multiple situations occur on the micro scale, which can effect and escalate into macro

issues or results. Using Conflict Analysis techniques, such as identifying needs, wants, and

issues from a first-person level, I will be able to investigate and respond to the stated research

topic and questions. A minor portion to my interdisciplinary study is human behavior, which

identifies the wants and needs from a personal and group level, which will assist in the first

person approach of my studies. This allows for exploration of improved processes by analyzing

the cause and effect of required equipment implementation in theater to military personnel. I will

also be analyzing and researching the topic from the macro to micro level, which is utilized in

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conflict analysis and consists of the top down, or leadership overview of information on the

topic, which is typically pushed out to the public and media.

The Conflict Analysis and Resolution approach is to dig down to the core issues, which is

typically on the micro scale, and analyze how the issues began, how they are currently being

dealt with, and to strategize on a resolution plan, with predicted outcomes, and potential

obstacles that could occur. This information would then be expedited to the leaders or top

command, without being filtered through the normal path of communication. This is done to

create a resolution which can be quickly implemented, without the delay of going through the

normal and censored channels of communication. Using the Conflict Analysis discipline

techniques, I plan on researching my topic from an overview and leadership perspective, but then

focusing on the personal, first person experiences and situations which were encountered during

the implementation of the topic via interview. This will be done to get a snapshot of the

successes and issues relating to the MRAP vehicles. The human behavior studies will help assist

in both the conflict analysis and military history approach, because it will assist identifying the

human wants, needs, and behaviors associated with these disciplines, and to be able to identify

them on a first person level with the interview subjects in this project.

Military and Conflict history is an integral part of this research, in order to understand the

background aspects, behavior, and mentality of the armed forces. By utilizing the background

knowledge and history of the United States military and conflict operations, one gains

knowledge of prior operations, why those operations did or did not work, and if they failed, what

could have been done differently to change the result. The successful or ineffective results of the

processes, procedures, and utilization of the MRAP implementation can be studied by analyzing

the time period beginning with the Iraq war and Afghanistan, through the present day. The

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historical process in this project will be able to help outline what led up to the MRAP

implementation, and how threats such as IEDs were dealt with. It also provides the analytics

needed to show the cause and effect of convoy strategies during the conflict period of the project.

This discipline is used within the proposal to track the changes of vehicles and military personnel

safety, and see the cause and effect from each course of action.

Blind spots are apparent through each individual discipline within this project, however,

an interdisciplinary approach will aid in rectifying the situation of “gaps”. Military history tends

to be analytical in approach, and relies on hard facts, data, and figures as a main approach to the

opposing side of a subject. Then it identifies how the leadership, motivation, and resources

affected an outcome. The drawback of using only military history techniques, is that it is largely

outcome based, and isn’t able to identify and analyze real time adaptations and affected

limitations of a situation. Conflict Analysis has a largely theoretical approach when

implemented into a situation; and although plans of analysis and action are perceived to look

good in theory, actual implementation can be a difficult task. The discipline takes into account

the soft skills needed for leadership to implement change, in order to reach a desired outcome.

Conflict Analysis can also have gaps due to an oversight of background and historical conflict,

which can be deep rooted, and negatively affect the desired outcome, which can prolong

resolution. An additional gap in the discipline is the failure of needed support and infrastructure

for supporting a resolution, which can be due to the culture, or physical location and resource

availability for a long term solution.

Being able to combine both the disciplines of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, along

with Military History, will aid in bridging research gaps, and allow a more in depth analysis and

dynamic perception of the overall topic of MRAP implementation. The limitations of this

Human Behavior

Conflict Analysis & Resolution

Military History

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research include limited access to proprietary data and information, due to national security,

along with the availability and total number of participants to be interviewed as part of this

research within the allotted amount of time. A study which may expand the depth and

comprehension of this major would have been political science and government. These subjects

could assist with the political side of incidents and events, where conflict analysis and military

history don’t have as much depth in this area

Interdisciplinary Diagram

Thought Processes

Group dynamics

Research

Peacekeeping

Factors

Outcome

Strategy

Conflict

Wants/

Background

Analytical

Operations

Hard data

Theory

Soft skills

Soft data

Micro

Underlying issues

Motivations

Actions

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Audience

The audience for this project will be the Department of Defense personnel, involved with

ground operations and allocating fielding equipment into theater. They will be able to benefit

from this research by identifying key issues the warfighter experienced, which are often

overlooked as minute details, but can have an overall negative impact on mission success. It will

also provide information on actual needs and wants of the affected personnel, instead of utilizing

unneeded or incapable combat systems; specifically the MRAP, whose features and capabilities

may not line up with the tactics and roles of certain missions. The Defense Department

identifying this could have the potential to save lives and wasted expense by fielding more

mission friendly, capable equipment.

Literature Review

The IED threat to United States military personnel became a primary focus of concern to

the Department of Defense during the Iraq and Afghanistan war. According to the International

Institute for Strategic Studies, the typical low cost of manufacturing IEDs due to their home-

made makeup, and the amount of damage, injuries, and casualties they can create make them an

effective force against coalition forces. They also have a strategic side effect of creating “fear,

lowering troop morale, limiting freedom of movement and undermining public support of

combat operations” (1). The article also sheds light on the secondary circumstances and

situations which IEDs create, and why they cause such a shift in modern warfare to not only

protect through armor, with the implementation of the MRAP, but detecting IEDs, shutting down

the IED making network, and training personnel of counter IED equipment.

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IED history and evolution is also explored in Glenn Zorpette’s “Countering IEDs”. IEDs

are constantly changing to respond to counter-IED measures that are implemented in theater.

Zorpette not only goes through the history of the IED and how they are made, but also the

triggers and effectiveness of IEDs and EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators). This ever-

changing environment is also addressed in Barbara Hamby’s articles “Mine Resistant Ambush

Protected (MRAP) Program meets Urgent Changing Requirements”. Hamby describes the

MRAP as “one of many innovations the U.S. military has developed to stay ahead of insurgents,

who readily adapt to American technology” (42). The article also describes the MRAPs

protective characteristics, and its ability to bring additional counter insurgent technologies to the

battlefield, which make it a game changing vehicle in theater.

Franz Gayl documents the MRAP chronology implementation in his article “Mine

Resistant Ambush Protect Vehicle (MRAP)”. The article begins with the initial needs assessment

before the Iraq and Afghanistan war even existed, and explores the history all the way to the

MRAPs fielding and use in theater. Gayl provides a historical look at the vehicles themselves, as

well as the results of fielding them compared with the alignment and vision of the current

military and counter insurgency tactics. The article also includes the multiple systems the MRAP

can be outfitted with to further justify its place in military tactics.

Marine Captain Tom Mancinelli, stated in the Marine Corps Gazette, “Our HMMWVs

(Humvee’s) are aging. First fielded in 1985, they lack the necessary armor and design to protect

our troops against today’s threats” (1). His statement was based on his experience seeing the

effects of IED blasts on Humvees from his two tours in Iraq. Michael Bruno, of Aerospace Daily

& Defense Report, states that “…insurgents' roadside bombs in Iraq have exploited their lighter-

armored, flat-bottomed weaknesses”. Even up-armored versions, which weigh approximately

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2,000 pounds more than the standard Humvee, are destroyed due to their flat-bottomed design.

The United States Government responded to the IED threat with the Deputy Secretary of

Defense, Gordon England (acting), who created a task force known as the Joint Improvised

Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) on June 27th, 2005. JIEDDO’s directives

included “Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe

operations including route clearance … and vehicle and personnel protection”. (6) The creation

of JIEDDO paved the way for a new personnel carrier, which would provide more protection

then the up-armored Humvee against an IED blast, and was known as the MRAP vehicle.

According to GAO Director, Michael J Sullivan, "in February 2005, Marine Corps

combatant commanders identified an urgent operational need for armored tactical vehicles to

increase crew protection and mobility of Marines operating in hazardous fire areas against

improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire” (1-2). At first, the

response to this was the up-armored Humvee, but as IED incidents increased, the need for a

heavily armored vehicle to protect against IED blast became a primary concern to commanders,

while mobility and adaptability became less paramount. This requirement led to the production

and utilization of the multiple MRAP vehicle variants, which traded mobility, simplicity, and

drivability, for personnel protection.

The changeover from the Humvee to the MRAP was intricate on multiple levels, which

affected the training and tactics of the soldiers who operated, traveled, and performed military

operations in them. Mancinelli explains that since the implementation of the MRAP was needed

on such a large scale, multiple variants of the MRAP were produced by different government

contractor manufacturers in multiple areas across the United States, along with two international

vendors (2). Because of the logistic complexity associated with the program, the military was

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forced to rely on contractors for MRAP support and repair in theater. According to Captain

David Stark from Marine Corps Combat Development Command, there are three categories of

MRAP vehicles within their different variants: Category I should be used during urban

operations and consist of the smallest MRAPs with the least weight. Category II MRAPs are

used for transportation of troops and road convoys. Category III MRAPs are used for route

clearance missions and operations of IEDs, and are the heaviest and biggest of the MRAP

variants (1-2). However, the MRAP’s sheer size and weight required for blast protection could

also be a challenge to integrate into combat strategies which require high mobility for

engagement, disengagement, and maximum clearance for maneuvers, which were initially

developed and easily carried out by the Humvee platform. Emelie Rutherford writes in her article

from Defense Daily about how the Army is addressing the known issues with the MRAP

variants, specifically from their height and weight. Rollovers, hitting power lines, fire

suppression, and jammed doors were addressed, which were unforeseen consequences from

having such a reinforced, large, and heavy vehicle.

Mission capability for the MRAP highly depends on the support and location surrounding

it in order to be operated and remain effective on the battlefield. Mission capability and

effectiveness can be a loose term, without definitive meaning. Mission capability may be

described as the ability to fully operate and be functional throughout the entire operation;

however it is important to gauge the protective ability the MRAP has as an overall acquisition,

which would benefit United States and Coalition forces. Colonel Michael Howitz stated in his

case study for the U.S. Army War College that the overall mission strategy of the military in

theater, doesn’t necessarily match the MRAP attributes and characteristics as a protective

vehicle. The MRAP by design keeps its crew isolated and protected from outside forces and

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dangers. However, the strategy of the United States military in the Afghanistan and Iraqi theaters

is to win the hearts and minds of the locals by keeping in constant contact and showing presence

with them to build relationships. Sharon Weiner states in her article on “Organizational Interests

versus Battlefield Needs” that “the MRAP is often too heavy or large for some urban

infrastructure, such as bridges, paved surfaces, and narrow alleys, plus the height increases the

risk of rollover on rough terrain and makes the vehicle too tall for some urban environments” (8).

This statement places the MRAP’s ability to be low overall for mission capability due to its

versatility, and suggests that it may be predestined for limited success.

The MRAP’s initial purpose addressed and delivered a need for more protection against

explosive blasts for military personnel; however, the changing dynamics of the modern

battlefield creates new operating challenges for the soldiers, due to the mobility restrictions the

MRAP provides. A statement from Brigadier General Ronald Johnson specified that “72% of the

world’s bridges cannot hold the MRAP (weight)” (165). The size and weight of the MRAP also

made even delivering it into theater a challenge. According to Major Eric A. McCoy from the

Army Sustainment Journal, MRAPs could not be transported by helicopter or traditional ships,

and, as a result, they had to rely on aircraft and maritime vessels for transportation. Furthermore,

McCoy brings up the issues of having the MRAP fielded at such a rapid pace, without

consideration of the doctrines, strategies, and training which needs to be rewritten and

redesigned to incorporate the vehicles into the military structure. Implementation was a

challenge; the publication of Strategic Comments reports that “the large numbers and types of

protected vehicles create logistical challenges and reduce operational flexibility”. This reduction

of operational flexibility compromises the soldier into unfavorable positions when utilizing the

MRAP if a situation occurs, which would evolve their tactics to address, adapt, and overcome the

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new found issues. As Major Eric A. McCoy stated in his article about filling the MRAP Gaps:

“Rapidly equipping Soldiers in theater with MRAPs had drawbacks because the Soldiers had

little time to train on the vehicles”.

Solutions to help alleviate the shortfalls of the MRAP platform were implemented from

the top down level starting with Congress. Then-Senator Joseph Biden gave a speech in March of

2007 where he lobbied for mass implementation of the MRAP stating “we can build more of

these vehicles which have one purpose—the specific purpose of saving lives, American lives”

(Biden, par 3). Biden continued to describe how the MRAP is safer than the Humvee against

IEDs, further emphasizing the need to quickly manufacture and ship the vehicle into theater.

Furthermore, Andrew Feickert’s Congressional research report stated that Congress

addressed the need for a lighter and more able vehicle over rough terrain by contracting out a

request for an MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). This program was conducted in late 2009,

and was more suitable for the needs and mobility which military personnel requested, but at the

tax payers expense, and the cost of time to get it delivered to military personnel. As Fieckert

described in his report; the Marines solution to have their needs met faster, was to upgrade the

suspension on the existing MRAP trucks, which took less time and less cost, so they could adapt

the MRAP platform to suit their other needs, besides IED survivability. Barbara Hamby explores

both the improvements to existing in-theater MRAPs, as well as M-ATVs as they were deployed

to Afghanistan in 2010. Hamby describes the reasoning behind the development of the M-ATV

stating that it “appropriately weighed survivability, mobility, maneuverability, production

capability, price, and other factors within the context of the urgent need for the procurement”

(24).

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Methods

The method in which this research project was conducted began with performing research

and investigation beginning from a top down level, in order to gain a high profile of background

knowledge and information base to gain a scope on MRAP development and its implementation.

This process included researching documents and articles relating to the MRAP vehicles,

including official government and corresponding data collected and analyzed for historical

background information, official positions and strategies related to MRAP implementation. With

military and defense personnel feedback being paramount to this project, the military trade

journals were a key research element to gain a collective perspective, in which they served as an

information medium between the Defense department, officers and enlisted men and women.

They were also used as a primary source of information, provided to the personnel utilizing the

MRAP first hand, and outlined key features and issues for operators to be aware of throughout

theater. The information of the trade journals helped outline the main focus of the research

project, which includes experiences of military personnel directly involved with the MRAP, and

its predecessor, the Humvee. The interviews conducted comprised of questions to the military

and defense personnel, with their involvement of Humvee and MRAP platforms in theater, and

the challenges of transitioning platforms, including safety, missions, and tactics. The personnel

interviewed consisted of seven enlisted and defense support personnel in order to gain a snapshot

scope of viewpoints from the operations perspective to address the research questions.

The information found by analyzing the background data, reports, articles and studies,

compared with the information collected from the interviews have helped determine if the

MRAP program fulfilled the needs of the warfighter, in order to successfully complete their

missions and operations in theater, or if the flaws of the MRAP vehicle were overshadowed

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because it increased survivability to the IED threat. The information gathered from the

interviews have been correlated with the background research to create an analysis which

compared the government research and articles, with a snapshot of exposure to MRAP and

Humvee utilization, which includes the personal, and operational implications relating to the

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle.

Analysis

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle was implemented into the Afghanistan

and Iraq theaters in response to the IED threat which caused over half of the coalition casualties

to date. The overall implementation and utilization of the MRAP vehicles created three distinct

issues for military and defense personnel, which were identified and investigated when the

interviews took place. The first key issue investigated was that the implementation and

utilization of the MRAP didn’t correlate with needs and wants of military and defense personnel

directly, but instead fulfilled a Defense Department directive which resulted in an unneeded or

incapable combat system; specifically the MRAP. The second key issue investigated was how

operational and mission tactics changed due to the characteristics of the MRAP vehicle, and how

it affected their effectiveness and success. The third key issue investigated involved the

interviewees’ personal perspective on the MRAP’s overall utilization increasing personnel

safety, or creating a higher risk of injury or death. The interview participants have had their

names changed, and are only identified by branch or department for this project to encourage

them to speak freely and honestly about their experiences. It should also be noted that the

Defense personnel interviewed, also had a prior military service.

FIGURE 1 MRAP IMPLEMENTATION

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Implementation and Utilization

The first key issue of implementation and

utilization involving the MRAP can be focused

down to the training of operating personnel, the

capability and performance, and physical

characteristics compared to the needs and wants of the warfighter for mission success. The

implementation strategy of rapid allocation (Figure 1) had downfalls related to unit orientation

and operational abilities of the vehicle. According to two Marine sources from the interviews:

The formal training of units was delayed due to the rapid implementation of the MRAP in

theater. This increased operational issues in the field, due to its differences in characteristics and

familiarity compared to the Humvee platform. The MRAP also experienced different driving

dynamics between variants, and when equipped with EFP armor, so capabilities and

familiarization had to be learned through operating mission experience instead of formal

training, and increased the potential for accidents as a result. According to an interviewed former

United States Marine Corps (USMC) Corporal Adam, “The implementation, that I believe with

my own personal opinion, I see it being the biggest problem… to rely on them (the MRAP) to

get around, was its downfall”. Corporal Adam indicated that the MRAP vehicles were tasked to

become the main personnel transport when they were first implemented and fielded in theater,

however, the enemy was still able to completely destroy multiple MRAPs using conventional

weapons. This was a result of the MRAP’s capability and performance compared to the

Humvee. The MRAP was not highly capable of traversing anything other than a paved road,

otherwise it had a high potential to get stuck and immobilized, or roll over. To better understand

the military and defense personnel perspective, interviewee’s were asked to compare their

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MRAP capability and performance experience with the Humvee platform. Common responses

from all represented parties included that the Humvee had better off-road capabilities, a smaller

detection signature, easier operating characteristics, and full crew capability of having

Situational Awareness (SA) with access to windows and doors on the vehicle. Performance

issues became apparent when Humvees were

swapped with MRAPs and expectations didn’t

meet the capabilities required for the

infrastructure and terrain in theater. The

characteristics of the MRAP can be correlated

with the majority of responses from the

interviews of their first impression of the MRAP vehicle when it was first delivered, stating that

it was very impressive visually, physically massive, and carried systems within it that were

wanted in the field. The larger footprint, height and weight of the vehicles didn’t align with the

wants and needs of personnel on missions, especially those in urban environments, according to

interviewed Defense and military personnel. They added that the larger size of the trucks limited

their operations to main roads, made them more conspicuous, and also created limitations of

routes due to their height. However, not all characteristics proved to be unaligned with the needs

and wants of the warfighter. The interview participants liked the more comfortable seating and

ample room compared with the Humvee, including space for the injured or casualties on medical

stretchers and medical equipment. The Humvee in comparison, due to its characteristics had little

room for the injured or casualties, so personnel were “forced to cram bodies in the vehicles due

to the limited room, and we would drive sometimes 4-5 clicks, sitting on bodies before they

could receive medical attention; causing additional injuries and casualties that can now be

FIGURE 2: MRAP FIREFIGHT

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avoided with the MRAP” stated USMC Corporal Adam. The physical size and amount of armor

the MRAP had was overwhelmingly agreed upon in the interviews to make the personnel feel

safer while traveling down a roadway, however dirt or canal roads were another issue.

Operations and Mission Tactics

The different characteristics of the MRAP changed the military and defense operations,

and effected the tactics, effectiveness and success of daily missions in theater. The MRAP egress

characteristics consisted of front doors for the operator and TC (Truck Commander), a gun turret

on the roof, and a door on the rear of the vehicle, which was the primary entrance and exit for the

vehicle squad. This differed from the egress characteristics of the Humvee, with the typical four

door setup as found on civilian vehicles, and

caused a change in tactics as a result. The Humvee characteristics allowed for quick engagement

and disengagement procedures, by being lower to the ground, and having a door for each

personnel in the vehicle besides the gunner, who is already overseeing the immediate area. The

MRAP is much higher from the ground, and most doors are hydraulically assisted because of

their weight which results in a slower dismount. The crews main egress point is through the rear

doorway, and consequently creates a main access point where the enemy could focus fire on.

United States Airforce (USAF) Airman Bruce stated his COIN (Counterinsurgency Operations)

missions as an MRAP operator had issues with tactics upon using the MRAP; stating: “The

enemy knowing that their small arms couldn’t penetrate the truck, would wait until we started to

dismount from the vehicle, and I saw many men hit by sniper fire as soon as they left the vehicle,

as a direct result of the bigger signature”. The tactical issues with having the MRAP as the

primary transport vehicle limited fast engagement with the enemy due to dismounting

limitations, and the situational awareness of the entire crew. The MRAP has multiple support

FIGURE 3: MRAP STUCK IN MUD

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features to assist and protect the warfighter, including a larger area of cover during a firefight

(Figure 2), but as United States Army personnel Frank stated in his interview; “The MRAP was

more effective when it had ground support, soldiers walking outside along with it, and able to get

situational awareness. Yes, operations conducted in this manner were much slower, however it

also meant that there wasn’t just a single large target for the enemy to focus on, and it’s harder to

take out a squad then a single vehicle”. Implementation of the MRAP vehicle caused a move

from small unit tactics, and had changed it to centralized movement and tactics around the

vehicle, causing issues with easier enemy targeting.

The MRAP’s effectiveness and efficiency was another issue it had in theater during its

missions. The Airforce Airman Bruce stated that:

Missions that were only supposed to be 6 hours, ended up being 10 or more,

because our MRAP would get stuck in the dirt or mud, and we had to sit there and

wait to get pulled out, which was a normal occurrence … it happened more times

than I could count … and if you’re in a fire fight, and your MRAP gets stuck,

that’s pretty bad. (Figure 3)

Interview participants also

disclosed that there were issues

during missions where they

couldn’t fit under certain bridges,

or were hesitant on going over

certain bridges due to the MRAP’s

extensive height and weight among all the variants they used. The use of the MRAP for ground

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operations decreased the efficiency and effectiveness for their missions, directly resulting from

their size, weight, and capability characteristics.

The overall success of the MRAP for mission operations had a mixed result among

different personnel interviewed, depending on their duties in theater. The engineering personnel

in charge of route clearance, which duties entail sweeping the roadway for IEDs, and disposing

them upon contact, welcomed the MRAP vehicles. The vehicle helped keep their squad safe, and

allowed them to go out on the mission with ample equipment and protection on un-cleared

roadways. The MRAP’s inabilities to go off of improved roads hindered the success of some

personnel, including interviewed Marine Scout Sniper Harry, who was required to driven to his

area of operation in the MRAP. He was forced to dismount early and occasionally double the

amount of foot travel to his operation location required before sunrise, which jeopardized

mission success. The MRAP wasn’t bomb proof either, many had still been destroyed along with

its personnel by IEDs, showing it was not the complete answer to the IED threat. The MRAP’s

success in missions depended on the nature of the operation, which included successful duties

such as route clearance, supply convoys, and high target personnel protection missions.

However, its broad implementation directive hindered other operations and missions from being

successful resulting from not fitting all the needs it was being mandated for.

Safety and Risk

The MRAP’s most common identified characteristic also attributes to the increased risk

of being utilized; its size. The signature of the vehicle, which includes its visual profile, sound,

and weight, translates to a larger exposure for the enemy to identify, and little can be done to

address it. A shared concern of being immobile in an MRAP, whether it is parked, stuck, or

Vigneault 23

rolled over, is attributed to its potential of being a “massive target” as Defense Personnel Dan

stated, and followed up with “you’re confined and you’re not going to escape that… and you’re

not necessarily protected behind all that armor. People can hear you, people can see you; you are

a bigger target”. With the MRAP at a standstill it was more susceptible against a targeted

ambush, and correlates with the project subjects’ statements of feeling safer only when traveling

on improved roads. If MRAPs created a more dangerous situation in certain immobile conditions

by consolidating personnel into a larger signature direct target, as opposed to multiple groups of

personnel dispersed on foot, or in multiple vehicles.

MRAP rollovers became a large area of concern for

both the military and its personnel when they started to

take lives as a result. The tall and top heavy armored

characteristics of the MRAP, along with the rapid

implementation and driver familiarity of the vehicles,

made the vehicle highly susceptible to rollovers, which left occupants vulnerable to injury or

death. The response to the higher risk of rollovers by the military commanders included the

implementation of the MRAP rollover egress training course which Emelie Rutherford refers to

in her 2008 Article to address the concern (Figure 4). This training was similar to the Humvee

rollover egress course, however incidents still

continued due to the tall and heavy nature of the

vehicle, and the additional equipment which the

MRAP could carry, that became hazardous during a

rollover event U.S. Army soldier Frank, who worked

at the military hospital in Ballad Iraq, stated in his

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interview that “We get a lot of the casualties, and most of the MRAP’s were rollovers. It

happened about daily at some point”. He went on to describe that the majority of the trauma was

caused by objects, gear, and equipment, hitting and falling on the personnel inside. The canal

roads were highly susceptible to rollovers, because they weren’t always able to support the

vehicles weight, and had uneven terrain characteristics which often resulted in a rollover into the

water, creating a highly dangerous and possibly fatal situation (Figure 5). After a rollover event,

the heavy armored doors commonly become jammed or inoperable, and cause the personnel

inside to become trapped inside the vehicle. With the rollovers becoming more common from the

MRAP’s characteristics, and abilities, it can be concluded that mission requirements should take

precedence over vehicle requirements in order to reduce vehicle safety incidents resulting from

their capability relative to the terrain.

FIGURE 6: EXPLOSIVELY FORMED PENETRATOR

Vigneault 25

The EFP and the 155mm artillery round threat became

a high priority issue (Figure 6), because the enemy used them

to target the MRAP with its ability to penetrate the existing

armor, and its potential to eliminate the entire crew inside.

Army Infantry Soldier Charlie stated that “a well-made and

aimed EFP could penetrate the MRAP’s hull, and could create

a pressure differential so large, that it would literally blow the doors off the truck, 100 yards

away from what I’ve seen; and those were heavy doors!...it was also said that it would liquefy

the organs of the personnel inside, although I’ve never had first-hand experience seeing it”. The

EFP threat was countered by adding additional EFP armor to the sides of the MRAP truck to

help protect personnel. Although the EFP armor reduced catastrophic EFP events, it attributed to

two additional issues with the MRAP vehicle. First was an increase in rollovers due to additional

weight, at and above the vehicles center of gravity. The second issue was an increased profile

and signature which limited the vehicles mobility, especially in narrow urban environments, and

increased its target size to the enemy. The armor made the vehicle more top heavy and changed

the handling characteristics of the vehicle even further. MRAPs with EFP armor were also

incorporated into some operator training when available, however the rollover incidents still

occurred, which resulted in the implementation of the rollover egress training. The larger vehicle

profile contributed to the inability to navigate narrow urban roads or have the fastest possible

response or withdraw from a mission area, especially in a narrow urban environment.

Recommendations, Limitations and Conclusion

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle has a place in the United States military,

and serves a purpose of protecting its occupants, and does so quite well. The major issues with

Vigneault 26

the MRAP became apparent when it was tied to roles and terrain outside of its normal design

features. Going forward, the recommendations I would suggest, would be a change in

implementation strategy, to better assess the needs and wants of military and defense personnel,

their specific operations and missions in their area, and the terrain it is located in. Even in a high

IED threat environment, a liaison from the personnel in the field, along with area intelligence

should be part of fielding equipment in theater, because they are the ones who will be actually

utilizing it for their missions. This process will create a more efficient and supported military

force in theater, and has the potential to reduce the amount of risk by using equipment which fits

the warfighters roles and missions. This could also attribute to less of a financial burden, by

moving and utilizing only the proper equipment needed.

The limitations I encountered during this research project included the scope, personnel,

and time. There are countless views, issues, and characteristics about the multiple MRAP

variants, which it was difficult to maintain focused on certain attributes, especially in the

interviews, without leading to other issues. The scope of the project was admittedly too large for

the requirements of the paper, and maintaining the focus to my research question was difficult,

because the majority of the MRAP issues was usually connected to multiple other issues. The

amount of information gathered from each individual interview was enormous, and ended up

being a lot of data to consolidate into a single research paper. Looking back, a single interview

could potentially provide enough information for a single research paper this size. Because of

timing, I wasn’t able to complete all the in-person interviews I initially wanted, however, I was

still able to attain a good snapshot of the majority of information I was looking for. Where the

physical interviews were data heavy, the written questionnaires tended to be light, and not well

defined or in depth. I sent this out in a survey format outlining the needs, wants and expectations

Vigneault 27

of the questionnaire answers because they were in lieu of an in-person or phone interview, but

the answers were still subpar. The issue of time to complete the interviews, analyze, and create a

research paper with my findings led to another setback of not having enough data to get an in

depth personal experience of the MATV in theater. The MATV is supposed to solve much of the

issues the MRAPs had or created, but I couldn’t create a proper argument in my research due to

the lack of data from personnel. The interview questions also limited my depth into the subject,

because they had to be created and submitted to the IRB board so far in advance, even though

my research evolved. I kept the same questions based on the IRB’s approval of using the

interview data only for the BIS capstone class, and I was afraid to change them further because I

may have to go through the IRB process again, so they could determine that the questions will

not harm any subjects in any way.

The MRAP vehicle was implemented and fielded in order to meet the need for protection

of military and defense personnel on missions in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters against the

IED threat. The features and design of the MRAP vehicles increased the survivability against

IED’s over their predecessor the Humvee, which was the military’s main wheeled personnel

transport for over 30 years. However, the design of the MRAP caused issues, because of their

size, weight, and their capabilities. Despite its survivability characteristics, a primary focus

should be given to the first-hand use and experience by defense and military personnel, to gain

insight on how the MRAP’s implementation has effected mission success, capabilities, and

changed strategies in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. Variables relating to the implementation

of the MRAP such as field training, terrain, utilization, and capabilities caused overall mission

success issues, and unforeseen challenges that has directly impacted the warfighter. If the United

States military looked at the historical issues of the MRAP from the South African army they

Vigneault 28

acquired the technology from, they would have identified the same exact issues they

experienced, possibly before implementing the vehicle into theater. The MRAP was also

addressing an issue – protection, and not the cause; the IED. Some of the personnel data that was

gathered said that there was more success and lives saved from IED interdiction – finding and

eliminating the enemy making the IEDs, then from the MRAP implementation. The data

suggested that personnel and budget would have been better spent on interdiction then on the

MRAP vehicles. Since the MRAP is now part of the military’s motor pool for the long term, it

would be recommended to reallocate the MRAP vehicles in to roles for which it is best suited for

in future operations. A revised allocation process of identifying the needs and wants of personnel

in the field, including the environment surrounding their mission, in order to have the highest

possible mission success rate based on those variables. The overall safety of military and defense

personnel is paramount, and by eliminating risk through proper fielding allocation, it will reduce

the amount of injuries and death.

Vigneault 29

Appendix

Interview Questions:1. Please provide your job, rank, duties, and mission in OIF or OEF with the armed

forces.2. Describe your personal duties involving the Humvee in theater?3. What features and aspects of the Humvee did you like in your opinion?4. What features and aspects of the Humvee did you not like?5. Were there any burdens associated with Humvee mission capability and

performance?6. Did the up armored humvee change your mission tactics and capabilities?7. Describe your first impression and experience of the MRAP compared to your

impression and experience of it now.8. What variant(s) of MRAP did you operate with?9. When you were introduced to the MRAP, was training available on its use? If so what

type of training?10. What features and aspects of the MRAP did you like?11. What features and aspects of the MRAP did you not like?12. Did the MRAP create or hinder a sense of security and capability for your missions

and tactics?13. Did the MRAP help your mission and duties while in theater?14. Overall, did you feel safer or more threatened in an MRAP? Examples?15. What; if any, were associated burdens with the MRAPs you were operating with

which affected your standard operating procedure on missions?16. What was your experience with MRAPs with added EFP armor?17. What was your experience with the MATV?18. Did the MATV meet the needs and wants of the war fighter in your opinion compared

to the larger MRAP variants?

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19. Was the additional EFP armor of the MRAPs effective or did it create more issues then it solved in your opinion?

20. As a soldier, is your overall opinion of the MRAP positive or negative in its use, functionality, safety, and capability relative to the job functions which you performed with it?

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