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Nicole Tan Jun Yi 003561-021

History Extended Essay 2012

To what extent did Mao’s adherence to strict Marxist ideology enable him to maintain his rule?

Candidate Name: Nicole Tan Jun Yi

Candidate Number: 003561-021

Supervisor: Mr. John Andrews

Session: November 2012

Centre: Saint Kentigern College, Auckland, New Zealand

Word Count: 3,897

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Reference of Picture: Raj Critic. A story of proletarian democracy in action. Retrieved from:

http://rajcritic.wordpress.com

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Abstract

The study of Marxist ideology has always been an area of personal interest for me, especially

within the context of China’s Communist Revolution. After extensive and specific research,

the following research question was formulated:

To what extent did Mao’s adherence to strict Marxist ideology enable him to maintain his rule?

This investigation will evaluate the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party both within the

context of the civil war and their rule from 1949 onwards. In order to evaluate Mao Tse-

Tung’s adherence to orthodox Marxist ideology, the CCP’s economic and social policies will

be analysed against fundamental Marxist premises. Within the existing historiographical

debate, this essay will integrate both orthodox and revisionist views to identify the water-shed

moment where Mao’s adherence to orthodox Marxism became subservient to his own

personal political agenda.

In his rise to power, Marxism’s egalitarian doctrine enabled Mao to mobilise the loyalty of

the peasantry. Although adherence to pure Marxism was inhibited by specific social

conditions, the substitution of an under-developed urban proletariat with China’s peasantry

allowed the revolution to be born in China whilst maintaining the universalism of Marx’s

class-analysis approach. As a political pragmatist, Mao complemented temporary

compromises of Marxist ideology with a long-term goal of establishing a Communist state.

However, the failure of Marxism’s egalitarian doctrine in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950

and the identification of widespread opposition in the Hundred Flowers Campaign marked a

key turning point in Mao’s formation of ideology. Whilst Mao continued to adopt a pretense

of adhering to Marxist ideology, from 1956 onwards, it was in fact his creation of a distinct

cult of personality that enabled him to maintain his rule. Word Count: 275

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Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….Page 3

Contents…………………………………………………………………………….

Essay Question……………………………………………………………………..Page 5

Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………….Page 19

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During China’s civil war, Mao’s utilisation of Marxism’s egalitarian doctrine helped to

mobilise the loyalty of China’s peasantry. However, once the Communist Party established

its rule in 1949, historical controversy was born regarding the extent to which Mao applied

Marxism in its true form, making it a valuable asset in the understanding of the maintenance

of his rule. Whilst orthodox historians like Benjamin Schwartz describe Mao’s adaptation as

the latest stage of Marxism’s ‘deterioration’, (Schwartz, 1951, p.201) revisionist historians

like Andrew Walder and Mark Selden attribute this to ‘overly dogmatic and rigid

understandings of Marxism’, (UCSD Modern Chinese History, 2000). Taking into

consideration Marxism’s prescription to 19th century British industrial workers in contrast to

China’s agrarian society, the limited potential of an urban proletariat in China necessitated

Mao’s initial deviation of Marxism. However, in response to growing internal opposition,

Mao also deliberately moulded Marxist ideology in compliance with a personal political

agenda, creating a cult of personality known as Mao-ism in order to maintain his rule.

In the opening chapter of ‘The Communist Manifesto’, a defining work in the formation of

Marxist ideology, history is described as ‘the history of class struggles’ (Marxists Internet

Archive, 2011). According to Marx’s process of historical determinism, the exploitation of

the proletariat class accumulated within a final economic stage known as Capitalism. As

workers recognised they were working for the benefit of others, Marx believed that the

development of the proletariat’s sphere of political consciousness would create the necessary

social conditions for a spontaneous uprising against the exploiting class of the bourgeoisie.

Strict Marxist ideology dictates prerequisites of a high level of productivity and abundant

material wealth, allowing the urban proletariat to act as an agent of revolutionary change.

However, considering the distinction of China’s feudalistic, agrarian society and the absence

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of these conditions, it was in fact Mao’s deviation from orthodox Marxism that allowed the

revolution to be born in China. Writing from a Westernised, and therefore objective view,

Nick Knight describes this compromise as ‘a formula by which a universal theory such as

Marxism could be utilised in a particular national context and culture without abandoning

the universality of that theory’ (Knight, 1983, p.18).

Writing from this new perspective, Knight has chosen to emphasise the volunteerist facet of

Mao’s decisions and his adaptation of Marxist ideology to China’s specific historical and

socio-economic context. Rather than adhere to orthodox Marxism and constrain China’s

Communist Revolution to the limited potential of the urban proletariat, Mao’s vision enabled

him to identify an alternative revolutionary agent in China’s peasantry.

In their post-revisionist account, Andrew Walder and Mark Selden criticise Benjamin

Schwartz’s dated account as an ‘overly dogmatic and rigid understanding of Marxism’

(UCSD Modern Chinese History, 2000). Although Mao’s substitution of a peasant

centrepiece challenged Marxism’s scientific process of historical determinism, a situation

where the development of the proletariat’s sphere of political consciousness was defined

solely by economic circumstances within the final economic stage of Capitalism, upon closer

analysis, it can be seen that Mao was still able to preserve the universality of Marxism’s

class-analysis approach.

In parallel to the exploitation of workers under a Capitalist society, China’s feudalistic

society identified the exploitation of the peasantry under the traditional ruling elite of the

landlord class, whose position of power was reaffirmed by the Emperor of China. Rather than

subject an illiterate peasantry to the study of Marxist ideology, Mao chose to use the Red

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Army as the physical embodiment of Marxist principles, illustrating egalitarian concepts

through actions rather than words.

In 1928, Mao implemented a strict code of conduct amidst Red Army soldiers known as the

Eight Points of Attention. In contrast to the Nationalist Army’s killing, rape and destruction

of property under Chiang Kai-Shek’s leadership, this code of conduct instructed Red Army

soldiers to ‘Pay fairly for what you buy’, ‘Don’t take liberties with women’ and ‘Don’t ill-

treat captives’ (Marx to Mao, 1999). During the civil war, Mao’s recognition of the

peasantry’s oppression under the hierarchical, feudalistic structure and discipline of the Red

Army helped to mobilise the loyalty of the peasantry who acted as scouts, providing supplies

and recruits.

In fact, Li Dazhao extends this concept of class-analysis to the whole country of China itself,

describing the situation as a parallel to bourgeoisie exploitation since ‘the whole country had

been transformed into part of the world proletariat’ (Marxists Internet Archive, 2011) under

their victimisation by imperialist powers. Comparable to the development of the proletariat’s

sphere of political consciousness within a Capitalist society, China’s ‘New Culture

Movement’ of 1915 to 1921 demonstrated a growing discontent with China’s subjection to

foreign rule under the Manchu dynasty. Harnessing this populist base, Shaun Breslin argues

that the Communist Party adopted ‘a brand of Marxism that had deep roots in Chinese

nationalism’ (Breslin, 1998, p.31).

In contrast to the Kuomintang’s acceptance of foreign military aid from the US, the Red

Army disregarded the presence of civil war within China and chose to focus primarily on the

external threat of the Japanese army, creating a portrayal of Mao Zedong as fighting a

nationalistic cause on behalf of China’s peasantry. Whilst class distinction was present within

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Chinese society, village rivalries existed as a replacement to the concept of class distinction

and alienated the idea of a unified peasantry rebelling as a class. Therefore, it was Mao’s

incorporation of a nationalist ideology that provided the necessary universal sentiment for the

establishment of China’s wide-scale Communist revolution.

Whilst Mao accepted the validity of Marxist premises, he disregarded the belief that the

assertions in themselves were universally applicable within varying historical and socio-

economic contexts. Whilst Mao accepted the law of class struggle as a universally existing

social phenomenon, he also considered that Marxism’s universal laws remained abstract until

adapted to a specific form that could be applicable within China’s specific circumstances.

Within his valid but somewhat dated accounted, Benjamin Schwartz’s view of Marxist

ideology is limited to the study of Mao’s application of Marxist ideology as an isolated case

(Schwartz, 1951). However, extending the scope of the question, history has proven that the

application of pure Marxist ideology and the attainment of a Communist society as a final

utopia-like conclusion have never been achieved in its entirety.

As an alternative study in Marxism’s application, the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917

was led in Russia by Vladimir Illich Ulyanov (Lenin). Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution,

Marxism had been a message exclusive to advanced industrialised economies within the

furthest stage of economic development. However, Lenin’s perception of imperialism as the

highest form of capitalism allowed the translation of Marx’s universal ideology to Russia’s

feudalistic, agrarian society.

From an extreme, anti-communist and therefore subjective account, Johnson states that

‘When Lenin insisted that consciousness had to be brought to the proletariat…and the

revolution pushed forward before it was ripe by vanguard fighters, he was in fact

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contradicting the whole scientific basis of Marxist theory (Johnson, 1991, p.56) Rather than

waiting for Marxism’s appropriate theoretical timing, Lenin chose to create revolution on

behalf of an urban proletariat that did not yet exist. In parallel to the absence of Marxism’s

prescribed social conditions within Russia, China’s unique circumstances necessitated Mao’s

deviation of orthodox Marxism. As Professor Spence, a well-researched and therefore

extremely useful authority on China argues, ‘The need remained, if Marxism was to have any

relevance to social conditions in China, to reformulate certain basic Marxist premises’

(Spence, 1991, p.307)

Initially, Mao’s adaptation of a peasant centrepiece and incorporation of a nationalist

ideology was central to the establishment of the Chinese Communist Revolution. As a

political pragmatist, Mao adapted Marxist ideology to the strength of the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) within society at the time. However, once he had successfully established a

power base amidst the peasantry, Mao’s redistribution of land and reformation of the tax

system according to Marxism’s egalitarian doctrine illustrated compliance with a long-term

goal of establishing a Communist society.

Similarly, upon coming to power in 1949, the CCP recognised the need to compromise

certain aspects of Marxism in order to consolidate its position. In Marx’s own words, ‘there

corresponds…a political transition period in which the State can be nothing but the

revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’. (Marxists Internet Archive, 2011).

Within a post-revolutionary society, the CCP’s prescribed role was the socialisation of the

means of production. According to Marxist theory, equal access to the means of production

would enable the removal of class-distinction within society. Providing a specialised focus on

Marxism as an economic system, Robert Freedman, argued in his well-researched account

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and therefore reliable account of ‘The Marxist System’, this meant that, ‘all power

relationships will disappear’ (Freedman, 1990, p.111)

Considering the revolution’s foundation of a peasant centrepiece, Mao’s first economic

policy was the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950, addressing the issue of land redistribution. In

compliance with Marxist premises, each peasant received individual plots of land. Although

the Communist Party’s position was consolidated within China, within an international

context, Mao’s leadership was still subject to the United States refusal to recognise the party

as the legal government of China.

Aware of the peasantry’s hesitation in denouncing landlords that could be restored in the

future, Mao recognised the necessity of implementing land redistribution in phases. Rather

than force the peasants into co-operatives, he chose to highlight the benefits of economies of

scale in production, implementing participation on a voluntary basis. As a second facet of

economic reform, the Communist Party’s first task within the cities was the nationalisation of

foreign-owned companies in 1953.

Whilst this policy adhered to Marx’s prescribed removal of an exploiting bourgeoisie class,

Mao was also forced to recognise a sector of society he identified as nationalist bourgeoisie.

Despite a lack of Communist ideology, their managerial skillset in managing the factors of

production was a vital component of China’s economic target of rapid modernisation.

However, by 1953, all private ownership had been abolished within China’s economy. In his

reliable and objective account of the Communist Party’s economic policies, Edwin Moise

argues that the private sector clearly ‘existed on a basis of sufferance’. (Moise, 1994, p. 64)

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On the other hand, Mao’s failure in agrarian reform marked a key turning-point in the

formation of the CCP’s ideology. In China, the process of land redistribution was inhibited by

an inadequate supply of fertiliser and machinery. As a result of peasants being forced to sell

their plots of land, the application of Marxist ideology was counteracted by the emergence of

a new class of rich peasants and rural economic differentiation in the countryside.

Significantly, this failure in agrarian reform lost the support of the peasantry, a key

constituency of Mao’s power base.

In response, Mao chose to shift the focus away from his failure in agrarian reform and re-

prioritised the ideological debate. At a Session of the Supreme State Conference in Beijing,

Mao said ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend’ (Marxists

Internet Archive, 2011) Considering the growing discontent amidst the peasantry, Mao chose

to liberalise the constraints placed on the bourgeoisie intellectuals in an effort to consolidate

his position amidst an alternative power base.

Officially, Mao justified the Hundred Flowers Campaign as the Communist Party’s deliberate

ploy of identifying counter-revolutionary elements within society. However, in reality, the

unexpected degree of criticism from intellectuals subject to the Communist Party’s

oppressive rule forced Mao to put an immediate end to the campaign in the Anti-Rightist

campaign of 1957. Compromising basic Marxist premises, Mao had allowed the remainder of

a sector of society he identified as the nationalist bourgeoisie.

According to Moise, in 1956, bourgeoisie intellectuals constituted ‘12% of the party’s 10.8

million members’ (Moise 1994, p.62). Contrary to his belief that the nationalist bourgeoisie

had conceded to the Party’s supremacy, Mao’s compromise of strict Marxist doctrine had in

fact allowed the remainder of widespread internal opposition within society. From this point

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onwards, adherence to strict Marxist ideology became secondary to Mao’s own political

agenda.

In order to consolidate his rule, Mao’s first step was to segregate himself from the CCP. In

1957, Harriet Ward describes China’s economic structure was a faithful copy of the USSR’s

with an allocation of ‘70% for heavy goods, 12% for consumer goods and 6.25% for

agriculture’ (Ward, 1978, p.205) However, in 1958, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) indicated

Mao’s rejection of a moderate Second Five-Year Plan based on the Soviet model.

Although the Great Leap Forward was defined by Mao’s personal political agenda, this was

hidden beneath a pretense of adhering to Marxist ideology. Accusing Nikita Khruschev of

Marxist revisionism, Mao opposed the USSR’s ideology of peaceful co-existence with a

Capitalist Europe. However, in parallel, the campaign also illustrated Mao’s strategic

detachment from the party’s associated failures in the Hundred Flowers Campaign.

In 1848, The Communist League of Germany’s programme August 1958 stated that ‘The

royal and other feudal estates…shall be transformed into state property. On these estates

agriculture is to be conducted on a large scale and with the most modern scientific means for

the benefit of all society’ (Marxists Internet Archive, 2011). This study of Marxist thinking

identifies a prioritisation of collective ownership over small, private ownership. In August

1958, Mao issued a decree complementing communes that combined economic, political and

militia functions.

Whilst this policy of decentralisation to the provinces could be justified within a study of

Marxist ideology, it also helped to detract from the role of the CCP as a form of central

command. Under a pretense of adhering to orthodox Marxist premises, Mao used the Great

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Leap Forward as a political tactic of appealing directly to the main constituency of his power

base. By identifying the peasantry as the key agents of revolutionary change, Mao was able to

strategically place power in the hands of those receptive to his ideas. As a political

pragmatist, Mao harnessed the mobilisation of the peasantry in the Great Leap Forward of

1958 in order to counteract growing internal opposition within the CCP.

Aside from implementing economic targets of modernisation, the campaign also placed

renewed emphasis on the ideological debate. This was justified by orthodox Marxism to the

extent that China’s peasantry had not undergone the development of their sphere of political

consciousness within China’s Communist revolution. However, this also strategically enabled

Mao to escape the blame for the failure of land redistribution in 1950, attributing it to the

underdeveloped political consciousness of obstructionist party cadres.

Addressing the issue of ideological re-education, the xiafang (down to the countryside)

engaged the bourgeoisie in manual labour and a formal study of Marxist doctrine at 7 th May

Cadre Schools. Whilst Mao justified this under the pretense of Marxist re-education, this also

enabled him to disperse political enemies that had been identified in the Hundred Flowers

Campaign, preventing opposition to his rule.

Rather than dwell on the failure of the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the identification of

widespread opposition to the CCP’s rule, Mao chose to divert the attention of the peasantry

into a new revolutionary campaign. Under the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s Backyard Steel

Campaign of 1958 established a target of surpassing Britain in steel production in less than 5

years. However, whilst the full-scale mobilization of the peasantry skillfully placed power in

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the hands of those receptive to his ideas, Mao’s disregard of economic planners led to the

production of poor-quality steel. Furthermore, the exhaustive diversion of resources into steel

production led to the neglect of agricultural harvest and grain being left to rot in the fields.

Exacerbating the existing grain shortage, over-inflated figures acted as the basis for economic

planning as opposed to their intended role for propaganda consumption. According to Edwin

Moise in 1959, a harvest of 170 million tons was reported as 282 million tons (Moise, 1994,

p. 73). Although figures vary across different sources, Frank-Dikkoter’s well-researched and

specialised study provides reliable and useful information on China’s Bitter Famine,

estimating that up to ’45 million people’ (New York Times, 2010) died as a result of Mao’s

failure in economic reform.

As a result of growing internal opposition, Mao was forced to resign his position as Chairman

of the People’s Republic in April 1959. Significantly, as Mao’s successor, Zhou En Lai’s first

policy initiated the dissolution of communes established in Mao’s Great Leap Forward. After

concrete evidence of Mao’s failure in the Great Leap Forward, policy-makers within the party

were now willing to openly obstruct Mao’s initiatives. In response, Mao chose to initiate the

Socialist Education Movement (SEM) of 1962.

Accusing the CCP of a Capitalist restoration was justified by Mao’s adherence to orthodox

Marxist ideology to the extent that Chen Yun had reinstated a profit incentive associated with

Capitalist societies. Marking a transition back to the right of the political spectrum, a program

of economic recovery was implemented under Chen Yun’s direction where produce was

being sold at a price level dictated by the mechanisms of laissez-faire economics. However,

this was subservient to Mao’s political agenda of targeting Deng Xiao Ping as a

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counterrevolutionary, providing the foundation for Mao’s purging of political enemies in the

upcoming Cultural Revolution.

In parallel to the purging of political enemies, Mao chose to consolidate his position through

the development of his power base amidst Chinese society. Aware of a desire for political

representation amidst the peasantry, Mao chose to create a ‘red by action’ basis for party

entrance. Whilst the CCP’s capitalistic tendencies justified this political reform, Mao was

also strategically placing power in the hands of those receptive to his ideas. Counteracting the

dominance of orthodox Leninists in policy making, the participation of provincial leaders

loyal to Mao at Politburo meetings forced realignment towards the Maoist pathway.

Despite Mao’s withdrawal into the background of policy-making, he continued to

strategically target and remove political opponents in order to consolidate his rule within the

CCP. In 1959, Peng Dehuai was dismissed as the Minister of National Defense and replaced

with Lin Biao. Significantly, Mao’s shrewd assessment of the political situation enabled him

to identify the potential of developing the Red Army as a parallel power structure to party-

state institutions. In 1964, Lin Biao promoted an emulation of the military in a ‘Learn from

the People’s Liberation Army’ movement.

Illustrating Mao’s ability to identify key political allies, this established a medium by which

Mao could bypass the formal party apparatus and formally implement party policy. In

contrast to the faceless party bureaucracy within China, Mao’s charismatic personality

enabled him to instil a sense of revolutionary fervour amidst the youth. Significantly, the Red

Army was used as a medium by which Mao could implement his formulation of a distinct

cult of personality, known as Mao-ism. At Red Guard rallies in August 1966, the youth could

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be heard chanting ‘Long Live Chairman Mao for 10,000 years’ (Marxists Internet Archive,

2011), a phrase traditionally reserved for the reigning Emperor in China’s feudalistic society.

Aware of China’s feudalistic historical context, Mao deliberately chose to fill the political

vacuum left by the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty and emulate the position of the Emperor

himself. As a component of his cult of personality, Mao elevated himself to a god-like status,

portraying himself as the single mediator between the Chinese people and country’s historic

destiny in order to legitimise his role within society and maintain his rule.

Balancing orthodox and revisionist views, Mao’s adherence to orthodox Marxism did enable

him to maintain his rule to a certain extent. However, he also chose to selectively emphasise

aspects of this ideology, such as the reprioritisation of the ideological debate, in order to

justify his purging of political enemies. According to Marxist ideology, there is no need for a

government within a utopian Communist society. As Karl Marx’s collaborator, Frederick

Engels said ‘the State is nothing else than a machine for the oppression of one class by

another’ (World Socialism, 2006). In adherence with Marxist ideology, Mao criticised the

oppressive nature of the party-state bureaucracy over the people.

On the 5th of August 1966, Mao declared that ‘to rebel is justified’ (Marxists Internet

Archive, 2011) and proceeded to attack key political figureheads in his ‘Bombard the

Headquarters’ movement. Although Mao’s criticism of the CCP’s oppressive bureaucracy

was reinforced by a populist consensus amidst society, it was also amplified significantly in

order to weaken a formal party apparatus that constantly opposed him.

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Aside from a charismatic personality, Mao-ism was also defined by the use of coercion and

violence as methods of maintaining himself in power. This militancy was defined by the

renewed emphasis placed on the Red Guards. Under the pretense of upholding ideological

purity, Mao was able to systematically attack the entire party-leadership with the exception of

Maoist supporters, regaining control of the CCP. After the eruption of factional in-fighting

amidst the Red Guards, the People’s Liberation Army was able to emerge as the principle

guarantor of law and the de facto political authority, further consolidating Mao’s position

within society.

A key aspect of Mao-ism was the concept of ‘permanent struggle’, illustrated in his constant

reprioritisation of the ideological debate. This was based on the belief that a continued

rectification movement must erupt periodically in order to prevent the reaching of a national

equilibrium that would enable the emergence of new class distinctions such as the

dictatorship of the party-state bureaucracy of the people. Under the pretense of ensuring

ideological purity, Mao chose to constantly reinvent himself and instil a sense of

revolutionary fervour in order to divert society’s attention from his failure and steer the

revolution back within his sphere of ideology

The significance of this question is reflected in the Communist Party’s continued

reassessment of Mao Zedong’s contribution to Marxist ideology even after his death. At the

6th Plenum of June 1981 the Central Committee released ‘Some Questions on Party History’.

As an official document from within the CCP itself, the reliability of the views expressed are

limited by the knowledge that severe criticism of Mao could undermine the party’s

legitimacy. However, whilst the document recognises the necessity of Mao’s theoretical

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contributions during the pre-Liberation period, it also acknowledged some of Mao’s errors,

recognising that in the latter part of his rule, Mao started ‘making serious mistakes…and

imagined that his theory and practice were Marxist’ (Cheek, 2002, p.217).

In conclusion, Mao’s adherence to Marxist ideology enabled him to come to power in 1949 to

the extent that he applied Marx’s universally existent social phenomenon of class struggle.

However, adopting a Hegelian approach, Mao also recognised that theory had arrived at a

point where it could only advance further by allowing the adaptation of human interpretation.

As Nick Knight argues, ‘the Sinification of Marxism was not a question of the elevation of

Chinese realities at the expense of ideology, but the completion of Marxism as an ideological

system’ (Knight, 1983, p.27). However, Mao’s recognition of internal opposition to his rule in

the Hundred Flowers Campaign marked a key water-shed moment in the formation of his

ideology. Considering the constant reprioritisation of ideological purity within Chinese

society, adherence to strict Marxist ideology did enable Mao to maintain his rule to a certain

extent. However, he also selectively emphasised aspects of Marxist ideology to serve his own

political agenda. In the establishment of an authoritarian state, distinguished by the presence

of a developed propaganda apparatus and methods of coercion, it was in fact the presence of

Mao’s distinct cult of personality, beneath a pretense of adhering to strict Marxist ideology

that enabled him to maintain his rule.

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Please be aware that Saint Kentigern College’s reference policy is that I use the American

Psychological Association (APA) system of referencing.

This is a citation system of referencing and therefore does not require footnotes but does

require a bibliography or list of sources at the end of the completed work.

It was retrieved from http://www.waikato.ac.nz/library/study/guides/apa.shtml at the

beginning of our course in January 2011.

Bibliography

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Cheek, Timothy (2002), Mao Zedong and China’s Revolution: A Brief Story with Documents,

(1st edition), Bedford, MA: St. Martin’s

Freedman, R. (1990) The Marxist System: Economic, Political and Social Perspectives,

Chatham NJ: Chatham House Publishers

Johnson, P. (1991) Modern Times, From the Twenties to the Nineties New York, NY: Harper

Collins Publishers.

Knight, N. (1983) The form of Mao Zedong’s ‘Sinificant of Marxism’, The Australian

Journal of Chinese Affairs, 1(9), 17-33. Retrieved from JSTOR database.

Marxists Internet Archive (2011) Manifesto of the Communist Party. Retrieved from:

http://www.marxists.org

Marx To Mao (1999) On The Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight

Points for Attention. Retrieved from: http://www.marx2mao.com

Moise, Edwin (1994) Modern China, a History, London, UK: Longman Group Ltd

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http://www.marx2mao.com/

http://www.marxists.org/


New York Times (2010) Mao’s Great Leap to Famine. Retrieved http://www.nytimes.com

Raj Critic. A story of proletarian democracy in action. Retrieved from:

http://rajcritic.wordpress.com

Schwartz, B. (1951) Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, New York, NY: Harper

Torch Books

Spence, J.D (1991) The Search for Modern China, Norton, MA: WW Norton

UCSD Modern Chinese History (2000), Who cared about whether Mao was a Marxist or

not? Retrieved from http://ucsdmodernchinesehistory.wordpress.com

Ward, Harriet (1978), World powers in the Twentieth Century, London, UK: BBC and

Heinemann Educational books

World Socialism (2006). Introduction to the Civil War in France. Retrieved from

http://www.worldsocialism.org/quotes.htm

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http://ucsdmodernchinesehistory.wordpress.com/