viewpoint tactical magazine #3
DESCRIPTION
It is the VIEWPOINT of this publication to provide articles that educate, engage, maybe even shock the reader. VPTAC contributors are experienced MIL, LE, PMC, Homeland, Intel, Trainers, Operators and more. They contribute because they feel the need to speak about their VIEWPOINT. Some will engage us with world events others the latest training observations... others may shed some light on things we know nothing about.TRANSCRIPT
VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM
KENT STATEMASSACRE:A LOOK BACKBy Jerry M. Lewis and Thomas R. Hensley
HUNTING AL-QAEDA PART IIBy Michael Yon
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOMFUELING TERRORISM WORLDWIDEBy Dr. Joshua Sinai
ONE SURGEON’S VIEWPOINTBy Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army
A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS
WEL
COM
E
4
OURVIEWPOINT
It is the VIEWPOINT of this publication to provide articles that educate, engage, maybe even shock the reader. VPTAC contrib-utors are experienced MIL, LE, PMC, Homeland, Intel, Train-ers, Operators and more. They contribute because they feel the need to speak about their VIEWPOINT. Some will engage us with world events others the latest training observations... others may shed some light on things we know nothing about.
Diversity is the name of the game here and the mission is simple.....to offer UNIQUE VIEWPOINTS from a diverse set of contributors from all aspects of the TACTI-CAL Community. Some of the topics that may be covered include:
• Global Operations, Charity, Intel, Psyops, Training, Tac-Med, Maritime, EOD, Politics, Human Trafficking, Drug War, Canine, Job Creators, Comms, Survival, Sniper, Pro-tection, Disabled Vets Speaking Out, Books and more.
VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM
WEL
COM
E
VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM
THE NETWORKThe VPTAC Network is how the information is disseminated. Built upon the viral philosophy we
feed the publication into networks which ensure a tactical readership. (published online at issuu.com we hope for organic growth as well)
HOW TO SHARE YOUR VIEWPOINTIf you would like to become part of the VIEWPOINT TACTICAL group of Writers, Advertisers
and Network Contributors please contact us. Your thoughts are very much welcome and we hope that we can build a relationship to further our mission.
THE BASICS• 48-64 page digital turn page magazine.• CLICK THE LINK AND READ no apps necessary published at ISSUU.com (which has a large
reader base) readable and downloadable on Windows, MAC, Ipad, Iphone, Android..etc.• The Magazine is FREE!• LARGER TYPE for better digital reading.• 2 AD Sizes (full and half page) all ads are hot linked as are text links.
SECTIONS• World Overview: World Views and Politics• Frontlines: Home and Abroad• Learning Curve: Training of all types• Drug Front: The world beneath• Secret Squirrel: Intel / Psyops• Perseverance: Disabled Vets Speak• Workforce: Hiring Vets etc• Let’s talk!: Interviews• By the Numbers: Facts about Everything
ABOUT THE LOGO• Raven: Messenger, Guide, Cunning, Swift Moving Intelligence• Color: Black (Stength) White (Illumination)• Shield: Protection• Skull: Represents Mortality• Sword: The Upright White Sword means Purity in Vigilance• Key: Knowledge• Oak Leaf: Strength • Olive Branch: Peace and the Search of.
VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM
CONT
ENTS 8 HUNTING AL-QAEDA PART II
By Michael Yon
18 KENT STATE MASSACRE, A LOOK BACK By Jerry M. Lewis and Thomas R. Hensley
34 A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS
36 KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM FUELING TERRORISM WORLDWIDE By Dr. Joshua Sinai
44 ONE SURGEON’S VIEWPOINT By Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army
ISSUE 3, MAR 2015
VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM6
PUBLISHER:VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine is published by: MAD4ART ® International LLC.,P.O. Box 56454, Virginia Beach, VA, 23456. / [email protected] / 757-721-2774 / MAD4ART.COM
© MAD4ART ® INTERNATIONAL LLC 2013 ALL RIGHTS RESERVEDU.S Department of Veterans Affairs,Registered Veteran- Owned Small Business (VOSB), DUNS: 829545115
Articles that appear in VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine or on VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM are for informational purposes only. The nature of the content of all of the articles is intended to provide readers with accurate information in regard to the subject matter covered. How-ever, some of the articles contain authors’ opinions which may not reflect a position considered or adopted by VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM. Articles are published with the understanding that VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM is not engaged in rendering ANY advice, instruction or opin-ions. VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM has taken reasonable care in sourcing and presenting the information contained in VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine or VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM, but accepts no responsibility for any physical or emotional injury, damages of any kind, financial, or other loss or damage. There is no promise or warranty, either expressed or implied regarding the content of any published submission appearing in this publication or website.
VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine is published by MAD4ART ® International LLC., P.O. Box 56454, Virginia Beach, VA, 23456. Contributors, who wish to submit manuscripts, letters, photographs, drawings, etc., do so at their own risk. We do not guarantee publication of unsolicited manuscripts. Materials submitted cannot be returned, and the contributor authorizes VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine to edit for content and space. Please provide captions and credits for all photographs. By submitting all photos, logos and text to VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Maga-zine and VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM you certify that you have photo releases and or permission that you have the right to use and are giving permission to use all photos, logos and text. By submitting material, you certify that it is original and unpublished. If it has been published you have the rights to the work and rights to republish. Reproduction or reprinting in whole or in part of any portion of this publication without written permission is prohibited. The opinions and recommendations expressed by individual authors within this magazine are not necessarily those of VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine, VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM or MAD4ART ® International. LLC.
CONT
ENTS
ISSUE 3, MAR 2015
HUNT
ING
AL Q
AEDA
By M
icha
el Y
on
8
FRON
TLIN
ES
When we dropped ramp in the “Me-chanics” section of Baqubah, and linked up with Iraqi soldiers, I heard my danger chimes peal. Minutes af-ter we hit the ground— POW!—a shot was fired close by and dust kicked in the air. An Iraqi soldier had managed to accidentally fire a shot
from his AK-47. They are getting much better, but not there yet. I am not sure what tipped me off that this particular group
HUNTINGAL QAEDA
PART II
SUMMONING FIREWITHOUT FLINT
By Michael Yon
of Iraqi soldiers wasn’t entirely squared-away, but that shot only underscored the feeling. Back in 2005, I would seek cover whenever
Iraqi Army approached. It’s not like that in 2007; they are becoming a real army,
but there is still room for im-provement.
We headed out to the palm groves next to the Diyala River. Along the way, the Alpha-compa-ny commander, Captain Sheldon Morris , kept everyone moving in the right direction.
Back at the COP, Captain Morris is quick to make soldiers laugh, but out
here he’s all business. Captain Morris spotted
an oxygen factory. “Hmmmm….” he
said (which made me laugh) but then he closed in to have a look. Morris was clear that his job was to ac-
complish the mission and secure the population
even if it meant losing himself or his people.
Mission comes first.
We walked and walked, and sol-diers kept asking me if I was okay. Es-pecially one soldier named Staff Ser-geant Chuomg Le, who kept asking if the heat was getting to me. I kept saying I would be carrying him be-fore he would be carrying me. He just laughed. Other soldiers said Le is a physical animal. But one of the tricks I’ve learned to combat reporting is you don’t have to be tougher than all the soldiers, just tougher than one.
When the first one collapses, and they stop to stick an IV into him, you also get a break.
In fact, the next day three soldiers would collapse from the heat during some fighting, and two of them were so dehydrated that their veins col-lapsed, proving once again that you don’t have to be tougher than every-one, just the guys who don’t drink enough water. If you can beat those guys, you are like the Lion King for re-porters. Soldiers say, “I can’t believe the photographer is still standing when sergeant so-and-so face-plant-
ed.” It’s all smoke and mirrors. I drink water like a fish and dive for every sliver of shade, thinking of the body like a battery that gets drained quickly by the heat and sun. With only so much juice, taking every sliver of shade, even if it’s only for 30 seconds, and pounding that water continuously, all adds up to a longer charge. Al Qaeda still lurks in the area, so the farmers were happy to see us. One woman said that seeing the Army out there was a blessing from God, which made the soldiers happy. There’s not a lot
of happiness to be had here, but the sol-diers respond when people show gratitude. It charges their batteries. And they really love those cards from home where kinder-gartners and first graders ask all kinds of funny questions like, “Is it hot in the des-ert?” Yes, a little bit. But along the water-ways in Iraq, such as here next to the Diyala River, it’s hot and humid. Practically steam-ing. Even the mosquitoes must sweat here.
Much food was growing all around us, and I was getting hungry, but for some rea-son I felt a twinge of danger. Couldn’t quite put my finger on it. Just a general feeling that something unexpected might happen.
HUNT
ING
AL Q
AEDA
By M
icha
el Y
on
10
FRON
TLIN
ES
Date palms: food every where. A perfect place for al Qaeda, where a savage enemy could live, terrorizing the people, making slaves of them, with a steady supply of food nearby and ready access to bomb-making materials.
[ 714] 692 1300WWW.SUREFIREINSTITUTE.COM
FOLLOW US!
LAS VEGAS
THE LEADERS IN LOW LIGHT TACTICAL TRAINING
SUREFIRE INSTITUTE12801 OLD US 95 HIGHWAYBOULDER CITY, NV 89005
Whether you are a member of the military, law enforcemnt, or are a private citizen, Surefire Institute has a highly effective training program tailored to meet the needs of any caliber of shooter. Less experienced sudents will develop basic fundamentals while advanced students will be pushed to learn new techniques and then trained in as close to real-life scenarios as possible. From certification courses to tactical training, SFI will take your firearms skills to the next level.
HUNT
ING
AL Q
AEDA
By M
icha
el Y
on
12
Date palms: food every where. A perfect place for al Qaeda, where a savage enemy could live, terrorizing the people, making slaves of them, with a steady supply of food nearby and ready access to bomb-making materials.
I watched during the Senate hearings on 11 September 07 as some Senators attempted to grill General Petraeus, insinuating that the war in Iraq was a distraction from the fight against al Qaeda. It was clearly that during the initial invasion, but not today. These photos were taken at the center of what al Qaeda claimed to be their worldwide headquarters. Listening to some of the Senators’ questions, the true magnitude of the gulf between what is hap-pening in Iraq and what people in America think is happening in Iraq became apparent. Some Senators clearly had been doing their homework and were asking smart questions--if negative at times--but others seemed completely ignorant of the ground situation here, which adds nothing meaningful to the debate.
During the mission, we kept hearing shots maybe a quarter mile away, and there also were some large bombs exploding in the further distance. Voices over the radio said some were just IEDs getting blown up.
Eventually we worked our way through a village then down the Diyala Riv-er, facing the river which flows from left to right, toward Baghdad. The Di-yala is an old river without great elevation change in this area, and so it twists and bows several times in and through Baqubah. All along the river, as with all Iraqi waterways, peo-ple suck out the water like human mosquitoes, sucking out far more than they need, wasting the water, and complaining about the people upriver who do the same.
We took a break be-side the river. Iraq Sol-
diers from the 5th IA started spray painting the outside wall of an Iraqi house to show they had been there. Captain Morris heard the hiss of the spray paint, and came around the corner, fit to be tied, and told them to stop painting people’s property!
FRON
TLIN
ES
CPL Matt Desmond briefing other 2 Para soldiers
The medics kept working.
Although the Iraqi soldiers are nearly always embarrassed when an American like Captain Morris bolts around and tells them to cut out the idiocy, the most interesting dynamic is how it also engenders respect from the Iraqi soldiers for the Americans. Before the war, our people had no street credibility in Iraq. Iraqis thought American soldiers were soft, and that the body armor was a type of personal air conditioner. But if the Iraqis knew back then what they know now about American willingness to suffer and fight, it’s doubtful that Saddam would have taunted an angry America. Yet today, knowing our soldiers to be actually aggressive and able killers when the switch gets flipped to ON, they also see how our people are more competent street fighters than the Iraqi Army, even without the high-tech tools. The man-to-man respect is there. And so when someone like Captain Morris points out to Iraqi soldiers something they already know they are doing wrong (like painting the wall of someone’s house, for instance), their respect for Americans
grows. Day after day, Iraqis come to Americans asking for justice, because they see countless thousands of daily actions by people like Captain Sheldon Morris. Our military is a powerful tribe.
The break was over. We kept hearing fighting, and it seemed to be roaming around slightly downriver. Captain Morris was monitoring comms. The Bradleys that had dropped us off had been watching some ac-tivity in the area of the fighting. At 0855, for instance, they spotted a man, wearing all black, running off with an AK-47. We continued the clearance operation. At about 0905, small arms fire was coming from the same area where the man in black had run off with the AK. We continued the clearing, but the light fighting in that area also continued.
At 0959, Apache 27 (one our Bradleys) reported a silver van carrying several men. Apache 27 saw the men drop off a large white sack on Route Burga, a few hundred meters to our south, and then the van drove west. Route Burga had not been cleared (not every-thing was cleared during Operation Arrowhead Rip-per), and so might be riddled with IEDs. In fact, what we didn’t know was that some 1920s were in a firefight
In the groves: The gear on this soldier’s back is called the “breach kit,” and it’s used to open just about everything.
Before the war, our people had no street credibility in Iraq. Iraqis thought American soldiers were soft, and that the body armor was a type of personal air conditioner. But if the Iraqis knew back then what they know now about American willingness to suffer and fight, it’s doubtful that Saddam would have taunted an angry America.
HUNT
ING
AL Q
AEDA
By M
icha
el Y
on
14
with what they later would say was al Qaeda. I heard a report that at least one 1920s guy was dead already, but we didn’t know this yet.
At around 1005 we started moving to contact (meaning: trying to engage in the fight). We walked south, mov-ing toward the firing, linking up with SSG Michael’s squad and the IA with him. By now the fighting was a few hundreds meters away. All small arms. I didn’t hear any explosions. Some ci-vilians were caught in the crossfire and a woman got shot in the neck and was slightly wounded, though we did not yet know this. The fighting was light: may-
be 1 PKC machinegun and 4-5 AKs. But often big fights start as other elements, friendly and enemy, are drawn in.
We approached a wide open field just before Burga and we could now see Route Burga perhaps a couple hun-dred yards in front of us. Staff Sergeant Le gave the hand signal for everyone to
cross the open area in an inverted wedge formation. We were accompanied by doz-ens of Iraqi soldiers from the 5th IA, and they recognized the signal and also got into the wedge. These Iraqi soldiers were vastly improved from 2005.
As we crossed the field, the silver van started driving in front of us at about 1020. We could see it driving from our right to our left on Route Burga a couple hundred meters to our front. The van was well within accurate small arms range. I was unaware of the radio chatter about the armed men in the van, and the white sack; so to me it was just a van that was driving near us with four men, while a fire-fight was going on nearby. But to Captain Mor-
ris and the others hearing the chatter, and to those soldiers in the Bradleys peering with ex-cellent optics, the men in the van were clearly armed and also were not displaying any sort of recognition signal. The van was in area where there was fighting going on, and where American forces had killed about 7 during the past 24 hours, and where we knew for a “fact” that al Qaeda was.
FRON
TLIN
ES
American soldiers closed in. This was fantastically dangerous. I remember wondering what their families might think about them moving in to take
the guys alive, when this could cost American lives. How would I write
about such soldiers should they get blown up by a suicide vest planted
to specifically take advantage of our soldiers’ sense of decency?
HUNT
ING
AL Q
AEDA
By M
icha
el Y
on
16
FRON
TLIN
ESMy video had
been running for sev-eral minutes. One of the Bradleys saw what he thought were bullets kicking up in our direction, as if someone were shooting at us, or at least in our direction. But at this time--the silver van now near-ly directly in front of us--I heard no shots nor saw any contact. As the van closed the range at about 200 meters, our guys fired several warn-ing shots. The van sped up. The Soldiers rained heavy small arms fire and were kicking up dust, and Corporal Antony Johnson fired a 40mm grenade, but the van just kept speeding away when --BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! BOOM! -- a Bradley fired 4 shots from the 25mm cannon. All four high explosive rounds impact-ed and the van careened off the road and crashed out of site.
Apache 27 saw a woman rush out to the van and scarf up an AK and run off into a palm grove. I was beside SSG Le when he had her in his sights, but he did not fire, even though she was now considered an armed combat-ant. As we moved out toward the van, there were reports that some of the guys had gone into a house. Our guys were going to attack the house, but that report apparently was wrong. At the same time, the woman who had been shot in the neck by someone else came running to us and screaming for help. The medic went to work on her, but it was fortunately only a flesh wound and she was pretty tough and just wanted to sit down. A few sol-
diers stayed back with her and for security for the rest of us as we kept closing in. We were now on Route Burga, which had not been cleared. Our guys could all be blown to pieces, but they kept moving forward.
Al Qaeda operatives often wear suicide vests, and given the way al Qaeda fights, our guys would have been justified in call-ing Apache 27 forward and ordering it to obliterate the van. Clearly the guys were armed and those who were still alive were also still combatants. But instead, at great risk to their own lives, our guys moved for-ward toward the van.
American soldiers closed in. This was fantastically dangerous. I remember won-dering what their families might think about them moving in to take the guys alive, when this could cost American lives. How would I write about such soldiers should they get blown up by a suicide vest planted to specifically take advantage of our soldiers’ sense of decency?
All four men were kitted out, and two AKs were found. One was on the scene,
Much food was growing all around us, and I was getting hungry, but for some reason I felt a twinge of danger. Couldn’t quite put my finger on it. Just a general
feeling that something unexpected might happen.
and the woman had run off with the other. The Soldiers would have been completely justified in shoot-ing the woman the moment she picked up that weapon: she was then a combatant on the battle-field. Instead, other American sol-diers entered her home, got the AK and left her and the family alone.
Before the medics could go to work, the four guys who had been hit had to be searched. Hand grenades could be in every pocket.
Iraqi men approached waving a white flag, which often has been used as a ploy to attack our people. The one without a shirt had a ban-dage on his left hand. (I would rec-ognize him in tomorrow’s fighting
by that hand.) They wanted to tell us that the men who had been shot were their friends.
The men were detained, and the treatment may look rough here, but in actuality, they were treat-ed well, given ice cold water, and brought back to COP White Castle.
They continued to be treated decently but firmly at COP White Castle, where one soldier noticed that this man was in pain, so his flex cuffs were removed and he was told to keep his hands behind his back. After some hours, they were all released.
It turned out that the two men who died were 1920s men. Two
others received only minor flesh wounds. The next day we would go into the same area with Iraqi Army soldiers and 1920s irregu-lars, and we would see the 1920s in action, as they got attacked by an IED and engaged their enemy in a serious firefight.
American soldiers closed in.
This was fantastically dangerous. I remember wondering what their families might think about them moving in to take the guys alive, when this could cost American lives. How would I write about such soldiers should they get blown up by a suicide vest plant-ed to specifically take ad-vantage of our soldiers’ sense of decency?
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
18
HIST
ORY
THE MAY 4, 1970
SHOOTINGSAT KENT STATE UNIVERSITY:
THE SEARCH FOR HISTORICAL ACCURACY By JERRY M. LEWIS
and THOMAS R. HENSLEY
On May 4, l970 members of the Ohio National Guard fired into a crowd of Kent State Univer-sity demonstrators, killing four and wounding nine Kent State students. The impact of the shootings was dramatic. The event triggered a nationwide student strike that forced hundreds of colleges and universities to close. H. R. Halde-
man, a top aide to President Richard Nixon, suggests the shootings had a direct impact on national politics. In The Ends of Power, Halde-man (1978) states that the shootings at Kent State began the slide into Watergate, eventually destroying the Nixon administration. Be-yond the direct effects of the May 4th, the shootings have certain-ly come to symbolize the deep political and social divisions that so sharply divided the country during the Vietnam War era.
20
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
HIST
ORY
In the nearly three decades since May 4, l970, a voluminous literature has developed analyzing the events of May 4th and their af-termath. Some books were published quickly, providing a fresh but frequently superficial or inaccurate analysis of the shootings (e.g., Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970; Warren, 1970; Casale and Paskoff, 1971; Michener, 1971; Stone, 1971; Taylor et al., 1971; and Tomp-kins and Anderson, 1971). Numerous addi-tional books have been published in subse-quent years (e.g., Davies, 1973; Hare, 1973; Hensley and Lewis, 1978; Kelner and Munves, 1980; Hensley, 1981; Payne, 1981; Bills, 1988; and Gordon, 1997). These books have the ad-vantage of a broader historical perspective than the earlier books, but no single book can be considered the definitive account of the events and aftermath of May 4, l970 at Kent State University.(1)
Despite the substantial literature which exists on the Kent State shootings, misinfor-mation and misunderstanding continue to surround the events of May 4. For example, a prominent college-level United States his-tory book by Mary Beth Norton et al. (1994), which is also used in high school advanced placement courses,(2) contains a picture of the shootings of May 4 accompanied by the following summary of events: “In May 1970, at Kent State University in Ohio, Na-tional Guardsmen confronted student an-tiwar protestors with a tear gas barrage. Soon afterward, with no provocation, sol-diers opened fire into a group of fleeing stu-dents. Four young people were killed, shot in the back, including two women who had been walking to class.” (Norton et al., 1994, p. 732) Unfortunately, this short descrip-tion contains four factual errors: (1) some degree of provocation did exist; (2) the stu-dents were not fleeing when the Guard ini-tially opened fire; (3) only one of the four students who died, William Schroeder, was shot in the back; and (4) one female stu-dent, Sandy Schreuer, had been walking to class, but the other female, Allison Krause, had been part of the demonstration.
This article is an attempt to deal with the
historical inaccuracies that surround the May 4th shootings at Kent State University by providing high school social studies teachers with a re-source to which they can turn if they wish to teach about the subject or to involve students in research on the issue. Our approach is to raise and provide answers to twelve of the most frequently asked ques-tions about May 4 at Kent State. We will also offer a list of the most important questions involving the shootings which have not yet been answered satisfactorily. Finally, we will conclude with a brief annotated bibliography for those wishing to ex-plore the subject further.
WHY WAS THE OHIO NATIONAL GUARD CALLED TO KENT?
The decision to bring the Ohio National Guard onto the Kent State University campus was di-rectly related to decisions regard-ing American involvement in the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon was elected president of the United States in 1968 based in part on his promise to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. During the first year of Nixon’s presidency, America’s involvement in the war appeared to be winding down. In late April of 1970, however, the United States invaded Cambodia and widened the Vietnam War. This decision was announced on national television and radio on April 30, l970 by President Nix-on, who stated that the invasion of Cambodia was designed to at-tack the headquarters of the Viet Cong, which had been using Cam-bodian territory as a sanctuary.
In late April of 1970, however, the United States invaded Cambodia and widened the Vietnam War. This decision was announced on national television and radio on April 30, l970 by President Nixon, who stated that the invasion of Cambodia was designed to attack the headquarters of the Viet Cong, which had been using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary.
Protests occurred the next day, Friday, May 1, across United States college campuses where anti-war sentiment ran high.
22
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
HIST
ORY
Protests occurred the next day, Friday, May 1, across United States col-lege campuses where an-ti-war sentiment ran high. At Kent State University, an anti-war rally was held at noon on the Commons, a large, grassy area in the middle of campus which had traditionally been the site for various types of rallies and demon-strations. Fiery speeches against the war and the Nixon administration were given, a copy of the Consti-tution was buried to sym-bolize the murder of the Constitution because Con-gress had never declared war, and another rally was called for noon on Mon-day, May 4.
Friday evening in downtown Kent began peacefully with the usual socializing in the bars, but events quickly escalated into a violent confronta-tion between protestors and local police. The ex-act causes of the distur-bance are still the subject of debate, but bonfires were built in the streets of downtown Kent, cars were stopped, police cars were hit with bottles, and some store windows were broken. The entire Kent
police force was called to duty as well as officers from the county and surrounding communities. Kent May-or Leroy Satrom declared a state of emergency, called Governor James Rhodes’ office to seek assistance, and ordered all of the bars closed. The decision to close the bars early increased the size of the angry crowd. Police eventually succeeded in using tear gas to disperse the crowd from downtown, forcing them to move several blocks back to the campus.
The next day, Saturday, May 2, Mayor Satrom met with other city officials and a representative of the Ohio National Guard who had been dispatched to Kent. Mayor Satrom then made the decision to ask Governor Rhodes to send the Ohio National Guard to Kent. The mayor feared further disturbances in Kent based upon the events of the previous evening, but more disturbing to the mayor were threats that had been made to downtown businesses and city officials as well as rumors that radical revolutionaries were in Kent to destroy the city and the university. Satrom was fearful that local forces would be inadequate to meet the potential disturbances, and thus about 5 p.m. he called the Governor’s office to make an official request for assistance from the Ohio National Guard.
WHAT HAPPENED ON THE KENT STATE UNIVERSITY CAMPUS ON SATURDAY MAY 2 AND SUNDAY MAY 3 AFTER THE GUARDS ARRIVED ON CAMPUS?
Members of the Ohio National Guard were already on duty in Northeast Ohio, and thus they were able to be mobilized quickly to move to Kent. As the Guard arrived in Kent at about 10 p.m., they encountered a tumultuous scene. The wooden ROTC building adja-cent to the Commons was ablaze and would eventually burn to the ground that evening, with well over 1000 demonstrators surrounding the building. Controversy
24
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
HIST
ORY
continues to exist regard-ing who was responsible for setting fire to the ROTC building, but radical pro-testors were assumed to be responsible because of their actions in inter-fering with the efforts of firemen to extinguish the fire as well as cheering the burning of the build-ing. Confrontations be-tween Guardsmen and demonstrators continued into the night, with tear gas filling the campus and numerous arrests being made.
Sunday, May 3rd was a day filled with contrasts. Nearly 1000 Ohio National Guards-men occupied the campus, making it appear like a mil-itary war zone. The day was warm and sunny, how-ever, and students frequently talk-ed amicably with Guardsmen. Ohio Governor James Rhodes flew to Kent on Sunday morning, and his mood was anything but calm. At a press conference, he is-sued a provocative statement calling
campus protestors the worst type of people in Ameri-ca and stating that every force of law would be used to deal with them. Rhodes also indicated that he would seek a court order declaring a state of emergency. This was never done, but the widespread assumption among both Guard and University officials was that a state of martial law was being declared in which con-trol of the campus resided with the Guard rather than University leaders and all rallies were banned. Further confrontations between protestors and guardsmen oc-curred Sunday evening, and once again rocks, tear gas, and arrests characterized a tense campus.
WHAT TYPE OF RALLY WASHELD AT NOON ON MAY 4?
At the conclusion of the anti-war rally on Friday, May 1, student protest leaders had called for another rally to be held on the Commons at noon on Monday, May 4. Al-though University officials had attempted on the morn-
ing of May 4 to inform the campus that the rally was prohibited, a crowd began to gather beginning as early as 11 a.m. By noon, the entire Commons area contained approximately 3000 people. Al-though estimates are inexact, probably about 500 core demonstrators were gathered around the Vic-tory Bell at one end of the Commons, another 1000 people were “cheerleaders” supporting the active demonstrators, and an additional 1500 people were spectators standing around the perimeter of the Commons. Across the Commons at the burned-out ROTC building stood about 100 Ohio National Guardsmen carrying lethal M-1 military rifles.
Substantial consensus exists that the active participants in the rally were primarily protesting the presence of the Guard on cam-pus, although a strong anti-war sentiment was also present. Little evidence exists as to who were the leaders of the rally and what activities were planned, but ini-tially the rally was peaceful.
WHO MADE THE DECISIONTO BAN THE RALLY OF MAY 4?
Conflicting evidence exists regarding who was re-sponsible for the decision to ban the noon rally of May 4th. At the 1975 federal civil trial, General Robert Can-terbury, the highest official of the Guard, testified that
widespread consensus existed that the rally should be prohibited because of the tensions that existed and the possibility that violence would again occur. Canter-bury further testified that Kent State President Robert White had explicitly told Canterbury that any demon-stration would be highly dangerous. In contrast, White testified that he could recall no conversation with Can-terbury regarding banning the rally.
The decision to ban the rally can most accurately be traced to Governor Rhodes’ statements on Sunday, May 3 when he stated that he would be seeking a state of emergency declaration from the courts. Although he never did this, all officials -- Guard, University, Kent -- assumed that the Guard was now in charge of the campus and that all rallies were illegal. Thus, Universi-ty leaders printed and distributed on Monday morning 12,000 leaflets indicating that all rallies, including the May 4th rally scheduled for noon, were prohibited as long as the Guard was in control of the campus.
WHAT EVENTS LED DIRECTLYTO THE SHOOTINGS?
Shortly before noon, General Canterbury made the decision to order the demonstrators to disperse.
26
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
HIST
ORY
A Kent State police officer standing by the Guard made an announcement using a bullhorn. When this had no effect, the officer was placed in a jeep along with several Guardsmen and driven across the Commons to tell the protestors that the rally was banned and that they must disperse.
This was met with angry shouting and rocks, and the jeep retreated. Canterbury then ordered his men to load and lock their weapons, tear gas canisters were fired into the crowd around the Victory Bell, and the Guard began to march across the Commons to disperse the rally. The protes-tors moved up a steep hill, known as Blanket Hill, and then down the other side of the hill onto the Prentice Hall parking lot as well as an adjoining practice football field. Most of the Guardsmen followed the students directly and soon found themselves somewhat trapped on the practice football field because it was surrounded by a fence. Yelling and rock throwing reached a peak as the Guard remained on the field for about ten minutes. Several Guardsmen could be seen huddling together, and some Guardsmen knelt and pointed their guns, but no weapons were shot at this time.
The Guard then began retracing their steps from the practice football field back up Blanket Hill. As they arrived at the top of the hill, twenty-eight of the more than seventy Guardsmen turned suddenly and fired their rifles and
28
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
HIST
ORY
pistols. Many guardsmen fired into the air or the ground. However, a small portion fired directly into the crowd. Altogether between 61 and 67 shots were fired in a 13 second period.
HOW MANYDEATHS ANDINJURIES OC-CURRED?
Four Kent State stu-dents died as a result of the firing by the Guard. The closest student was Jeffrey Miller, who was shot in the mouth while standing in an access road leading into the Prentice Hall parking lot, a distance of approximately 270 feet from the Guard. Allison Krause was in the Prentice Hall parking lot; she was 330 feet from the Guards-men and was shot in the left side of her body. Wil-liam Schroeder was 390 feet from the Guard in the Prentice Hall parking lot when he was shot in the left side of his back. Sandra Scheuer was also about 390 feet from the Guard in the Prentice Hall parking lot when a bullet pierced the left front side of her neck.
Nine Kent State students were wounded in the 13 sec-ond fusillade. Most of the students were in the Prentice Hall parking lot, but a few were on the Blanket Hill area. Joseph Lewis was the student closest to the Guard at a distance of about sixty feet; he was standing still with his middle finger extended when bullets struck him in the right abdomen and left lower leg. Thomas Grace was also approximately 60 feet from the Guardsmen and was wounded in the left ankle. John Cleary was over 100 feet from the Guardsmen when he was hit in the upper left chest. Alan Canfora was 225 feet from the Guard and was struck in the right wrist. Dean Kahler was the most seriously wounded of the nine students. He was struck in the small of his back from approximately 300 feet and was permanently paralyzed from the waist down. Douglas Wrentmore was wounded in the right knee from a distance of 330 feet. James Russell was struck in the right thigh and right forehead at a distance of 375 feet. Robert Stamps was almost 500 feet from the line of fire when he was wounded in the right buttock. Donald Mackenzie was the student the farthest from the Guardsmen at a distance of almost 750 feet when he was hit in the neck.
WHY DID THE GUARDSMEN FIRE?
The most important question associated with the events of May 4 is why did members of the Guard fire into a crowd of unarmed students? Two quite different answers have been advanced to this question: (1) the Guardsmen fired in self-defense, and the shootings were therefore jus-tified and (2) the Guardsmen were not in immediate dan-ger, and therefore the shootings were unjustified.
The answer offered by the Guardsmen is that they fired because they were in fear of their lives. Guardsmen testi-fied before numerous investigating commissions as well as in federal court that they felt the demonstrators were advancing on them in such a way as to pose a serious and immediate threat to the safety of the Guardsmen, and they therefore had to fire in self-defense. Some authors (e.g., Michener, 1971 and Grant and Hill, 1974) agree with this assessment. Much more importantly, federal criminal and civil trials have accepted the position of the Guardsmen. In a 1974 federal criminal trial, District Judge Frank Battisti
dismissed the case against eight Guardsmen indicted by a federal grand jury, ruling at mid-trial that the government’s case against the Guardsmen was so weak that the defense did not have to present its case. In the much longer and more complex federal civil trial of 1975, a jury voted 9-3 that none of the Guardsmen were legally responsible for the shootings. This decision was appealed, however, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a new trial had to be held because of the improper handling of a threat to a jury member.
The legal aftermath of the May 4 shootings ended in January of 1979 with an out-of-court settlement involving a statement signed by 28 defendants(3) as well as a mone-tary settlement, and the Guardsmen and their supporters view this as a final vindication of their position. The finan-cial settlement provided $675,000 to the wounded stu-dents and the parents of the students who had been killed. This money was paid by the State of Ohio rather than by any Guardsmen, and the amount equaled what the State estimated it would cost to go to trial again. Perhaps most importantly, the statement signed by members of the Ohio National Guard was viewed by them to be a declaration of regret, not an apology or an admission of wrongdoing:
In retrospect, the tragedy of May 4, 1970 should not have occurred. The students may have be-lieved that they were right in continuing their mass protest in response to the Cambodian inva-sion, even though this protest followed the post-ing and reading by the university of an order to ban rallies and an order to disperse. These orders have since been determined by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to have been lawful.
Some of the Guardsmen on Blanket Hill, fearful and anxious from prior events, may have believed in their own minds that their lives were in danger. Hindsight suggests that another method would have resolved the confrontation. Better ways must be found to deal with such a confrontation.
We devoutly wish that a means had been found to avoid the May 4th events culminating in the Guard shoot-
ings and the irreversible deaths and injuries. We deeply regret those events and are profoundly saddened by the deaths of four students and the wounding of nine others which resulted. We hope that the agreement to end the lit-igation will help to assuage the tragic memories regarding that sad day.
A starkly different interpretation to that of the Guards’ has been offered in numerous other studies of the shoot-ings, with all of these analyses sharing the common view-point that primary responsibility for the shootings lies with the Guardsmen. Some authors (e.g., Stone, 1971; Da-vies, 1973; and Kelner and Munves, 1980) argue that the Guardsmen’s lives were not in danger. Instead, these au-thors argue that the evidence shows that certain members of the Guard conspired on the practice football field to fire when they reached the top of Blanket Hill. Other authors (e.g., Best, 1981 and Payne, 1981) do not find sufficient evi-dence to accept the conspiracy theory, but they also do not find the Guard self-defense theory to be plausible. Experts who find the Guard primarily responsible find themselves in agreement with the conclusion of the Scranton Commis-sion (Report , 1970, p. 87): “The indiscriminate firing of ri-fles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.”
WHAT HAPPENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SHOOTINGS?
While debate still remains about the extent to which the Guardsmen’s lives were in danger at the mo-ment they opened fire, little doubt can exist that their lives were indeed at stake in the immediate aftermath of the shootings. The 13 second shooting that result-ed in four deaths and nine wounded could have been followed by an even more tragic and bloody confron-tation. The nervous and fearful Guardsmen retreated back to the Commons, facing a large and hostile crowd which realized that the Guard had live ammunition and
30
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
HIST
ORY
had used it to kill and wound a large number of people. In their intense anger, many demonstrators were willing to risk their own lives to at-tack the Guardsmen, and there can be little doubt that the Guard would have opened fire again, this time killing a much larger number of students.
Further tragedy was prevented by the actions of a number of Kent State University faculty marshals, who had organized hastily when trouble began several days earlier. Led by Profes-sor Glenn Frank, the faculty members pleaded with Na-tional Guard leaders to allow them to talk with the dem-onstrators, and then they begged the students not to risk their lives by confronting the Guardsmen. After about twenty minutes of emotional pleading, the marshals con-vinced the students to leave the Commons.
Back at the site of the shootings, ambulances had arrived and emergency med-ical attention had been given to the students who had not died immediately. The ambu-lances formed a screaming procession as they rushed the victims of the shootings to the local hospital.
The University was or-dered closed immediately, first by President Robert White and then indefinitely by Portage County Prosecu-tor Ronald Kane under an in-junction from Common Pleas Judge Albert Caris. Classes did not resume until the
Summer of 1970, and faculty members engaged in a wide variety of activities through the mail and off-campus meetings that en-abled Kent State students to finish the semester.
WHAT IS THE STORY BEHIND THE PULITZER PRIZE WINNING PHOTO OF THE YOUNG WOMAN CRYING OUT IN HORROR OVER THE DYING BODY OF ONE OF THE STUDENTS?
A photograph of Mary Vecchio, a fourteen year old runaway, screaming over the body of Jeffery Miller appeared on the front pages of newspapers and magazines throughout the country, and the photographer, John Filo, was to win a Pulitzer Prize for the picture. The photo has taken on a life and importance of its own. This analysis looks at the photo, the photographer, and the impact of the photo.
The Mary Vecchio picture shows her on one knee screaming over Jeffrey Miller’s body. Mary told one of us that she was calling for help because she felt she could do nothing (Personal Interview, 4/4/94). Miller is lying on the tarmac of the Prentice Hall parking lot. One student is standing near the Miller body closer than Vec-chio. Four students are seen in the immediate background.
John Filo, a Kent State photography major in 1970, continues to works as a professional newspaper photographer and editor. He was near the Prentice Hall parking lot when the Guard fired. He saw bullets hitting the ground, but he did not take cover be-cause he thought the bullets were blanks. Of course, blanks can-not hit the ground.
WHAT WAS THE LONG-TERM FACULTY RESPONSE TO THE SHOOTINGS?
Three hours after the shootings Kent State closed and was not to open for six weeks as a viable university. When it resumed classes in the Summer of 1970, its faculty was charged with three new responsibilities, their residues remaining today.
First, we as a University faculty had to bring aid and com-fort to our own. This began earlier on with faculty trying to finish the academic quarter with a reasonable amount of academic in-tegrity. It had ended about at mid-term examinations. However,
the faculty voted before the week was out to help students complete the quarter in any way possible. Students were advised to study independently until they were contacted by individual professors. Most of the professors organized their completion of courses around papers, but many gave lectures in churches and in homes in the community of Kent and surrounding communities. For example, Norman Duffy, an award winning teacher, gave off-campus chemistry lec-tures and tutorial sessions in Kent and Cleveland. His grad-uate students made films of laboratory sessions and mailed them to students.
Beyond helping thousands of students finish their cours-es, there were 1900 students as well who needed help with gradation. Talking to students about courses allowed the faculty to do some counseling about the shootings, which helped the faculty as much in healing as it did students.
Second, the University faculty was called upon to con-duct research about May 4 communicating the results of this research through teaching and traditional writing about the tragedy. Many responded and created a solid body of scholarship as well as an extremely useful archive contribut-ing to a wide range of activities in Summer of 1970 including press interviews and the Scranton Commission.
Third, many saw as one of the faculty’s challenges to develop alternative forms of protest and conflict resolution to help prevent tragedies such as the May 4 shootings and the killings at Jackson State ten days after Kent State.
WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MAY 4 SHOOTINGS?
Although we have attempted in this article to answer many of the most important and frequently asked questions about the May 4th shootings, our responses have some-times been tentative because many important questions remain unanswered. It thus seems important to ask what are the most significant questions which yet remain unanswered about the May 4th events. These questions could serve as the basis for research projects by students who are interested in studying the shootings in greater detail.
(1) Who was responsible for the violence in downtown Kent and on the Kent State campus in the three days prior to May 4th?
As an important part of this question, were “outside agitators” primarily responsible? Who was responsible for setting fire to the ROTC building?
(2) Should the Guard have been called to Kent and Kent State University? Could local law enforcement personnel have handled any situations? Were the Guard properly trained for this type of assignment?
32
KENT
STA
TEBY
JERR
Y M
. LEW
IS a
nd T
HOM
AS R
. HEN
SLEY
HIST
ORY
(3) Did the Kent State University administra-tion respond appropriately in their reactions to the demonstrations and with Ohio political officials and Guard officials?
(4) Would the shootings have been avoided if the rally had not been banned? Did the banning of the rally violate First Amendment rights?
(5) Did the Guardsmen conspire to shoot stu-dents when they huddled on the practice football field? If not, why did they fire? Were they justified in firing?
(6) Who was ultimately responsible for the events of May 4, l970?
WHY SHOULD WE STILL BE CONCERNED ABOUT MAY 4, 1970 AT KENT STATE?
In Robert McNamara’s (1995) book, “In Retro-spect:The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam” is a way to begin is an illustration of the this process. In it he says that United States policy towards Vietnam was “... terribly wrong and we owe it to future genera-tions to explain why.”
The May 4 shootings at Kent State need to be remembered for several reasons. First, the shootings have come to symbolize a great American tragedy which occurred at the height of the Vietnam War era, a period in which the nation found itself deeply divided both politically and culturally. The poignant picture of Mary Vecchio kneeling in agony over Jef-frey Miller’s body, for example, will remain forever as a reminder of the day when the Vietnam War came home to America. If the Kent State shootings will continue to be such a powerful symbol, then it is certainly important that Americans have a realistic view of the facts associated with this event.
Second, May 4 at Kent State and the Vietnam War era remain contro-versial even today, and the need for healing continues to exist. Healing will not occur if events are either for-gotten or distorted, and hence it is im-
portant to continue to search for the truth behind the events of May 4th at Kent State. Third, and most importantly, May 4th at Kent State should be remembered in order that we can learn from the mis-takes of the past. The Guards-men in their signed statement at the end of the civil trials recognized that better ways have to be found to deal with these types of confrontations. This has probably already oc-curred in numerous situations where law enforcement offi-cials have issued a caution to their troops to be careful be-cause “we don’t want another Kent State.” Insofar as this has happened, lessons have been learned, and the deaths of four young Kent State students have not been in vain.
About the AuthorJerry M. LewisEmeritus Professor of SociologyKent State UniversityKent, Ohio 44242Office: Merrill Hall #334Telephone: 330-672-2708Fax: 330-672-4724
ANNOTATEDBIBLIOGRAPHY
Bills, Scott. (1988). Kent State/May 4: Echoes Through a Decade. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press. This book provides town and gown reactions to May 4th. It has the best annotated bibliography avail-able on the literature on the shootings and is the basis for the annotations that follow.
Casale, Ottavio M. & Paskoff, Louis (Eds.) (1971). The Kent Affair: Documents and Interpretations . Bos-ton: Houghton Mifflin. This is an early, useful volume which reproduces local and national newspaper arti-cles on the shootings as well as radio and television broadcasts.
Davies, Peter. (1973). The Truth About Kent State: A Challenge to the American Conscience. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. This is a detailed nar-rative and analysis of the events of May 4 and their aftermath. He argues that the Guard conspired to fire upon the students. 74 photographs are included.
Eszterhas, Joe & Roberts, Michael D. (1970). Thirteen Seconds: Confrontation at Kent State. New York: Dodd, Mead. A very quick publication by two Cleveland journalists who use interviews of students, faculty, and Guardsmen to provide a background and narrative of May 1970 events.
Grant, Edward J. & Hill, Michael (1974). I Was There: What Really Went on at Kent State . Lima, OH: C.S.S. Publishing Co. The only book written by mem-bers of the Ohio National Guard, the authors provide a view of the hostile environment in which the Guards-men found themselves.
Hare, A. Paul (Ed.) (l973). Kent State: The Nonvi-olent Response. Haverford, PA: Center for Nonviolent Conflict Resolution. A series of articles by noted peace activist Paul Hare as well as many Kent State faculty members. The common theme is the search for non-violent approaches to conflictual situations.
Hensley, Thomas R. (1981). The Kent State Inci-dent: Impact of Judicial Process on Public Attitudes. Westport, CONN: Greenwood Press. This is a detailed examination of the legal aftermath of the shootings, focusing upon the impact of various legal proceedings on public attitudes about the shootings.
Hensley, Thomas R. and Lewis, Jerry M. (1978). Kent State and May 4th: A Social Science Perspective. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt. This collection brings to-gether a number of previous articles on May 4 that were published in social science journals, but articles covering the Kent State litigation and the 1977 gym-nasium controversy were written specifically for this volume. This book also contains the excellent analysis
of the events of May 4 written by James Best.Kelner, Joseph and Munves, James. (1980). The
Kent State Coverup . New York: Harper and Row. Kel-ner was the chief legal counsel for the students and parents in the 1975 federal civil trial. He presents a harsh analysis of the handling of the trial by Judge Donald Young. The book has a strong bias, but it pro-vides the only detailed analysis of this long and im-portant trial.
Michener, James. (1971). Kent State: What Happened and Why . New York: Random House and Reader’s Digest Books. This is undoubtedly the most widely read book on May 4th because of Michener’s reputation and the wide publicity it received. The book suffers from being produced so quickly, howev-er, containing numerous factual errors.
Payne, J. Gregory (1981). Mayday: Kent State. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt. The book provides a rath-er sketchy overview of the May 4 events, presents excerpts from letters written by participants in the events, and discusses the made-for-TV movie on May 4 to which Payne served as a consultant.
Report of the President’s Commission on Cam-pus Unrest. (1970) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office. Reprint edition by Arno Press. This remains the best single source for understanding the events of May 4. The report examines not only the shootings at Kent State but also the student move-ment of the sixties and the shootings at Jackson State University. Excellent photographs are included.
Stone, I. F. (1971). The Killings at Kent State: How Murder Went Unpunished. New York: Review Book. This is a rather sketchy book written with a strongly held viewpoint that the Guardsmen com-mitted murder.
Taylor, Stuart; Shuntlich, Richard; McGovern, Patrick; & Genther, Robert. (1971). Violence at Kent State, May 1 to 4, l970: The Student’s Per-spective. New York: College Notes and Texts, 1971. A study of the perceptions, feelings, attitudes, and reactions of Kent State students based upon a questionnaire sent to all Kent State students shortly after the shootings. Seven thousand stu-dents responded, and although this is not a ran-dom sample, it has the best data available about the views of Kent State students about May 4.
Tompkins, Phillip K. and Anderson, Elaine Vanden Bout. (l971). Communication Crisis at Kent State: A Case Study. New York: Gordon & Breach. This book presents a harsh analysis of the commu-nications problems that permeated the University during May 1970.
Warren, Bill (Ed.) (1970). The Middle of the Country: The Events of May 4th As Seen by Stu-dents & Faculty at Kent State University . A hastily
compiled set of essays put together by a Kent State University sophomore containing various reactions to the shootings by Kent State students and faculty members.
ADDITIONALREFERENCES
Best, James J. (1978). “Kent State: Answers and Questions” in Thomas R. Hensley and Jerry M. Lewis .) Kent State and May 4th: A Social Science Perspective . Dubuque, IA:
Kendall/Hunt.Haldeman, H.R. (1978). The Ends of Power.
New York: Times Books.McNamara, Robert. (1995). In Retrospect:
The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books.
Norton, Mary Beth; Katzman, David M.; Es-cott, Paul D.; Chudacoff, Howard P.; Paterson, Thomas G.; & Tuttle, William M. (1994). A People and a Nation: A History of the United
States. Fourth Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
NOTES1.In addition to the many books on the Kent
State shootings, numerous reports, book chap-ters, and articles have been written. The most comprehensive and accurate commission investi-gation is The Report of the President’s Commis-sion on Campus Unrest (1970) chaired by William W. Scranton. An excellent book chapter on the shootings is by James J. Best (1978). The most comprehensive bibliography on the shootings is in Bills (1988).
2. Professor Hensley, the co-author of this ar-ticle, became aware of this reference to the Kent State shootings because his daughter, Sarah, was taking Advanced Placement United States History at Kent Roosevelt High School with Mr. Bruce Dze-da. We thank Mr. Dzeda for reading this article and offering his reactions, although he bears no re-sponsibility for the ideas expressed in this article.
3. In addition to Guard officers and enlisted men, Governor James Rhodes was also a defen-dant in the civil trial and signed the statement.
PUBLISHED IN REVISED FORM BY THE OHIO COUNCIL FOR THE SO-CIAL STUDIES REVIEW, VOL 34, NUM-BER 1 (SUMMER, 1998) PP. 9-21
NUM
BERS
34
NUM
BERS
$1.747 TRILLION
150 MILLION
$500 PER SECOND
$1.1 TRILLION
12.3 MILLION
$2141
$16.2 TRILLION
MILITARY BUDGET GLOBAL 2013http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_
military_and_paramilitary_personnel
If women farmers had the same access to re-sources as men, the number of hungry in the world could be reduced by up to 150 million. (Source: FAO, 2011)
The U.S. federal government spent over $15 billion dollars in 2010 on the War on Drugs, at a rate of about $500 per second. Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy
School Expenditures, by Type of Control and Level of Instruction in Constant (2009 to 2010) Dollars Source: U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of
Education Statistics, annual.
There are at least 12.3 million enslaved adults and children around the world “at any given time.” Of these, at least 1.39 million are victims of commercial sexual servitude, both interna-tionally and within national borders. More than half, 56 percent, of all forced labor victims are women and girls.http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/human-trafficking
DOLLARS PER AMERCAN FOR NATIONAL DEFENSEhttp://en.wikipedia.org
GDP in billions - PPP$http://www.uis.unesco.org
NUMBERSA GLOBAL VIEWPOINT
KIDN
APPI
NGBY
DR.
JOSH
UA S
INAI
36
TERR
ORIS
M
KIDNAPPINGFOR RANSOM
FUELINGTERRORISMWORLDWIDE
BY DR. JOSHUA SINAI
Kidnapping for ransom (KfR) is considered one of the primary sources of revenues that fuel the op-erations of numerous terrorist groups worldwide. In general, while the majority of worldwide kid-nappings for ransom are perpetrated by organized criminal groups (including tribes in countries such as Yemen or vessel-borne pirates off the coasts of
east or west Africa), this tactic is increasingly being used by land-based terrorist groups – especially those affiliated with Al Qaeda – making this criminal tactic for monetary gain a significant com-ponent in their warfare activities in conjunction with their killing attacks against their adversaries.
RE-PUBLISHED WITHPERMISSION OF THE IACSP
38
Although kidnappings have always been used as a terrorist tactic, in this new trend they are being frequently employed – even by supposedly religiously-based militant groups – for monetary ransom, rather than as co-ercive bargaining chips against their govern-ment adversaries to compel them to give in to their political demands or to release their
imprisoned terrorists. Such tactics present governments with a serious dilemma, since, as with the justified insistence of governments not to give in to such coercive-based terrorist demands in general, governments risk having the terrorist kidnappers kill their captives when their ransom demands are not met.
It needs to be pointed out that kidnap-pings for ransom also differ from hostage
taking situations in which a terrorist group will hold hostages in a barri-caded location while being surround-ed by counterterrorism forces, ac-companied by negotiations that may or may not resolve the crisis without loss of life of the victims.
Terrorist groups generally employ
a supporting network, such as, in cer-tain countries where lawlessness is pervasive, of corrupt local merchants or tour and transport operators to identify foreign visitors for potential kidnap operations.
Hostages are either held in the countries where they are captured or taken by their captors into a second
Four factors make such high risk countries especially vulnerable to kidnappings by terrorist groups: weak and failing central governments, widespread anarchy and lawlessness in the countryside, the presence of terrorist groups that establish their own safe havens in such ungoverned territories, and the presence of foreigners – whether tourists, employees of multinational corporations operating in such resource-rich (e.g., petroleum extraction) but high risk environments, or humanitarian relief workers.
KIDN
APPI
NGBY
DR.
JOSH
UA S
INAI
TERR
ORIS
M
40
neighboring country. In Kenya, for example, humanitarian relief workers and foreign tour-ists have been kidnapped by al Shabaab-affili-ated terrorists and then held in nearby Soma-lia, where the group maintains its safe havens.
According to various organizations that compile such data, countries of high risk to the threat of kidnapping for ransom by ter-rorist groups include (in alphabetical order): Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Mali,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.
Four factors make such high risk countries especially vulnerable to kidnappings by ter-rorist groups: weak and failing central govern-ments, widespread anarchy and lawlessness in the countryside, the presence of terrorist groups that establish their own safe havens in such ungoverned territories, and the presence of foreigners – whether tourists, employees of
multinational corporations operating in such resource-rich (e.g., petroleum ex-traction) but high risk environments, or humanitarian relief workers.
Thus, in an impoverished country such as Yemen, armed tribesmen often collaborate with Al Qaeda in the Ara-bian Peninsula (AQAP)-linked militants to take foreign hostages in order to ex-change them for ransom. In other coun-
tries, such as Mali, the instability and anarchy that led to the French-led inter-vention in early January 2013 uninten-tionally resulted in increasing the risk of kidnapping of foreigners throughout the Sahel region, with the most promi-nent example the hostage takeover by an Al Qaeda affiliate of the natural gas plant near the town of Amenas in east-ern Algeria (although it could also be
KIDN
APPI
NGBY
DR.
JOSH
UA S
INAI
TERR
ORIS
M
Other regions include the Latin and South American
countries of Mexico and Colombia, although the rate
of kidnapping in Colombia has reduced significantly
as the FARC insurgency has weakened and the
central government has increased its control
over the country’s territory, while narco-criminal
organizations in Mexico have escalated their
kidnapping for ransom activities.
considered a botched operation, since the hostage takers were killed and no ransom was paid to the group). On the other hand, Al Qaeda-affiliated groups, such as Boko Haram, operating in Ni-geria and Niger conduct numerous kid-nappings of foreign workers, resulting in substantial ransom payouts. In an-other significant conflict zone where terrorist groups operate, the Syrian civ-il war has witnessed numerous kidnap-pings for ransom of foreign nationals, particularly media personnel (report-ers and photographers), humanitarian relief personnel, and other foreigners active in the country.
Other long-standing kidnapping for ransom campaigns by terrorist groups include the Philippines, where Abu Sayyaf operatives abduct foreign nationals for long periods of time in exchange for large ransoms. Other regions include the Latin and South American countries of Mexico and Colombia, although the rate of kid-napping in Colombia has reduced sig-nificantly as the FARC insurgency has weakened and the central government has increased its control over the coun-try’s territory, while narco-criminal or-ganizations in Mexico have escalated their kidnapping for ransom activities.
According to various reports, the total amounts that have been paid in terrorist ransoms from 2008 to 2014 range between $60 million to more than $70 million (with these amounts, which are unverified, likely to be higher than these projections) with an aver-age of between $3 million to $5 million paid for high profile captives – often depending on the locations of the kid-napping incidents, with ransoms in the
Sahel or Yemen estimated to be higher than those in Syria.
Once the ransom payouts are distributed to the various operatives involved in a kidnapping operation, including intermediaries, these funds are generally used to pay for a group’s weapons and explosives procure-ment, training camps, travel, and, for certain groups, such as the Mokhtar Belmokhtar-led faction in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), personal enrichment of their top leadership.
HIGH PROFILE CASESRecent high profile KfR cases in-
clude the following:• In November 2008 David
Rohde (a reporter for The New York Times) and two associ-ates were kidnapped and held for ransom by the Taliban in Afghanistan. After being held captive for eight months, Rohde and one of his associates es-caped and made their way to safety.
• In 2009, Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler was kidnapped by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, lead-er of the AQIM faction al-Mu-lathameen Brigade, with the Canadian government report-edly negotiating a $1.1 million in ransom (with this figure is not verified), through a third party, to secure his release.
• In 2009 Saharan jihadist opera-tives kidnapped a group of Eu-ropean tourists in Mali and held them for ransom. Following the payment of ransom, most of
those kidnapped were released, with the exception of Edwin Dyer, of the UK, who was mur-dered
• In August 2011, Warren Wein-stein, an American aid worker, was kidnapped in Lahore, Paki-stan. As of mid-2014 he was still being held captive by his alleged Al Qaeda (or AQ affiliated) kid-nappers.
• In January 2012 Giovanni Lo Porto and Berndt Muehlenbeck, aid workers for the relief orga-nization Welthungerhilfe, were kidnapped in Multan, in the Pa-kistani Punjab province.
• On January 16, 2013 terrorist operatives linked to Al Qaeda in Mali took over the Amenas gas plant in eastern Algeria, holding its employees hostage. Although the hostage takers’ demands included the release of Islamists held in Algerian pris-ons, ransom was also consid-ered a motive for the attack.
• In February 2013, Boko Haram, the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group, kidnapped a French fam-ily in Cameroon, with a ransom of $3 million reportedly paid for their release.
• In December 2013, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) kidnapped Swiss, Austrian and Finnish personnel in Yemen, eventually releasing them in ex-change for a reported (although not verified) payment of $22 million, which was arranged by intermediaries from a nearby Gulf Arab country.
42
KIDN
APPI
NGBY
DR.
JOSH
UA S
INAI
TERR
ORIS
M
• In February 2014 five Malians working for the Red Cross were kidnapped by the Is-lamist Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Gao, northern Mali.
• In early March 2014, 13 nuns and three attendants were released from their three-month captivity, following their kidnapping from their monastery in the ancient Christian town of Maaloula in Syria. It is reported (although not verified) that Qatar had paid a ransom of $4 million for their release.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSESWhile some governments, particularly the United States, adhere to a strict policy
of not paying ransom to kidnappers, other countries do accede to the kidnappers’ de-mands. At the June 2013 G8 summit at Lough Erne in Northern Ireland, for example, while the assembled government leaders agreed to ban such payments and also called on private corporations to refuse to provide money to terrorist kidnappers because they encourage more kidnappings, in practice the agreement does not appear to be holding, with countries such as France, Italy, Japan, and Spain reported to continue to meet the demands of the kidnappers of their nationals. It is difficult to find fault with such con-cessions to terrorist demands on humanitarian grounds, since these governments face domestic backlash when their citizens are paraded on hostage videos with threatening guns to their heads if they do nothing to obtain their release. Moreover, the corporations that employ many of the kidnapped personnel often lobby their governments to permit them to pay ransom to secure the release of their employees. An additional factor is that in many countries it is legal to pay ransom for criminal kidnappings, thus blurring the legal line between criminal and terrorist kidnapping incidents.
CONCLUSIONBased on current trends, kidnappings for ransom by terrorist groups are likely to continue
on an upward trajectory, particularly in countries experiencing high-intensity terrorist activi-ties, such as (in alphabetical order) Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In another trend of concern, with al Qaida leader Ayman al-Za-wahiri’s August 2011 call on Muslims to kidnap Westerners (citing their success in abducting American humanitarian aid worker Warren Weinstein, from his home in Lahore, Pakistan, in August 2011), the organization’s worldwide affiliates are likely to target high profile Western-ers for kidnappings not only for ransom but for use as bargaining chips to free prominent Al Qaeda and AQ-affiliated operatives, such as Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the mastermind be-hind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, who is currently imprisoned in the United States.
ABOUT THE AUTHORJoshua Sinai is a Washington, DC-based consultant on counterterrorism
studies. He is the author of “Active Shooter – A Handbook on Prevention” (ASIS International, 2013). He can be reached at: [email protected].
ONE
SURG
EON’
SBY
Ric
hard
L. K
lingl
er, M
D CO
L(R)
US
Arm
y
44
DEPL
OYM
ENT
Editors Note: This short story was penned by the author of his experiences during the very first part of OIF when he served as a BN surgeon in Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq.
One by one, all members of the battalion encircled our small “Band of Broth-ers” and cluster of convoy vehicles-they had, with-out being ordered, chose to wish us safe passage on our sojourn to Iraq. As the Chaplain prayed, we all wondered if our souls were ready should He request an inventory of our lives.
My army unit was being tasked for a mission in Iraq. That morning, I prepared to move out with a small lead element that was to reconnoiter an area where the main body would re-locate to-our destination
It was 3:00 A.M.. Although the sun’s rays had retreated hours before, its hot breath refused to dissipate from the steppes of Kuwait’s Ad Dibdibah plain. The heat attacked us from all sides. Airborne sandy powder hung above us and dimmed lights as if in a London fog.
was Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq. This was south of Babylon; where civiliza-tion had begun.
Intelligence briefings warned that insurgents had been active along the route we were to trav-el. Appropriate Force Protection info was given-suddenly, the des-iccated saliva in my throat grew to the size of a dry, furry tennis ball; swallowing failed to amelio-rate the choking sensation.
Why was I there, in Kuwait, and now heading for Iraq? Col-lectively, that question was in-fecting us all. In retrospect, I be-
lieve God had had a hand in my being allowed to serve, in the military, in a time of war. Although a 9mm pistol hung from my belt, He allowed me to serve Him, and the Army, without it ever leaving its sand encrusted holster.
The sun, a most unwel-comed fiery orb, soon began its westward migration, and our vehicles, pregnant with supplies, groped the sizzling hardball with the speed of a glacier. Each glance, form right to left, recorded a ce-rebral picture as vivid as a 10
ONESURGEON’SVIEWPOINT
BY Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army
46
billion pixel image-charred tank skeletons, gun emplacements that had lost their duels with “smart bombs”, breached sandy berms and towns with masses of children attacking us with smiles and thumbs up gestures.
Although I was tasked to keep our battalion’s health in check, my real job was waiting for me up the road. My itinerary was prepared by God, and the Army afforded the venue.
Serving in a fixed base, air conditioned “C.A.S.H” hospital (where every-one wore daily fresh fatigue uniforms) was not to be.......instead, I was to travel, eat, sleep and suffer with a line unit. Working out of a canvas M-5 aid bag was as high tech as it got. I, the PA, nurse and medics were tapped to minister to wounded Iraqis, and Islamic insurgents, in the city prison.
Upon arriving at our destination, Camp Edson, the U.S. Marines greeted us and did all they could to assist us in our mission. Soon, a dedicated Iraqi physician showed up at the compound gate and asked for our assistance. The city hospital was critically low on medicine and supplies. After visiting the local hospital, I realized that God was again involved in my odyssey.
Although not officially sanctioned, the medics “pro-cured” a huge cache of medical supplies. Daily, we made our way to the hospital where the medicines were re-ceived with smiles of biblical proportions. That Iraqi hospital was choked by a sea of desperate souls-limb-less, weak, filthy and dying-looking into their eyes told vivid stories about how miserable things had been.
Work at the prison was grueling, hot, frustrating and endless. Within its sand colored walls were fly infested cells that reeked. I often thought of the infamous Black Hole of Calcutta and how similar it must have been to where we worked. Al Queda, Hamas Baath Party and street thugs were crammed into sweltering cells. All seemed to have an eclectic array of mal-adies-infected bayonet/gunshot wounds, abscesses, burns and festering, maggot laden sores.
ONE
SURG
EON’
SBY
Ric
hard
L. K
lingl
er, M
D CO
L(R)
US
Arm
y
DEPL
OYM
ENT
Administering whatever an-tibiotics we had, to the sick, would have triggered a peer re-view investigation, in the U.S.; however, there, by God’s hand, no matter what was used af-forded improvement, and the wounds healed.
Despite the heat, sweat, filth and flies, seeing the prisoners’ smiles, on our daily rounds,
made me believe that what was being done, as crude as it seemed, was appreciated....again, God was there.
My tour of duty eventually came to a close. My exit from Iraq was in the belly of a Ma-rine helicopter. After lift off, I gazed down at the barren, life-less-appearing Syrian Desert and reflected on my mission. I
was blessed to have served my country, fellow soldiers and the wounded enemy. Some-how I know that our efforts made a difference.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Written by Richard L. Klingler, MD COL(R) US Army ........after his first tour of duty in Iraq-2003.
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International Vol. 20, No.4
IACSP_MAGAZINE_V20N4.indd 50 11/11/2014 3:43:00 PM
...to offer UNIQUE VIEWPOINTS from
a diverse set of contributors fromall aspects of the
TACTICAL Community.
Contact us today if you would like toWrite, Advertise or be a Network Contributor!
Call or Click Today! 757-721-2774 viewpointtacmag.comThe 2015 VIEWPOINT TACTICAL MEDIA KIT is available upon request!