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TRANSCRIPT
How Things Really Are
(As Far As I Can Tell)
And Why(As Nearly As I Can Discern Without Too Much Guesswork)
A Millennial Worldviewby S. A. Joyce
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Contents
Preface...........................................................................................................................................5Introduction...................................................................................................................................6
Historical Context.............................................................................................................11
The Path Ahead................................................................................................................13
Part I: The Underpinnings of Human Knowledge.........................................................................15Chapter 1: Knowledge and Certainty.......................................................................................16
Chapter 2: Reality, Truth, and Evidence...................................................................................24
Reality...................................................................................................................................24
Material Reality................................................................................................................24
Conceptual Reality...........................................................................................................26
Semantic Reality...............................................................................................................29
Truth.....................................................................................................................................32
Evidence............................................................................................................................... 34
Universal Reality...................................................................................................................35
Brief Review of Key Ideas.....................................................................................................36
Chapter 3: Belief.......................................................................................................................38
Conditional Belief................................................................................................................. 38
Committed Belief..................................................................................................................39
A Reasonable Approach to Belief.........................................................................................40
God as Creator: An Illustration of Reasoning in Conditional Belief.......................................42
Textual Outline for Premises and Inference of a Sample Argument................................43
Analysis of the Argument.................................................................................................45
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Summary of the Argument’s Implications and Limitations..............................................47
Chapter 4: Free Will and Responsibility...................................................................................49
The “Free Will versus Determinism” Debate........................................................................49
Implications of Free Will with Regard to Moral Responsibility.............................................53
A Pragmatic Resolution........................................................................................................ 53
Attributability and Accountability....................................................................................53
Society’s Responsibility....................................................................................................55
Part II: Psyche: Mind, Spirit, Soul, and Being...............................................................................59Chapter 5: Distinguishing Mind, Spirit, and Soul......................................................................60
Spirit..................................................................................................................................... 60
Mind..................................................................................................................................... 63
Soul.......................................................................................................................................65
Implications of Mortality......................................................................................................69
Chapter 6: Being.......................................................................................................................72
The Essence and Justification of Being.................................................................................72
The Importance of Being......................................................................................................74
Further Implications of Being...............................................................................................75
Unequal Distribution of Being..........................................................................................75
Human Non-beings..........................................................................................................76
Part III: Real-World Implications..................................................................................................79Chapter 7: Politics.................................................................................................................... 81
Smokescreen Issues..............................................................................................................83
Enemy Groups..................................................................................................................83
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Flag-Burning.....................................................................................................................85
School Prayer...................................................................................................................86
Socialism.......................................................................................................................... 87
Real Issues............................................................................................................................ 90
Abortion...........................................................................................................................90
Creationism......................................................................................................................91
Gun Rights........................................................................................................................91
Gun Control......................................................................................................................98
Voter Fraud....................................................................................................................103
How Are We Doing at Self-governance?.............................................................................106
Chapter 8: Economics.............................................................................................................110
A Tale of Two Ideologies................................................................................................111
Macroeconomics? What Is It, and Why Should It Interest Me?....................................114
Essential Concepts of Economics........................................................................................116
Wealth and Money........................................................................................................117
The Multiplier Effect......................................................................................................121
The Job-creation Cycle...................................................................................................121
Unemployment..............................................................................................................123
Inflation..........................................................................................................................123
Taxes..............................................................................................................................125
Common Myths about Economics......................................................................................129
Macroeconomic Problems and Solutions...........................................................................141
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Cyclical Economic Swings: Inflation and Recession........................................................141
Wealth Stratification and Redistribution (The Two Sides of “Class Warfare”)...............141
Part IV: Popular Mythology........................................................................................................149Chapter 8: Myths about Religion and Belief...........................................................................151
Myths about Scripture........................................................................................................151
Myths about Believers........................................................................................................155
Confusion about Non-believers..........................................................................................157
Myths about Belief.............................................................................................................165
Chapter 9: Myths about History.............................................................................................168
Chapter 10: Myths about Science..........................................................................................172
Part V: How Things Might Someday Be......................................................................................179Chapter 11: Justice.................................................................................................................180
Chapter 12: Rebalancing Work and Leisure...........................................................................186
Reflections................................................................................................................................. 191
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Preface
Every once in a while, the accumulation of papers, notes, and odd bits of stuff on my
desk demands to be sorted through and either properly stored or disposed of. At such times, I
must skim each item to evaluate its importance and judge whether to discard or file it, and if
the latter, where. In the process, I sometimes find myself reviewing things I’ve written some
time ago and have since put out of mind. Some of the old ideas, read with fresh eyes, develop
meaning with respect to more recent events and works. And the notion occurs to me that it
might be worthwhile to organize and consolidate these shorter works into something of
broader scale—not merely a loose anthology, but a more integrated progression of related
thoughts which, taken as a whole, offer some new, cumulative insight, of which the individual
works fall somewhat short.
This time, the product of this synthesis is a series of essays that clarify questions—and
propose a few answers—about how we think about just about everything. It’s a collection of
ideas on various topics to which I’d begun devoting some serious thought about the time I’d
retired and decided to go back to university. (As it happened, my re-matriculation occurred on
the cusp of the millennium; hence the sub-title, “A Millennial Worldview.”) Taken together,
these essays afford a general, organized outlook on how we (Western thinkers in the early third
millennium) gather, evaluate, and use information, and on which techniques seem to work
better than others. In other words, it’s a thoughtfully practical approach to confronting and
dealing with reality, both the everyday sort and major issues, based on the knowledge pool of
our time. And what thinking person wouldn’t find such an analysis and summary useful?
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Introduction
“Things,” as alluded to in the title, How Things Really Are and Why, are various key
aspects of the common reality we all inhabit, yet about which we somehow acquire very
different perceptions and develop very different opinions. Some of these differences are
philosophical in nature, and require some abstract reasoning ability to make sense of them.
Abstract thinking is an innate human ability. Nearly all human beings above the age of eleven
years or so have it, but only a minority exercise it enough to make it work reliably and discover
that it can be both fun and useful. The rest dismiss the things we’re about to discuss as
pointless and not worth bothering about. And to some extent they’re right; many abstractions
have little or no practical point in and of themselves. Yet discussing them offers substantive
insight into how we ground our thinking on important and very real issues like morality and
justice, rights and obligations, and the distinction between perception and reality.
The things we’re about to discuss are pivotal to a fundamental comprehension of both
nature and human affairs, how we perceive our universe and understand how it works, from
both material and human perspectives. The better our understanding of human perception and
reasoning, and the better our ability to discern what we truly know from what we merely
believe, the better our chances of narrowing down our conflicting notions of reality, by paring
away, layer by layer, the most highly improbable and demonstrably absurd from serious
consideration. We thereby make prudently cautious yet purposefully incremental progress
toward developing an ever clearer collective vision of the common reality that binds us all, and
thereby prepare and empower ourselves to deal with this reality more cooperatively,
intelligently, and effectively.
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Since our discussion here concerns the general interest, we’ll avoid philosophical and
technical jargon. We’ll keep the tone conversational, and most concepts in laymen’s terms. In
instances where this isn’t practical, we’ll explain any obscure concepts well enough that no
passably educated adult who understands collegiate level English (or secondary-school English
and knows how to use a dictionary) need feel excluded.
As we’ll presently see, for anyone—myself included—to make a blanket assertion about
“how things really are” with an air of absolute certainty would be grossly presumptuous. After
all, most people assume they know how things really are, even when what one person “knows”
is vastly different from, or even directly contradictory to, what his neighbor “knows.” So, how
to tell which, if either, is more right—or at least less wrong? This is where the “and why”
comes in. Why we believe something (or how we know it) is just as important as what we
believe (or think we know). Beliefs can be held for good reasons or for bad ones, and
understanding the difference can offer clues to whether the beliefs themselves are good or bad
—the terms “good” and “bad” here distilling to “true” and “false” or “likely and unlikely,” but in
other cases also to “beneficial” and “harmful,” “moral” and “immoral,” “rational” and
“irrational,” or the like. In most cases, I intend to avoid the term “evil,” which implies malicious
intent. Such an assumption is inappropriate where something bad occurs unintentionally, or
because of a non-ethical agent, such as weather.
It comes down to sources and methods. Many people rely heavily on ideology or simple
belief, on speculation that seems to support these, on categorical rejection of evidence or
argument that conflicts with them, and on the reassurance of like-thinking associates and
companions. Others demand a more rigorous and impartial standard of verifiable evidence and
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methodical reasoning based thereon, and choose sources with demonstrable success records.
Most people are somewhere between the two. They rely on a mix of mainstream news,
partisan punditry, advertising, word-of-mouth among neighbors and coworkers, and their own
so-called common sense to tell them what’s true. They trust their chosen sources, but do little
independent investigation or logical analysis to discern whether these sources are themselves
reliably and consistently in tune with reality.
Indeed, quite a few leaders accepted by many as reliable authorities are simply
ideologues with diploma-mill “degrees,” who’ve gotten themselves recognized on the basis of
personal charisma and the popularity of their professed views, rather than the critical
impartiality of their observations and the soundness and depth of their reasoning. It’s nigh
impossible to make a fair judgment about what reality is or isn’t, if the closest we ever get to it
is the unexamined opinions of others who might well be no better informed than we ourselves
are, and whose entire repertory of ideas is based on high sounding fiction, antique notions,
emotional appeal, misrepresentation of evidence, and made-up “facts.” Clearly, there are
significant differences in the reliability of source authorities. They command much public trust
by virtue of their being in print, on radio, or on screen, or because they consistently tell their
fan base what it wants to hear. But they’re not at all equal in terms of substance, supporting
evidence, unbiased reasoning, and credibility, and thus rack up very different scores in an
independent fact-checking contest.
Theology, for example, is founded on ancient word-of-mouth myth and cryptic
prophecy, which in turn have been interpreted by priests, recorded by scribes, and not
infrequently embellished by both (with the consequences of multiple interpretations and
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increasing sectarianism). Theologians are experts on scriptural texts and church doctrine. The
best ones are also knowledgeable about the historical and cultural contexts of these writings.
Such knowledge makes for interpretations reliably reflecting the circumstances of their origin,
including some instances in which the source found it desirable to take on someone else’s
identity to establish credibility,1 to “adjust” the truth to advance an agenda,2 or to encode the
message to avoid persecution or death.3 Some theologians are not so expert at discerning
whether a text reflects literal reality or something else—allegorical teaching or illustrative
myth, for instance—and the more mystically inclined are as apt as any uncritical lay person to
accept a scriptural text as literally true by default, without serious question. The product of this
variable and often undisciplined and biased process is popularized and sustained by a public
eager to believe the unbelievable whenever its implications are more attractive than those
offered by a sometimes dull or even grim reality.
Politics is likewise based largely on ideology, some of which may be related to reality
and some of which is clearly not. It’s often based on notions of what ought to be, which in
1 Examination of Hebrew texts reveals at least three authors prophesying under the name of Isaiah over a period of
more than two and a half centuries.
2 The text of Deuteronomy, which laid to rest the early polytheistic tradition of Israel, is traditionally attributed to
Moses, but the style of writing is much more recent (circa the reign of Josiah) than the other books of the
Pentateuch. The book of Job is a non-historical story advancing the then-new (post-exilic) demonology of Satan.
3 Jews, and later early Christians, were often oppressed, and had to choose their words carefully to avoid
imprisonment (or worse) of either themselves or their associates. The gospel of John, for example, is extremely
cryptic. It was most likely a code intended for the understanding only of certain designated Christian leaders of the
time, but became subject to wildly speculative interpretations centuries after the code had lapsed from living
memory.
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many cases are at odds with the facts of what actually is or can be. Impressed by their assumed
power, some (far too many) politicians presume to impose their ideological will upon reality by
force of law, with consequences ranging from incoherent nonsense to worthless or even
counterproductive policy, from public embarrassment to outright injustice. And, when the
truth of reality eventually emerges to expose the violation of public trust, the result is long-
term erosion of political authority, which then becomes suspect even when it restricts itself to
matters with which it’s legitimately empowered and competent to deal.
In contrast, science is based on a methodology that has historically delivered, with a
rapidity and reliability far superior to any prior system, usable results, from wonder drugs and
life-saving technology, to horrendous devices of death and destruction. Science doesn’t have
all the answers, for its scope of inquiry is limited to observable or detectable natural
phenomena; its investigation into these is ongoing, and thus its theories can’t be considered
final. Science can offer the empirical facts of discoveries and inventions, but it can’t provide
moral guidance on whether or how we ought to use them. This is because it isn’t within
science’s power to answer questions of virtue or justice, which are human concepts, not
material phenomena. Furthermore, scientists themselves are the first to admit that the
answers they have aren’t absolutely complete or certain. However, this open
acknowledgement of science’s own imperfection has turned out to be an advantage. For, in
confronting this weakness, science has devised a self-correcting methodology, which routinely
reviews and retests its established laws with respect to new evidence, and revises or replaces
theories found to be problematic.
History has likewise shown itself to be a passably reliable source of information—
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provided we consider the source, which for most of the history of history has been the seldom
impartial opinion of the ultimate victor in any given dispute. Like science, history is based on
evidence and reason. Unlike science, however, history usually can’t be empirically tested to
verify by duplication what actually happened in the past. We can only discern what was
impossible and what was imperative at the time, and sort out the remaining possibilities as to
which were most probable in light of often sketchy evidence and questionable testimony.
Indeed, much of history’s evidence is not material in nature, but appears in the forms of written
opinion, decree, protest, or report; and it’s often more rhetorical than logical. So, it’s often
evidence more of the way people have subjectively experienced and speculated about reality or
judged it in terms of their own biases, rather than how it actually unfolded. It often takes some
detective work to develop a passably realistic view distilled from the opinions of those who
lived the past and presented it from their own various perspectives. Thus, we must be always
on guard against those who present slanted views of the past in order to advance ideological
agendas of various sorts.
Historical Context
I began this work in the early years of the third millennium CE. For roughly four
thousand years (2000 BCE to 2000 CE), various groups—Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians,
Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Mongols, Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, Russians,
Austrians, British, French, Dutch, Germans, Japanese, Americans, and Soviets—have taken turns
conquering and dominating others. Although some particulars varied in each case, the general
pattern was a self-perpetuating cycle: The victors subjugated the vanquished, occupying their
land, abusing and enslaving their people, confiscating their assets, outlawing their beliefs,
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destroying their culture. It was a universal tradition of punishing and shaming one’s enemies,
offering the victors a perverse sense of “glory.” But among the vanquished, such oppression
inevitably bred resentment and unrest, which grew until rebellion and aggression broke out,
sparking the next war. And the cycle had repeated again and again, century after century. It
was accompanied by a gradual escalation of weaponry—from arrows and spears, to swords and
catapults, to muskets and cannons, to machine guns and tanks, to biological and chemical
horrors—until 1945, when the first use of nuclear weapons by one nation against another
brought World War II to an abrupt close.
The ensuing acquisition of similar weaponry by other nations, both allies and
adversaries, forced everyone to contemplate the prospect of “MAD” (mutually assured
destruction), the fall of civilization, if not indeed the self-extermination of all humanity. So, the
United States gambled with a new strategy for peace. As in previous practice, it began with
victorious troops occupying their defeated foes’ territories and placing them under military
authority. On the Soviet side, conquest as usual involved annexing “satellite” countries and
subjugating their people. But on the American side, instead of oppressing the conquered, the
task was to establish institutions of humane law and justice, under which the native civilian
populations were granted limited rights of domestic self-governance under restrictions set by
the occupying power. The United States also provided massive aid to rebuild the ruined nations
of both friends and foes, restoring their economic vitality and allowing them to regain national
respectability. Instead of taking everything from the vanquished, it gave them the means for
growth and the opportunity for prosperity. What did America get in return? Lots of trading
partners! In other words, the strategy gave everyone something to lose if ever again they chose
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to become oppressive or aggressive. Western Europe was finally stabilized, transformed from
its ancient tradition of mutual aggression and oppression into an alliance of nations devoted to
addressing common concerns.
Over the next forty years, most of Western Europe’s remaining empires dissolved, some
with a final flare of rebellion or social chaos, some through stoically peaceful resistance, and
some more or less amicably. Eventually, even the Warsaw Pact broke up, and the Soviet Union
—which everyone had come to think was here to stay—suddenly collapsed. For a time, there
was instability as East and West learned to live and work with each other. And there was
localized genocide in the former Yugoslavia. But otherwise, for a fleeting decade, the world
seemed as if it might be approaching a hopeful new era, in which peace and cooperation might
replace war and conquest as the accepted norms—at least in the developed world. But then
came the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and we were reminded that some not only do
not share our happy vision, but are determined to extinguish it.
The Path Ahead
As investigators of reality, we may, with reasonably guarded confidence, arm ourselves
with the authority of science and history, taking into account their acknowledged
imperfections. We may also take into consideration often less than objective religious and
political opinion, as well as popular (and sometimes unpopular) opinion—often revealed in the
form of diaries, letters, artistic and journalistic commentary, interviews, debates, propaganda,
and the like—not as evidence that the opinions are true, but as evidence of the predominant or
innovative thinking of a culture or an era. From this, we may glean clues about actual events
and motives for the behaviors of individuals and groups. We can then make a number of
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informed assumptions that most thinking people would grant are highly probable and
acceptably safe, and build reasoning upon these and related evidence to glimpse whatever
plausible possibilities we may. We might then apply this reasoned vision to some advantage,
insofar as having a view that corresponds closely to reality constitutes an advantage, even if
reality should turn out not to be what we might prefer it to be. For even understanding what
we don’t and can’t know is an advantage, in that such understanding allows us to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of our starting position and our ability, and thus our prospects and
most promising trajectory for success. Though perfection isn’t an achievable goal for us
humans, improvement nearly always is—as long as we’ve the ambition and persistence to
pursue it, and the critical judgment to avoid the opposite.
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Part I: The Underpinnings of Human Knowledge
In this section, we’ll cover such basics as distinguishing knowledge from belief,
examining the different ways people think, and what’s meant by “truth,” “reality,” and
“perception.” Yes, very basic concepts that everyone knows. But oddly enough, different
people have wildly different ideas about them; so, what one person “knows” about them can
be significantly different from what another person “knows.” If a discussion about such matters
often seems as confused as if it were being conducted in different languages, that’s because it
essentially is: different people using the same words to refer to very different things or ideas.
Thus, we need to come to a common understanding of terms for the purposes of discussion.
The common understanding here will be the author’s—mine—since I’ve no way of knowing
what the reader’s (yours) is. We need to converse in the same language with mutually
understood definitions of terms, in order to ensure we’re on the same track. You don’t have to
agree with my definitions, but you must understand what they are in order to comprehend
what you’re reading.
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Chapter 1: Knowledge and Certainty
I think, therefore I am.
–French philosopher René Descartes
Epistemology, the study of what things we can know and how we know them, has been
around, in one form or another, since our ancestors first tried—mostly unsuccessfully—to
figure out earth, water, air, and fire. But in the seventeenth century, French philosopher René
Descartes decided to take an intensely rational look at the issue of human knowledge: how we
acquire it, evaluate it, and justify it. He took note that some ideas are more certain than others,
yet it seemed to him that there was always some room for doubt about everything. Could
there be any exceptions to this pattern? Is there anything we can know with complete
certainty, with absolutely no question or doubt whatsoever?
In his Meditations, Descartes sets about the task of figuring out which ideas—if any—he
can know with absolute certainty. He eliminates everything that might be subject to any form
of doubt. He considers, for example, that he’s sometimes deceived even by his own senses—
whether through illusion, misdirection, or misinterpretation—and that he sometimes finds it
difficult to distinguish thoughts that occur when he’s been dreaming from those that occur
when he’s been awake.
He thus distills the absolutely knowable to a single observation, and a thought derived
directly and inescapably from this observation: Cogito, ergo sum, Latin for “I think, therefore I
am.” This statement is to be taken in its most basic sense, of “I” as something that thinks,
which implies only mind, and not necessarily a physical presence of body and sensation, which
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he concedes might be mere illusions or hallucinations within the mind. Even if he can eliminate
everything else, Descartes can’t escape that, in the very act of questioning and analyzing what
he can know, he’s engaging in the process of thought. And the process of thought requires
something capable of thinking, namely a thinker. And since the thought is obviously occurring
to him, there’s no denying that the creator of the thought, the thinker—Descartes himself—
must exist, at least as a cognitive awareness, even if everything else—his body, his pen, his
desk, his room, his world—were mere illusions created entirely by his thought.
Now, in the process of arriving at this revolutionary conclusion, Descartes tries to
exhaust every other conceivable possibility. He even speculates about the possibility that his
mind might be secretly controlled by an “evil genius.” Perhaps, muses Descartes, his own body
and the world around it don’t really exist, but are only intricate illusions crafted and implanted
in his mind by the evil genius.
But if we accept the evil genius as a possibility, then we could as easily speculate that
perhaps Descartes himself is not doing any active thinking at all. Instead, he might be passively
experiencing a series of thoughts created, not by his own mind, but by the mind of the evil
genius—a series of thoughts that cleverly includes this very bit of speculation about the evil
genius himself. Thus, we could further reduce Descartes’ vision of what is absolutely knowable,
from existence as an actively thinking thing, to existence as a merely passively experiencing
thing.
Yet even if he doesn’t do his own thinking, even if he experiences thought the way we
might experience a pre-determined plot in a very engaging motion picture with other sensory
and emotional input (smell, taste, touch, equilibrium, intuition, happiness, fear, sorrow, anger)
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added, the subject of the genius’s machinations nonetheless exists as an experiencing and
perceiving awareness. Even this awareness, passive though it may be, clearly implies existence
of an aware being: Percipeo, ergo sum. “I perceive, therefore I am.”
This is absolutely certain to anyone with conscious experience, which is to say, virtually
every human who isn’t brain-dead, and probably many of the higher animals. All conscious
things exist as experiencing things, even if they have neither the intellect to analyze their
experience nor the language to express it. A crocodile probably doesn’t do much thinking, yet it
perceives itself, if only as a powerful appetite.
This confirmation of our existence, through the evidence of being able to experience
something, is the only thing we can know with absolute certainty. Our perception forces that
essential bit of knowledge upon us. Even if what we experience is pure illusion, the fact that we
experience anything at all allows us to conclude our own existence beyond any doubt
whatsoever. By comparison, every other sort of thought has some shadow of doubt over it,
howsoever faint that shadow might be. In some cases (such as “I am a physical, living thing”),
doubt is barely perceptible (since, without evidence for an evil genius, that scenario appears
contrived and improbable), while in others (such as “I will live forever”), doubt may be strong,
but sometimes not sufficiently so to dispel a will to believe in immortality.
So, if the only thought of which each of us can be absolutely certain is “I exist,” how can
we determine what else is real and what isn’t? Indeed, what’s the point of discussing the
matter at all, if it’s possible that all that exists is my own mind, and everything else is imaginary?
This last question practically answers itself, because even if there’s really nothing outside my
own awareness, there’s nothing to be lost (and at least a measure of entertainment to be
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gained) by speculating about my various illusory experiences and perhaps discussing them with
my illusory fellow beings. Indeed, if my mind is controlled by a Cartesian evil genius, then I
have no choice in the matter: I must experience whatever speculations the genius presents to
me. However, if my experience reflects some actual reality outside my own mind (as I’m
inclined to assume, for want of a more plausible explanation), then there might be something,
perhaps even a great deal, to be gained by studying and discussing the matter (or something to
be missed by not discussing it).
While “I exist” may be the only thing one can know with absolute certainty, experience
offers some consistent clues that some other things are distinctly probable. If we observe
something that appears to be a solid object (a brick wall, for example), and we try to walk
through that apparent object as if it weren’t really there, then from that moment forward
experience will tell us that such an action has unpleasant consequences, and we’ll be less apt to
try it again. So, we cultivate the habit of treating anything that appears to be a solid object as if
it is indeed a solid object, unless we have good grounds to suppose otherwise. Even if we later
learn that solid objects are actually made up of atoms that are mostly empty space, we still
treat things that appear solid to our eyes as if they were indeed solid, because we prefer to
avoid the unpleasant experience of trying to move the mostly-but-not-entirely empty matrix of
our own atoms into the same space occupied by the mostly-but-not-entirely empty matrix of
the other object’s atoms.
But what about things we can’t detect with our physical senses—gravity, magnetism,
electricity, or radio waves, for example? In these cases, although we can’t experience a
phenomenon directly, we can clearly observe its effects: massive objects fall, rather than hang
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in midair; compasses point northward; motors turn and light bulbs glow; voices and music from
far away sound from a radio speaker. Again, an accumulation of evidence provides clues to
what’s probably real, and a lack of evidence for something suggests it might not be real. While
we’re never absolutely certain, we learn by experience what’s most likely true (i.e., what
accurately reflects reality) and what’s most likely false (what doesn’t reflect reality) and develop
a feel for what degrees of conditional certainty might lie between these two extremes.
Likewise, we may observe in a mirror what seems a reversed image of our own form.
When we encounter similar forms which act and speak in much the same way we do, this
suggests to us that those similar forms are beings like us, with similar experiences, wants, and
needs. Continued experience among these others seems to confirm this suggestion. Even so,
there’s a possibility that they aren’t really like us, that they’re animals or machines with the
knack of mimicking our appearance and behavior, or perhaps they’re mere figments of our
imaginations. But, in the absence of any evidence to such effects, we hold with a high degree
of confidence the belief that they are other, kindred beings, like ourselves, and not mere
products of our own imagining. Indeed, we’re so confident of this, that we say we “know” that
they are. Even though this knowledge is less than absolutely certain, we have enough
confidence in it to risk our lives on the assumption, and to build our entire social and moral
structure around it.
Moreover, we learn to trust some of these others-like-us, to the extent that we’re
inclined to credit what they say as true, without our personally witnessing the things or events
about which they tell us. We don’t know from personal experience that a fellow named
Thomas Jefferson wrote the American Declaration of Independence, for many people have
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never seen the document, and no one now living has ever met the man. However, we’ve been
told by people we trust that Jefferson wrote the Declaration, and this assertion is affirmed by
many references we’ve come to think of as reliable, so we’re happy to say with reasonable
confidence that we know this statement is true.
On the other hand, trust breaks down when someone else makes a claim contrary to
what we already think we know. Suppose, for example, we’ve been taught that Jefferson was a
devout Christian, but now someone shows us the evidence of Jefferson’s own correspondence
revealing that he was not. We then find ourselves in the dilemma of having to decide which—
the teaching or the evidence—is actually in accord with reality. Insofar as evidence is a
manifestation of reality, we might think that people would tend to give evidence the edge in a
contest with any other form of information. But this is often not the case. For whatever
reasons, many people simply choose to retain their existing beliefs, and ignore both any
evidence for competing claims and the lack of supporting evidence for their own opinion. Far
from resolving the issue of what’s real and what isn’t, this maneuver simply puts the believer
into the unhappy situation of waging a perpetual and ultimately unwinnable war of personal
bias against earnest inquiry and hard fact. Even so, popular but erroneous beliefs can win
influence over public policy for a time, thus to this extent hampering people’s ability to deal
forthrightly with reality, until the truth finally comes to light and the bogus policies are
rescinded.
Obviously, though we might be able to justify a high degree of certainty in many things,
as we’ve seen, absolute certainty is out of the question in all but a very limited field: the
existence of one’s conscious self as a prerequisite for experiencing anything. One step away
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from this point-size foundation of absolute certainty of “me,” there lies an array of near-certain
probabilities. Each is perched on assumptions that seem reliable enough in light of consistent
experience: [1] that my experience closely corresponds to some external reality independent of
my own mind, and [2] that logic, guided by experience, is a reliable tool for analysis and
interpretation of that external reality. Among these near-certainties are that there are other
individuals like me, each with its own individual mind and physical body, though neither of
these may be exactly as we experience them through our imperfect mechanisms of sensation
and perception.
Since knowledge of anything outside this still narrow range of near-certainty requires
additional layers of assumptions, it also involves additional degrees of uncertainty. This is what
gets us into trouble when we assume too much beyond what existing evidence clearly shows.
We humans thirst for knowledge. But we mustn’t be so greedy for it that we claim to “know”
things that are categorically unknowable from available information, ideas that amount to
nothing more than opinion or belief, based solely on hopeful or fearful speculation. We must
be prepared to change our opinions if conflicting evidence comes to light, or else end up being
forever out of step with reality and incurring whatever additional risks this might entail. We’re
wise to be skeptical. But when the evidence is relevant and overwhelming, then wisdom directs
us to adjust our opinions to the evidence (not the other way around).
If we approach such epiphanies with a positive attitude, we treat them as learning
opportunities from which we can benefit. Learning an unpleasant truth is preferable to being
guided by an appealing falsehood, for the truth can lead us away from peril, whereas the error
could lead us, in blissful ignorance, straight into it. Even the discovery that an idea is false,
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without the compensating offer of a truthful alternative, is a positive, if less than satisfying,
event. For as our esteemed Mr. Jefferson himself commented in his Notes on Virginia, “He is
less remote from truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong.”
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Chapter 2: Reality, Truth, and Evidence
The truth will set you free, but first it will make you miserable.
–20th U.S. President James A. Garfield
Any process works more efficiently and effectively if it has a feasible plan of operation.
Inquiry is no exception. Here are some of the key tools (and at least one pitfall) we encounter
in an effort to figure out whether our investigative efforts are leading us closer to reality or
luring us further from it.
Reality
The word reality was used, without explanation, a number of times in the previous
chapter. However, the term is understood and used very differently by different people and
groups. Some think reality is what is expounded by a favorite authority—a religious or political
dogma, for example. Others think of reality as scientific law. Still others think of it as a
personal or institutional worldview. What such views have in common is that they’re products
of the human mind, which we’ve already found to be variable, fallible, and often too easily
misguided. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, we reject such definitions of reality,
and we propose something else entirely, something independent of mind. We can think of
reality as being of two kinds: material and conceptual.
Material Reality
Material reality, as understood here, means an actual thing, event, or state of affairs,
which either exists now, existed previously, or will exist eventually. We may have vastly
different perceptions, interpretations, recollections, and predictions of and about reality, but,
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for reasons we’ll explore soon, in practical terms there is but one reality in which we’re all
immersed and within which we interact. Our perceptions, interpretations, and such are mind-
dependent, but the material reality external to our minds is not. There are no alternative
material realities, only alternative frames of reference within it and alternative opinions about
it. (The reader may disagree with this, but must understand it as the writer’s intent, in order to
avoid confusion in any discussion involving material or physical “reality” or “actuality.”)
Now, it’s a popular view that what we perceive with our senses is reality. This is only
approximately true. What human senses provide is not a direct connection to reality, but a
representation of patterns of light, sound, chemistry, and tactile sensations as translated to
electrochemical impulses and interpreted by the brain. We can sense only a small part of
what’s actually out there. For example, we have a visual range of only about one octave of the
electromagnetic spectrum; we can’t see infrared, radio waves, ultraviolet, x-ray, or gamma
radiation, even though we can create devices to detect them. Our hearing is limited to about
ten octaves of acoustic vibration; we can’t hear below 15 hertz (infrasonic) or above 20,000
hertz (ultrasonic), although some other creatures can. We have no inkling that objects we
perceive to be massive and solid are actually mostly empty space, and we have difficulty
visualizing the idea that “empty” space could actually be “curved” in a dimension with which
our three-spatial-dimension-plus-time brains are not evolved to deal.
Still, our senses provide useful information about reality, albeit in a filtered and coded
form that can be detected by our senses and (usually) made sense of by our brains. Imperfect
though our physical senses might be, they’ve demonstrated themselves crucial to our survival,
and routinely guide us through our daily activities. But we should bear in mind that the images
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and impressions our senses sample from the world, and the associations and evaluations our
minds inevitably contribute to them, combine to yield a less than faithful caricature of the raw
reality that’s actually “out there.”
Conceptual Reality
Conceptual reality is the existence of an idea. An idea isn’t a material thing or event, but
it may concern the material world in some way, and it may indirectly affect the material world
by influencing the behavior of the person in whose mind the idea exists. Now, there’s a subtle
distinction here that sometimes gets ignored. A concept that actually exists is real—as an idea.
But the concept’s content—what the idea is about—might be something that isn’t real. To
illustrate, consider the concept of a flying unicorn. The concept might exist in someone’s mind,
on paper, or in some other form. If so, then the concept exists; it’s real—as a concept. But this
doesn’t imply that the concept’s content—a flying unicorn, an actual living, breathing, winged
equine with a single horn—exists as well as a material thing. There’s a discontinuity between
the existence of concepts and the reality of their contents.
Concepts can be about things that actually exist, about things that might probably or
possibly exist, about things that do not exist and are purely imaginary, and even about things
that are categorically false and cannot actually exist. If we forget this distinction, between the
existence of a concept and the actuality of its content, then we commit the fallacy of reification,
an error of reasoning that assumes that the content of a concept exists simply because the
concept itself exists. This is worth mentioning because—perhaps surprisingly—it happens all
too often. From the existence of an idea about a flying unicorn, a perfect circle, or God, some
people are inclined to infer that the idea’s content—an actual flying unicorn, an actual perfect
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circle, or an actual God—must exist as well. (Of course, people are typically somewhat selective
about this. Many people who’d ridicule the idea that flying unicorns really exist nonetheless
insist that God exists, despite that verifiable evidence for the existence of either ranges from
ambiguous to non-existent.) Certainly, such things might be real, but certainly not simply
because ideas about them exist, nor even because such ideas might be very popular. Or they
might not be real, but not merely because someone—or everyone—holds an opinion that they
don’t exist.
Conceptual reality—in the form of ideas of meaning, purpose, and value—probably
holds little importance for most creatures, and none at all for inanimate objects. However, it
plays a major role in the realm of human activity.
For instance, a “game” doesn’t exist as a material object. To be sure, game boards,
fields, equipment, and devices exist as such; but a game itself is instead an organized activity
involving the interaction of humans (and sometimes other creatures) with either physical
objects or animated images, according to a specific set of rules concocted by the game’s
designers. Without the conceptual reality of rules, the material aspects of a game have no
meaning, purpose, or value; and the game wouldn’t exist as such, even though people might
still throw, strike, catch, and carry objects for other reasons.
Likewise, a city doesn’t exist as a material thing or event, but as a concept of the
aggregate activity of many humans interacting in an artificial environment of buildings, streets,
businesses, utilities, government, and laws. The notion that a city is simply a material collection
of structures and people is absurdly simplistic: The Egyptian pyramids are a collection of
structures, and at times there may be many humans wandering among them, yet this
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assemblage has no meaning or purpose whatsoever like a city. A city has a different function
altogether, specifically, to provide and maintain an environment for people in a certain
geographical area to interact in their daily activities of production, consumption, education, and
recreation. If this conceptual reality isn’t present as an organizing and motivating force, then
neither is function; and without function, the material objects alone don’t constitute a city.
A popular and prominent form of conceptual reality is institutional doctrine. Christian
doctrine, for example, stipulates that redemption of a person’s soul from eternal damnation is
possible through acceptance of Jesus as savior. The doctrine is described in Christian scripture,
and is subscribed to by about one third of the world’s population, so there’s ample evidence
that the idea, as such, exists. But is the idea true? Is the content of the idea in accord with
reality? Many fervently believe so; others aren’t convinced, but believe—or hope or fear—that
it’s possible or even probable. But we can’t know, because there’s no verifiable evidence of a
soul that survives physical death, no reliably consistent and confirmed eyewitness account of an
actual state of eternal damnation. Furthermore, there’s no extant independent (i.e., non-
biblical, e.g., occupying Roman) record of the birth, trial, or execution of a specific early-first-
century spiritual teacher named Jesus, thus only the scriptural testimony of men who’d never
actually met Jesus4 that such a person even existed. In short, there’s no verifiable evidence of
anything to be redeemed, nor of any state from which it might be redeemed, nor of a
4 The earliest synoptic gospel, “Mark,” was written fifty years or more after the purported crucifixion of Jesus; if the
writer ever met Jesus personally, it would have to have been as a youngster, and his memories at the time of
writing would have been far from fresh, and very likely embellished. The letters of Peter might be an exception.
However, expert examination reveals they were probably written by the same scribe who penned much of Paul’s
output. Thus, there’s reasonable suspicion that their true source was actually Paul, not Peter.
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redeemer, and thus no basis for knowledge that the idea expressed in the doctrine corresponds
to any known reality. On the other hand, it’s a matter of historical record that Yeshua (the
Aramaic equivalent of “Jesus”) was a fairly common name among male Jews of the time. It’s
also a matter of record that, for at least a couple of centuries, the Essene sect had been
fervently advocating a Zoroastrian-style dualistic (forces of good versus forces of evil) mystery-
religion offshoot of Judaism. Thus, it’s entirely possible that one or more among them
preached redemption of soul from damnation, and that some followers seized upon the notion
that their leader was an incarnation of God. And perhaps one was, for who can prove
otherwise? But no human being, as long as he’s alive, will ever know for certain. And the dead,
even if they know, aren’t saying.
Other examples of conceptual reality include artistry and sport, business and industry,
fairness and justice, money and credit, professions and hobbies, science and philosophy, states
and nations, and many other mind-based human institutions, endeavors, and principles that
require ideas of meaning, purpose, and value—essence, utility, and desirability—for their
functional existence.
Semantic Reality
The use of language sometimes introduces oddities that would seem to suggest the
possibility of different realities for different people. For example, does the statement “I am the
spouse of the U.S. President” correspond to reality? It depends on to whom the pronoun “I”
refers. If it indeed refers to the one person on the planet who is married to America’s current
chief executive, then it corresponds to reality. But if the statement refers instead to any of the
other billions of Earth’s inhabitants, or to a fictional character, then that same statement does
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not reflect reality. Whether it does or doesn’t depends entirely on the “I” pronoun’s referent.
This isn’t sorcery; it’s simply an example of the tricks that language can play on the mind. On
the other hand, “The first U.S. President was Abraham Lincoln” does not correspond to reality,
but “The sixteenth U.S. President was Abraham Lincoln” does correspond to reality5, no matter
who makes either statement.
But when the topic shifts from fact to judgments, such as “Michelangelo’s David is a
magnificent sculpture,” this statement seems to suggest that magnificence emanates from the
sculpture itself, when in fact magnificence is a subjective judgment that exists in the mind of
the viewer, not in the marble of the object. That many people concur in such a judgment does
not make it a fact; it just makes it a popular opinion. If we wanted to compose a statement that
corresponds accurately to reality, we’d have to say something like, “The sight of Michelangelo’s
David [evokes / doesn’t evoke] in my mind a sense of magnificence.” The problem here, clearly,
is that we’re in the habit of expressing our feelings about something, not as feelings, but as
properties of the object of our feelings. The solution, in most cases, is not to demand that the
speaker or writer express his opinions with rigorous precision (which in some cases might take
quite a while), but simply to interpret and understand them as they’re most likely intended—so
long as they’re in the context of art appreciation or other aesthetic judgment, not a
philosophical debate.
This topic is not quite as commonsense as we might suppose. It arises in philosophical
circles from time to time, especially in discussions of aesthetics, values, and such. A professor
of my acquaintance insists that he finds objects to be beautiful or ugly because the objects
5 This assumes that we start the count with George Washington, the first president sworn in under the
Constitution, and disregard the presidents who had previously served under the Articles of Confederation.
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themselves possess qualities of beauty or ugliness, which they radiate to observers. I counter
that if this were true, then all observers should agree that one particular object is beautiful and
that another object is ugly, but we often find this not to be the case. Indeed, perception of an
object can vary even for a single observer. Consider that if, while not wearing my glasses, I
observe the professor approaching from a distance. If he appears blurry to me, this must be (to
use his reasoning) because he possesses the quality of blurriness and radiates that quality to
me. But the instant I put on my glasses, his image becomes clear and sharp, because he
simultaneously stops radiating blurriness (and presumably begins radiating clarity and
sharpness). I argue, and believe I’ve adequately demonstrated, that such a view is absurd. I
thus contend that subjective qualities, such as beauty and ugliness, are not properties of
objects, but are judgments formulated in the mind of the observer, just as blurriness is a result
of an imperfection in the observer’s eye, not a property of the object being observed. It’s just
that we’re so accustomed to expressing our perceptions and judgments of objects as if they
were properties of the objects themselves, that it seems natural to suppose what we’re saying
is literal truth, when in fact it’s a figurative expression, simply a customary, time-saving
shorthand, if you will.
As we see, the imprecision of language can give rise to many odd appearances, including
an illusion of alternate realities. It’s up to us as critical thinkers to identify and treat these
oddities as the ambiguities they are, and not to be charmed into thinking nonsense just because
there are often substantive gaps between reality and casual descriptions of it.
Truth
Truth means simply an idea that corresponds accurately to reality. The problem is that,
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since human senses, minds, and communications are limited and imperfect, it’s impossible for
us to know with perfect accuracy and infinite detail what reality—and hence truth—is. Even if
we were to know something that is in fact real, we couldn’t be absolutely certain that this
knowledge is truly accurate and not possibly afflicted with some subtle or hidden flaw.
Moreover, except in the case of an abstraction, we’d find it difficult to express such knowledge
in words with absolute completeness and no possibility of misunderstanding. Thus, the phrase
“telling the truth” is usually interpreted with respect to a degree of clarity adequate for
practical purposes, rather than demanding absolute perfection from an inherently imperfect
process of understanding and communication.
On the other hand, we often say that someone speaks the truth when he makes a
statement that he earnestly believes true, especially when we ourselves are inclined to share
his view, even if it might turn out not to correspond accurately to reality. A person can
deliberately make false statements for a variety of reasons, some quite innocent and some not.
For example, a debater might state a false idea as a step in proving the absurdity of that idea;
an entertainer uses fiction to tell stories or jokes; a theologian might use a parable to illustrate
an underlying moral truth; a scoundrel might tell a lie in order to cheat others or escape
punishment. Someone can also innocently make false statements because he’s misinformed or
mistaken. Or, as in perhaps most cases, one might state a less than entirely true approximation
of reality, either because language is imprecise, or because a comprehensively true statement
about an incomprehensibly complex reality would be literally too complex for anyone to
comprehend or express with absolute completeness and accuracy.
With respect to these last matters of precision and complexity, we must often consider
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the relationship of truth to reality within the frame of reference of the speaker or writer. We
can use a fictional falsehood to illustrate. Suppose it’s an utterly calm day, and an artist, a
geologist, a physicist, and a biologist are standing by the edge of a placid, mirror-smooth pond.
The artist, thinking to paint a picture of the scene, describes the pond’s surface as appearing
perfectly flat and still. The geologist objects, noting that the pond’s surface isn’t quite flat, but
slightly convex, following the curvature of the earth; extended far enough, the pond’s surface
would be seen to have the same curvature as the earth’s oceans. The physicist notes in
addition that some parts of the pond’s surface aren’t at all flat, or even slightly convex, but
instead bend to the curve of a meniscus wherever the surface of the water intersects a solid
object, whether it’s the pond’s edge, the stem of a reed, or the foot of an insect skimming
across the surface. The biologist comments that, at a microscopic level, the surface of the pond
isn’t at all as still as it appears to the others, but is actually teeming with the activity of tiny
organisms ranging from barely visible to microscopic. Though each of these individuals has said
something different about the surface of the pond, each has expressed the truth according to
his or her own perspective and understanding of it. The single reality of the pond reflects all of
these approximate truths and thousands more, and is independent of anyone’s opinion or
statement about it.
Now let’s suppose that a small boy joins the adults by the pond. The boy is carrying a
straight walking-stick, and he plunges the end of it into the pond at an angle. “Hey look,” he
shouts to the others, “the water broke my stick!” In this case, the boy is pointing out his
observation that, although the part of the stick above the surface, and the part below it, still
appear straight, the two images don’t line up at the point where the stick intersects the surface.
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The truth, of course (according to current understanding), is that light passes through water
more slowly than it does through air. Thus, the light reflected from the different parts of the
stick, below the surface and above it, enters the observer’s eye at different angles. This
refraction of light through different media causes the stick, which is still actually straight, to
appear bent or broken. The boy’s statement may be in earnest, and he may earnestly believe
it’s true, even though in fact it isn’t. But when he pulls the stick out of the water, it once again
appears straight and intact. The reality of the straight stick is not in the least affected by the
boy’s observation, claim, or belief. Indeed, to make a truthful statement about his observation,
he’d merely need to be more precise about what he’s observed, to distinguish between the
appearance and the reality: “The border between the air and the water makes my stick look
broken!” In this way, we begin to see the relationship, not only between truth and reality
themselves, but also in the context of observation and evidence. Appearances are sometimes
misleading, so we must consider them with care to understand precisely what our senses are
telling us and what the implications are.
Evidence
As we’ve seen, observations can sometimes be misleading. Therefore, we should
critically evaluate observations presented to us as evidence of one thing, when in fact they
might be evidence of something else. The reason for this is exemplified by a real-world
example of the carbon-dating of a fragment of the shell of a live clam, in which the test seemed
to indicate that the creature was thousands of years old. But through thoughtful analysis, we
come to realize that the carbon date of the shell reveals, not the age of the shell’s current
owner, but of the seafloor material that the clam had consumed to grow its shell. This is
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because what carbon-dating yields is the approximate time that has elapsed since the death of
the organisms that originally consumed and assimilated atmospheric carbon from the
environment at or near the water’s surface. Clams are not surface-dwelling, but the seafloor
deposits they consume contain the calcareous (calcium carbonate) remnants of surface-
dwelling creatures that had died and sunk to the bottom tens, thousands, or even millions of
years earlier.
Combining what we now understand about critical interpretation of evidence and the
confusion of concepts with their content, we might be better prepared to consider, say, a
widespread belief in the existence of ghosts as evidence for . . . for what? We’d be gullible to
suppose it’s evidence that ghosts actually exist. Without significant material evidence to back
up the belief, we’d have to concede it’s evidence only that many people are inclined to believe
bizarre things, and perhaps even to imagine the presence of such things. Our skepticism
doesn’t by any means rule out the existence of those bizarre things, but unsupported popular
belief clearly doesn’t serve as reliable evidence for anything other than the popularity of
unsupported belief.
Universal Reality
As we recall from the previous chapter, we feel justified in assuming that other people
we encounter are in fact beings like us. But does each of these people have his or her own
separate and individual reality? To hear some of them talk, we might be led to suppose so.
“That might be true for you, but it isn’t true for me,” is a common utterance we hear among
people of different persuasions. Natives of Alaska and Arizona might have wildly different
opinions about the “heat” or “cold” of the weather on the same late spring day on the same
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street corner in Albany, New York, despite that they could instantly agree on the reading of the
thermometer on the side of a nearby building. Yet we observe that all humans, despite their
individual differences in ability, adaptation, aptitude, belief, custom, preference, wealth, and so
forth, seem undeniably subject to similar basic wants, needs, and limitations. Black, white, or
brown, we’re all biologically incapable of surviving for more than a few days without food,
water, and sleep. Male or female, we all go gradually crazy if deprived of companionship.
Stoned or sober, we all go splat if we fall out of a tenth-floor window onto a concrete sidewalk.
Creationists or evolutionists, we’ll all sicken and die from infection by the same mutated
tuberculosis microbe if we don’t seek modern medical treatment.
While there’s some evidence that multiple realities exist at the quantum level, we can
say with a high degree of confidence that at the human level there are no alternative material
realities. There are only alternative perspectives and opinions about the one reality we all
share, plus a variety of raw speculation about unknown probabilities and appealing
impossibilities.
Brief Review of Key Ideas
Reality comprises actual persons, events, and things. In the “things” category we must include
ideas, being careful to stipulate that the things we call ideas exist only as mental constructs—as
neural linkages in our brains, or as words or as diagrams or charts—but not necessarily as actual
material objects. We can have ideas about things that do not really exist as well as about things
that do exist; and any ideas we have about things that do exist might be either true or false. In
most cases, we can’t know exactly what reality is with absolute certainty, because the natural
limitations of human sensation and mind restrict what we can experience and comprehend.
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But even if absolute knowledge is beyond our grasp, improved understanding of reality is the
attainable goal of the earnestly inquiring human being.
Truth is the accurate correspondence of an idea to reality. Knowledge of reality is the truth-
seeker’s goal, but it’s a goal that typically can only be approached, and seldom (if ever) attained
with absolute completeness and certainty.
Reification is a common error in reasoning. It happens if we confuse the existence of a concept
(as an idea) with the existence of the concept’s content (as something actual). That is,
reification occurs when we claim that an idea corresponds to an actual mind-independent
thing, event, or relationship, when in fact we have no clear evidence that such a thing, event, or
relationship has ever actually existed.
Evidence is something observed and verifiable. Used well with clear reasoning, evidence can
help guide us toward truth. Misinterpreted, it often leads to absurdity, and sometimes to
injustice or misfortune.
Universal reality, the idea that all humans inhabit a common material reality, is the most
plausible explanation for what we collectively experience as diverse yet interactive individuals.
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Chapter 3: Belief
As we’ve seen, absolutely certain knowledge is a very rare thing. However, inquisitive
creatures that we are, we have tools to deal with the multitude of ideas that are less than
certain. Among these are theory, speculation, opinion, and belief, all of which are based on, at
most, inconclusive evidence. It’s conceded among honestly self-described theorists,
speculators, and opinion holders that their ideas are open to question and might turn out to be
wrong.
But belief? Well, that depends on the believer, the subject of belief, and the kind of
belief. Belief is a very useful tool that we can use to test ideas in light of experience. In our
efforts to know and understand things, we often seize upon ideas which are emotionally
appealing or easy to grasp, but for which there is little or no evidential support.
Conditional Belief
If, through experience, we consistently find that such an idea is never refuted and
perhaps even seems somewhat supported, then we might adopt it as a belief—a tacit
assumption that the idea is true, on condition that we never find it to be demonstrated false or
superseded by another idea with superior support and explanatory power. This conditional
form of belief is a healthy and sometimes even productive implement in the earnest human
quest to get to know and understand the reality of ourselves and our universe—whatever
reality might actually turn out to be.
“I believe that it will be sunny tomorrow” expresses a conditional belief that will be
either confirmed or refuted a few hours hence, and we can then decide whether to keep,
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revise, or reject the belief on the basis of the new evidence. Or take “I believe that the sun,
moon, planets, and stars are embedded in concentric hollow crystal spheres that rotate around
the earth, which stands motionless at their common center.” This is also a conditional belief
that we might reasonably retain, so long as we find no evidence to the contrary, and so long as
no one develops a more convincing or better supported hypothesis. And indeed, this very idea
of a geo-centric universe was widely believed for many centuries—until one clear night when
Galileo gazed through a new gadget called a telescope and discovered four moons circling the
planet Jupiter, apparently passing effortlessly through the region supposedly occupied by the
solid crystal sphere bearing Jupiter itself. Galileo didn’t shatter the crystal; he just discovered
that it wasn’t there, and ventured a most reasonable guess that it hadn’t been there all along.
Committed Belief
However, churchmen rejected Galileo’s evidence, because they held a different kind of
belief in the pre-Galilean cosmology, a belief that is not conditioned upon available evidence,
but is rather committed to a certain rigid view of things. Obviously, this committed form of
belief—often distinguished by the phrase belief in6—is very different from the conditional belief
that we can readily revise or replace whenever experience demonstrates it isn’t as true as we
once supposed it to be. Probably most people use both kinds of belief, but for different things:
the conditional kind for everyday practical problem resolution, and the committed kind for 6 The sort of belief in discussed here implies willful belief of something despite lack of supporting evidence or even
despite evidence to the contrary. A different kind of belief in is exhibited by the example, “I don’t believe in sex
education.” By this, the speaker does not mean that he or she doesn’t believe that sex education exists, but that
he or she disapproves of it or believes it’s morally wrong. It isn’t truly an expression of belief or disbelief, but just a
sloppy use of language, which to some suggests sloppy thinking behind it.
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ideology-driven pursuits like politics and religion.
A Reasonable Approach to Belief
Here I must ask the reader to pardon the following shift from “we” to “I.”
This seems to me an intensely personal issue, with which each individual must
deal independently, perhaps with differing results. I’m willing to share my view,
and will use it as illustration where it would benefit discussion, but I’ve no intent
or desire to impose it upon anyone else.
Like most people, I’ve used both kinds of belief. However, it’s been my experience that
committed belief leads one to evaluate information on the basis of its correspondence to
existing belief, rather than to independent reality. If the existing belief happens to be flawed in
any way, the subsequent chain of beliefs that unquestioningly rely on it can become seriously
out of step with reality. This seems a potentially hazardous way to conduct one’s thinking,
especially when the implications are of great importance. For one thing, it can make
communication difficult between individuals with different sets of beliefs. For another, it’s
been my experience that reality always trumps belief. It might lose a battle or two to tradition,
coercion, or misrepresentation, but reality always eventually wins the war through evidence,
reason, and the raw necessity of addressing real-world issues effectively. Thus, it’s wisest to
operate under the assumption that, if there’s a conflict between belief and reality, it’s best to
bank on reality and adjust belief to it, not the other way around.
Committed belief locks the mind into logically untenable positions and blinds it to
evidence that in some cases may have serious, even life-or-death, consequences. Even in less
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dire circumstances, such skewing interferes with fair and impartial consideration of hard
evidence and the formulation of coherent reason; and in extreme instances, its effects are
functionally indistinguishable from those of dementia. In any case, committed belief interferes
with problem solving to the extent that it leads to solutions that are overly simplistic,
impractical, ineffectual, or even counterproductive in the real world.
Consequently, I’ve shied away from using committed belief in any aspect of my life,
adopting Hume’s maxim: “The wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.7” If I
catch myself saying or thinking “I believe in X,” I consider this a warning that it’s time to
reexamine whatever X I’m so committed to that I’d be willing to overlook a lack of supporting
evidence or to dismiss substantive evidence to the contrary. Any idea really worth believing
doesn’t need belief in it to support it; it can withstand fair scrutiny and stand on evidence and
reason alone. Thus, I’ve come to the view that committed belief is pointless: It neither validates
ideas that cannot withstand scrutiny nor improves those that can.
The one belief to which I might admit to being committed is that there is a reality
independent of mind, and that I must deal with this reality in straightforward fashion, or else
consider myself delusional. Yet even here, I’m open to evidence that might refute this belief,
though I can’t imagine what form it might take. Indeed, once convinced that such evidence is
genuine and its implications sound, I expect I’d be inclined to accept it as simply a new (to me)
aspect of reality, and follow my habit of adjusting my view of reality to accommodate the newly
discovered evidence. Far from overthrowing my current thought discipline, such an epiphany
would fit right into my learning process with the same ease as any other paradigm-shifting
7 David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
41
concept or phenomenon that’s already come to my attention.
The main obstacle is my own worn down credulity. I’ve become a hard fellow to
convince. This isn’t because I’m habitually closed-minded, for I’m delighted to discover
something that changes my worldview in a way that broadens and deepens my understanding.
It’s because during my lifetime I’ve encountered countless hoaxers and hucksters peddling
bogus schemes and hoping to sucker people into surrendering their freedom, their scruples,
their sanity, their votes, or the contents of their wallets. Thanks to such predators and
parasites, I’ve grown generally suspicious of appeals to emotion, of offers that sound too good
to be true, and of any “opportunity” perched on obvious misinformation or fallacy. In other
words, I’ve developed a robust nonsense filter that activates on any of the aforementioned
triggers, indicating that some notion probably falls into the vast category of ideas that aren’t
worth studying further. It’s not that I lack trust, but only that it’s been abused to the point that
what’s left of it has become precious. So, like belief, I proportion it to the evidence, as well as
to the source’s demonstrated level of reliability.
God as Creator: An Illustration of Reasoning in Conditional Belief
It isn’t my intent to preach a certain view of deity. Your religious views are none of my
concern, and mine are none of yours. However, I need a handy example of a skeptical
viewpoint, for the purpose of demonstrating why thinking about “sensitive” topics needn’t
(indeed shouldn’t) be substantively different from critical reasoning about practical, everyday
matters. Why a skeptical view? Simply to show why a methodically critical thinker, beginning
with fewer assumptions, might come to a conclusion that doesn’t coincide with a less critical
consensus. Why my view, specifically? Because [1] I can’t presume to speak for all skeptics and
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don’t want to be perceived as misrepresenting their views; [2] my own view is as handy as it
gets, and I’ve nothing to hide; and [3] you needn’t agree with the view, but only observe the
method used to progress from one point to the next. Moreover, it shouldn’t require much
time or effort, since the essential argument’s four points and its analysis together span only a
few hundred words, with peripheral and explanatory material relegated to footnotes—handy if
you need or want them, out of the way if you don’t. So, let’s get on with it.
Textual Outline for Premises and Inference of a Sample Argument
Premise (from observed evidence): The material world is founded on a universally consistent
micro-level order.
Rationale: I look at the universe as a person passably familiar with the precepts and
history of Judeo-Christian tradition, but also informed in, among other things, the basics of the
natural sciences. As I gaze upon what many contend is God’s creation, I note that, on atomic
and subatomic levels, the whole of nature appears governed by an intricate and absolutely
consistent micro-order, which gives rise to an apparent mix of order and disorder (within
certain limits) on the human scale and larger. Given what I understand and have observed of
nature so far, there’s little question in my mind that such an order exists, even though our
science has yet to probe it deeply enough to understand it completely.
Premise (proposition): The observed micro-level order might have been intentionally created
by a conscious being.
Rationale: Let’s speculate that the universe and its underlying order were intentionally
conceived and created by the mind of a conscious entity, which we may conveniently call
“God.” But if so, reason suggests that the conscious creator of such a universally consistent
43
underlying order must itself be one whose thoughts are no less consistent and orderly.
Premise (evidence): Scriptural accounts of God’s activities reveal numerous significant
inconsistencies 8 in God’s thought and action.
Implication: It’s implausible to suppose that any God exhibiting such inconsistencies
could be capable of creating the observed consistent order of the universe. If indeed it’s
impossible for a greater net level of order to arise from a lesser one in a closed system,9 this
would rule out as creator any God whose irrational will and aberrant behavior are described in
religious scripture with any degree of accuracy.
8 Beginning in the book of Genesis, for example, God lies to Adam and Eve about the consequences of eating the
fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (warning them that they will die that very day; yet they do not).
Later, God brings about a flood to destroy all mankind, excepting Noah and his family, but then expresses regret
for having done so. In Hinduism, the various gods are portrayed with conflicting natures and often at odds with
each other, rather than being of a consistent, universal mind. Moreover, the creation stories of any established
religion, if taken as God’s own literal Word, turn out to be inconsistent with the reality of what is held by the same
believers to be God’s own Creation, as revealed in the fossil record.
9 This parallels a common Creationist argument invoking the second law of thermodynamics in an attempt to
disprove evolution. The Creationist account erroneously assumes that the earth is a closed system, when in fact
the main energy supply driving evolution—and even life itself—comes from outside: the sun. In contrast, the
skeptic’s argument more plausibly considers “God plus universe” to be a closed system.
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Inference: No real creator God could be identified with any of the self-conflicted caricatures
found in the scriptures of organized religion.
In other words, I’m convinced that, if there really is a God, it couldn’t be what most
religious people suppose it to be.
Analysis of the Argument
Such a line of thinking pits independently verifiable factual evidence (a consistent order
in the material universe, as detected through critical observation and experiment) against
scriptural evidence (an account that, if taken as literal truth, indicates serious inconsistencies in
God’s thought and action) to rule out the existence of one subcategory of deity. Specifically, it
argues that alleged creator gods, whose scriptural accounts reveal significant inconsistencies,
are incapable of formulating and establishing a universally consistent order in nature. The
claim that God has supernatural power can’t compensate for Its being burdened with an
intellect too inconsistent to guide that power to create the consistent order that’s observed.
So, if we take scriptural accounts to be literally true, this would rule out the gods of most (or
perhaps all) organized religions, gods whose authoritative descriptions reveal markedly human
inconsistencies. For example, the Old Testament account of God reveals stark inconsistencies,
such as claimed truthfulness and actual deceit [Gen.3:17], claimed constancy and actual
variation [Gen.8:21], claimed justice and actual favoritism [Deut.7:6], claimed mercy and actual
wrath [2Chr.36:17]; plus some superhuman ones: giving life and commanding genocide
[1Sam.15:3], claimed perfection and any of the aforementioned or other imperfections. With
appropriate scriptural citations from any particular religion, such an argument could rule out
any creator gods for which there are authoritative accounts indicating anything from
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performance-affecting mood swings to multiple-personality disorders.10
However, this reasoning doesn’t categorically refute the existence of all things people
identify as God. Gods which are not clearly described, such as the deist Jefferson’s “Creator”
and “Natural God,” can’t be easily dislodged by this method, because They offer few
identifiable points to which the levers of logic can be applied.11 Nor can we disprove the
existence of Gods defined as synonymous with something known to exist, such as the pantheist
Spinoza’s ambiguous God-as-Nature.12 We might argue that these things are not gods,
according to generally accepted definitions of the term. But the proponent of the idea might
counter-argue that his concept must be nearer to actual truth than the accepted definitions,
since those are clearly at odds with both logic and evidence.
10 I’m sure some might say, “We don’t believe in science or logic, so your argument doesn’t hold for us.” To them I
respond that they’re free to disbelieve anything they like. But no intensity of disbelief can remove a single atom of
the mountains of physical evidence from existence, and the evidence is what ultimately gives the lie to the belief.
11 We might yet dispute the seriousness of Jefferson’s contention, that all men are endowed with unalienable
rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, since the Creator evidently neglected to distribute the liberty and
happiness packages to more than a relative few for most of the history of civilization.
12 I suppose I could appease believers who feel threatened by a skeptic in their midst, by calling by the name “God”
something I believe exists, such as the consistent underlying order of the material universe, and affirming that I
believe in it. However, this would be dishonest. It would simply lead those who believe in a conventional God to
infer that I believe in the same thing they do (a purposeful, willful creator-king unaccountably fascinated with
human affairs and craving human adoration) and that I believe in it in the same way they do (devoutly,
worshipfully, and with no regard for evidence), and thus that I give my personal assent to such unquestioning
belief, when in fact none of these is actually the case. The predictable outcome of such a ploy would be contrary
to my mission, which I envision as exposing and dispelling misinformation, not condoning or promoting it.
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Summary of the Argument’s Implications and Limitations
Those who assert it’s impossible to prove the non-existence of God are correct, but only
partly so. It isn’t possible to eliminate the entire category of all deities, if only because it can
easily be replenished simply by redefining what we choose to call “God,” 13 either as something
too vague to be logically analyzed, or as something already generally conceded to exist—
nature, money, power, or love, for example. However, some specific gods—including those of
the three currently most popular religions14 as described by a literal interpretation of their
scriptures—can be shown to be inconsistent with themselves, as well as with the unyielding
evidence of the observed universe (creation), and thus both logically absurd and virtually
impossible.
There are, of course, many other reasons for believing in a God, and thus many more
questions to ask in order to verify whether any creed’s answers are consistent and correspond
satisfactorily to a well informed view of reality. The short sample argument and analysis we’ve
just examined may serve as a rough example to follow in probing other fundamental issues,
such as origin, destiny, purpose, value, and morality. (Although there are skeptical arguments
13 The term “God” has different meanings to different people. However, there’s a danger in redefining God (or any
other term, for that matter) too radically, in that this can alter the concept to a point that it’s unrecognizable by
any commonly accepted understanding of the term. It then becomes functionally meaningless to anyone who
hasn’t been duly informed of the alteration. Of course, in some instances this might be the whole point of the
change—as in Spinoza’s case to avoid religious persecution for his disbelief in the biblical God.
14 The world’s currently most popular religions are Christianity, representing about a third of global population;
Islam, representing about a fifth; and Hinduism, about a sixth. We can add to this list Buddhism, which is well
known and dispersed throughout East Asia, and Judaism, representing a relatively tiny proportion of world
population, yet disproportionately influential in Western society.
47
addressing these as well, there’s no need to trot them out here. The point regarding the ability
to apply hard evidence and reason to at least some nebulous issues has been well enough made
already.)
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Chapter 4: Free Will and Responsibility
Most people seldom, if ever, consider the possibility that their thoughts and behavior
might be predetermined. If asked about it, they typically respond, to the effect, “I’m a human
being, not a programmed automaton. I have free will to choose among any available
alternatives. Presented with two choices—or a dozen or a thousand—I’m equally able to opt
for any one of them.” This is the general perception of most individuals, that each person is
perfectly free to take any available option, either through deliberate choice or through random
selection. Even to use a flipped coin as the decision-maker is a choice.
This is the premise by which we conduct our activities and live our lives. Still, the
question arises: Is this premise false? Could it be that we really can’t help doing what we do
because something—fate, predestination, cosmic inertia, God—compels our every impulse, and
despite the happy illusion that we’re in control, we’re actually just “along for the ride”?
The “Free Will versus Determinism” Debate
This is a question that has puzzled philosophers for a long time, for they note that, on a
large scale, human behavior seems somewhat predictable. People’s thoughts and behavior are
obviously influenced by their physical and social environment: We can’t walk through brick
walls, except by way of doors or other openings. Most of us won’t intentionally consume
poison (at least the non-recreational kinds) because we fear the natural consequences of it.
And most of us dare not commit crimes, or at least try to avoid getting caught doing so, because
we find the prospects of arrest and punishment unpalatable. If these constraints and influences
weren’t there, many of us would probably behave very differently from the way we currently
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do.
People are also influenced by their own make-up, conditioning, and experience. Those
with a certain genetic code that makes broccoli taste bitter to them make a point of avoiding it,
while those with a different gene either like that vegetable or are indifferent to it. Most people
brought up in homes where classical music is played choose as adults to go to symphony
concerts and operas more often than people raised primarily on country, folk, or rock music.
While it might be too strong a claim that behavior is determined by these influences, it’s
certainly clear that such factors cause people to have certain preferences, and thus usually to
act in ways that tend to satisfy these preferences.
Of course, it can get more complicated. To illustrate, suppose there are two philosophy
students, one who advocates free will (whom we’ll call Wilfred), and his friend who thinks
human action is otherwise determined (whom we’ll identify as Dieter). Now, these two
routinely join a group of their classmates at a local coffee shop on Friday evenings to discuss
philosophy. Upon arriving, everyone in the group except Wilfred orders a steaming mug of
coffee. Wilfred can’t stand the stuff, so he always orders tea instead. But one Friday, the
conversation turns to free will versus determinism. To prove his point that his behavior isn’t
controlled by influences, Wilfred changes his order to coffee, strong and black, and chugs the
entire mug. He makes an awful face and visibly suppresses an impulse to gag. His face is beet-
red, but presently subsides to a pale green. When he’s finally able to speak, he croaks, “See? I
may be strongly influenced not to drink this, but I can make a free-will choice to do so if I wish.”
But Dieter counters, “This is simply a matter of one influence—your strong aversion to coffee—
being overridden by another, temporarily stronger one—your desire to demonstrate what you
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think is free will.” Turning to the others in the group, Dieter explains, “Wilfred’s seemingly free
choice wasn’t truly free, but was compelled by his desire, in the context of our current
discussion, to prove a point. With his argumentative personality and faced with this challenge,
this particular combination of influences was overwhelming and he could not have chosen
otherwise.”
Furthermore, even seemingly random choices might be governed or triggered by
unsensed influences: the sporadic secretion of a tiny amount of a hormone, or perhaps the
impact of a stray cosmic particle upon a neuron receptor in the brain. Dieter could plausibly
press this argument by supposing that either of these events could in turn have been the
inevitable result of a causal chain of events tracing back to the beginning of time and perhaps
even spanning the universe, thereby predetermining what Wilfred would do in this particular
place at this particular instant. Even if we might not be able to speak of this as “control” in the
absence of a conscious and purposeful controller, Dieter could contend that the cumulative
influences add up to a net determining force that alters not only Wilfred’s customary behavior,
but also our understanding of the word “choice.”
A variant of this thinking is that some unsensed influences on human behavior might be
random, as in the nuclear decay of a radioactive element, which produces a beta particle or a
neutron, which in turn happens to impact a brain cell, thus affecting whether or not the cell
transmits an impulse at some decisive moment. It’s important to note that randomness of the
cause does not translate to free will, but only adds the proposition that some influences on
human choice could be absolutely unpredictable. The implication of this is that some human
behavior might be determined moment by moment, rather than predetermined by a causal
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chain triggered by some primordial event.
The frustrating part is that this conflict of views over free will has never been
conclusively resolved, because each side of the issue is animated mostly by conjecture, some of
which might possibly be true, but none of which so far has been testable or provable. There is
no known way to “rewind” real-world events and conditions to the exact same starting point
and conditions to see whether they play out exactly the same each time (as in a movie) or
differently (as in a video game), or whether differences in outcomes would signify true free will
or simply quantum-level randomness of behavioral triggers. Even if we could approximate such
a rewinding of events, there are just too many incalculable variables—including any effects of
the rewind itself, the events in it already having become part of memory and history (else we’d
have no reference for comparison in subsequent testing)—to be accounted for. Reason alone
has been inconclusive; hypothetical results of speculative free-will and deterministic scenarios
of identical problems would appear so similar as not to offer a way to distinguish which
scenario produces which result, and thus provides no clue to discern which process is actually
the one predominating in the real world when net influences become negligible.
Complicating the situation is the fact that many human decisions are not rational, but
are made on a basis of incoherent guesswork or sheer impulse. This leaves us to wonder
whether such an impulse might be the result of some failure, whether deliberate or accidental,
to consider all pertinent factors, and whether this failure is itself the result either of a caused
influence or of an uncaused, autonomous initiative. While it’s true that human action is subject
to some strict limitations and many influences, it remains unclear whether all human behavior
ultimately distills to cause-and-effect, or whether the mind actually contains an autonomous
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decision-making mechanism that can indeed make one choice just as easily as any other in
cases where competing influences effectively cancel.
Implications of Free Will with Regard to Moral Responsibility
And so, without having resolved the free-will-versus-determinism issue, we return to
the ethical question: If it should turn out to be true that human behavior is not a product of
free will, but is predetermined, then how can we hold individuals morally responsible for
behavior over which they ultimately have no real control?
A Pragmatic Resolution
This is the puzzler. But if we study it awhile, sooner or later we note that the question
hangs on precisely how we interpret the term “responsibility.”
Attributability and Accountability
In this context, responsibility has two common meanings:
Attributability is the possibility of credibly attributing an action and its results to a certain
person, thing, or event.
Accountability is the apportioning of credit or blame to a person to whom an action is
attributed, perhaps taking into account whether the effects of the action were a matter of
deliberate choice, negligence, or innocent error.
If we know who or what brought about a certain action, then he, she, or it can’t escape
attributability; assuming that the attribution is true, it’s a fact and can’t be undone. For
instance, if we’re injured by a stone spontaneously falling from a cliff face after it’s been
loosened by wind and rain, we attribute the action to the cumulative effects of weather and, of
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course, gravity; it’s a straightforward matter of identifying a cause-and-effect relationship
through evidence and reason. But we can’t hold the weather morally accountable, because
weather has no conscious will of its own, no intent to do either good or harm, but acts solely on
the basis of indifferent physics.15 If we’re looking for someone to blame, we’d have to blame
ourselves for foolishly wandering too near a crumbling outcrop.
However, if the stone had instead been thrown by a man, then in addition to attributing
our injury to him, couldn’t we also hold him morally accountable? If we knew that he had free
will to choose otherwise, that would be the naturally human thing to do. But if the man’s
actions were predetermined, if he was compelled by some overpowering influence or force of
destiny to throw the rock in our direction at that moment, then how could he be fairly
considered morally accountable for that action if he was powerless to choose otherwise?
The solution to this puzzle lies in understanding that attributability is a matter of
determining the facts in the causation of an event, whereas accountability is a matter of human
values as expressed in a social context. Attributability is mostly a matter of simple physics, and
carries no inherent value judgment with it. Accountability, in contrast, is all about values—
virtue or vice, merit or guilt, credit or blame, praise or shame, reward or penalty—or in the case
of a tie, ambivalence or indifference. Accountability is not an aspect of nature, but rather a tool
whereby society attempts to maintain its viability and stability by establishing and enforcing a
social order.
Society’s leaders accomplish this by imposing acceptable limits on the behavior of the
15 If, as some are inclined, we suppose that weather is controlled by gods or spirits, then perhaps we could hold
those controlling powers accountable for whatever good or evil results from its purposeful interference in
meteorology. But here we’re concerned with rational explanation, not mystical rationalization.
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individuals and groups within it. When enforced by promise of benefit for conformance (e.g., a
paycheck for one’s labor), or by threat of penalty for their infringement (e.g., a fine or
imprisonment for theft), these limits become part of the environment of influences to which
we’re all subject. Whether, as members of society, our behavior is predetermined or freely
chosen, these influences clearly cause our inclination to behave a certain way to be stronger or
weaker than would be the case if the influences didn’t exist. And, to take this reasoning a step
further, whether the actions of society’s leaders are predetermined or freely chosen, their
decision to impose wise and just laws16 is influenced by what they understand to be the needs
of society and the necessity of keeping it viable, stable, productive, and reasonably orderly. If
human behavior is predetermined, then the behavior of leaders is no exception. Leaders are
obliged—determinists might say compelled—to enact and enforce some effective laws, or else
put society at an unacceptable risk of collapse, and consequently put their own prospects as
leaders in jeopardy.
Society’s Responsibility
Now we begin to see accountability in a pragmatic light, rather than under the more
traditionally abstract “honor versus disgrace” view. Survival is the primary objective of society,
for without the survival of society there’s virtually no hope of attaining the further goals of our
inherently social species, such as prosperity and justice. Accountability is simply a man-made
(or God-given, if we prefer) tool that society uses to attain its primary objective of survival. In
16 Of course, leaders sometimes have other motives, not all of which are in the public interest, and unwise and
unjust laws are often the result. However, we may consider these exceptions to the rule, and thus beyond the
scope of this elemental discussion.
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the final analysis, it makes no discernible difference whether human behavior is entirely
determined or partly a matter of free choice. Accountability is in either case a crucial part of
our practical framework of social influences to encourage behavior that benefits (or at least
doesn’t harm) society, and to discourage behavior that clearly threatens it.
Obviously, these artificial influences aren’t powerful enough to guide the behavior of all
people, some of whom may be ignorant, misinformed, unreceptive, rebellious, desperate, or in
some cases deranged. Thus, the policy of accurately identifying and consistently punishing
wrongdoers serves as additional incentive for the rest of us to comply. And in the specific case
of incarceration, it also serves to restore stability to society by denying disruptive individuals
the ability to interact with, and thus to continue to exploit and victimize, those whose generally
positive behavior affirms their assent to the social contract.17
So, we see that applying penalties to offenders is simply a tool for maintaining social
order, a means to solve a problem. It isn’t society’s function to provide a channel for venting
public outrage upon the guilty. It isn’t society’s concern whether human behavior is
determined or arises from free will. The responsibility of society—meaning us, interacting both
individually and collectively through our chosen leaders—is to safeguard itself for the benefit of
17 Social contract is the term that philosophers John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau applied to the tacit mutual
agreement of each individual in society, to participate in obligatory duties, and to abstain from behavior which
threatens, harms, or otherwise abuses others, in exchange for all other members’ reciprocal agreement to do
likewise. For example, Smith gives up the right to take or damage anyone else’s stuff, in return for everyone else’s
agreement not to take or damage Smith’s stuff. A social contract is not a written document, but rather an
assumed commitment to mutual duty and restraint, expected of society’s members as the price of partaking of
society’s benefits, and affirmed through consistent compliance with society’s standards.
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the people. To this end, society’s obligation is to use its influence to place prudent limits on
behavior, to provide incentives for people to abide by those limits18 and penalties to persuade
the less cooperative and the callously indifferent not to make socially harmful choices, and to
separate from society those who are not thus persuaded.
But it’s vitally important in the first place that we get attributability right—identifying
the true instigator and agent of an act—so that the subsequent process of accountability
reliably results in penalizing only the actual perpetrator, rather than some unfortunate
scapegoat.19 If instead we substitute indiscriminate vengeance for well considered justice, then
the deterrent effect of the penalty is lost. For when it becomes evident that the system
routinely imposes undeserved penalties upon innocent individuals, the incentive to behave well
is voided, since good behavior no longer ensures freedom from punishment. The incentive
then becomes not to do only what’s moral and lawful, but merely to do whatever one can get
away with—a very poor and ultimately counterproductive substitute.
Free will versus determinism isn’t a real-world concern. It’s a metaphysical red herring,
whose only practical use is to challenge sophomore philosophy students to think deeply, to
18 In most instances and for most people, the right to share in society’s natural benefits (e.g., organization,
specialization, efficiency, infrastructure, justice, security, education, prosperity, and common standards) is
incentive enough.
19 In the long run, it’s generally better to let a few suspected wrongdoers escape penalty than to penalize any
innocents, through either deliberate scapegoating or error due to insufficiency of evidence. However, allowing
actual wrongdoers to run free can, through their continuing misbehavior, result in the infliction of suffering upon
the innocent. Correcting this problem might well involve some readjustment of judicial philosophy and
restructuring of the justice system, and perhaps no system could be made perfect. Consideration of such reform
would be a worthwhile endeavor, but is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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penetrate surface appearances and attempt to discover and understand the roots of issues.
What really matters is survival, and whatever further benefits we can derive from it.
Accountability is simply one of the methods we use to achieve these. Other common methods
include flattery, coercion, deceit, and bribery. However, despite their effectiveness, these
others seem categorically opposed to our current notions of fairness and justice (except
perhaps within the institutions of business, politics, and religion). Thus, well considered
accountability emerges among the least objectionable yet acceptably effective options known
for establishing behavioral influences to promote the viability and stability of society, and thus
to support and augment whatever advantages society can in return offer the individual.
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Part II: Psyche: Mind, Spirit, Soul, and Being
Psyche is a Greek word (ψξχε) that embraces the interrelated and often overlapping
concepts of spirit, mind, and soul. Here we’ll discuss each of these concepts individually, but
also note areas of overlap. The word psyche has been chosen to avoid confusion when
discussing all three consciousness-related concepts as a group. Some romantics might object
that we’ve omitted “heart” as the emotional component of psyche, but they’ll find such matters
addressed under the topic of “spirit.”
The final chapter of this part concerns what we call “being,” and what significance the
term has for us human beings, as distinct from living things that are not beings.
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Chapter 5: Distinguishing Mind, Spirit, and Soul
These terms have acquired several meanings in practice. In many cases, their meanings
overlap, and indeed they’re often used interchangeably. However, here we’ll be discussing
specific qualities applying to each concept, so it’s best that we specify what definitions and
distinctions we’ll be applying to each, in order to maintain clarity of thought about a topic that’s
often badly muddled. So, it’s appropriate here to reemphasize that your understanding of
these terms might be different from mine. You needn’t accept my definitions, but you must be
aware of what mine are for an accurate understanding of what you’re reading here.
Key to our discussion is the fact that, since the 19th century, much has been learned
about the human brain, senses, and endocrine system. With advances in both psychology and
neuroscience, much of human experience, having previously been attributed to supernatural or
mystical phenomena, now appears rooted in the biochemistry of these material components of
our bodies. 20
Spirit
We take up the concept of spirit first, because it has key implications for both mind and
soul. It’s a word with many meanings, ranging from “ghost” to “intoxicating drink,” most of
which are irrelevant to our discussion. However, spirit, as an animating force, is one focus of
20 Some object to natural explanations as “reductionism,” by which they generally mean they don’t like their pet
mysteries being objectively studied and explained. But if we truly want to know “how things really are,” we must
be willing to seek out reality, and to peer beneath the veil of mystery with which the collective ignorance of the
ages has cloaked it. The active intellect sees mysticism, not as an occult strength to be exalted, but as a human
weakness to be remedied by understanding whenever possible.
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our inquiry. The animating (literally “life-giving”) force is an ancient concept related to
breathing (respiration), and has been attributed not only to humans but to animals and plants
as well, not to mention other objects (weather, fire, bodies of water, mountains, forests,
disease, crystals, and celestial bodies, for instance) that appear to move or change of their own
accord. Spirit is mentioned in the records of virtually all civilizations since the invention of
writing. There’s also symbolic and pictorial evidence for the concept in the artworks and
artifacts of illiterate prehistoric peoples on every continent except Antarctica. It’s been a
common facet of accepted philosophies until relatively recently. It continues to be significant in
Eastern philosophy, and remains a key concept in religious thinking.
However, since the late 19th century, the flowering of the sciences of biology and
chemistry has gradually brought to light the details of certain biochemical processes by which
life operates. While we don’t yet have an absolutely complete picture, we’re now close enough
to be able to draw numerous testable inferences from what we’ve learned so far—even to the
point of understanding many of the processes that give rise to consciousness itself, and
identifying the regions of the brain in which they occur.
Even if we’re still a long way from filling in all the blanks, it would appear that we’re well
on the way to doing so. The known and anticipated natural processes of chemistry and physics
are sufficient to explain most of what we know of life and its processes, and we’re continually
learning more. Biologists now understand the animating force of life in terms of biochemistry,
whose processes can be investigated, tested, and rationally understood. The mystical concept
of spirit, on the other hand, has never advanced to a level where it could be observed, tested,
or used to explain or predict anything in a way that enhances understanding; its failure in this
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regard has rendered it essentially obsolete where science is concerned.
“Unfair!” the spiritists may cry. Very well, let them present verifiable evidence to
support their claims. Their response: “Our evidence is overwhelming belief!” Yes, widespread
belief is evidence. But evidence of what? Only that many people are eager to seize upon
appealing beliefs, not that the beliefs are true. There was a time when virtually everyone
believed that the Earth stands motionless at the center of the universe while everything else
revolves about it. There’s no question that this belief was overwhelmingly appealing and
popular; but it was also just as contrary to reality then as it is today. It isn’t reality that has
changed, but only our understanding of it, in a way that brings that understanding into closer
accord with reality. Popularity and intensity of belief are irrelevant to the question of whether
belief corresponds to reality.
Over a span of three centuries, biochemistry has come to explain, often in excruciating
detail, our verifiable observations of life, from major and minor body functions, to energy
production by incrementally controlled oxidation and fermentation in the cells, to DNA’s21 sub-
microscopic molecular mechanism of genetic coding, translation, and replication, as well as its
evolution through mutation and selection. In contrast, the vague concept of animating spirit
has filled the imaginations of countless generations, yet has never graduated from the category
of entertaining, poetic notions. It’s turned out to be one of those quaint attempts at
“explanation” that has never truly explained anything, and has never moved mankind a
millimeter closer to genuine understanding of anything demonstrably real.
In deciding what to do about this outdated concept of spirit, two options are available.
21 DNA: deoxy-ribonucleic acid, which forms paired helical strands of adenine, cytosine, guanine, and tyrosine
molecules, and which determines the characteristics of the organism in whose cells it resides.
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First, we could simply declare our concept of spirit-as-animating-force obsolete and consign it
to history’s rubbish heap of charming but nonsensical notions. This option is straightforward,
but might be difficult for some people to accept, particularly if they’ve been inculcated in
religious belief in mystical spirits. Or second, we could say that the animating force we’ve been
calling spirit for thousands of years has actually turned out to be the natural array of processes
we are now beginning to understand in terms of biochemistry. Spirit, if we still choose to call it
that, should now be understood, not as a supernatural entity, but as a potentially
understandable (if not yet fully understood) natural process. Its meaning is no longer life-giver
(Latin anima), but has become life itself (Latin vita). This option would allow us to continue
using the traditional term spirit in this context as a synonym and convenient shorthand for
biochemical process. However, such use could be confusing and misleading if the context isn’t
explained in advance, for many audiences might be unfamiliar with the use of the word “spirit”
as a biochemical euphemism. (As one who prefers to avoid confusion, I’m inclined to
recommend the first option.) In either case, we can credibly retain the figurative definition of
spirit as an animated (rather than animating) state of mind related to some specific idea—a
spirit of community, a spirit of inquiry, a spirit of justice, etc.—and thus as a product of mind
rather than the source of it.
Mind
One of the most remarkable offshoots of this animating force of life is something we call
mind. Mind is an extraordinary level of self-awareness that enables us to contemplate, not just
how to secure our own immediate survival, and not just material objects in present experience,
but also concepts such as past and future, virtue and vice, purpose and value. We even possess
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the ability to contemplate the workings of the mind itself, a self-reflective ability we think may
be unique to humans among all living creatures on Earth.
But as we’ve seen, spirit has turned out to be a non-explanation, as much for mind as it
is for anything else. In its place, biochemistry has led to a rapidly evolving understanding of life,
body, and now even mind, which turns out to be a natural manifestation of a physical organ we
call the brain. What’s our evidence? Abuse or damage the brain, and the mind inevitably
suffers the consequences. Destroy the brain—starve it of oxygen and nutrients, poison it
chemically, fry it with electricity, or batter it into jelly with a blunt instrument—and all functions
of mind cease, even if other body processes continue operating for a time. No working brain,
no mind. It’s hard to argue with evidence like that. In the old days, this is how we discovered—
usually by accident—that there was some connection between the material brain and the
processes of mind.
But nowadays there’s no need to damage or destroy a brain to see how it affects mind.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) detects and displays real-time brain activity corresponding
to specific stimuli, activities, and thoughts. Electrodes implanted in various specific areas of the
brain allow experimenters to trigger predictable sensations, actions, and thoughts, and thus
map the brain’s functional areas. There’s now no question that the brain is quite literally the
nerve-center of all mental activity.
But let’s momentarily backtrack to a previous thought: the animating force of life and
mind. With animating spirit no longer a serious consideration, it would appear that
biochemistry neatly fills the void that spirit has vacated. Mind arises from, is sustained by, and
is entirely dependent upon, the physical brain and the biochemical processes going on within it.
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Today there is no serious doubt about this among those who’ve investigated the matter in any
depth. Moreover, there’s another important aspect of mind about which there’s no doubt:
Mind exists. For, unlike an undetectable animating spirit for which no verifiable evidence
exists, we all have our own personal experiences as perceiving, remembering, believing,
reasoning creatures to convince us that the existence of mind is an irrefutable fact. If you can
understand this sentence, you’re able to do so only because you have mind.
Soul
Soul is an alleged immaterial part of psyche that presumably lives on after the physical
death of the body. However, this assertion is virtually impossible to confirm, since there seems
no verifiable evidence of disembodied souls, and no seriously investigated reports of them that
haven’t turned out to involve hoaxes or hallucinations. Nonetheless, we have a rough
compilation of soul’s alleged properties, which we can scrutinize and evaluate as to coherency
and consistency. To understand exactly what soul could be, we need to understand what parts
of psyche might survive the trauma of death. And—believe it or not—there’s some material
evidence that we can use to assist in this inquiry. However, we must bear in mind that
methodically investigating soul in this way is very different from the traditional path of
uncritically hopeful faith in our own immortality. Therefore, we must be prepared to have
some of our traditional views of soul challenged by a critical assessment of whatever we might
discover.
A necessary characteristic of anything that can transcend physical death is immunity to
(or at least ability to recover from) the effects of physical frailty and failure. Obviously, if an
immaterial soul can live on after the death of a material body that ultimately disintegrates and
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decomposes altogether, then this enduring soul can’t be dependent upon the temporal body.
Indeed, any soul durable enough to transcend the catastrophe of physical death and
disintegration ought to rebound with relative ease from any lesser material trauma, perhaps a
bit sadder and wiser, but otherwise virtually unaffected, its fundamental identity and character
enduring intact. For the notion of an immaterial and immortal soul to be viable, such an entity
must be essentially independent of, and unharmed in any lasting way by, any material thing or
event that humans are apt to encounter in the temporal, physical world.
Yet such a notion would seem to defy the evidence at hand. While our psyche is indeed
resilient to a remarkable degree, there are clearly limits to its endurance, beyond which it
suffers irrevocable change. Material reality does affect mind, in many cases permanently. It’s
not uncommon, for example, for a person who consumes alcohol excessively to develop a
personality significantly different from his sober self, a difference greater than can be
accounted for by a mere numbing of inhibitions. The inebriate’s behavior may go well beyond
the mildly peculiar to the truly bizarre, exhibiting a personality fundamentally at odds with his
normal disposition—transforming from responsible to reckless, or from affable to violent, for
instance. Granted, in the early stages of alcoholism, the drinker typically reverts to his normal
self if he avoids alcohol for a time; yet while decidedly under its influence, he’s literally “not
himself.” Though he has the same body, name, and even memories, while intoxicated his mind
is clouded, out of control, subject to extremes of mood. When he recovers his sobriety, he
might not remember his drunken behavior; or if he does, he might be either dismissive of it or
thoroughly ashamed of it. His intoxicated self and his sober self are, for all practical purposes,
two different people who take turns occupying the same body, according to its chemical
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condition at the moment.
If he continues to drink abusively over a long period, and if the material structure and
chemistry of his brain are progressively damaged as a result, then recovery eventually becomes
impossible. His brain becomes permanently altered by the material chemical substance. And
his mind, far from impervious to these material effects, continues to exhibit through his
behavior the inevitable results of neural damage, even if he ceases to imbibe for many days,
weeks, or even years. When he can no longer recollect the state of a whole and healthy mind,
when he becomes incapable of recovering it, when he accepts this chemically damaged state as
“normal,” then his sober self no longer exists, and he’s permanently become truly a different
person.
In this way, we know that psyche is affected by changes in the brain. Furthermore,
modern science now understands in considerable detail how ethyl alcohol influences and
disrupts the chemistry of living cells—including those of the brain. So we know that this
alteration and degeneration of psyche—including whatever part of it is presumably to be
preserved as soul—is the result of damage to the physical brain, and that this damage is
wrought by the chemical ethanol itself by disrupting normal cell processes, sometimes so
severely that the cells themselves are rendered permanently non-functional—they die. The
quaint notion, that the effects of strong drink owe to an immaterial, diabolical essence of evil
lurking in the bottle with the physical liquid, is as obsolete as the Greek wine god Dionysus.
Yet intoxication is but one example of the effects of material phenomena upon the
physical brain, hence upon its processes of mind, and hence upon the reflection of mind in the
presumably immaterial soul. The mind’s chemical nature is revealed by the effects not only of
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alcohol, but of other drugs, of poisons, of surgical anesthesia, of malnutrition and dehydration,
of oxygen deprivation, and of prolonged exposure to environmental extremes. Its electrical
nature is demonstrated by our ability to detect reactions or trigger responses through
electrodes attached to the scalp or implanted in the brain itself. Its physical nature is evident
through loss of memory or skills, or sometimes drastic changes of personality or thought
patterns, following severe head injury, stroke, or brain surgery. Its biological nature is exhibited
by the natural disorders and diseases that afflict it, from hormonal imbalances to brain tumors,
from epilepsy to Alzheimer’s. In addition, mind is affected by both physical and social
environments through the senses, which are themselves physical biological structures that
convey impulses to the brain by way of an electrochemical neural network.
Now, most proponents of soul would probably not dispute that it’s a reflection of mind,
for after all, it presumably carries with it all reward of virtue and burden of sin acquired during
life. Immaterial though it might be, soul would inevitably have to be affected by mind, which in
turn is altered by changes in the physical brain, which are typically the results of an individual’s
environment and life experience. Thus, soul is influenced by events during physical life, and in
extreme cases can even undergo Jekyll-and-Hyde transformations resulting from material
causes. Thus, whatever soul might become after physical death has been shaped to a
significant degree by behavior and events during physical life.
Implications of Mortality
With mind so profoundly connected to, and affected by, the physical state of brain and
body (and, by extension, to their temporal environment), its demonstrated dependence upon
material existence rules out its survival after corporeal death. Still, we can’t rule out that some
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immaterial aspect of psyche—soul—might cross over into some other phase of existence. So
our inquiring minds want to know: What form might immaterial existence take? Once we
identify the parts of human thought, feeling, and experience that necessarily vanish when
physical life ends, what part of awareness could remain? What part can see, hear, taste, smell,
or feel, when all the physical senses have gone blind, deaf, and numb? What part can think,
remember, imagine, or believe, when the brain’s synapses have stopped firing? What part can
experience joy or sorrow, love or hate, fear or anger, pride or shame, when the endocrine
system has shut down and the heart no longer beats? What inspiration can revive awareness
when the flesh has fallen into decay and the brain has rotted away? Without the living brain to
perform the functions that shape our personality, conscious experience, thoughts, feelings, and
even dreams, what dim and feeble trace of dark, silent, vegetative existence could possibly
remain, as anything we would recognize or appreciate from our accustomed material point of
reference? Since such aspects of awareness as sensation, memory, thought, and dreaming are
demonstrably dependent on the physical, living brain, we can safely reason that any immaterial
remnant of awareness that survives physical death would be devoid of these physically
dependent aspects. And since these indeed constitute virtually all of what most of us think of
as conscious existence, there would not seem much else left to be aware of—or with.
To salvage what little we might from the sparse evidence at hand, the existence of soul
disconnected from physical experience would likely be, at most, a dormant seed-like state,
subjectively indistinguishable from complete oblivion. But if we care to indulge in some
judicious speculation, we might imagine other possibilities without stretching credulity beyond
the breaking point. Perhaps our material existence is merely a blossom that first opens, then is
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fertilized by material experience, and then fades, but in so doing creates the seed that ripens
and sprouts into an utterly different phase of existence. We might suppose that some unknown
process of disembodied awareness kicks in after physical death, and that the soul-seed awakens
into some new and unfathomable immaterial state.
The disappointment here is that we can’t rationally anticipate what such a state might
be like, for the chances are vanishingly small that an immaterial state would be even remotely
like anything we’ve ever experienced during our material existence. Forget about experiencing
anything through the senses, the emotions, or thoughts, for we’ve seen that these depend on
biological processes, which in turn depend on a living, physical body, which at physical death
ceases to be part of us. Moreover, to describe, with emptily glowing adjectives like “sublime,”
“glorious,” and “perfect,” a state which no living person has ever experienced, doesn’t help in
the least. It merely prompts us to admonish the describers: You make pretty noises, but you
tell us nothing. For indeed you know nothing, because you’re in no better position than anyone
else to know the unknowable. You’re neither seekers of truth nor teachers of wisdom; you’re
contemptible pretenders, mere entertainers! Even if we suspect that an immaterial after-death
state might exist, we’ve no idea how we ought to prepare for it, or even if preparation is
possible, let alone necessary. For the revelations of mystics, prophets, and priests are all
stubbornly rooted in references to familiar material existence. What have scriptural allusions
to material objects like trumpets and harps, chariots and swords, fountains and bridges, blood
and fire, virgins and palaces, streets of gold and gates of pearl, to do with the immaterial, for
the love of sanity?
If we’re honest, we must admit we can’t know the answers to such questions, or even
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know whether there are answers, with even the slightest degree of certainty. Still, we run our
daily lives without certainty, so we may feel free to venture an educated guess as to what
seems most probable. Perhaps one of humankind’s many religions happened to get it right,
and soul goes to a dim and quiet realm of repose in Hades or Sheol, or daily wages glorious
battle at Valhalla. Maybe soul is judged and sentenced to spend eternity in Paradise or Hell, or
merges with the cosmic mind, or transmigrates to reincarnation in a new body, schlepping its
karma with it.
These are all pure conjecture. While there is endless wonder and discussion of them,
there’s no verifiable, unambiguous evidence for any of them. Perhaps it’s all just wishful
fantasy, a groundless hope born of a senseless dread of final oblivion. Yet why fear oblivion?
Why not anticipate it instead as the ultimate release from worry and suffering, the best slumber
we’ve ever had, a blissful passing from the lifelong struggle of being to the supremely serene
peace of not being? If there’s anything beyond this, then we’ll each find out when we get
there, and either deal with it or be dealt with by it, whatsoever it might be. Curiosity about the
unknown is a normal, healthy, and occasionally enlightening or profitable pursuit; but obsession
with the unknowable is pointless folly.
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Chapter 6: Being
Human beings. Ha! Humans are animals. We’re part of a menagerie of living creatures
that can move at will and under our own power from one position to another. We take in
carbohydrates and oxygen, which combine in our cells to produce the energy we need for
movement and other functions, and we produce carbon dioxide and water as waste products of
this controlled oxidation. So, apart from the fact that we aren’t plants, fungi, bacteria, or rocks,
what makes us so special?
The Essence and Justification of Being
Specifically, we’re animals belonging to a class called mammals, so called because we
bear our young live (not in eggs) and suckle them when they’re infants. We mammals are
warm-blooded, which is to say we maintain a fairly constant internal body temperature, and
thus—unlike cold-blooded fish, amphibians, and reptiles—we can sustain high activity levels
even when the ambient temperature drops. Assisting in this temperature control is a layer of
hair that covers most of our bodies’ surface; exceptions to this are our marine cousins, whales
and dolphins, who instead have a layer of insulating blubber under their skins.
More specifically, we’re mammals belonging to the order called primates. As primates,
we’re characterized by well developed hands and feet (in contrast to the clawed paws, hoofed
feet, or flippers of other mammals) and by our shortened snouts and large brains. As a result,
we can grasp and manipulate objects firmly and precisely without puncturing or tearing them,
we have unobstructed forward binocular vision, and we have enough ingenuity to devise
solutions to simple problems.
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Most specifically, we’re primates of the family known as hominids, who alone among
the primates walk fully upright and have fully opposable thumbs, and who also have the largest
brains of any animal, calculated as a percentage of body mass.22 And as modern humans, we’re
the only surviving species of the hominid family, the rest of whom became extinct more than
ten thousand years ago.
We aren’t the largest, fastest, strongest, most agile, most physically durable, most
prolific, or longest-lived of all creatures. However, we’re the only mammals with a speech
apparatus configured in a way that allows us to utter consonant and vowel sounds in rapid,
controlled succession, plus advanced speech, auditory, and associative centers in the brain,
which together have enabled us to develop highly elaborate spoken language. And we’re the
only animals with the brainpower to contemplate, not just our own immediate basic needs, but
also complex symbolism (e.g., writing, numbers, geometric figures, money), abstractions (e.g.,
past and future, origin and destiny, purpose and value, civilization and justice, evolution and
extinction, good and bad, spirit and God), and reason (methodical association, deduction, and
induction). And, as far as we know, we’re the only creatures on Earth able to turn our
brainpower inward to contemplate both the workings and the limits of our own minds, as well
as our own existence as individual temporal parts of a greater continuous whole. This unique
power to contemplate the implications of our own existence is our justification for
distinguishing ourselves from other species, not just as human animals, but as self-aware and
22 Elephants and whales have larger brains in absolute terms, but they also have enormous body mass, which
consumes some brainpower for its control. Humans incorporate a greater percentage of their body mass (about 2
to 2.5 percent) into their brains than any other species, and thus have the reserve mental capacity to engage in art,
science, industry, politics, religion, and philosophy.
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self-contemplative human beings.
The Importance of Being
All this to justify the concept of being! “Being” is not just a tag-on title to make us feel
important. It is important. The unique qualities of being are likely at least partly responsible
for our own species’ survival, out of all the other hominid species who succumbed to extinction.
The components of being are what have enabled us not only to heal our sick, but to extend our
lifespan; not only to use language, but to preserve our ideas in writing and to communicate
instantaneously over long distances; not only to travel at will, but to design and build machines
that carry us faster than any cheetah and higher than any eagle.
The abilities of being empower us to have dominion over other creatures, to
domesticate them as pets, to harness them for labor, to cage them for amusement, to
exterminate them for convenience, to butcher them for food. But it is also this same state of
being that cautions us not to become abusive, either in our exploitation of the creatures that
serve us, or in our interaction with our fellow beings. (From this, we might infer that anyone
who fails to heed this caution is to that extent revealed as less of a being. And we might well be
right to do so, provided we remain mindful of our own failings as well.)
The components of being give us power to do great good—or great evil. But it is being
itself that offers us the discretion to understand the difference, and the concern and discipline
to act accordingly. It’s the understanding of being that prompts us, not simply to choose good
over bad, but to reject a lesser good in favor of a better one, or to commit a lesser bad to avert
a worse one, or to choose the optimum course from among available options, each comprising
portions of both good and bad. And it’s the burden of being that causes us to make such a
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compromise in full knowledge that we must live with the regrets of any negative consequences.
Further Implications of Being
Unequal Distribution of Being
As we noted earlier, the abilities to reason abstractly and to communicate our thoughts
to others are the primary factors associated with self-aware being. However, not all humans
share these abilities to the same degree. Some people are star athletes, some are skilled
artisans, and some are innovative planners. Some are great speakers, others are great artists,
still others have a greater than usual capacity for reasoning, and probably most have a fairly
even mix of mostly mediocre talents. Perhaps some might say this isn’t fair. But life isn’t fair. If
you have a complaint, register it with the manufacturer, whether you believe it’s Mother
Nature, Father God, cruel Fate, or something else. Here we’re simply discussing what appears
to be the reality of the situation, like it or not.
What clearly appears to be the case is that people are different; each of us has his or her
particular set of strengths and weaknesses. We must play the cards we’re dealt, and it seems
obvious that some people just don’t draw a high card from the introspection suit. As a result,
we get someone rich in ambition but poor in empathy, or maybe an otherwise super business
strategist who’d rather not be bothered with safety and health issues, or a fumbling drunkard
who’s aware of little more than his own craving. As thinking, feeling individuals they still get
basic credit for being human beings, though their final score might be somewhat below
average.
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Human Non-beings
There are some things which are human and alive, but which aren’t human beings,
according our basic “being” criterion of conscious self-awareness and introspective ability. Let’s
consider a few examples:
Groups of humans: A corporation is an entity owned and controlled by one or more individual
human beings. Thus, a corporation might be considered human in its general makeup, and may
even be legally considered the same as a human individual for tax purposes, considering the
corporation’s income separately from the incomes of its owners and investors. However, the
corporation itself isn’t truly alive as an autonomous biological organism. It isn’t truly a human
being with its own individual awareness, intellect, opinions, and civil rights. Human beings have
to eat, make rent or mortgage payments, make decisions about having and educating kids, and
worry about the quality of the air, water, and food they and their families ingest, whereas
corporations don’t. Corporations, as such, don’t worry about anything; any necessary
corporate worrying (which in most cases distills to such matters as profit, viability, and public
relations) is assigned to various individual human beings within it.
Much the same can be said of a non-corporate business or foundation, a union or guild,
a government, a political party, or a religious institution. The controllers of some organizations
assert that their organizations have opinions. But in most cases, the “organization’s” alleged
opinions are really just those of the few individuals who are its dominant leaders, who might be
eager to expend corporate funds to propagandize their own views, irrespective of a possibly
conflicting consensus of the organization’s general membership. The claim that an organization
comprising more than one individual has a human view and a will of its own is a fallacy of
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composition, which falsely attributes to the whole of an entity the properties of its parts.
Parts of humans: An extracted wisdom tooth, a circumcised foreskin, or a surgically removed
appendix or colon polyp is human; but it doesn’t qualify as a human being, since it isn’t self-
aware on any level. There should be no moral problem with unceremoniously tossing such
items into an appropriate waste receptacle. Attributing the qualities of a whole human being to
each of its parts would be a fallacy of division (a reverse image of the composition fallacy).
Brain-dead humans: A helmetless motorcycle accident victim, whose skull has been crushed
and its contents reduced to bloody pulp, is still human, and might even remain biologically alive
for a while. But he has permanently passed out of the realm of conscious being. Without a
functioning brain, there is no hope whatsoever of his recovery to consciousness. Whatever else
of him might still be salvageable can be bagged and tagged “organ donor.”
Pre-conscious embryos and fetuses: A human fetus at gestation week 22 has a beating heart
and can react reflexively to stimuli—but so can a fetal pig at the equivalent stage. It’s never
been conscious, and has at least six weeks yet before it could begin to develop enough of a
brain to experience a glimmer of conscious sensation, be it pleasure or pain. So if, in the
prospective mother’s or her physician’s opinion, there’s any reason to terminate the pregnancy
at this point, there’s no rational humanitarian case to be made against doing so.
“Heartless!” some emotion-driven readers might exclaim. But what it really is, is myth-
less. We’ve approached the issue objectively and forthrightly, on the basis of available relevant
evidence, and with as few unsupported preconceptions as we can manage. It’s where evidence
and logic lead when emotion and mythology aren’t allowed to muddle the reasoning. I grant
this might be a strange new approach to the subject for some.
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I also grant that some people strongly believe that the potentiality of a fetus to become
a self-aware being is a necessary point to consider. They’re free to believe this, and to be
guided by that belief with respect to themselves and their families. We haven’t done so here,
because we’ve concerned ourselves only with harm to existing awareness, which is to say, with
causing actual experienced pain, distress, or loss. The only existing awareness affected by
concern for a 22-week fetus is that of an overly empathic observer, not of the fetus itself.
Granted, empathy is a very desirable quality, but like many other good things it can be
overdone or misdirected. Empathizing with something that isn’t actually aware is like
empathizing with a hapless character in a novel, play, or movie: The feeling of empathy is
natural and real to the observer, but the object of the empathy—the seemingly experiencing
character—isn’t. Although the observer might experience an induced sense of loss, in such
cases no actual self-aware being experiences actual loss. Potentiality may be a necessary
consideration23 for those whose beliefs command it; but for everyone else, it’s an option, and
then only with respect to one’s own pregnancy.
23 Allowing potentiality as a factor introduces the problem that every ovum could be considered a potential being.
Thus, it could be argued that every human female of childbearing age should become pregnant at every
opportunity, in order to realize the maximum potential for new beings. This is a condition we observe in Third
World countries, where a high birth rate is needed to compensate for a high mortality rate. In a developed
country, it simply leads to overpopulation and the spread of urban slums, as in England following the Industrial
Revolution, and in India today.
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Part III: Real-World Implications
So, is there some significant lesson to be learned from all this mental meandering, or is
it merely a procession of ultimately pointless points? Actually, there are real implications
affecting the quality of our thinking and the reliability of its results. Coherent, evidence-based
reasoning enables us, at the personal, family, community, and workplace levels, to make better
informed and reasoned decisions on a more consistent basis, and thus to lead better lives with
respect to happiness, health, longevity, morality, justice, security, and prosperity. It doesn’t
guarantee perfect results every time, but it vastly increases our odds beyond what we could
expect from random chance, guesswork, or reliance on blind ideology.
But the most important implications of relevant evidence and sound reasoning have to
do with how we govern ourselves as a society and as a nation. To be fully competent at self-
governance, we need to be familiar with a variety of subjects—probably more than most
people have the time or inclination to keep abreast of. However, we can probably make a
better than average showing by becoming basically informed in two categories: politics and
economics. By basically informed, we don’t mean expert, but at least acquainted with current
issues and with the competing positions taken on them. By applying our evidence-and-reason
skills, we stand a good chance of sorting through which positions are in fair agreement with
reality and which aren’t.
Before we get into particulars, I should openly declare (as if you hadn’t already guessed)
that I have my own biases, and in many cases they’re somewhat different from the American
mainstream. I admit my biases are, like most people’s, partly influenced by emotion and
personal background. But, unlike many, I do listen to and try to understand opposing points of
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view—at least those I haven’t already heard countless times and long since found to be utterly
unsupported. Some of my views are better informed than others, but even those that aren’t
are mostly disciplined by evidence and reason, and steeped in introspection, none of which are
much in style in some quarters. This probably accounts in part for my intellectual departures
from the mainstream.
So, if your views and mine don’t exactly match, that’s not a big deal. My aim is not to
convince anyone to accept my ideas just because I claim they’re “how things really are,” but to
tempt you to use your own mind to explore the “and why.” I want to coax you to examine new
ideas with some criterion more vigorously and rationally discriminating than simply “I believe in
this” or “I don’t believe in that,” and to reexamine old ideas that might benefit from some
dusting off and updating.
So, let’s see what new light, if any, our previous discussion sheds on the real world of
the here and now. Let’s steer past transient topics that in a year or two we’d likely agree
weren’t really worth anyone’s time and attention, and concentrate instead on perennial issues
that have been a focus of importance and consternation for some time, and perhaps one or two
that are even now becoming prominent. Let’s see whether we can manage to break up any
intellectual (or ideological) logjams in the process.
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Chapter 7: Politics
You can fool too many of the people too much of the time.
–American author James Thurber
Many Americans—maybe even most—would rather not think about politics. We have
other more pleasant or personally urgent things on our minds: providing for a family; running a
business; saving for retirement; rooting for the home team. If we bother to vote, it’s only in the
widely hyped presidential elections every four years. Who has time for politicians? The
common perception is that the only ones who aren’t scheming crooks and liars are morons
incapable of holding a real job. But this is precisely the point. As it stands, our political system
discourages most good and competent people from running for public office. We can’t expect
perfection. Unfortunately, many in politics are dishonest, greedy, incompetent, or sociopathic.
But some aren’t. Our job as responsible citizens is to sort through the lot, to find the few who
are clearly superior—or at least less inferior—and do what we can to get the marginally better
ones elected and the really bad ones thrown out. Like it or not, we need to get involved, even if
all our time and energy allows is getting informed through the news, making a small
contribution to our favorite candidates and maybe putting up a sign or two in the yard,
registering to vote, and getting to our polling place on election day.
Aside from the “getting informed” part, the rest might consume all of an hour or so a
couple of times a year for most people. It’s a small price to pay to help make government
incrementally better—or, perhaps in many cases, to keep it from becoming significantly worse.
For inaction has its price, too. There was a time not so long ago, when want of a little extra
effort by a relative few—a few more votes in one state—might’ve tipped the balance to keep
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our nation out of a needless war that further destabilized a crucial region of the world, might’ve
kept our national budget deficit close to zero, might’ve allowed the nation’s longest continuous
stretch of prosperity in living memory to resume shortly after the “dot.com” bubble burst,
might’ve forestalled the worst economic calamity since the Great Depression. Make no
mistake: We pay a price for inaction. Acting in non-presidential elections is just as important,
and voting in primaries can help weed out the worst of the worst for the general election. In
the off-year election of 2010, many moderate voters failed to turn out, with the result that
extremists were able to pack many state legislatures and governors’ offices. They then
gerrymandered congressional districts, and rewrote election laws in an effort to keep
themselves permanently in power, despite that their non-factual ideologies run contrary not
only to reality but also to the will of the majority and the public interest. If we’re concerned
about our own well-being, we can’t excuse ourselves from getting informed and voting in any
election, whether the presidency is in question, or “only” members of Congress and state
offices, and local issues. Political decisions may be distasteful, but in the long run they’re
among the most important we ever make. With as many uninformed and severely misinformed
voters as are being stirred up by scare tactics, manufactured “facts,” and bogus reasoning, we
the soberly informed, as a matter of self-preservation, simply cannot afford to blow off our
responsibility at the polls.
As for getting informed—honestly and accurately through reliable sources—that’s
arguably the most important part, and what this discussion is mainly about. Whether we do it
methodically through evidence and reason, or haphazardly through ideology and guesswork,
makes the time and effort we put into it either worthwhile or worse than worthless. Issues and
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candidates change from one election to the next. However, there’s one thing on which we can
count: that the fear mongers, having nothing better on which to run, will trot out their time-
worn smokescreen issues, and use them to persuade multitudes of gullible voters to vote
against their own interests and well-being. So let’s have a thoughtful look at some of the most
common.
Smokescreen Issues
Smokescreen issues are essentially non-issues. They’re stock-in-trade ploys for
candidates with no real proposals to offer, or with problems to cover up, to harp on in the hope
of stirring up enough emotional frenzy to distract the gullible into voting against their own
interests.
Enemy Groups
Take your pick: different ethnicities, different beliefs; women, men; homosexuals,
transsexuals; immigrants; the handicapped; the young, the old; the wealthy, the poor, the
middle class; the educated, the uneducated; liberals, conservatives; capitalists, socialists;
people who look, dress, talk, or act “funny.” Then take your best shot at both defending their
rights to be accepted as equals into society, and at providing verifiable evidence and coherent
reasoning to show why they should be denied full participation in, or utterly rejected from,
society.
Bear in mind, though, that, with the exception of convicted criminals and the criminally
deranged, all previous long-term attempts to exclude this or that group from participation in
society have ultimately been defeated. Typically, defeat occurs when the assumptions
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justifying discrimination are found to be fraudulent, or the evidence “cherry picked,”
manufactured, or misrepresented. The general pattern is that defeat of discrimination is then
affirmed and sustained by after-the-fact evidence that experience of acceptance of the once
despised group into society hasn’t produced any of the dire effects predicted. The only
unhappy aspect of resolution is that the fear- and hate-mongers are then saddled with the task
of figuring out what other group to single out as a socially acceptable object of their
misanthropy.
Among the most recent manifestations is the so-called “Defense of Marriage Act.” The
DMA makes mandatory a legal definition declaring marriage to be restricted to the union of one
man and one woman, on the assumption that allowing other forms of marital unions will
somehow mysteriously degrade or destroy conventional marriage—the mystery being that the
degrading or destructive force is never explicitly identified, and its anticipated effects are never
described. We’re left to wonder just what it might be that DMA proponents warn about, yet
decline to specify, with the implication that everyone knows what it is, and anyone who doesn’t
know must be stupid. If we press the issue, confess our supposed stupidity, and demand an
answer, they either can’t or won’t tell us, or else toss us a red herring having no relevance to
the issue. It becomes evident that they don’t know either. If anyone—particularly a politician
—makes a claim with the intent of compelling the rest of society to comply with it, then he or
she should be able to support the claim with verifiable evidence and coherent reason, and
defend the claim against reasonable challenge. Groundless fear and prejudice might stampede
the gullible, but it can’t sway thinking people—at least not for long. The same vague claim had
been made decades earlier about interracial and interfaith marriage, and its threats turned out
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to be just as empty then. To my knowledge, there has never been a satisfactorily rational
answer to the question, “What, exactly, is there about gay marriage that endangers
conventional marriage; what’s the specific nature of the alleged damage; and what’s the cause-
and-effect mechanism by which the damage is inflicted?”
Flag-Burning
Flag desecration became an issue back during the Vietnam conflict and the ensuing
protests. It hasn’t been a significant problem since. But this doesn’t keep politicians from
dredging up this red herring to demand a constitutional amendment banning it, in the hope of
rousing the gullible rabble to this non-cause.
Ceremonial burning of the American flag is the accepted method of disposing of
damaged, worn, or badly faded flags that no longer serve the purpose of symbolizing a strong
democracy. But herein lies a point: The flag is only a symbol, not the substance or essence, of
our nation. The flag is neither the nation itself nor the principles that define and support it.
Among these principles are the freedom of speech and the right to petition government for
redress of grievances. Without its initiative to enshrine and protect these and other rights, the
United States of America might just as well have foregone the bother and cost of revolution and
remained colonies of the British Empire.
Burning or otherwise desecrating the nation’s flag as a way to express either or both of
these freedoms is a protected right in this country—provided one doesn’t create a safety
hazard, and provided one supplies one’s own flag for the purpose and doesn’t damage
someone else’s. Ironically, the flag symbolizes the rights of free speech and petition (among
many others). This is the flag’s only true value and meaning, without which it’s just a piece of
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cloth. So, if we deny the right to burn the flag in protest, then we trample the very thing the
flag symbolizes. In other words, those who deny the freedom the symbol represents in order to
preserve the symbol itself thereby render the symbol worthless, by effectively voiding its
meaning of “freedom.” They could do no worse by using it to wrap garbage.
In my experience (as an observer only, mind you), publicly burning an American flag on
American soil is intended to elicit a reaction, and it’s usually quite effective at that. However, it
typically gets a positive reaction only from the flag-burner’s support group, but draws a vast
negative reaction from everyone else, including many who might otherwise sympathize with
the protester’s cause. In other words, flag-burning may be a spectacular way to attract
attention, but it’s not a smart way for protesters to bring others around to their way of
thinking; indeed, the result would seem quite the opposite. Yet I think the right of free
expression must include the right to express oneself stupidly. If it didn’t, then every one of us
would be up on charges on a fairly frequent basis.
School Prayer
The issue of school prayer—officially organized group prayer as administered or
designated by teachers or principals acting as paid agents of government—comes up frequently
in some states, and not at all in others. It’s more prevalent where religion is loud, literal, public,
and perpetually at war with the stubborn evidence of science and history, where religious
leaders find it easy to hijack public schools in their quest to indoctrinate everyone’s
impressionable young. They fire up their support by loudly objecting to what they describe as
the heavy hand of godless government out to smother prayer in public schools.
In reality, nothing prohibits students or faculty from praying individually, quietly, and on
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their own initiative, so long as this doesn’t interfere with the educational process for which
public schools are funded by taxes on all citizens, including those who don’t share the
predominant local beliefs. Public-school teachers and principals, as agents of government, may
not order, coax, or even suggest that students pray, meditate, or undergo any form of religious
indoctrination, and may not create a situation in which students who choose not to participate
become subject to ostracism or abuse. In other words, school faculty in the paid service of
government may not “establish” any religion as officially prescribed, and thereby inhibit the
“free exercise” of other beliefs or non-belief.24
The constitutional restriction upheld by the Supreme Court is not a ban on non-
disruptive, voluntary, individual prayer. That’s a straw man erected by churchmen who, not
content with peace, tolerance, and brotherhood, crave an adversary to justify their existence,
and by corrupt politicians to justify their election.
Socialism
Socialism is an economic plan in which the means of production are publicly owned and
controlled by government, in contrast to capitalism, in which the means of production are
privately owned and controlled by individuals. So, if socialism is an economic system, why is it
grouped here under Politics instead of Economics? It has to do with socialism’s having become
identified with communism (a theory of collective ownership and control), after Marxists
overthrew the Russian monarchy and in 1922 established the “Union of Soviet Socialist
24 Amendment I to the U.S. Constitution reads, in part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” This provision and others in the same amendment have
subsequently been interpreted by courts as necessarily applying to all branches of government at all levels.
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Republics,” or “Soviet Union” for short. In practice, the theory never really materialized in the
benevolent way Karl Marx had envisioned (probably because Marx had been too naïvely
charitable in his estimation of human nature with regard to political ambition). What emerged
in the U.S.S.R., instead of a benevolent dictatorship of the proletariat, was a brutally
oppressive, aggressive, anti-religious, paranoid and truth-averse25 regime, which was
communist only in name and socialist only in an extreme totalitarian aberration of the concept.
Thus, the word “socialism” became identified in many American minds as synonymous with
oppressive totalitarian politics and the antithesis of liberty. The extreme sort of “socialism”
practiced in the Soviet bloc, and later in Mao’s so-called People’s Republic of China, is indeed at
least as much political as economic.
Communist-bloc radical socialism contrasts starkly with the more genial and benevolent
forms of democratic socialism as practiced in much of western Europe and elsewhere. Indeed,
socialism is the basis of some very popular programs in the United States, such as Social
Security and Medicare, national defense, law enforcement, emergency response, public
education, public roads, basic research, food inspection, drug testing, bank regulation,
agricultural subsidies, and many others. Socialism in this normal sense of the word isn’t
incompatible with liberty, democracy, or capitalism. It’s commonly used to perform necessary
or desirable tasks for which the profit motive either is insufficient or in some way undermines
the public interest. Prudently applied, socialism not only doesn’t interfere with healthy
prosperity, but can actually enhance our experience of it by lifting some onerous worries from
25 The erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had about as much in common with true socialism as the
German Democratic Republic had with democracy, or the People’s Republic of China with rule by the people:
essentially nothing.
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individuals’ shoulders.
The main point of bringing this up here is that we Americans need to shed our obsolete
notions about socialism, and overcome our knee-jerk association of the term with unmitigated
evil. We need to understand socialism for what it actually is in most of today’s world: an
alternative way of getting something necessary or desirable done, at public expense, when
capitalism either can’t do it at all or won’t do it as well.26 By shedding our misperceptions, we
can stop being the puppets of partisan pundits, reacting irrationally whenever they use
“socialism” as a buzzword to manipulate our feelings and judgment with nightmares of
totalitarianism. We can then calmly and matter-of-factly accept socialism as simply another
tool at our disposal, to channel resources to where they can serve the public well-being. It’s a
tool that developed democratic societies, including the U.S., have been using to mostly
beneficial effect for a century or more—except that Americans alone irrationally cringe at
calling it “socialism.” It’s now the 21st century—time to grow up and get real.
If a candidate bases his or her campaign on any of these smokescreen issues, pitching a
view for which the available evidence ranges from non-existent to diametrically opposed, it’s a
clear indication that he or she either has nothing real to run on, is trying to cover up an
underhanded scheme or severe failing of some sort, or else is hopelessly irrational and
dangerously delusional. The solution? Vote for whoever is running against the demagogue. If
there’s no challenger, or if the challenger is no better, then use the “none of the above” option
26 Steel industrialist Andrew Carnegie was an exception. He used a portion of his great wealth to build and stock
numerous free public libraries around the nation. However, he worked his labor force so long and hard that few of
them had the spare time and energy to better themselves through book-reading, free or not.
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if it’s available, or else write in your own name on the ballot, in an effort to deny the bad guy or
gal a majority of votes cast and call the race into public question.
Real Issues
Abortion
In a previous chapter, we discussed a rationale for understanding what constitutes a
meaningful concept of “being.” This exercise might serve the individual reader as an approach
to defending or rethinking his or her existing views on the subject of abortion rights.
One item we might note here is that those vehemently opposed to reproductive choice
and abortion rights typically label their cause as “pro-life” and their opponents’ as “pro-
abortion.” Now, I don’t know of anyone who considers abortion a positive experience that
every woman ought to try. It’s an undesirable option that serves, not as a prime choice, but as
a last resort. At most, abortion seems the lesser of two bads in the earnest opinion of many,
and most thoughtful people would probably concede that an informed person of child-bearing
age ought to be allowed, in good conscience and without interference from politicians, to
choose whichever of available options he or she personally considers the least bad. So, no,
“pro-abortion” doesn’t seem to apply to any real person or attitude; it’s a made-up position to
portray in an unfavorable light those who don’t share the anti-choice opinion.
As to “pro-life,” the term would seem to apply not only to “anti-abortion,” but also to all
categories of “anti-death” generally. Is the self-proclaimed pro-life advocate also anti-war and
anti-capital punishment? Is he or she categorically opposed to the use of deadly force even for
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defense of self and innocents? For that matter, is he or she anti-hunting? Does he or she eat
only things that are found dead and don’t have to be killed? If not, then pro-life is not truly the
appropriate term. For a person who abhors the thought of aborting an under-23-week-old
fetus incapable of consciously experiencing pain or pleasure, but a person who favors military
action over diplomacy, or who finds capital punishment appealing, specific applicable terms
would seem pretty much limited on the “anti” side to “anti-abortion” or “anti-choice,” or on the
“pro” side to “pro-meddling-in-others’-affairs.” But for a handy, general term that would serve
in any case, “hypocrite” would seem an honest fit.
Creationism
Our previous discussion of a skeptic’s reasoning, concerning the qualifications of God to
be creator of the universe, is probably sufficient example of exploring the path less taken, in
matters in which one viewpoint is widely taken for granted and other possibilities are not even
mentioned, let alone explored.
Gun Rights
The National Rifle Association trumpets “The right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed” as its justification for claiming an absolute right of all citizens to acquire
and use any weapons they desire without answering to any authority. The NRA’s quoted
excerpt of Amendment II to the U.S. Constitution is intended to sound like an unqualified
blanket guarantee of unrestricted gun ownership to all citizens of the United States. However,
before we unquestioningly accept the NRA’s position, there are some facts we ought to chew
on.
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The particular clause the NRA cites is their favorite part of the Second Amendment.
Now, if that’s what the nation’s founders truly intended, they certainly would have left it that
way. But they didn’t. The full amendment states,
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
The opening phrase, “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state,”
which the NRA deliberately omits, is the sole explicit justification and qualification for
Amendment II. It clearly frames the constitutionally protected purpose of bearing arms in
terms of service to the state. Not hunting, not self-defense, not protection of personal
property, not target practice, not playing soldier, not making a racket on the fourth of July, and
most certainly not getting rid of duly elected officials or other people we don’t like.
But even in this very short, one-sentence amendment, a couple of terms bear critical
scrutiny. To clarify what’s meant by “a well regulated militia,” we must refer to the two other
places in the Constitution where it’s mentioned:
Article I, Section VIII, establishes the power of Congress “[15] To provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;” and
“[16] To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia . . . reserving to the States
respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”
Article II, Section II, states: “[1] The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual
service of the United States . . .”
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Further relevant points include the following:
The meaning of the word “infringed” has significantly evolved since 1787. Nowadays, it’s
commonly assumed synonymous with “encroached upon” (perhaps suggesting to some,
“weakened around the fringes”). But this is a relatively modern interpretation. The word
derives from the Latin verb infringere, which means “to destroy.” By analyzing a variety of texts
from the era when the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were being written, language
historians have found that the accepted meaning of “infringed” was then much stronger than
today, closer to “defeated” or “invalidated” than to merely “encroached upon.”27 Thus, we see
the intention of the framers of Amendment II was to forbid destroying, defeating, or
invalidating the right altogether; it was not at all to imply that the right couldn’t be subject to
reasonable conditions, regulations, and restrictions.
Beyond this, it’s quite likely the framers intended the amendment to be somewhat
vague, to allow future generations to adapt it to conditions that might later arise. Certainly,
they could foresee some changes, such as the opening of the western frontier and the gradual
civilizing of the stabilized areas behind it, and perhaps the prospect of a musket in the hands of
a mentally unstable frontiersman struck them as an acceptable risk. But they couldn’t have
foreseen the invention of high-capacity automatic firearms or of chemical and nuclear
weapons,28 let alone their unrestricted availability to criminal gangs, terrorists, drug-addicts, the
27 That language changes over time shouldn’t surprise anyone who’s read material written half a century or more in
the past. To cite just one example, in the late 18th and 19th centuries, the word “welfare” meant “well-being,”
quite different from its late 20th century identification with “socialist charity.”
28 The founders were doubtless already familiar with early forms of biological warfare, such as the European import
of smallpox inflicted on the indigenous population—clearly a weapon of offense only, not defense.
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mentally deranged, and the unsupervised young. Nor could they have anticipated the rapid
mass transport of weaponry, from a jurisdiction with lax standards, to one in which stricter
rules are necessary to the constitutional obligations of insuring domestic tranquility, promoting
the general welfare, and securing the blessings of life and liberty to those who prefer not to
bear arms as well as to those who do.
Owing to reluctance of the states to fund and maintain militias, in 1903 the militia’s
function and upkeep were taken over by the National Guard. The Guard’s local units are still
normally under the authority of the states’ governors, but can, if needed in the national
interest, be placed under the authority of the President. Thus, the militia’s functionality
remains intact, though its support now comes from higher up, with uniforms, equipment,
weapons, and ammunition being furnished at taxpayer expense rather than out of militiamen’s
own pockets.
These are the facts of the matter. Like them or not, this is what they are. This is what’s
written in the Constitution, and how those who wrote it evidently intended it under the more
obvious influences of their time, as well as how the political reality has been updated with
respect to militias.
Now the question is, just what do these facts imply generally, as well as particularly in
the here and now? Upon the established factual basis, we can build a superstructure of
reasoning. Amendment II definitely applies to the well regulated militia (now the National
Guard). However, the much ballyhooed claim, that its guarantee must apply as well to people
outside this militia, isn’t borne out by a critical assessment. This doesn’t mean that people who
aren’t militia members don’t have a right to bear arms; but support for the claim that such a
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universal right is constitutionally guaranteed is far from clear, let alone robust. Still, there’s
another line of reasoning about this, which we’ll investigate shortly, after wrapping up the
militia matter.
Some try to argue either that the people are the militia or that the militia is the people.
But this is a classic oversimplification, a blanket statement that confuses the issue rather than
clarifies it. It fails to make the crucial distinction that, in reality, the militia is some of the
people, not all of the people. Some of the people are members of the militia, but some others
are not. Among those others are young children, the elderly or infirm, addicts, criminals,
otherwise unqualified, indifferent, conscientiously objecting, or simply too busy to participate in
militia exercises and missions. Consider that there might also be some of the people who feel it
their patriotic duty to mount an insurrection (say, to address a perceived injustice), while others
of the people (members of the militia) are obliged to suppress such an action. The category of
“the people” plainly overlaps the category of “the militia”—just as the category of “the people”
also overlaps “the insurrectionists” and all other categories of citizens as well. But to claim that
any two of these groups (or all of them) are one and the same is absurd.
Clearly, the well regulated militia is established, organized, controlled, trained, and
armed, either directly by government or under its authority. Militia members are given
training, are issued weapons, and act under the authority of government, while this is not true
of people who are not militia members. What the well regulated militia is clearly not is a
spontaneously formed gang of misfits who enjoy playing soldier, call themselves a “militia,”
choose their own “officers” who have no legal authority, and fancy their mission is to threaten
or overthrow the duly elected government and its millions-strong armed forces on account of
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any grievance, real or imagined. To take Amendment II in the context of Articles I and II, it
would appear that, strictly speaking, the purpose and guarantee of the uninfringible right “to
keep and bear [though not necessarily to own] arms” extend specifically only to members of
the well regulated militia—not necessarily to freewheeling militiaman-wannabes, many of
whom might not measure up to real militia standards. Indeed, part of the well regulated
militia’s job is, according to Article I, to keep those more erratic amateur groups under control
(that is, to “suppress insurrections”). The power to extend the same or modified rights to
others, according to Amendment X, is “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Concerning this point, the Constitution’s framers certainly recognized a legitimate need
for frontier families to have firearms, both for hunting and for protection. Yet, as educated and
worldly gentlemen, the framers also understood that such need for weaponry would eventually
subside (if not entirely disappear) in former frontier territories that had become stable and had
been admitted to the Union as civilized states, where law and order presumably rule. The
framers understood that the need for personal firearms would vary from one area to another
as long as frontiers (or remote and isolated frontier-like conditions) existed. This is why they
left this particular point vague, and presumably up to state or territorial discretion.
When the framers were vague about an important point, it was for a reason. Number
one was conciseness; the Constitution was to be a brief, general, “framework” document, not
one overflowing with details, explanations, and exceptions. Another was that they simply
encountered irreconcilable differences of opinion among themselves, and couldn’t agree on
specifics. Certainly, a big problem of the time was that some of the pioneering steps being
undertaken in national democratic self-governance were brand new and untested, and would
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require the experience of a few generations to smooth out difficulties—for example, as to what
fraction of a free citizen should a slave count in proportioning a state’s representation in the
Congress. Sometimes, the framers might have considered an idea so obvious in their time that
it shouldn’t need an explicit statement—such as, to get from Boston to Philadelphia in a hurry,
you must either ride a horse or take a horse-carriage. Or something crucial in the future hadn’t
yet come to light—such as submarines, tanks, warplanes, and automatic firearms. Or they
viewed an issue as requiring local or situational discretion, and thus not suitable as a blanket
rule for the entire nation or under all conditions. Certainly some of these factors, and possibly
others, came into play during the formulation of Amendment II.
But in any case, we’re left to ponder this rather glaring point: If the phrase, “A well
regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state,” is not key to understanding the
rest of the amendment, why bother mentioning it at all? Why would James Madison
gratuitously insert that long phrase, if the shorter “The right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed” would, by itself, have been sufficient to his intent? Whatever the
answers, NRA leaders’ persistent attempt to pretend that Amendment II’s qualifying phrase
doesn’t exist suggests they realize it’s inconvenient to their agenda. And perhaps, in the course
of our inquiry, we’ve discovered why.
Note: The stream of reasoning in the previous item, “Gun Rights,” and the following one, “Gun
Control,” is continuous. Ideas developed in the second are rooted in, and constrained by, the
evidence and conclusions of the first. The two are intended to be read and understood as a
single unit. They’re separated here only to acknowledge the shift in focus, and to offer
opportunity for reflection before continuing—thoughtful reflection being an important part of
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the methodical examination of evidence and its logical implications, as opposed to the
emotional rhetorical disputes that usually dominate discussions of this subject.
Gun Control
In the United States, there’s a long-standing consensus (dating from colonial times) that
a right to private firearm ownership for lawful purposes, such as self-defense and hunting, or
even for recreational pursuits, such as target-shooting and collecting, is permissible, and in
some cases even desirable or necessary. So, it’s a plausible proposition that people who want
or need such weapons, and who can be relied upon to use them responsibly, ought to be free
to obtain arms suitable for their legitimate purposes.
However, there’s the problem of keeping guns out of the hands of those likely to use
them irresponsibly or criminally. This problem can’t and won’t be dismissed, since failure to
address it effectively has consequences that are costly, tragic, irreversible, and increasingly
widespread. Likely irresponsible users of deadly weapons include children without direct adult
supervision, the mentally deranged and violently disposed, the emotionally disturbed, the
dangerously delusional, the habitually intoxicated, and convicted felons. In all cases, the
primary effort should be universal screening of all prospective customers in all legal public and
private venues for sale (or other transfer) of firearms and ammunition. This would screen out
the under-aged and those with records of criminal activity, chronic substance abuse, or
sociopathic disorders. By requiring that gun owners properly secure their weapons and
ammunition against misuse and theft, and by disrupting the flow of weaponry to the criminal
realm, the numbers of both illicit weapons in circulation and the traffickers who circulate them
would gradually dwindle. While this wouldn’t eradicate violent crime, it would make it
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progressively more difficult and less lucrative, and thus less attractive to some as a lifestyle.
Such a move isn’t perfect. It might inconvenience sober, law-abiding gun owners, but it
wouldn’t infringe their legitimate rights. It could help trace stolen weapons and restore them
to their rightful owners, and would be a significant step to reducing gun-related fatalities.
Putting up with the inconvenience of two or three minutes’ delay in making a gun purchase
seems an acceptable trade for saving thousands of lives.
The case of “mass-murderers” is special, in three ways. First, many of these don’t own
their own weapons, but manage to steal or “borrow” them from the rightful owners who’ve
failed to secure them properly. Second, their weapons of choice are military-style, mass-killing
weapons, whose only legitimate purpose is military combat. Such weapons enable them to kill
large numbers of people in a short time, and to generate their own covering fire, without
frequent reloading. Third, they’re often suicidal: Their sole objective is death; their plans do
not include mercy, escape, or surrender; and few are responsive to reasoning or bargaining. As
a result, their premiere performances in many cases also turn out to be their final ones. Their
families, friends, and coworkers often describe them as quiet, good-natured, thoughtful, “not
the type” to commit such acts. For this reason, it’s hard to identify members of the massacre
mentality beforehand, or to institutionalize them against their will even if early behavioral clues
are detected. Consequently, screening isn’t a sufficiently reliable option in their case. Barring
psychiatric screening of the entire population, the only widely effective preventive measure
would be to remove the source of mass-murderers’ weapons of choice. This would entail
banning civilian possession of operational weapons having no legitimate civilian application that
couldn’t be more efficiently and safely managed with a six- or seven-shot handgun, a ten-shot
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bolt-action game rifle, or a breech-loading shotgun, in the hands of a competent marksman.
Such a measure wouldn’t eliminate multiple murders, but it would drastically cut the numbers
of both incidents and victims, without infringing anyone’s legitimate rights to self-defense,
hunting, and recreation.
Truly law-abiding and mentally sound individuals might be inconvenienced by
precautions—just as drivers are inconvenienced by having to renew their licenses and vehicle
registrations. But in the end, the right to procure and use weapons appropriate to legitimate
civilian purposes would be upheld for truly law-abiding and responsible adults.
In summary, according to my understanding of a detailed close reading of the parts of
the Constitution and its Bill of Rights relevant to this issue, a general right of non-militia
personnel to keep and bear arms is not guaranteed by Amendment II, but is accessible through
Amendment X, with the consent of the states and subject to any conditions or restrictions each
state may deem necessary and proper. This might not be what many Americans would prefer
to hear. But here it isn’t anyone’s personal opinion that matters, but the methodical approach
to distinguishing what’s consistent with reality from what isn’t.
There’s one more important point to clear up, specifically, rhetorical remarks by Thomas
Jefferson and others regarding the desirability of an occasional bloody revolution to shake
things up and undo systemic corruption. Such remarks are not part of the U.S. Constitution—
and with compellingly good reason in this day and age. A second revolution in an infant
republic isolated along the Atlantic coast of North America in the early 19th century would have
been just another jolt in an already bumpy road for early Americans, and wouldn’t have ruffled
a feather elsewhere. But in 21st-century America, a revolution that would shatter the existing
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intricate political and economic framework of what has become the world’s primary
agricultural, industrial, military, and economic power could well prove catastrophic to
civilization, casting the entire world into crippling depression, devastating famine, unrelenting
war and tribal rivalry, and a new dark age. Both as a nation and as a species, even the least
fortunate among us have too much to lose. Even if things turn really sour, we’d be insane to
risk such an event.
Fortunately, to help keep things from turning sour, we have the ballot box, and both the
right and the responsibility to use it wisely and at every legal opportunity. And if this fails, the
U.S. Constitution provides for constitutional conventions as a passably orderly way to make
fundamental changes to government. A constitutional convention is a big deal, and has its own
pitfalls; therefore, the framers decided that it should take a supermajority vote even to get one
started. But even at that, it has a far greater chance of success, and with far fewer losses in
both blood and treasure, than an armed insurrection whose outcome would be utterly
unpredictable. Even if a successful revolution were somehow possible in today’s United States,
there’s simply no need for it, and no justification for it that outweighs the risk.
So much for the arguments. Now, in a final reflection on this topic, let’s return our gaze
to the National Rifle Association. Its mission for the past three decades has been to captivate a
fear-driven membership, by scaring them into believing that the NRA is the only thing standing
between them and swarms of black helicopters full of “jack-booted thugs” itching to confiscate
their guns. But lately, NRA members are getting wise to this cartoonish nonsense. The only
helicopters in evidence are those chasing criminals, evacuating victims, and training the militia
on weekends. Now would be a good time for NRA leadership to run a reality check on their
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mythology. Stop telling the dues-paying members what to think, and for a change listen to
what they actually do think: Stop treating us like morons; lose the paranoia and the
inflammatory rhetoric; only the crackpots buy into it anymore! And enough with the absurd
notion that the problem can be solved by putting armed guards in every school. The problem
isn’t only in schools; it’s in shopping malls, in theaters, in parks, in houses of worship, at clinics,
in the streets, even in homes—it’s anywhere and everywhere. Wake up, NRA, and get real!
Gun owners, like everyone else, need to think and work rationally and cooperatively to
help develop and implement realistic solutions. Gun owners in particular have a wealth of
knowledge to assist in this effort. Polls now indicate a majority of NRA members have been
awakening to the increasingly urgent, commonsense necessity of reasonable precautions and
restrictions that would reduce illicit gun traffic and deny the mentally unhinged easy access to
their mass-killing weapons of choice, while securing the right of truly law-abiding citizens to
responsible gun ownership. We probably shouldn’t hold our breath waiting for a sea change in
official NRA policy. But in any case, it’s already well past time for politicians to stop beating this
dead horse on behalf of a primarily gun-industry funded and controlled lobby, which has
departed from reality, reason, and credibility.
Voter Fraud
An exception to our pattern of discussing here only items of long-standing interest, this
issue has risen to national significance only since the 2010 mid-term elections, and most
particularly since 2013, when, in its Shelby County v. Holder decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
effectively crippled the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Fraudulent voting—voting more than once in an election, or casting a vote on behalf of
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an unregistered, deceased, or fictional person, for example—has constituted an extremely
small proportion of total votes cast in recent elections in the United States. It’s difficult, if not
impossible, to find an instance in which votes illegally cast outnumbered the winning margin of
votes, and thus threw the result into doubt. As long as things stay this way, it isn’t a problem
troublesome enough for voters to make an issue of.
But, oddly, someone is making an issue of it. State legislatures packed by conservatives
during the 2010 mid-term election have been trumpeting voter fraud as a motive for an urgent
overhaul of voting laws. The troublesome thing here is that these revisions don’t affect voter
fraud to a detectable degree—if only because the rate of voter fraud itself is barely detectable.
What the new measures have done is make it selectively harder for people to vote in precincts
where voting tends to be liberal-leaning—urban, working-class, minority, university, and (lately)
elderly neighborhoods. The states’ first line of offense is to ramrod laws through legislatures to
weaken unions, so that they no longer have the resources to compete against corporate
interests in campaign contributions and advertising. Other worrisome strategies include:
restricting early voting;
abolishing election-day registration;
requiring forms of voter identification that many voters (mainly the poor and the elderly)
often don’t have or don’t carry;
consolidating or moving polling places so that they’re inconvenient to access and cause
voters to wait in line for hours;
posting “poll monitors” whose job is to intimidate and harass voters;
instructing poll workers not to help lost voters find their proper precincts.
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In addition, unofficial measures have extended to “misplacing” or destroying absentee and
provisional ballots from target precincts.
Even more insidious is a recent plan hatched in several states to alter the electoral
college makeup in presidential voting. The scheme is to discard the accepted “winner-take-all”
(electoral votes) policy used in most states, and replace it with an apportionment of a state’s
electoral votes to different candidates. Now, without further details, this might seem a
reasonable and fair measure. But here’s the insidious part: This apportionment would not be
by the distribution of total votes in the state, but by congressional district, which systemically
favors the party in power at the state level as of the latest ten-year redistricting (currently, in
many states, the Republican party, as a result of the low-turnout mid-term election in 2010).
Periodic reapportionment is ostensibly to ensure proportional representation of a state’s
population in all of its districts, but in fact it’s usually used in an attempt to group liberal and
conservative precincts in such a way as to lock the incumbent legislature’s majority party into
power. And now, conservatives hope, they can lock themselves into the White House, despite
numerous polls showing rejection of their increasingly extremist ideology by a large majority of
Americans, often sixty to ninety percent, depending on the state and the particular issue. Had
such a plan been in place for the 2012 presidential election, the outcome would have been
reversed in favor of the Republican candidate, despite that the Democratic candidate received
over sixty percent of the popular vote. Democracy would have been nullified!
Voter fraud is a crime, but not a significant problem in recent American history. But
election fraud, committed, not by voters, but by government and election officials, is also a
crime, and is most definitely a problem, plotted and perpetrated by the very politicians raising
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the greatest fuss about voter fraud. Their banner of combating voter fraud is a scare-tactic ruse
to cover their real intent, either to commit election fraud under pretense of fixing something
that isn’t broken, or to rig the system to produce equivalent results. It’s an act of desperation,
committed by double-talking extremists who know they can’t be elected fairly on the issues,
but can win only by duping or shutting out significant sectors of the public.
Election fraud had been a problem in the past, particularly in states and districts that
supported racial segregation or opposed labor unions; but it had pretty much dropped out of
the picture until 2010. Now it’s a real worry again, and it should be teaching us a lesson about
the ethics (or lack thereof) of the more “fringy” people whom we’ve elected recently—or whom
we’ve allowed others to elect by not voting ourselves. It’s essentially an admission by the
perpetrators that they know they can’t win an election on the issues, and so have to subvert
democracy in order to stay in power. But it’s also a lesson that should motivate us—liberals,
moderates, independents, and sober-minded conservatives—to get into the habit of
intelligently exercising our right to vote in every election—primary, general, and special—
before it’s too late, and we find it’s been effectively nullified by an unscrupulous minority.
How Are We Doing at Self-governance?
We might be super-patriots, fly the flag, sing the national anthem, and so forth. But
that isn’t the question. The question is, “How well are we at doing our part in the process of
governing ourselves within our constitutional representative democracy?” Do we do it fairly
and consistently, in rigorous accord with the evidence of reality and coherent reasoning based
thereon? Are the principles enunciated in our constitution and expressed in our laws—
representational self-governance, equality of individuals under the law, protection of minority
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rights against tyranny by a majority, protection of the majority from undue influence by
minority factions controlling the major portion of the nation’s wealth and property—actually
carried out in practice? In protecting and promoting the well-being of the human beings who
constitute our society, do we have a realistic and consistent standard for distinguishing beings,
such as human adults and children, from non-beings, such as cattle, corporations, unions, and
embryos?
In practice, our record so far is spotty at best. In America’s proclaimed nation of liberty
and justice for all, many groups—Africans, Asians, American Indians, Hispanics and other non-
Nordic Europeans—have all been singled out for abuse in various forms and intensities. On the
religious front, Christian fundamentalists have long been at the forefront of a war of ignorance-
bred fear and hatred against not only Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Mormons,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, neo-pagans, and atheists, but also against mainstream Protestants, not to
mention scientists, historians, educators, writers, and artists. It took more than a century for
the unalienable Creator-endowed rights declared for all men to begin to apply also to women.
Homosexuals, long abused and unjustly lumped in with rapists and child-abusers, have only
recently been granted the dignity, rights, and protections enjoyed by everyone else. Our
shining principles have often seemed unattainable against the inclination of some, ruled by
generations-old prejudice, to stampede in the opposite direction, fairness and justice be
damned. Our culture has even shunned the poor, the mentally infirm, the handicapped, and
the disabled—our military veterans among them. It’s still a long, hard-fought struggle against
ignorance, illogic, greed, and, in the computer age, a flood of unchallenged misinformation. But
a look back over the history of the past two centuries seems to indicate we’ve been making
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significant progress in the long run. Bit by bit, generation by generation, reality is winning out
over timeworn mythology and mistaken ideology, as people find themselves having to confront
reality and often discovering it isn’t what they’ve been told. Unfortunately, our lawmakers
have often been the last to get the message.
The United States of America is nominally a pluralistic society that respects and protects
the rights of all citizens, at least in principle if not always in action or in every state. A pluralistic
society is one in which diversity is valued and differences in ethnicity, sex, orientation, and
belief are tolerated, and in which no individual human being may be denied any legitimate right
on account of these differences. Just and reasonable laws apply to all citizens; prestige,
ancestry, wealth, rank, and influence are not acceptable excuses for non-compliance by any
individual or group. To be true to its principles, a society’s civil laws must be universally applied
and must conform to a view of reality governed, not by mere opinion or prejudice, nor by
mythology, ideology, or phobia, but by factual evidence and coherent reasoning based thereon.
Obviously we aren’t quite there yet. There are still some large pockets of prejudice, and there’s
a powerful faction that wants to revert to Gilded Age “robber-baron” days, when wealthy
industrialists and speculators controlled everything including elections, while working people
and everyone else had to settle for scraps, and the only middle class comprised mainly
landlords, merchants, and professionals. Since the end of World War II, we’ve known the true,
broad prosperity of which our system is capable, and we mustn’t allow a relative few to take
this from us, either by stealth or by force.
We must be mindful of the real-world implications of just what the law protects and
why. For example, the purpose of our laws is, according to our Constitution, “to form a more
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perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty.” In other words, it’s to serve
the interests of society and the individual human beings it comprises. So, we must also
understand with some degree of precision what a human being is (and is not), and what specific
factors consistently differentiate beings (who are entitled to certain rights and subject to
certain obligations under our laws) from non-beings (for which there is no evidential or rational
justification for such entitlement or obligation). In addition, we must bear in mind that the
distinction between non-self-aware non-being and self-aware being is not a sharp line, and that
the natural events during the course of the transformation from one to the other do not occur
all in one magical instant. Rather, it’s a gradual shift from one level to another, during which
the actual status at any point in between is not clearly defined, simply because the particulars
of transformations between categories are far more difficult to define than the general
categories themselves—an inconvenient facet of reality with which category-oriented human
intellect must deal as best it can. So, our laws must be designed to acknowledge and
accommodate such uncertainty, by establishing realistic (that is, reasoned and evidence-based,
not arbitrary) boundaries for regions of uncertainty, in order to safeguard possibly sentient
beings from injustice. This much is now well within our ability with the knowledge of
neuroscience; we no longer have to guess at it, though we may refine it as our science
improves.
Individuals, of course, are free to concoct or adopt any beliefs of their choosing—
including beliefs having no basis in reality, or even beliefs that directly defy reality—so long as
the practice of such beliefs doesn’t result in significant threat or harm to others or to society.
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But the mere holding of beliefs, even with great devotion, doesn’t entitle the believers to
impose those heartfelt but unproved notions upon others, either by force of law or by any form
of pressure that encroaches upon those others’ legitimate rights to conduct their own affairs as
they themselves see fit and without undue interference. We are, as the saying goes, entitled to
our own opinions, but not to our own facts. In the service of people of all beliefs yet
constrained by a single common reality, only facts, and not opinions, are the legitimate criteria
of civil law. At least, that’s how it’s supposed to work, according to the framers of the
Constitution. As to when, if ever, it actually will work that way for everyone is anyone’s guess.
But if history is any clue, long-term momentum for the past four centuries has been on the side
of reality. So, like it or not, believe it or not, we’d best learn to live with it.
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Chapter 8: Economics
In the long run, the free market spontaneously corrects itself. —conservative economic maxim
In the long run, we’re all dead. —economist John Maynard Keynes
NOTE: I am not an economist. However, I’ve been interested in economics for some time, and
have taken courses in both micro- and macro-economics as recently as 2009. 29 My thoughts on
the subject are guided by acknowledged experts, ranging from the moderately liberal Paul
Krugman to the moderately conservative Gregory Mankiw. In addition, I’m informed by my
lifelong immersion in a history in which the theories of John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) have,
by and large, convincingly demonstrated themselves more consistently beneficial and more
accurately reflective of reality than their laissez faire30 competition.
We’re about to devote several pages to economics, which, like politics, is admittedly not
everyone’s idea of a fun read. Nonetheless, it’s a field of crucial importance to us all, for our
29 I count myself extraordinarily fortunate to have been taking a class in macroeconomics at the very time the
“Great Recession” struck in 2008-9. Our class enjoyed (to use a charitable term for the experience) a real-time,
real-world rollercoaster demonstration of the very principles we were discussing—and then some! I think I can
honestly say that observing the phenomenon under laboratory conditions, so to speak, took some of the panic out
of it. That’s why I recommend taking a course in the subject, and why I’m writing this piece as a poor but perhaps
practically adequate substitute for those for whom the preferred choice isn’t a ready option.
30 Laissez faire policy advocated by the administration of Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929), proposed minimum
government regulation of banking, business, and speculation, in the belief that unfettered capitalism is self-
regulating and inherently works for the common good.
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own financial and material well-being, as well as that of our neighbors and nation, depend on
the good and bad decisions our elected representatives and appointed officials make about it.
Therefore, it’s in everyone’s interest to acquire enough of an understanding of economics to
trigger a mental alarm whenever political demagogues make simplistic ideological claims that
are completely at odds with reality. Besides, when framed as a question of “I’m no banker or
broker, so what’s in it for me?” answered by “A lot more than you imagine,” even the most
seemingly boring topic transforms into one of intense interest. So, it’s with this thought in
mind that we’ll delve into a what we may find to be a most fascinating subject!
Our discussion won’t be intensive, but will cover basic ideas and dispel common myths,
of which responsibly informed citizens ought to be aware. We’ll also outline some important
but easily comprehensible nuts-and-bolts issues, examine a few problems and propose some
solutions, all in layman’s terms, and with just enough simple math to illustrate a point or two.
Even so, the reader may find his or her eyes glazing over on occasion, so it’s wise to take this
material in manageable doses. When you find your mental buffer is full, take a break to process
its contents before continuing. Note, however, that it’s advisable to read this chapter in the
sequence it’s presented, since each part builds on those preceding. Skimming parts in random
order could very well leave the reader hopelessly bewildered and frustrated. So, let’s begin at
the beginning.
A Tale of Two Ideologies
Probably most readers of this material have at least heard of a couple of iconic figures:
Karl Marx and Ayn Rand. At the outset, I should clarify that I’m not a disciple of either, but,
taken together, they present an intriguing pair of opposites.
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Marx (1818-1883) is most noted, along with socialist advocate Friedrich Engels (1820-
1895), for developing the socio-economic theory of communism, notably most popular among
the downtrodden and (at one time) sympathetic intellectuals. Marx’s theory failed almost
immediately in practice, as adopted and modified beyond recognition by the fledgling Soviet
Union in the early 20th century; but its brutal enforcement apparatus took seven decades to
collapse. Yet although very mistaken about the real-world prospects for his own idealistic
system, Marx accurately predicted some of the troublesome shortcomings of its burgeoning
competitor, free-market capitalism. Unfortunately, he didn’t realize that these weaknesses
could be remedied.
Rand (1905-1982) held a view diametrically opposed to that of Marx. She composed
very engaging and intriguing fiction, illustrating an ideology—perennially popular among
impressionable college sophomores—based on the one-dimensional notion that entrepreneurs
are all objectively clear-sighted and fair-minded, and that anyone who questions their actions
and motives is lazy, stupid, or socialist. Rand also wrote seriously about economic theory, but
her theory was seriously at odds with historical evidence. Her view of human psychology was
innovative and insightful, but in the main fatally distorted by her idealistic vision of the
superhuman virtue and flawless judgment of free-market capitalism’s entrepreneur class. Like
Marx, she was too enchanted by her own vision to pay much attention to reality. Whereas
Marx had failed to see capitalism’s potential, Rand chose to ignore its pitfalls.
Many people have come to hold an opinion, either that capitalism is good and
socialism is bad, or vice versa. But in a majority of cases, their reasons for either evaluation are
fragmentary, misinformed, politically dogmatic, and seldom coherently rational. When it
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comes to economics, unlike idealists Marx and Rand, I’m a pragmatist. I’m for whatever system
works best at a particular task, so long as it’s ethical. Capitalism and socialism aren’t mutually
incompatible; they’re just different tools to accomplish different objectives under different
conditions. Indeed, the most successful nations of the developed world (including the United
States) use the two in combination, each for tasks for which it’s deemed best suited. Capitalism
is employed wherever innovation, competition, and profit motive serve the public interest, as in
the development and production of consumer goods and services at competitive prices.
Socialism is used for vital tasks for which a profit motive either doesn’t exist or would tend to
work against the public interest, as in defense, justice, and basic research. And in some
instances, socialism and capitalism work cooperatively, as in public contracting of private firms
for infrastructure projects or defense materiel. There are two major points to be made here.
First, taken realistically, capitalism and socialism are complementary, not conflicting,
approaches to various economic tasks. Second, most “isms” in their pure form leave much to
be desired when applied in the real world. Socialism must be diligently overseen by a
democratic process to prevent its becoming autocratic, and capitalism must be regulated, both
to curb abuse by an influential few, and to moderate its tendencies toward wealth stratification
and “boom and bust” cycles.
Economics is a topic often intertwined with politics. Partly for this reason, most people
are just as disenchanted with the one as with the other. Many at some point take an entry-
level course in microeconomics (economics concerning individual households, businesses, and
markets). Here they learn how forces of supply and demand interact neatly to establish a
natural pricing equilibrium in the marketplace, in a way that early economic theorist Adam
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Smith (1723-1790) described “as if guided by an invisible hand.” Having learned this bit of
magic, plus a few graphs and some simple algebra to quantify everything, they’re inclined to
guess this is all there is to it. Guess again!
Macroeconomics? What Is It, and Why Should It Interest Me?
Perhaps a majority of people understand how, in a free market, prices are governed by
production and consumption, and by competition and “elasticity”31 on both sides. But most are
mystified about what forces are at work at the macroeconomic level. At one extreme are those
entirely unaware even that there is a macroeconomy at work. At the other are those vaguely
aware of it, but lacking any realistic understanding of it. In many cases, their ignorance leads to
a fear that it’s a vast global conspiracy by Jews and intellectuals to confiscate guns, abolish
religion, and change the national language to Russian or Chinese or Spanish, for reasons that
are never quite clear.
Most Americans are in between. They take economics for granted, or else assume that,
like nature, it’s magic and under the control of God, or maybe the President. They don’t
understand what causes inflation or recession, much less how to remedy them. They spout
nonsensical reasons for what stimulates hiring and reduces unemployment. They have little
idea of what the Federal Reserve Bank does or why. Likely they’ve been told (and firmly
believe) that the solution to everything is simply to balance the national budget and cut taxes—
31 Elasticity is an economists’ term for the relative flexibility of supply and demand. Supply of plentiful items is
elastic, while the supply of scarce items is inelastic. Elasticity of supply is controlled by the supplier’s ability to
produce more (or less) of the product. Likewise, demand for essential items tends to be inelastic, but demand for
luxury items is elastic. We can live without prime steak, but not without food altogether. The market price of an
item is governed by the less elastic side of the supply-demand equation forcing the more elastic side up or down.
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not realizing that doing either makes it virtually impossible to do the other simultaneously and
humanely. Some aren’t even clear about the distinction between deficit and debt.32 The truly
alarming thing about all this is that many of these people are not only routinely elected to
public office, but even serve on committees charged with keeping lawmakers reliably informed
and advised about overall conditions and trends in the national economy, commerce, banking,
business, labor, wealth distribution, and the like.
Why is it alarming? Simply this: Macroeconomics is the study of what controls or
influences general prosperity—or the general ruin of runaway inflation or recession—at the
national and global levels. But though macroeconomic decisions are made in far-off places,
their results profoundly affect us all in both short and long terms. Having ignoramuses and
incompetents in charge is a formula for economic disaster. They may offer great
entertainment, but at an ultimate cost that we the people literally can’t afford.
Compared to centuries-old microeconomics, macroeconomics is a relatively new social
science. The large-scale methodical study of it didn’t begin until the 20th century, spurred
largely by events preceding or during the two Roosevelt administrations—progressivism and
business reform under Theodore (1901-1909), and work projects and social reforms following
the Great Depression under Franklin (1933-1945). Because this science is new, and because it’s
difficult or impossible to carry out tightly controlled experiments without risking the disruption
of millions of lives, there’s still much we don’t fully understand about it. Thus, macroeconomics
32 Deficit is the net loss for a particular budgetary period—typically a year. Surplus is a net gain for the period.
Debt is the algebraic sum of all accumulated deficits and surpluses over time. Balancing a budget doesn’t make a
dent in the debt; it just keeps debt from increasing. Debt can be reduced only by running a surplus—which would
mean that the budget is unbalanced in favor of revenues instead of expenditures.
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is still largely a trial-and-error process. And even this innately slow learning process has to do
battle with entrenched ideologies based either on dubious evidence or on made-up notions
contrary to evidence.
Even so, serious economists have managed to learn enough about macroeconomics to
be able to make fairly reliable predictions and to devise safeguards and regulations to keep
instabilities and abuses from getting out of hand—but only if government officials listen,
understand, and act accordingly. Properly applied, the principles learned so far can help to
moderate the spontaneously occurring erratic swings of a free market system. Therefore, it’s
important for us to understand something about it, so we can make informed judgments about
politicians’ stands on economic issues. Does their thinking reflect lessons learned over the past
century, or are they still reading from the “leeches cure all” book?
My general advice is for people to take an entry level course in macroeconomics. It’s
not all that difficult, makes sense, and explains a lot. That’s the best option, but perhaps not a
practical one for those whose schedules are overloaded already. So, the second-best option is
to learn what the best and worst common notions about economics are, and to understand the
evidence and reasoning (or lack thereof) for each.
Essential Concepts of Economics
Following are important concepts that experienced economists have developed to
account for their observations of the normal and abnormal functioning of market economies
under various conditions and influences. The observed phenomena appear consistent enough
to have been accepted by experts in the field as highly reliable, if not irrefutable fact. They’re
disputed by few, save for those whose theories are dictated by ideology rather than guided by
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observed reality.
Wealth and Money
What is wealth? Many people would probably say wealth is material goods, property,
and money. Some would add services to the list. Some might observe that wealth includes
what economists call “human capital,” personal training and natural ability. And some might
propose we include spiritual wealth as well; however, while material, service, and intellectual
wealth are to some extent calculable in terms of dollars and cents, spiritual wealth is not; it’s
wealth of an entirely different, non-quantifiable kind, and so can’t meaningfully be included in a
discussion of the observable and measurable effects of economics.
If we really want to home in on just what constitutes wealth, we’d have to say it’s
something from which we derive some sort of benefit. We derive material benefit—
nourishment—from the food we eat. We derive material benefit—comfort—from the
sheltering structures we call “home,” from the land on which they’re built, and from the energy
we use to heat, cool, and maintain such facilities. We also draw material benefit from
education—the increase in our personal store of information and our ability to evaluate,
analyze, integrate, and apply it. This makes us more knowledgeable, more skilled, better at
problem-solving and decision-making, and thus (presumably) more productive, all of which
increase our value to employers and clients, and hence our ability to attain a higher standard of
living. Thus, food, shelter, energy, and education are all examples of wealth, because we derive
measurable benefit from each of them.
What about money? Would you be surprised if I suggested that money isn’t real
wealth? Think about it: We can’t derive nourishment, comfort, knowledge, skill, or anything
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else directly from money itself (except perhaps heat, by burning it). We derive no benefit from
stacks of money sitting idle in a vault. Even money we invest to generate more money
ultimately produces no direct benefit to us, unless and until we exchange it for something truly
beneficial: goods, services, property, and the like.
So, what is money? Money is what’s called a medium of exchange, a token whose value
is artificial, but which is universally accepted in transactions of all sorts. Although it isn’t real
wealth, money is an easily transferable symbol of wealth, or, more precisely, a symbol of the
labor and expertise required to produce material wealth.
Who or what produces material wealth? Farmers extract it, in the form of grain, from
the soil; bakers convert the grain to bread; and truckers haul the bread to neighborhood stores,
so customers needn’t trek to a bakery to pick it up. Likewise, miners extract wealth, in the form
of ore, from the earth; smelters convert and refine the ore into metal; then, according to
designs developed by engineers, machinists form the metal into usable parts, assemblers join
the parts into components. Then, either line workers assemble the components into usable
products (e.g., appliances, machinery, cars) to be distributed to consumer markets, or else the
parts are shipped to specific locations where the final products (e.g., buildings, pipelines, ships,
tracks) are erected on site. What induces all of these workers to produce this material wealth?
The ability to acquire things they need and want. That ability comes in the form of paychecks.
Money. A symbol of the worth of their labor and skill contributed to the wealth-producing
effort. They provide their time and labor in exchange for this symbolic wealth, which they can
then readily exchange for various forms of material wealth to benefit themselves and their
families.
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So, what do non-producers, such as clerks, accountants, executives, and investors, do to
earn this monetary symbol of labor and skill? Although clerks, accountants, and other auxiliary
staff aren’t directly involved in production, their work is needed in order to handle and manage
inventory, cash flow, quality control, customer relations, and the like. The cost of their pay,
along with that of wholesalers and retailers, must be factored into the selling price of the firm’s
product.
Executives are the ones who provide the vision, the planning, and the organization to
design and build or expand the physical plant, to acquire resources, to recruit and train a work
force, to identify markets, and to arrange for transport of all materials and products from their
points of origin to wherever they need to go. Executives offer a special blend of conceptual and
organizational skills, specialized knowledge, and administrative know-how necessary to make
production happen, and to make it happen in such a way that the product can be sold for more
than it costs to produce. An executive’s combination of special education, connections, and
natural talent are scarcer and more expensive to develop than, say, the bolt-torquing, gauge-
reading, switch-setting, and lever-pulling skills of a line worker. In other words, the supply of
people with good executive skills is much lower than the supply of common labor. So, although
the firm needs fewer execs than laborers, its crucial need for executive skills is less “elastic,”
because those relatively rare skills make the difference between success and failure for the
firm. So, a firm must offer a somewhat larger salary to executives in order to attract and retain
their less common set of crucial skills.
Investors put up the capital to build the plant, to buy production machinery, and to
establish physical lines of supply and distribution. In a major industry, this investment is
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substantial, usually requiring many investors. Each investor assumes a certain amount of risk33
in return for the prospect of a return on his or her investment, in the form of interest on bonds
and dividends on stocks, both of which are made possible by the profit—the difference
between the selling price of a product and the cost of producing it—earned on the sale of the
firm’s products.
But still, all this money—this symbolic wealth, representing the labor and expertise
required to produce real wealth—doesn’t in itself yield real wealth. It must be exchanged for
goods, services, or property that someone else has produced or developed, in order to derive
any material benefit. Although we tend to lose track of this fundamental concept in our routine
tallies of dollars and cents, it’s one well worth bearing in mind in any discussion of economics:
The overall health of an economy depends on how well the distribution of wealth corresponds to
the contribution of labor and skill required to produce it. When this distribution is proportional
to the contributions of individuals to its production, the money these individuals earn flows into
active circulation, and dynamic general prosperity ensues. When it isn’t proportional, when
cash is hoarded by a relatively non-productive few, then there is less money in active
circulation, and the outlook becomes not so cheery, as we’ll see presently.
The Multiplier Effect
Insofar as it represents the power to purchase material wealth (goods, services, and
property), money has a potential value as a medium of exchange. Money’s value propagates
through the economy whenever it’s exchanged for something else, and thus is much greater
33 The risk is that businesses sometimes underperform, or fail altogether, in which case, instead of reaping returns,
investors may lose part or all of their investments.
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when it’s in active circulation, as opposed to resting quietly in a vault. A dollar in wages earned
by a construction worker goes to buy a burger for his lunch. The manager of the burger
emporium uses the dollar toward her next purchase of ground beef. The beef processor applies
the dollar toward his next shipment of live cattle. The shipper applies the dollar to buy fuel.
The fuel supplier applies the dollar to the next paycheck for a refinery technician. The
technician may take that dollar and put it into his retirement account. The account’s manager
invests the operator’s dollar so that it earns dividends, a percentage of which goes toward the
account manager’s commission as well. Every time monetary (symbolic) wealth changes hands
as it moves through the economy, material (real) wealth—goods and services—moves in the
other direction, benefitting each recipient along the way. Each time someone spends a dollar,
he or she receives something in return that is, to him or her, worth the expense. When money
goes out of active circulation, as when it sits idle in a bank’s reserve funds, it retains its static
value (minus inflation), but ceases to have the dynamic multiplier effect that contributes to
economic prosperity, until it’s eventually withdrawn and spent.
The Job-creation Cycle
Business operators are in business, not to create jobs, but to make money. Businesses
hire employees only when there’s enough money to be made by doing so to justify the expense
of hiring, training, and paying the employees. Business makes money by creating goods and
services that it can sell for more than the goods and services cost to produce. Its motive to do
this is demand, which consists of two things: a willingness to purchase what the business has to
sell, and the available cash or credit to pay for the purchase. The willingness to purchase may
come from government, from other businesses, or from private individuals, who need or want
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what the business has to sell. In most cases, private individuals get the cash from their
paychecks, which they get for selling their labor and skills to businesses that hire them to
produce other goods or services. A business operator is motivated to hire more employees
only when an increase in production makes it necessary. A production increase is warranted
only when an increase in demand is experienced or anticipated. Demand is high when most
people have cash available; people have cash available when they have regular income; and the
greater part of most people’s income comes from wages and salaries earned from their being
gainfully and productively employed.
When people have more cash available, demand goes up, businesses are motivated to
increase production to meet the demand (and thus make more money), and they must hire
more employees to increase production. Once in motion and barring any serious snags, this
cycle tends to continue upward toward prosperity. On the other hand, if demand sags, a
business can’t sell all it produces, and so reduces production. When it reduces production,
business needs fewer workers and lays some of them off. Laid-off workers have less cash
available, so if many businesses lay off their workers, consumer demand drops further,
production slows further, and even more layoffs result. Once moving in this direction on a
broadening scale, the cycle continues moving downward into recession. Job-creation goes into
negative territory, and the job-creation cycle becomes a job-loss cycle. It can be reversed only
by a significant and sustained increase in demand. Such an increase in demand doesn’t come
from ordinary consumers, since in a recession too many of them are too afraid to spend what
cash they may have, because they fear they may need it to survive if they find themselves
unemployed. Nor does it come from businesses or investors, even if they’re sitting on cash
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hordes, because doing so without universal cooperation offers only an increased risk of losing
any money they put into the effort, not making more. Usually, government is the only power
large enough to reverse the process of recession, short of simply allowing it to run its course,
with all the human cost that would entail.
Unemployment
Many people envision zero unemployment as the ideal toward which we must strive.
However, in a normal economy, an unemployment rate between five and six percent of the
workforce is normal. This is because it’s normal for people to be occasionally unemployed for
various reasons, such as scouting for a better location or position, acquiring education for
advancement or changing technology, or attending to family or health issues.
It’s also important to note that unemployment is linked to inflation. Artificial efforts to
reduce unemployment put pressures on job markets that cause inflation to increase. Attempts
to force unemployment below its normal equilibrium level become decreasingly effective and
generate more inflation. Thus, a pragmatic approach is to aim for the equilibrium level rather
than zero unemployment.
Inflation
Inflation is the tendency for the prices of goods, services, and labor to increase over
time, without a corresponding increase in their actual quantity or quality. Negative inflation—
deflation, or progressively decreasing prices—is dangerous, because it can trigger a destructive
cycle known by the justifiably fearsome name, “economic depression.” Since the precise
balance point between inflation and deflation shifts a bit from month to month, it’s better for
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government planners to employ policies that encourage slight inflation rather than zero
inflation, so as not to risk a negative drift that might go unnoticed until too late to correct.
Over time, and all other factors remaining stable, inflation normally affects prices and
paychecks to about the same degree, so individual purchasing power tends to remain fairly
constant, rising only with productivity. However, savings do not grow with inflation. Even
though interest on savings adds to their dollar amount, this is seldom enough to compensate
for the inflationary erosion of the money’s purchasing power. This is why long-term savers (for
major purchases, education, and retirement) prefer other media, such as certificates of deposit,
bonds, stocks, and mutual funds, which entail increased risk, but usually come out ahead of
inflation over time.
Interestingly, a small amount of inflation can actually be beneficial. Since inflation
increases prices, it encourages people to purchase things they need or want sooner rather than
later, since the expectation is that we’d have to pay a higher dollar amount for an item
purchased next year than for the same item this year. This incentive to buy sooner rather than
later helps keep cash in active circulation rather than lying idle.
Hyperinflation (annual inflation of ten percent or more), on the other hand, is very
destructive, eating away at the value of one’s hard-earned money at a furious pace, and inciting
people to spend all their money before it becomes worthless. Hyperinflation is more common
in countries where government is unstable and economic policies range from non-existent to
clumsily overbearing.
Taxes
Taxes are the primary means by which governments raise the money to pay their bills—
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for example, national defense, highways and bridges, general education, law enforcement,
emergency responders, the courts, legislative and executive staff, national parks, regulation and
oversight, service on debt. A thorough discussion of taxation would fill volumes, but here we’re
interested in just a few key points about how taxes affect other components of an economy.
Flat-rate income tax:
A flat-rate tax has the simplest tax structure: one rate fits all. A flat-rate system is one in
which every family pays the same percentage of its income in tax. For example, at a flat
income-tax rate of 20 percent, a family with an annual income of $20,000 owes $4,000
($20,000 × 20% or 0.2) in income tax, leaving $16,000 in after-tax income. A family with an
income of $100,000 owes $20, 000 in income tax, leaving $80,000 after taxes, and a family with
$1,000,000 in income owes $200,000 in income tax, leaving 800,000 after taxes.
Graduated income tax:
“Graduated” describes a tax system in which families with large incomes pay a higher
percentage of their income than families with modest incomes, and families with incomes
below a certain level pay no tax at all. To demonstrate, let’s use a hypothetical three-bracket
system (for simplicity’s sake), with a low-end bracket of 0% (no tax) for family incomes of
$20,000 and below, a middle bracket of 20% for incomes between $20,000 and $200,000, and
an upper bracket of 40% for incomes greater than $200,000. Under this system, a family with
an annual income of less than $20,000 owes no income tax at all.
A family with income between $20,000 and $200,000 owes a rate of twenty percent on the
portion of income over $20,000.
For instance, on an income of $20,005, the 20% tax rate applies only to the $5 that’s
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above the $20,000 line; twenty percent of $5 is $1, leaving them with an after-tax income of
$20,004.
For a family with income of $200,000, the tax would be 20% of $180,000 (the excess
over $20,000), for a tax of $36,000, leaving an after-tax income of $164,000.
In our three-bracket sample system, families with incomes over $200,000 are in the
highest tax bracket, in which they owe 40% of their income in excess of $200,000, in addition to
the 20% of income between $20,000 and $200,000. It breaks down this way: The first $20,000
is tax-free. The $180,000 of income between $20,000 and $200,000 is taxed at 20%, for a tax of
$36,000. Any income in excess of $200,000 is taxed at a rate of 40%. If the family’s income is
$200,005, then the tax is $20,000 x 0% = $0, plus $180,000 x 20% = $36,000, plus $5 x 40% = $2,
for a grand total tax bill of $36,002, leaving an after-tax income of $164.003.
A common misunderstanding:
Some people who are “on the borderline” between a lower and a higher income bracket
purposely keep their incomes below that level, because they labor under a misunderstanding
that increasing their income just a dollar or two into the next higher tax bracket subjects all of
their income to the higher tax rate. As we’ve just seen, it does not. Earning one dollar above a
tax bracket’s minimum level does not affect the tax burden on amounts earned up to that level
in any way; it imposes the higher tax rate on only that one extra dollar. Each bracket’s tax rate
applies only to the portion of income that exceeds that bracket’s minimum level, not to any
income below that level.
The graduated income tax is more complicated than the flat tax, but is both fairer to
taxpayers and a far more effective way for government to gather the revenues it needs to
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operate without placing a crushing burden on anyone, least of all those of minimal or modest
means. Some critics often characterize this as “soaking the rich” or “punishing success.” But
from a fairness standpoint, it’s a way for the economic system to demand a disproportionate
“price” from those who derive disproportionate benefit from the system. Or from a pragmatic
standpoint, it’s simply a way for government to acquire the greatest portion of the cash it
needs from those with the greatest ability to supply it, which is to say those with the greatest
surplus of cash in excess of what’s needed simply to survive and to prosper moderately. In
addition, a graduated tax system serves other useful purposes, at least one of which (the
multiplier effect of money in active circulation) we’ve already mentioned.
Progressive versus regressive taxation:
A tax is progressive if it reflects the taxpayer’s ability to pay, as with income tax; it’s
regressive if it’s linked instead only to what the payer owns or spends, as in the case of property
or sales tax. The difference is significant in the effects each type of tax has on different sectors
of the economy.
A progressive tax places a greater dollar-value burden on those who have larger
incomes, and may even absolve those with near-poverty level incomes and below of any
income-tax burden. Some critics berate such a system as taxing the wealthy into poverty, or of
depriving the poor of a personal stake in the system. In reality, the poor have the same
fundamental stake as everyone else: survival. As for the wealthy, some individuals suddenly
find themselves sunk in poverty as a result of unforeseen calamities or their own ignorance or
unwise choices; but it’s mathematically impossible for a progressive tax system, which imposes
a burden only on income above poverty level, to tax anyone into poverty—whereas a flat or
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regressive tax can indeed do just that.
A regressive tax system tends to place the greatest burdens on those who spend the
most or who own the most property. A wealthy person may well spend more dollars than a
poor person, but there’s a catch: Both must spend about the same amount to acquire the
necessities for basic survival. But having done this, the poor person’s income is virtually
exhausted, while the rich person has barely dented his, and can afford to spend some of the
rest on luxuries, donate some to charity, and put the rest into savings and investments to
generate still more income. The upshot is that, although the rich person spends more dollars
than the poor person, the rich one needs to spend a much smaller percentage of his or her
income than the poor one must; thus, a regressive tax places its most significant burden on
those with the least ability to pay.
Deadweight loss:
This is a term economists use to identify a loss in the calculated efficiency of the market
system whenever a tax or some other non-market influence skews supply and demand curves
away from their natural equilibrium. In the big picture, however, this supposed loss typically
turns up as a gain elsewhere, most often in the form of government jobs and services, but in
some cases also as incremental advances in public health, safety, security, and quality of life,
which can hardly be considered “dead weight” by any thoughtful individual.
Common Myths about Economics
It’s understandable that many people are underinformed or misinformed about
economics. What’s surprising is that many people in banking, business, government, and other
positions requiring up-to-date understanding of the topic, cling to ideologies long discredited by
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abundant historical evidence. If today’s doctors practiced medicine this way, many would still
be using leeches to treat headaches and high blood pressure.
Myth: Increasing taxes kills jobs.
This can be true if tax increases are exorbitant, ill-timed, or ill-targeted. On the other
hand, in a prosperous economy, a tax increase can reduce a budget deficit and help damp
inflation. Tax increases fund the construction, maintenance, and upgrading of infrastructure, as
well as education of the workforce, both of which are necessary to thriving commerce,
competition, and job creation. This is precisely what happened in the late 1990s, when taxes
were increased during a long run of economic growth. Few complained seriously about the
higher taxes, because nearly everyone who wanted a job had one, the purchasing power of
personal income was high, and production and profits were heading steadily upward. And the
decade ended with the first projected federal budget surplus in a generation.
Taxes can be one factor among many in determining where a business chooses to
locate. But once a business is established, the tax rates that most businesses pay are seldom, if
ever, a significant factor in hiring. Recall that, in the 1950s during the Eisenhower
administration, the highest income tax rate was ninety percent, and except for a couple of
bothersome recessions, job creation was rolling along in the Korean War and postwar era.
Again, in the 1990s during the Clinton administration, tax rates went up, but few complained
because long-term prosperity had blossomed at the same time. Workers, their employers, and
shareholders were all happy; only conservative politicians were grim-faced, because reality
refused to conform to their ideology that taxes inhibit job growth.
Our highest federal income tax rate is currently less than forty percent. And very few
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actually pay the highest rate, because those with incomes sufficient to put them into that top
bracket derive much of their income from unearned capital gains and dividends, which are
currently taxed at rates closer to fifteen percent—lower than what an entry-level clerk or
secretary pays on the income from his or her daily toil and skill. What truly suppresses job
creation is lack of demand for goods and services, increased demand being the actual incentive
for business owners to earn more profit by increasing production and hiring more workers.
Taxes are typically the last concern for savvy business people when opportunity knocks.
Myth: Income redistribution punishes success.
In most instances, what redistribution punishes—or rather attempts to begin to correct
—is the initial grossly disproportionate distribution of wealth, away from the workers whose
labor and skill actually produce the wealth, and into the pockets of corporate executives and
shareholders whose contributions to the per-unit value of the product are, though admittedly
important, relatively small on a per-unit basis. If we choose to call this “punishing success,”
then we must ask, “Success at what?” In this case, it’s success at steering a disproportionate
share of wealth away from the many who actually produce it and into the pockets of the
moneyed few who are in a position to make the rules—curious rules that say the contribution
of an executive who spends his afternoons at the golf course is worth from several hundred to a
thousand average productive workers, and deserves a seven-figure bonus, even if he trashes
the company and destroys the jobs of thousands. Yes, an executive must have extraordinary
vision and talent to run a company. But to suppose, that he or she contributes as much as a
thousand hourly workers do to the value of the products that attract buyers and produce profit,
seems an exaggerated claim that deserves, if not categorical rejection, at least serious scrutiny
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and impartial evaluation.
Yes, they’re very “successful,” sardonically speaking.34 But is this a kind of success that
deserves to be rewarded to such a degree that it devalues practical ability and honest labor,
squelches incentive and opportunity, diverts large amounts of cash from active circulation,
tightens credit, and strangles the economy? The ideal solution would be for businesses
voluntarily to distribute wealth in proportion to the calculated contributions of those who make
it possible and whose efforts design and create it. But as long as there are influential factions of
overweening greed determined to keep this from happening, government redistribution in
some form is a partial remedy to help ameliorate the consequences of disproportionate
distribution.
One of the greatest problems of disproportionate wealth distribution is economic
stratification, in which a small wealthy class, imagining itself to be “privileged,” unscrupulously
accumulates and hoards the major portion of the nation’s money, thus squeezing the vitality
out of the middle and working classes, and leaving those with little or no income in desperate
conditions, with little to lose by resorting to crime and violence in order to survive. Economic
stratification leads to social unrest and instability, and to widespread scapegoating, as people
look for some group to blame for their problems and to victimize in retaliation for wrongs
actually precipitated by unmitigated greed. Crime, violence, and unrest rise, and the rich find it
increasingly necessary to sink more of their wealth into security measures to fend off the
desperately needy, and into taxes to fund prisons.
34 Taking disproportionate distribution by corporations into account sheds a very different light on the conservative
talking point of “[wealthy] makers versus [poor] takers,” revealing that those who provide the labor and expertise
to create wealth are the true “makers,” and grossly overpaid execs and greedy speculators are the real “takers.”
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Half-truth: A free market left to itself spontaneously corrects fluctuations.
Most economists believe this laissez-faire theory is true—but with a big qualification: “in
the long run.” Spontaneous recovery from a serious recession takes time; it could span many
years, decades, or even generations in the case of a catastrophic swing. As interventionist
economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) observed, “In the long run, we are all dead,”
acknowledging the obvious reality that, unlike economics, mortal human beings operate within
a biological timeframe. People can’t wait a decade or a generation to be able to buy food and
pay for rent and utilities, let alone send their kids to college or save for retirement. The primary
purpose of an economy is not to enshrine the theories of ideologues, or to reward non-
productive speculation, but to serve the needs of people and business with a mechanism that
balances stability and prosperity, and fairly rewards value with value. An economy in distress
needs timely and effective help, if it’s to serve the needs of all who both contribute to and
depend upon its regular day-to-day operation. Appropriate, sufficient, and timely government
action pays for itself by nudging the economy back on track and by restoring and moderating
the normal business cycle. Government is the only humanly controllable force with enough
clout and flexibility to curb recession, speed up recovery, or rein in inflation. Clout and
flexibility have a stiff price; but when applied appropriately and sufficiently, anyone who’s been
paying attention would have to agree that the result is well worth the investment.
Myth: High-end tax cuts trickle down to everyone, and ultimately pay for themselves.
The notion that tax cuts for the rich pay for themselves is based on anticipation of the
following chain of events:
1. that tax cuts for the wealthy promote investment;
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2. that investment promotes production;
3. that increased production promotes hiring;
4. that hiring increases aggregate personal income;
5. that hiring and higher aggregate income increase the tax base;
6. that a broader and higher tax base increases overall tax revenues from the working class
to pay for the tax cuts for the wealthy.
This so-called theory has long been preached by conservative politicians, but in practice has
never performed as advertised. No such tax cut has ever paid for itself, and no such policy has
ever led to self-sustaining prosperity. The supply-side or “trickle-down” scheme has been tried
many times—in the 1920s, the 1950s, the 1980s, and the 2000s—each time in the devout (or
perhaps desperately hopeful) belief that it ought to work, yet each time yielding the same
disappointing results.
Why doesn’t it work? Let’s take a look at what actually happens—and what doesn’t,
and why. Giving federal aid to people who already have considerable wealth does very little to
promote spending on goods and services, but has the primary effect of spurring investment of
the spare cash. (This squares with the first link in the supply-side chain.) Investment generates
demand for stocks, which spurs a rise in stock prices. But this has little effect aside from giving
those at the top end a sense of marginally increased wealth, which produces a pleasant illusion
of greater prosperity among the already well off. So, once stock prices even out, and nothing
else has changed, things go back about to where they started, except that now the rich are
indeed slightly richer, the government is a bit deeper in debt because of the lost tax revenue,
and everyone else is awaiting the promised trickle-down that never comes. Hiring hasn’t been
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budged, because nothing has prompted an increase in production, because the only increase in
demand has been for investments, not for goods and services. As we’ve already noted,
business operators are not in business to hire people; they’re in it to make money. They hire
only when there’s a money-making reason to do so. So, in reality it turns out that the second
(investment promotes production) link in the supply-side chain theory doesn’t exist.
Otherwise, it would seem a plausible plan; but a chain with even one missing link is just so
much junk. This is why the supply-side theory consistently fails.
What else has to change? If you’ve read “The Job-creation Cycle” discussion under
Essential Concepts of Economics, it should be obvious. But we’ll reiterate it here, because it’s
so important: Hiring is justified by increased production, which, if significant, raises business’s
manpower requirement—something investment doesn’t do. Production is stimulated by the
need to increase supply of the firm’s product, which in turn is motivated by an actual or
anticipated increase in sustained demand for the product and the prospect of increasing sales
and profits. Behold: Economics 101! So, what stimulates sustained demand? Plain and simple:
steady and larger paychecks for lots of people. Demand is the target, and widespread income is
the projectile we must use to hit it! The main question now is how best to guide the one to the
other for optimum effect. Tax cuts for the already well-off being an obvious non-starter, what
else is available?
Historically, tax cuts have stimulated prosperity only under certain conditions. First,
they should appear in the form of a marginal increase on regular paychecks (most of which will
likely be spent) rather than as a lump-sum payment (much of which would likely be saved and
not spent). Second, it should be directed toward the middle class and the working poor. This is
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because lower-income people must spend a greater proportion of whatever income they have
just to survive; so, they spend most or all of the tax break in each paycheck, and thus get the
cash circulating. Once in active circulation, the cash generates both a multiplier effect and
consumer demand, which produces more profits if businesses ramp up production, which
means hiring more employees to produce enough output to pace demand.
Unfortunately, an income tax cut has little if any effect on the population bloc with the
greatest propensity to spend. Unemployed working-class people typically don’t have enough
income to owe any tax. So, the effect of an income tax cut on them is zero, and this prime
opportunity to put more money into circulation is missed. So, what would make good use of
this cash-propagation channel? Starting a major war to mobilize all the nation’s manpower and
resources is one way that’s been shown effective. (World War II was what finally completed
recovery from the Great Depression.) But all-out war is usually undesirable for many reasons.
Other, more practical approaches, ones that can actually work if adequately supported, include
large works programs,35 food stamps (which translate to cash for grocers and their suppliers),
extended or expanded unemployment benefits, job-related education assistance, and
suspension of regressive sales taxes on non-luxury items.
Myth: Government doesn’t create jobs,
Anyone in public office who makes such an absurd claim is either lying or delusional,
because government created his job and pays his salary. Government creates millions of jobs—
35 Those who claim that government work programs are make-work with no value or purpose should consider that
when one is involuntarily out of work, any job is still a job, any wage is still a wage, and government programs have
undertaken some enormously beneficial projects that private enterprise wouldn’t touch, like installing
hydroelectric dams, electrifying rural America, and building the Interstate highway system.
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usually not “for profit” jobs, but salary-paying jobs nonetheless. Besides political and
regulatory offices, government operates the armed forces and funds basic research, plus
thousands of offices and agencies. It builds and staffs offices, schools, and prisons. It hires and
pays police, judges, firefighters, paramedics, teachers, inspectors, civil engineers, and such. It
creates public works projects, and it contracts with private firms to have work done and
products supplied. In all cases, these jobs provide income, which employees then spend in the
general economy on the same things that people working for private businesses do—thus
creating demand, prompting increased production, prompting hiring, and so forth. Where per-
capita income is concerned, the distinction between public and private sector jobs is utterly
irrelevant.
Myth: Small business accounts for most hiring.
This would be true only if we specify “new” hiring, simply because the employee
turnover rate is greater for small businesses. Small businesses do more hiring and firing than
big businesses, because most larger firms tend to be more stable and to require more highly
trained employees. Firing or laying off highly skilled individuals constitutes a loss to the firm of
its investment in human capital, so there’s some incentive for large businesses to keep people
on the job even through a slack period, an option not as accessible to smaller firms. We should
also note that small business is strongly dependent on big industry. A community with a single
large industry can support hundreds of small businesses, both as suppliers of parts, materials,
and services, and as a source of consumer demand in the form of well paid workers and their
families. If that community’s only large industry shuts down and is not replaced, many of the
smaller businesses will also close when their local customer base dries up. Small businesses are
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part of a successful employment environment, but they can seldom manage on their own to
sustain a thriving economy in a town larger than a few hundred, because the big businesses are
the ones that attract big outside money and talent, and buy and sell into major markets.
Myth: Government regulation is unneeded; responsible businesses and banks can self-regulate.
This assumes that marketplace competition can and will deal automatically and justly
with all problems. But because it’s influenced by sometimes short-sighted, irrational, or
unscrupulous human behavior, the free market generates some problems of its own. No-holds-
barred competition virtually ensures that not all operators will be responsible, by encouraging
some to take advantage of unscrupulous measures, such as using inferior or even dangerous
methods and materials in order to lower their prices, with which honest and ethical business
operators must then compete. Despite the resistance of the ethically minded, unchecked
competition becomes a race to the bottom, to the detriment not only of workers and
consumers, but also of ethical business leaders, and ultimately of the general quality of life.
Relatively recent examples include the savings-and-loan failure crisis of the 1980s,
resulting from banking deregulation; the bursting of the tech “bubble” in 2000, an effect of lax
regulation in securities valuation and trading standards; and the Great Recession of 2008, a
consequence of a combination of excessively risky real-estate, banking, and securities practices
encouraged by hopeful but unwise bipartisan deregulation decisions made over the preceding
thirty years. In other fields, lack of proper regulation or oversight has allowed numerous
instances of pollution, food contamination, and product malfunction to endanger the health,
life, and environment, not only of humans, but also of their pets, their livestock, and other
species.
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Myth: Economic problems can be fixed simply by balancing the federal budget.
There’s no historical evidence to support this claim; indeed, there’s considerable
evidence to the contrary. My guess is that this myth arises from the popular notion that
balancing a budget is categorically “good” for households and businesses, and that anything in
the category of “good” is bound to help in any situation. It neglects the question, “Good for
what?” Rat poison is good for killing rodent pests, but not good for seasoning your soup. A
balanced budget is usually good for households and businesses, but not for a national economy
that needs more cash to recover from a recession, or less cash to counteract inflation. Where
government is concerned, a balanced budget is a long-term guide, not a quick fix.
This cannot be stressed enough: A balanced budget is the result, not the cause, of a well
running and prudently managed economy. Balancing the national budget is virtually impossible
during a recession or a recovery. It’s a ham-fisted attempt to treat the symptom rather than
the disorder that causes it, and the consequences of such a misguided approach are invariably
counterproductive. Budget-balancing as a remedy for economic decline has been tried in the
1930s, the 1950s, and the 1980s. Each time, the resulting austerity caused the economy to
backslide into deeper and more prolonged recession.
The reason for this should be obvious: During a recession or recovery, when large
numbers of people are out of work and business is slack, tax revenues plummet while relief
costs skyrocket. Unless we’re willing to put up with crime waves of poverty-driven desperation
and multitudes of citizens starving, dying, and rotting in the streets, budget balancing at such a
time isn’t a realistic option. The only recession remedy we know from experience to be
effective involves massive deficit spending, to spark demand, to motivate increased production
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and hiring, to get money flowing steadily into people’s pockets, to create and sustain more
demand, and so on. Until recession comes under control and unemployment returns to normal
levels, and thus relief spending bottoms and tax revenues recover, we can’t even dream of
budget-balancing. The realistic and opportune time to balance the national budget is when
prosperity is charging ahead. The problem then is that no one wants to “spoil the party” by
imposing austerity. But it has been done, most recently in the late 1990s. And surprise! The
self-sustaining momentum of rolling prosperity continued despite higher tax rates, and even
generated a $500 billion projected surplus.
Myth: Balancing the federal budget should be mandatory.
This contention is based on the idea that balancing budgets at home and in business is
always a desirable (if not always feasible) thing to do, plus the assumption that whatever is
good for households and businesses must be good for government, too. This, in turn, is based
on an assumption that government operates both functionally and financially just like
households and businesses, which reflects a gross misunderstanding of the unique capacity and
purpose of government as the instrument of the people, especially in times of widespread
distress or emergency. It presumes the universality of simple virtue, but is impracticable in an
arena that operates under a different set of powers and responsibilities from households and
businesses, and where the highest callings are not individual virtue, but human necessity, the
common well-being, and the stability and survival of the republic and the liberties it supports
and defends.
Yes, it’s a good idea to balance government’s budget over the long term, if for no other
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reason than to keep the debt from rising beyond our ability to pay the interest on it.36 But as
the servant of the people, government must have the flexibility to protect the people’s
interests, particularly when natural, man-made, or economic disaster strikes. Government
must deal with such things as wars, terrorism, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and wildfires, as
well as the enormous relief efforts these entail and the material and human losses they cause.
In addition, the national government’s ability to regulate the money supply—including the
unique power to print and mint new money and to issue and redeem treasury bonds—is crucial
to mitigating economic recession and inflation. Putting large amounts of money into circulation
can reverse a recessionary trend, and taking money out of circulation can help curb inflation.
Without government’s ability to run deficits and surpluses (budget imbalances) when
necessary, such economic swings can become intense and protracted, thus transforming the
economy, from what people rely on for day-to-day business, into a faceless public enemy that
robs them of their buying power and their life’s savings. Mandating a balanced federal budget
would end abusive spending sprees, but it would also nullify government’s ability to act when
necessary, to defend against an aggressor, to respond to a disaster, to damp disruptive
economic swings. When economic hard times hit, a hamstrung government would be
powerless to do anything but ride it out—along with people and businesses. As a consequence,
36 There’s a theoretical absolute maximum for debt, at which interest on the debt exceeds the gross domestic
product. In such a case, even taxing all income at 100 percent wouldn’t be enough to cover the interest payments,
let alone pay a penny against the principle. But long before such a situation could occur, other things would
become humanly intolerable, and civilization would likely revert to some primitive state of universal war and
famine, physically incapable of supporting the billions who rely on it. That possibility is still a long way off, but it
bears keeping in mind, and we should take steps to forestall it whenever feasible.
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a largely bewildered and desperate public would have to figure out for themselves how to
survive from one calamity to the next, as they watch their assets dwindle to nothing, and as
mounting social unrest threatens even families who’ve for generations smugly fancied
themselves immune to catastrophe.
Macroeconomic Problems and Solutions
Cyclical Economic Swings: Inflation and Recession
Wealth Stratification and Redistribution (The Two Sides of “Class Warfare”)
Wealth stratification occurs when the aggregate wealth of an economy accrues mostly
to a relatively small segment of the population. Concentrating a major portion of the money
supply in the hands of a relative few reduces overall demand in an economy, by limiting the
number of people with disposable income that can be put into active circulation—which, as
we’ve seen, inhibits demand, production, employment and profit, and so on. Stratification thus
imposes a drag on the overall economy, thereby disadvantaging everyone—ultimately even
those who’ve amassed the lion’s share of the money supply, since, when invested, that money
earns significantly lower returns (interest, dividends, and capital gains) in a constricted
economy than if businesses were optimally productive and profitable. There has long been a
growing suspicion to this effect, yet little correlation of evidence and coherent thinking to
complete the picture. But recently, French economist Thomas Piketty (b. 1971) has used data
accumulated over 250 years to demonstrate convincingly that wealth stratification is a real (and
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non-self-correcting) phenomenon in market economies.37 The question is no longer whether
such a problem exists, but what to do about it.
Piketty’s proposed course of action is a tax on wealth. But this probably wouldn’t be
well received in the United States, where free-market absolutism dominates an influential neo-
know-nothing political sector dogmatically devoted to minimalist government (except in
bedrooms). However, our discussion here might shed light on other ways to remedy the
problem, or at least trim it back to a tolerable level while we work on a satisfactory
comprehensive fix.
Symptomatic of public concern about wealth stratification are cries for “income
equality.” But this is a misnomer. True income equality—with everyone from day laborers to
professionals and executives earning the same size paycheck—just isn’t feasible, because it
removes incentive for anyone to aspire to greater training or responsibility than that required
of a supermarket checkout bagger. If minimum wage were all everyone made, why would we
go to the bother of educating ourselves for jobs that are more stressful and impose greater
responsibility, without prospect of a correspondingly higher reward?38
In the real world, we acknowledge that some kinds of work are worth more than others
with respect to the production of wealth. It costs more to train a skilled technician than to train
a menial laborer, more to train an engineer than a technician, more to train a scientist than an
engineer. And in addition to cost, there’s the matter of personal ability: people have different
37 Piketty, Thomas: Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 2014 (English), Harvard University Press.
38 Marx’s communism attempted to solve this problem through a principle of contribution according to ability and
distribution according to need, a system whose incentives involved penalties for failure to fulfill production quotas,
rather than rewarding ability, initiative, and efficiency. As we recall, that system didn’t work out very well.
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natural talents, and some are more conducive than others to learning and applying higher-level
skills. Corporate executives, for example, ideally must possess an extraordinary skill set,
including natural talent, academic credentials, and practical experience; communication,
interpersonal, management, and organizational skills; comprehensive knowledge of the
business; strategic planning and problem analysis; connections to other business and banking
leaders; and yes, and a firm grounding in ethics, including a keen sense of responsibility to
employees, customers, investors, and community. Obviously, such a skill set is of great value to
a company and its productive effort, and must be rewarded accordingly in order to attract and
retain such talent. It might be a reasonable guess that, in a small firm, a year’s contribution of
the leader’s talents to the per-unit value of the firm’s product are worth the annual
contributions of two or three technicians to that per-unit value of production. In a large
corporation with top-end talent in its highest offices, the CEO’s contribution might be worth as
much as that of fifty technicians. So, if technicians in the large firm earn annual wages of
$50,000 apiece, then the CEO would earn a salary fifty times that, or $2,500,000 per annum.
Obviously, fifty thousand does not equal two and a half million, so that isn’t “income equality.”
But if such distribution of earnings to each individual is indeed proportionate to his or her
actual contribution of effort and expertise to the firm’s wealth production, then we have a fair
arrangement we can call “income proportionality.” It’s an easy, almost intuitive concept to
grasp; but there are some problems to be dealt with in implementing it.
Problem: establishing proportionate compensation rates
Since the progressive reforms of the Theodore Roosevelt administration, and
increasingly since the since the end of World War II through the 1970s, businesses, often in
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collaboration with labor, have established reasonable compensation structures passably
reflecting the relative contributions of their labor, technical, engineering, and low-to-middle
administrative staff. These structures incentivize work and advancement, and reward natural
talent and skills acquired through training and experience. But as we progress into the upper-
tier executive realm, this structure becomes less structured, often unrealistically out of touch
with proportionality to one’s actual contributions to productive output. When, in an afternoon
on the golf course, an upper-level executive rakes in what one of the firm’s ordinary laborers
earns in a year or more, or if an exec receives huge bonuses even when his company is failing
because of his decisions, and when his compensation package is determined solely by his own
cronies on the corporate board, it becomes appropriate to question whether the distribution-
contribution proportionality at his or her level has exceeded the bounds of reality. If it has,
then the disproportionate rewarding of a less productive few at the expense of the most
productive many is the moral equivalent of either grand larceny on the part of the exec, or
gross incompetence on the part of the board. Clearly, it is not in a business’s best interest to
reward executives so lavishly, unless their talents and contributions are indeed so
extraordinarily outstanding as to be truly worth the expenditure. A firm that can’t afford to pay
its workers a wage sufficient to raise them above poverty level can’t afford golden parachutes
for its execs. Perhaps mandatory consultation with a few independent accountants would help
guide the board’s judgment back into the territory of sober credibility. If not, then government
regulation might be a more consistently effective alternative.
Problem: “special” tax rates on unearned income
Compounding the front-end problem of overcompensation for less productive tasks,
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there’s an odd back-end situation, that unearned investment income (dividends and capital
gains) is taxed at a lower rate than income earned by productive individuals’ time, effort, and
expertise. The rationale—proposed by corporate lobbyists, of course—has been advanced that
tax breaks on such income are needed to stimulate investment. However, the returns on such
investments are, in the main, already significantly higher than those on interest, and thus
provide their own incentive; there seems no rational justification for, in effect, higher taxes on
earned income subsidizing unearned income from the already profitable activity of others. 39
Moreover, who receives unearned income? Investors. A fair number of them are retirees,
most of whom live on a mix of pension or investment income and Social Security, and are of
modest means. But the bulk of investments are held by the wealthy. Indeed, it’s often the case
that the wealthy derive most of their income from investments rather than salaries.
Thus, it would seem reasonable to tax all income—earned and unearned—at the same
rate, depending on the taxpayer’s overall income bracket. Raising the tax on unearned income
could have either or both of two benefits: first, enabling government to improve services and
pay down debt; second, reducing the general income-tax rate somewhat. In addition,
eliminating the special tax rate for unearned income would help to simplify the tax code—
something for which we often hear a great deal of clamor but seldom see any result.
Problem: income from non-productive activity—something for nothing
We’ve earlier explained how laborers, technicians, and engineers contribute directly to
39 So-called unearned income is actually earned, but not by the recipient’s productive effort. Rather, it’s earned by
the productive employees of the firm invested in. The recipient receives his investment return in exchange for
risking part of his own wealth to support the firm, and the firm takes part of the profit from consumer sales to
reward investors’ passive risk-taking.
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wealth production, and how the auxiliary efforts of clerks, accountants, secretaries,
transporters, executives, and investors contribute indirectly to that production. However,
there’s one group that makes money from the process without contributing anything of value
to the product: speculators. Now, there’s a certain amount of speculation inherent in the
routine exchange of any sort of property, commodities, or securities. But those who make a
living solely from trading at a profit contribute nothing of value. The only “service” they
provide is to inflate the price of the traded commodity to the end purchaser, whether it be
grain or gasoline, real estate or stocks. Since speculators benefit without offering anything of
value in return, we can consider professional speculation as an essentially parasitic activity,
whoch might be tolerated within limits, but not encouraged. Yet the existing lower tax rates on
unearned income, already mentioned, do indeed encourage it. Granted, the current tax code
makes a feeble attempt to damp excessive speculation by imposing a higher tax rate on income
from speculative holdings held for less than one year—the arbitrary transition point between
“short term” and “long term” investment. Yet the tax rate on short-term investment income is
still lower than that on earned income. The system is rigged to reward non-productive activity
over productive activity—and this would appear to violate Americans’ much touted work ethic.
Now if, as previously proposed, we discard the tax break for unearned income, and treat
taxation on all personal income according to the individual’s standard tax-bracket, this does
away with even the token disincentive for parasitic speculation. However, if it is reimposed as a
surtax on short-term unearned income, such that it is taxed at a rate higher than that on
general income, then it becomes a true disincentive to rely on speculation as a primary income
source, with the result that price swings on widely speculated commodities would moderate
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significantly, to the advantage of everyone—except the career parasites, who might then finally
find the incentive to become productive.
Problem: subsidies for profitable enterprises
Tax breaks and subsidies have been around for such a long time they’re accepted as
tradition. Originally intended to help family businesses and fledgling enterprises to get started
and to survive through temporarily unproductive conditions, they have now been
grandfathered to provide taxpayer support to large, mature, or even obsolete industries. This
unneeded support to long established firms interferes with the free market system’s normal
mechanisms of rewarding performance and innovation. It puts taxpayers in the uncomfortable
position of having to support businesses that their government has deemed harmful (e.g.,
tobacco), and of artificially depressing prices for fossil energy and thus impeding development
of competing renewable and non-polluting energy resources that are mankind’s future (if it
doesn’t destroy itself first). Removing huge subsidies to the immensely profitable petroleum
industry and agribusiness would bring their true costs of production into scrutiny by the free
market, and motivate consumers to exercise realistic options, such as conservation and shifting
to long-term, non-polluting40 technology that isn’t ultimately chained to dwindling finite
40 Many people think electricity is non-polluting, because there’s no exhaust from an electric car, tool, or appliance.
True, the end product doesn’t pollute the area immediately around where it’s used. But electricity isn’t an energy
source; it’s just the transmitting and storage medium for energy generated from some other process. If your
electric company uses a hydroelectric, wind, or solar power for generation, then yes, that is indeed non-polluting.
However, if your electric company uses fossil fuels to generate electricity, the pollution resulting from their
combustion is released at the generating site. So, if your electric company uses coal-fired generators, your
seemingly clean-and-green electric car or mower is actually powered by coal. It’s just that the exhaust is located
far away, where you can’t usually see or smell it.
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reserves of dinosaur remains in unfriendly countries.
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Part IV: Popular Mythology
In addition to considering how things really are, it can also be enlightening to consider
how a number of things most probably are not—not only in politics and economics, but in
general. In this section, we’ll examine miscellaneous ideas held by many to be true beyond
question, but which actually range from reasonably questionable to utterly incoherent, from
somewhat improbable to categorically impossible. Some popular notions are simply not
supported by clear and verifiable evidence, some are believed even in the face of evidence to
the contrary, and some are ruled out by their own contradictions.
But before we begin, we should understand that, though the words “myth” and
“mythology” carry a popular connotation of “fictional stories,” it’s important to note that myths
often have a factual basis. Many myths start with a factual account that’s subsequently
embellished to make a point. Some are mostly fiction wrapped around a kernel of truth. Still
others are purely fictional. But most prepared myths, whether factual or not, have a purpose,
such as to teach values, principles, and other lessons by example, to condition attitudes and
rouse enthusiasm, to try to explain the inexplicable, or simply to make a dull subject more
interesting.
The point is that it’s a mistake to dismiss all myths as lies (as some do), even if they’re
far from factual. There are many shades of falsehood, most of them benign. There is innocent
error, entertaining fiction, humor, and such. Lies are intended to deceive, whereas many myths
are intended to instruct or explain, albeit indirectly. For allegorical myths, the fiction is merely
to illustrate a meaning that is the real point. It’s the responsibility of the reader or listener to
decipher the meaning to get the point; this is usually an easy and intuitive task for anyone
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familiar with the mythmaker’s culture and background. Problems arise, however, if people fail
to grasp the underlying meaning of a myth, and instead get sidetracked into a futile effort to
reconcile the literal wording of the myth with fact. If this distraction causes them to miss the
true meaning, then the lesson is lost to them.
In contrast, myths that spontaneously balloon from misperception or misinterpretation,
even if containing a grain of truth, can turn destructive by appealing to people’s worst instincts.
Even honest misunderstanding can lead to suspicion, suspicion to fear, fear to hatred, hatred to
wrath, wrath to violence, and so on. There is no good purpose to be served by myths of this
sort. They should be rooted out and debunked.
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Chapter 8: Myths about Religion and Belief
Religion is rich in tradition, ritual, morality, history, legend, and mythology. The
mythology of religion takes two general forms. First, there is foundational mythology, the
ancient legends that accompany long established religions. Foundational mythology typically
concerns stories of origins, afterlife, miracles, mysteries, heroes, and such. Second, there is
contemporary mythology, which continually accrues to a religion through its vision of the world
as seen from the religion’s unique frame of reference (biases). Contemporary mythology
concerns assorted perceptions and misperceptions, both about people who hold beliefs
different from our own, and about the general authenticity and purpose of our own belief.
Here we’ll consider both foundational and contemporary mythology. But since the two are
very different in character, it’s appropriate that our approach to each be different as well. And
where the two kinds overlap (for example, current attitudes about ancient myth), our approach
will be appropriately nuanced.
Myths about Scripture
Mythology has been a staple of virtually all major religions, from ancient Sumerian,
Egyptian, and Hindu beliefs, through Persian, Greco-Roman, and Norse legends, to
contemporary Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and even to relative newcomers Mormonism,
Christian Science, and Wicca. It isn’t our aim here to nitpick individual ancient myths, but to
understand and appreciate them for what they are and the purpose they serve. In other words,
we shan’t concern ourselves so much with foundational dogmas, as with an over-simplistic
contemporary mythology about how scriptural mythology ought to be understood. We’ll take
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on the big problem that seems to afflict certain factions of many religions: scriptural literalism,
also known as fundamentalism. For this, we’ll use the Judeo-Christian Bible41 as a convenient
example. It’s familiar to believers with whom I’m most frequently in contact, yet the general
concepts and practices we’ll explore apply passably well to other religions, too, along with their
scriptures and doctrines.
Myth: Religious scripture is one hundred percent literally true.
It doesn’t require too much study to reveal that at least parts of religious scripture are
not literally true. Let’s start with a familiar example. David—the shepherd boy and giant killer
who later became king—was also a poet. In Psalm 23, he begins, “The Lord is my shepherd.” If
we accept that “The Lord” signifies “God” (in David’s case, Yahweh, the Hebrew deity), and that
“shepherd” literally means a herder of sheep, this statement could have two literal meanings:
(1) I employ God to herd sheep; or (2) God herds sheep, and I am one of his sheep. It’s fair to
say that no one credits the first interpretation, that David is God’s boss. The second
interpretation is generally accepted—but not literally, even by fundamentalists. David writes
poetry; but sheep do not write poetry. So, David is not a sheep. Therefore, the statement is
not literally true. Yet it has a meaning we can grasp. It’s just that what it says and what it
means are two different things. In his poetry, David describes his relationship to God, not
literally, but metaphorically: God is to me as I am to my sheep. God guides and protects me,
and provides for my spiritual needs, in much the same way as I guide and protect my sheep, and
provide for their physical needs. In other words, David’s poetic statement, “The Lord is my
41 The Bible I have on hand is a King James Protestant Version. I grant it’s a bit slanted in some respects.
Nonetheless, it enjoys wide readership in the English-speaking world, and so serves well enough as a convenient
common reference for discussion.
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shepherd,” does not express an idea that is literally true. But he uses this poetic metaphor to
teach a lesson about the relationship, not only between God and himself, but between God and
man generally.
In the New Testament, Jesus uses parables—stories—as fictional examples to illustrate
how faithful people ought to conduct themselves in real life. The stories aren’t literally true—
that is, they don’t recount the involvement of specific actual individuals in specific actual events
—but they effectively illustrate the results of good and bad behavior generally. This is the
intended purpose of the fiction: not to tell entertaining stories or to propagate misinformation,
but to lead by an illustrative example. All religions make extensive use of fiction—material that
is not literally true—as a teaching tool.
The Old Testament is a mix of legend, law, and a presumably historical account of
various pivotal events—exiles, wars, plagues, and such. There are entire books—Genesis and
Job, for example—that would appear to be mostly or entirely fiction. It is fiction intended to
teach, not literally that the material universe was magically created in six days, but to instruct
primitive people in the importance of trusting and obeying God. If we’re diverted by the notion
that the text must be literally true, and obsess over defending this supposed literal truth against
clear evidence to the contrary, then we’re liable to overlook the underlying meaning, and
foolishly fail to learn its real lessons.
Moreover, a literal reading of scripture gives rise to conflicts, not only with the observed
real world, but even within the scripture itself. Among the most glaringly obvious of these is
God’s warning to Adam, “But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of
it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. (Gen.2:17)” Yet Adam doesn’t
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die until he’s 930 years old (Gen.5:5). This logically necessitates one of three possibilities:
Either (1) the length of a day back then was at least 930 years42; (2) Adam waited until his 930th
birthday to eat the forbidden fruit; or, If neither of these is true, then the only other possibility
is (3) God’s warning was not literally true. Even so, it can be taken as figuratively true, if what
God meant was that Adam would experience, not actual death, but a metaphorical death, when
he would cease to exist as the innocent creature that he was created, and be transformed into
a different person, a morally enlightened being clearly superior to the other creatures. In this
light, the concept of virtual death is not unlike the New Testament idea of spiritual rebirth.
Once we free ourselves from the notion that every jot of religious scripture must be
literally true, we can shed a multitude of conflicts, and graduate to a fuller level of
understanding. We can grasp and appreciate the true teachings underlying scriptural
storytelling. Simultaneously, we can accept and understand the marvelous material reality that
scientific discovery reveals to us. And, guided by our moral values, we can put this evolving
understanding to productive and beneficial use.
Myths about Believers
In addition to belief in their own religions, many believers believe things about
themselves—things which, in the aggregate, can be strangely conflicting. One of these is that
42 If the length of a day was 930 years or more until Adam partook of the forbidden fruit, this would have further
implications. The six days of creation, plus God’s day of rest, would have lasted at least 6,510 years. This would
put the biblical date of the beginning of creation, not at 4004 BCE, but sometime before 10,000 BCE—before the
scientifically established end of the last ice age and the beginning of human settlement and agriculture. But if we
grant 930 years as the minimum duration of a day at the time of creation, then the maximum duration of a day
could have been a thousand years. Or a million, or even a billion years, for that matter.
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one’s own belief is the One True Belief, and that all beliefs that differ from it must therefore be
false. For instance, Smith devoutly believes his belief is true and Jones’s is false, while Jones
just as devoutly believes his belief is true and Smith’s is false. Odd, isn’t it? But it gets even
odder, if it turns out that Smith and Jones both derive their differing beliefs from the same holy
book. But it does happen, and quite frequently, in fact.
But there’s another odd belief that appears to operate the other way around.
Myth: All who believe in God share a universal belief.
It seems common sense among a religious majority that everyone who believes in
something they all call “God” shares a universal concept of such an entity. But consider other
things that may share a common name. (Following a practice we’ve discussed earlier, we’ll use
a fictional story to make a real point.) Suppose Smith has a dog he calls “Rex,” and suppose his
neighbor, Jones, also has a dog he calls “Rex.” Are they the same dog? Possibly. Without
further details, it’s not unreasonable to suppose they might be. Maybe, unknown to either
Smith or Jones, Rex alternates between both their homes for meals and comfort. But suppose
the Rex who shows up at Smith’s home loves pork and hates chicken, but the Rex who goes to
Jones’s home loves chicken and won’t touch pork. Same dog? Not very likely. Now suppose
the Rex that goes to Smith’s home and likes pork is a bulldog, while the Rex that goes to Jones’s
home and likes chicken is a collie. Same dog? Same “Rex”? No way!
If we dare ask a diverse group what they believe God is, and what its characteristics are,
we find great disagreement about what different English-speaking people call by the same
name, “God.” While Christians believe in a trinity—a single entity with three manifestations—
what Jews and Muslims call God has only one aspect. And that aspect is different from one sect
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to the other. All Abrahamic religions organize days into seven-day weeks; however, the Jews’
Yahweh rests on Saturdays, the Christians’ Jehovah on Sundays, and the Muslims’ Allah on
Fridays. All (except Christian Protestants) observe dietary taboos ostensibly declared by God,
but the specifics of what’s permitted on the menu at any time of the week or year are different
for each culture. Hindus also have dietary taboos, but what they call “God” turns out to be a
group of beings, each with special and separate powers (creation, sustenance, destruction),
some with multiple pairs of arms, and even one with an elephant’s head. Furthermore, there
are great sectarian differences of opinion, even within a single religion, about the nature of
God. At one end of the spectrum are fundamentalists, who typically embrace a rigid or even
militant stance opposed to all others. At the other end are liberals who suppose that all people
will be blessed, regardless of their behavior in life. Between them are the mainstream, which in
most cases constitute a vast body of mostly moderate and tolerably harmonious, if not entirely
unified, opinion.
In addition, there are areas of religious belief that lack the traditional trappings of
organized religion. What deists call “God” is an intelligent but otherwise impersonal power that
created the universe and invented morality, but since that primordial time has not interfered
with the workings of nature or the affairs of humankind; in the deist’s view, God may have
preferences, but lacks either the power or the will to impose them. In contrast, what
pantheists call “God” is not a distinct being, but nature itself. Thus, a pantheist is as certain
that his God exists as he is that nature exists; but he cannot credibly claim that what he calls
“God” is the same thing that others call by the same name.
Since, to different individuals and groups, the word “God” has substantively or even
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irreconcilably different meanings, the word becomes ambiguous in any setting where opinion
about the nature of God is not uniform. So, to phrase the issue in terms of logic, the claim, that
all people who say they believe in God believe in the same thing, is an equivocation fallacy, a
logical error arising from indiscriminate use of a word or expression having multiple meanings.
The commonality that it suggests may be comforting, but it is utterly illusory.
Confusion about Non-believers
I am myself a non-believer (a catch-all category for both disbelievers and unbelievers),
and also an ex-believer (a former non-denominational Protestant Christian). My non-belief has
shifted its parameters somewhat over the years, and I cannot presume to speak for all non-
believers. Still, there are some general distinctions that seem fairly constant, so perhaps
they’re worth clarifying for those who’ve never experienced any form of non-belief.
What are atheism, anti-theism, agnosticism, and atheistic religion?
What most people think of when the word “atheist” is mentioned is “someone who
doesn’t believe in God.” This casual definition is rather vague, and actually includes various
points of view. What we usually call atheism is of two major types, often referred to as
“strong” and “weak” atheism. Strong atheism is active disbelief in the existence of any and all
gods (and usually all other things supernatural as well). Weak atheism is passive unbelief, or
lack of belief in gods, usually simply for lack of clear evidence of such beings. Ironically, so-
called “weak atheism” is the logically stronger of the two positions, since it makes fewer
assumptions. Even so, lacking clear evidence for the existence of gods, many weak atheists
tentatively suppose that gods do not exist, and conduct their lives accordingly, though they
reserve the option to change this view if convincing evidence to the contrary should ever come
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to light. Weak atheists often self-identify as “agnostics,” although agnosticism technically falls
into a different category, not of belief (or disbelief), but of knowledge—specifically, the
impossibility of certain knowledge of first principles (God, for example, or other things outside
of nature). So, one can be agnostic (in this strict sense of the word), and also be either a
believer or a non-believer, for there’s no conflict in having belief in the existence or non-
existence of something without having certain knowledge of it. This is why religious belief is
called “faith,” not “fact.”
An activist offshoot of strong atheism is an assertive category sometimes called anti-
theism, characterized by vigorous or even militant opposition to religious belief in others. Like
religious fundamentalists, anti-theists tend to be more noisily noticeable, but also far less
numerous, than their moderate cohorts. Most moderate atheists observe a live-and-let-live
philosophy. They’re indifferent to religion, so long as religion does not seek to impose its will
on them, or to divert tax dollars and public resources to its support.
In addition, there are religions that do not embrace a god concept (Buddhism,
Confucianism, and Daoism, for example). These are technically atheistic, though being spiritual
in other respects, such as ritual ceremony, meditation, prayer to spirits, or reverence of
ancestors.
Is atheism a religion?
The short answer is no, atheism is not a religion as such, since it lacks religion’s
integrated features of dogma, doctrine, ritual, morality, and belief-related objectives.
However, the long answer would add the qualifier, that atheism is a category of religious belief,
insofar as it constitutes belief about (but not in) the supernatural. This is analogous to saying
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that black is not a color, since color is a quality of light, yet black is a category of color
exemplified by absence of light.
Is humanism a religion?
No. Humanism itself can exist with religion or without it. Humanism is a philosophy
that acknowledges the importance of human beings seeking the well-being of their fellow
humans and humankind. Although humanism originally arose under the aegis of religious
humanitarians, it serves primarily secular interests—“secular” here meaning indifferent to
religion, not necessarily opposed to it.43 The main difference between religious and secular
humanism concerns the presumed source of the importance of humans. Religious humanism
assumes that humans were created by God for some important purpose, and from this reasons
that, if we’re important to God, then we ought to accept that we’re important to each other as
well. Secular humanists see the importance of humanity as a natural extension of self- and
community-interest: humanity is important to us as humans and as social creatures, because
our own well-being depends on the well-being of our entire species. In addition, religious
humanists are likely to count worship as a factor in human well-being, whereas secular
humanists see human well-being in a more exclusively pragmatic light. Beyond such nuances,
though, the general goals of humanism, both religious and secular, are virtually
indistinguishable: to protect, and where feasible to advance, the well-being of human beings in
43 Humanists come in a variety of flavors: some religious, some anti-religious, some indifferent to religion. Many
self-identified secular humanists are the anti-religious sort; however, many believers mistakenly tag all humanists
with the “secular” modifier. Though this unwarranted assumption seems to simplify matters for those believers,
it’s actually in conflict with reality and thus problematic, for it needlessly erects barriers between people who
might otherwise happily work together toward common goals.
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particular and of humankind in general. Humanism doesn’t inherently oppose religion, except
when religion opposes human well-being—slavery, injustice, treatment of women and children
as chattel, holy wars, persecution, and propagation of intolerance, fear, hatred, superstition,
and the like. Humanistic ethics are similar in aim to religious morality, except that they do not
concern themselves with strictly religious issues, such as piety or heresy. In other words,
humanistic ethics are not in competition with religious morals; in most cases, they reinforce
each other, religion providing authority and humanism providing thoughtful rationale.
Myth: Atheists choose not to believe in God because they don’t want to be moral.
Some people have the ability to choose whatever they wish to believe, even when there
is no evidence for it, or even despite evidence to the contrary. Some notions believers find
particularly attractive are a caring father or mother figure that guides and protects them, fixes
all their boo-boos, and relieves them of the horrendous responsibility of making thoughtful
decisions for themselves; a prospect of eternal life for themselves and their loved ones; and a
prospect of eternal punishment for their enemies. Probably most people are attracted to such
ideas, but not everyone can accept them on the sole basis of their attractiveness. But some
decide to believe anyway, out of fear of the supposed unpleasant consequences of not doing
so. Both approaches furnish abundant motive for professing to believe, but neither offers
evidence that the belief is actually true. (The mere popularity of ideas is not evidence that they
correspond to reality.)
At this point, it’s proper that we touch upon an item of peripheral interest. Some
people are more serious than others about their beliefs. Some believe out of conviction, but
others adopt beliefs on the basis of social convenience. The latter claim to believe whatever
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others in their chosen social group profess to believe, not as a matter of conviction, but simply
as a means of fitting in. As children, they subscribe to the religious traditions of their families.
If they later attend a college where religious skepticism is the accepted norm, they switch from
believers to doubters. After graduating and finding jobs, they adopt the beliefs of their bosses
and coworkers. When moving into a new neighborhood, they adopt whatever beliefs their new
friends and neighbors hold, and attend their local house of worship if that’s the fashion. It’s
important to distinguish consistent and loyal belief from conviction from the free-flowing
attitude of social conformity, because the distinction applies to believers and non-believers
alike. And here we’re concerned, not with social opportunists, but with conscientious believers
and non-believers.
Atheists—the serious ones intellectually anchored to their atheism, not those who idly
drift in and out—are typically people who lack the knack of believing whatever they choose.
They find it to their advantage to embrace reality instead of illusion, and they distinguish
between the two on the basis of evidence and reason. Unless or until they encounter
persuasive evidence for something, no matter how appealing it might seem, they’re inclined to
suppose it isn’t real. In other words, without clear evidence to the contrary, atheists judge the
gods of modern religion to be in the same category as Odin, Zeus, Osiris, and little green men
from outer space.
In most cases, an inclination to godlessness is not a matter of amoral craving. Maturely
responsible atheists are thoroughly aware that standards of behavior are necessary for society
to function and to remain stable, and thus for people—whether believers or not—to contribute
to society and earn the benefits that it has to offer. Atheists see morality, not as fear-
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motivated, blind obedience to a set of commandments, but rather as a matter of purely
practical concern.
But what about the burden of sin? What about salvation?
So, what is sin? Sin is a religious concept, defined as the deliberate violation of the will
of God. But atheists are persuaded that gods do not exist. If God doesn’t exist, then it can’t
have a will. If there’s no divine will, then it can’t be violated. If there’s no violation, then
there’s no sin. If there’s no sin, then there’s nothing from which to be saved. If there’s nothing
from which to be saved, then salvation is meaningless.
But how can the atheist be sure he’s right? What if he’s wrong? What happens when he
comes to final judgment?
No one can be absolutely sure of anything except his own existence, let alone anything
for which evidence is sketchy or non-existent. But the atheist will at least have the advantage
of being honest, of not professing a belief that he doesn’t actually hold. What would be the
point of trying to fool a supposedly omniscient being one believes to be imaginary? Wouldn’t
such a being, if it turns out to be real, be offended by the pretense? If God values honesty, then
that much is in the atheist’s favor. And if God does not value honesty, then perhaps it isn’t
worth worshiping.
On the other hand, how does the believer fare if, at the moment of judgment, the judge
turns out to be something other than the particular deity he’d worshiped? Would this judge
forgive the error? Or would it be roused to jealous fury? There’s no getting around this
dilemma; it’s a gamble any way one approaches it. Everyone must deal with it the best he can
in light of available evidence—which, if we’re entirely objective about it, would appear scant
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and ambiguous at best.
Myth: Without religion, people are without morality.
By itself, atheism, as simple disbelief or unbelief in gods and the supernatural, contains
no code of morality. However, most thinking people, religious or not, acknowledge the
practical need for standards of behavior that make it possible for society to function, and for
people to interact easily within society. Atheists, like everyone else, are bound by the civil law.
And there’s nothing to prevent atheists from “borrowing” moral codes from religion, and
indeed many do. But contrary to popular opinion, religion isn’t the sole source of morality. To
maintain intellectual integrity, many atheists look to secular sources for moral guidance. Of
particular interest are systems employing rational methods to distinguish right from wrong with
respect to core principles, instead of simplistic lists of rigid dos and don’ts. Various secular
ethics have been in widespread practice for centuries, and new ones are developed by
conscientious individuals and groups to fit the needs of contemporary society, either as
adjuncts to conventional morality, or as stand-alone replacements for it. We might add that, in
most cases, the practical results of rational ethics turn out tolerably similar, or even identical, to
those of religious morality, except that secular ethics are indifferent to non-secular matters,
such as piety, blasphemy, and holy day observances. The main difference between doctrinaire
morals and rational ethics is that morals simply decree which behaviors are right and which are
wrong, whereas ethics enable us to understand why a behavior is right, wrong, or of no moral
consequence, in any situation. Morals require only memorization and obedience, and thus are
handy and easy to apply in simple situations. Ethics require disciplined thinking and prudent
judgment, and so require greater investment of brainpower to apply, but provide ways to
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resolve moral conflicts and to adapt to new or unusual circumstances never envisioned by
traditional moralists of bygone ages.
Myth: Without religion, life Is without purpose.
Try telling that to Isaac Asimov, Clara Barton, Ambrose Bierce, Arthur C. Clarke, Andrew
Carnegie, Emily Dickinson, Thomas Edison, Albert Einstein, Stephen Hawking, H. L. Mencken,
Bertrand Russell, Carl Sagan, Mark Twain—as purposeful and religionless a bunch as you’re ever
likely to encounter. Well, you might have trouble telling those folks anything, since they’re all
dead. But the names may offer an idea of the caliber of purpose that can arise in the absence
of divine inspiration, if one simply opens one’s eyes and applies a little intellect and effort. And
there are still a billion or so live specimens—mighty or modest, take your pick—actively
defining and fulfilling their own purposes, if you can find one with the spare time to grant you
an interview.
Religious people are used to being told what their purpose in life is: to serve God—
whatever that means. It typically translates to leading a virtuous life, becoming educated,
earning one’s keep, supporting and caring for one’s family, serving one’s community, respecting
nature, periodically performing religious rituals and attending services, and so forth. In other
words, mostly secular stuff.
Atheists mostly manage to figure out the secular stuff for themselves without being
told. To them, it’s part of fulfilling one’s practical obligations to oneself and to society. The
part that atheists don’t get is the part about worshiping an imaginary being. It seems to them a
purposeless distraction, having to do with conformity, not with an actual purpose. A religious
person would likely claim that the purpose of devotion to God, if nothing else, is to avoid
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damnation and attain a happy afterlife. But the non-believer sees this as a non-starter, for it
isn’t just the existence of gods that he doubts, but the whole package that goes with them:
Paradise, hell, salvation, redemption, sin, damnation; or reincarnation, it’s all fantasy to him,
and the only purpose he might find in it is entertainment.
Surely, the non-believer can find more entertaining and purposeful things to do than
sitting in a church pew on a gorgeous day, serving as an easy target for fellow congregants’
communicable diseases. Purpose is abundant for those who look for it: leading a virtuous life,
becoming educated, earning one’s keep, supporting and caring for one’s family, serving one’s
community, respecting nature, and applying one’s own set of natural abilities, acquired insights,
and learned skills to make the world a better place than he found it. Or just taking time out to
have fun. Even recreation, after all, has a restorative purpose.
Myths about Belief
Hyperbole: It’s a miracle!
To understand this claim properly, we need to know just what constitutes a miracle. A
typical dictionary defines a miracle as an event that can’t be explained by laws of nature, and is
thus believed to be supernatural. In other words, a miracle is something that appears to defy
nature—which in the Bronze Age might have been most anything, but in the era of modern
science is a rather high bar.
Still, it’s common to hear “miracle” used to describe the commonplace. The so-called
“miracles” of life and birth, for example, were once thought to be supernatural, but are now
readily understood (by anyone who takes the time to study them) in terms of chemistry and
biology. In such terms, the natural birth of a human is perhaps admittedly more complex, but
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certainly no more miraculous, than the natural cell division of one bacterium into two bacteria.
The same general rules of reproduction apply, but with the additional steps of cell
differentiation, sex, and gestation for multicellular creatures.
Gratuitous overuse of the word “miracle” to describe a natural event follows the same
general pattern as overuse of “great” to describe the mediocre, “extraordinary” to describe the
ordinary, “awesome” to describe what awes only the far too impressionable, and “incredible”
to describe what’s believed by multitudes. That is to say, such overuse not only robs such
terms of their ability to convey a truly superlative meaning, but also forfeits the credibility of
those who engage in such sensationalist hyperbole—which is why the credibility of advertisers
tends to rank on a par with that of politicians, petty criminals, and religious fanatics. If
someone routinely claims whatever he talks about to be “unbelievable,” then, to take him
literally, we can’t believe what he says. Likewise, someone who applies “miracle” to routine
events evidently isn’t much of an authority on what a miracle is, so his judgment of such things
isn’t to be trusted.
As for me, I’ve experienced a number of things that I haven’t fully understood, but
nothing that I’ve assumed couldn’t ultimately be explained in terms of nature. If someday I
ever do experience something that seems beyond the bounds of nature, I think my response
would be, not to assume it’s supernatural, but rather to expand my concept of nature to
include it. Before resorting to a non-explanation as frivolously speculative as “a miracle,” I’d try
to exhaust all natural explanations. And if unsuccessful in this, I’d frankly concede my
ignorance in the matter, rather than fish for fantastic notions that explain nothing and are
utterly devoid of supporting evidence. Being human, I might indulge a little speculation for
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amusement’s sake, but I don’t pretend to turn fancies into fact by sheer force of make-believe.
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Chapter 9: Myths about History
History is made by everyone. But it’s written by the victors, not the vanquished; by the
masters, not the slaves; by the powerful, not the downtrodden; by the educated, not the
ignorant. In addition, there are times when history is “adjusted” to favor a prevailing opinion of
the times. On the other hand, history is sometimes revised upon discovery of facts previously
unknown: artifacts found at the site of an old barn, yellowed letters tucked into an ancient
desk, testimony of the elderly, and the like. Thus, we can’t always expect recorded history to
be an accurate and unbiased account of actual events. But we can expect the recording to be
updated occasionally—sometimes to add a bias, sometimes to expunge it.
Glaring examples of wholesale historical tinkering include suppression of the true plight
of slaves in the American South, and claims by the Soviet Union that many modern devices,
from electric lights and refrigerators to television and computers, had been invented by Russian
scientists. But truth has a way of eventually breaking back into the open and shining its glaring
light upon lies. In the United States, some of the most popular myths about history involve
religion.
Myth: Immigrants to England’s North American colonies were seeking religious freedom.
Many elementary school History books of the 20th century claimed that religious
minorities migrating from England to Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 1620s were escaping
sectarian persecution in the Old World and seeking religious freedom in the New. The part
about escaping persecution was true enough, but what these immigrants actually had in mind
was setting up a religious tyranny of their own, and persecuting any who harbored dissenting
opinions: Anabaptists against Quakers, Congregationalists against Baptists, Protestants against
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Catholics, Christians against Jews and deists, and everyone against “freethinkers.” It’s not that
there was evil intent; it was just the way things were done in those days: adherents of any
religious sect attempted to protect their beliefs by isolating themselves from competing
opinions, and by forming community power bases within which they could dominate,
persecute, and ostracize others. Real religious freedom wouldn’t appear until 1636, when,
upon being banished from Massachusetts, reformer Roger Williams established a refuge for
religious minorities in Rhode Island. And even then, the religious freedom idea did not receive
nationwide support until the Bill of Rights was added to the U.S. Constitution in 1791.
Myth: The United States was founded as a Christian nation on Christian principles.
Another American myth that continues to enthrall many to this day is that the United
States of America was founded by Christians, based on the tenets of their religion. It’s true
enough that there were Christians among the founders, but this is not to say that all, or even
most, were Christian. Private letters and other writings, written either by the founders
themselves or by others who knew them personally, reveal them to have been far from a
unanimous congregation of Christians, and few if any of these were of the charismatic Bible-
thumping variety. Several, including some of the most prominent, were deists—believers in a
non-biblical “Natural God” or “Creator.”
George Washington (1st U.S. President, 1789-1797) was very tight-lipped about his religious
beliefs, regarding them as a matter of strictly personal concern. He attended Episcopal
services with his wife Martha, but always departed before communion was to be taken.
When challenged by the rector about this, Washington simply declined from then on to
attend any service at which the Eucharist was to be celebrated. Moreover, he refused to
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have clergy present at his deathbed. His rector speculated that Washington was not a
Christian, but a deist, and that it seemed he attended church mainly to please his wife.
John Adams (2nd U.S. President, 1797-1801) was a Christian—a Calvinist (Methodist), to be
precise. However, his correspondence with others reveals a decided disdain for organized
religion. And when, as the second U.S. President, he signed the Treaty of Tripoli, that
document contained a clear disclaimer to the Muslims who were the other party to that
agreement: “The government of the United States is not, in any sense, founded on the
Christian religion.”44
Thomas Jefferson (3rd U.S. President, 1801-1809) invoked a “Creator” and “Natural God” in
the Declaration of Independence, reflecting his belief in a non-biblical God, but in a way that
would also artfully suggest reverence for the God of the Anglican Church, of which the
Declaration’s intended recipient, King George III, was the political defender. In other
writings, Jefferson expressed high regard for Jesus as a great teacher, but extreme disgust
for the Christian church. As President in 1802, he invoked “a wall of separation between
Church & State”45 to defend religious minorities (in this case, Baptists) against abuse by their
political adversaries.
James Madison (4th U.S. President, 1809-1817), primary author of the Constitution and its
Bill of Rights, had been reared a Presbyterian, but had long since developed a profound
loathing for Christianity, and had become a deist by the time he undertook his duty as
scribe for the Constitutional Convention. Madison’s later writings reveal he continued to
44 John Adams: Treaty of Tripoli, 1797
45 Thomas Jefferson: letter to the Danbury [CT] Baptists, 1802
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share Jefferson’s staunch support of “total separation of the Church from the State.”46
Benjamin Franklin described himself as a “rational Christian,” but strongly disapproved of
the intermingling of religion and government. He expressed the opinion that a religion
could be considered good as long as it managed to support and take care of itself with
God’s help; but if it asked for government endorsement or support, “’tis a sign, I apprehend,
of its being a bad one.”47
46 JamesMadison: letter to Robert Walsh, 1819
47 Benjamin Franklin: letter to Richard Price, 1780
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Chapter 10: Myths about Science
Prior to the 17th century, “natural philosophy”—what had passed for “science” for
thousands of years—was conducted primarily on the basis of observation and measurement.
Much detailed data had been compiled about the appearance of the heavens, and the cyclical
movements of celestial objects could be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy. But minimal
efforts to explain these movements, or even what kept these objects from falling to earth, were
entirely speculative. There was no systematic testing to verify these speculations—not because
there was no desire to do so, but because there were not yet any instruments that would make
such verification possible.
In the year 1610, Galileo Galilei learned of a new Dutch navigational device called a
telescope, and built one for himself. After verifying that it worked as designed to enhance the
images of distant ships, it occurred to him to train the gadget on the night sky. At that point,
Galileo’s empirical observations were brought to bear on the then currently held theory,
formulated by Aristotle 2,000 years earlier, elaborated upon by Ptolemy, and long held to be
true by the Roman Catholic Church. Aristotle’s theory proposed that the earth stands
absolutely unmoving at the center of the universe, and that the planets and stars are
embedded in hollow concentric crystal spheres that rotate at different rates about the earth at
their common center, thus explaining both the motions of heavenly objects and why they did
not fall to earth.
Galileo aimed his telescope at the planet Jupiter, where, in addition to the planet itself,
he noted four tiny points of light from objects utterly unknown at the time. As he continued to
observe on successive nights, Galileo noted that these four objects were not locked in place,
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but were revolving about Jupiter, just as our single moon—presumably embedded in its crystal
sphere—revolves around our Earth. But for this to happen, Jupiter’s moons would have to be
moving freely through the region supposedly occupied by the crystal sphere holding Jupiter
itself. So obviously, there couldn’t be any crystal there, or else it would block the motion of the
moons and lock them in place. Moreover, this left no explanation for why these objects revolve
around Jupiter, because Aristotle’s theory claimed that everything revolves around the earth.
And indeed, until that time, nothing had ever been observed to the contrary—by the naked
human eye.
Over the span of a few nights, Galileo’s empirical observations refuted Aristotle’s long-
standing “divine” theory of the heavenly spheres. Modern, evidence-based science was born.
And the Church was furious. Galileo was compelled by threat of torture to renounce his
findings, placed under permanent house-arrest, and forbidden to publish anything further. But
by that time, the word had already gotten out, and the facts remained clearly observable to any
heretic who chose to peer through a telescope.
Myth: Science is just another belief system.
In the 17th century, French philosopher René Descartes mused that the only thing a
person can know with absolute certainty is the fact of his or her own existence. One’s body and
senses, one’s fellow humans, and one’s universe (and, we might add, even one’s thoughts),
might be mere illusions; yet one cannot explain the existence of his or her own conscious
experiences except by acknowledging the inescapable evidence of his or her own existence as a
consciously experiencing entity. I think, therefore I am.
Beyond this fundamental certainty, though, everything else that enters our
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consciousness requires at least a little faith. We assume, for example, that what appears to us
as our own body is indeed a physical body more or less under our own control. We assume
that the senses of this body tell us something about a real, external world independent of our
imagination, and that this world is populated by other beings more or less like us, with physical
bodies (and presumably conscious awareness) more or less like ours. And we assume that our
behavioral choices are made of our own free will. Although it’s possible that these things might
be illusions, we’re persuaded that they’re probably true, since supposing otherwise—for
instance, that we can walk through walls, fly out of upper story windows, or refuse to pay the
rent—can have unpleasant consequences. In our world of experience, most of us prefer
pleasure to pain, and so try to adjust our behavior to increase the former and reduce the latter.
The results usually affirm our beliefs, so we accept them as true.
But some things require more faith than others. Language, mathematics, and logic are
abstractions that take some work and practice to grasp and apply. But once we come to see
that, used properly and consistently, these abstractions yield a new and useful level of
understanding, we use them to learn even more. Perhaps most fundamentally important, the
fact that this level of understanding is non-random and, for the most part independent of our
personal preferences, furnishes additional evidence that the natural world we experience is
something real and not merely a product of imagination.
The sciences provide still more information about the external world. Natural
phenomena can be observed or detected, measured, and verified. As we seek to satisfy our
curiosity about our observations, we speculate about possible explanations. We formulate
testable hypotheses, and then carry out the tests to verify objectively whether or not these
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hypotheses are in consistent accord with reality. If a hypothesis can withstand, not only our
own intense scrutiny, but also that of others whose aim it is to prove it false, and if it yields
both explanatory and reliably predictive power about nature without conflicting inexplicably
with evidence, then we eventually develop enough confidence in it to promote it to the level of
scientific theory.
Nowadays, we’ve developed enough confidence in this reliable scientific method to
trust it with our lives. And that trust pays us back with tangible results: the doubling and
trebling of human life expectancy, the ability to travel swiftly and to communicate almost
instantaneously, the capacity to support billions of humans on a planet that once supported
only a few thousands, and a grandly expanding vision of the natural universe in both space and
time, beyond the wildest imaginings of even those just three or four generations before us.
The natural sciences offer a comprehensive understanding of material nature, and the
social sciences can teach us much about human nature. But because science is based on
empirical evidence, it’s limited to the study of things that can be observed, detected, and
measured. It can’t tell us much, if anything, about intangibles, such as human values, purpose,
morality, justice, and liberty—concepts that have no direct concrete references that can be
reliably observed, tested, and independently corroborated by people who subscribe to different
sets of suppositions and traditions. Thus, we transition from the realm of substance to the
realm of supposition. Belief systems are predicated primarily upon notions of tradition,
ideology, duty, and blind loyalty, not upon empirical evidence. There are many belief systems,
but the two major fields that significantly affect our lives are politics and religion.
In this frame of reference, we can say that politics is a system of belief about the
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legitimate objectives of society and government, what they ought to do (and ought not to do),
and how the ruling and the ruled should interact. Politics has an abundance of historical record
and some prehistoric evidence to inform us of the outcomes of various social orders and forms
of government that have been tried so far. However, much of his evidence is complex,
fragmentary, opinionated, and subject to rather liberal interpretation by no less opinionated
historians trying to sort out the implications of ancients’ situations and intents, in order to
extract some degree of truth about what actually transpired in earlier times. Needless to say,
such a process can be very imprecise and misleading. But at least the historical evidence we
have—fragmentary, opinionated, and confusing though it might be—serves as an overall guide
to set limits on our own speculations.
But when we get to religion, all bets are off. We enter a completely different realm,
where the concepts we discuss—spirit, soul, deity, afterlife—are utterly outside of observable
nature, and thus cannot be detected or measured by natural means. While there must be
strong and unambiguous empirical evidence to confirm a scientific theory, and at least some
acceptably reliable recorded evidence to guide political historians, there’s no verifiable
evidence for most of the concepts with which religion is primarily concerned. Religion is
predicated on the existence of supernatural beings, powers, and states of existence for which
there is no empirical evidence. There is evidence of a sort—scripture and popularity of belief—
but these are evidence only of the thinking of the ancients, and of the popularity of belief
among both ancient and modern peoples. It is evidence of the existence of beliefs as concepts,
but not evidence of the truth of the content of those beliefs. The mere popularity of an idea,
even if unanimous, is evidence only that the idea is appealing, not that it’s true.
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Science relies upon a universe of empirical evidence, and disciplined reasoning based
thereon. But in the absence of empirical evidence, religion must be believed solely on the basis
of unquestioning faith—faith in the truth of the dogmas of the religion, and faith in the
authority that formulates and preaches those dogmas. Each religion is one of many such faith-
based belief systems, but solidly evidence-based science is most certainly not just another of
these.
Myth: It’s a scientifically proven fact!
During the 19th century, it was becoming a widespread view that science was learning so
much so fast that it would soon reach a point when it would have discovered everything
important about nature. Even many scientists had begun to believe this. Then, beginning in
1887, along came Michelson and Morley, followed by Curie, Einstein, Planck, Hubble, and
others. Over the span of a few decades, our view of the universe, its complexity, its size, and its
age, suddenly expanded roughly a millionfold, in both macro and micro directions. Presumed
“natural laws” that had held fast since Newton’s time were suddenly called into question, and
all bets were off. Science had to reconfigure its attitude, from one of being smugly on the
threshold of omniscience to one of gaping, awestruck wonder and humility at the newfound
scope of things.
Nowadays, science takes a more sober stance. While accepting credit for its
accomplishments, it also acknowledges its weaknesses, and has in effect downgraded its
“master of the universe” self-image to “student of the universe.” Science observes facts and
tries to interpret and explain them. It does not prove them. Science does not make the laws of
nature (for only nature itself can do that); it merely tries to understand them, to improve that
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understanding as methods improve, and to express that understanding in a thorough but
concise way. The most science can prove is that a hypothesis or theory is false, by the
detection of a single inexplicable instance in which the hypothesis or theory is clearly not borne
out. Hypotheses that consistently withstand intense scrutiny over time may eventually be
elevated to the status of “theory,” not because they’re ever proved true, but because they’ve
never been found to be false. We can never be absolutely certain, even after millions of
successes and zero failures (so far), that the next time we test a scientific theory it will yet again
turn out to confirm our expectations. It almost always does. Almost always. But occasionally
not, and that’s when science advances, by learning something so different from the current
view that it must revise its thinking. Though hardly a routine occurrence, this is an essential
part of the self-correcting process, without which science would no longer be science, but “just
another belief system,” as its detractors mistakenly claim. This is the power of science: to
maintain a firm grasp on reality by adjusting its theories to the evidence, not the evidence to its
theories. All we can be sure of is that anyone who claims “It’s a scientifically proven fact…”
clearly shouldn’t be considered a credible authority on science, proof, or fact. It is not in spite
of its self-critical nature, but because of it, that science has matured into a self-correcting
discipline that turns out to be the most reliable method yet devised to discover what’s most
probably true about the natural world.
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Part V: How Things Might Someday Be
To this point, we’ve mainly discussed how things are (as I see them) in the here-and-
now. Obviously, despite thousands of years of progress, civilization hasn’t yet achieved
perfection. Nor is it ever likely to do so, since perfection itself is a nebulous concept with
numerous interpretations, some mutually conflicting. Still, there’s clearly room for
improvement, if only we can discover what constitutes “improvement” in terms that might be
agreeable to most people of sound mind and good will.
So, let’s explore the possibility that what we’ve covered so far might lead us to any
plausible predictions about the future, and perhaps indulge in some conjecture about how we
might want to alter our present course in the interest of preserving society and improving
conditions for future generations. In the course of this speculative adventure, I admit I’ll be in
over my head at times, since I have little or no formal training in some of these areas, and my
connections to the many cutting edges of development are rather hit and miss at best. My
intent here is not to provide the reader with reliable information, but to sow a few seeds of
inquiry, some of which might germinate and flower with the help of others far more
knowledgeable than I.
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Chapter 11: Justice
As I write this, the United States of America has the dubious distinction among
developed nations of having the highest percentage of its citizenry in prison. Moreover, many
of those imprisoned are serving time for relatively minor and non-violent transgressions, such
as smoking a little marijuana, while corporate CEOs and investment bankers are rewarded with
“golden parachutes” for wrecking not only their own businesses but also the national economy.
And the icing on this dung-cake is that the U.S. is the only developed country in the free world
that has not yet abolished capital punishment. Do we know something the other countries
don’t? Or is it we who need to learn something from them?
One thing the United States has, which most other countries don’t, is an institutional
assumption of innocence until proven guilty. How’s that working out for us? If we’d ask some
of those multitudes now in prison, we’d find our institutional assumption is working only part
time, if at all. It isn’t that the concept is bad, but only that it’s so spottily applied as to seem the
exception rather than the rule.
Perhaps we wouldn’t need instruction from others, if only we’d think through the
reasons society has for crafting laws and punishing violators. Let’s take a step back, and
consider whether what our legal and justice systems do accomplishes the legitimate objective
“to protect and serve” the people and their society. And if we find it doesn’t, if our presumed
solutions fail to address specific problems, or if some of what we have identified as problems
are actually inconsequential transgressions of tradition, then let’s make the changes necessary
to restore both the integrity and the consistency of justice, as well as public respect for it.
The problems involve lawmaking, interactions of law enforcement with the public, the
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fairness and impartiality (or lack thereof) of the justice system, and the penal system. There is
already active involvement in identifying and resolving problems in most of these areas. But as
to the matter of punishment, there seems much confusion, and not much serious reflection,
about what its true purpose is. I admit that this is one area in which I’m not even an amateur,
let alone an expert. For the most part, I’m a passive (but concerned) observer via the news
media. My few interactions with the criminal element have been transient, resulting from my
early work experience in a hospital emergency room, and later on jury duty. Still, being
relatively detached from a system sometimes affords an analytical mind the opportunity to
examine it with fresh eyes. So here’s my take on it, for whatever it may be worth.
Let’s consider just what the legitimate duty of a justice system is: “to protect and serve.”
It should protect society’s citizens against abuse, exploitation, and negligence, whether by other
individuals or groups, by businesses or banks, or even by government itself. And it should serve
the purpose of providing a means for people to resolve their disagreements peacefully and
fairly. It’s supposedly to these ends that government makes and enforces laws, and that the
judicial and penal systems exist to deter abuse, by imposing penalties upon convicted
offenders. The two most common forms of penalties fall into the general categories of
deprivation and isolation.
Deprivation, in the form of confiscation of wealth or property, imposes a material
burden upon offenders by requiring them to pay restitution to their victims, plus a punitive fine
or confiscation to discourage further misconduct by raising the odds against its successful
outcome. A severe (and usually irreversible) variant of deprivation strategy is incapacitation:
inflicting injury to prevent wrongdoers from repeating their offenses (e.g., amputating a thief’s
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hands or castrating a rapist).
Isolation from society typically involves imprisonment, or psychiatric detention and
treatment for mental or emotional disorders contributing to criminal behavior. Imprisonment
may involve forced labor, both as an additional punitive measure, and as a way for prisoners to
earn their room, board, and health care while confined. It may also include rehabilitation,
conditioning prisoners for good citizenship and training them for productive occupation once
they’re discharged from prison. A severe (and irreversible) form of both isolation and
deprivation is execution.
I admit this is an oversimplification, but it should suit our purpose here of considering
the underlying assumptions of the system. So, can we spot any problem areas, and are there
any workable solutions?
First, like any other human endeavor, justice isn’t perfect. Witnesses are sometimes
mistaken (or dishonest), and implications of evidence are sometimes unclear. The system
sometimes has technical or political glitches, and some laws are unjust. And attorneys are
under pressure to “win” cases, rather than to seek justice. Result: Sometimes people are
wrongly convicted and punished for wrongs they haven’t committed. Therefore, society should
categorically abolish any punishment that can’t be reversed or compensated in the event of
wrongful conviction or repeal of an unjust law.
Second, just as the human institution of justice isn’t perfect, neither are humans
themselves. Not everyone is inclined to behave in what the rest of us consider a civilized
manner. Not everyone is trained or experienced in thinking rationally, or is adept at pushing
emotional impulses aside, especially when under pressure. This applies not only to prisoners,
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but also to the guards and officials responsible for managing them; psychological experiments
have shown that the very nature of the prison environment tends to break down empathy and
encourage dehumanization of “the other,” regardless of on which side of the bars one happens
to be. Brutality breeds brutality, no matter which side initiates it.
Third, effective rehabilitation requires that prisoners learn to behave as responsible
members of society, to perform useful work to earn a living, and to earn respect (not fear) and
trust from others, by being respectful and trustworthy themselves. But humans who are
treated as animals learn to behave as animals, acting on impulse rather than reason. So, in an
environment where brutality prevails, rehabilitation is virtually impossible. Therefore, brutal
treatment of prisoners must be eliminated. Prisoners must be treated with firm but humane
control and discipline, and with basic respect for their humanity. Even if some prisoners don’t
return that respect, prison staff must have the extraordinary strength of character to maintain
the moral high ground. Yet even the best of people can crack under the strain. Those who do
must be immediately relieved of duties involving direct interaction with prisoners, if
rehabilitation efforts are to succeed.
With those matters taken care of, we can turn our attention to society’s legitimate
obligation in dealing with injustice. Simply put, as we’ve already noted, it’s “to protect and
serve.” Ideally, this would be accomplished by creating and preserving an environment in
which no injustice is ever perpetrated by or upon any person, group, or business. Realistically,
though, people and situations are often more complicated than simple textbook cases.
Abstract ideals are seldom humanly attainable, and we must settle instead for a practical
“optimum.”
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So, let’s outline the fundamental objectives of the justice system to which this
“protection and service” are legitimately directed: maintaining a social order that is stable yet
flexible enough to accommodate progress, deterring abusive activity, correcting problems that
result from abuse that isn’t effectively deterred, and protecting all persons under its
jurisdiction.
What is not the duty of the justice system is to exact revenge or perpetrate vendettas,
either against offenders themselves, or against innocent parties, such as offenders’ families or
ethnic groups. If it indulges in such practices, justice is replaced by vengeance, and society
reduces itself to the criminal level, by perpetuating injustice rather than discouraging and
ending it. Any society that does so deserves neither respect nor trust, but only a very poor
substitute: fear.
It’s also justice’s duty to take every reasonable precaution to ensure that no person is
wrongly convicted. For if a pattern emerges in which innocent people are convicted and
punished for offenses actually committed by others, then word will spread, not only that crime
pays handsomely, but also that those who do nothing wrong can expect to be penalized for the
acts of others. When that happens, any incentive to play by the rules is lost. The de facto
moral standard becomes “whatever I can get away with.” Crime skyrockets, and justice and
social order become nothing but a sad joke.
So now, let’s take a look around. Does this last scenario reflect actual prevailing
conditions in our community, in our nation, and in our world? If it does, this is a clue that
something in the system is broken and needs to be fixed. And we can be sure that neither
ignorant apathy nor impulsive wrath are parts of the solution. For these are what gave rise to
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the problem in the first place, and will continue to plague us until we deal with them.
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Chapter 12: Rebalancing Work and Leisure
At the end of the Second Millennium CE, America had just experienced an
unprecedented eight years of steady prosperity, fueled by economic growth and underpinned
by government services. The government services were funded by taxes, and, as usual, there
were complaints about “waste” and “handouts to the undeserving.” But the complaints rang
hollow, for both wages and business were consistently good. Employment was up, the stock
market was soaring, and, for the first time in decades, the federal budget had been balanced
with a projected surplus.
However, in 2001, the first year of the Third Millennium, a new American leader was
inaugurated. Seeing the word “surplus” (and ignoring the accumulated debt), President George
W. Bush, Jr. declared the nation was “rolling in money,” and immediately cut taxes.
Accordingly, the surplus turned into a deficit. Government services became underfunded.
Personal income and purchasing power became stagnant, lagging behind inflation. And the
economy reverted to a succession of rolling recessions similar to those of the 1980s. Then new
wars in the Middle East erupted, and the administration’s solution to the added expense was
magical accounting: Simply don’t include war in the national budget! Seven years later, the
banking system locked up and the Great Recession set in.
Of course, there were additional factors in this collapse. Some (like deregulation) were
directly attributable to the new administration. Others (such as risky lending practices and job
outsourcing) had emerged from past practices of both political parties, going back to the 1970s.
The risky lending started as a venture combining good will with poor judgment: to help poor
families purchase homes. Many of the jobs outsourced went to foreign countries with cheap
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labor—South Korea, China, Malaysia, India, Mexico—thus pricing American workers out of
some job markets.
But computerization and automation were (and continue to be) additional factors in the
loss of semi-skilled and skilled jobs. Even if America were able to recover all the jobs now
outsourced to foreign labor, many of them would be displaced by computers and robots—
which in many cases can do the same work faster, cheaper, and (in some cases) better, without
weekends, holidays, vacations, or sick leave. Even with domestic manufacturing running full
tilt, there would still be millions of Americans either unemployed or working for starvation
wages. To fix this, we need to think outside the customary box.
Fortunately, there’s a precedent that we can glean for hints on how to go about it. The
Industrial Age began in the late 18th century, with the invention of an abundant power source:
the high-pressure steam engine, fired first by wood, and later by abundant coal.
Among steam’s first applications was textiles, production of which until that time had
been by hand, and spread out over the countryside in hundreds of family-size “cottage”
operations, spinning, weaving, and sewing from dawn till dusk. When steam power was
adopted, it was necessary to consolidate operations into centralized manufactory facilities
(“factories” for short), where the power could directly drive the semi-automated equipment
through systems of belts, pulleys, shafts, and levers. The machinery replaced the labor of many
pairs of hands. But it still required hands, eyes, ears, and even a few brains, to set it up and
keep it running smoothly all day, every day. Yet the labor supply—mostly women and children
—was cheap and plentiful. (Employment was a take-it-or-leave-it deal in the days before
organized labor and collective bargaining.) This made “sweatshop” operation efficient enough
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to produce huge volumes of product at low per-unit cost, thus generating a handsome profit for
the owners and investors.
But the machinery, operating at high speed just inches away from busy hands and
without safety shielding, was physically dangerous. It also generated clouds of airborne fibrous
dust, which, it soon became tragically apparent, presented both a health hazard and a fire
hazard. Consequently, the injury, illness, death, and turnover rates in the industry were high.
Similar conditions attended many other early industries when machinery came to
farming, mining, wood- and metal-working, transportation, and many other productive fields,
vastly increasing efficiency and productivity, but also keeping wages at starvation level and
introducing new hazards. Since then, incremental reform has reduced the standard work day,
from 16 hours to 12, then 10, then 8. Minimum wages and ages have been mandated. Safety
and health standards have been imposed. And workers’ quality of life has correspondingly
improved. Plus, instead of laboring to exhaustion in factories, children can now spend time in
school being educated for the more intellectually demanding jobs of the future.
Thus, the per-unit cost of production has increased. Yet this hasn’t adversely affected
profits over the long run! What kind of magic is this? Well, it isn’t magic at all. When we
consider the entire operation in its environmental context, what stands out is that workers now
earn enough to buy the products they make—not just textiles, but food, appliances, cars, and
computers—thus driving up demand, and profits as well.
So, can we apply any of this knowledge to reduce hardship in the face of continuing
automation? Counterintuitive though it might seem on the surface, there’s reasonable hope
that we can. Though I haven’t thoroughly worked through the details of the economics
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involved, I believe we could devise a workable plan to adjust the business and work
environments to the new realities of globalization and automation. Suppose we do something
like the following:
First, ensure that the minimum wage provides a level of weekly full-time pay above the
poverty level, and maintain this level with periodic increases to compensate for inflation.
Second, reduce unemployment by shortening the standard work-week, from 40 hours to
perhaps 36 (a 10-percent reduction), while using additional employees to maintain the
same level of production. (We must also consider that this would increase the business cost
of providing health care coverage and fringe benefits for more employees. On the other
hand, if the 36 hour week were divided into four nine-hour work days, some savings could
be achieved in start-up and shut-down efficiency.)
Third, as individual work time is reduced, raise the hourly minimum wage to keep the
weekly pay for a full-time 36-hour-per-week job above poverty level. (Any professional
economist would correctly point out that these two steps would be inflationary. Thus, the
changes would have to be gradual, to soften economic impact and avert hyperinflation.
Spreading the 10-percent adjustment over four years would mean a tolerable 2.5 percent
non-compounded change per year for four years.)
Fourth, with more people working fewer hours each for living wages, and with more leisure
time available, expect to see a corresponding increase in consumer demand (thus justifying
the additional hiring and maintaining acceptable profit margins), and also in tax revenues
(from more people earning a living wage). These tax revenues could help offset the next
step.
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Fifth, be aware that, under such a plan, businesses would be assuming the brunt of the
burden during this transition, and so may require temporary government assistance to
remain solvent. Such assistance would be phased out as overall market equilibria stabilize
under the new standards.
I must point out that these are my own admittedly non-professional thoughts. I offer
them only because I haven’t recently come across any thinking on this seemingly pressing issue.
However, if my half-baked ideas serve to spark better informed and experienced thought and
action among seasoned economists and businesspeople, they will have served their intended
purpose.
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Reflections
In this work, we’ve progressively covered overlapping topics of knowledge, truth, belief,
responsibility, mind, spirit, soul, and being, plus others that provide useful background and real-
world perspective. Most of these are of basic interest to most people, but are generally
considered so commonsense that we needn’t bother thinking about them. Yet, as we’ve seen,
they’re worth a second glance, just to double-check the basic assumptions of our thinking,
especially whenever new evidence comes to light, casting shadows of doubt here and there.
Our investigation has deliberately avoided so-called common sense—which, it turns out,
often isn’t all that common or sensible. Instead, we’ve blazed a more philosophical trail of
rational thought that has led, step-by-step, through the whole sequence. We’ve taken
advantage of relevant evidence where we can find it, and used methodical reason to tie the
evidence together and make it meaningful in human terms, while discrediting stale myths that
color our beliefs and thoughts. Each step has built on the understanding of those previous.
Thus, our current view of basic human understanding should be more coherent and
integrated—and, with our myth-filtering, perhaps a bit more streamlined—than it was
previously. Granted, there’ve been gaps in our progress, but this work is intended more as a
“sampler” than as a comprehensive dissertation, on the intricacies of methodical thinking about
reality and truth. Even so, the going might have seemed tedious at times. Yet we’d hope that
the resulting enhancement of understanding has been found worth the effort, and furthermore
that the experience may serve as a springboard to independent critical investigation of other
related subjects, such as ethics and logic.
=SAJ=
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