· web view8,302 600 var pvt property at risk 367 1.5 mil 9/2 5 t2 s. pearson 10,002 1700 evac...

Purpose On November 26, 2012, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry (SPF) issued a letter requiring several large fires of Fiscal Year 2012 be reviewed by the National Incident Management Organization (NIMO). The letter emphasized the responsibility of the Forest Service to evaluate management actions and assure they were appropriate, risk based and effective. The fires were selected based on complexity and national significance ensuring the selected fires provide a cross section of our risk management performance in fires of various final costs, sizes and oversight complexity.

On January 28, 2013, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation Management (FAM), issued a letter to Dan Kleinman defining expectations for the review of the McGuire fire. The purpose of the review was to identify areas that need improvement and carry recommendations forward for best management practices in the future. The reviews were conducted using the 2012 Risk Decision Framework which was included with the 2012 Wildfire Guidance letter signed by James Hubbard, dated May 25, 2012.

Background

The team reviewed numerous documents located on the Nez Perce-Clearwater National Forests (NF), within the McGuire ftp site and on InciWeb. Documentation that was reviewed included: Incident Action Plans (IAPs); WFDSS; Incident Status Summaries (209’s); fire maps; and Grangeville Dispatch 2012 Year-end Summary. On site interviews were held in Grangeville and Elk City, Idaho on March 19-21, 2013. Those interviewed included the: Forest Supervisor; Deputy Forest Supervisor; Forest Fire Staff; Deputy Fire Staff; Initial Attack Incident Commander (IC); District FMO; Operations Section Chief (Pearson’s Type 2 IMT); Red River District Ranger; Red River District AFMO; and the Type 2 (T2) Incident Management Team (IMT) IC. Phone interviews were held with the Type 1 (T1) IMT ICs and Operations Section Chiefs on March 25-28, 2013.The team found that there were many factors that influenced the outcome of the McGuire Fire. It was a complex incident located in difficult terrain, with five rural communities, scattered residences, and ranches potentially threatened by the wildfire. Extreme weather, fuel

McGuire Fire Review Nez Perce-Clearwater National Forests USDA Forest Service June 2013

Review Objectives:

Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

Review Team Members from the US Forest Service National Incident Management Organization (NIMO), Region1 and 3.

Dan Kleinman- Operations Section Chief, NIMO,

Bill VanBruggen-R3 Deputy Fire Director

Tom Johnston, Safety Officer, NIMO

Rick Floch, R1 Fire Staff Bitterroot NF, and

Brent Spencer, Logistics Section Chief, NIMO

McGuire Fire Review NezPerce-Clearwater National Forests USDA Forest Service

conditions, other large wildfires burning in the immediate area, within the region and on the adjoining region, and an extended fire season that lasted nearly a month beyond the norm also contributed to the complexity. The team focused on the objectives of the review and was cognizant of not being influenced by hindsight bias when reviewing documents or interviewing people. The team had open discussions with personnel regarding the incident, their interactions, and what they thought was important to share as lessons learned.

The McGuire Fire (ID-NPF-000531) was ignited by lightning on Sunday, August 26, 2012, and was declared 100% contained on October 29, 2012, after burning 43,621 acres in Idaho on the Nez Perce-Clearwater Forests and private ownership.

The fire was detected and put under initial attack on August 28, 2012, the product of lightning, and seven strikes started several other fires within the area. The rapid growth of the McGuire Fire in acres and complexity led to multiple transitions of IMTs. The fire was aggressively attacked and then managed by a T3 IMT, but rapidly progressed in complexity to a T2 IMT (S. Pearson). The rapid growth in complexity, size, and the presence of intermingled communities, private ranches, and timberlands in front of the fire resulted in mobilizing a T1 Incident Management Team (C. Joseph) on September 14, 2012.

Carlton Joseph’s T1 IMT assumed command of the McGuire Fire on September 19, 2012, due to the extended logistical reach of district personnel and the need for them to be available for initial attack and large fire support. Though fairly large (27,000 acres), the fire was situated in locations that inhibited growth and had minimal values at risk. The IMT took the fire and named it Branch V of the McGuire Fire and it was contained at 37,131 acres on October 8, 2012, after burning from the Nez Perce-Clearwater NF north onto the Bitterroot NF in Montana.

A Northern Rockies T1 IMT (G. Poncin) transitioned on September 29, 2012, and took the fire until it was released to Carbone’s T3 NIMO on October 10, 2012. The McGuire Fire was contained on October 29, 2012, sixty three days after ignition.

The last 15+ days (October 10-18, 2012) of the incident were spent in mopping up activities and locating excess equipment, back haul to supply, packaging and returning to the respective cache(s).

Fire Chronology and Incident Management Transitions:

Date % Command Acres + Comments Person Cost8/28 0 Initial Attack 105 5 to100 acres, wind driven 40 157,000

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Date % Command Acres + Comments Person Cost

8/29 0 T3 IMO 13,002 Poor escape routes, critical fire weather

40 300,000

8/30 0 T2 S. Pearson 7,502 Spotting, Bagley/McGuire, evac order Orogrande, ID

186 500,000

8/31 0 T2 S. Pearson 7,702 200 Snags, VAR critical 377 750,0009/1 5 T2 S. Pearson 8,302 600 VAR pvt property at risk 367 1.5 mil9/2 5 T2 S. Pearson 10,002 1700 Evac - Dixie, crowning fire 347 2.2 mil9/3 5 T2 S. Pearson 14,002 4000 Structs threatened Dixie,

Comstock, Orogrande374 2.6 mil

9/4 5 T2 S. Pearson 16,002 2000 Low RH recovery-night, erratic fire behavior

383 3.1 mil

9/5 5 T2 S. Pearson 17,002 1000 Thermal belt activity-night 390 3.5 mil9/6 5 T2 S. Pearson 17,202 200 Active, Stage III Orogrande 445 4.0 mil9/7 5 T2 S. Pearson 18,002 800 Low night RH, fire active 520 4.6 mil9/8 5 T2 S. Pearson 18.102 100 Low night RH, crown/spot 512 5.0 mil9/9 5 T2 S. Pearson 24,002 5900 Red Flag, Stage II Red River,

Hot Springs, Mallard532 5.6 mil

9/10 2 T2 S. Pearson 24,202 200 Red Flag, Evac Warning Red River, no escape routes.

510 6.1 mil

9/11 2 T2 S. Pearson 25,002 800 Active, T1 IMT brief 9/12 523 6.6 mil9/12 2 T2 S. Pearson 25,502 500 Shadow Joseph T1 IMT 497 7.1 mil9/13 2 T2 S. Pearson 26,502 1000 Very active, low night RH 464 7.5 mil9/14 2 T1 C. Joseph 26,884 382 Active fire behavior, wind 429 8.2 mil9/15 2 T1 C. Joseph 30,575 3691 Active, limited safety zones

limiting tactics452 8.6 mil

9/16 2 T1 C. Joseph 32,260 1685 Hi pressure, grp torching 546 9.2 mil9/17 2 T1 C. Joseph 33,017 757 Crowning, group torching,

take Porcupine fire 9/18611 9.9 mil

9/18 2 T1 C. Joseph 33,564 547 Long range spotting, Branch V = Porcupine fire

648 10.6 mil

9/19 2 T1 C. Joseph 35,016 1452 Limited access, long range spotting, egress threatened Red River+

635 11.4 mil

9/20 3 T1 C. Joseph 37,259 2243

27,002

Active at night, smoke limiting aviation usePorcupine listed 2nd

746 12.3 mil

9/21 4 T1 C. Joseph 38,669 141028,889 1887

Haines 5, limited aviation, Elk City+ threatened

746 13.0 mil

9/22 4 T1 C. Joseph 39,050 38129,343 454

Egress rts compromised on E flank, resources off

730 13.8 mil

9/23 5 T1 C. Joseph 39,280 23030,738 1395

Contingency grp - safety zone, fuels treatment

685 14.2 mil

9/24 5 T1 C. Joseph 41,603 1323 Light showers, mid-range 663 14.9 mil

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Date % Command Acres + Comments Person Cost30,966 228 spotting, 1/5 days infrared

9/25 5 T1 C. Joseph 41,698 9530,966 0

Weather moderating, mid- range spotting

603 15.7 mil

9/26 7 T1 C. Joseph 41,846 14831,581 651

Moderate spread, increasing activity

736 16.6 mil

9/27 9 T1 C. Joseph 41,948 10231,297 716

Haines 5 9/28, ½ mi+ spots, shuttle residents

698 17.3 mil

9/28 10 T1 C. Joseph 42,166 21833,238 941

Short range spotting, Poncin T1 IMT shadowing.

734 18.0 mil

9/29 10 T1 G. Poncin 42,234 6833,248 10

Long Term WFDSS done, MT. portion back to Bitterroot NF

700 19.2 mil

9/30 20 T1 G. Poncin 42,296 6233,440 192

Moderate fire spread, creeping, back haul equip.

700 19.2 mil

10/1 25 T1 G. Poncin 42,376 8033,691 251

4.5 mi line to construct, mop-up, back haul equip.

649 20.7

10/2 25 T1 G. Poncin 42,518 14234,872 1181

Mop-up continues, back haul equipment

616 21.4 mil

10/3 25 T1 G. Poncin 43,040 52234,549 -323

Low fire growth, low potential, back haul equip.

552 22.0 mil

10/4 30 T1 G. Poncin 43,040 034,549 0

Patrol, mop-up and back haul excess equipment

448 22.6 mil

10/5 35 T1 G. Poncin 43,040 034,549 0

Patrol all Divisions, low growth potential, mop-up

410 23.0 mil

10/6 40 T1 G. Poncin 43,348 30837,069 2520


352 23.4 mil

10/7 45 T1 G. Poncin 43,540 19237,069 0


339 23.6 mil

10/8 50 T1 G. Poncin 43,600 6037,131 2


455 23.9 mil

10/10 50 T3 L. Carbone 43,557 0 Internal burning, mop-up, back haul, BAER, rehab.

146-110 24.4 mil


49-39 24.5 mil


21 24.7 mil


18 24.7 mil

10/18 85 T4 J. Anderson 43,557 0 Internal burning, mop-up, back haul, BAER, rehab.

15 2.,7 mil

10/19 90 T4 J. Anderson 43,558 1 $24,741,628 1510/29 10

0T4 J. Anderson 43,621 63 Contained 0 xx

Fire Environment:

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The Grangeville Dispatch Initial Attack Zone had 260+ incidents in 2012. The Dispatch Center brought in four Center Managers and three Assistant Center Managers to assist with the increased work load. On August 28, 2012, a weather system moved through northern Idaho with lightning strikes, starting four incidents including the McGuire Fire. It had been a busy summer and many of the fires had gone 20+ acres before being suppressed. Local resources had just contained the Diamond (25 acres) and the Mallard (50 acres) Fires the day prior to the lightning storm of August 26, 2012.

Lightning detection data from August 26, 2012, indicated seven strikes in the McGuire area around the fire’s point of origin. Several fires were detected from this storm. By 1000 MDT on August 29, 2012, there were four active fires (Churchill, Herman, Bagley and McGuire) identified in addition to the two T3 fires (Sheep, Porcupine) that were on-going suppression activities. In addition, there were currently three complexes (Sheep, Moose and Powell) active on the Forest at this time. At the time the fire started, the Northern Rockies were at Preparedness Level (PL) 3 and the Nation was at PL 3.

Environmental factors and fire behavior experienced throughout the McGuire Fire resulted in high resistance to control and presented management challenges (steep terrain, fuel type-spruce, lack of safety zones, access, etc.) from initial attack through multiple IMT transitions.

Fire behavior on the McGuire Fire from the day of initial attack on August 28 through September 24, 2012, was influenced by heavy fuel loadings, remote access, warm temperatures in the 85 to 90 degree range, low relative humidity, gusty winds from the west/northwest up to about 12 m.p.h., and unstable atmospheric conditions as reflected by the Haines Index level 5 with multiple red flag days (wind and low relative humidity {RH}). These conditions produced a high intensity fire with torching, crowning, and spotting from ½ to one mile. Fire spread is normally to the north, northeast due to the prevailing winds, which is typical of most fires on the Nez Perce-Clearwater NFs, however a change in wind direction pushed the fire to the south, threatening the communities of Dixie, Red River and Comstock. Local firefighters and Agency Administrators with past fire experience in this area reported that they expected the fire to continue spreading to the northeast and not swing to the south, southeast.

Initially the fire grew toward the north, northeast which is normal for this time of year. From August 29 through September 4, 2012, the fire experienced changes in wind direction and grew to the south and southeast. The alignment of the terrain, change in wind direction and low night time RH’s caused the fire to grow approximately 10,000 acres. The Haines Index ranged from levels 3-5.

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From September 15 through September 27, 2012, a high pressure system centered over the fire causing a Haines Index level 5, extreme erratic fire behavior and expansive growth to the north but primarily to the east and south east. After September 26, 2012, more normal weather conditions with cooler temperatures, higher RH, and a more stable air mass settled over the area.

Critical Values at Risk

Values at risk in the fire area as identified by Forest Service, cooperators/partners, and stakeholders included homes and businesses; public and private timber (including active logging operations and plantations); outfitter/guide operations (hunting units); road access for hunting (Darby Road); ranch lands (including infrastructure, e.g. fences and corrals); threatened, endangered and sensitive species and habitat (salmon and steelhead); recreation sites; and public/cooperator/partner relationships. Resource values, such as wildlife habitat, watershed values, aesthetics, etc. were identified by agency personnel. No homes or businesses were destroyed or damaged, but several communities were threatened and required structure protection (sprinklers).

Observation by Objective:The following are key observations and corresponding lessons learned organized by the four objectives of the review.

1. Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires This Past Season

The McGuire Fire burned over a large geographical area. Adjacent to the fire perimeter, there are several private ranches and communities. Direct attack became ineffective due to poor access; complex terrain features; lack of safety zones; and mid-to-long range spotting. Tactics and strategy changed from “full suppression” to point protection of values at risk. Some of the lessons learned were to involve stakeholders early and establish dialogue on values, firefighter exposure, and risk vs. gain and fire strategies. Even with extreme burning conditions and rapid large fire growth, IMT's were able to keep up with local contacts and notifications. Communicating with and gathering local input is essential to success - utilizing the landowners, permittees, and especially local Forest Service personnel knowledge and expertise of the area aided the out-of-area responders in strategies, tactics, values at risk, and community interactions.

Preseason planning is important to exercise the response of all cooperators with their roles and responsibilities of any incident that would occur locally. Ensure that

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firefighters understand the fire behavior (intensity, spotting) and rates of spread to keep from falling behind the planning and execution of the plan. Ensure that every firefighter understands their mission and can articulate their mission to anyone that questions them.

Open communication between the two forests (Bitterroot and Nez Perce-Clearwater) as well as between Regions was displayed on the McGuire Fire. The Forest Supervisor and fire staff from the Forest made contact with their Forest Service partners well before the McGuire Fire even started. They had a fairly busy season to date and requested additional resources for fire management activities and leadership. They also had numerous Line Officers come to the Forest to shadow and train in a highly complex fire unit.

Extreme burning conditions in an unfamiliar remote location made it difficult for out-of-area resources to be comfortable and hit the ground tactically and strategically. It was difficult for the incoming teams to get ahead of the incident at the start of their assignment. It was also easy for teams to underestimate the local political significance of State, fish, and game licensing boards, outfitter/guide associations, and the general hunting and fishing public. It will be important in the future for Forests to get together and discuss area and road closures on adjacent hunting units.

2. Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

The social and political issues on the fire were not controversial for the Forest or the IMTs. Community involvement and relationships were well in place prior to the fire season. Protection of private property and structures were clearly identified as a priority in the objectives for the incident. Most of the employees we talked with felt that they understood the values at risk for the different stakeholders. Values such as structures, infrastructure, recreation (hunting/fishing), plantations, and commercial timber were easily identified and those stakeholders were included in the process early.

The direction of Deputy Chief Hubbard’s letter for the fire season caused some confusion with the public and local communities. They are extremely familiar with historic strategies and tactics within this remote, wilderness rich area. Fire personnel knowing that direct attack in this type of fuel type and terrain was difficult at best, spent days visiting with people in the potentially threatened communities describing best fire management practices.

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There was a considerable amount of time and energy spent between the Forest and IMTs concerning the indirect line/safety zone along the 222 road leading into the community of Dixie. The widened roadway (fire suppression project) would have, when completed given Dixie a measure of protection from not only the McGuire but future fires. The fire suppression project was confused with a fuels/logging operation. The fire suppression project was stopped when the McGuire Fire spotted over the 222 road, but will be invaluable in the future if completed. In contrast, IMTs had over 200 portable pumps, porta-tanks and 125 miles of hose laid out for the protection of values at risk. What type of tactics and strategy can or should be used for the protection (sprinklers, gel, wrapping, retardant, etc.) of values at risk? This is not a local or even a regional issue, but national in scope and should be defined before the next fire season.

The firefighter fatality on the unit was traumatic and heartfelt by leadership and the fire community. Forest personnel are commended for managing their fires successfully in the aftermath of that very tragic event.

3. Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

Several common themes were identified in looking at expanding and enhancing procedures. The Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) process was considered cumbersome with questionable value for the firefighting effort. Some felt it was a valuable tool in the beginning, but lost value as the incident increased in size, intensity and complexity. Specialist input by non-fire personnel can be a barrier on fast moving fires. In some instances, teams and units find themselves behind and playing catch-up on highly complex fires when setting strategy. Password expiration dates can be untimely.

The Unit did unofficially assign a fire management “Liaison Expert” to assist the IMT on traditional strategies and tactics of the area. Out-of-area IMTs and fire resources need a long time commitment of this expert position to assist them to be successful with strategies/tactics on unfamiliar fuel types, longer duration fires, and local peculiarities.

No one works better at sharing fire resources during their respective fire seasons than the Northern Rockies and the Southwest Region. In addition to augmenting fire personnel (suppression, dispatch, leadership, etc.), the Forest also brought in numerous Agency Administrators for shadowing, training, and mentoring opportunities. In addition, Grangeville Dispatch brought in four Center Managers and three Assistant Center Managers to assist. Several Line Officers were brought in to shadow, learn and train in high complexity fires.

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The conversation between adjacent units regarding area and road closures as it pertains to public safety, but more especially recreation (hunting/fishing) should be expanded. Definitive “what if” proposals need to be discussed prior to the fire season but certainly before hunting season(s) so all units speak the same language with the same intent.

Programmatic fire reviews in the present context of “Lessons Learned” for Agency Administrators, IMTs and Fire Managers was viewed as a good tool. This effort is aimed at providing an atmosphere of learning in a very dynamic environment.

National Multi-Agency Coordinating (NMAC) Group’s decision to assign out-of-area IMTs was viewed as a hindrance to the success in managing the McGuire Fire. Pre-established rotations were “changed” and seen as not considering the right team for the right job. It was felt by the Forest that the geographic team might have been better suited to handle the fire due to the rapid rates of spread and the ability of the local team to hit the ground running. In addition, the notification caused some difficulties, fast manipulation and assembly of team rosters and in some cases a delay of team deployments.

Communication with expanded dispatch has to be more than a general message when ordering technical specialists (name suggest-LTAN, etc.), and unfamiliar resources such as ambulances. Descriptions plus a short narrative on “need” is strongly recommended and should be followed by a phone call. This will reduce unnecessary delays in receiving resources (personnel and equipment) and help create more of a team environment.

4. Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

It is the expectation of the Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry and the Director of Fire and Aviation Management that we emphasize the importance of communicating our intent to all of our partners, including Agency Administrators and Incident Commanders. They expect each Region and Forest to become actively engaged with their stakeholders and prepare them to participate in risk-informed decision making meetings to prepare them for the upcoming fire season. Leader’s Intent was stressed very often on the McGuire Fire. Firefighter and public safety was stressed as the primary objective.

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Implement preseason planning to ensure that all cooperators understand their roles and responsibilities for not only evacuations but fire management activities. There was some confusion with the relationship of the Sheriff’s Department (Idaho County) and the Forest Service as it pertained to road closures, road monitoring, etc. The unit(s) should determine clear direction and understanding of their expectations for the fire season. They need to begin communicating with local law enforcement, landowners, and permittees early to develop understanding of the “what ifs” of wildland fire.

Continue partnership development with the local volunteer fire departments, cooperators and partners to include sand table scenarios, simulations and joint exercises to build relationships and establish understanding of capabilities.

Lessons Learned, Observations and Recommendations

National Priority1. Communicate Leaders Intent in delegations and briefings and ensure it is more

focused on objectives and does not include numerous process requirements that cloud the issues and values at risk to be protected. Discussions should occur between leadership and personnel to ensure forest priorities and mission are understood. Ensure that every firefighter understands their mission and can articulate their mission to anyone.

2. On the second day of the McGuire and Bagley fires, a key decision was made by local fire managers. The decision was to disengage from direct attack and initiate actions to protect values at risk (point protection). The early recognition of the need to change strategy increased the probability of success and decreased firefighter exposure.

3. The Tri-Region Agreement between the Northern Rockies, Intermountain, and Pacific Norwest Regions provides for outstanding cooperation, efficiencies, and working relationships for those Forests that border these three Regions.

4. The WFDSS is intended to assist in the strategic decision process, however due to a lack of thorough understanding and familiarity with the system it is considered by many to be cumbersome with questionable value to the firefighting effort. The Forest had developed a decision-making framework that is incorporated into the WFDSS process. Part of this process includes building a Common Operating Picture (COP). This is a visual tool through Google with multiple intelligence layers (fuels, terrain, values at risk, etc.). The decision making process provides Course-of-Action options with supporting information and intelligence for Agency Administrators enabling them to make a more informed decision. This process is similar to the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop decision making process, this is followed by re-evaluation.

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5. Decisions and rational should be well documented by ALL fire personnel. It’s important to capture who, when, where, why and how decisions were made to depict the process and outcome. Clarity of the mission is paramount to a successful outcome. Every firefighter must understand the purpose and importance of their actions to provide an understanding of expectations and risk vs. gain.

6. Effective pre-season communication about risk, values at risk, and firefighter exposure with communities, stakeholders, partners and adjacent units (Bitterroot, Payette NF’s, Regions 4 and 6) was critical to success during the incident. The public, communities, cooperators and partners basically understand fire suppression activities and have a good relationship with the Forest Service. Even with football games being cancelled due to smoke, communities supported the Forest’s fire management activities. The team did receive a letter of Commendation and Appreciation from the Mayor of Elk City, Idaho for personnel who fought the McGuire Fire.

7. Dutch Creek protocols and procedures, approved by National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) have been in place for several years. Point of contact, assessment, stabilization and transportation (ground and/or air) within the proper time frame (situation dependent) of personnel to substantial care is vital. Assigning ground ambulances, Emergency Medical Technicians and paramedics to specific locations of high risk operations is common place. Remote locations and smoky conditions with poor visibility often cause fire personnel to rely on ground support rather than air-ambulances or designated IMT aviation assets.

8. The development of a long term strategy (tactical, resource needs, etc.) of 15-20 days out is a valuable tool for understanding by Line Officers, assigned resources and the public, cooperators and partners. Utilizing technical specialists, such as a Long Term Planner, Fire Behavior Analyst at public meetings to explain and describe topography, fuel characteristics, and fire behavior, etc. created collaboration and understanding between the public and forest.

9. Rapidly escalating incidents and response time for team mobilization require a forward-looking strategy for complexity analysis and team ordering. It is imperative that the incoming Logistics Section Chief coordinate with the existing team to determine resources needed vs. resources on hand, etc. This communication ensures adequate rentals; electronic equipment, etc. will be on site for the incoming resources and IMT when they arrive. Many teams utilize their own equipment and will take it with them when they leave. The potential to have several days of chaos while rented equipment is ordered and installed is likely, unless arrangements are made while there is still time to implement before the exit of the existing team.

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Regional & Local Priority1. The Tri-Region Agreement between the Northern Rockies, Intermountain, and

Pacific Norwest Regions provides for outstanding cooperation, efficiencies, and working relationships for those Forests that border these three Regions.

2. Maintain active relationships with local publics and communities. Consideration, mitigation(s) and actively work with State Licensing Boards (Game and Fish) for outfitter/guides is vital for our partners/cooperators and key stakeholders.

3. Continue to engage and utilize the local knowledge of landowners and permittees when identifying strategies and setting tactics. Roles and responsibilities of all cooperators locally should be clearly identified through pre-season planning, exercises and include the development of Evacuation and Structure Protection Plans.

4. Safety stand-downs at the appropriate time due to increased accidents, injuries, illnesses can be extremely valuable for contractors, partners, and fire resources to stop/think and renew safe practices and risk management analyses. In addition, deciding to not have a night shift due to the numerous aerial hazards and near-misses was a good decision.

5. Communication of Leaders Intent, expectations and definition(s) from the Forest as to what “point protection” is and is not is essential. This is especially meaningful to out-of-area IMTs and resources. Assigning a local fire technical specialist to act as the “Fire Expert Liaison” for a few days after the IMT assignment or transition is important to help the team understand the proposed strategy, reduce tension during the development of effective tactics that have historically been successful with “new” fuel types in the area and provide an understanding and usefulness of the most effective local equipment. The overall intent of a Fire Expert Liaison is to help incoming teams and resources succeed.

6. There were minimal accident/injuries on the fire line; in contrast there were several significant injuries (slips, trips, fall and burns) in camp. It might be beneficial for IMTs to develop the Hazard/Risk modified 215A for the “other” locations and activities on the incident.

7. When ordering technical specialists (name suggest-LTAN, etc.), and unfamiliar resources such as ambulances, descriptions plus a short narrative on “need” is strongly recommended and should be followed by a phone call. This will reduce unnecessary delays in receiving resources (personnel and equipment) and help create more of a team environment.

ATTACHMENTS Progression Map September 1, 2012 Progression Map September 6, 2012

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Progression Map September 29, 2012 Fires within the Region (Map) WFDSS Summary (September 28 – October 2012)

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Fires within the RegionAugust 26, 2012

WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Rationale)

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August 29, 2012 - Day 2 of Fire, Pearson’s T2 IMT Ordered

Weather Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (42-55, 73-88)

Objectives Base all actions on sound risk management principles with the highest priority on

firefighter and public Safety. Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk. Keep fire to the smallest size as practicable. Keep fire from impacting private property within the communities of Dixie and

Orogrande. Keep fire west of the 222 (Red River-Dixie) road.

Course of Action Follow the planned initial response. Appropriate responses for this incident can range from full perimeter control to

point protection, with consideration given to the location of the fire, expected fire behavior, values at risk, and suppression costs.

A Type 2 IMT has been ordered for full perimeter control of the Herman, McGuire, and Bagley Fires. This fire will be managed as a complex, and actions taken on the Herman and Bagley fires will be documented in the course of action for the McGuire fire.

RationaleThe McGuire fire is in a complex along with two other fires; Herman and Bagley. McGuire has been active since it started and is approximately 10,000 acres in size. It has been in a full suppression strategy since it was first detected, but resources were unable to establish an anchor point and engage the fire. In addition, aerial delivery of retardant and/or water drops to support this confinement strategy will be incorporated when deemed effective to do so. The Herman fire is located within the Gospel Hump Wilderness and is approximately 2-4 acres in size. The Bagley fire started near the McGuire fire and made a significant run north and is approximately 5,000 acres in size and is burning towards Red River.

In response to the Regional Forester’s Letter of Intent and Delegation of Authority for the 2012 Fire Season, and in compliance with Deputy Chief, State and Private Forestry Hubbard’s letter, the following are responses to the 10 risk assessment and decision concern questions attached to that letter.Risk Assessment

What are the critical values at risk?

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The values at risk within the McGuire Planning area include: the communities of Dixie and Orogrande; Red River community and Ranger Station; numerous campgrounds; Walker Cabin; lookouts; and critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and trailheads.

What is the chance the critical value(s) will be impacted and if so, what are the consequences?

There is a very high likelihood that the communities of Orogrande and Dixie will be impacted. The consequences of losing these communities to wildfire would be severe both fiscally and politically.

What are the opportunities to manage the fire to meet land management plan objectives?

None. National direction took that decision space away from local fire managers at the beginning of the 2012 fire season. Forest Plan Direction identifies this Fire Management Unit as full suppression or modified suppression. The McGuire fire lies adjacent to, and the Herman fire within, the Gospel Hump Wilderness where the use of wildfire to meet resource objectives is allowed by both the Nez Perce-Clearwater Forest Land and Resource Management Plan and Fire Management Plan.

What are the low probability/high consequence events? The low probability/high consequence events would be if the fire continues to

exhibit extreme fire behavior, and burns down the town of Orogrande, changes direction and burns towards and destroys the community of Dixie.

Who are the stakeholders that should be consulted prior to making a decision? The stakeholders are the nearest private property owners, special-use permittee

outfitters and guides, district and forest personnel working within the area and the general public using the area for recreating, woodcutting, or general travel.

Risk Decision

What alternatives (objectives, strategies, and tactics) are being considered?

Objectives for the incident include: Protect the safety of firefighters and the public. Utilize tactics with the highest probability of success and based on sound risk

management principles. Keep cost commensurate with the values at risk.

Course of Action alternatives include:

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Employ point protection with some limited slowing or delaying actions using helicopters with buckets, aerially delivered retardant.

Direct attack.

What is the exposure to responders for the alternatives being considered? The exposure is highest for the direct attack alternative and lowest for point

protection or modified suppression.

What is the relative probability of success associated with the alternatives being considered?

The probability of success is highest with the direct attack alternative simply because the exposure time of the fire to a rare wind event is the least. Conversely, it has the highest probability for injury due to firefighter exposure to snags, rolling rocks, etc.

Both point protection and modified suppression options would have a lower probability of success because of the increased exposure time of the fire to a rare wind event. The exposure to ground firefighters would be greatly reduced, however.

What alternative provides for the best balance between the desired outcome and exposure to responders?

The best balance would be to utilize full or modified suppression actions.

What are the critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed alternatives and how will they be monitored?

There are really no other viable alternatives, only extensions of the current ones. Factors that could come into play are if the fire threatening the community of Orogrande to the north necessitating point protection for private property and critical infrastructure. The access to the Gospel Hump Wilderness would also need to be closed to the public. Should a wind event materialize with the approaching cold front, the fire growth could occur towards Dixie and or Red River.

The purpose of the Periodic Assessment is to keep track of changing conditions and to determine if the current course of action is still appropriate. If it is not, than a new decision would be needed. Examples of thresholds for the Periodic Assessment might include: (1) when there is a significant increase in fire activity; (2) when there is a weather forecast that might increase the spread and intensity of the wildfire; or (3) when social and/or political issues become critical enough for the agency administrator to reconsider his/her decision.

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September 4, 2012 - Day 7 of Fire, Day 6 of Pearson’s T2 IMT

Weather Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (44-57, 71-90). Outlook- September 12-18, above normal temperatures and below normal

precipitation.Objectives

Base all actions on sound risk management principles with the highest priority on firefighter and public safety.

Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk. Assess Point/Community Protection opportunities for communities of

Dixie/Comstock, Orogrande, Red River, Mallard/Cook Ranches, and Elk City.Course of Action

August 29, 2012 4 Follow the planned initial response.4 Appropriate responses for this incident can range from full perimeter control to


4 A Type 2 IMT has been ordered for full perimeter control of the Herman, McGuire, and Bagley fires. McGuire fire will be managed as a complex, and actions taken on the Herman and Bagley fires will be documented in the course of action for the McGuire fire.

September 4, 20124 To date, efforts to establish anchor point(s) and construct direct fire control line

have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in sight for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, and Red River Valley.

4 Should weather conditions become more favorable, the objective of full suppression or modified suppression would be re-evaluated based on fire behavior and/or time of season.

4 An area closure has been ordered for the McGuire fire area.Rationale

The McGuire fire is in a complex along with two other fires, Herman and Bagley. The McGuire fire and Bagley fire burned together at approximately 1500 on

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September 2, 2012. The IR flight on September 2 showed a perimeter of approximately 12,474 acres. The fire is still showing extreme fire behavior and is actively burning on all sides. This has necessitated the change in tactics from one of full perimeter control to point/community protection. Evacuation requests have been made by the Idaho County Sheriff's Office for the communities of Orogrande and Dixie/Comstock.

In response to the Regional Foresters Letter of Intent and Delegation of Authority for the 2012 Fire Season, and in compliance with Deputy Chief, State and Private Forestry Hubbard’s letter, the following are responses to the 10 risk assessment and decision concern questions attached to that letter.

Risk Assessment

What are the critical values at risk? The values at risk within the McGuire Planning area include: the communities of

Dixie/Comstock, Orogrande; Red River community and Ranger Station; Mallard/Cook Ranches; Elk City; numerous campgrounds; Walker Cabin; lookouts; and critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and trailheads.


There is a very high likelihood that the communities of Orogrande and Dixie/Comstock will be impacted. The consequences of losing these communities to wildfire would be severe both fiscally and politically.


None. National direction requires a suppression response on all fires for the 2012 wildfire season. Forest Plan Direction identifies this Fire Management Unit as full suppression or modified suppression. The McGuire fire lies adjacent to and the Herman fire within the Gospel Hump Wilderness, where the use of wildfire to meet resource objectives is allowed by both the Nez Perce-Clearwater Forest Land and Resource Management Plan and Fire Management Plan.


exhibit extreme fire behavior, and burns through the towns of Dixie/Comstock and Orogrande.

Who are the stakeholders that should be consulted prior to making a decision? The stakeholders are the nearest private property owners, special use permittee


Risk Decision

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Objectives for the incident include: Protect the safety of firefighters and the public. Utilize tactics with the highest probability of success and based on sound risk


Course of Action alternatives include: Employ point protection with some limited slowing or delaying actions using

helicopters with buckets, aerially delivered retardant. Direct attack.


protection or modified suppression.What is the relative probability of success associated with the alternatives being considered?





What are the critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed alternatives and how will they be monitored.

There are really no other viable alternatives, only extensions of the current ones. Factors that could come into play are if the fire threatens the community of Orogrande to the north necessitates point protection for private property and critical infrastructure. The access to the Gospel Hump Wilderness would also need to be closed to the public. Should a wind event materialize with the approaching cold front, the fire growth could occur towards Dixie and or Red River.

The purpose of the Periodic Assessment is to keep track of changing conditions and to determine if the current course of action is still appropriate. If it is not, than a

23 | P a g e


new decision would be needed. Examples of thresholds for the Periodic Assessment might include: (1) when there is a significant increase in fire activity; (2) when there is a weather forecast that might increase the spread and intensity of the wildfire; or (3) when social and/or political issues become critical enough for the agency administrator to reconsider his/her decision.

August 11, 2012 - Day 14 of Fire, Day 13 of Pearson’s T2 IMT

Weather Dry, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (44-57, 71-90). Outlook - September 12-18, above normal temperatures and below normal

precipitation.


firefighter and public safety Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk Assess Point / Community Protection opportunities for communities of

Dixie/Comstock, Orogrande, Red River, Mallard/Cook Ranches, and Elk City

Course of Action August 29, 2012

4 Follow the planned initial response.4 Appropriate responses for this incident can range from full perimeter control to


4 A Type 2 IMT has been ordered for full perimeter control of the Herman, McGuire, and Bagley fires. This fire will be managed as a complex, and actions taken on the Herman and Bagley fires will be documented in the course of action for the McGuire fire.


have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in site for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, and Red River Valley.

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4 Should weather conditions become more favorable, the objective of full suppression or modified suppression would be re-evaluated based on fire behavior and /or time of the season.

4 An area closure has been ordered for the McGuire Fire area. September 11, 2012

4 To date, efforts to establish anchor point(s) and construct direct fire control line have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in site for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, Mallard/Cook Ranches, Red River Valley, and Elk City


4 An area closure has been ordered for the McGuire Fire area.4 An order for an IMT1 was submitted on September 10 to NRCC. A change from

an IMT2 (long) to a IMT1 was decided due to long-term weather forecast, public, etc.

Rationale The McGuire Fire is in a complex along with two other fires, Herman, and Bagley.

The McGuire Fire and Bagley fires burned together at approximately 1500 on September 2, 2012. As of September 11, the fire is estimated to be 28,000 acres. The fire is still showing extreme fire behavior and is actively burning on all sides. This has necessitated the change in tactics from one of full perimeter control to point/community protection. Evacuation Requests have been made by the Idaho County Sheriff's Office for the communities of Orogrande and Dixie/Comstock.

An IMT1 was ordered on September 10 due to a change of operational and public information complexity. To date $6.6 million has been spent on this incident. SCI was used to determine a new cost estimate using 50% of historic fire cost for 40,000 acres. SCI generated a cost of $14.040 million, but due to time of year we are reducing that to $12 million.

In response to the Regional Foresters Letter of Intent and Delegation of Authority for the 2012 Fire Season, and in compliance with Deputy Chief, State and Private Forestry Hubbard’s letter, the following are responses to the 10 risk assessment and decision concern questions attached to that letter.

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Risk Assessment

What are the critical values at risk? The values at risk within the McGuire Planning area include: the communities of

Dixie/Comstock; Orogrande; Red River community and Ranger Station; Mallard/Cook Ranches; Elk City; numerous campgrounds; Walker Cabin; lookouts; and critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and trailheads.


There is a very high likelihood that the communities of Orogrande and Dixie/Comstock will be impacted. The consequences of losing these communities to wildfire would be severe both fiscally and politically.


None. National direction requires a suppression response on all fires for the 2012 wildfire season. Forest Plan Direction identifies this FMU as full suppression or modified suppression. The McGuire fire lies adjacent to and the Herman fire within, the Gospel Hump Wilderness, where the use of wildfire to meet resource objectives is allowed by both the Nez Perce-Clearwater Forest Land and Resource Management Plan and Fire Management Plan


exhibit extreme fire behavior, and burns through the towns of Dixie/Comstock and Orogrande.

Who are the stakeholders that should be consulted prior to making a decision? The stakeholders are the nearest private property owners, special use permittee


Risk Decision


Objectives for the incident include:

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Protect the safety of firefighters and the public. Utilize tactics with the highest probability of success and based on sound risk


Course of Action alternatives include: Employ point protection with some limited slowing or delaying actions using

helicopters with buckets, aerially delivered retardant. Direct attack.


protection or modified suppression.

What is the relative probability of success associated with the alternatives being considered?





What are the critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed alternatives and how will they be monitored.

There are really no other viable alternatives, only extensions of the current ones. Factors that could come into play are if the fire threatening the community of Orogrande to the north necessitating point protection for private property and critical infrastructure. The access to the Gospel Hump Wilderness would also need to be closed to the public. Should a wind event materialize with the approaching cold front, the fire growth could occur towards adjacent communities.

The purpose of the Periodic Assessment is to keep track of changing conditions and to determine if the current course of action is still appropriate. If it is not than a new decision would be needed. Examples of thresholds for the Periodic Assessment

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might include: (1) when there is a significant increase in fire activity; (2) when there is a weather forecast that might increase the spread and intensity of the wildfire; or (3) when social and/or political issues become critical enough for the agency administrator to reconsider his/her decision.

September 16, 2012 - Day 19 of Fire, Day 3 of Joseph’s T1 IMT

Weather Dry, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (41-56, 74-81). Outlook - September 24-30, above normal temperatures and below normal

precipitation.


firefighter and public safety Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk Assess Point / Community Protection opportunities for communities of

Dixie/Comstock, Orogrande, Red River, Mallard/Cook Ranches, and Elk City






have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in site for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to

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serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, and Red River Valley.

4 Should weather conditions become more favorable, the objective of full suppression or modified suppression would be re-evaluated based on fire behavior and/or time of the season.


4 To date, efforts to establish anchor point(s) and construct direct fire control line have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in site for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, Mallard/Cook Ranches, Red River Valley, and Elk City.



an IMT2 (long) to an IMT1 was decided due to long-term weather forecast, public, etc.

September 16, 20124 Estimated costs to date are at $8.6 million. The current IMT1 is projecting that

they are spending $700,000 a day. At this time, it appears that this team will be on this incident for at least a 14-day tour. Cost projections have been revised to $20 million.

Rationale The previous decision and risk assessment are still valid. A new decision is being

made to show an increase of costs from $9 million to $20 million. Estimated cost expenditures to date are at $8.6 million. The current IMT1 is projecting they are spending approximately $700,000 per day. It appears the current IMT 1 will be assigned to this incident for the remainder of their 14 day tour.

September 25, 2012 - Day 28 of Fire, Day 12 of Joseph’s T1 IMT

Note: Fire Behavior and Long Term Assessment are within this WFDSS (09/22/2012)

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Weather Dry, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (39-50, 61-76). Periodic fall showers, lower temperatures, etc.


firefighter and public safety. Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk. Assess point/community protection opportunities for communities of

Dixie/Comstock, Orogrande, Red River, Mallard/Cook Ranches, and Elk City.






have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in site for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, and Red River Valley.

4 Should weather conditions become more favorable, the objective of full suppression or modified suppression would be re-evaluated based on fire behavior and /or time of the season?


4 To date, efforts to establish anchor point(s) and construct direct fire control line have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in sight for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change

30 | P a g e


in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, Mallard/Cook Ranches, Red River Valley, and Elk City.



an IMT2 (long) to an IMT1 was decided due to long-term weather forecast, public, etc.


they are spending $700,000 a day. At this time, it appears that this team will be on this incident for at least a 14-day tour. Cost projections have been revised to $20 million.

September 25, 20124 The course of action is point protection for all values at risk with modified

suppression (partial perimeter control). The cost has been updated to $20 million. The organizational needs assessment indicates a Type 1 IMT will be needed to implement the course of action due to complexity.

General Strategies and Tactics for the Protection of Values The WFDSS decision developed by the Nez Perce Forest provides direction to the

incident management team to protect communities while providing for firefighter and public safety. Full perimeter containment of the fire is not required, nor considered achievable. Partial perimeter containment is desired in areas that provide additional protection for communities. However for containment lines to be effective in the subalpine fir/lodge pole pine and mixed conifer (grand fir/Douglas-fir/spruce) vegetation, they should be as close to the fire edge as possible and supported by hose lays or other water handling equipment. Indirect fire lines have not proved to be effective in those fuel/vegetation types this year. When considering contingency lines well ahead of the fire perimeter, it is best to use roads. When using roads as contingency lines, snagging and mastication of shrubs and small trees adjacent to the road are being conducted to improve safe access/egress. Fire is spreading by prolific torching and spotting. Spotting distances have been well over ½ mile.

Priorities for Protection – Based on Values and Imminence of Fire Threat

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Dixie - 188 structures - surrounding fuel has been treated; structures are defensible; pumps and sprinklers deployed; time required to start pumps = 45 minutes. If fire spreads to the area, engines could remain nearby (at Dixie Work Station airstrip) and suppress fire within the community after high intensity fire subsides.

Comstock - 93 structures - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated/little opportunity for additional fuel treatment due to the amount of time it would take to treat fuel to a level that would make a difference if fire spread to the area; some structures are defensible/many structures are not defensible; pumps and sprinklers deployed; time required to start pumps=90 minutes; if fire spreads to the area, engines could remain nearby (at Dixie airstrip or Dixie Work Station airstrip) and suppress fire within the community after high intensity subsides. Note: road corridor up to Comstock from Dixie has had trees thinned and slash removed (fire should be low intensity and short duration).

Mallard Ranch - 69 structures - previous fire (Grouse Fire 2011) is immediately to the west of Mallard Ranch and provides a break in fuel which would reduce fire intensity if the fire spread to Mallard Ranch. Structures are defensible and engines could remain in the area as the fire passes through. Pumps and sprinklers have been deployed and fuel treatment is occurring; fuel treatments will continue; emphasizing reduction of fuel immediately adjacent to structures; time required to start pumps=45 minutes.

Cook Ranch - 10 structures - Structures are defensible; pumps and sprinklers have been deployed (by owner). No additional needs (no engine access).

Orogrande - 66 structures - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated/little opportunity for additional fuel treatment due to the amount of time it would take to treat fuel to a level that would make a difference if fire spread to the area; some structures are defensible/some structures are not defensible; pumps and sprinklers deployed; time required to start pumps=90 minutes. If fire spreads to the area, engines could remain nearby (at Orogrande airstrip or farther north out of the path of fire spread) and suppress fire within the community after high intensity subsides.

Gnome Mine - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated/little opportunity for additional fuel treatment due to the amount of time it would take to treat fuel to a level that would make a difference if fire spread to the area.

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Red River Ranger Station - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated/little opportunity for additional fuel treatment due to the amount of time it would take to treat fuel to a level that would make a difference if fire spread to the area; some structures are defensible/some structures are not defensible; pumps and sprinklers deployed; time required to start pumps = 30 minutes.

Red River Meadows - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated; some structures are defensible/some structures are not defensible; additional fuel treatment work could be beneficial; one-way road access/egress; engines could stay and defend.

Red River Hot Springs - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated; some structures are defensible/some structures are not defensible.

Dixie Guard Station - 17 structures - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated; structures are defensible.

White Water Ranch - some of the surrounding fuel has been treated; structures are defensible.

Jim Moore Ranch - ongoing structure assessment including ability to land boat at ranch site; access is via jet boat or four mile foot trail.

Perimeter containment priorities 1. Continue to hold and improve direct fire line on the southeast portion of the fire

perimeter (Divisions Z and Y).2. Continue to hold, improve and extend the direct fire line which runs northwest from

the 222 road in Division D.3. Containment opportunities in Division E: consider using the 1194 Road south from

its junction with the 222 road past its intersection with the 1190 road; then follow the 1192 road to its end along Grouse Creek.

4. Containment opportunities in Divisions X and W: consider using the 9505 road to Sinker Mountain. If fire behavior allows, continue along the 9505 (nagging and masticating) to its end in section 28. Use dozers and other equipment to contain fire spread south of the 9505 and support with hose lays.

5. Other portions of fire perimeter would likely not have perimeter containment actions conducted due to scarcity of firefighting resources, lateness of fire season, and relatively low values which could be damaged by fire spread.

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Note: above priorities should be reviewed and adjusted if necessary based on fire spread and predicted fire spread. Wind rose information indicates most common wind directions for this time of year are: west, southwest, and then northwest (representing about 60% of wind directions during September and October). South and southwesterly winds (combined) occur less than 10% of the time during September and October. See wind rose in Long-Term Assessment.

Rationale The strategy on the McGuire Fire has been to protect the values at risk in the Dixie,

Comstock, Mallard Ranch, Cook Ranch, Red River, Elk City, Orogrande areas by implementing fuel mitigation/reduction measures, providing structure protection to keep any fire from impacting or damaging structures in those areas, and to use a combination of direct and indirect attack around the perimeter of the fire where those tactics would be the most effective and provide for the safety of the firefighting resource and protection of the public. The objective of employing these strategies and tactics was to meet incident objectives designed to keep costs commensurate with the values that need protecting.

One of the tactics that was being utilized was to provide for community protection to Dixie and Comstock areas by performing fuel mitigation along the 222 Road, completing a 150 foot wide fuel break along the east side of the road by thinning trees to reduce fire intensity and spread. The objective of this tactic was to protect the Dixie/Comstock values at risk and to provide for safe ingress/egress of the firefighting resources and residents in the Dixie/Comstock area if the fire were to threaten Road 222, Dixie, and Comstock.

Extreme smoke conditions since September 20th and mechanical/operational problems with the infrared aircraft have prevented adequate intelligence on fire spread and location. On September 24 an infrared flight was conducted showing additional perimeter expansion south, east and west of the Sinker Mountain area. The fire is now positioned in Jack Creek with a higher probability of threatening the Mallard and Cook Ranches and spreading north to the head of Jack Creek. The fire also shows additional spread to the West in the head of Rhett Creek that has a high potential of spreading up-canyon and up-slope to Dixie Summit. The fire in Rhett Creek is also in a position, with a high probability under the forecasted weather conditions, to threaten the values at risk in the Dixie/Comstock area.

Because of this changed condition in the fire situation, it is felt that a significant change in strategy and tactics is warranted. Therefore, in order to meet the most important incident objective of providing for firefighter and public safety, the heavy equipment community protection fuel mitigation actions being conducted along the 222 road are being suspended due to the heightened threat to the safety of the

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firefighting personnel in that area with the fire located now below in Rhett Creek. The emphasis is being changed to direct protection to all values at risk that might be threatened under by the updated fire perimeter intelligence. The direct community protection tactics will include some minor fuel mitigation around some of the values at risk, firefighter presence within those areas of highest value to suppress spot fires in areas that are safe to do so, and start sprinkler systems to protect structures when necessary.

During the time lapse between the infrared flight on September 20 and the most recent flight on September 24, it is interesting to note that the fire spread during this time was under very stable, smoky conditions. In most cases a heavy smoke cap usually reduces fire intensities and spread but in this case, it is felt that due to the record ERC’s and predominance of dead/dying lodge pole pine with the sub-alpine fir component, the smoky conditions did not hamper fire spread to the extent that was predicted. The long-range outlook shows another strong high pressure due over the area in the next week proceeded by little or no moisture from the current weather system that will be exiting the area by September 26. This scenario will increase fire spread and intensities in much of the uncontained perimeter on the McGuire fire. All these changed and impending conditions require this significant change in strategy and tactics. As the fire progresses, the current road and area closures may need to be revised. All these changed and impending conditions require this significant change in strategy and tactics. As the fire progresses, the current road and area closures may need to be revised.

October 2, 2012 - Day 35 of Fire, Day 4 of Poncin’s T1 IMT

Weather Mostly clear, normal temps (17-27, 42-60). Start of a series of cold fronts arriving in this portion of Idaho.


firefighter and public safety. Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk. Assess Point / Community Protection opportunities for communities of



4 Follow the planned initial response.

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4 Appropriate responses for this incident can range from full perimeter control to point protection, with consideration given to the location of the fire, expected fire behavior, values at risk, and suppression costs.



have been largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in site for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, and Red River Valley. Should weather conditions become more favorable, the objective of full suppression or modified suppression would be re-evaluated based on fire behavior and/or time of season.



4 Should weather conditions become more favorable, the objective of full suppression or modified suppression would be re-evaluated based on fire behavior and/or time of season?

4 An area closure has been ordered for the McGuire fire area.4 An order for an IMT1 was submitted on September 10 to NRCC. A change from

an IMT2 (long) to a IMT1 was decided due to long-term weather forecast, public, etc.


they are spending $700,000 a day. At this time it appears that this team will be

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on this incident for at least a 14-day tour. Cost projections have been revised to $20 million.



October 2, 20124 Estimated cost based on ~$400,000 to $500,000 daily operating costs for IMT1.

The IMT1 is currently "right sizing" fire resources and equipment that should further reduce the daily costs.

Rationale Estimated costs have been increased from $20 million to $27 million due to

anticipated IMT costs, abnormally dry fuels and no precipitation in the 10-day forecast. The current course of action and objectives are still valid.

The strategy on the McGuire fire has been to protect the values at risk in the Dixie, Comstock, Mallard Ranch, Cook Ranch, Red River, Elk City, Orogrande areas by implementing fuel mitigation/reduction measures, providing structure protection to keep any fire from impacting or damaging structures in those areas, and to use a combination of direct and indirect attack around the perimeter of the fire where those tactics would be the most effective and provide for the safety of the firefighting resource and protection of the public. The objective of employing these strategies and tactics was to meet incident objectives designed to keep costs commensurate with the values that need protecting.

October 10, 2012 - Day 35 of Fire

Weather Dry, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (35-47, 55-70). Outlook for Wednesday October 17 through October 23 calls for near normal

temperatures and precipitation.


firefighter and public safety. Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk. Assess point community protection opportunities for communities of


37 | P a g e



4 Follow the planned initial response.4 Appropriate responses for this incident can range from full perimeter control to point

protection, with consideration given to the location of the fire, expected fire behavior, values at risk, and suppression costs.


September 4, 20124 To date, efforts to establish anchor point(s) and construct direct fire control line have been

largely unsuccessful due to limited access, lack of safety zones, extreme fire behavior in dead/dry fuels, and hot/dry weather with gusty winds. No weather relief is in site for the next 6-10 days. This necessitates the change in primary objective of full perimeter control to one of community and point protection of values. The IMT is reevaluating and has identified several MAP's to serve as trigger points for evacuation plans for the communities of Orogrande, Dixie/Comstock, and Red River Valley. Should weather conditions become more favorable, the objective of full suppression or modified suppression would be re-evaluated based on fire behavior and /or time of the season?

4 An area closure has been ordered for the McGuire fire area. September 11, 2012



4 An area closure has been ordered for the McGuire Fire area.4 An order for an IMT1 was submitted on 9/10 to NRCC. A change from an IMT2 (long) to a

IMT1 was decided due to long-term weather forecast, public, etc. September 16, 2012

4 Estimated costs to date are at $8.6 million. The current IMT1 is projecting that they are spending $700,000 a day. At this time it appears that this team will be on this incident for at least a 14-day tour. Cost projections have been revised to $20 million.

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October 2, 20124 Estimated cost based on ~$400,000 to $500,000 daily operating costs for IMT1.

The IMT1 is currently "right sizing" fire resources and equipment that should further reduce the daily costs.

October 10, 2012, Day 1 of Carbone’s T3 IMO A Type 3 IMT will assume command of the McGuire fire at 1800 PST on October 9.

Potential for season ending precipitation within the next 7-10 days.Rationale

A Type 3 IMT will be assuming command of the McGuire Fire at 1800 October 9. The Porcupine will also be returned to the local District at this time. It is expected that significant weather relief will affect the fire area within the next 7-10 days. The main focus of the management of this fire will be rehabilitating ground disturbed by fire suppression efforts.

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· web view8,302 600 var pvt property at risk 367 1.5 mil 9/2 5 t2 s. pearson 10,002 1700 evac...

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