CASE TITLE: Domingo v. RayalaDATE: February 18, 2008PONENTE: Nachura, J. DIGEST BY: John Michael Gabriel N. Vida

SUMMARY: Domingo, then a stenographic reporter in the NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual harassment against Chairman Rayala of the NLRC.

The SC first cited the application of the three-fold liability rule in the law of public officers, which states that wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can therefore proceed independently of the others. In the case of sexual harassment, the same applies with full force.

It is true that Section 3, RA 7877, calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. All of the acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

DOCTRINE: Three-fold liability rule: wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can therefore proceed independently of the others.

FACTS: Ma. Lourdes Domingo, previously a Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual harassment against NLRC Chairman Rogelio Rayala with the DOLE. According to Domingos affidavit, Rayala made several unwanted sexual advances to her person, such as suddenly massaging her while she was performing her duties as stenographer to Rayala. The advances reached to a point where she was molested by Rayala, leading to her filing for a leave of absence and request for immediate transfer, and her subsequent filing of a complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, on the basis of the IRRs of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law). Upon receipt of the complaint, the Office of the President ordered then-DOLE Secretary Laguesma to form a Committee on Decorum and Investigation in accordance with RA 7877. Said Committee heard the parties and received evidence, and on March 2000, the Committee submitted its report, finding Rayala guilty of the offense charged. The penalty was, however, erroneously held to be only for suspension for 6 months. Secretary Laguesma, however, recommended that the penalty be suspension for 6 months and 1 day, in accordance with RA 7877. The Office of the President issued Administrative Order 119, which stated that it recommends the dismissal of Rayala from the service due to the aggravating circumstance that Rayala took advantage of his position of the superior of Domingo. Furthermore, Rayala occupied the highest position in the NLRC, hence it was incumbent upon respondent to set an example to the others as to how they should conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation. Rayala filed an MR with the OP, which was denied. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, however the same was dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. Another MR was filed, which was resolved by the Supreme Court in favor of Rayala, and referred the same to the CA. CA: There was sufficient evidence on record to create a moral certainty that Rayala was indeed guilty of sexual harassment. The CA also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper, pointing out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct, a violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). CA initially affirmed the penalty of dismissal but later modified it into the penalty of suspension from the service for 1 year. All three parties (Domingo, the OP, and Rayala all filed Petitions for Review: DOMINGO: The power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OPs decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.

OP: Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim. Also, although AO 250 provides only a 1-year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. Even though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law, which provides that disgraceful and immoral conduct constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.

RAYALA: Citing Aquino v. Acosta, for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee. Domingo failed to allege and establish that any sexual favor, demand or request was made for her continued employment or promotion.

ISSUES: 1. WON Rayala committed acts that constitute sexual harassment.2. WON dismissal is the proper penalty for Rayalas offense.

HELD: 1. YES. 2. NO. The maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for 1 year.

RATIO: 1. The SC first cited the application of the three-fold liability rule in the law of public officers, which states that wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can therefore proceed independently of the others. In the case of sexual harassment, the same applies with full force.

RA 7877 defines work-related sexual harassment as:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

RA 7877 also provides for the criminal and civil aspect (Section 7 in relation to Section 6), as well as the administrative aspect (Section 4, in relation to Section 3) of the case for the unlawful act of sexual harassment. Therefore, Rayalas culpability can be determined through different aspects, and he can therefore be charged administratively, separate from the other actions that may be filed against him.

Nevertheless, even if Section 3 of RA 7877s standards were applied, Rayala may still be held administratively liable. While the provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor", it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Furthermore, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. The acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

2. Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 52 A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.

In this case, it is the OP, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the OP found that Rayala was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the OP did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. The imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was wrong for the OP to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, since it can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

And even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance and where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.